7.0.4-rc1 review
Subsystems (5)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/307 ALSA: usb-audio: stop parsing UAC2 rates at MAX_NR_RATES
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
commit 3c318f97dcc50b2e0556a1813bd6958678e881fd upstream.
parse_uac2_sample_rate_range() caps the number of enumerated rates at MAX_NR_RATES, but it only breaks out of the current rate loop. A malformed UAC2 RANGE response with additional triplets continues parsing the remaining triplets and repeatedly prints "invalid uac2 rates" while probe still holds register_mutex.
Stop the whole parse once the cap is reached and return the number of rates collected so far.
--- sound/usb/format.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/format.c +1 -1
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static int parse_uac2_sample_rate_range( nr_rates++;if (nr_rates >=MAX_NR_RATES ) {usb_audio_err (chip,"invalid uac2 rates\n" ); -break ; +return nr_rates; } skip_rate:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/307 leds: qcom-lpg: Check for array overflow when selecting the high resolution
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit d45963a93c1495e9f1338fde91d0ebba8fd22474 upstream.
When selecting the high resolution values from the array, FIELD_GET() is used to pull from a 3 bit register, yet the array being indexed has only 5 values in it. Odds are the hardware is sane, but just to be safe, properly check before just overflowing and reading random data and then setting up chip values based on that.
--- drivers/leds/rgb/leds-qcom-lpg.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/leds/rgb/leds-qcom-lpg.c +6 -1
@@ -1273,7 +1273,12 @@ static int lpg_pwm_get_state(struct pwm_return ret;if (chan->subtype ==LPG_SUBTYPE_HI_RES_PWM ) { - refclk = lpg_clk_rates_hi_res[FIELD_GET (PWM_CLK_SELECT_HI_RES_MASK , val)]; +unsigned int clk_idx =FIELD_GET (PWM_CLK_SELECT_HI_RES_MASK , val); + +if (clk_idx >=ARRAY_SIZE (lpg_clk_rates_hi_res)) +return -EINVAL ; + + refclk = lpg_clk_rates_hi_res[clk_idx]; resolution = lpg_pwm_resolution_hi_res[FIELD_GET (PWM_SIZE_HI_RES_MASK , val)]; }else { refclk = lpg_clk_rates[FIELD_GET (PWM_CLK_SELECT_MASK , val)];
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/307 greybus: gb-beagleplay: bound bootloader receive buffering
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]>
commit 1214bf28965ceaf584fb20d357731264dd2e10e1 upstream.
cc1352_bootloader_rx() appends each serdev chunk into the fixed rx_buffer before parsing bootloader packets. The helper can keep leftover bytes between callbacks and may receive multiple packets in one callback, so a single count value is not constrained by one packet length.
Check that the incoming chunk fits in the remaining receive buffer space before memcpy(). If it does not, drop the staged data and consume the bytes instead of overflowing rx_buffer.
--- drivers/greybus/gb-beagleplay.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/greybus/gb-beagleplay.c +7 -0
@@ -535,6 +535,13 @@ static size_t cc1352_bootloader_rx(strucint ret;size_t off =0 ; +if (count >sizeof (bg->rx_buffer) - bg->rx_buffer_len) { +dev_warn (&bg->sd->dev, +"dropping oversized bootloader receive chunk" ); + bg->rx_buffer_len =0 ; +return count; + } +memcpy (bg->rx_buffer + bg->rx_buffer_len, data, count); bg->rx_buffer_len += count;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/307 greybus: gb-beagleplay: fix sleep in atomic context in hdlc_tx_frames()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weigang He <[email protected]>
commit 6b526dca0966f2370835765019a54319b78fca8d upstream.
hdlc_append() calls usleep_range() to wait for circular buffer space, but it is called with tx_producer_lock (a spinlock) held via hdlc_tx_frames() -> hdlc_append_tx_frame()/hdlc_append_tx_u8()/etc. Sleeping while holding a spinlock is illegal and can trigger "BUG: scheduling while atomic".
Fix this by moving the buffer-space wait out of hdlc_append() and into hdlc_tx_frames(), before the spinlock is acquired. The new flow:
1. Pre-calculate the worst-case encoded frame length.
2. Wait (with sleep) outside the lock until enough space is available, kicking the TX consumer work to drain the buffer.
3. Acquire the spinlock, re-verify space, and write the entire frame atomically.
This ensures that sleeping only happens without any lock held, and that frames are either fully enqueued or not written at all.
This bug is found by CodeQL static analysis tool (interprocedural sleep-in-atomic query) and my code review.
--- drivers/greybus/gb-beagleplay.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/greybus/gb-beagleplay.c +90 -17
@@ -242,30 +242,26 @@ static void hdlc_write(struct gb_beaglep }/** -* hdlc_append() - Queue HDLC data for sending. +* hdlc_append() - Queue a single HDLC byte for sending. * @bg: beagleplay greybus driver * @value: hdlc byte to transmit * -* Assumes that producer lock as been acquired. +* Caller must hold tx_producer_lock and must have ensured sufficient +* space in the circular buffer before calling (see hdlc_tx_frames()). */ static void hdlc_append (struct gb_beagleplay *bg,u8 value) { -int tail, head = bg->tx_circ_buf.head; +int head = bg->tx_circ_buf.head; +int tail =READ_ONCE (bg->tx_circ_buf.tail); -while (true) { - tail =READ_ONCE (bg->tx_circ_buf.tail); - -if (CIRC_SPACE (head, tail,TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE ) >=1 ) { - bg->tx_circ_buf.buf[head] = value; - -/* Finish producing HDLC byte */ -smp_store_release (&bg->tx_circ_buf.head, - (head +1 ) & (TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE -1 )); -return ; - } -dev_warn (&bg->sd->dev,"Tx circ buf full" ); -usleep_range (3000 ,5000 ); - } +lockdep_assert_held (&bg->tx_producer_lock); +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (CIRC_SPACE (head, tail,TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE ) <1 )) +return ; + + bg->tx_circ_buf.buf[head] = value; +/* Ensure buffer write is visible before advancing head. */ +smp_store_release (&bg->tx_circ_buf.head, + (head +1 ) & (TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE -1 )); }static void hdlc_append_escaped (struct gb_beagleplay *bg,u8 value)
@@ -313,13 +309,90 @@ static void hdlc_transmit(struct work_stspin_unlock_bh (&bg->tx_consumer_lock); } +/** +* hdlc_encoded_length() - Calculate worst-case encoded length of an HDLC frame. +* @payloads: array of payload buffers +* @count: number of payloads +* +* Returns the maximum number of bytes needed in the circular buffer. +*/ +static size_t hdlc_encoded_length (const struct hdlc_payload payloads[], +size_t count) +{ +size_t i, payload_len =0 ; + +for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) + payload_len += payloads[i].len; + +/* +* Worst case: every data byte needs escaping (doubles in size). +* data bytes = address(1) + control(1) + payload + crc(2) +* framing = opening flag(1) + closing flag(1) +*/ +return 2 + (1 +1 + payload_len +2 ) *2 ; +} + +#define HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_RETRIES 500 +#define HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_US_MIN 3000 +#define HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_US_MAX 5000 + +/** +* hdlc_tx_frames() - Encode and queue an HDLC frame for transmission. +* @bg: beagleplay greybus driver +* @address: HDLC address field +* @control: HDLC control field +* @payloads: array of payload buffers +* @count: number of payloads +* +* Sleeps outside the spinlock until enough circular-buffer space is +* available, then verifies space under the lock and writes the entire +* frame atomically. Either a complete frame is enqueued or nothing is +* written, avoiding both sleeping in atomic context and partial frames. +*/ static void hdlc_tx_frames (struct gb_beagleplay *bg,u8 address,u8 control,const struct hdlc_payload payloads[],size_t count) { +size_t needed =hdlc_encoded_length (payloads, count); +int retries =HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_RETRIES ;size_t i; +int head, tail; + +/* Wait outside the lock for sufficient buffer space. */ +while (retries--) { +/* Pairs with smp_store_release() in hdlc_append(). */ + head =smp_load_acquire (&bg->tx_circ_buf.head); + tail =READ_ONCE (bg->tx_circ_buf.tail); + +if (CIRC_SPACE (head, tail,TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE ) >= needed) +break ; + +/* Kick the consumer and sleep — no lock held. */ +schedule_work (&bg->tx_work); +usleep_range (HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_US_MIN ,HDLC_TX_BUF_WAIT_US_MAX ); + } + +if (retries <0 ) { +dev_warn_ratelimited (&bg->sd->dev, +"Tx circ buf full, dropping frame\n" ); +return ; + }spin_lock (&bg->tx_producer_lock); +/* +* Re-check under the lock. Should not fail since +* tx_producer_lock serialises all producers and the +* consumer only frees space, but guard against it. +*/ + head = bg->tx_circ_buf.head; + tail =READ_ONCE (bg->tx_circ_buf.tail); +if (unlikely (CIRC_SPACE (head, tail,TX_CIRC_BUF_SIZE ) < needed)) { +spin_unlock (&bg->tx_producer_lock); +dev_warn_ratelimited (&bg->sd->dev, +"Tx circ buf space lost, dropping frame\n" ); +return ; + } +hdlc_append_tx_frame (bg);hdlc_append_tx_u8 (bg, address);hdlc_append_tx_u8 (bg, control);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/307 misc: ibmasm: fix OOB MMIO read in ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>
commit 4b6e6ead556734bdc14024c5f837132b1e7a4b84 upstream.
ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt() performs an out-of-bounds MMIO read when the queue reader or writer index from hardware exceeds REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE (60).
A compromised service processor can trigger this by writing an out-of-range value to the reader or writer MMIO register before asserting an interrupt. Since writer is re-read from hardware on every loop iteration, it can also be set to an out-of-range value after the loop has already started.
The root cause is that get_queue_reader() and get_queue_writer() return raw readl() values that are passed directly into get_queue_entry(), which computes:
queue_begin + reader * sizeof(struct remote_input)
with no bounds check. This unchecked MMIO address is then passed to memcpy_fromio(), reading 8 bytes from unintended device registers. For sufficiently large values the address falls outside the PCI BAR mapping entirely, triggering a machine check exception.
Fix by checking both indices against REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE at the top of the loop body, before any call to get_queue_entry(). On an out-of-range value, reset the reader register to 0 via set_queue_reader() before breaking, so that normal queue operation can resume if the corrupted hardware state is transient.
--- drivers/misc/ibmasm/remote.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/misc/ibmasm/remote.c +5 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,11 @@ void ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt(struc writer =get_queue_writer (sp);while (reader != writer) { +if (reader >=REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE || writer >=REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE ) { +set_queue_reader (sp,0 ); +break ; + } +memcpy_fromio (&input,get_queue_entry (sp, reader),sizeof (struct remote_input ));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/307 ibmasm: fix OOB reads in command_file_write due to missing size checks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>
commit 0eb09f737428e482a32a2e31e5e223f2b35a71d3 upstream.
The command_file_write() handler allocates a kernel buffer of exactly count bytes and copies user data into it, but does not validate the buffer against the dot command protocol before passing it to get_dot_command_size() and get_dot_command_timeout().
Since both the allocation size (count) and the header fields (command_size, data_size) are independently user-controlled, an attacker can cause get_dot_command_size() to return a value exceeding the allocation, triggering OOB reads in get_dot_command_timeout() and an out-of-bounds memcpy_toio() that leaks kernel heap memory to the service processor.
Fix with two guards: reject writes smaller than sizeof(struct dot_command_header) before allocation, then after copying user data reject commands where the buffer is smaller than the total size declared by the header (sizeof(header) + command_size + data_size). This ensures all subsequent header and payload field accesses stay within the buffer.
--- drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c +7 -0
@@ -303,6 +303,8 @@ static ssize_t command_file_write(structreturn -EINVAL ;if (count ==0 || count >IBMASM_CMD_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE )return 0 ; +if (count <sizeof (struct dot_command_header )) +return -EINVAL ;if (*offset !=0 )return 0 ;
@@ -319,6 +321,11 @@ static ssize_t command_file_write(structreturn -EFAULT ; } +if (count <get_dot_command_size (cmd->buffer)) { +command_put (cmd); +return -EINVAL ; + } +spin_lock_irqsave (&command_data->sp->lock, flags);if (command_data->command) {spin_unlock_irqrestore (&command_data->sp->lock, flags);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/307 ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>
commit 9aad71144fa3682cca3837a06c8623016790e7ec upstream.
The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8,data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO.
Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure.
Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller's free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it.
Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field.
--- drivers/misc/ibmasm/lowlevel.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/ibmasm/lowlevel.c +8 -4
@@ -19,17 +19,21 @@ static struct i2o_header header = I2O_HEint ibmasm_send_i2o_message (struct service_processor *sp) {u32 mfa; -unsigned int command_size; +size_t command_size;struct i2o_message *message;struct command *command = sp->current_command; + command_size =get_dot_command_size (command->buffer); +if (command_size > command->buffer_size) +return 1 ; +if (command_size >I2O_COMMAND_SIZE ) + command_size =I2O_COMMAND_SIZE ; + mfa =get_mfa_inbound (sp->base_address);if (!mfa)return 1 ; - command_size =get_dot_command_size (command->buffer); - header.message_size =outgoing_message_size (command_size); - + header.message_size =outgoing_message_size ((unsigned int )command_size); message =get_i2o_message (sp->base_address, mfa);memcpy_toio (&message->header, &header,sizeof (struct i2o_header ));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/307 sysfs: attribute_group: Respect is_visible_const() when changing owner
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>
commit 9ce4a8c07b28cdd70f6ca38b60bf688c27dbbfb9 upstream.
The call to grp->is_visible in sysfs_group_attrs_change_owner() was missed when support for is_visible_const() was added.
Check for both is_visible variants there too.
--- fs/sysfs/group.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/sysfs/group.c +5 -2
@@ -517,8 +517,11 @@ static int sysfs_group_attrs_change_ownestruct attribute *const *attr;for (i =0 , attr = grp->attrs; *attr; i++, attr++) { -if (grp->is_visible) { - mode = grp->is_visible (kobj, *attr, i); +if (grp->is_visible || grp->is_visible_const) { +if (grp->is_visible) + mode = grp->is_visible (kobj, *attr, i); +else + mode = grp->is_visible_const (kobj, *attr, i);if (mode &SYSFS_GROUP_INVISIBLE )break ;if (!mode)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/307 driver core: Dont let a device probe until its ready
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
commit a2225b6e834a838ae3c93709760edc0a169eb2f2 upstream.
The moment we link a "struct device" into the list of devices for the bus, it's possible probe can happen. This is because another thread can load the driver at any time and that can cause the device to probe. This has been seen in practice with a stack crawl that looks like this [1]:
really_probe()
__driver_probe_device()
driver_probe_device()
__driver_attach()
bus_for_each_dev()
driver_attach()
bus_add_driver()
driver_register()
__platform_driver_register()
init_module() [some module]
do_one_initcall()
do_init_module()
load_module()
__arm64_sys_finit_module()
invoke_syscall()
As a result of the above, it was seen that device_links_driver_bound() could be called for the device before "dev->fwnode->dev" was assigned. This prevented __fw_devlink_pickup_dangling_consumers() from being called which meant that other devices waiting on our driver's sub-nodes were stuck deferring forever.
It's believed that this problem is showing up suddenly for two reasons:
1. Android has recently (last ~1 year) implemented an optimization to the order it loads modules [2]. When devices opt-in to this faster loading, modules are loaded one-after-the-other very quickly. This is unlike how other distributions do it. The reproduction of this problem has only been seen on devices that opt-in to Android's "parallel module loading".
2. Android devices typically opt-in to fw_devlink, and the most noticeable issue is the NULL "dev->fwnode->dev" in device_links_driver_bound(). fw_devlink is somewhat new code and also not in use by all Linux devices.
Even though the specific symptom where "dev->fwnode->dev" wasn't assigned could be fixed by moving that assignment higher in device_add(), other parts of device_add() (like the call to device_pm_add()) are also important to run before probe. Only moving the "dev->fwnode->dev" assignment would likely fix the current symptoms but lead to difficult-to-debug problems in the future.
Fix the problem by preventing probe until device_add() has run far enough that the device is ready to probe. If somehow we end up trying to probe before we're allowed, __driver_probe_device() will return -EPROBE_DEFER which will make certain the device is noticed.
In the race condition that was seen with Android's faster module loading, we will temporarily add the device to the deferred list and then take it off immediately when device_add() probes the device.
Instead of adding another flag to the bitfields already in "struct device", instead add a new "flags" field and use that. This allows us to freely change the bit from different thread without worrying about corrupting nearby bits (and means threads changing other bit won't corrupt us).
[1] Captured on a machine running a downstream 6.6 kernel
[2] https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:system/core/libmodprobe/libmodprobe.cpp?q=LoadModulesParallel
--- drivers/base/core.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ drivers/base/dd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/device.h | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
drivers/base/core.c +15 -0
@@ -3687,6 +3687,21 @@ int device_add(struct device *dev)fw_devlink_link_device (dev); } +/* +* The moment the device was linked into the bus's "klist_devices" in +* bus_add_device() then it's possible that probe could have been +* attempted in a different thread via userspace loading a driver +* matching the device. "ready_to_probe" being unset would have +* blocked those attempts. Now that all of the above initialization has +* happened, unblock probe. If probe happens through another thread +* after this point but before bus_probe_device() runs then it's fine. +* bus_probe_device() -> device_initial_probe() -> __device_attach() +* will notice (under device_lock) that the device is already bound. +*/ +device_lock (dev); +dev_set_ready_to_probe (dev); +device_unlock (dev); +bus_probe_device (dev);/*
drivers/base/dd.c +20 -0
@@ -848,6 +848,26 @@ static int __driver_probe_device(const sif (dev->driver)return -EBUSY ; +/* +* In device_add(), the "struct device" gets linked into the subsystem's +* list of devices and broadcast to userspace (via uevent) before we're +* quite ready to probe. Those open pathways to driver probe before +* we've finished enough of device_add() to reliably support probe. +* Detect this and tell other pathways to try again later. device_add() +* itself will also try to probe immediately after setting +* "ready_to_probe". +*/ +if (!dev_ready_to_probe (dev)) +return dev_err_probe (dev, -EPROBE_DEFER ,"Device not ready to probe\n" ); + +/* +* Set can_match = true after calling dev_ready_to_probe(), so +* driver_deferred_probe_add() won't actually add the device to the +* deferred probe list when dev_ready_to_probe() returns false. +* +* When dev_ready_to_probe() returns false, it means that device_add() +* will do another probe() attempt for us. +*/ dev->can_match = true;dev_dbg (dev,"bus: '%s': %s: matched device with driver %s\n" , drv->bus->name, __func__, drv->name);
include/linux/device.h +44 -0
64 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/307 device property: Make modifications of fwnode "flags" thread safe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
commit f72e77c33e4b5657af35125e75bab249256030f3 upstream.
