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mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

PATCH Superseded Mike Rapoport 3 participants 18 messages Jan 20, 2021 – Jan 27, 2021

Subsystems (20)
Memory management x86 VFS Kselftest +16 more subsystems

v15 of 20 Superseded Latest is v20 →

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Mike Rapoport

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#0 lore raw

v15 cover mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Hi,

@Andrew, this is based on v5.11-rc4-mmots-2021-01-19-13-54 with secretmem patches dropped from there, I can rebase whatever way you prefer.

This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.

The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm.

Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.

Additionally, in the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.

For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git

that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification.

Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks.

The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future.

To limit fragmentation of the direct map to splitting only PUD-size pages, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size pages to each file descriptor that is used as an allocation pool for the secret memory areas.

As the memory allocated by secretmem becomes unmovable, we use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages.

v15:
* Add riscv/Kconfig update to disable set_memory operations for nommu builds (patch 3)
* Update the code around add_to_page_cache() per Matthew's comments (patches 6,7)
* Add fixups for build/checkpatch errors discovered by CI systems

v14: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Finally s/mod_node_page_state/mod_lruvec_page_state/

v13: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Added Reviewed-by, thanks Catalin and David
* s/mod_node_page_state/mod_lruvec_page_state/ as Shakeel suggested

v12: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Add detection of whether set_direct_map has actual effect on arm64 and bail out of CMA allocation for secretmem and the memfd_secret() syscall if pages would not be removed from the direct map

v11: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Drop support for uncached mappings

Older history:
v10: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v9: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]

Mike Rapoport (11):
mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages
set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
secretmem: add memcg accounting
PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant
secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)

 arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild             |   1 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h       |   6 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h       |  17 +
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h      |   1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c         |   1 +
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c                       |   6 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c                  |  23 +-
 arch/riscv/Kconfig                        |   4 +-
 arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h       |   4 +-
 arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h           |   1 +
 arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c                  |   8 +-
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl    |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl    |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h         |   4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c              |   8 +-
 fs/dax.c                                  |  11 +-
 include/linux/pgtable.h                   |   3 +
 include/linux/secretmem.h                 |  30 ++
 include/linux/set_memory.h                |  16 +-
 include/linux/syscalls.h                  |   1 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h         |   6 +-
 include/uapi/linux/magic.h                |   1 +
 kernel/power/hibernate.c                  |   5 +-
 kernel/power/snapshot.c                   |   4 +-
 kernel/sys_ni.c                           |   2 +
 mm/Kconfig                                |   5 +
 mm/Makefile                               |   1 +
 mm/filemap.c                              |   3 +-
 mm/gup.c                                  |  10 +
 mm/internal.h                             |   3 +
 mm/mmap.c                                 |   5 +-
 mm/secretmem.c                            | 444 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/vmalloc.c                              |   5 +-
 scripts/checksyscalls.sh                  |   4 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore     |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile       |   3 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296 +++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests    |  17 +
 38 files changed, 910 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h
 create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c
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#1 lore raw

PATCH v15 1/11 mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other cases as well.

Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively.

Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Christopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Cc Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Hagen Paul Pfeifer <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
---
 fs/dax.c                | 11 ++++-------
 include/linux/pgtable.h |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/dax.c +4 -7
index 26d5dcd2d69e..0f109eb16196 100644
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ static inline unsigned int pe_order(enum page_entry_size pe_size)
 #define PG_PMD_COLOUR	((PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1)
 #define PG_PMD_NR	(PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT)
 
-/* The order of a PMD entry */
-#define PMD_ORDER	(PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
-
 static wait_queue_head_t wait_table[DAX_WAIT_TABLE_ENTRIES];
 
