iommu/vt-d: Force snooping improvement
Subsystems (2)
Lu Baolu
maintainercover iommu/vt-d: Force snooping improvement
Hi folks,
Previously, the IOMMU capability of enforcing cache coherency is queried through iommu_capable(IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY). This is a global capability, hence the IOMMU driver reports support for this capability only when all IOMMUs in the system has this support.
Commit 6043257b1de06 ("iommu: Introduce the domain op enforce_cache_coherency()") converts this into a per-domain test-and-set option, and the previous iommu_capable(IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY) is deprecated.
This is a follow-up series which improves the Intel IOMMU driver to support the per-domain scheme better.
Best regards,
baolu
Lu Baolu (5):
iommu/vt-d: Block force-snoop domain attaching if no SC support iommu/vt-d: Set SNP bit only in second-level page table entries iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping() iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 3 +- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 24 +++++++--- 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
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2.25.1
Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH 1/5 iommu/vt-d: Block force-snoop domain attaching if no SC support
In the attach_dev callback of the default domain ops, if the domain has been set force_snooping, but the iommu hardware of the device does not support SC(Snoop Control) capability, the callback should block it and return a corresponding error code.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +3 -0
@@ -4354,6 +4354,9 @@ static int prepare_domain_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain,if (!iommu)return -ENODEV ; +if (dmar_domain->force_snooping && !ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +/* check if this iommu agaw is sufficient for max mapped address */ addr_width =agaw_to_width (iommu->agaw);if (addr_width >cap_mgaw (iommu->cap))
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH 2/5 iommu/vt-d: Set SNP bit only in second-level page table entries
In reply to Lu BaoluThe SNP bit is only valid for second-level PTEs. Setting this bit in the first-level PTEs has no functional impact because the Intel IOMMU always ignores the same bit in first-level PTEs. Anyway, let's check the page table type before setting SNP bit in PTEs to make the code more readable.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +1 -1
@@ -4431,7 +4431,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_map(struct iommu_domain *domain, prot |=DMA_PTE_READ ;if (iommu_prot &IOMMU_WRITE ) prot |=DMA_PTE_WRITE ; -if (dmar_domain->force_snooping) +if (dmar_domain->force_snooping && !domain_use_first_level (dmar_domain)) prot |=DMA_PTE_SNP ; max_addr = iova + size;
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH 3/5 iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
In reply to Lu BaoluAs domain->force_snooping only impacts the devices attached with the domain, there's no need to check against all IOMMU units. At the same time, for a brand new domain (hasn't been attached to any device), the force_snooping field could be set, but the attach_dev callback will return failure if it wants to attach to a device which IOMMU has no snoop control capability.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 2 ++ drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 18 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h +2 -0
@@ -123,4 +123,6 @@ void intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(struct intel_iommu *iommu, bool fault_ignore);int vcmd_alloc_pasid (struct intel_iommu *iommu,u32 *pasid);void vcmd_free_pasid (struct intel_iommu *iommu,u32 pasid); +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid);#endif /* __INTEL_PASID_H */
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +49 -1
62 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +18 -0
@@ -762,3 +762,21 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu,return 0 ; } + +/* +* Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up. +*/ +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid) +{ +struct pasid_entry *pte; +u16 did; + + pte =intel_pasid_get_entry (dev, pasid); +if (WARN_ON (!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present (pte))) +return ; + +pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); + did =pasid_get_domain_id (pte); +pasid_flush_caches (iommu, pte, pasid, did); +}
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH 4/5 iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping()
In reply to Lu BaoluThe IOMMU force snooping capability is not required to be consistent among all the IOMMUs anymore. Remove force snooping capability check in the IOMMU hot-add path and domain_update_iommu_snooping() becomes a dead code now.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 34 +--------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 33 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +1 -33
