mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Subsystems (20)
Mike Rapoport
maintainerv18 cover mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Hi,
@Andrew, this is based on v5.12-rc1, I can rebase whatever way you prefer.
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm.
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Additionally, in the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host.
For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git
that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification.
Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows usage of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks.
The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future.
Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time.
In addition, there is also a long term goal to improve management of the direct map.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
v18:
* rebase on v5.12-rc1
* merge kfence fix into the original patch
* massage commit message of the patch introducing the memfd_secret syscall
v17: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Remove pool of large pages backing secretmem allocations, per Michal Hocko
* Add secretmem pages to unevictable LRU, per Michal Hocko
* Use GFP_HIGHUSER as secretmem mapping mask, per Michal Hocko
* Make secretmem an opt-in feature that is disabled by default
v16: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Fix memory leak intorduced in v15
* Clean the data left from previous page user before handing the page to the userspace
v15: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Add riscv/Kconfig update to disable set_memory operations for nommu builds (patch 3)
* Update the code around add_to_page_cache() per Matthew's comments (patches 6,7)
* Add fixups for build/checkpatch errors discovered by CI systems
v14: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Finally s/mod_node_page_state/mod_lruvec_page_state/
v13: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
* Added Reviewed-by, thanks Catalin and David
* s/mod_node_page_state/mod_lruvec_page_state/ as Shakeel suggested
Older history:
v12: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v11: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v10: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v9: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]
rfc-v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
rfc-v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200130162340.GA14232@rapoport-lnx/
rfc-v0: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Mike Rapoport (9):
mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages
set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant
secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)
arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 6 - arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 ++ arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 6 +- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 23 +- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 +- fs/dax.c | 11 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 + include/linux/secretmem.h | 30 +++ include/linux/set_memory.h | 16 +- include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +- include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 +- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 +- kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 3 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/gup.c | 10 + mm/internal.h | 3 + mm/mlock.c | 3 +- mm/mmap.c | 5 +- mm/secretmem.c | 261 +++++++++++++++++++ mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +- scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh | 17 ++ 39 files changed, 726 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c
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2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v18 1/9 mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
The definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER denoting the number of base pages in the second-level leaf page is already used by DAX and maybe handy in other cases as well.
Several architectures already have definition of PMD_ORDER as the size of second level page table, so to avoid conflict with these definitions use PMD_PAGE_ORDER name and update DAX respectively.
--- fs/dax.c | 11 ++++------- include/linux/pgtable.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/dax.c +4 -7
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ static inline unsigned int pe_order(enum page_entry_size pe_size)#define PG_PMD_COLOUR ((PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) - 1)#define PG_PMD_NR (PMD_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT) -/* The order of a PMD entry */ -#define PMD_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -static wait_queue_head_t wait_table[DAX_WAIT_TABLE_ENTRIES ];static int __init init_dax_wait_table (void )
@@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ static bool dax_is_locked(void *entry)static unsigned int dax_entry_order (void *entry) {if (xa_to_value (entry) &DAX_PMD ) -return PMD_ORDER ; +return PMD_PAGE_ORDER ;return 0 ; }
@@ -1471,7 +1468,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp, {struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping; -XA_STATE_ORDER (xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff,PMD_ORDER ); +XA_STATE_ORDER (xas, &mapping->i_pages, vmf->pgoff,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );unsigned long pmd_addr = vmf->address &PMD_MASK ;bool write = vmf->flags &FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;bool sync;
@@ -1530,7 +1527,7 @@ static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp,* entry is already in the array, for instance), it will return * VM_FAULT_FALLBACK. */ - entry =grab_mapping_entry (&xas, mapping,PMD_ORDER ); + entry =grab_mapping_entry (&xas, mapping,PMD_PAGE_ORDER );if (xa_is_internal (entry)) { result =xa_to_internal (entry); goto fallback;
@@ -1696,7 +1693,7 @@ dax_insert_pfn_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t pfn, unsigned int order)if (order ==0 ) ret =vmf_insert_mixed_mkwrite (vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn);#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD - else if (order == PMD_ORDER) + else if (order == PMD_PAGE_ORDER) ret =vmf_insert_pfn_pmd (vmf, pfn,FAULT_FLAG_WRITE );#endif else
include/linux/pgtable.h +3 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@#define USER_PGTABLES_CEILING 0UL#endif +/* Number of base pages in a second level leaf page */ +#define PMD_PAGE_ORDER (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) +/* * A page table page can be thought of an array like this: pXd_t[PTRS_PER_PxD] *
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2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v18 2/9 mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation.
--- mm/internal.h | 3 +++ mm/mmap.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/internal.h +3 -0
@@ -353,6 +353,9 @@ static inline void munlock_vma_pages_all(struct vm_area_struct *vma)extern void mlock_vma_page (struct page *page);extern unsigned int munlock_vma_page (struct page *page); +extern int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long len); +/* * Clear the page's PageMlocked(). This can be useful in a situation where * we want to unconditionally remove a page from the pagecache -- e.g.,
mm/mmap.c +2 -3
@@ -1346,9 +1346,8 @@ static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)return hint; } -static inline int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm, -unsigned long flags, -unsigned long len) +int mlock_future_check (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long len) {unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
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2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v18 3/9 riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP and ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY configuration options have no meaning when CONFIG_MMU is disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case.
Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options.
--- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/riscv/Kconfig +2 -2
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ config RISCV select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_HAS_MMIOWB select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL - select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP - select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY + select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP if MMU + select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY if MMU select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX if MMU select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
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Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v18 4/9 set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
The underlying implementations of set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() allow updating multiple contiguous pages at once.