In various places in the kernel, we modify the fwnode "flags" member by doing either:
fwnode->flags |= SOME_FLAG;
fwnode->flags &= ~SOME_FLAG;
This type of modification is not thread-safe. If two threads are both mucking with the flags at the same time then one can clobber the other.
While flags are often modified while under the "fwnode_link_lock", this is not universally true.
Create some accessor functions for setting, clearing, and testing the FWNODE flags and move all users to these accessor functions. New accessor functions use set_bit() and clear_bit(), which are thread-safe.
[ Fix fwnode_clear_flag() argument alignment, restore dropped blank
line in fwnode_dev_initialized(), and remove unnecessary parentheses around fwnode_test_flag() calls. - Danilo ]
--- drivers/base/core.c | 24 +++++++++---------- drivers/bus/imx-weim.c | 2 - drivers/i2c/i2c-core-of.c | 2 - drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus_provider.c | 4 +-- drivers/of/base.c | 2 - drivers/of/dynamic.c | 2 - drivers/of/platform.c | 2 - drivers/spi/spi.c | 2 - include/linux/fwnode.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 9 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
drivers/base/core.c +12 -12
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ void fw_devlink_purge_absent_suppliers(sif (fwnode->dev)return ; - fwnode->flags |=FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE ; +fwnode_set_flag (fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE );fwnode_links_purge_consumers (fwnode);fwnode_for_each_available_child_node (fwnode, child)
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static void __fw_devlink_pickup_danglingif (fwnode->dev && fwnode->dev->bus)return ; - fwnode->flags |=FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE ; +fwnode_set_flag (fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE );__fwnode_links_move_consumers (fwnode, new_sup);fwnode_for_each_available_child_node (fwnode, child)
@@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ static void device_links_missing_suppliestatic bool dev_is_best_effort (struct device *dev) {return (fw_devlink_best_effort && dev->can_match) || - (dev->fwnode && (dev->fwnode->flags &FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT )); + (dev->fwnode &&fwnode_test_flag (dev->fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT )); } static struct fwnode_handle *fwnode_links_check_suppliers(
@@ -1723,11 +1723,11 @@ bool fw_devlink_is_strict(void)static void fw_devlink_parse_fwnode (struct fwnode_handle *fwnode) { -if (fwnode->flags &FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED ) +if (fwnode_test_flag (fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED ))return ;fwnode_call_int_op (fwnode, add_links); - fwnode->flags |=FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED ; +fwnode_set_flag (fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED ); }static void fw_devlink_parse_fwtree (struct fwnode_handle *fwnode)
@@ -1885,7 +1885,7 @@ static bool fwnode_init_without_drv(strustruct device *dev;bool ret; -if (!(fwnode->flags &FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED )) +if (!fwnode_test_flag (fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED ))return false; dev =get_dev_from_fwnode (fwnode);
@@ -2001,10 +2001,10 @@ static bool __fw_devlink_relax_cycles(st* We aren't trying to find all cycles. Just a cycle between con and * sup_handle. */ -if (sup_handle->flags &FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED ) +if (fwnode_test_flag (sup_handle,FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED ))return false; - sup_handle->flags |=FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED ; +fwnode_set_flag (sup_handle,FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED );/* Termination condition. */ if (sup_handle == con_handle) {
@@ -2074,7 +2074,7 @@ static bool __fw_devlink_relax_cycles(st } out: - sup_handle->flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED ; +fwnode_clear_flag (sup_handle,FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED );put_device (sup_dev);put_device (con_dev);put_device (par_dev);
@@ -2127,7 +2127,7 @@ static int fw_devlink_create_devlink(str* When such a flag is set, we can't create device links where P is the * supplier of C as that would delay the probe of C. */ -if (sup_handle->flags &FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD && +if (fwnode_test_flag (sup_handle,FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD ) &&fwnode_is_ancestor_of (sup_handle, con->fwnode))return -EINVAL ;
@@ -2150,7 +2150,7 @@ static int fw_devlink_create_devlink(strelse flags =FW_DEVLINK_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE ; -if (sup_handle->flags &FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE ) +if (fwnode_test_flag (sup_handle,FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE )) sup_dev =fwnode_get_next_parent_dev (sup_handle);else sup_dev =get_dev_from_fwnode (sup_handle);
@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ static int fw_devlink_create_devlink(str* supplier device indefinitely. */ if (sup_dev->links.status ==DL_DEV_NO_DRIVER && - sup_handle->flags &FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED ) { +fwnode_test_flag (sup_handle,FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED )) {dev_dbg (con,"Not linking %pfwf - dev might never probe\n" , sup_handle);
drivers/bus/imx-weim.c +1 -1
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static int of_weim_notify(struct notifie* fw_devlink doesn't skip adding consumers to this * device. */ - rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE ; +fwnode_clear_flag (&rd->dn->fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE );if (!of_platform_device_create (rd->dn,NULL , &pdev->dev)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to create child device '%pOF'\n",
drivers/i2c/i2c-core-of.c +1 -1
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static int of_i2c_notify(struct notifier* Clear the flag before adding the device so that fw_devlink * doesn't skip adding consumers to this device. */ - rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE ; +fwnode_clear_flag (&rd->dn->fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE ); client =of_i2c_register_device (adap, rd->dn);if (IS_ERR (client)) { dev_err(&adap->dev, "failed to create client for '%pOF'\n",
drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus_provider.c +2 -2
@@ -294,8 +294,8 @@ int __mdiobus_register(struct mii_bus *breturn -EINVAL ;if (bus->parent && bus->parent->of_node) - bus->parent->of_node->fwnode.flags |= -FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD ; +fwnode_set_flag (&bus->parent->of_node->fwnode, +FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD ); WARN(bus->state != MDIOBUS_ALLOCATED && bus->state != MDIOBUS_UNREGISTERED,
drivers/of/base.c +1 -1
@@ -1915,7 +1915,7 @@ void of_alias_scan(void * (*dt_alloc)(u6if (name) of_stdout =of_find_node_opts_by_path (name, &of_stdout_options);if (of_stdout) - of_stdout->fwnode.flags |=FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT ; +fwnode_set_flag (&of_stdout->fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT ); }if (!of_aliases)
drivers/of/dynamic.c +1 -1
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ static void __of_attach_node(struct devi np->sibling = np->parent->child; np->parent->child = np;of_node_clear_flag (np,OF_DETACHED ); - np->fwnode.flags |=FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE ; +fwnode_set_flag (&np->fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE );raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&devtree_lock, flags);
drivers/of/platform.c +1 -1
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ static int of_platform_notify(struct not* Clear the flag before adding the device so that fw_devlink * doesn't skip adding consumers to this device. */ - rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE ; +fwnode_clear_flag (&rd->dn->fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE );/* pdev_parent may be NULL when no bus platform device */ pdev_parent =of_find_device_by_node (parent); pdev = of_platform_device_create(rd->dn, NULL,
drivers/spi/spi.c +1 -1
@@ -4943,7 +4943,7 @@ static int of_spi_notify(struct notifier* Clear the flag before adding the device so that fw_devlink * doesn't skip adding consumers to this device. */ - rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE ; +fwnode_clear_flag (&rd->dn->fwnode,FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE ); spi =of_register_spi_device (ctlr, rd->dn);put_device (&ctlr->dev);
include/linux/fwnode.h +33 -11
74 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/307 drm/nouveau: fix nvkm_device leak on aperture removal failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Carlier <[email protected]>
commit 6597ff1d8de3f583be169587efeafd8af134e138 upstream.
When aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_devices() fails during probe, the error path returns directly without unwinding the nvkm_device that was just allocated by nvkm_device_pci_new(). This leaks both the device wrapper and the pci_enable_device() reference taken inside it.
Jump to the existing fail_nvkm label so nvkm_device_del() runs and balances both. The leak was introduced when the intermediate nvkm_device_del() between detection and aperture removal was dropped in favor of creating the pci device once.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_drm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_drm.c +1 -1
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ static int nouveau_drm_probe(struct pci_/* Remove conflicting drivers (vesafb, efifb etc). */ ret =aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_devices (pdev, driver_pci.name);if (ret) -return ret; + goto fail_nvkm;pci_set_master (pdev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/307 ALSA: usb-audio: Avoid false E-MU sample-rate notifications
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
commit fca9c850042a7ab4828ce3a9caa8bc40ea09856a upstream.
snd_emuusb_set_samplerate() unconditionally notifies the E-MU SampleRate Extension Unit control after issuing SET_CUR.