@@ -533,33 +533,6 @@ static void domain_update_iommu_coherency(struct dmar_domain *domain)rcu_read_unlock (); } -static bool domain_update_iommu_snooping (struct intel_iommu *skip) -{ -struct dmar_drhd_unit *drhd; -struct intel_iommu *iommu; -bool ret = true; - -rcu_read_lock (); -for_each_active_iommu (iommu, drhd) { -if (iommu != skip) { -/* -* If the hardware is operating in the scalable mode, -* the snooping control is always supported since we -* always set PASID-table-entry.PGSNP bit if the domain -* is managed outside (UNMANAGED). -*/ -if (!sm_supported (iommu) && - !ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap)) { - ret = false; -break ; - } - } - } -rcu_read_unlock (); - -return ret; -} -static int domain_update_iommu_superpage (struct dmar_domain *domain,struct intel_iommu *skip) {
@@ -3593,12 +3566,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add(struct dmar_drhd_unit *dmaru) iommu->name);return -ENXIO ; } -if (!ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap) && -domain_update_iommu_snooping (iommu)) { -pr_warn ("%s: Doesn't support snooping.\n" , - iommu->name); -return -ENXIO ; - } + sp =domain_update_iommu_superpage (NULL , iommu) -1 ;if (sp >=0 && !(cap_super_page_val (iommu->cap) & (1 << sp))) { pr_warn("%s: Doesn't support large page.\n",
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH 5/5 iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries
In reply to Lu BaoluAs enforce_cache_coherency has been introduced into the iommu_domain_ops, the kernel component which owns the iommu domain is able to opt-in its requirement for force snooping support. The iommu driver has no need to hard code the page snoop control bit in the PASID table entries anymore.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 1 - drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 3 --- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 6 ------ 3 files changed, 10 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h +0 -1
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@*/ #define PASID_FLAG_SUPERVISOR_MODE BIT(0)#define PASID_FLAG_NESTED BIT(1) -#define PASID_FLAG_PAGE_SNOOP BIT(2)/* * The PASID_FLAG_FL5LP flag Indicates using 5-level paging for first-
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0 -3
@@ -2432,9 +2432,6 @@ static int domain_setup_first_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu,if (level ==5 ) flags |=PASID_FLAG_FL5LP ; -if (domain->domain.type ==IOMMU_DOMAIN_UNMANAGED ) - flags |=PASID_FLAG_PAGE_SNOOP ; -return intel_pasid_setup_first_level (iommu, dev, (pgd_t *)pgd, pasid, domain->iommu_did[iommu->seq_id], flags);
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +0 -6
@@ -625,9 +625,6 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_first_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu, } } -if (flags &PASID_FLAG_PAGE_SNOOP ) -pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); -pasid_set_domain_id (pte, did);pasid_set_address_width (pte, iommu->agaw);pasid_set_page_snoop (pte, !!ecap_smpwc (iommu->ecap));
@@ -710,9 +707,6 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_second_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu,pasid_set_fault_enable (pte);pasid_set_page_snoop (pte, !!ecap_smpwc (iommu->ecap)); -if (domain->domain.type ==IOMMU_DOMAIN_UNMANAGED ) -pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); -/* * Since it is a second level only translation setup, we should * set SRE bit as well (addresses are expected to be GPAs).
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Re: [PATCH 1/5] iommu/vt-d: Block force-snoop domain attaching if no SC support
In reply to Lu BaoluQuoted 9 lines · Lu Baolu
In the
attach_devcallback of the default domain ops, if the domain has been setforce_snooping, but the iommu hardware of the device does not support SC(Snoop Control) capability, the callback should block it and return a corresponding error code.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
Jason
Re: [PATCH 2/5] iommu/vt-d: Set SNP bit only in second-level page table entries
In reply to Lu BaoluQuoted 4 lines · Lu Baolu
The SNP bit is only valid for second-level PTEs. Setting this bit in the first-level PTEs has no functional impact because the Intel IOMMU always ignores the same bit in first-level PTEs. Anyway, let's check the page table type before setting SNP bit in PTEs to make the code more readable.
Shouldn't this be tested before setting force_snooping and not during every map?
Jason
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Re: [PATCH 3/5] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
In reply to Lu Baoludrivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4565
Quoted 9 lines · Lu Baolu
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +9
-0+static bool domain_support_force_snooping (struct dmar_domain *domain) +{ +struct device_domain_info *info; +unsigned long flags; +bool support = true; + +spin_lock_irqsave (&device_domain_lock, flags); +if (list_empty (&domain->devices)) + goto out;
Why? list_for_each_entry will just do nothing..