Add numpages parameter to set_direct_map_*_noflush() to expose this ability with these APIs.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c | 8 ++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 ++++---- include/linux/set_memory.h | 4 ++-- kernel/power/snapshot.c | 4 ++-- mm/vmalloc.c | 5 +++-- 9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +2 -2
@@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void)int set_memory_valid (unsigned long addr,int numpages,int enable); -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page);#include <asm-generic/cacheflush.h>
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +6 -4
@@ -148,34 +148,36 @@ int set_memory_valid(unsigned long addr, int numpages, int enable) __pgprot(PTE_VALID)); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {struct page_change_data data = { .set_mask =__pgprot (0 ), .clear_mask =__pgprot (PTE_VALID ), }; +unsigned long size =PAGE_SIZE * numpages;if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full)return 0 ;return apply_to_page_range (&init_mm, (unsigned long )page_address (page), -PAGE_SIZE , change_page_range, &data); + size, change_page_range, &data); } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {struct page_change_data data = { .set_mask =__pgprot (PTE_VALID |PTE_WRITE ), .clear_mask =__pgprot (PTE_RDONLY ), }; +unsigned long size =PAGE_SIZE * numpages;if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full)return 0 ;return apply_to_page_range (&init_mm, (unsigned long )page_address (page), -PAGE_SIZE , change_page_range, &data); + size, change_page_range, &data); }#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
arch/riscv/include/asm/set_memory.h +2 -2
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ static inline void protect_kernel_text_data(void) {}static inline int set_memory_rw_nx (unsigned long addr,int numpages) {return 0 ; }#endif -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page);#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/riscv/mm/pageattr.c +4 -4
@@ -156,11 +156,11 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages)return __set_memory (addr, numpages,__pgprot (0 ),__pgprot (_PAGE_EXEC)); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {int ret;unsigned long start = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE ; +unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE * numpages;struct pageattr_masks masks = { .set_mask =__pgprot (0 ), .clear_mask =__pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT)
@@ -173,11 +173,11 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page)return ret; } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {int ret;unsigned long start = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE ; +unsigned long end = start +PAGE_SIZE * numpages;struct pageattr_masks masks = { .set_mask =PAGE_KERNEL , .clear_mask =__pgprot (0 )
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +2 -2
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ int set_pages_wb(struct page *page, int numpages);int set_pages_ro (struct page *page,int numpages);int set_pages_rw (struct page *page,int numpages); -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page); +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page);extern int kernel_set_to_readonly;
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +4 -4
@@ -2184,14 +2184,14 @@ static int __set_pages_np(struct page *page, int numpages)return __change_page_attr_set_clr (&cpa,0 ); } -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) { -return __set_pages_np (page,1 ); +return __set_pages_np (page, numpages); } -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) { -return __set_pages_p (page,1 ); +return __set_pages_p (page, numpages); }#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
include/linux/set_memory.h +2 -2
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ static inline int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages) { return 0; }#endif #ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP -static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page) +static inline int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {return 0 ; } -static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page) +static inline int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages) {return 0 ; }
kernel/power/snapshot.c +2 -2
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static inline void hibernate_restore_unprotect_page(void *page_address) {}static inline void hibernate_map_page (struct page *page) {if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP )) { -int ret =set_direct_map_default_noflush (page); +int ret =set_direct_map_default_noflush (page,1 );if (ret)pr_warn_once ("Failed to remap page\n" );
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static inline void hibernate_unmap_page(struct page *page) {if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP )) {unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -int ret =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page); +int ret =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page,1 );if (ret)pr_warn_once ("Failed to remap page\n" );
mm/vmalloc.c +3 -2
@@ -2195,13 +2195,14 @@ struct vm_struct *remove_vm_area(const void *addr) }static inline void set_area_direct_map (const struct vm_struct *area, -int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page)) +int (*set_direct_map)(struct page *page, +int numpages)) {int i;for (i =0 ; i < area->nr_pages; i++)if (page_address (area->pages[i])) -set_direct_map (area->pages[i]); +set_direct_map (area->pages[i],1 ); }/* Handle removing and resetting vm mappings related to the vm_struct. */
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2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v18 5/9 set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
On arm64, set_direct_map_*() functions may return 0 without actually changing the linear map. This behaviour can be controlled using kernel parameters, so we need a way to determine at runtime whether calls to set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() have any effect.
Extend set_memory API with can_set_direct_map() function that allows checking if calling set_direct_map_*() will actually change the page table, replace several occurrences of open coded checks in arm64 with the new function and provide a generic stub for architectures that always modify page tables upon calls to set_direct_map APIs.
[[email protected]: arm64: kfence: fix header inclusion ]
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild | 1 - arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 6 ------ arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 6 +++--- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 13 +++++++++---- include/linux/set_memory.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/Kbuild +0 -1
@@ -3,5 +3,4 @@ generic-y += early_ioremap.h generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h generic-y += qrwlock.h generic-y += qspinlock.h -generic-y += set_memory.h generic-y += user.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h +0 -6
@@ -131,12 +131,6 @@ static __always_inline void __flush_icache_all(void) dsb(ish); } -int set_memory_valid (unsigned long addr,int numpages,int enable); - -int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); -int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); -bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page); -#include <asm-generic/cacheflush.h> #endif /* __ASM_CACHEFLUSH_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h +1 -1
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@#ifndef __ASM_KFENCE_H#define __ASM_KFENCE_H -#include <asm/cacheflush.h> +#include <asm/set_memory.h> static inline bool arch_kfence_init_pool (void ) {return true; }
arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h new file +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H +#define _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H + +#include <asm-generic/set_memory.h> + +bool can_set_direct_map (void ); +#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map + +int set_memory_valid (unsigned long addr,int numpages,int enable); + +int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page,int numpages); +bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page); + +#endif /* _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> #include <linux/page-flags.h> +#include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <linux/smp.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +3 -3
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <asm/barrier.h> #include <asm/cputype.h>
@@ -492,7 +493,7 @@ static void __init map_mem(pgd_t *pgdp)int flags =0 ;u64 i; -if (rodata_full || crash_mem_map ||debug_pagealloc_enabled ()) +if (can_set_direct_map () || crash_mem_map) flags =NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS |NO_CONT_MAPPINGS ;/*
@@ -1470,8 +1471,7 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,* KFENCE requires linear map to be mapped at page granularity, so that * it is possible to protect/unprotect single pages in the KFENCE pool. */ -if (rodata_full ||debug_pagealloc_enabled () || -IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KFENCE )) +if (can_set_direct_map () ||IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KFENCE )) flags =NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS |NO_CONT_MAPPINGS ; __create_pgd_mapping(swapper_pg_dir, start, __phys_to_virt(start),
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +9 -4