If snd_usb_mixer_set_ctl_value() fails, the control value has not changed, yet snd_usb_mixer_notify_id() still invalidates the cache and emits a value-change event to userspace.
Notify the control only after a successful write.
--- sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c +6 -4
@@ -1538,15 +1538,17 @@ void snd_emuusb_set_samplerate(struct sn {struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer;struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval; +int err;int unitid =12 ;/* SampleRate ExtensionUnit ID */ list_for_each_entry (mixer, &chip->mixer_list, list) {if (mixer->id_elems[unitid]) { cval =mixer_elem_list_to_info (mixer->id_elems[unitid]); -snd_usb_mixer_set_ctl_value (cval,UAC_SET_CUR , - cval->control <<8 , - samplerate_id); -snd_usb_mixer_notify_id (mixer, unitid); + err =snd_usb_mixer_set_ctl_value (cval,UAC_SET_CUR , + cval->control <<8 , + samplerate_id); +if (!err) +snd_usb_mixer_notify_id (mixer, unitid);break ; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/307 rust: dma: remove DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING from public attrs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]>
commit 18fb5f1f0289b8217c0c43d54d12bccc201dd640 upstream.
When DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING is passed to dma_alloc_attrs(), the returned CPU address is not a pointer to the allocated memory but an opaque handle (e.g. struct page *).
Coherent<T> (or CoherentAllocation<T> respectively) stores this value as NonNull<T> and exposes methods that dereference it and even modify its contents.
Remove the flag from the public attrs module such that drivers cannot pass it to Coherent<T> (or CoherentAllocation<T> respectively) in the first place.
Instead DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING can be supported with an additional opaque type (e.g. CoherentHandle) which does not provide access to the allocated memory.
--- rust/kernel/dma.rs | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
rust/kernel/dma.rs +0 -3
@@ -250,9 +250,6 @@ pub mod attrs {/// Specifies that writes to the mapping may be buffered to improve performance. pub const DMA_ATTR_WRITE_COMBINE :Attrs =Attrs (bindings::DMA_ATTR_WRITE_COMBINE ); -/// Lets the platform to avoid creating a kernel virtual mapping for the allocated buffer. -pub const DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING :Attrs =Attrs (bindings::DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING ); -/// Allows platform code to skip synchronization of the CPU cache for the given buffer assuming /// that it has been already transferred to 'device' domain. pub const DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC :Attrs =Attrs (bindings::DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/307 kbuild: rust: allow `clippy::uninlined_format_args`
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]>
commit 10eea3c147141c90cf409b8df56d245c9d7f88d9 upstream.
Clippy in Rust 1.88.0 (only) reports [1]:
warning: variables can be used directly in the `format!` string
--> rust/macros/module.rs:112:23
|
112 | let content = format!("{param}:{content}", param = param, content = content);
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
= help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#uninlined_format_args
= note: `-W clippy::uninlined-format-args` implied by `-W clippy::all`
= help: to override `-W clippy::all` add `#[allow(clippy::uninlined_format_args)]`
help: change this to
|
112 - let content = format!("{param}:{content}", param = param, content = content);
112 + let content = format!("{param}:{content}");
warning: variables can be used directly in the `format!` string
--> rust/macros/module.rs:198:14
|
198 | t => panic!("Unsupported parameter type {}", t),
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
= help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#uninlined_format_args
= note: `-W clippy::uninlined-format-args` implied by `-W clippy::all`
= help: to override `-W clippy::all` add `#[allow(clippy::uninlined_format_args)]`
help: change this to
|
198 - t => panic!("Unsupported parameter type {}", t),
198 + t => panic!("Unsupported parameter type {t}"),
|The reason it only triggers in that version is that the lint was moved from pedantic to style in Rust 1.88.0 and then back to pedantic in Rust 1.89.0 [2][3].
In the first case, the suggestion is fair and a pure simplification, thus we will clean it up separately.
To keep the behavior the same across all versions, and since the lint does not work for all macros (e.g. custom ones like pr_info!), disable it globally.
--- Makefile | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
Makefile +1 -0
@@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ export rust_common_flags := --edition=20 -Wclippy::ptr_cast_constness \ -Wclippy::ref_as_ptr \ -Wclippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks \ + -Aclippy::uninlined_format_args \ -Wclippy::unnecessary_safety_comment \ -Wclippy::unnecessary_safety_doc \ -Wrustdoc::missing_crate_level_docs \
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/307 fs: afs: revert mmap_prepare() change
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <[email protected]>
commit fbfc6578eaca12daa0c09df1e9ba7f2c657b49da upstream.
Partially reverts commit 9d5403b1036c ("fs: convert most other generic_file_*mmap() users to .mmap_prepare()").
This is because the .mmap invocation establishes a refcount, but .mmap_prepare is called at a point where a merge or an allocation failure might happen after the call, which would leak the refcount increment.
Functionality is being added to permit the use of .mmap_prepare in this case, but in the interim, we need to fix this.
--- fs/afs/file.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/afs/file.c +6 -6
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@#include <trace/events/netfs.h> #include "internal.h" -static int afs_file_mmap_prepare (struct vm_area_desc *desc); +static int afs_file_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma);static ssize_t afs_file_read_iter (struct kiocb *iocb,struct iov_iter *iter); static ssize_t afs_file_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ const struct file_operations afs_file_op .llseek = generic_file_llseek, .read_iter = afs_file_read_iter, .write_iter = netfs_file_write_iter, - .mmap_prepare = afs_file_mmap_prepare, + .mmap = afs_file_mmap, .splice_read = afs_file_splice_read, .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, .fsync = afs_fsync,
@@ -492,16 +492,16 @@ static void afs_drop_open_mmap(struct af/* * Handle setting up a memory mapping on an AFS file. */ -static int afs_file_mmap_prepare (struct vm_area_desc *desc) +static int afs_file_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma) { -struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (file_inode (desc->file)); +struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (file_inode (file));int ret;afs_add_open_mmap (vnode); - ret =generic_file_mmap_prepare (desc); + ret =generic_file_mmap (file, vma);if (ret ==0 ) - desc->vm_ops = &afs_vm_ops; + vma->vm_ops = &afs_vm_ops;else afs_drop_open_mmap (vnode);return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/307 firmware: google: framebuffer: Do not mark framebuffer as busy
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>
commit f3850d399de3b6142b02315227ef9e772ed0c302 upstream.
Remove the flag IORESOURCE_BUSY flag from coreboot's framebuffer resource. It prevents simpledrm from successfully requesting the range for its own use; resulting in errors such as
[ 2.775430] simple-framebuffer simple-framebuffer.0: [drm] could not acquire memory region [mem 0x80000000-0x80407fff flags 0x80000200]
As with other uses of simple-framebuffer, the simple-framebuffer device should only declare it's I/O resources, but not actively use them.
--- drivers/firmware/google/framebuffer-coreboot.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/google/framebuffer-coreboot.c +1 -1
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int framebuffer_probe(struct corereturn -ENODEV ;memset (&res,0 ,sizeof (res)); - res.flags =IORESOURCE_MEM |IORESOURCE_BUSY ; + res.flags =IORESOURCE_MEM ; res.name ="Coreboot Framebuffer" ; res.start = fb->physical_address; length =PAGE_ALIGN (fb->y_resolution * fb->bytes_per_line);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/307 lib: test_hmm: evict device pages on file close to avoid use-after-free
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alistair Popple <[email protected]>
commit 744dd97752ef1076a8d8672bb0d8aa2c7abc1144 upstream.
Patch series "Minor hmm_test fixes and cleanups".
Two bugfixes a cleanup for the HMM kernel selftests. These were mostly reported by Zenghui Yu with special thanks to Lorenzo for analysing and pointing out the problems.
This patch (of 3):
When dmirror_fops_release() is called it frees the dmirror struct but doesn't migrate device private pages back to system memory first. This leaves those pages with a dangling zone_device_data pointer to the freed dmirror.
If a subsequent fault occurs on those pages (eg. during coredump) the dmirror_devmem_fault() callback dereferences the stale pointer causing a kernel panic. This was reported [1] when running mm/ksft_hmm.sh on arm64, where a test failure triggered SIGABRT and the resulting coredump walked the VMAs faulting in the stale device private pages.
Fix this by calling dmirror_device_evict_chunk() for each devmem chunk in dmirror_fops_release() to migrate all device private pages back to system memory before freeing the dmirror struct. The function is moved earlier in the file to avoid a forward declaration.