Quoted 32 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +32
-0+list_for_each_entry (info, &domain->devices, link) { +if (!ecap_sc_support (info->iommu->ecap)) { + support = false; +break ; + } + } +out: +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&device_domain_lock, flags); +return support; +} + +static void domain_set_force_snooping (struct dmar_domain *domain) +{ +struct device_domain_info *info; +unsigned long flags; + +/* +* Second level page table supports per-PTE snoop control. The +* iommu_map() interface will handle this by setting SNP bit. +*/ +if (!domain_use_first_level (domain)) +return ; + +spin_lock_irqsave (&device_domain_lock, flags); +if (list_empty (&domain->devices)) + goto out_unlock; + +list_for_each_entry (info, &domain->devices, link) +intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (info->iommu, info->dev, +PASID_RID2PASID ); + +out_unlock:
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4607
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +4
-1+spin_unlock_irqrestore (&device_domain_lock, flags); +} +static bool intel_iommu_enforce_cache_coherency (struct iommu_domain *domain) {struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain =to_dmar_domain (domain); -if (!domain_update_iommu_snooping (NULL )) +if (!domain_support_force_snooping (dmar_domain))return false;
Maybe exit early if force_snooping = true?
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +2
-0+domain_set_force_snooping (dmar_domain); dmar_domain->force_snooping = true; +return true; }drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +1
-0+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu, · line 768
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +4
-0@@ -762,3 +762,21 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu,return 0 ; } + +/* +* Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up. +*/
So the 'first level' is only used with pasid?
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu, · line 779
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +11
-0+void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid) +{ +struct pasid_entry *pte; +u16 did; + + pte =intel_pasid_get_entry (dev, pasid); +if (WARN_ON (!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present (pte))) +return ; + +pasid_set_pgsnp (pte);
Doesn't this need to be done in other places too, like when a new attach is made? Patch 5 removed it, but should that be made if domain->force_snooping?
Jason
Re: [PATCH 4/5] iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping()
In reply to Lu BaoluQuoted 9 lines · Lu Baolu
The IOMMU force snooping capability is not required to be consistent among all the IOMMUs anymore. Remove force snooping capability check in the IOMMU hot-add path and
domain_update_iommu_snooping()becomes a dead code now.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 34 +--------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 33 deletions(-)
Jason
Re: [PATCH 5/5] iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries
In reply to Lu BaoluQuoted 11 lines · Lu Baolu
As
enforce_cache_coherencyhas been introduced into theiommu_domain_ops, the kernel component which owns the iommu domain is able to opt-in its requirement for force snooping support. The iommu driver has no need to hard code the page snoop control bit in the PASID table entries anymore.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 1 - drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 3 --- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 6 ------ 3 files changed, 10 deletions(-)
It seems fine, but as in the other email where do we do pasid_set_pgsnp() for a new device attach on an already no-snopp domain?
Jason
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Re: [PATCH 3/5] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
In reply to Lu BaoluHi BaoLu,
Quoted 39 lines · Lu Baolu
As
domain->force_snoopingonly impacts the devices attached with the domain, there's no need to check against all IOMMU units. At the same time, for a brand new domain (hasn't been attached to any device), theforce_snoopingfield could be set, but theattach_devcallback will return failure if it wants to attach to a device which IOMMU has no snoop control capability.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 2 ++ drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 18 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h +2
-0@@ -123,4 +123,6 @@ void intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(struct intel_iommu *iommu, bool fault_ignore);int vcmd_alloc_pasid (struct intel_iommu *iommu,u32 *pasid);void vcmd_free_pasid (struct intel_iommu *iommu,u32 pasid); +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid);#endif /* __INTEL_PASID_H */ drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +6
-0@@ -4554,13 +4554,61 @@ static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, return phys; } +static bool domain_support_force_snooping (struct dmar_domain *domain) +{ +struct device_domain_info *info; +unsigned long flags; +bool support = true; +
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t · line 4572
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +10
-0+spin_lock_irqsave (&device_domain_lock, flags); +if (list_empty (&domain->devices)) + goto out; + +list_for_each_entry (info, &domain->devices, link) { +if (!ecap_sc_support (info->iommu->ecap)) { + support = false; +break ; + } + }
why not just check the flag dmar_domain->force_snooping? devices wouldn't be able to attach if !ecap_sc, right?
