mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Subsystems (20)
Mike Rapoport
maintainerv15 cover mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
@Andrew, this is based on v5.11-rc4-mmots-2021-01-19-13-54 with secretmem patches dropped from there, I can rebase whatever way you prefer.
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm.
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Additionally, in the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.
For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git
that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification.
Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks.
The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future.
To limit fragmentation of the direct map to splitting only PUD-size pages, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor that is used as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas.
As the memory allocated by secretmem becomes unmovable, we use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages.
v15:
* Add riscv/Kconfig update to disable set_memory operations for nommu builds (patch 3)
* Update the code around add_to_page_cache() per Matthew's comments (patches 6,7)
* Add fixups for build/checkpatch errors discovered by CI systems
v14: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Finally s/mod_node_page_state/mod_lruvec_page_state/
v13: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Added Reviewed-by, thanks Catalin and David
* s/mod_node_page_state/mod_lruvec_page_state/ as Shakeel suggested
v12: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Add detection of whether set_direct_map has actual effect on arm64 and bail out of CMA allocation for secretmem and the memfd_secret() syscall if pages would not be removed from the direct map
v11: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Drop support for uncached mappings
Older history:
v10: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v9: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
Mike Rapoport (11):
mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages
set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
secretmem: add memcg accounting
PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant
secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)
arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 6 - arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 6 +- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 +- fs/dax.c | 11 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/secretmem.h | 30 ++ include/linux/set_memory.h | 16 +- include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 +- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 +- kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 5 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/filemap.c | 3 +- mm/gup.c | 10 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 444 ++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +- scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296 +++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests | 17 + 38 files changed, 910 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c
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2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v15 1/11 mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other cases as well.
Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively.
--- fs/dax.c | 11 ++++------- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/dax.c +4 -7
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ static inline unsigned int pe_order(enum page_entry_size pe_size)#define PG_PMD_COLOUR ((PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1)#define PG_PMD_NR (PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) -/* The order of a PMD entry */ -#define PMD_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -static wait_queue_head_t wait_table[DAX_WAIT_TABLE_ENTRIES ];static int __init init_dax_wait_table (void )
@@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ static bool dax_is_locked(void *entry)static unsigned int dax_entry_order (void *entry) {if (xa_to_value (entry) &DAX_PMD ) -return PMD_ORDER ; +return PMD_PAGE_ORDER ;return 0 ; }
@@ -1470,7 +1467,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp, {struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping; -XA_STATE_ORDER (xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff,PMD_ORDER ); +XA_STATE_ORDER (xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );unsigned long pmd_addr = vmf->address &PMD_MASK ;bool write = vmf->flags &FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;bool sync;
@@ -1529,7 +1526,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp,* entry is already in the array, for instance), it will return * VM_FAULT_FALLBACK. */ - entry =grab_mapping_entry (&xas, mapping,PMD_ORDER ); + entry =grab_mapping_entry (&xas, mapping,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );if (xa_is_internal (entry)) { result =xa_to_internal (entry); goto fallback;
@@ -1695,7 +1692,7 @@ dax_insert_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, unsigned int order)if (order ==0 ) ret =vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite (vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn);#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD - else if (order == PMD_ORDER) + else if (order == PMD_PAGE_ORDER) ret =vmf_insert_pfn_pmd (vmf, pfn,FAULT_FLAG_WRITE );#endif else
include/linux/pgtable.h +3 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@#define USER_PGTABLES_CEILING 0UL#endif +/* Number of base pages in a second level leaf page */ +#define PMD_PAGE_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) +/* * A page table page can be thought of an array like this: pXd_t[PTRS_PER_PxD] *
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2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v15 2/11 mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation.
--- mm/internal.h | 3 +++ mm/mmap.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/internal.h +3 -0
@@ -353,6 +353,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma)extern void mlock_vma_page (struct page *page);extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page (struct page *page); +extern int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long len); +/* * Clear the page's PageMlocked(). This can be useful in a situation where * we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g.,
mm/mmap.c +2 -3
@@ -1346,9 +1346,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)return hint; } -static inline int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm, -unsigned long flags, -unsigned long len) +int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long len) {unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v15 3/11 riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP and ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY configuration options have no meaning when CONFIG_MMU is disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case.
Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options.
--- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/riscv/Kconfig +2 -2
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ config RISCV select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL - select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP - select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY + select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP if MMU + select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY if MMU select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if MMU select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
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2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v15 4/11 set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
The underlying implementations of set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() allow updating multiple contiguous pages at once.
Add numpages parameter to set_direct_map_*_noflush() to expose this ability with these APIs.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 ++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 ++++---- include/linux/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 ++-- mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +++-- 9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +2 -2
@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void)int set_memory_valid (unsigned long addr,int numpages,int enable); -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page);#include <asm-generic/cacheflush.h>
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +6 -4
@@ -148,34 +148,36 @@ int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable) __pgprot(PTE_VALID)); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {struct page_change_data data = { .set_mask =__pgprot (0 ), .clear_mask =__pgprot (PTE_VALID ), }; +unsigned long size =PAGE_SIZE * numpages;if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full)return 0 ;return apply_to_page_range (&init_mm, (unsigned long )page_address (page), -PAGE_SIZE , change_page_range, &data); + size, change_page_range, &data); } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {struct page_change_data data = { .set_mask =__pgprot (PTE_VALID |PTE_WRITE ), .clear_mask =__pgprot (PTE_RDONLY ), }; +unsigned long size =PAGE_SIZE * numpages;if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full)return 0 ;return apply_to_page_range (&init_mm, (unsigned long )page_address (page), -PAGE_SIZE , change_page_range, &data); + size, change_page_range, &data); }#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h +2 -2
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ static inline void protect_kernel_text_data(void) {};static inline int set_memory_rw_nx (unsigned long addr,int numpages) {return 0 ; }#endif -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page);#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c +4 -4
@@ -156,11 +156,11 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages)return __set_memory (addr, numpages,__pgprot (0 ),__pgprot (_PAGE_EXEC)); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {int ret;unsigned long start = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE ; +unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE * numpages;struct pageattr_masks masks = { .set_mask =__pgprot (0 ), .clear_mask =__pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT)
@@ -173,11 +173,11 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)return ret; } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {int ret;unsigned long start = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE ; +unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE * numpages;struct pageattr_masks masks = { .set_mask =PAGE_KERNEL , .clear_mask =__pgprot (0 )
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +2 -2
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ int set_pages_wb(struct page *page, int numpages);int set_pages_ro (struct page *page,int numpages);int set_pages_rw (struct page *page,int numpages); -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page);extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +4 -4
@@ -2184,14 +2184,14 @@ static int __set_pages_np(struct page *page, int numpages)return __change_page_attr_set_clr (&cpa,0 ); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) { -return __set_pages_np (page,1 ); +return __set_pages_np (page, numpages); } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) { -return __set_pages_p (page,1 ); +return __set_pages_p (page, numpages); }#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
include/linux/set_memory.h +2 -2
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }#endif #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP -static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {return 0 ; } -static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {return 0 ; }
kernel/power/snapshot.c +2 -2
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static inline void hibernate_restore_unprotect_page(void *page_address) {}static inline void hibernate_map_page (struct page *page) {if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP )) { -int ret =set_direct_map_default_noflush (page); +int ret =set_direct_map_default_noflush (page,1 );if (ret)pr_warn_once ("Failed to remap page\n" );
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static inline void hibernate_unmap_page(struct page *page) {if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP )) {unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -int ret =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page); +int ret =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page,1 );if (ret)pr_warn_once ("Failed to remap page\n" );
mm/vmalloc.c +3 -2
@@ -2195,13 +2195,14 @@ struct vm_struct *remove_vm_area(const void *addr) }static inline void set_area_direct_map (const struct vm_struct *area, -int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page)) +int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page, +int numpages)) {int i;for (i =0 ; i < area->nr_pages; i++)if (page_address (area->pages[i])) -set_direct_map (area->pages[i]); +set_direct_map (area->pages[i],1 ); }/* Handle removing and resetting vm mappings related to the vm_struct. */
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v15 5/11 set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
On arm64, set_direct_map_*() functions may return 0 without actually changing the linear map. This behaviour can be controlled using kernel parameters, so we need a way to determine at runtime whether calls to set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() have any effect.