--- lib/test_hmm.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
lib/test_hmm.c +62 -50
@@ -185,11 +185,73 @@ static int dmirror_fops_open(struct inodreturn 0 ; } +static void dmirror_device_evict_chunk (struct dmirror_chunk *chunk) +{ +unsigned long start_pfn = chunk->pagemap.range.start >>PAGE_SHIFT ; +unsigned long end_pfn = chunk->pagemap.range.end >>PAGE_SHIFT ; +unsigned long npages = end_pfn - start_pfn +1 ; +unsigned long i; +unsigned long *src_pfns; +unsigned long *dst_pfns; +unsigned int order =0 ; + + src_pfns =kvcalloc (npages,sizeof (*src_pfns),GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); + dst_pfns =kvcalloc (npages,sizeof (*dst_pfns),GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); + +migrate_device_range (src_pfns, start_pfn, npages); +for (i =0 ; i < npages; i++) { +struct page *dpage, *spage; + + spage =migrate_pfn_to_page (src_pfns[i]); +if (!spage || !(src_pfns[i] &MIGRATE_PFN_MIGRATE )) +continue ; + +if (WARN_ON (!is_device_private_page (spage) && + !is_device_coherent_page (spage))) +continue ; + + order =folio_order (page_folio (spage)); + spage =BACKING_PAGE (spage); +if (src_pfns[i] &MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND ) { + dpage =folio_page (folio_alloc (GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE , + order),0 ); + }else { + dpage =alloc_page (GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_NOFAIL); + order =0 ; + } + +/* TODO Support splitting here */ +lock_page (dpage); + dst_pfns[i] =migrate_pfn (page_to_pfn (dpage)); +if (src_pfns[i] &MIGRATE_PFN_WRITE ) + dst_pfns[i] |=MIGRATE_PFN_WRITE ; +if (order) + dst_pfns[i] |=MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND ; +folio_copy (page_folio (dpage),page_folio (spage)); + } +migrate_device_pages (src_pfns, dst_pfns, npages); +migrate_device_finalize (src_pfns, dst_pfns, npages); +kvfree (src_pfns); +kvfree (dst_pfns); +} +static int dmirror_fops_release (struct inode *inode,struct file *filp) {struct dmirror *dmirror = filp->private_data; +struct dmirror_device *mdevice = dmirror->mdevice; +int i;mmu_interval_notifier_remove (&dmirror->notifier); + +if (mdevice->devmem_chunks) { +for (i =0 ; i < mdevice->devmem_count; i++) { +struct dmirror_chunk *devmem = + mdevice->devmem_chunks[i]; + +dmirror_device_evict_chunk (devmem); + } + } +xa_destroy (&dmirror->pt);kfree (dmirror);return 0 ;
@@ -1377,56 +1439,6 @@ static int dmirror_snapshot(struct dmirrreturn ret; } -static void dmirror_device_evict_chunk (struct dmirror_chunk *chunk) -{ -unsigned long start_pfn = chunk->pagemap.range.start >>PAGE_SHIFT ; -unsigned long end_pfn = chunk->pagemap.range.end >>PAGE_SHIFT ; -unsigned long npages = end_pfn - start_pfn +1 ; -unsigned long i; -unsigned long *src_pfns; -unsigned long *dst_pfns; -unsigned int order =0 ; - - src_pfns =kvcalloc (npages,sizeof (*src_pfns),GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); - dst_pfns =kvcalloc (npages,sizeof (*dst_pfns),GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); - -migrate_device_range (src_pfns, start_pfn, npages); -for (i =0 ; i < npages; i++) { -struct page *dpage, *spage; - - spage =migrate_pfn_to_page (src_pfns[i]); -if (!spage || !(src_pfns[i] &MIGRATE_PFN_MIGRATE )) -continue ; - -if (WARN_ON (!is_device_private_page (spage) && - !is_device_coherent_page (spage))) -continue ; - - order =folio_order (page_folio (spage)); - spage =BACKING_PAGE (spage); -if (src_pfns[i] &MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND ) { - dpage =folio_page (folio_alloc (GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE , - order),0 ); - }else { - dpage =alloc_page (GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_NOFAIL); - order =0 ; - } - -/* TODO Support splitting here */ -lock_page (dpage); - dst_pfns[i] =migrate_pfn (page_to_pfn (dpage)); -if (src_pfns[i] &MIGRATE_PFN_WRITE ) - dst_pfns[i] |=MIGRATE_PFN_WRITE ; -if (order) - dst_pfns[i] |=MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND ; -folio_copy (page_folio (dpage),page_folio (spage)); - } -migrate_device_pages (src_pfns, dst_pfns, npages); -migrate_device_finalize (src_pfns, dst_pfns, npages); -kvfree (src_pfns); -kvfree (dst_pfns); -} -/* Removes free pages from the free list so they can't be re-allocated */ static void dmirror_remove_free_pages (struct dmirror_chunk *devmem) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/307 arm64/mm: Enable batched TLB flush in unmap_hotplug_range()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
commit 48478b9f791376b4b89018d7afdfd06865498f65 upstream.
During a memory hot remove operation, both linear and vmemmap mappings for the memory range being removed, get unmapped via unmap_hotplug_range() but mapped pages get freed only for vmemmap mapping. This is just a sequential operation where each table entry gets cleared, followed by a leaf specific TLB flush, and then followed by memory free operation when applicable.
This approach was simple and uniform both for vmemmap and linear mappings. But linear mapping might contain CONT marked block memory where it becomes necessary to first clear out all entire in the range before a TLB flush. This is as per the architecture requirement. Hence batch all TLB flushes during the table tear down walk and finally do it in unmap_hotplug_range().
Prior to this fix, it was hypothetically possible for a speculative access to a higher address in the contiguous block to fill the TLB with shattered entries for the entire contiguous range after a lower address had already been cleared and invalidated. Due to the table entries being shattered, the subsequent TLB invalidation for the higher address would not then clear the TLB entries for the lower address, meaning stale TLB entries could persist.
Besides it also helps in improving the performance via TLBI range operation along with reduced synchronization instructions. The time spent executing unmap_hotplug_range() improved 97% measured over a 2GB memory hot removal in KVM guest.
This scheme is not applicable during vmemmap mapping tear down where memory needs to be freed and hence a TLB flush is required after clearing out page table entry.
--- arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +20 -16
@@ -1462,10 +1462,14 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_pte_range(pmd_WARN_ON (!pte_present (pte));__pte_clear (&init_mm, addr, ptep); -flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE ); -if (free_mapped) +if (free_mapped) { +/* CONT blocks are not supported in the vmemmap */ +WARN_ON (pte_cont (pte)); +flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE );free_hotplug_page_range (pte_page (pte),PAGE_SIZE , altmap); + } +/* unmap_hotplug_range() flushes TLB for !free_mapped */ }while (addr +=PAGE_SIZE , addr < end); }
@@ -1486,15 +1490,14 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_pmd_range(pud_WARN_ON (!pmd_present (pmd));if (pmd_sect (pmd)) {pmd_clear (pmdp); - -/* -* One TLBI should be sufficient here as the PMD_SIZE -* range is mapped with a single block entry. -*/ -flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE ); -if (free_mapped) +if (free_mapped) { +/* CONT blocks are not supported in the vmemmap */ +WARN_ON (pmd_cont (pmd)); +flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PMD_SIZE );free_hotplug_page_range (pmd_page (pmd),PMD_SIZE , altmap); + } +/* unmap_hotplug_range() flushes TLB for !free_mapped */ continue ; }WARN_ON (!pmd_table (pmd));
@@ -1519,15 +1522,12 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_pud_range(p4d_WARN_ON (!pud_present (pud));if (pud_sect (pud)) {pud_clear (pudp); - -/* -* One TLBI should be sufficient here as the PUD_SIZE -* range is mapped with a single block entry. -*/ -flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PAGE_SIZE ); -if (free_mapped) +if (free_mapped) { +flush_tlb_kernel_range (addr, addr +PUD_SIZE );free_hotplug_page_range (pud_page (pud),PUD_SIZE , altmap); + } +/* unmap_hotplug_range() flushes TLB for !free_mapped */ continue ; }WARN_ON (!pud_table (pud));
@@ -1557,6 +1557,7 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_p4d_range(pgd_static void unmap_hotplug_range (unsigned long addr,unsigned long end,bool free_mapped,struct vmem_altmap *altmap) { +unsigned long start = addr;unsigned long next;pgd_t *pgdp, pgd;
@@ -1578,6 +1579,9 @@ static void unmap_hotplug_range(unsignedWARN_ON (!pgd_present (pgd));unmap_hotplug_p4d_range (pgdp, addr, next, free_mapped, altmap); }while (addr = next, addr < end); + +if (!free_mapped) +flush_tlb_kernel_range (start, end); } static void free_empty_pte_table(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/307 arm64: mm: Fix rodata=full block mapping support for realm guests
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>
commit f12b435de2f2bb09ce406467020181ada528844c upstream.
Commit a166563e7ec37 ("arm64: mm: support large block mapping when rodata=full") enabled the linear map to be mapped by block/cont while still allowing granular permission changes on BBML2_NOABORT systems by lazily splitting the live mappings. This mechanism was intended to be usable by realm guests since they need to dynamically share dma buffers with the host by "decrypting" them - which for Arm CCA, means marking them as shared in the page tables.