Quoted 16 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +16
-0+out: +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&device_domain_lock, flags); +return support; +} + +static void domain_set_force_snooping (struct dmar_domain *domain) +{ +struct device_domain_info *info; +unsigned long flags; + +/* +* Second level page table supports per-PTE snoop control. The +* iommu_map() interface will handle this by setting SNP bit. +*/ +if (!domain_use_first_level (domain)) +return ;
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4597
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +9
-0+ +spin_lock_irqsave (&device_domain_lock, flags); +if (list_empty (&domain->devices)) + goto out_unlock; + +list_for_each_entry (info, &domain->devices, link) +intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (info->iommu, info->dev, +PASID_RID2PASID ); +
I guess other DMA API PASIDs need to have sc bit set as well. I will keep this in mind for my DMA API PASID patch.
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +4
-0+out_unlock: +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&device_domain_lock, flags); +} + static bool intel_iommu_enforce_cache_coherency(struct iommu_domain
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4611
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +4
-1*domain) {struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain =to_dmar_domain (domain); -if (!domain_update_iommu_snooping (NULL )) +if (!domain_support_force_snooping (dmar_domain))return false; + +domain_set_force_snooping (dmar_domain); dmar_domain->force_snooping = true; +
nit: spurious change
Quoted 19 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-0return true; }drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +8
-0@@ -762,3 +762,21 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(structintel_iommu *iommu, return 0; } + +/* +* Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up. +*/ +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid) +{ +struct pasid_entry *pte;
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct · line 782
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +10
-0+u16 did; + + pte =intel_pasid_get_entry (dev, pasid); +if (WARN_ON (!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present (pte))) +return ; + +pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); + did =pasid_get_domain_id (pte); +pasid_flush_caches (iommu, pte, pasid, did); +}
Thanks,
Jacob
Re: [PATCH 4/5] iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping()
In reply to Lu BaoluHi BaoLu,
Quoted 52 lines · Lu Baolu
The IOMMU force snooping capability is not required to be consistent among all the IOMMUs anymore. Remove force snooping capability check in the IOMMU hot-add path and
domain_update_iommu_snooping()becomes a dead code now.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 34 +--------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 33 deletions(-)drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-12@@ -533,33 +533,6 @@ static void domain_update_iommu_coherency(struct dmar_domain *domain) rcu_read_unlock(); } -static bool domain_update_iommu_snooping (struct intel_iommu *skip) -{ -struct dmar_drhd_unit *drhd; -struct intel_iommu *iommu; -bool ret = true; - -rcu_read_lock (); -for_each_active_iommu (iommu, drhd) { -if (iommu != skip) { -/* -* If the hardware is operating in the scalable mode, -* the snooping control is always supported since we
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-1-* always set PASID-table-entry.PGSNP bit if the domain
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-14-* is managed outside (UNMANAGED). -*/ -if (!sm_supported (iommu) && - !ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap)) { - ret = false; -break ; - } - } - } -rcu_read_unlock (); - -return ret; -} -static int domain_update_iommu_superpage (struct dmar_domain *domain,struct intel_iommu *skip) {
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static int intel_iommu_add(struct dmar_drhd_unit · line 3569
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +1
-6@@ -3593,12 +3566,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add(struct dmar_drhd_unit *dmaru) iommu->name);return -ENXIO ; } -if (!ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap) && -domain_update_iommu_snooping (iommu)) { -pr_warn ("%s: Doesn't support snooping.\n" , - iommu->name); -return -ENXIO ; - } +
Maybe I missed earlier patches, so this bit can also be deleted?
