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mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

PATCH Superseded Mike Rapoport 2 participants 13 messages Dec 1, 2020

Subsystems (20)
Memory management x86 VFS Kselftest +16 more subsystems

v13 of 20 Superseded Latest is v20 →

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Mike Rapoport

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#0 lore raw

v13 cover mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Hi,

@Andrew, this is based on v5.10-rc2-mmotm-2020-11-07-21-40, I can rebase on current mmotm if you prefer.

This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.

The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm.

Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.

Additionally, in the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.

For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git

that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification.

Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks.

The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future.

To limit fragmentation of the direct map to splitting only PUD-size pages, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor that is used as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas.

As the memory allocated by secretmem becomes unmovable, we use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages.

v13:
* Added Reviewed-by, thanks Catalin and David
* s/mod_node_page_state/mod_lruvec_page_state/ as Shakeel suggested

v12: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Add detection of whether set_direct_map has actual effect on arm64 and bail out of CMA allocation for secretmem and the memfd_secret() syscall if pages would not be removed from the direct map

v11: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Drop support for uncached mappings

v10: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Drop changes to arm64 compatibility layer
* Add Roman's Ack for memcg accounting

v9: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Fix build with and without CONFIG_MEMCG
* Update memcg accounting to avoid copying memcg_data, per Roman comments
* Fix issues in secretmem_fault(), thanks Matthew
* Do not wire up syscall in arm64 compatibility layer

Older history:
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]

Mike Rapoport (10):
mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages
set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
secretmem: add memcg accounting
PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant
secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)

 arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild             |   1 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h       |   6 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h       |  17 +
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h      |   1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c         |   1 +
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c                       |   6 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c                  |  23 +-
 arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h       |   4 +-
 arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h           |   1 +
 arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c                  |   8 +-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                          |   2 +-
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl    |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl    |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h         |   4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c              |   8 +-
 fs/dax.c                                  |  11 +-
 include/linux/pgtable.h                   |   3 +
 include/linux/secretmem.h                 |  30 ++
 include/linux/set_memory.h                |  16 +-
 include/linux/syscalls.h                  |   1 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h         |   6 +-
 include/uapi/linux/magic.h                |   1 +
 kernel/power/hibernate.c                  |   5 +-
 kernel/power/snapshot.c                   |   4 +-
 kernel/sys_ni.c                           |   2 +
 mm/Kconfig                                |   5 +
 mm/Makefile                               |   1 +
 mm/filemap.c                              |   3 +-
 mm/gup.c                                  |  10 +
 mm/internal.h                             |   3 +
 mm/mmap.c                                 |   5 +-
 mm/secretmem.c                            | 439 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/vmalloc.c                              |   5 +-
 scripts/checksyscalls.sh                  |   4 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore     |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile       |   3 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 298 +++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests    |  17 +
 38 files changed, 906 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h
 create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c

base-commit: 9f8ce377d420db12b19d6a4f636fecbd88a725a5

Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v13 1/10 mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other cases as well.

Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively.

---
 fs/dax.c                | 11 ++++-------
 include/linux/pgtable.h |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/dax.c +4 -7
index 26d5dcd2d69e..0f109eb16196 100644
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ static inline unsigned int pe_order(enum page_entry_size pe_size)
 #define PG_PMD_COLOUR	((PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1)
 #define PG_PMD_NR	(PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT)
 
-/* The order of a PMD entry */
-#define PMD_ORDER	(PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
-
 static wait_queue_head_t wait_table[DAX_WAIT_TABLE_ENTRIES];
 