However, it turns out that the mechanism was failing for realm guests because realms need to share their dma buffers (via __set_memory_enc_dec()) much earlier during boot than split_kernel_leaf_mapping() was able to handle. The report linked below showed that GIC's ITS was one such user. But during the investigation I found other callsites that could not meet the split_kernel_leaf_mapping() constraints.
The problem is that we block map the linear map based on the boot CPU supporting BBML2_NOABORT, then check that all the other CPUs support it too when finalizing the caps. If they don't, then we stop_machine() and split to ptes. For safety, split_kernel_leaf_mapping() previously wouldn't permit splitting until after the caps were finalized. That ensured that if any secondary cpus were running that didn't support BBML2_NOABORT, we wouldn't risk breaking them.
I've fix this problem by reducing the black-out window where we refuse to split; there are now 2 windows. The first is from T0 until the page allocator is inititialized. Splitting allocates memory for the page allocator so it must be in use. The second covers the period between starting to online the secondary cpus until the system caps are finalized (this is a very small window).
All of the problematic callers are calling __set_memory_enc_dec() before the secondary cpus come online, so this solves the problem. However, one of these callers, swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(), was trying to split before the page allocator was initialized. So I have moved this call from arch_mm_preinit() to mem_init(), which solves the ordering issue.
I've added warnings and return an error if any attempt is made to split in the black-out windows.
Note there are other issues which prevent booting all the way to user space, which will be fixed in subsequent patches.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 + arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 9 +++++++- arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +2 -0
@@ -112,5 +112,7 @@ void kpti_install_ng_mappings(void);static inline void kpti_install_ng_mappings (void ) {}#endif +extern bool page_alloc_available; +#endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */ #endif
arch/arm64/mm/init.c +8 -1
@@ -350,7 +350,6 @@ void __init arch_mm_preinit(void) }swiotlb_init (swiotlb, flags); -swiotlb_update_mem_attributes ();/* * Check boundaries twice: Some fundamental inconsistencies can be
@@ -377,6 +376,14 @@ void __init arch_mm_preinit(void) } } +bool page_alloc_available__ro_after_init ; + +void __init mem_init (void ) +{ + page_alloc_available = true; +swiotlb_update_mem_attributes (); +} +void free_initmem (void ) {void *lm_init_begin =lm_alias (__init_begin);
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +32 -13
70 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/307 ALSA: usb-audio: Fix Audio Advantage Micro II SPDIF switch
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
commit a9224f26b754b5034719248891ff3c2ea0d11144 upstream.
snd_microii_spdif_switch_put() returns 0 when the requested vendor register value differs from the cached one.
This comparison was inverted by the resume-support conversion, so real SPDIF switch toggles are ignored while no-op writes still issue SET_CUR and report success.
Return early only when the requested value matches the cached one.
--- sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c +1 -1
@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ static int snd_microii_spdif_switch_put(int err; reg = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] ?0x28 :0x2a ; -if (reg != list->kctl->private_value) +if (reg == list->kctl->private_value)return 0 ; kcontrol->private_value = reg;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/307 usb: xhci: Make usb_host_endpoint.hcpriv survive endpoint_disable()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Pecio <[email protected]>
commit 25e531b422dc2ac90cdae3b6e74b5cdeb081440d upstream.
xHCI hardware maintains its endpoint state between add_endpoint() and drop_endpoint() calls followed by successful check_bandwidth(). So does the driver.
Core may call endpoint_disable() during xHCI endpoint life, so don't clear host_ep->hcpriv then, because this breaks endpoint_reset().
If a driver calls usb_set_interface(), submits URBs which make host sequence state non-zero and calls usb_clear_halt(), the device clears its sequence state but xhci_endpoint_reset() bails out. The next URB
malfunctions: USB2 loses one packet, USB3 gets Transaction Error or may not complete at all on some (buggy?) HCs from ASMedia and AMD. This is triggered by uvcvideo on bulk video devices.
The code was copied from ehci_endpoint_disable() but it isn't needed here - hcpriv should only be NULL on emulated root hub endpoints. It might prevent resetting and inadvertently enabling a disabled and dropped endpoint, but core shouldn't try to reset dropped endpoints.
Document xhci requirements regarding hcpriv. They are currently met.
--- drivers/usb/host/xhci.c | 1 - include/linux/usb.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/host/xhci.c +0 -1
@@ -3285,7 +3285,6 @@ rescan:xhci_dbg (xhci,"endpoint disable with ep_state 0x%x\n" , ep->ep_state); done: - host_ep->hcpriv =NULL ;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&xhci->lock, flags); }
include/linux/usb.h +2 -1
@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@ struct ep_device;* @eusb2_isoc_ep_comp: eUSB2 isoc companion descriptor for this endpoint * @urb_list: urbs queued to this endpoint; maintained by usbcore * @hcpriv: for use by HCD; typically holds hardware dma queue head (QH) -* with one or more transfer descriptors (TDs) per urb +* with one or more transfer descriptors (TDs) per urb; must be preserved +* by core while BW is allocated for the endpoint * @ep_dev: ep_device for sysfs info * @extra: descriptors following this endpoint in the configuration * @extralen: how many bytes of "extra" are valid
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/307 usb: chipidea: otg: not wait vbus drop if use role_switch
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xu Yang <[email protected]>
commit a4e99587102a83ee911c670752fbca694c7e557f upstream.
The usb role switch will update ID and VBUS states at the same time, and vbus will not drop when execute data role swap in Type-C usecase. So lets not wait vbus drop in usb role switch case too.
--- drivers/usb/chipidea/otg.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/chipidea/otg.c +2 -2
@@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ void ci_handle_id_switch(struct ci_hdrcci_role_stop (ci); -if (role ==CI_ROLE_GADGET && -IS_ERR (ci->platdata->vbus_extcon.edev)) +if (role ==CI_ROLE_GADGET && !ci->role_switch && +IS_ERR (ci->platdata->vbus_extcon.edev))/* * Wait vbus lower than OTGSC_BSV before connecting * to host. If connecting status is from an external
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/307 usb: chipidea: core: allow ci_irq_handler() handle both ID and VBUS change
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xu Yang <[email protected]>
commit b94b631d9f78e653855f7fb58dbcb86c2a856f6f upstream.
For USB role switch-triggered IRQ, ID and VBUS change come together, for example when switching from host to device mode. ID indicate a role switch and VBUS is required to determine whether the device controller can start operating. Currently, ci_irq_handler() handles only a single event per invocation. This can cause an issue where switching to device mode results in the device controller not working at all. Allowing ci_irq_handler() to handle both ID and VBUS change in one call resolves this issue.
Meanwhile, this change also affects the VBUS event handling logic. Previously, if an ID event indicated host mode the VBUS IRQ will be ignored as the device disable BSE when stop() is called. With the new behavior, if ID and VBUS IRQ occur together and the target mode is host, the VBUS event is queued and ci_handle_vbus_change() will call usb_gadget_vbus_connect(), after which USBMODE is switched to device mode, causing host mode to stop working. To prevent this, an additional check is added to skip handling VBUS event when current role is not device mode.
--- drivers/usb/chipidea/core.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- drivers/usb/chipidea/otg.c | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/chipidea/core.c +23 -22
@@ -544,30 +544,31 @@ static irqreturn_t ci_irq_handler(int irif (ret ==IRQ_HANDLED )return ret; } - } -/* -* Handle id change interrupt, it indicates device/host function -* switch. -*/ -if (ci->is_otg && (otgsc &OTGSC_IDIE ) && (otgsc &OTGSC_IDIS )) { - ci->id_event = true; -/* Clear ID change irq status */ -hw_write_otgsc (ci,OTGSC_IDIS ,OTGSC_IDIS ); -ci_otg_queue_work (ci); -return IRQ_HANDLED ; - } +/* +* Handle id change interrupt, it indicates device/host function +* switch. +*/ +if ((otgsc &OTGSC_IDIE ) && (otgsc &OTGSC_IDIS )) { + ci->id_event = true; +/* Clear ID change irq status */ +hw_write_otgsc (ci,OTGSC_IDIS ,OTGSC_IDIS ); + } -/* -* Handle vbus change interrupt, it indicates device connection -* and disconnection events. -*/ -if (ci->is_otg && (otgsc &OTGSC_BSVIE ) && (otgsc &OTGSC_BSVIS )) { - ci->b_sess_valid_event = true; -/* Clear BSV irq */ -hw_write_otgsc (ci,OTGSC_BSVIS ,OTGSC_BSVIS ); -ci_otg_queue_work (ci); -return IRQ_HANDLED ; +/* +* Handle vbus change interrupt, it indicates device connection +* and disconnection events. +*/ +if ((otgsc &OTGSC_BSVIE ) && (otgsc &OTGSC_BSVIS )) { + ci->b_sess_valid_event = true; +/* Clear BSV irq */ +hw_write_otgsc (ci,OTGSC_BSVIS ,OTGSC_BSVIS ); + } + +if (ci->id_event || ci->b_sess_valid_event) { +ci_otg_queue_work (ci); +return IRQ_HANDLED ; + } }/* Handle device/host interrupt */
drivers/usb/chipidea/otg.c +3 -0
@@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ enum ci_role ci_otg_role(struct ci_hdrcvoid ci_handle_vbus_change (struct ci_hdrc *ci) { +if (ci->role !=CI_ROLE_GADGET ) +return ; +if (!ci->is_otg) {if (ci->platdata->flags &CI_HDRC_FORCE_VBUS_ACTIVE_ALWAYS )usb_gadget_vbus_connect (&ci->gadget);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/307 ALSA: usb-audio: Evaluate packsize caps at the right place
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 52521e8398839105ef8eb22b3f0993f9b0d11a57 upstream.