Extend set_memory API with can_set_direct_map() function that allows checking if calling set_direct_map_*() will actually change the page table, replace several occurrences of open coded checks in arm64 with the new function and provide a generic stub for architectures that always modify page tables upon calls to set_direct_map APIs.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 6 ------ arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 6 +++--- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 13 +++++++++---- include/linux/set_memory.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild +0 -1
@@ -3,5 +3,4 @@ generic-y += early_ioremap.h generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h generic-y += qrwlock.h generic-y += qspinlock.h -generic-y += set_memory.h generic-y += user.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +0 -6
@@ -136,12 +136,6 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void) dsb(ish); } -int set_memory_valid (unsigned long addr,int numpages,int enable); - -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); -bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page); -#include <asm-generic/cacheflush.h> #endif /* __ASM_CACHEFLUSH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h new file +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H +#define _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H + +#include <asm-generic/set_memory.h> + +bool can_set_direct_map (void ); +#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map + +int set_memory_valid (unsigned long addr,int numpages,int enable); + +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page); + +#endif /* _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> #include <linux/page-flags.h> +#include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <linux/smp.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +3 -3
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <asm/barrier.h> #include <asm/cputype.h>
@@ -492,7 +493,7 @@ static void __init map_mem(pgd_t *pgdp)int flags =0 ;u64 i; -if (rodata_full || crash_mem_map ||debug_pagealloc_enabled ()) +if (can_set_direct_map () || crash_mem_map) flags =NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS |NO_CONT_MAPPINGS ;/*
@@ -1468,8 +1469,7 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,* KFENCE requires linear map to be mapped at page granularity, so that * it is possible to protect/unprotect single pages in the KFENCE pool. */ -if (rodata_full ||debug_pagealloc_enabled () || -IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KFENCE )) +if (can_set_direct_map () ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KFENCE )) flags =NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS |NO_CONT_MAPPINGS ; __create_pgd_mapping(swapper_pg_dir, start, __phys_to_virt(start),
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +9 -4
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ struct page_change_data {bool rodata_full__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED ); +bool can_set_direct_map (void ) +{ +return rodata_full ||debug_pagealloc_enabled (); +} +static int change_page_range (pte_t *ptep,unsigned long addr,void *data) {struct page_change_data *cdata = data;
@@ -156,7 +161,7 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) };unsigned long size =PAGE_SIZE * numpages; -if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full) +if (!can_set_direct_map ())return 0 ; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
@@ -172,7 +177,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) };unsigned long size =PAGE_SIZE * numpages; -if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full) +if (!can_set_direct_map ())return 0 ; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
@@ -183,7 +188,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC void __kernel_map_pages (struct page *page,int numpages,int enable) { -if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full) +if (!can_set_direct_map ())return ;set_memory_valid ((unsigned long )page_address (page), numpages, enable);
@@ -208,7 +213,7 @@ bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page)pte_t *ptep;unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full) +if (!can_set_direct_map ())return true; pgdp =pgd_offset_k (addr);
include/linux/set_memory.h +12 -0
@@ -28,7 +28,19 @@ static inline bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page) {return true; } +#else /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */ +/* +* Some architectures, e.g. ARM64 can disable direct map modifications at +* boot time. Let them overrive this query. +*/ +#ifndef can_set_direct_map +static inline bool can_set_direct_map (void ) +{ +return true; +} +#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */ #ifndef set_mce_nospecstatic inline int set_mce_nospec (unsigned long pfn,bool unmap)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v15 6/11 mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.
The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the owning mm.
The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not accessible using direct/linear map addresses.
Functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area.
A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed.