 static int __init init_dax_wait_table(void)
@@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ static bool dax_is_locked(void *entry)
 static unsigned int dax_entry_order(void *entry)
 {
 	if (xa_to_value(entry) & DAX_PMD)
-		return PMD_ORDER;
+		return PMD_PAGE_ORDER;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1470,7 +1467,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp,
 {
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
 	struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
-	XA_STATE_ORDER(xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff, PMD_ORDER);
+	XA_STATE_ORDER(xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 	unsigned long pmd_addr = vmf->address & PMD_MASK;
 	bool write = vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 	bool sync;
@@ -1529,7 +1526,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp,
 	 * entry is already in the array, for instance), it will return
 	 * VM_FAULT_FALLBACK.
 	 */
-	entry = grab_mapping_entry(&xas, mapping, PMD_ORDER);
+	entry = grab_mapping_entry(&xas, mapping, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 	if (xa_is_internal(entry)) {
 		result = xa_to_internal(entry);
 		goto fallback;
@@ -1695,7 +1692,7 @@ dax_insert_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, unsigned int order)
 	if (order == 0)
 		ret = vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite(vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn);
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD
-	else if (order == PMD_ORDER)
+	else if (order == PMD_PAGE_ORDER)
 		ret = vmf_insert_pfn_pmd(vmf, pfn, FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
 #endif
 	else
include/linux/pgtable.h +3 -0
index 8fcdfa52eb4b..ea5c4102c23e 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
 #define USER_PGTABLES_CEILING	0UL
 #endif
 
+/* Number of base pages in a second level leaf page */
+#define PMD_PAGE_ORDER	(PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
+
 /*
  * A page table page can be thought of an array like this: pXd_t[PTRS_PER_PxD]
  *
Signature · 4 lines
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#2 lore raw

PATCH v15 2/11 mmap: make mlock_future_check() global

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation.

Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Christopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Cc Hagen Paul Pfeifer <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Cc Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 mm/internal.h | 3 +++
 mm/mmap.c     | 5 ++---
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/internal.h +3 -0
index 9902648f2206..8e9c660f33ca 100644
@@ -353,6 +353,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 extern void mlock_vma_page(struct page *page);
 extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page(struct page *page);
 
+extern int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,
+			      unsigned long len);
+
 /*
  * Clear the page's PageMlocked().  This can be useful in a situation where
  * we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g.,
mm/mmap.c +2 -3
index 28ef5e29152a..10b9b8b88913 100644
@@ -1346,9 +1346,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)
 	return hint;
 }
 
-static inline int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm,
-				     unsigned long flags,
-				     unsigned long len)
+int mlock_future_check(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,
+		       unsigned long len)
 {
 	unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
 
Signature · 1 line
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author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH v15 3/11 riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP and ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY configuration options have no meaning when CONFIG_MMU is disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case.

Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options.

---
 arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/riscv/Kconfig +2 -2
index d82303dcc6b6..d35ce19ab1fa 100644
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ config RISCV
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
 	select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB
 	select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
-	select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
-	select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
+	select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP if MMU
+	select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY if MMU
 	select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if MMU
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
Signature · 4 lines
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#7 lore raw

PATCH v15 4/11 set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

The underlying implementations of set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() allow updating multiple contiguous pages at once.

Add numpages parameter to set_direct_map_*_noflush() to expose this ability with these APIs.

Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Christopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Cc Hagen Paul Pfeifer <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Cc Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h |  4 ++--
 arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c            | 10 ++++++----
 arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h |  4 ++--
 arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c            |  8 ++++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h   |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c        |  8 ++++----
 include/linux/set_memory.h          |  4 ++--
 kernel/power/snapshot.c             |  4 ++--
 mm/vmalloc.c                        |  5 +++--
 9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +2 -2
index 45217f21f1fe..d3598419a284 100644
@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void)
 
 int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable);
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page);
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page);
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
 bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
 
 #include <asm-generic/cacheflush.h>
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +6 -4
index 92eccaf595c8..b53ef37bf95a 100644
@@ -148,34 +148,36 @@ int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable)
 					__pgprot(PTE_VALID));
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	struct page_change_data data = {
 		.set_mask = __pgprot(0),
 		.clear_mask = __pgprot(PTE_VALID),
 	};
+	unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 
 	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
 		return 0;
 
 	return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
 				   (unsigned long)page_address(page),
-				   PAGE_SIZE, change_page_range, &data);
+				   size, change_page_range, &data);
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	struct page_change_data data = {
 		.set_mask = __pgprot(PTE_VALID | PTE_WRITE),
 		.clear_mask = __pgprot(PTE_RDONLY),
 	};
+	unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 
 	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
 		return 0;
 