We introduced the upper bound checks of the packet sizes by the ep->maxframesize for avoiding the URB submission errors. However, the check was applied at an incorrect place in the function snd_usb_endpoint_set_params() where ep->maxframesize isn't defined yet; the value is defined at a bit later position. So this ended up with a failure at the first run while the second run works.
For fixing it, move the check at the correct place, right after the calculation of ep->maxframesize in the same function.
--- sound/usb/endpoint.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/usb/endpoint.c +3 -3
@@ -1379,9 +1379,6 @@ int snd_usb_endpoint_set_params(struct sreturn -EINVAL ; } - ep->packsize[0 ] =min (ep->packsize[0 ], ep->maxframesize); - ep->packsize[1 ] =min (ep->packsize[1 ], ep->maxframesize); -/* calculate the frequency in 16.16 format */ ep->freqm = ep->freqn; ep->freqshift =INT_MIN ;
@@ -1408,6 +1405,9 @@ int snd_usb_endpoint_set_params(struct s ep->maxframesize = ep->maxpacksize / ep->cur_frame_bytes; ep->curframesize = ep->curpacksize / ep->cur_frame_bytes; + ep->packsize[0 ] =min (ep->packsize[0 ], ep->maxframesize); + ep->packsize[1 ] =min (ep->packsize[1 ], ep->maxframesize); + err =update_clock_ref_rate (chip, ep);if (err >=0 ) { ep->need_setup = false;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/307 LoongArch: Add spectre boundry for syscall dispatch table
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 0c965d2784fbbd7f8e3b96d875c9cfdf7c00da3d upstream.
The LoongArch syscall number is directly controlled by userspace, but does not have a array_index_nospec() boundry to prevent access past the syscall function pointer tables.
--- arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c +2 -1
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/entry-common.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/objtool.h> #include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ void noinstr __no_stack_protector do_sysadd_random_kstack_offset ();if (nr < NR_syscalls) { - syscall_fn = sys_call_table[nr]; + syscall_fn = sys_call_table[array_index_nospec (nr, NR_syscalls)]; regs->regs[4 ] =syscall_fn (regs->orig_a0, regs->regs[5 ], regs->regs[6 ], regs->regs[7 ], regs->regs[8 ], regs->regs[9 ]); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/307 drm/nouveau: fix u32 overflow in pushbuf reloc bounds check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 2fc87d37be1b730a149b035f9375fdb8cc5333a5 upstream.
nouveau_gem_pushbuf_reloc_apply() validates each relocation with
if (r->reloc_bo_offset + 4 > nvbo->bo.base.size)
but reloc_bo_offset is __u32 (uapi/drm/nouveau_drm.h) and the integer literal 4 promotes to unsigned int, so the addition is performed in 32 bits and wraps before the comparison against the size_t bo size.
Cast to u64 so the addition happens in 64-bit arithmetic.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c +1 -1
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ nouveau_gem_pushbuf_reloc_apply(struct n } nvbo = (void *)(unsigned long )bo[r->reloc_bo_index].user_priv; -if (unlikely (r->reloc_bo_offset +4 > +if (unlikely ((u64 )r->reloc_bo_offset +4 > nvbo->bo.base.size)) {NV_PRINTK (err, cli,"reloc outside of bo\n" ); ret = -EINVAL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 7.0.4-rc1 review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 7.0.4 release. There are 307 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 06 May 2026 13:50:49 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v7.x/stable-review/patch-7.0.4-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-7.0.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 7.0.4-rc1
Kai Ma <[email protected]>
netfilter: reject zero shift in nft_bitwise
Andrea Mayer <[email protected]>
net: ipv6: fix NOREF dst use in seg6 and rpl lwtunnels
Harry Yoo (Oracle) <[email protected]>
mm/slab: return NULL early from kmalloc_nolock() in NMI on UP
Harry Yoo (Oracle) <[email protected]>
mm/page_alloc: return NULL early from alloc_frozen_pages_nolock() in NMI on UP
Marco Elver <[email protected]>
vmalloc: fix buffer overflow in vrealloc_node_align()
Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: aloop: Fix peer runtime UAF during format-change stop
Deepanshu Kartikey <[email protected]>
ALSA: caiaq: fix usb_dev refcount leak on probe failure
Brajesh Gupta <[email protected]>
drm/imagination: Fix segfault when updating ftrace mask
Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
drm/amdgpu: fix zero-size GDS range init on RDNA4
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ipv6: rpl: reserve mac_len headroom when recompressed SRH grows
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: caiaq: Don't abort when no input device is available
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: caiaq: Fix potentially leftover ep1_in_urb at error path
Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
driver core: Add kernel-doc for DEV_FLAG_COUNT enum value
Yucheng Lu <[email protected]>
crypto: authencesn - reject short ahash digests during instance creation
Alexander Usyskin <[email protected]>
mei: me: add nova lake point H DID
Alexander Usyskin <[email protected]>
mei: me: use PCI_DEVICE_DATA macro
Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <[email protected]>
mm: avoid deadlock when holding rmap on mmap_prepare error
Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <[email protected]>
mm: various small mmap_prepare cleanups
Sean Wang <[email protected]>
wifi: mt76: mt792x: fix mt7925u USB WFSYS reset handling
Sean Wang <[email protected]>
wifi: mt76: mt792x: describe USB WFSYS reset with a descriptor
Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>
iio: frequency: admv1013: fix NULL pointer dereference on str
Antoniu Miclaus <[email protected]>
iio: frequency: admv1013: add dev variable
WANG Rui <[email protected]>
perf loongarch: Fix build failure with CONFIG_LIBDW_DWARF_UNWIND
Andrea Mayer <[email protected]>
seg6: fix seg6 lwtunnel output redirect for L2 reduced encap mode
Yang Xiuwei <[email protected]>
scsi: sd: fix missing put_disk() when device_add(&disk_dev) fails
Andrea Righi <[email protected]>
sched_ext: Documentation: Clarify ops.dispatch() role in task lifecycle
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxgk: Fix potential integer overflow in length check
Keenan Dong <[email protected]>
rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()
Tobias Gaertner <[email protected]>
ntfs3: fix integer overflow in run_unpack() volume boundary check
Tobias Gaertner <[email protected]>
ntfs3: add buffer boundary checks to run_unpack()
Tushar Sariya <[email protected]>
NFSv4.1: Apply session size limits on clone path
Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
ktest: Fix the month in the name of the failure directory
Chen Zhao <[email protected]>
IB/core: Fix zero dmac race in neighbor resolution
David Carlier <[email protected]>
gtp: disable BH before calling udp_tunnel_xmit_skb()
Max Kellermann <[email protected]>
ceph: only d_add() negative dentries when they are unhashed
Sam Edwards <[email protected]>
ceph: fix num_ops off-by-one when crypto allocation fails
Junrui Luo <[email protected]>
erofs: fix unsigned underflow in z_erofs_lz4_handle_overlap()
Junrui Luo <[email protected]>
dm mirror: fix integer overflow in create_dirty_log()
Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
crypto: nx - Fix packed layout in struct nx842_crypto_header
Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: nx - fix context leak in nx842_crypto_free_ctx
Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: nx - fix bounce buffer leaks in nx842_crypto_{alloc,free}_ctx
Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix uninitialized data access on OTP read error
Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix potential UAF and memory leak in remove path
Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix error codes in OTP reads
Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-tdes - fix DMA sync direction
Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>
crypto: ccree - fix a memory leak in cc_mac_digest()
Thomas Fourier <[email protected]>
crypto: hisilicon - Fix dma_unmap_single() direction
Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-ecc - Release client on allocation failure
Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-aes - Fix 3-page memory leak in atmel_aes_buff_cleanup
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: arm64/aes - Fix 32-bit aes_mac_update() arg treated as 64-bit
Giovanni Cabiddu <[email protected]>
crypto: acomp - fix wrong pointer stored by acomp_save_req()
Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
can: ucan: fix devres lifetime
Qiang Yu <[email protected]>
bus: mhi: host: pci_generic: Switch to async power up to avoid boot delays
Shuvam Pandey <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: hci_event: fix potential UAF in SSP passkey handlers
Cengiz Can <[email protected]>
apparmor: use target task's context in apparmor_getprocattr()
Pierre Barre <[email protected]>
9p: fix access mode flags being ORed instead of replaced
Brian Mak <[email protected]>
mfd: core: Preserve OF node when ACPI handle is present
Gang Yan <[email protected]>
mptcp: sync the msk->sndbuf at accept() time
Yiyang Chen <[email protected]>
taskstats: set version in TGID exit notifications
Zhenzhong Wu <[email protected]>
tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration
Yi Cong <[email protected]>
wifi: rtl8xxxu: fix potential use of uninitialized value
Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
x86/shstk: Prevent deadlock during shstk sigreturn
Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
x86/cpu: Disable FRED when PTI is forced on
Chia-Ming Chang <[email protected]>
inotify: fix watch count leak when fsnotify_add_inode_mark_locked() fails
Aditya Garg <[email protected]>
HID: apple: ensure the keyboard backlight is off if suspending
Kairui Song <[email protected]>
mm, swap: speed up hibernation allocation and writeout
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
check-uapi: link into shared objects
Junrui Luo <[email protected]>
md/raid5: validate payload size before accessing journal metadata
Chia-Ming Chang <[email protected]>
md/raid5: fix soft lockup in retry_aligned_read()
Yu Kuai <[email protected]>
md/md-llbitmap: raise barrier before state machine transition
Yu Kuai <[email protected]>