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ struct page_change_data {bool rodata_full__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED ); +bool can_set_direct_map (void ) +{ +return rodata_full ||debug_pagealloc_enabled (); +} +static int change_page_range (pte_t *ptep,unsigned long addr,void *data) {struct page_change_data *cdata = data;
@@ -156,7 +161,7 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) };unsigned long size =PAGE_SIZE * numpages; -if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full) +if (!can_set_direct_map ())return 0 ; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
@@ -172,7 +177,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages) };unsigned long size =PAGE_SIZE * numpages; -if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full) +if (!can_set_direct_map ())return 0 ; return apply_to_page_range(&init_mm,
@@ -183,7 +188,7 @@ int set_direct_map_default_noflush(struct page *page, int numpages)#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC void __kernel_map_pages (struct page *page,int numpages,int enable) { -if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full) +if (!can_set_direct_map ())return ;set_memory_valid ((unsigned long )page_address (page), numpages, enable);
@@ -208,7 +213,7 @@ bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page)pte_t *ptep;unsigned long addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page); -if (!debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !rodata_full) +if (!can_set_direct_map ())return true; pgdp =pgd_offset_k (addr);
include/linux/set_memory.h +12 -0
@@ -28,7 +28,19 @@ static inline bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page) {return true; } +#else /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */ +/* +* Some architectures, e.g. ARM64 can disable direct map modifications at +* boot time. Let them overrive this query. +*/ +#ifndef can_set_direct_map +static inline bool can_set_direct_map (void ) +{ +return true; +} +#define can_set_direct_map can_set_direct_map#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */ #ifndef set_mce_nospecstatic inline int set_mce_nospec (unsigned long pfn,bool unmap)
Signature · 4 lines
2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v18 6/9 mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.
The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time.
Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor.
The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explict and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userpace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says:
"Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work
in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse."
memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extention to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs.
The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area.
Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel.
Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time.
Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration.
Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings.
However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA.
A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page.
The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted):
fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
--- include/linux/secretmem.h | 24 ++++ include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 1 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 + mm/Kconfig | 3 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/gup.c | 10 ++ mm/mlock.c | 3 +- mm/secretmem.c | 246 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 289 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/secretmem.h create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c
include/linux/secretmem.h new file +24 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +#ifndef _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H +#define _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECRETMEM + +bool vma_is_secretmem (struct vm_area_struct *vma); +bool page_is_secretmem (struct page *page); + +#else + +static inline bool vma_is_secretmem (struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool page_is_secretmem (struct page *page) +{ +return false; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ + +#endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
include/uapi/linux/magic.h +1 -0
@@ -97,5 +97,6 @@#define DEVMEM_MAGIC 0x454d444d/* "DMEM" */ #define Z3FOLD_MAGIC 0x33#define PPC_CMM_MAGIC 0xc7571590 +#define SECRETMEM_MAGIC 0x5345434d/* "SECM" */ #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */
kernel/sys_ni.c +2 -0
@@ -352,6 +352,8 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect);COND_SYSCALL (pkey_alloc);COND_SYSCALL (pkey_free); +/* memfd_secret */ +COND_SYSCALL (memfd_secret);/* * Architecture specific weak syscall entries.
mm/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -872,4 +872,7 @@ config MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS config KMAP_LOCAL bool +config SECRETMEM + def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED + endmenu
mm/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -120,3 +120,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o
mm/gup.c +10 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#include <linux/rmap.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/swapops.h> +#include <linux/secretmem.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/rwsem.h>
@@ -758,6 +759,9 @@ struct page *follow_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,struct follow_page_context ctx = {NULL };struct page *page; +if (vma_is_secretmem (vma)) +return NULL ; + page =follow_page_mask (vma, address, foll_flags, &ctx);if (ctx.pgmap)put_dev_pagemap (ctx.pgmap);
@@ -891,6 +895,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)if ((gup_flags &FOLL_LONGTERM ) &&vma_is_fsdax (vma))return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (vma_is_secretmem (vma)) +return -EFAULT ; +if (write) {if (!(vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) {if (!(gup_flags &FOLL_FORCE ))
@@ -2030,6 +2037,9 @@ static int gup_pte_range(pmd_t pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,VM_BUG_ON (!pfn_valid (pte_pfn (pte))); page =pte_page (pte); +if (page_is_secretmem (page)) + goto pte_unmap; + head =try_grab_compound_head (page,1 , flags);if (!head) goto pte_unmap;
mm/mlock.c +2 -1
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/memcontrol.h> #include <linux/mm_inline.h> +#include <linux/secretmem.h> #include "internal.h"
@@ -503,7 +504,7 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **prev,if (newflags == vma->vm_flags || (vma->vm_flags &VM_SPECIAL ) ||is_vm_hugetlb_page (vma) || vma ==get_gate_vma (current->mm) || -vma_is_dax (vma)) +vma_is_dax (vma) ||vma_is_secretmem (vma))/* don't set VM_LOCKED or VM_LOCKONFAULT and don't count */ goto out;
mm/secretmem.c new file +246 -0
246 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 4 lines
2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v18 7/9 PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
--- include/linux/secretmem.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/power/hibernate.c | 5 ++++- mm/secretmem.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/secretmem.h +6 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@bool vma_is_secretmem (struct vm_area_struct *vma);bool page_is_secretmem (struct page *page); +bool secretmem_active (void );#else
@@ -19,6 +20,11 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page)return false; } +static inline bool secretmem_active (void ) +{ +return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */ #endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
kernel/power/hibernate.c +4 -1
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#include <linux/genhd.h> #include <linux/ktime.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/secretmem.h> #include <trace/events/power.h> #include "power.h"
@@ -81,7 +82,9 @@ void hibernate_release(void)bool hibernation_available (void ) { -return nohibernate ==0 && !security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION ); +return nohibernate ==0 && + !security_locked_down (LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION ) && + !secretmem_active (); }/**
mm/secretmem.c +15 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ module_param_named(enable, secretmem_enable, bool, 0400);MODULE_PARM_DESC (secretmem_enable,"Enable secretmem and memfd_secret(2) system call" ); +static atomic_t secretmem_users; + +bool secretmem_active (void ) +{ +return !!atomic_read (&secretmem_users); +} +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf) {struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
@@ -94,6 +101,12 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = { .fault = secretmem_fault, }; +static int secretmem_release (struct inode *inode,struct file *file) +{ +atomic_dec (&secretmem_users); +return 0 ; +} +static int secretmem_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
@@ -116,6 +129,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma) }static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = { + .release = secretmem_release, .mmap = secretmem_mmap, };
@@ -212,6 +226,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags) file->f_flags |=O_LARGEFILE ;fd_install (fd, file); +atomic_inc (&secretmem_users);return fd; err_put_fd:
Signature · 4 lines
2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v18 8/9 arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.
--- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 6 +++++- scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 ++++ 7 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
@@ -20,5 +20,6 @@#define __ARCH_WANT_SET_GET_RLIMIT#define __ARCH_WANT_TIME32_SYSCALLS#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE3 +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET#include <asm-generic/unistd.h>
arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@*/ #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE +#define __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET#include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -447,3 +447,4 @@ 440 i386 process_madvise sys_process_madvise 441 i386 epoll_pwait2 sys_epoll_pwait2 compat_sys_epoll_pwait2 442 i386 mount_setattr sys_mount_setattr +443 i386 memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ 440 common process_madvise sys_process_madvise 441 common epoll_pwait2 sys_epoll_pwait2 442 common mount_setattr sys_mount_setattr +443 common memfd_secret sys_memfd_secret # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
include/linux/syscalls.h +1 -0
@@ -1041,6 +1041,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_send_signal(int pidfd, int sig,siginfo_t __user *info, unsigned int flags);asmlinkage long sys_pidfd_getfd (int pidfd,int fd,unsigned int flags); +asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret (unsigned long flags);/* * Architecture-specific system calls
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +5 -1
@@ -863,9 +863,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_process_madvise, sys_process_madvise) __SC_COMP(__NR_epoll_pwait2, sys_epoll_pwait2, compat_sys_epoll_pwait2)#define __NR_mount_setattr 442 __SYSCALL(__NR_mount_setattr, sys_mount_setattr) +#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __NR_memfd_secret 443 +__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_secret, sys_memfd_secret) +#endif #undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 443 +#define __NR_syscalls 444/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
scripts/checksyscalls.sh +4 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ cat << EOF #define __IGNORE_setrlimit /* setrlimit */ #endif +#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_MEMFD_SECRET +#define __IGNORE_memfd_secret +#endif + /* Missing flags argument */ #define __IGNORE_renameat /* renameat2 */
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2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Mike Rapoport
maintainerPATCH v18 9/9 secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)
In reply to Mike RapoportFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail.
--- tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c | 296 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh | 17 ++ 4 files changed, 316 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c
tools/testing/selftests/vm/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -21,4 +21,5 @@ va_128TBswitch map_fixed_noreplace write_to_hugetlbfs hmm-tests +memfd_secret local_config.*
tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += khugepaged TEST_GEN_FILES += map_fixed_noreplace TEST_GEN_FILES += map_hugetlb TEST_GEN_FILES += map_populate +TEST_GEN_FILES += memfd_secret TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock-random-test TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock2-tests TEST_GEN_FILES += mremap_dontunmap
@@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ warn_32bit_failure: endif endif -$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test: LDLIBS += -lcap +$(OUTPUT)/mlock-random-test $(OUTPUT)/memfd_secret: LDLIBS += -lcap $(OUTPUT)/gup_test: ../../../../mm/gup_test.h
tools/testing/selftests/vm/memfd_secret.c new file +296 -0
296 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/vm/run_vmtests.sh +17 -0
@@ -346,4 +346,21 @@ else exitcode=1 fi +echo "running memfd_secret test" +echo "------------------------------------" +./memfd_secret +ret_val=$? + +if [ $ret_val -eq 0 ]; then + echo "[PASS]" +elif [ $ret_val -eq $ksft_skip ]; then + echo "[SKIP]" + exitcode=$ksft_skip +else + echo "[FAIL]" + exitcode=1 +fi + +exit $exitcode + exit $exitcode
Signature · 4 lines
2.28.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
Andrew Morton
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 18:22:00 +0200 Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> wrote:
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm.
Quoted 4 lines
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
I continue to struggle with this and I don't recall seeing much enthusiasm from others. Perhaps we're all missing the value point and some additional selling is needed.
Am I correct in understanding that the overall direction here is to protect keys (and perhaps other things) from kernel bugs? That if the kernel was bug-free then there would be no need for this feature? If so, that's a bit sad. But realistic I guess.
Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems optimistic, doesn't it?
I think that a very complete description of the threats which this feature addresses would be helpful.
Quoted 19 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 11 lines · On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 18:22:00 +0200 Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> wrote:
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm.Quoted 4 lines
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Quoted 8 lines
I continue to struggle with this and I don't recall seeing much enthusiasm from others. Perhaps we're all missing the value point and some additional selling is needed.
Am I correct in understanding that the overall direction here is to protect keys (and perhaps other things) from kernel bugs? That if the kernel was bug-free then there would be no need for this feature? If so, that's a bit sad. But realistic I guess.
Secret memory really serves several purposes. The "increase the level of difficulty of secret exfiltration" you describe. And, as you say, if the kernel were bug free this wouldn't be necessary.
But also:
1. Memory safety for use space code. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere.
2. It also serves as a basis for context protection of virtual machines, but other groups are working on this aspect, and it is broadly similar to the secret exfiltration from the kernel problem.
Quoted 4 lines
Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems optimistic, doesn't it?
Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is to be completely secure against root trying to extract the secret (some what similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege escalation and to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP gadgets.