The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted):
fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
--- include/linux/secretmem.h | 24 ++++ include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 3 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/gup.c | 10 ++ mm/secretmem.c | 276 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 317 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
include/linux/secretmem.h new file +24 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H +#define _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECRETMEM + +bool vma_is_secretmem (struct vm_area_struct *vma); +bool page_is_secretmem (struct page *page); + +#else + +static inline bool vma_is_secretmem (struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool page_is_secretmem (struct page *page) +{ +return false; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ + +#endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
include/uapi/linux/magic.h +1 -0
@@ -97,5 +97,6 @@#define DEVMEM_MAGIC 0x454d444d/* "DMEM" */ #define Z3FOLD_MAGIC 0x33#define PPC_CMM_MAGIC 0xc7571590 +#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC 0x5345434d/* "SECM" */ #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */
kernel/sys_ni.c +2 -0
@@ -355,6 +355,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect);COND_SYSCALL (pkey_alloc);COND_SYSCALL (pkey_free); +/* memfd_secret */ +COND_SYSCALL (memfd_secret);/* * Architecture specific weak syscall entries.
mm/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -872,4 +872,7 @@ config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS config KMAP_LOCAL bool +config SECRETMEM + def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + endmenu
mm/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -120,3 +120,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o
mm/gup.c +10 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#include <linux/rmap.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/swapops.h> +#include <linux/secretmem.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/rwsem.h>
@@ -759,6 +760,9 @@ struct page *follow_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,struct follow_page_context ctx = {NULL };struct page *page; +if (vma_is_secretmem (vma)) +return NULL ; + page =follow_page_mask (vma, address, foll_flags, &ctx);if (ctx.pgmap)put_dev_pagemap (ctx.pgmap);
@@ -892,6 +896,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)if ((gup_flags &FOLL_LONGTERM ) &&vma_is_fsdax (vma))return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (vma_is_secretmem (vma)) +return -EFAULT ; +if (write) {if (!(vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) {if (!(gup_flags &FOLL_FORCE ))
@@ -2031,6 +2038,9 @@ static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,VM_BUG_ON (!pfn_valid (pte_pfn (pte))); page =pte_page (pte); +if (page_is_secretmem (page)) + goto pte_unmap; + head =try_grab_compound_head (page,1 , flags);if (!head) goto pte_unmap;
mm/secretmem.c new file +276 -0
276 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v15 7/11 secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings.
Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with PMD-size pages.
As pages allocated by secretmem become unmovable, use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages.
The CMA area used by secretmem is controlled by the "secretmem=" kernel parameter. This allows explicit control over the memory available for secretmem and provides upper hard limit for secretmem consumption.
--- mm/Kconfig | 2 + mm/secretmem.c | 166 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
mm/Kconfig +2 -0
@@ -874,5 +874,7 @@ config KMAP_LOCAL config SECRETMEM def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR + select CMA endmenu
mm/secretmem.c +141 -25
262 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v15 8/11 secretmem: add memcg accounting
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Account memory consumed by secretmem to memcg. The accounting is updated when the memory is actually allocated and freed.
--- mm/filemap.c | 3 ++- mm/secretmem.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/filemap.c +2 -1
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@#include <linux/psi.h> #include <linux/ramfs.h> #include <linux/page_idle.h> +#include <linux/secretmem.h> #include "internal.h" #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -839,7 +840,7 @@ noinline int __add_to_page_cache_locked(struct page *page, page->mapping = mapping; page->index = offset; -if (!huge) { +if (!huge && !page_is_secretmem (page)) { error =mem_cgroup_charge (page, current->mm, gfp);if (error) goto error;
mm/secretmem.c +35 -1
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h> #include <linux/secretmem.h> +#include <linux/memcontrol.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
@@ -44,6 +45,32 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {static struct cma *secretmem_cma; +static int secretmem_account_pages (struct page *page,gfp_t gfp,int order) +{ +int err; + + err =memcg_kmem_charge_page (page, gfp, order); +if (err) +return err; + +/* +* seceremem caches are unreclaimable kernel allocations, so treat +* them as unreclaimable slab memory for VM statistics purposes +*/ +mod_lruvec_page_state (page,NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B , +PAGE_SIZE << order); + +return 0 ; +} + +static void secretmem_unaccount_pages (struct page *page,int order) +{ + +mod_lruvec_page_state (page,NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B , + -PAGE_SIZE << order); +memcg_kmem_uncharge_page (page, order); +} +static int secretmem_pool_increase (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx,gfp_t gfp) {unsigned long nr_pages = (1 <<PMD_PAGE_ORDER );