 static int __init init_dax_wait_table(void)
@@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ static bool dax_is_locked(void *entry)
 static unsigned int dax_entry_order(void *entry)
 {
 	if (xa_to_value(entry) & DAX_PMD)
-		return PMD_ORDER;
+		return PMD_PAGE_ORDER;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1470,7 +1467,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp,
 {
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
 	struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
-	XA_STATE_ORDER(xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff, PMD_ORDER);
+	XA_STATE_ORDER(xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 	unsigned long pmd_addr = vmf->address & PMD_MASK;
 	bool write = vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 	bool sync;
@@ -1529,7 +1526,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp,
 	 * entry is already in the array, for instance), it will return
 	 * VM_FAULT_FALLBACK.
 	 */
-	entry = grab_mapping_entry(&xas, mapping, PMD_ORDER);
+	entry = grab_mapping_entry(&xas, mapping, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 	if (xa_is_internal(entry)) {
 		result = xa_to_internal(entry);
 		goto fallback;
@@ -1695,7 +1692,7 @@ dax_insert_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, unsigned int order)
 	if (order == 0)
 		ret = vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite(vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn);
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD
-	else if (order == PMD_ORDER)
+	else if (order == PMD_PAGE_ORDER)
 		ret = vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(vmf, pfn, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
 #endif
 	else
include/linux/pgtable.h +3 -0
index 71125a4676c4..7f718b8dc789 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
 #define USER_PGTABLES_CEILING	0UL
 #endif
 
+/* Number of base pages in a second level leaf page */
+#define PMD_PAGE_ORDER	(PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+
 /*
  * A page table page can be thought of an array like this: pXd_t[PTRS_PER_PxD]
  *
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH v13 2/10 mmap: make mlock_future_check() global

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation.

---
 mm/internal.h | 3 +++
 mm/mmap.c     | 5 ++---
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/internal.h +3 -0
index c43ccdddb0f6..ae146a260b14 100644
@@ -348,6 +348,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 extern void mlock_vma_page(struct page *page);
 extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page(struct page *page);
 
+extern int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,
+			      unsigned long len);
+
 /*
  * Clear the page's PageMlocked().  This can be useful in a situation where
  * we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g.,
mm/mmap.c +2 -3
index 61f72b09d990..c481f088bd50 100644
@@ -1348,9 +1348,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)
 	return hint;
 }
 
-static inline int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm,
-				     unsigned long flags,
-				     unsigned long len)
+int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,
+		       unsigned long len)
 {
 	unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH v13 3/10 set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

The underlying implementations of set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() allow updating multiple contiguous pages at once.

Add numpages parameter to set_direct_map_*_noflush() to expose this ability with these APIs.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h |  4 ++--
 arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c            | 10 ++++++----
 arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h |  4 ++--
 arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c            |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h   |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c        |  8 ++++----
 include/linux/set_memory.h          |  4 ++--
 kernel/power/snapshot.c             |  4 ++--
 mm/vmalloc.c                        |  5 +++--
 9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +2 -2
index 45217f21f1fe..d3598419a284 100644
@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void)
 
 int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable);
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page);
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page);
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
 bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
 
 #include <asm-generic/cacheflush.h>
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +6 -4
index 92eccaf595c8..b53ef37bf95a 100644
@@ -148,34 +148,36 @@ int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable)
 					__pgprot(PTE_VALID));
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	struct page_change_data data = {
 		.set_mask = __pgprot(0),
 		.clear_mask = __pgprot(PTE_VALID),
 	};
+	unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 
 	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
 		return 0;
 
 	return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
 				   (unsigned long)page_address(page),
-				   PAGE_SIZE, change_page_range, &data);
+				   size, change_page_range, &data);
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	struct page_change_data data = {
 		.set_mask = __pgprot(PTE_VALID | PTE_WRITE),
 		.clear_mask = __pgprot(PTE_RDONLY),
 	};
+	unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 
 	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
 		return 0;
 
 	return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
 				   (unsigned long)page_address(page),
-				   PAGE_SIZE, change_page_range, &data);
+				   size, change_page_range, &data);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h +2 -2
index d690b08dff2a..92b9bb26bf5e 100644
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ static inline int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
 static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page);
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page);
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
 bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c +4 -4
index 87ba5a68bbb8..0454f2d052c4 100644
@@ -150,11 +150,11 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 	return __set_memory(addr, numpages, __pgprot(0), __pgprot(_PAGE_EXEC));
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	int ret;
 	unsigned long start = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
-	unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE;
+	unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 	struct pageattr_masks masks = {
 		.set_mask = __pgprot(0),
 		.clear_mask = __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT)
@@ -167,11 +167,11 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	int ret;
 	unsigned long start = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
-	unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE;
+	unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 	struct pageattr_masks masks = {
 		.set_mask = PAGE_KERNEL,
 		.clear_mask = __pgprot(0)
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +2 -2
index 4352f08bfbb5..6224cb291f6c 100644
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ int set_pages_wb(struct page *page, int numpages);
 int set_pages_ro(struct page *page, int numpages);
 int set_pages_rw(struct page *page, int numpages);
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page);
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page);
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
 bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
 
 extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +4 -4
index 16f878c26667..d157fd617c99 100644
@@ -2184,14 +2184,14 @@ static int __set_pages_np(struct page *page, int numpages)
 	return __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 0);
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
-	return __set_pages_np(page, 1);
+	return __set_pages_np(page, numpages);
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
-	return __set_pages_p(page, 1);
+	return __set_pages_p(page, numpages);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
include/linux/set_memory.h +2 -2
index fe1aa4e54680..c650f82db813 100644
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
-static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)
+static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page)
+static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
kernel/power/snapshot.c +2 -2
index 069576704c57..d40bb6666735 100644
@@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ static inline void hibernate_map_page(struct page *page, int enable)
 		 * changes and this will no longer be the case.
 		 */
 		if (enable)
-			ret = set_direct_map_default_noflush(page);
+			ret = set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, 1);
 		else
-			ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page);
+			ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1);
 
 		if (ret) {
 			pr_warn_once("Failed to remap page\n");
mm/vmalloc.c +3 -2
index d7075ad340aa..7e903524e002 100644
@@ -2179,13 +2179,14 @@ struct vm_struct *remove_vm_area(const void *addr)
 }
 
 static inline void set_area_direct_map(const struct vm_struct *area,
-				       int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page))
+				       int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page,
+							     int numpages))
 {
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < area->nr_pages; i++)
 		if (page_address(area->pages[i]))
-			set_direct_map(area->pages[i]);
+			set_direct_map(area->pages[i], 1);
 }
 
 /* Handle removing and resetting vm mappings related to the vm_struct. */
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH v13 4/10 set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

On arm64, set_direct_map_*() functions may return 0 without actually changing the linear map. This behaviour can be controlled using kernel parameters, so we need a way to determine at runtime whether calls to set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() have any effect.

Extend set_memory API with can_set_direct_map() function that allows checking if calling set_direct_map_*() will actually change the page table, replace several occurrences of open coded checks in arm64 with the new function and provide a generic stub for architectures that always modify page tables upon calls to set_direct_map APIs.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild       |  1 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h |  6 ------
 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c   |  1 +
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c                 |  6 +++---
 arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c            | 13 +++++++++----
 include/linux/set_memory.h          | 12 ++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild +0 -1
index ff9cbb631212..4306136ef329 100644
@@ -4,5 +4,4 @@ generic-y += local64.h
 generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
 generic-y += qrwlock.h
 generic-y += qspinlock.h
-generic-y += set_memory.h
 generic-y += user.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +0 -6
index d3598419a284..b1bdf83a73db 100644
@@ -136,12 +136,6 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void)
 	dsb(ish);
 }
 
-int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable);
-
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
-bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
-
 #include <asm-generic/cacheflush.h>
 
 #endif /* __ASM_CACHEFLUSH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h new file +17 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ecb6b0f449ab
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+
+#ifndef _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H
+#define _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H
+
+#include <asm-generic/set_memory.h>
+
+bool can_set_direct_map(void);
+#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map
+
+int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable);
+
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
+bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
+
+#endif /* _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c +1 -0
index a0b144cfaea7..0cbc50c4fa5a 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/page-flags.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +3 -3
index 86be6d1a78ab..aa5ec08cb902 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
 
 #include <asm/barrier.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
@@ -477,7 +478,7 @@ static void __init map_mem(pgd_t *pgdp)
 	int flags = 0;
 	u64 i;
 
-	if (rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled())
+	if (can_set_direct_map())
 		flags = NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS;
 