The ROP gadget thing needs more explanation: the usual defeatist approach is to say that once the attacker gains the stack, they can do anything because they can find enough ROP gadgets to be turing complete. However, in the real world, given the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization making finding gadgets really hard, usually the attacker gets one or at most two gadgets to string together. Not having any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks.
Quoted 2 lines
I think that a very complete description of the threats which this feature addresses would be helpful.
It's designed to protect against three different threats:
1. Detection of user secret memory mismanagement
2. significant protection against privilege escalation
3. enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks.
Do you want us to add this to one of the patch descriptions?
James
Quoted 33 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 19 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 11 lines · On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 18:22:00 +0200 Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> wrote:
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm.Quoted 4 lines
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Quoted 8 lines
I continue to struggle with this and I don't recall seeing much enthusiasm from others. Perhaps we're all missing the value point and some additional selling is needed.
Am I correct in understanding that the overall direction here is to protect keys (and perhaps other things) from kernel bugs? That if the kernel was bug-free then there would be no need for this feature? If so, that's a bit sad. But realistic I guess.
Secret memory really serves several purposes. The "increase the level of difficulty of secret exfiltration" you describe. And, as you say, if the kernel were bug free this wouldn't be necessary.
Quoted 5 lines
But also:
1. Memory safety for use space code. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere.
That's an interesting point I didn't realize so far.
Quoted 4 lines
2. It also serves as a basis for context protection of virtual machines, but other groups are working on this aspect, and it is broadly similar to the secret exfiltration from the kernel problem.
I was wondering if this also helps against CPU microcode issues like spectre and friends.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems optimistic, doesn't it?
Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is to be completely secure against root trying to extract the secret (some what similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege escalation and to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP gadget.
What stops "root" from mapping /dev/mem and reading that memory?
IOW, would we want to enforce "CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM" with CONFIG_SECRETMEM?
Also, there is a way to still read that memory when root by
1. Having kdump active (which would often be the case, but maybe not to dump user pages )
2. Triggering a kernel crash (easy via proc as root)
3. Waiting for the reboot after kump() created the dump and then reading the content from disk.
Or, as an attacker, load a custom kexec() kernel and read memory from the new environment. Of course, the latter two are advanced mechanisms, but they are possible when root. We might be able to mitigate, for example, by zeroing out secretmem pages before booting into the kexec kernel, if we care :)
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Quoted 53 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 36 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 25 lines · Andrew Morton
On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 18:22:00 +0200 Mike Rapoport <[email protected]
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 12 lines · wrote:
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm.Quoted 4 lines
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
I continue to struggle with this and I don't recall seeing much enthusiasm from others. Perhaps we're all missing the value point and some additional selling is needed.
Quoted 5 lines
Am I correct in understanding that the overall direction here is to protect keys (and perhaps other things) from kernel bugs? That if the kernel was bug-free then there would be no need for this feature? If so, that's a bit sad. But realistic I guess.
Secret memory really serves several purposes. The "increase the level of difficulty of secret exfiltration" you describe. And, as you say, if the kernel were bug free this wouldn't be necessary.
Quoted 6 lines
But also:
1. Memory safety for use space code. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the
kernel to be
transmitted somewhere.That's an interesting point I didn't realize so far.
Quoted 6 lines
2. It also serves as a basis for context protection of virtual machines, but other groups are working on this aspect, and
it is
broadly similar to the secret exfiltration from the kernel
problem.
Quoted 2 lines
I was wondering if this also helps against CPU microcode issues like spectre and friends.
It can for VMs, but not really for the user space secret memory use cases ... the in-kernel mitigations already present are much more effective.
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Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems optimistic, doesn't it?
Quoted 7 lines
Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is to be completely secure against root trying to extract the secret (some what similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege escalation and to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP gadget.
Quoted 1 line
What stops "root" from mapping
/dev/memand reading that memory?
/dev/mem uses the direct map for the copy at least for read/write, so it gets a fault in the same way root trying to use ptrace does. I think we've protected mmap, but Mike would know that better than I.
Quoted 2 lines
IOW, would we want to enforce "
CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM" withCONFIG_SECRETMEM?
Unless there's a corner case I haven't thought of, I don't think it adds much. However, doing a full lockdown on a public system where users want to use secret memory is best practice I think (except I think you want it to be the full secure boot lockdown to close all the root holes).
Quoted 7 lines
Also, there is a way to still read that memory when root by
1. Having kdump active (which would often be the case, but maybe not to dump user pages )
2. Triggering a kernel crash (easy via proc as root)
3. Waiting for the reboot afterkump()created the dump and then reading the content from disk.
Anything that can leave physical memory intact but boot to a kernel where the missing direct map entry is restored could theoretically extract the secret. However, it's not exactly going to be a stealthy extraction ...
Quoted 5 lines
Or, as an attacker, load a custom
kexec()kernel and read memory from the new environment. Of course, the latter two are advanced mechanisms, but they are possible when root. We might be able to mitigate, for example, by zeroing out secretmem pages before booting into the kexec kernel, if we care :)
I think we could handle it by marking the region, yes, and a zero on shutdown might be useful ... it would prevent all warm reboot type attacks.
James
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Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems optimistic, doesn't it?
Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is to be completely secure against root trying to extract the secret (some what similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege escalation and to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP gadget.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
What stops "root" from mapping
/dev/memand reading that memory?
/dev/memuses the direct map for the copy at least for read/write, so it gets a fault in the same way root trying to use ptrace does. I think we've protected mmap, but Mike would know that better than I.
I'm more concerned about the mmap case -> remap_pfn_range(). Anybody going via the VMA shouldn't see the struct page, at least when vma_normal_page() is properly used; so you cannot detect secretmem memory mapped via /dev/mem reliably. At least that's my theory :)
[...]
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Also, there is a way to still read that memory when root by
1. Having kdump active (which would often be the case, but maybe not to dump user pages )
2. Triggering a kernel crash (easy via proc as root)
3. Waiting for the reboot afterkump()created the dump and then reading the content from disk.Anything that can leave physical memory intact but boot to a kernel where the missing direct map entry is restored could theoretically extract the secret. However, it's not exactly going to be a stealthy extraction ...