 	return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
 				   (unsigned long)page_address(page),
-				   PAGE_SIZE, change_page_range, &data);
+				   size, change_page_range, &data);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h +2 -2
index 211eb8244a45..1aaf2720b8f6 100644
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ static inline void protect_kernel_text_data(void) {};
 static inline int set_memory_rw_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page);
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page);
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
 bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c +4 -4
index 5e49e4b4a4cc..9618181b70be 100644
@@ -156,11 +156,11 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 	return __set_memory(addr, numpages, __pgprot(0), __pgprot(_PAGE_EXEC));
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	int ret;
 	unsigned long start = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
-	unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE;
+	unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 	struct pageattr_masks masks = {
 		.set_mask = __pgprot(0),
 		.clear_mask = __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT)
@@ -173,11 +173,11 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	int ret;
 	unsigned long start = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
-	unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE;
+	unsigned long end = start + PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 	struct pageattr_masks masks = {
 		.set_mask = PAGE_KERNEL,
 		.clear_mask = __pgprot(0)
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +2 -2
index 4352f08bfbb5..6224cb291f6c 100644
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ int set_pages_wb(struct page *page, int numpages);
 int set_pages_ro(struct page *page, int numpages);
 int set_pages_rw(struct page *page, int numpages);
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page);
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page);
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
 bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
 
 extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +4 -4
index 16f878c26667..d157fd617c99 100644
@@ -2184,14 +2184,14 @@ static int __set_pages_np(struct page *page, int numpages)
 	return __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 0);
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
-	return __set_pages_np(page, 1);
+	return __set_pages_np(page, numpages);
 }
 
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page)
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
-	return __set_pages_p(page, 1);
+	return __set_pages_p(page, numpages);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
include/linux/set_memory.h +2 -2
index fe1aa4e54680..c650f82db813 100644
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
-static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)
+static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page)
+static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
kernel/power/snapshot.c +2 -2
index d63560e1cf87..64b7aab9aee4 100644
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static inline void hibernate_restore_unprotect_page(void *page_address) {}
 static inline void hibernate_map_page(struct page *page)
 {
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP)) {
-		int ret = set_direct_map_default_noflush(page);
+		int ret = set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, 1);
 
 		if (ret)
 			pr_warn_once("Failed to remap page\n");
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static inline void hibernate_unmap_page(struct page *page)
 {
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP)) {
 		unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
-		int ret  = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page);
+		int ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1);
 
 		if (ret)
 			pr_warn_once("Failed to remap page\n");
mm/vmalloc.c +3 -2
index d5f2a84e488a..1da9cd1d0758 100644
@@ -2195,13 +2195,14 @@ struct vm_struct *remove_vm_area(const void *addr)
 }
 
 static inline void set_area_direct_map(const struct vm_struct *area,
-				       int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page))
+				       int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page,
+							     int numpages))
 {
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < area->nr_pages; i++)
 		if (page_address(area->pages[i]))
-			set_direct_map(area->pages[i]);
+			set_direct_map(area->pages[i], 1);
 }
 
 /* Handle removing and resetting vm mappings related to the vm_struct. */
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH v15 5/11 set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

On arm64, set_direct_map_*() functions may return 0 without actually changing the linear map. This behaviour can be controlled using kernel parameters, so we need a way to determine at runtime whether calls to set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() have any effect.

Extend set_memory API with can_set_direct_map() function that allows checking if calling set_direct_map_*() will actually change the page table, replace several occurrences of open coded checks in arm64 with the new function and provide a generic stub for architectures that always modify page tables upon calls to set_direct_map APIs.

Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Christopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Cc Hagen Paul Pfeifer <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Cc Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild       |  1 -
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h |  6 ------
 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c   |  1 +
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c                 |  6 +++---
 arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c            | 13 +++++++++----
 include/linux/set_memory.h          | 12 ++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild +0 -1
index 07ac208edc89..73aa25843f65 100644
@@ -3,5 +3,4 @@ generic-y += early_ioremap.h
 generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
 generic-y += qrwlock.h
 generic-y += qspinlock.h
-generic-y += set_memory.h
 generic-y += user.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +0 -6
index d3598419a284..b1bdf83a73db 100644
@@ -136,12 +136,6 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void)
 	dsb(ish);
 }
 
-int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable);
-
-int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
-int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
-bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
-
 #include <asm-generic/cacheflush.h>
 
 #endif /* __ASM_CACHEFLUSH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h new file +17 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ecb6b0f449ab
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+
+#ifndef _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H
+#define _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H
+
+#include <asm-generic/set_memory.h>
+
+bool can_set_direct_map(void);
+#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map
+
+int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable);
+
+int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
+int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages);
+bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
+
+#endif /* _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c +1 -0
index a0b144cfaea7..0cbc50c4fa5a 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/page-flags.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +3 -3
index 30c6dd02e706..79604049fff5 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
 