 	/*
@@ -1453,8 +1454,7 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,
 	 * KFENCE requires linear map to be mapped at page granularity, so that
 	 * it is possible to protect/unprotect single pages in the KFENCE pool.
 	 */
-	if (rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled() ||
-	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE))
+	if (can_set_direct_map() || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE))
 		flags = NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS;
 
 	__create_pgd_mapping(swapper_pg_dir, start, __phys_to_virt(start),
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +9 -4
index b53ef37bf95a..d505172265b0 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ struct page_change_data {
 
 bool rodata_full __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED);
 
+bool can_set_direct_map(void)
+{
+	return rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled();
+}
+
 static int change_page_range(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, void *data)
 {
 	struct page_change_data *cdata = data;
@@ -156,7 +161,7 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 	};
 	unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 
-	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
+	if (!can_set_direct_map())
 		return 0;
 
 	return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
@@ -172,7 +177,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 	};
 	unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 
-	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
+	if (!can_set_direct_map())
 		return 0;
 
 	return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
@@ -183,7 +188,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
 void __kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable)
 {
-	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
+	if (!can_set_direct_map())
 		return;
 
 	set_memory_valid((unsigned long)page_address(page), numpages, enable);
@@ -208,7 +213,7 @@ bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page)
 	pte_t *ptep;
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
 
-	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
+	if (!can_set_direct_map())
 		return true;
 
 	pgdp = pgd_offset_k(addr);
include/linux/set_memory.h +12 -0
index c650f82db813..7b4b6626032d 100644
@@ -28,7 +28,19 @@ static inline bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page)
 {
 	return true;
 }
+#else /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */
+/*
+ * Some architectures, e.g. ARM64 can disable direct map modifications at
+ * boot time. Let them overrive this query.
+ */
+#ifndef can_set_direct_map
+static inline bool can_set_direct_map(void)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map
 #endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */
 
 #ifndef set_mce_nospec
 static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH v13 5/10 mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.

The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the owning mm.

The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not accessible using direct/linear map addresses.

Functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area.

A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed.

The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted):

	fd = memfd_secret(0);
	ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE);
	ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig           |   2 +-
 include/linux/secretmem.h  |  24 ++++
 include/uapi/linux/magic.h |   1 +
 kernel/sys_ni.c            |   2 +
 mm/Kconfig                 |   3 +
 mm/Makefile                |   1 +
 mm/gup.c                   |  10 ++
 mm/secretmem.c             | 273 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 8 files changed, 315 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h
 create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -1
index 34d5fb82f674..7d781fea79c2 100644
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ config FORCE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
 	 in order to test the non static function tracing in the
 	 generic code, as other architectures still use it. But we
 	 only need to keep it around for x86_64. No need to keep it
-	 for x86_32. For x86_32, force DYNAMIC_FTRACE. 
+	 for x86_32. For x86_32, force DYNAMIC_FTRACE.
 #
 # Arch settings
 #
include/linux/secretmem.h new file +24 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..70e7db9f94fe
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+#ifndef _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H
+#define _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECRETMEM
+
+bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page);
+
+#else
+
+static inline bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
include/uapi/linux/magic.h +1 -0
index f3956fc11de6..35687dcb1a42 100644
@@ -97,5 +97,6 @@
 #define DEVMEM_MAGIC		0x454d444d	/* "DMEM" */
 #define Z3FOLD_MAGIC		0x33
 #define PPC_CMM_MAGIC		0xc7571590
+#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC		0x5345434d	/* "SECM" */
 
 #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */
kernel/sys_ni.c +2 -0
index 2dd6cbb8cabc..805fd7a668be 100644
@@ -353,6 +353,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect);
 COND_SYSCALL(pkey_alloc);
 COND_SYSCALL(pkey_free);
 
+/* memfd_secret */
+COND_SYSCALL(memfd_secret);
 
 /*
  * Architecture specific weak syscall entries.
mm/Kconfig +3 -0
index c89c5444924b..d8d170fa5210 100644
@@ -884,4 +884,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_HUGEPD
 config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS
         bool
 