@@ -56,10 +83,14 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)if (!page)return -ENOMEM ; - err =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page, nr_pages); + err =secretmem_account_pages (page, gfp,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );if (err) goto err_cma_release; + err =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page, nr_pages); +if (err) + goto err_memcg_uncharge; + addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); err =gen_pool_add (pool, addr,PMD_SIZE ,NUMA_NO_NODE );if (err)
@@ -76,6 +107,8 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)* won't fail */ set_direct_map_default_noflush (page, nr_pages); +err_memcg_uncharge: +secretmem_unaccount_pages (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); err_cma_release:cma_release (secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages);return err;
@@ -307,6 +340,7 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool,int i;set_direct_map_default_noflush (page, nr_pages); +secretmem_unaccount_pages (page,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );for (i =0 ; i < nr_pages; i++)clear_highpage (page + i);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v15 9/11 PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
--- include/linux/secretmem.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 ++++- mm/secretmem.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/secretmem.h +6 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@bool vma_is_secretmem (struct vm_area_struct *vma);bool page_is_secretmem (struct page *page); +bool secretmem_active (void );#else
@@ -19,6 +20,11 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page)return false; } +static inline bool secretmem_active (void ) +{ +return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ #endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
kernel/power/hibernate.c +4 -1
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#include <linux/genhd.h> #include <linux/ktime.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/secretmem.h> #include <trace/events/power.h> #include "power.h"
@@ -81,7 +82,9 @@ void hibernate_release(void)bool hibernation_available (void ) { -return nohibernate ==0 && !security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION ); +return nohibernate ==0 && + !security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION ) && + !secretmem_active (); }/**
mm/secretmem.c +15 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {static struct cma *secretmem_cma; +static atomic_t secretmem_users; + +bool secretmem_active (void ) +{ +return !!atomic_read (&secretmem_users); +} +static int secretmem_account_pages (struct page *page,gfp_t gfp,int order) {int err;
@@ -186,6 +193,12 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { .fault = secretmem_fault, }; +static int secretmem_release (struct inode *inode,struct file *file) +{ +atomic_dec (&secretmem_users); +return 0 ; +} +static int secretmem_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
@@ -208,6 +221,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) }static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .release = secretmem_release, .mmap = secretmem_mmap, };
@@ -323,6 +337,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags) file->f_flags |=O_LARGEFILE ;fd_install (fd, file); +atomic_inc (&secretmem_users);return fd; err_put_fd:
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v15 10/11 arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.
--- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +++++- mm/secretmem.c | 3 +++ scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 ++++ 8 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@#define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT#define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@*/ #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET#include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -447,3 +447,4 @@ 440 i386 process_madvise sys_process_madvise 441 i386 epoll_pwait2 sys_epoll_pwait2 compat_sys_epoll_pwait2 442 i386 watch_mount sys_watch_mount +443 i386 memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ 440 common process_madvise sys_process_madvise 441 common epoll_pwait2 sys_epoll_pwait2 442 common watch_mount sys_watch_mount +443 common memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
include/linux/syscalls.h +1 -0
@@ -1039,6 +1039,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig,asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd (int pidfd,int fd,unsigned int flags);asmlinkage long sys_watch_mount (int dfd,const char __user *path,unsigned int at_flags,int watch_fd,int watch_id); +asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret (unsigned long flags);/* * Architecture-specific system calls
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +5 -1
@@ -863,9 +863,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_process_madvise, sys_process_madvise) __SC_COMP(__NR_epoll_pwait2, sys_epoll_pwait2, compat_sys_epoll_pwait2)#define __NR_watch_mount 442 __SYSCALL(__NR_watch_mount, sys_watch_mount) +#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __NR_memfd_secret 443 +__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret) +#endif #undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 443 +#define __NR_syscalls 444/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
mm/secretmem.c +3 -0
@@ -420,6 +420,9 @@ static int __init secretmem_setup(char *str)unsigned long reserved_size;int err; +if (!can_set_direct_map ()) +return 0 ; + reserved_size =memparse (str,NULL );if (!reserved_size)return 0 ;
scripts/checksyscalls.sh +4 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ cat << EOF #define __IGNORE_setrlimit /* setrlimit */ #endif +#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __IGNORE_memfd_secret +#endif + /* Missing flags argument */ #define __IGNORE_renameat /* renameat2 */
Signature · 4 lines
2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v15 11/11 secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail.
--- tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests | 17 ++ 4 files changed, 316 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c
tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -21,4 +21,5 @@ va_128TBswitch map_fixed_noreplace write_to_hugetlbfs hmm-tests +memfd_secret local_config.*
tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += khugepaged TEST_GEN_FILES += map_fixed_noreplace TEST_GEN_FILES += map_hugetlb TEST_GEN_FILES += map_populate +TEST_GEN_FILES += memfd_secret TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock-random-test TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock2-tests TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_dontunmap
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ warn_32bit_failure: endif endif -$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test: LDLIBS += -lcap +$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test $(OUTPUT)/memfd_secret: LDLIBS += -lcap $(OUTPUT)/gup_test: ../../../../mm/gup_test.h
tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c new file +296 -0
296 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests +17 -0
@@ -346,4 +346,21 @@ else exitcode=1 fi +echo "running memfd_secret test" +echo "------------------------------------" +./memfd_secret +ret_val=$? + +if [ $ret_val -eq 0 ]; then + echo "[PASS]" +elif [ $ret_val -eq $ksft_skip ]; then + echo "[SKIP]" + exitcode=$ksft_skip +else + echo "[FAIL]" + exitcode=1 +fi + +exit $exitcode + exit $exitcode
Signature · 4 lines
2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Matthew Wilcox
maintainerQuoted 21 lines · Mike Rapoport
mm/secretmem.c new file +21
-0+static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page (gfp_t gfp) +{ +/* +* FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map +* fragmentation +*/ +return alloc_page (gfp); +} + +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ +struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; +struct inode *inode =file_inode (vmf->vma->vm_file); +pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; +unsigned long addr; +struct page *page; +int err; + +if (((loff_t )vmf->pgoff <<PAGE_SHIFT ) >=i_size_read (inode)) +return vmf_error (-EINVAL ); +
mm/secretmem.c line 71
Quoted 10 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +10
-0+retry: + page =find_lock_page (mapping, offset); +if (!page) { + page =secretmem_alloc_page (vmf->gfp_mask); +if (!page) +return VM_FAULT_OOM ; + + err =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page,1 ); +if (err) +return vmf_error (err);
Haven't we leaked the page at this point?
mm/secretmem.c line 74
Quoted 2 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +2
-0+__SetPageUptodate (page); + err =add_to_page_cache (page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask);
At this point, doesn't the page contain data from the last person to use the page? ie we've leaked data to this process? I don't see anywhere that we write data to the page.
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Mike Rapoport
maintainerQuoted 26 lines · Matthew Wilcox
Quoted 25 lines · Mike Rapoport
mm/secretmem.c new file +25
-0+static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page (gfp_t gfp) +{ +/* +* FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map +* fragmentation +*/ +return alloc_page (gfp); +} + +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ +struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping; +struct inode *inode =file_inode (vmf->vma->vm_file); +pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff; +unsigned long addr; +struct page *page; +int err; + +if (((loff_t )vmf->pgoff <<PAGE_SHIFT ) >=i_size_read (inode)) +return vmf_error (-EINVAL ); + +retry: + page =find_lock_page (mapping, offset); +if (!page) { + page =secretmem_alloc_page (vmf->gfp_mask);
Quoted 8 lines
mm/secretmem.c line 71
Quoted 6 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +6
-0+if (!page) +return VM_FAULT_OOM ; + + err =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page,1 ); +if (err) +return vmf_error (err);Haven't we leaked the page at this point?
Well, yes. :(
But this code is anyway changed in the next patch. Is this really so important to fix this in the middle of the series?
Quoted 6 lines
mm/secretmem.c line 74
Quoted 2 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +2
-0+__SetPageUptodate (page); + err =add_to_page_cache (page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask);At this point, doesn't the page contain data from the last person to use the page? ie we've leaked data to this process? I don't see anywhere that we write data to the page.