 #include <asm/barrier.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
@@ -492,7 +493,7 @@ static void __init map_mem(pgd_t *pgdp)
 	int flags = 0;
 	u64 i;
 
-	if (rodata_full || crash_mem_map || debug_pagealloc_enabled())
+	if (can_set_direct_map() || crash_mem_map)
 		flags = NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS;
 
 	/*
@@ -1468,8 +1469,7 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,
 	 * KFENCE requires linear map to be mapped at page granularity, so that
 	 * it is possible to protect/unprotect single pages in the KFENCE pool.
 	 */
-	if (rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled() ||
-	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE))
+	if (can_set_direct_map() || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE))
 		flags = NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS;
 
 	__create_pgd_mapping(swapper_pg_dir, start, __phys_to_virt(start),
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +9 -4
index b53ef37bf95a..d505172265b0 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ struct page_change_data {
 
 bool rodata_full __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED);
 
+bool can_set_direct_map(void)
+{
+	return rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled();
+}
+
 static int change_page_range(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, void *data)
 {
 	struct page_change_data *cdata = data;
@@ -156,7 +161,7 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 	};
 	unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 
-	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
+	if (!can_set_direct_map())
 		return 0;
 
 	return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
@@ -172,7 +177,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 	};
 	unsigned long size = PAGE_SIZE * numpages;
 
-	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
+	if (!can_set_direct_map())
 		return 0;
 
 	return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
@@ -183,7 +188,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
 void __kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable)
 {
-	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
+	if (!can_set_direct_map())
 		return;
 
 	set_memory_valid((unsigned long)page_address(page), numpages, enable);
@@ -208,7 +213,7 @@ bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page)
 	pte_t *ptep;
 	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
 
-	if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled() && !rodata_full)
+	if (!can_set_direct_map())
 		return true;
 
 	pgdp = pgd_offset_k(addr);
include/linux/set_memory.h +12 -0
index c650f82db813..7b4b6626032d 100644
@@ -28,7 +28,19 @@ static inline bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page)
 {
 	return true;
 }
+#else /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */
+/*
+ * Some architectures, e.g. ARM64 can disable direct map modifications at
+ * boot time. Let them overrive this query.
+ */
+#ifndef can_set_direct_map
+static inline bool can_set_direct_map(void)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map
 #endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */
 
 #ifndef set_mce_nospec
 static inline int set_mce_nospec(unsigned long pfn, bool unmap)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH v15 6/11 mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.

The user will create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the owning mm.

The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not accessible using direct/linear map addresses.

Functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area.

A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed.

The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted):

	fd = memfd_secret(0);
	ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE);
	ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Christopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Cc Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/secretmem.h  |  24 ++++
 include/uapi/linux/magic.h |   1 +
 kernel/sys_ni.c            |   2 +
 mm/Kconfig                 |   3 +
 mm/Makefile                |   1 +
 mm/gup.c                   |  10 ++
 mm/secretmem.c             | 276 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 317 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h
 create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
include/linux/secretmem.h new file +24 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..70e7db9f94fe
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
+#ifndef _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H
+#define _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECRETMEM
+
+bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page);
+
+#else
+
+static inline bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
include/uapi/linux/magic.h +1 -0
index f3956fc11de6..35687dcb1a42 100644
@@ -97,5 +97,6 @@
 #define DEVMEM_MAGIC		0x454d444d	/* "DMEM" */
 #define Z3FOLD_MAGIC		0x33
 #define PPC_CMM_MAGIC		0xc7571590
+#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC		0x5345434d	/* "SECM" */
 
 #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */
kernel/sys_ni.c +2 -0
index 769ad6225ab1..869aa6b5bf34 100644
@@ -355,6 +355,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect);
 COND_SYSCALL(pkey_alloc);
 COND_SYSCALL(pkey_free);
 
+/* memfd_secret */
+COND_SYSCALL(memfd_secret);
 
 /*
  * Architecture specific weak syscall entries.
mm/Kconfig +3 -0
index 24c045b24b95..5f8243442f66 100644
@@ -872,4 +872,7 @@ config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS
 config KMAP_LOCAL
 	bool
 
+config SECRETMEM
+	def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED
+
 endmenu
mm/Makefile +1 -0
index 72227b24a616..b2a564eec27f 100644
@@ -120,3 +120,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o
mm/gup.c +10 -0
index e4c224cd9661..3e086b073624 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/rmap.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/swapops.h>
+#include <linux/secretmem.h>
 