+config SECRETMEM
+	def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED
+
 endmenu
mm/Makefile +1 -0
index 6eeb4b29efb8..dfda14c48a75 100644
@@ -121,3 +121,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o
mm/gup.c +10 -0
index 5ec98de1e5de..71164fa83114 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/rmap.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/swapops.h>
+#include <linux/secretmem.h>
 
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
@@ -793,6 +794,9 @@ struct page *follow_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
 	struct follow_page_context ctx = { NULL };
 	struct page *page;
 
+	if (vma_is_secretmem(vma))
+		return NULL;
+
 	page = follow_page_mask(vma, address, foll_flags, &ctx);
 	if (ctx.pgmap)
 		put_dev_pagemap(ctx.pgmap);
@@ -923,6 +927,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)
 	if (gup_flags & FOLL_ANON && !vma_is_anonymous(vma))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	if (vma_is_secretmem(vma))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
 	if (write) {
 		if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
 			if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
@@ -2196,6 +2203,9 @@ static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
 		VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte)));
 		page = pte_page(pte);
 
+		if (page_is_secretmem(page))
+			goto pte_unmap;
+
 		head = try_grab_compound_head(page, 1, flags);
 		if (!head)
 			goto pte_unmap;
mm/secretmem.c new file +273 -0

273 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH v13 6/10 secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings.

Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with PMD-size pages.

As pages allocated by secretmem become unmovable, use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages.

The CMA area used by secretmem is controlled by the "secretmem=" kernel parameter. This allows explicit control over the memory available for secretmem and provides upper hard limit for secretmem consumption.

---
 mm/Kconfig     |   2 +
 mm/secretmem.c | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
mm/Kconfig +2 -0
index d8d170fa5210..e0e789398421 100644
@@ -886,5 +886,7 @@ config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS
 
 config SECRETMEM
 	def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED
+	select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR
+	select CMA
 
 endmenu
mm/secretmem.c +133 -19

247 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH v13 7/10 secretmem: add memcg accounting

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Account memory consumed by secretmem to memcg. The accounting is updated when the memory is actually allocated and freed.

---
 mm/filemap.c   |  3 ++-
 mm/secretmem.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/filemap.c +2 -1
index 249cf489f5df..cf7f1dc9f4b8 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include <linux/psi.h>
 #include <linux/ramfs.h>
 #include <linux/page_idle.h>
+#include <linux/secretmem.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -844,7 +845,7 @@ static noinline int __add_to_page_cache_locked(struct page *page,
 	page->mapping = mapping;
 	page->index = offset;
 
-	if (!huge) {
+	if (!huge && !page_is_secretmem(page)) {
 		error = mem_cgroup_charge(page, current->mm, gfp);
 		if (error)
 			goto error;
mm/secretmem.c +35 -1
index 52a900a135a5..5e3e5102ad4c 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
 #include <linux/secretmem.h>
+#include <linux/memcontrol.h>
 #include <linux/set_memory.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 
@@ -44,6 +45,32 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {
 
 static struct cma *secretmem_cma;
 
+static int secretmem_account_pages(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = memcg_kmem_charge_page(page, gfp, order);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/*
+	 * seceremem caches are unreclaimable kernel allocations, so treat
+	 * them as unreclaimable slab memory for VM statistics purposes
+	 */
+	mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B,
+			      PAGE_SIZE << order);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void secretmem_unaccount_pages(struct page *page, int order)
+{
+
+	mod_node_page_state(page_pgdat(page), NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B,
+			    -PAGE_SIZE << order);
+	memcg_kmem_uncharge_page(page, order);
+}
+
 static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	unsigned long nr_pages = (1 << PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
@@ -56,10 +83,14 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
 	if (!page)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+	err = secretmem_account_pages(page, gfp, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 	if (err)
 		goto err_cma_release;
 
+	err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_memcg_uncharge;
+
 	addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
 	err = gen_pool_add(pool, addr, PMD_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE);
 	if (err)
@@ -76,6 +107,8 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
 	 * won't fail
 	 */
 	set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+err_memcg_uncharge:
+	secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 err_cma_release:
 	cma_release(secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages);
 	return err;
@@ -302,6 +335,7 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool,
 	int i;
 
 	set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+	secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++)
 		clear_highpage(page + i);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH v13 8/10 PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.

Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.

---
 include/linux/secretmem.h |  6 ++++++
 kernel/power/hibernate.c  |  5 ++++-
 mm/secretmem.c            | 15 +++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/secretmem.h +6 -0
index 70e7db9f94fe..907a6734059c 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page);
+bool secretmem_active(void);
 
 #else
 
@@ -19,6 +20,11 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static inline bool secretmem_active(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
kernel/power/hibernate.c +4 -1
index da0b41914177..559acef3fddb 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/genhd.h>
 #include <linux/ktime.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/secretmem.h>
 #include <trace/events/power.h>
 
 #include "power.h"
@@ -81,7 +82,9 @@ void hibernate_release(void)
 
 bool hibernation_available(void)
 {
-	return nohibernate == 0 && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION);
+	return nohibernate == 0 &&
+		!security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION) &&
+		!secretmem_active();
 }
 
 /**
mm/secretmem.c +15 -0
index 5e3e5102ad4c..2cf5cc79418b 100644
@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {
 
 static struct cma *secretmem_cma;
 
+static atomic_t secretmem_users;
+
+bool secretmem_active(void)
+{
+	return !!atomic_read(&secretmem_users);
+}
+
 static int secretmem_account_pages(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order)
 {
 	int err;
@@ -179,6 +186,12 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = {
 	.fault = secretmem_fault,
 };
 
+static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&secretmem_users);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
@@ -201,6 +214,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = {
+	.release	= secretmem_release,
 	.mmap		= secretmem_mmap,
 };
 
@@ -318,6 +332,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags)
 	file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
 
 	fd_install(fd, file);
+	atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
 	return fd;
 
 err_put_fd:
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH v13 9/10 arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.

---
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h   | 1 +
 arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h        | 1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h               | 1 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h      | 6 +++++-
 mm/secretmem.c                         | 3 +++
 scripts/checksyscalls.sh               | 4 ++++
 8 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
index f83a70e07df8..ce2ee8f1e361 100644
@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@
 #define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT
 #define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS
 #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3
+#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET
 
 #include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
index 977ee6181dab..6c316093a1e5 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  */
 
 #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
+#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET
 
 #include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
 
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
index c52ab1c4a755..109e6681b8fa 100644
@@ -446,3 +446,4 @@
 439	i386	faccessat2		sys_faccessat2
 440	i386	process_madvise		sys_process_madvise
 441	i386	watch_mount		sys_watch_mount
+442	i386	memfd_secret		sys_memfd_secret
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
index f3270a9ef467..742cf17d7725 100644
@@ -363,6 +363,7 @@
 439	common	faccessat2		sys_faccessat2
 440	common	process_madvise		sys_process_madvise
 441	common	watch_mount		sys_watch_mount
+442	common	memfd_secret		sys_memfd_secret
 
 #
 # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
include/linux/syscalls.h +1 -0
index 6d55324363ab..f9d93fbf9b69 100644
@@ -1010,6 +1010,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig,
 asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd(int pidfd, int fd, unsigned int flags);
 asmlinkage long sys_watch_mount(int dfd, const char __user *path,
 				unsigned int at_flags, int watch_fd, int watch_id);
+asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned long flags);
 
 /*
  * Architecture-specific system calls
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +5 -1
index 5df46517260e..51151888f330 100644
@@ -861,9 +861,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_faccessat2, sys_faccessat2)
 __SYSCALL(__NR_process_madvise, sys_process_madvise)
 #define __NR_watch_mount 441
 __SYSCALL(__NR_watch_mount, sys_watch_mount)
+#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET
+#define __NR_memfd_secret 442
+__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret)
+#endif
 
 #undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 442
+#define __NR_syscalls 443
 