Quoted 5 lines
Or, as an attacker, load a custom
kexec()kernel and read memory from the new environment. Of course, the latter two are advanced mechanisms, but they are possible when root. We might be able to mitigate, for example, by zeroing out secretmem pages before booting into the kexec kernel, if we care :)
Quoted 3 lines
I think we could handle it by marking the region, yes, and a zero on shutdown might be useful ... it would prevent all warm reboot type attacks.
Right. But I guess when you're actually root, you can just write a kernel module to extract the information you need (unless we have signed modules, so it could be harder/impossible).
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Quoted 6 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 2 lines · On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 18:22:00 +0200 Mike Rapoport <[email protected]> wrote:
This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
tl;dr: I like this series, I think there are number of clarifications needed, though. See below.
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The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated
memfd_secretsystem call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. Themmap()of the file descriptor created withmemfd_secret()will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm.Quoted 4 lines
Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings.
Quoted 8 lines
I continue to struggle with this and I don't recall seeing much enthusiasm from others. Perhaps we're all missing the value point and some additional selling is needed.
Am I correct in understanding that the overall direction here is to protect keys (and perhaps other things) from kernel bugs? That if the kernel was bug-free then there would be no need for this feature? If so, that's a bit sad. But realistic I guess.
Secret memory really serves several purposes. The "increase the level of difficulty of secret exfiltration" you describe. And, as you say, if the kernel were bug free this wouldn't be necessary.
Quoted 5 lines
But also:
1. Memory safety for user space code. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere.
In my first read through, I didn't see how cross-userspace operations were blocked, but it looks like it's the various gup paths where {vma,page}_is_secretmem() is called. (Thank you for the self-test! That helped me follow along.) I think this access pattern should be more clearly spelled out in the cover later (i.e. "This will block things like process_vm_readv()").
I like the results (inaccessible outside the process), though I suspect this will absolutely melt gdb or other ptracers that try to see into the memory. Don't get me wrong, I'm a big fan of such concepts[0], but I see nothing in the cover letter about it (e.g. the effects on "ptrace" or "gdb" are not mentioned.)
There is also a risk here of this becoming a forensics nightmare:
userspace malware will just download their entire executable region into a memfd_secret region. Can we, perhaps, disallow mmap/mprotect with PROT_EXEC when vma_is_secretmem()? The OpenSSL example, for example, certainly doesn't need PROT_EXEC.
What's happening with O_CLOEXEC in this code? I don't see that mentioned in the cover letter either. Why is it disallowed? That seems a strange limitation for something trying to avoid leaking secrets into other processes.
And just so I'm sure I understand: if a vma_is_secretmem() check is missed in future mm code evolutions, it seems there is nothing to block the kernel from accessing the contents directly through copy_from_user() via the userspace virtual address, yes?
Quoted 16 lines
2. It also serves as a basis for context protection of virtual machines, but other groups are working on this aspect, and it is broadly similar to the secret exfiltration from the kernel problem.
Quoted 4 lines
Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems optimistic, doesn't it?
Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is to be completely secure against root trying to extract the secret (some what similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege escalation and to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP gadgets.
Quoted 13 lines
The ROP gadget thing needs more explanation: the usual defeatist approach is to say that once the attacker gains the stack, they can do anything because they can find enough ROP gadgets to be turing complete. However, in the real world, given the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization making finding gadgets really hard, usually the attacker gets one or at most two gadgets to string together. Not having any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks.
As for protecting against exploited kernel flaws I also see benefits here. While the kernel is already blocked from directly reading contents from userspace virtual addresses (i.e. SMAP), this feature does help by blocking the kernel from directly reading contents via the direct map alias. (i.e. this feature is a specialized version of XPFO[1], which tried to do this for ALL user memory.) So in that regard, yes, this has value in the sense that to perform exfiltration, an attacker would need a significant level of control over kernel execution or over page table contents.
Sufficient control over PTE allocation and positioning is possible without kernel execution control[3], and "only" having an arbitrary write primitive can lead to direct PTE control. Because of this, it would be nice to have page tables strongly protected[2] in the kernel. They remain a viable "data only" attack given a sufficiently "capable" write flaw.
I would argue that page table entries are a more important asset to protect than userspace secrets, but given the difficulties with XPFO and the not-yet-available PKS I can understand starting here. It does, absolutely, narrow the ways exploits must be written to exfiltrate secret contents. (We are starting to now constrict[4] many attack methods into attacking the page table itself, which is good in the sense that protecting page tables will be a big win, and bad in the sense that focusing attack research on page tables means we're going to see some very powerful attacks.)
Quoted 6 lines
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I think that a very complete description of the threats which this feature addresses would be helpful.
It's designed to protect against three different threats:
1. Detection of user secret memory mismanagement
I would say "cross-process secret userspace memory exposures" (via a number of common interfaces by blocking it at the GUP level).
Quoted 1 line
2. significant protection against privilege escalation
I don't see how this series protects against privilege escalation. (It protects against exfiltration.) Maybe you mean include this in the first bullet point (i.e. "cross-process secret userspace memory exposures, even in the face of privileged processes")?
Quoted 2 lines
3. enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks.
Same here, I don't see it preventing ROP, but I see it making "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration.
-Kees
[0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/security/yama/yama_lsm.c?h=v5.12#n410
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[3] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[4] https://git.kernel.org/linus/cf68fffb66d60d96209446bfc4a15291dc5a5d41
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 1 line · Kees Cook
On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 08:26:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
[...]
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 4 lines
1. Memory safety for user space code. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the
kernel to be
transmitted somewhere.In my first read through, I didn't see how cross-userspace operations were blocked, but it looks like it's the various gup paths where {vma,page}_is_secretmem() is called. (Thank you for the self-test! That helped me follow along.) I think this access pattern should be more clearly spelled out in the cover later (i.e. "This will block things like
process_vm_readv()").
I'm sure Mike can add it.
Quoted 3 lines
I like the results (inaccessible outside the process), though I suspect this will absolutely melt gdb or other ptracers that try to see into the memory.