struct dmar_domain {
u8 iommu_snooping: 1; /* indicate snooping control
feature */
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static int intel_iommu_add(struct dmar_drhd_unit *dmaru) · line 3572
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-0sp =domain_update_iommu_superpage (NULL , iommu) -1 ;if (sp >=0 && !(cap_super_page_val (iommu->cap) & (1 << sp))) { pr_warn("%s: Doesn't support large page.\n",
Thanks,
Jacob
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Baolu Lu
maintainerRe: [PATCH 2/5] iommu/vt-d: Set SNP bit only in second-level page table entries
In reply to Jason GunthorpeHi Jason,
Quoted 7 lines · Jason Gunthorpe
Quoted 4 lines · Lu Baolu
The SNP bit is only valid for second-level PTEs. Setting this bit in the first-level PTEs has no functional impact because the Intel IOMMU always ignores the same bit in first-level PTEs. Anyway, let's check the page table type before setting SNP bit in PTEs to make the code more readable.
Shouldn't this be tested before setting
force_snoopingand not during every map?
The check is in the following patch. This just makes sure that SNP is only set in second-level page table entries.
Best regards,
baolu
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Baolu Lu
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/5] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
In reply to Jason GunthorpeQuoted 12 lines · Jason Gunthorpe
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4565
Quoted 9 lines · Lu Baolu
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +9
-0+static bool domain_support_force_snooping (struct dmar_domain *domain) +{ +struct device_domain_info *info; +unsigned long flags; +bool support = true; + +spin_lock_irqsave (&device_domain_lock, flags); +if (list_empty (&domain->devices)) + goto out;Why?
list_for_each_entrywill just do nothing..
Yes. I will remove above two lines.
Quoted 40 lines
Quoted 40 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +35
-0+list_for_each_entry (info, &domain->devices, link) { +if (!ecap_sc_support (info->iommu->ecap)) { + support = false; +break ; + } + } +out: +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&device_domain_lock, flags); +return support; +} + +static void domain_set_force_snooping (struct dmar_domain *domain) +{ +struct device_domain_info *info; +unsigned long flags; + +/* +* Second level page table supports per-PTE snoop control. The +* iommu_map() interface will handle this by setting SNP bit. +*/ +if (!domain_use_first_level (domain)) +return ; + +spin_lock_irqsave (&device_domain_lock, flags); +if (list_empty (&domain->devices)) + goto out_unlock; + +list_for_each_entry (info, &domain->devices, link) +intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (info->iommu, info->dev, +PASID_RID2PASID ); + +out_unlock: +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&device_domain_lock, flags); +} +static bool intel_iommu_enforce_cache_coherency (struct iommu_domain *domain) {struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain =to_dmar_domain (domain);
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4607
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +1
-1-if (!domain_update_iommu_snooping (NULL )) +if (!domain_support_force_snooping (dmar_domain))return false;Maybe exit early if
force_snooping= true?
Yes, should check "force_snooping = true" and return directly if force_snooping has already been set. As you pointed below, the new domain_attach should take care of this flag as well. Thanks!
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +2
-0+domain_set_force_snooping (dmar_domain); dmar_domain->force_snooping = true; +return true; }drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +1
-0+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c@@ -762,3 +762,21 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu,
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu, · line 768
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +4
-0return 0 ; } + +/* +* Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up. +*/ So the 'first level' is only used with pasid?
Yes. A fake pasid (RID2PASID in spec) is used for legacy transactions (those w/o pasid).
Quoted 16 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu, · line 779
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +11
-0+void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid) +{ +struct pasid_entry *pte; +u16 did; + + pte =intel_pasid_get_entry (dev, pasid); +if (WARN_ON (!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present (pte))) +return ; + +pasid_set_pgsnp (pte);Doesn't this need to be done in other places too, like when a new attach is made? Patch 5 removed it, but should that be made if
domain->force_snooping?
Yes. I missed this. Will take care of this in the next version.