The data is visible for all processes that share the file descriptor. So no, we don't leak anything unless the file descriptor itself is leaked.
Did you have a particular scenario in mind?
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.
Matthew Wilcox
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
In reply to Mike Rapoportmm/secretmem.c line 57
Quoted 11 lines · Mike Rapoport
mm/secretmem.c +10
-0+static int secretmem_pool_increase (struct secretmem_ctx *ctx,gfp_t gfp) { +unsigned long nr_pages = (1 <<PMD_PAGE_ORDER ); +struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool; +unsigned long addr; +struct page *page; +int err; + + page =cma_alloc (secretmem_cma, nr_pages,PMD_SIZE , gfp & __GFP_NOWARN); +if (!page) +return -ENOMEM ;
Does cma_alloc() zero the pages it allocates? If not, where do we avoid leaking kernel memory to userspace?
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Re: [PATCH v15 03/11] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
In reply to Mike RapoportQuoted 19 lines · On Wed, 20 Jan 2021 10:06:04 PST (-0800), [email protected] wrote:
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAPandARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORYconfiguration options have no meaning whenCONFIG_MMUis disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case.Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options.
Signed-off-by Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>Reported-by kernel test robot <[email protected]>--- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/riscv/Kconfig +0
-0
arch/riscv/Kconfig config RISCV · line 32
Quoted 10 lines
arch/riscv/Kconfig +2
-2@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ config RISCV select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL - select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP - select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY + select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP if MMU + select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY if MMU select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if MMU select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
LMK if you want this to go in via the RISC-V tree, otherwise I'm going to assume it's going in along with the rest of these. FWIW I see these in other architectures without the MMU guard.
Thanks!
Mike Rapoport
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 03/11] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
Quoted 34 lines · Palmer Dabbelt
Quoted 19 lines · On Wed, 20 Jan 2021 10:06:04 PST (-0800), [email protected] wrote:
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAPandARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORYconfiguration options have no meaning whenCONFIG_MMUis disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case.Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options.
Signed-off-by Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>Reported-by kernel test robot <[email protected]>--- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/riscv/Kconfig +0
-0arch/riscv/Kconfig config RISCV · line 32
Quoted 10 lines
arch/riscv/Kconfig +2
-2@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ config RISCV select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL - select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP - select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY + select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP if MMU + select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY if MMU select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if MMU select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULTReviewed-by Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>Acked-by Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines
LMK if you want this to go in via the RISC-V tree, otherwise I'm going to assume it's going in along with the rest of these. FWIW I see these in other architectures without the MMU guard.
Except arm, they all always have MMU=y and arm selects only ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY and has empty stubs for those when MMU=n.
Indeed I might have been over zealous adding ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY dependency on MMU, as riscv also has these stubs, but I thought that making this explicit is a nice thing.
Quoted 1 line
Thanks!
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.
Palmer Dabbelt
maintainerRe: [PATCH v15 03/11] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
Quoted 35 lines · On Sat, 23 Jan 2021 03:00:41 PST (-0800), [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 34 lines · Palmer Dabbelt
Quoted 19 lines · On Wed, 20 Jan 2021 10:06:04 PST (-0800), [email protected] wrote:
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAPandARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORYconfiguration options have no meaning whenCONFIG_MMUis disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case.Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options.
Signed-off-by Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>Reported-by kernel test robot <[email protected]>--- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/riscv/Kconfig +0
-0arch/riscv/Kconfig config RISCV · line 32
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arch/riscv/Kconfig +2
-2@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ config RISCV select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL - select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP - select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY + select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP if MMU + select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY if MMU select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if MMU select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULTReviewed-by Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>Acked-by Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
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LMK if you want this to go in via the RISC-V tree, otherwise I'm going to assume it's going in along with the rest of these. FWIW I see these in other architectures without the MMU guard.
Except arm, they all always have MMU=y and arm selects only
ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORYand has empty stubs for those when MMU=n.
OK, maybe I just checked ARM, then. I was just making sure.
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Indeed I might have been over zealous adding
ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORYdependency on MMU, as riscv also has these stubs, but I thought that making this explicit is a nice thing.
It seems reasonable to me.
Thanks!