I wouldn't say "melt" ... one of the Demos we did a FOSDEM was using gdb/ptrace to extract secrets and then showing it couldn't be done if secret memory was used. You can still trace the execution of the process (and thus you could extract the secret as it's processed in registers, for instance) but you just can't extract the actual secret memory contents ... that's a fairly limited and well defined restriction.
Quoted 3 lines
Don't get me wrong, I'm a big fan of such concepts[0], but I see
nothing in the cover letter about it (e.g. the effects on "ptrace" or "gdb" are not mentioned.)
Sure, but we thought "secret" covered it. It wouldn't be secret if gdb/ptrace from another process could see it.
Quoted 5 lines
There is also a risk here of this becoming a forensics nightmare:
userspace malware will just download their entire executable region into amemfd_secretregion. Can we, perhaps, disallow mmap/mprotect withPROT_EXECwhenvma_is_secretmem()? The OpenSSL example, for example, certainly doesn't needPROT_EXEC.
I think disallowing PROT_EXEC is a great enhancement.
Quoted 4 lines
What's happening with
O_CLOEXECin this code? I don't see that mentioned in the cover letter either. Why is it disallowed? That seems a strange limitation for something trying to avoid leaking secrets into other processes.
I actually thought we forced it, so I'll let Mike address this. I think allowing it is great, so the secret memory isn't inherited by children, but I can see use cases where a process would want its child to inherit the secrets.
Quoted 4 lines
And just so I'm sure I understand: if a
vma_is_secretmem()check is missed in future mm code evolutions, it seems there is nothing to block the kernel from accessing the contents directly throughcopy_from_user()via the userspace virtual address, yes?
Technically no because copy_from_user goes via the userspace page tables which do have access.
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2. It also serves as a basis for context protection of virtual machines, but other groups are working on this aspect, and it
is
broadly similar to the secret exfiltration from the kernel
problem.Quoted 3 lines
Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems optimistic, doesn't it?
Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is to be completely secure against root trying to extract the secret (some what similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege escalation and to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP gadgets.
Quoted 13 lines
The ROP gadget thing needs more explanation: the usual defeatist approach is to say that once the attacker gains the stack, they can do anything because they can find enough ROP gadgets to be turing complete. However, in the real world, given the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization making finding gadgets really hard, usually the attacker gets one or at most two gadgets to string together. Not having any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks.
As for protecting against exploited kernel flaws I also see benefits here. While the kernel is already blocked from directly reading contents from userspace virtual addresses (i.e. SMAP), this feature does help by blocking the kernel from directly reading contents via the direct map alias. (i.e. this feature is a specialized version of XPFO[1], which tried to do this for ALL user memory.) So in that regard, yes, this has value in the sense that to perform exfiltration, an attacker would need a significant level of control over kernel execution or over page table contents.
Quoted 6 lines
Sufficient control over PTE allocation and positioning is possible without kernel execution control[3], and "only" having an arbitrary write primitive can lead to direct PTE control. Because of this, it would be nice to have page tables strongly protected[2] in the kernel. They remain a viable "data only" attack given a sufficiently "capable" write flaw.
Right, but this is on the radar of several people and when fixed will strengthen the value of secret memory.
Quoted 20 lines
I would argue that page table entries are a more important asset to protect than userspace secrets, but given the difficulties with XPFO and the not-yet-available PKS I can understand starting here. It does, absolutely, narrow the ways exploits must be written to exfiltrate secret contents. (We are starting to now constrict[4] many attack methods into attacking the page table itself, which is good in the sense that protecting page tables will be a big win, and bad in the sense that focusing attack research on page tables means we're going to see some very powerful attacks.)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think that a very complete description of the threats which this feature addresses would be helpful.
It's designed to protect against three different threats:
1. Detection of user secret memory mismanagement
I would say "cross-process secret userspace memory exposures" (via a number of common interfaces by blocking it at the GUP level).
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
2. significant protection against privilege escalation
I don't see how this series protects against privilege escalation. (It protects against exfiltration.) Maybe you mean include this in the first bullet point (i.e. "cross-process secret userspace memory exposures, even in the face of privileged processes")?
It doesn't prevent privilege escalation from happening in the first place, but once the escalation has happened it protects against exfiltration by the newly minted root attacker.
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3. enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-
kernel
attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks.Same here, I don't see it preventing ROP, but I see it making "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration.
Right, that's why I call it "enhanced protection". With ROP the design goal is to take exfiltration beyond the simple, and require increasing complexity in the attack ... the usual security whack-a-mole approach ... in the hope that script kiddies get bored by the level of difficulty and move on to something easier.
James
Στις 2021-05-06 20:05, James Bottomley έγραψε:
Quoted 21 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 8 lines
Also, there is a way to still read that memory when root by
1. Having kdump active (which would often be the case, but maybe not to dump user pages )
2. Triggering a kernel crash (easy via proc as root)
3. Waiting for the reboot afterkump()created the dump and then reading the content from disk.Anything that can leave physical memory intact but boot to a kernel where the missing direct map entry is restored could theoretically extract the secret. However, it's not exactly going to be a stealthy extraction ...
Quoted 5 lines
Or, as an attacker, load a custom
kexec()kernel and read memory from the new environment. Of course, the latter two are advanced mechanisms, but they are possible when root. We might be able to mitigate, for example, by zeroing out secretmem pages before booting into the kexec kernel, if we care :)
Quoted 4 lines
I think we could handle it by marking the region, yes, and a zero on shutdown might be useful ... it would prevent all warm reboot type attacks.
I had similar concerns about recovering secrets with kdump, and considered cleaning up keyrings before jumping to the new kernel. The problem is we can't provide guarantees in that case, once the kernel has crashed and we are on our way to run crashkernel, we can't be sure we can reliably zero-out anything, the more code we add to that path the more risky it gets. However during reboot/normal kexec() we should do some cleanup, it makes sense and secretmem can indeed be useful in that case. Regarding loading custom kexec() kernels, we mitigate this with the kexec file-based API where we can verify the signature of the loaded kimage (assuming the system runs a kernel provided by a trusted 3rd party and we 've maintained a chain of trust since booting).