 /*
  * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
mm/secretmem.c +3 -0
index 2cf5cc79418b..ecd7a586af8e 100644
@@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ static int __init secretmem_setup(char *str)
 	unsigned long reserved_size;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!can_set_direct_map())
+		return 0;
+
 	reserved_size = memparse(str, NULL);
 	if (!reserved_size)
 		return 0;
scripts/checksyscalls.sh +4 -0
index a18b47695f55..b7609958ee36 100755
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ cat << EOF
 #define __IGNORE_setrlimit	/* setrlimit */
 #endif
 
+#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET
+#define __IGNORE_memfd_secret
+#endif
+
 /* Missing flags argument */
 #define __IGNORE_renameat	/* renameat2 */
 
Signature · 4 lines
2.28.0
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH v13 10/10 secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore     |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile       |   3 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 298 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests    |  17 ++
 4 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c
tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore +1 -0
index 9a35c3f6a557..c8deddc81e7a 100644
@@ -21,4 +21,5 @@ va_128TBswitch
 map_fixed_noreplace
 write_to_hugetlbfs
 hmm-tests
+memfd_secret
 local_config.*
tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile +2 -1
index 62fb15f286ee..9ab98946fbf2 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += khugepaged
 TEST_GEN_FILES += map_fixed_noreplace
 TEST_GEN_FILES += map_hugetlb
 TEST_GEN_FILES += map_populate
+TEST_GEN_FILES += memfd_secret
 TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock-random-test
 TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock2-tests
 TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_dontunmap
@@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ warn_32bit_failure:
 endif
 endif
 
-$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test: LDLIBS += -lcap
+$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test $(OUTPUT)/memfd_secret: LDLIBS += -lcap
 
 $(OUTPUT)/gup_test: ../../../../mm/gup_test.h
 
tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c new file +298 -0

298 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests +17 -0
index e953f3cd9664..95a67382f132 100755
@@ -346,4 +346,21 @@ else
 	exitcode=1
 fi
 
+echo "running memfd_secret test"
+echo "------------------------------------"
+./memfd_secret
+ret_val=$?
+
+if [ $ret_val -eq 0 ]; then
+	echo "[PASS]"
+elif [ $ret_val -eq $ksft_skip ]; then
+	echo "[SKIP]"
+	exitcode=$ksft_skip
+else
+	echo "[FAIL]"
+	exitcode=1
+fi
+
+exit $exitcode
+
 exit $exitcode
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v13 07/10] secretmem: add memcg accounting

In reply to Mike Rapoport
Quoted 63 lines · Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Account memory consumed by secretmem to memcg. The accounting is updated when the memory is actually allocated and freed.

---
 mm/filemap.c   |  3 ++-
 mm/secretmem.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/filemap.c +2 -1
index 249cf489f5df..cf7f1dc9f4b8 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include <linux/psi.h>
 #include <linux/ramfs.h>
 #include <linux/page_idle.h>
+#include <linux/secretmem.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -844,7 +845,7 @@ static noinline int __add_to_page_cache_locked(struct page *page,
        page->mapping = mapping;
        page->index = offset;
 
-       if (!huge) {
+       if (!huge && !page_is_secretmem(page)) {
                error = mem_cgroup_charge(page, current->mm, gfp);
                if (error)
                        goto error;
mm/secretmem.c +14 -0
index 52a900a135a5..5e3e5102ad4c 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
 #include <linux/secretmem.h>
+#include <linux/memcontrol.h>
 #include <linux/set_memory.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 
@@ -44,6 +45,32 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {
 
 static struct cma *secretmem_cma;
 
+static int secretmem_account_pages(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order)
+{
+       int err;
+
+       err = memcg_kmem_charge_page(page, gfp, order);
+       if (err)
+               return err;
+
+       /*
+        * seceremem caches are unreclaimable kernel allocations, so treat
+        * them as unreclaimable slab memory for VM statistics purposes
+        */
+       mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B,

mm/secretmem.c struct secretmem_ctx { · line 70

Quoted 10 lines
mm/secretmem.c +10 -0
+                             PAGE_SIZE << order);
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static void secretmem_unaccount_pages(struct page *page, int order)
+{
+
+       mod_node_page_state(page_pgdat(page), NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B,
+                           -PAGE_SIZE << order);

mod_lruvec_page_state()