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
@@ -759,6 +760,9 @@ struct page *follow_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
 	struct follow_page_context ctx = { NULL };
 	struct page *page;
 
+	if (vma_is_secretmem(vma))
+		return NULL;
+
 	page = follow_page_mask(vma, address, foll_flags, &ctx);
 	if (ctx.pgmap)
 		put_dev_pagemap(ctx.pgmap);
@@ -892,6 +896,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)
 	if ((gup_flags & FOLL_LONGTERM) && vma_is_fsdax(vma))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	if (vma_is_secretmem(vma))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
 	if (write) {
 		if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
 			if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
@@ -2031,6 +2038,9 @@ static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
 		VM_BUG_ON(!pfn_valid(pte_pfn(pte)));
 		page = pte_page(pte);
 
+		if (page_is_secretmem(page))
+			goto pte_unmap;
+
 		head = try_grab_compound_head(page, 1, flags);
 		if (!head)
 			goto pte_unmap;
mm/secretmem.c new file +276 -0

276 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH v15 7/11 secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Removing a PAGE_SIZE page from the direct map every time such page is allocated for a secret memory mapping will cause severe fragmentation of the direct map. This fragmentation can be reduced by using PMD-size pages as a pool for small pages for secret memory mappings.

Add a gen_pool per secretmem inode and lazily populate this pool with PMD-size pages.

As pages allocated by secretmem become unmovable, use CMA to back large page caches so that page allocator won't be surprised by failing attempt to migrate these pages.

The CMA area used by secretmem is controlled by the "secretmem=" kernel parameter. This allows explicit control over the memory available for secretmem and provides upper hard limit for secretmem consumption.

Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Christopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Cc Hagen Paul Pfeifer <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Cc Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 mm/Kconfig     |   2 +
 mm/secretmem.c | 166 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
mm/Kconfig +2 -0
index 5f8243442f66..ec35bf406439 100644
@@ -874,5 +874,7 @@ config KMAP_LOCAL
 
 config SECRETMEM
 	def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED
+	select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR
+	select CMA
 
 endmenu
mm/secretmem.c +141 -25

262 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH v15 8/11 secretmem: add memcg accounting

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Account memory consumed by secretmem to memcg. The accounting is updated when the memory is actually allocated and freed.

Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Christopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Cc Hagen Paul Pfeifer <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 mm/filemap.c   |  3 ++-
 mm/secretmem.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/filemap.c +2 -1
index 2d0c6721879d..bb28dd6d9e22 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include <linux/psi.h>
 #include <linux/ramfs.h>
 #include <linux/page_idle.h>
+#include <linux/secretmem.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -839,7 +840,7 @@ noinline int __add_to_page_cache_locked(struct page *page,
 	page->mapping = mapping;
 	page->index = offset;
 
-	if (!huge) {
+	if (!huge && !page_is_secretmem(page)) {
 		error = mem_cgroup_charge(page, current->mm, gfp);
 		if (error)
 			goto error;
mm/secretmem.c +35 -1
index fe193bdedd76..3c6c037b3381 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
 #include <linux/secretmem.h>
+#include <linux/memcontrol.h>
 #include <linux/set_memory.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 
@@ -44,6 +45,32 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {
 
 static struct cma *secretmem_cma;
 
+static int secretmem_account_pages(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = memcg_kmem_charge_page(page, gfp, order);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/*
+	 * seceremem caches are unreclaimable kernel allocations, so treat
+	 * them as unreclaimable slab memory for VM statistics purposes
+	 */
+	mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B,
+			      PAGE_SIZE << order);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void secretmem_unaccount_pages(struct page *page, int order)
+{
+
+	mod_lruvec_page_state(page, NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B,
+			      -PAGE_SIZE << order);
+	memcg_kmem_uncharge_page(page, order);
+}
+
 static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	unsigned long nr_pages = (1 << PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
@@ -56,10 +83,14 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
 	if (!page)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+	err = secretmem_account_pages(page, gfp, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 	if (err)
 		goto err_cma_release;
 
+	err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_memcg_uncharge;
+
 	addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
 	err = gen_pool_add(pool, addr, PMD_SIZE, NUMA_NO_NODE);
 	if (err)
@@ -76,6 +107,8 @@ static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
 	 * won't fail
 	 */
 	set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+err_memcg_uncharge:
+	secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 err_cma_release:
 	cma_release(secretmem_cma, page, nr_pages);
 	return err;
@@ -307,6 +340,7 @@ static void secretmem_cleanup_chunk(struct gen_pool *pool,
 	int i;
 
 	set_direct_map_default_noflush(page, nr_pages);
+	secretmem_unaccount_pages(page, PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++)
 		clear_highpage(page + i);
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH v15 9/11 PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.

Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.

Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Christopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Cc Hagen Paul Pfeifer <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Cc Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/secretmem.h |  6 ++++++
 kernel/power/hibernate.c  |  5 ++++-
 mm/secretmem.c            | 15 +++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/secretmem.h +6 -0
index 70e7db9f94fe..907a6734059c 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page);
+bool secretmem_active(void);
 
 #else
 
@@ -19,6 +20,11 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static inline bool secretmem_active(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
kernel/power/hibernate.c +4 -1
index da0b41914177..559acef3fddb 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/genhd.h>
 #include <linux/ktime.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/secretmem.h>
 #include <trace/events/power.h>
 
 #include "power.h"
@@ -81,7 +82,9 @@ void hibernate_release(void)
 
 bool hibernation_available(void)
 {
-	return nohibernate == 0 && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION);
+	return nohibernate == 0 &&
+		!security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION) &&
+		!secretmem_active();
 }
 
 /**
mm/secretmem.c +15 -0
index 3c6c037b3381..2de06446ebf9 100644
@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {
 
 static struct cma *secretmem_cma;
 
+static atomic_t secretmem_users;
+
+bool secretmem_active(void)
+{
+	return !!atomic_read(&secretmem_users);
+}
+
 static int secretmem_account_pages(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order)
 {
 	int err;
@@ -186,6 +193,12 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = {
 	.fault = secretmem_fault,
 };
 
+static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&secretmem_users);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
@@ -208,6 +221,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = {
+	.release	= secretmem_release,
 	.mmap		= secretmem_mmap,
 };
 
@@ -323,6 +337,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags)
 	file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
 
 	fd_install(fd, file);
+	atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
 	return fd;
 
 err_put_fd:
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH v15 10/11 arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.

Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Christopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Cc Hagen Paul Pfeifer <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Cc Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h   | 1 +
 arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h        | 1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h               | 1 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h      | 6 +++++-
 mm/secretmem.c                         | 3 +++
 scripts/checksyscalls.sh               | 4 ++++
 8 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
index f83a70e07df8..ce2ee8f1e361 100644
@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@
 #define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT
 #define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS
 #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3
+#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET
 
 #include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
index 977ee6181dab..6c316093a1e5 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  */
 
 #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
+#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET
 
 #include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
 
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
index 02a349afaf9c..a1578cdf6d91 100644
@@ -447,3 +447,4 @@
 440	i386	process_madvise		sys_process_madvise
 441	i386	epoll_pwait2		sys_epoll_pwait2		compat_sys_epoll_pwait2
 442	i386	watch_mount		sys_watch_mount
+443	i386	memfd_secret		sys_memfd_secret
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
index d9bcc4e02588..d8ecd9df0942 100644
@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@
 440	common	process_madvise		sys_process_madvise
 441	common	epoll_pwait2		sys_epoll_pwait2
 442	common	watch_mount		sys_watch_mount
+443	common	memfd_secret		sys_memfd_secret
 
 #
 # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
include/linux/syscalls.h +1 -0
index 28bde029109d..4bc70ac0e993 100644
@@ -1039,6 +1039,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig,
 asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd(int pidfd, int fd, unsigned int flags);
 asmlinkage long sys_watch_mount(int dfd, const char __user *path,
 				unsigned int at_flags, int watch_fd, int watch_id);
+asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned long flags);
 
 /*
  * Architecture-specific system calls
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +5 -1
index ad58f661f4aa..26125974a8a2 100644
@@ -863,9 +863,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_process_madvise, sys_process_madvise)
 __SC_COMP(__NR_epoll_pwait2, sys_epoll_pwait2, compat_sys_epoll_pwait2)
 #define __NR_watch_mount 442
 __SYSCALL(__NR_watch_mount, sys_watch_mount)
+#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET
+#define __NR_memfd_secret 443
+__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret)
+#endif
 
 #undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 443
+#define __NR_syscalls 444
 
 /*
  * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
mm/secretmem.c +3 -0
index 2de06446ebf9..6f75c0c69c70 100644
@@ -420,6 +420,9 @@ static int __init secretmem_setup(char *str)
 	unsigned long reserved_size;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!can_set_direct_map())
+		return 0;
+
 	reserved_size = memparse(str, NULL);
 	if (!reserved_size)
 		return 0;
scripts/checksyscalls.sh +4 -0
index a18b47695f55..b7609958ee36 100755
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ cat << EOF
 #define __IGNORE_setrlimit	/* setrlimit */
 #endif
 
+#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET
+#define __IGNORE_memfd_secret
+#endif
+
 /* Missing flags argument */
 #define __IGNORE_renameat	/* renameat2 */
 
Signature · 4 lines
2.28.0
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH v15 11/11 secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)

In reply to Mike Rapoport

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail.

Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Christopher Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Cc Elena Reshetova <[email protected]>
Cc Hagen Paul Pfeifer <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Walmsley <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Cc Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore     |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile       |   3 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests    |  17 ++
 4 files changed, 316 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c
tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore +1 -0
index 9a35c3f6a557..c8deddc81e7a 100644
@@ -21,4 +21,5 @@ va_128TBswitch
 map_fixed_noreplace
 write_to_hugetlbfs
 hmm-tests
+memfd_secret
 local_config.*
tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile +2 -1
index d42115e4284d..0200fb61646c 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += khugepaged
 TEST_GEN_FILES += map_fixed_noreplace
 TEST_GEN_FILES += map_hugetlb
 TEST_GEN_FILES += map_populate
+TEST_GEN_FILES += memfd_secret
 TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock-random-test
 TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock2-tests
 TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_dontunmap
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ warn_32bit_failure:
 endif
 endif
 
-$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test: LDLIBS += -lcap
+$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test $(OUTPUT)/memfd_secret: LDLIBS += -lcap
 
 $(OUTPUT)/gup_test: ../../../../mm/gup_test.h
 
tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c new file +296 -0

296 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests +17 -0
index e953f3cd9664..95a67382f132 100755
@@ -346,4 +346,21 @@ else
 	exitcode=1
 fi
 
+echo "running memfd_secret test"
+echo "------------------------------------"
+./memfd_secret
+ret_val=$?
+
+if [ $ret_val -eq 0 ]; then
+	echo "[PASS]"
+elif [ $ret_val -eq $ksft_skip ]; then
+	echo "[SKIP]"
+	exitcode=$ksft_skip
+else
+	echo "[FAIL]"
+	exitcode=1
+fi
+
+exit $exitcode
+
 exit $exitcode
Signature · 4 lines
2.28.0
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
maintainer
#10 lore raw
In reply to Mike Rapoport
Quoted 21 lines · Mike Rapoport
mm/secretmem.c new file +21 -0
+static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map
+	 * fragmentation
+	 */
+	return alloc_page(gfp);
+}
+
+static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+	struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file);
+	pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	struct page *page;
+	int err;
+
+	if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
+		return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
+

mm/secretmem.c line 71

Quoted 10 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +10 -0
+retry:
+	page = find_lock_page(mapping, offset);
+	if (!page) {
+		page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask);
+		if (!page)
+			return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+
+		err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1);
+		if (err)
+			return vmf_error(err);

Haven't we leaked the page at this point?

mm/secretmem.c line 74

Quoted 2 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +2 -0
+		__SetPageUptodate(page);
+		err = add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask);

At this point, doesn't the page contain data from the last person to use the page? ie we've leaked data to this process? I don't see anywhere that we write data to the page.

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[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

author maintainer
#11 lore raw
Quoted 26 lines · Matthew Wilcox
Quoted 25 lines · Mike Rapoport
mm/secretmem.c new file +25 -0
+static struct page *secretmem_alloc_page(gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: use a cache of large pages to reduce the direct map
+	 * fragmentation
+	 */
+	return alloc_page(gfp);
+}
+
+static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+	struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file);
+	pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	struct page *page;
+	int err;
+
+	if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
+		return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
+
+retry:
+	page = find_lock_page(mapping, offset);
+	if (!page) {
+		page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask);
Quoted 8 lines

mm/secretmem.c line 71

Quoted 6 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +6 -0
+		if (!page)
+			return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+
+		err = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1);
+		if (err)
+			return vmf_error(err);

Haven't we leaked the page at this point?

Well, yes. :(

But this code is anyway changed in the next patch. Is this really so important to fix this in the middle of the series?