Quoted 2 lines
Jason
Best regards,
baolu
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Baolu Lu
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/5] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
In reply to Jacob PanQuoted 1 line · Jacob Pan
Hi BaoLu,
Hi Jacob,
Quoted 47 lines
Quoted 43 lines · Lu Baolu
As
domain->force_snoopingonly impacts the devices attached with the domain, there's no need to check against all IOMMU units. At the same time, for a brand new domain (hasn't been attached to any device), theforce_snoopingfield could be set, but theattach_devcallback will return failure if it wants to attach to a device which IOMMU has no snoop control capability.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 2 ++ drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 18 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h +2
-0@@ -123,4 +123,6 @@ void intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(struct intel_iommu *iommu, bool fault_ignore);int vcmd_alloc_pasid (struct intel_iommu *iommu,u32 *pasid);void vcmd_free_pasid (struct intel_iommu *iommu,u32 pasid); +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid);#endif /* __INTEL_PASID_H */ drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +10
-0@@ -4554,13 +4554,61 @@ static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, return phys; } +static bool domain_support_force_snooping (struct dmar_domain *domain) +{ +struct device_domain_info *info; +unsigned long flags; +bool support = true; + +spin_lock_irqsave (&device_domain_lock, flags); +if (list_empty (&domain->devices)) + goto out; +
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4572
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +6
-0+list_for_each_entry (info, &domain->devices, link) { +if (!ecap_sc_support (info->iommu->ecap)) { + support = false; +break ; + } + }why not just check the flag
dmar_domain->force_snooping? devices wouldn't be able to attach if !ecap_sc, right?
I should check "dmar_domain->force_snooping" first. If this is the first time that this flag is about to set, then check the capabilities.
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 21 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +20
-0+out: +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&device_domain_lock, flags); +return support; +} + +static void domain_set_force_snooping (struct dmar_domain *domain) +{ +struct device_domain_info *info; +unsigned long flags; + +/* +* Second level page table supports per-PTE snoop control. The +* iommu_map() interface will handle this by setting SNP bit. +*/ +if (!domain_use_first_level (domain)) +return ; + +spin_lock_irqsave (&device_domain_lock, flags); +if (list_empty (&domain->devices)) + goto out_unlock;
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4597
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +5
-0+ +list_for_each_entry (info, &domain->devices, link) +intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (info->iommu, info->dev, +PASID_RID2PASID ); +I guess other DMA API PASIDs need to have sc bit set as well. I will keep this in mind for my DMA API PASID patch.
Kernel DMA don't need to set the PGSNP bit. The x86 arch is always DMA coherent. The force snooping is only needed when the device is controlled by user space, but the VMM is optimized not to support the virtualization of the wbinv instruction.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +4
-0+out_unlock: +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&device_domain_lock, flags); +} +static bool intel_iommu_enforce_cache_coherency (struct iommu_domain *domain) {struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain =to_dmar_domain (domain);
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain, · line 4611
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +4
-1-if (!domain_update_iommu_snooping (NULL )) +if (!domain_support_force_snooping (dmar_domain))return false; + +domain_set_force_snooping (dmar_domain); dmar_domain->force_snooping = true; +nit: spurious change
I expect a blank line before return in the end.
Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 19 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-0return true; }drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +8
-0@@ -762,3 +762,21 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(structintel_iommu *iommu, return 0; } + +/* +* Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up. +*/ +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid) +{ +struct pasid_entry *pte;drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct · line 782
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +10
-0+u16 did; + + pte =intel_pasid_get_entry (dev, pasid); +if (WARN_ON (!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present (pte))) +return ; + +pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); + did =pasid_get_domain_id (pte); +pasid_flush_caches (iommu, pte, pasid, did); +}Thanks,
Quoted 1 line
Jacob
Best regards,
baolu
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Baolu Lu
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4/5] iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping()
In reply to Jacob PanQuoted 69 lines · Jacob Pan
Hi BaoLu,
Quoted 52 lines · Lu Baolu
The IOMMU force snooping capability is not required to be consistent among all the IOMMUs anymore. Remove force snooping capability check in the IOMMU hot-add path and
domain_update_iommu_snooping()becomes a dead code now.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 34 +--------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 33 deletions(-)drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-12@@ -533,33 +533,6 @@ static void domain_update_iommu_coherency(struct dmar_domain *domain) rcu_read_unlock(); } -static bool domain_update_iommu_snooping (struct intel_iommu *skip) -{ -struct dmar_drhd_unit *drhd; -struct intel_iommu *iommu; -bool ret = true; - -rcu_read_lock (); -for_each_active_iommu (iommu, drhd) { -if (iommu != skip) { -/* -* If the hardware is operating in the scalable mode, -* the snooping control is always supported since we
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-1-* always set PASID-table-entry.PGSNP bit if the domain
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-14-* is managed outside (UNMANAGED). -*/ -if (!sm_supported (iommu) && - !ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap)) { - ret = false; -break ; - } - } - } -rcu_read_unlock (); - -return ret; -} -static int domain_update_iommu_superpage (struct dmar_domain *domain,struct intel_iommu *skip) {drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static int intel_iommu_add(struct dmar_drhd_unit · line 3569
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +1
-6@@ -3593,12 +3566,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add(struct dmar_drhd_unit *dmaru) iommu->name);return -ENXIO ; } -if (!ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap) && -domain_update_iommu_snooping (iommu)) { -pr_warn ("%s: Doesn't support snooping.\n" , - iommu->name); -return -ENXIO ; - } +Maybe I missed earlier patches, so this bit can also be deleted?