Quoted 40 lines
mm/secretmem.c +11 -2
+       memcg_kmem_uncharge_page(page, order);
+}
+
 static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
 {
        unsigned long nr_pages = (1 << PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
@@ -56,10 +83,14 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
        if (!page)
                return -ENOMEM;
 
-       err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+       err = secretmem_account_pages(page, gfp, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
        if (err)
                goto err_cma_release;
 
+       err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+       if (err)
+               goto err_memcg_uncharge;
+
        addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
        err = gen_pool_add(pool, addr, PMD_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE);
        if (err)
@@ -76,6 +107,8 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
         * won't fail
         */
        set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+err_memcg_uncharge:
+       secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 err_cma_release:
        cma_release(secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages);
        return err;
@@ -302,6 +335,7 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool,
        int i;
 
        set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+       secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 
        for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++)
                clear_highpage(page + i);
--
Quoted 2 lines

2.28.0

_______________________________________________
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author maintainer
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v13 07/10] secretmem: add memcg accounting

Quoted 68 lines · Shakeel Butt
Quoted 67 lines · Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Account memory consumed by secretmem to memcg. The accounting is updated when the memory is actually allocated and freed.

---
 mm/filemap.c   |  3 ++-
 mm/secretmem.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/filemap.c +2 -1
index 249cf489f5df..cf7f1dc9f4b8 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include <linux/psi.h>
 #include <linux/ramfs.h>
 #include <linux/page_idle.h>
+#include <linux/secretmem.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -844,7 +845,7 @@ static noinline int __add_to_page_cache_locked(struct page *page,
        page->mapping = mapping;
        page->index = offset;
 
-       if (!huge) {
+       if (!huge && !page_is_secretmem(page)) {
                error = mem_cgroup_charge(page, current->mm, gfp);
                if (error)
                        goto error;
mm/secretmem.c +18 -0
index 52a900a135a5..5e3e5102ad4c 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
 #include <linux/secretmem.h>
+#include <linux/memcontrol.h>
 #include <linux/set_memory.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 
@@ -44,6 +45,32 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {
 
 static struct cma *secretmem_cma;
 
+static int secretmem_account_pages(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order)
+{
+       int err;
+
+       err = memcg_kmem_charge_page(page, gfp, order);
+       if (err)
+               return err;
+
+       /*
+        * seceremem caches are unreclaimable kernel allocations, so treat
+        * them as unreclaimable slab memory for VM statistics purposes
+        */
+       mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B,
+                             PAGE_SIZE << order);
+
+       return 0;
+}
Quoted 8 lines

mm/secretmem.c struct secretmem_ctx { · line 70

Quoted 6 lines
mm/secretmem.c +6 -0
+
+static void secretmem_unaccount_pages(struct page *page, int order)
+{
+
+       mod_node_page_state(page_pgdat(page), NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B,
+                           -PAGE_SIZE << order);

mod_lruvec_page_state()

Argh... Will fix.

Quoted 42 lines
Quoted 42 lines
mm/secretmem.c +11 -2
+       memcg_kmem_uncharge_page(page, order);
+}
+
 static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
 {
        unsigned long nr_pages = (1 << PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
@@ -56,10 +83,14 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
        if (!page)
                return -ENOMEM;
 
-       err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+       err = secretmem_account_pages(page, gfp, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
        if (err)
                goto err_cma_release;
 
+       err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+       if (err)
+               goto err_memcg_uncharge;
+
        addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
        err = gen_pool_add(pool, addr, PMD_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE);
        if (err)
@@ -76,6 +107,8 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
         * won't fail
         */
        set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+err_memcg_uncharge:
+       secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 err_cma_release:
        cma_release(secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages);
        return err;
@@ -302,6 +335,7 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool,
        int i;
 
        set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+       secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 
        for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++)
                clear_highpage(page + i);
--

2.28.0

Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours,
Mike.