Quoted 6 lines

mm/secretmem.c line 74

Quoted 2 lines
mm/secretmem.c new file +2 -0
+		__SetPageUptodate(page);
+		err = add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask);

At this point, doesn't the page contain data from the last person to use the page? ie we've leaked data to this process? I don't see anywhere that we write data to the page.

The data is visible for all processes that share the file descriptor. So no, we don't leak anything unless the file descriptor itself is leaked.

Did you have a particular scenario in mind?

Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
maintainer
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v15 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation

In reply to Mike Rapoport

mm/secretmem.c line 57

Quoted 11 lines · Mike Rapoport
mm/secretmem.c +10 -0
+static int secretmem_pool_increase(struct secretmem_ctx *ctx, gfp_t gfp)
 {
+	unsigned long nr_pages = (1 << PMD_PAGE_ORDER);
+	struct gen_pool *pool = ctx->pool;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	struct page *page;
+	int err;
+
+	page = cma_alloc(secretmem_cma, nr_pages, PMD_SIZE, gfp & __GFP_NOWARN);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;

Does cma_alloc() zero the pages it allocates? If not, where do we avoid leaking kernel memory to userspace?

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maintainer Reviewed-by Acked-by on v15 3/11
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v15 03/11] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU

In reply to Mike Rapoport
Quoted 19 lines · On Wed, 20 Jan 2021 10:06:04 PST (-0800), [email protected] wrote:

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP and ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY configuration options have no meaning when CONFIG_MMU is disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case.

Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options.

---
 arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/riscv/Kconfig +0 -0
index d82303dcc6b6..d35ce19ab1fa 100644

arch/riscv/Kconfig config RISCV · line 32

Quoted 10 lines
arch/riscv/Kconfig +2 -2
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ config RISCV
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
 	select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB
 	select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
-	select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
-	select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
+	select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP if MMU
+	select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY if MMU
 	select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if MMU
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT

LMK if you want this to go in via the RISC-V tree, otherwise I'm going to assume it's going in along with the rest of these. FWIW I see these in other architectures without the MMU guard.

Thanks!

author maintainer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v15 03/11] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU

Quoted 34 lines · Palmer Dabbelt
Quoted 19 lines · On Wed, 20 Jan 2021 10:06:04 PST (-0800), [email protected] wrote:

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP and ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY configuration options have no meaning when CONFIG_MMU is disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case.

Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options.

---
 arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/riscv/Kconfig +0 -0
index d82303dcc6b6..d35ce19ab1fa 100644

arch/riscv/Kconfig config RISCV · line 32

Quoted 10 lines
arch/riscv/Kconfig +2 -2
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ config RISCV
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
 	select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB
 	select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
-	select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
-	select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
+	select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP if MMU
+	select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY if MMU
 	select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if MMU
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
Quoted 3 lines

LMK if you want this to go in via the RISC-V tree, otherwise I'm going to assume it's going in along with the rest of these. FWIW I see these in other architectures without the MMU guard.

Except arm, they all always have MMU=y and arm selects only ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY and has empty stubs for those when MMU=n.

Indeed I might have been over zealous adding ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY dependency on MMU, as riscv also has these stubs, but I thought that making this explicit is a nice thing.

Quoted 1 line

Thanks!

Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
maintainer
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v15 03/11] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU

Quoted 35 lines · On Sat, 23 Jan 2021 03:00:41 PST (-0800), [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 34 lines · Palmer Dabbelt
Quoted 19 lines · On Wed, 20 Jan 2021 10:06:04 PST (-0800), [email protected] wrote:

From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>

ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP and ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY configuration options have no meaning when CONFIG_MMU is disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case.

Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options.

---
 arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/riscv/Kconfig +0 -0
index d82303dcc6b6..d35ce19ab1fa 100644

arch/riscv/Kconfig config RISCV · line 32

Quoted 10 lines
arch/riscv/Kconfig +2 -2
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ config RISCV
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
 	select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB
 	select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
-	select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
-	select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
+	select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP if MMU
+	select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY if MMU
 	select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if MMU
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

LMK if you want this to go in via the RISC-V tree, otherwise I'm going to assume it's going in along with the rest of these. FWIW I see these in other architectures without the MMU guard.

Except arm, they all always have MMU=y and arm selects only ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY and has empty stubs for those when MMU=n.

OK, maybe I just checked ARM, then. I was just making sure.

Quoted 3 lines

Indeed I might have been over zealous adding ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY dependency on MMU, as riscv also has these stubs, but I thought that making this explicit is a nice thing.

It seems reasonable to me.

Thanks!