Quoted 3 lines
struct
dmar_domain{
u8iommu_snooping: 1; /* indicate snooping control
feature */
It has been cleaned up by below commit:
71cfafda9c9b vfio: Move the Intel no-snoop control off of IOMMU_CACHE
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c static int intel_iommu_add(struct dmar_drhd_unit *dmaru) · line 3572
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +0
-0sp =domain_update_iommu_superpage (NULL , iommu) -1 ;if (sp >=0 && !(cap_super_page_val (iommu->cap) & (1 << sp))) { pr_warn("%s: Doesn't support large page.\n",Thanks,
Jacob
Best regards,
baolu
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Baolu Lu
maintainerRe: [PATCH 5/5] iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries
In reply to Jason GunthorpeQuoted 13 lines · Jason Gunthorpe
Quoted 11 lines · Lu Baolu
As
enforce_cache_coherencyhas been introduced into theiommu_domain_ops, the kernel component which owns the iommu domain is able to opt-in its requirement for force snooping support. The iommu driver has no need to hard code the page snoop control bit in the PASID table entries anymore.Signed-off-by Lu Baolu <[email protected]>--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 1 - drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 3 --- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 6 ------ 3 files changed, 10 deletions(-)
Quoted 2 lines
It seems fine, but as in the other email where do we do
pasid_set_pgsnp()for a new device attach on an already no-snopp domain?
Yes. I will take care of this in the next version.
Quoted 1 line
Jason
Best regards,
baolu
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Re: [PATCH 2/5] iommu/vt-d: Set SNP bit only in second-level page table entries
In reply to Baolu LuQuoted 8 lines · Baolu Lu
Hi Jason,
Quoted 5 lines · Jason Gunthorpe
Quoted 4 lines · Lu Baolu
The SNP bit is only valid for second-level PTEs. Setting this bit in the first-level PTEs has no functional impact because the Intel IOMMU always ignores the same bit in first-level PTEs. Anyway, let's check the page table type before setting SNP bit in PTEs to make the code more readable.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Shouldn't this be tested before setting
force_snoopingand not during every map?The check is in the following patch. This just makes sure that SNP is only set in second-level page table entries.
I think you should add a 2nd flag to indicate 'set SNP bit in PTEs' and take care of computing that flag in the enforce_no_snoop function
Jason
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Baolu Lu
maintainerRe: [PATCH 2/5] iommu/vt-d: Set SNP bit only in second-level page table entries
Quoted 9 lines · Jason Gunthorpe
Quoted 8 lines · Baolu Lu
Hi Jason,
Quoted 5 lines · Jason Gunthorpe
Quoted 4 lines · Lu Baolu
The SNP bit is only valid for second-level PTEs. Setting this bit in the first-level PTEs has no functional impact because the Intel IOMMU always ignores the same bit in first-level PTEs. Anyway, let's check the page table type before setting SNP bit in PTEs to make the code more readable.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Shouldn't this be tested before setting
force_snoopingand not during every map?The check is in the following patch. This just makes sure that SNP is only set in second-level page table entries.
I think you should add a 2nd flag to indicate 'set SNP bit in PTEs' and take care of computing that flag in the
enforce_no_snoopfunction
Yours looks better. Will add it in the next version.
Quoted 1 line
Jason
Best regards,
baolu
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