Quoted 27 lines · Nick Kossifidis
Στις 2021-05-06 20:05, James Bottomley έγραψε:
Quoted 21 lines · David Hildenbrand
Quoted 8 lines
Also, there is a way to still read that memory when root by
1. Having kdump active (which would often be the case, but maybe not to dump user pages )
2. Triggering a kernel crash (easy via proc as root)
3. Waiting for the reboot afterkump()created the dump and then reading the content from disk.Anything that can leave physical memory intact but boot to a kernel where the missing direct map entry is restored could theoretically extract the secret. However, it's not exactly going to be a stealthy extraction ...
Quoted 5 lines
Or, as an attacker, load a custom
kexec()kernel and read memory from the new environment. Of course, the latter two are advanced mechanisms, but they are possible when root. We might be able to mitigate, for example, by zeroing out secretmem pages before booting into the kexec kernel, if we care :)Quoted 4 lines
I think we could handle it by marking the region, yes, and a zero on shutdown might be useful ... it would prevent all warm reboot type attacks.
Quoted 5 lines
I had similar concerns about recovering secrets with kdump, and considered cleaning up keyrings before jumping to the new kernel. The problem is we can't provide guarantees in that case, once the kernel has crashed and we are on our way to run crashkernel, we can't be sure we can reliably zero-out anything, the more code we add to that path the
Well, I think it depends. Assume we do the following
1) Zero out any secretmem pages when handing them back to the buddy. (alternative: init_on_free=1) -- if not already done, I didn't check the code.
2) On kdump(), zero out all allocated secretmem. It'd be easier if we'd just allocated from a fixed physical memory area; otherwise we have to walk process page tables or use a PFN walker. And zeroing out secretmem pages without a direct mapping is a different challenge.
Now, during 2) it can happen that
a) We crash in our clearing code (e.g., something is seriously messed up) and fail to start the kdump kernel. That's actually good, instead of leaking data we fail hard.
b) We don't find all secretmem pages, for example, because process page tables are messed up or something messed up our memmap (if we'd use that to identify secretmem pages via a PFN walker somehow)
But for the simple cases (e.g., malicious root tries to crash the kernel via /proc/sysrq-trigger) both a) and b) wouldn't apply.
Obviously, if an admin would want to mitigate right now, he would want to disable kdump completely, meaning any attempt to load a crashkernel would fail and cannot be enabled again for that kernel (also not via cmdline an attacker could modify to reboot into a system with the option for a crashkernel). Disabling kdump in the kernel when secretmem pages are allocated is one approach, although sub-optimal.
Quoted 6 lines
more risky it gets. However during reboot/normal
kexec()we should do some cleanup, it makes sense and secretmem can indeed be useful in that case. Regarding loading customkexec()kernels, we mitigate this with the kexec file-based API where we can verify the signature of the loaded kimage (assuming the system runs a kernel provided by a trusted 3rd party and we 've maintained a chain of trust since booting).
For example in VMs (like QEMU), we often don't clear physical memory during a reboot. So if an attacker manages to load a kernel that you can trick into reading random physical memory areas, we can leak secretmem data I think.
And there might be ways to achieve that just using the cmdline, not necessarily loading a different kernel. For example if you limit the kernel footprint ("mem=256M") and disable strict_iomem_checks ("strict_iomem_checks=relaxed") you can just extract that memory via /dev/mem if I am not wrong.
So as an attacker, modify the (grub) cmdline to "mem=256M strict_iomem_checks=relaxed", reboot, and read all memory via /dev/mem. Or load a signed kexec kernel with that cmdline and boot into it.
Interesting problem :)
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
Quoted 15 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 1 line · Kees Cook
On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 08:26:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
[...]
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think that a very complete description of the threats which this feature addresses would be helpful.
It's designed to protect against three different threats:
1. Detection of user secret memory mismanagement
I would say "cross-process secret userspace memory exposures" (via a number of common interfaces by blocking it at the GUP level).
Quoted 1 line
2. significant protection against privilege escalation
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I don't see how this series protects against privilege escalation. (It protects against exfiltration.) Maybe you mean include this in the first bullet point (i.e. "cross-process secret userspace memory exposures, even in the face of privileged processes")?
It doesn't prevent privilege escalation from happening in the first place, but once the escalation has happened it protects against exfiltration by the newly minted root attacker.
So, after thinking a bit more about this, I don't think there is protection here against privileged execution. This feature kind of helps against cross-process read/write attempts, but it doesn't help with sufficiently privileged (i.e. ptraced) execution, since we can just ask the process itself to do the reading:
$ gdb ./memfd_secret
...
ready: 0x7ffff7ffb000
Breakpoint 1, ...
(gdb) compile code unsigned long addr = 0x7ffff7ffb000UL; printf("%016lx\n", *((unsigned long *)addr));
55555555555555555And since process_vm_readv() requires PTRACE_ATTACH, there's very little difference in effort between process_vm_readv() and the above.
So, what other paths through GUP exist that aren't covered by PTRACE_ATTACH? And if none, then should this actually just be done by setting the process undumpable? (This is already what things like gnupg do.)
So, the user-space side of this doesn't seem to really help. The kernel side protection is interesting for kernel read/write flaws, though, in the sense that the process is likely not being attacked from "current", so a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new userspace process to do the ptracing.
So, while I like the idea of this stuff, and I see how it provides certain coverages, I'm curious to learn more about the threat model to make sure it's actually providing meaningful hurdles to attacks.
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Mike Rapoport
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · James Bottomley
Quoted 6 lines · Kees Cook
On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 08:26:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
What's happening with
O_CLOEXECin this code? I don't see that mentioned in the cover letter either. Why is it disallowed? That seems a strange limitation for something trying to avoid leaking secrets into other processes.
Quoted 4 lines
I actually thought we forced it, so I'll let Mike address this. I think allowing it is great, so the secret memory isn't inherited by children, but I can see use cases where a process would want its child to inherit the secrets.
We do not enforce O_CLOEXEC, but if the user explicitly requested O_CLOEXEC it would be passed to get_unused_fd_flags().
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.