md/md-llbitmap: skip reading rdevs that are not in_sync
David (Ming Qiang) Wu <[email protected]>
amdgpu/jpeg: fix deepsleep register for jpeg 5_0_0 and 5_0_2
Miquel Raynal <[email protected]>
mtd: spinand: winbond: Declare the QE bit on W25NxxJW
Sanjaikumar V S <[email protected]>
mtd: spi-nor: sst: Fix write enable before AAI sequence
Seohyeon Maeng <[email protected]>
udf: fix partition descriptor append bookkeeping
Sohei Koyama <[email protected]>
ext4: fix missing brelse() in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all()
Deepanshu Kartikey <[email protected]>
ext4: fix bounds check in check_xattrs() to prevent out-of-bounds access
Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
ring-buffer: Do not double count the reader_page
Brian Ruley <[email protected]>
ARM: 9472/1: fix race condition on PG_dcache_clean in __sync_icache_dcache()
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Always intercept VMMCALL when L2 is active
Kevin Cheng <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Raise #UD if unhandled VMMCALL isn't intercepted by L1
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Add missing consistency check for nCR3 validity
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Drop the non-architectural consistency check for NP_ENABLE
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Add missing consistency check for EFER, CR0, CR4, and CS
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Clear tracking of L1->L2 NMI and soft IRQ on nested #VMEXIT
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Clear EVENTINJ fields in vmcb12 on nested #VMEXIT
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Clear GIF on nested #VMEXIT(INVALID)
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Triple fault if mapping VMCB12 fails on nested #VMEXIT
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Triple fault if restore host CR3 fails on nested #VMEXIT
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Refactor writing vmcb12 on nested #VMEXIT as a helper
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Refactor checking LBRV enablement in vmcb12 into a helper
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Always inject a #GP if mapping VMCB12 fails on nested VMRUN
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: SVM: Add missing save/restore handling of LBR MSRs
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: SVM: Switch svm_copy_lbrs() to a macro
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Delay setting soft IRQ RIP tracking fields until vCPU run
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Avoid clearing VMCB_LBR in vmcb12
Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
KVM: arm64: Account for RESx bits in __compute_fgt()
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Use vcpu->arch.cr2 when updating vmcb12 on nested #VMEXIT
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Delay stuffing L2's current RIP into NextRIP until vCPU run
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Always use NextRIP as vmcb02's NextRIP after first L2 VMRUN
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Ensure AVIC is inhibited when restoring a vCPU to guest mode
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: SVM: Explicitly mark vmcb01 dirty after modifying VMCB intercepts
Kevin Cheng <[email protected]>
KVM: SVM: Inject #UD for INVLPGA if EFER.SVME=0
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Sync interrupt shadow to cached vmcb12 after VMRUN of L2
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Sync NextRIP to cached vmcb12 after VMRUN of L2
Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]>
KVM: nSVM: Mark all of vmcb02 dirty when restoring nested state
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: Defer non-architectural deliver of exception payload to userspace read
Tao Cui <[email protected]>
LoongArch: KVM: Use CSR_CRMD_PLV in kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel()
Denis M. Karpov <[email protected]>
userfaultfd: allow registration of ranges below mmap_min_addr
SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
mm/damon/core: disallow non-power of two min_region_sz on damon_start()
SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
mm/damon/core: disallow time-quota setting zero esz
SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
mm/damon/core: use time_in_range_open() for damos quota window start
SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
mm/damon/core: validate damos_quota_goal->nid for node_memcg_{used,free}_bpSeongJae Park <[email protected]>
mm/damon/core: validate damos_quota_goal->nid for node_mem_{used,free}_bpJackie Liu <[email protected]>
mm/damon/stat: fix memory leak on damon_start() failure in damon_stat_start()
Jackie Liu <[email protected]>
mm/mempolicy: fix memory leaks in weighted_interleave_auto_store()
Chenghao Duan <[email protected]>
mm/memfd_luo: fix physical address conversion in put_folios cleanup
Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <[email protected]>
mm/vmalloc: take vmap_purge_lock in shrinker
Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
rtc: ntxec: fix OF node reference imbalance
Jacqueline Wong <[email protected]>
tpm: tpm_tis: stop transmit if retries are exhausted
Jacqueline Wong <[email protected]>
tpm: tpm_tis: add error logging for data transfer
Gunnar Kudrjavets <[email protected]>
tpm: Use kfree_sensitive() to free auth session in tpm_dev_release()
Gunnar Kudrjavets <[email protected]>
tpm: Fix auth session leak in tpm2_get_random() error path
Gunnar Kudrjavets <[email protected]>
tpm2-sessions: Fix missing tpm_buf_destroy() in tpm2_read_public()
Viorel Suman (OSS) <[email protected]>
pwm: imx-tpm: Count the number of enabled channels in probe
Paul Louvel <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - rename first/last to first_desc/last_desc
Paul Louvel <[email protected]>
crypto: talitos - fix SEC1 32k ahash request limitation
Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
firmware: exynos-acpm: Drop fake 'const' on handle pointer
Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>
firmware: google: framebuffer: Do not unregister platform device
Haoxiang Li <[email protected]>
xfs: fix a resource leak in xfs_alloc_buftarg()
Hans Holmberg <[email protected]>
xfs: start gc on zonegc_low_space attribute updates
Giovanni Cabiddu <[email protected]>
crypto: qat - fix IRQ cleanup on 6xxx probe failure
Francesco Dolcini <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: ti: am62-verdin: Enable pullup for eMMC data pins
Shawn Lin <[email protected]>
mmc: sdhci-of-dwcmshc: Disable clock before DLL configuration
Bin Liu <[email protected]>
mmc: block: use single block write in retry
Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>
randomize_kstack: Maintain kstack_offset per task
Sanman Pradhan <[email protected]>
hwmon: (pt5161l) Fix bugs in pt5161l_read_block_data()
Paul Moore <[email protected]>
selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks
Paul Moore <[email protected]>
lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks
Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file
Barnabás Pőcze <[email protected]>
media: rzv2h-ivc: Fix AXIRX_VBLANK register write
Daniel Scally <[email protected]>
media: rzv2h-ivc: Revise default VBLANK formula
Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>
hwmon: (powerz) Avoid cacheline sharing for DMA buffer
Sanman Pradhan <[email protected]>
hwmon: (isl28022) Fix integer overflow in power calculation on 32-bit
Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
power: supply: axp288_charger: Do not cancel work before initializing it
Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>
fbdev: defio: Disconnect deferred I/O from the lifetime of struct fb_info
Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
LoongArch: Show CPU vulnerabilites correctly
Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
LoongArch: Make arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() true only if IPI HW exist
Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
tpm: avoid -Wunused-but-set-variable
Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
extract-cert: Wrap key_pass with '#ifdef USE_PKCS11_ENGINE'
Daniel J Blueman <[email protected]>
apparmor: Fix string overrun due to missing termination
Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
spi: fix resource leaks on device setup failure
Raphael Zimmer <[email protected]>
libceph: Prevent potential null-ptr-deref in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
Ruide Cao <[email protected]>
ipv4: icmp: validate reply type before using icmp_pointers
Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
printf: Compile the kunit test with DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
hkbinbin <[email protected]>
RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv
Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
tracing/fprobe: Reject registration of a registered fprobe before init
Marco Elver <[email protected]>
slub: fix data loss and overflow in krealloc()
Luca Ceresoli <[email protected]>
drm/arcpgu: fix device node leak
Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
net: ks8851: Avoid excess softirq scheduling
Yuan Zhaoming <[email protected]>
net: mctp: fix don't require received header reserved bits to be zero
Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
netconsole: avoid out-of-bounds access on empty string in trim_newline()
Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>
net: bridge: use a stable FDB dst snapshot in RCU readers
Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
net: ks8851: Reinstate disabling of BHs around IRQ handler
Ruijie Li <[email protected]>
net/smc: avoid early lgr access in smc_clc_wait_msg
Jiawen Wu <[email protected]>
net: txgbe: fix firmware version check
Ao Zhou <[email protected]>
net: rds: fix MR cleanup on copy error
Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
net: qrtr: ns: Limit the total number of nodes
Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
net: qrtr: ns: Free the node during ctrl_cmd_bye()
Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
net: qrtr: ns: Limit the maximum number of lookups
Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
net: qrtr: ns: Limit the maximum server registration per node
Robert Marko <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: marvell: uDPU: add ethernet aliases
Jiawen Wu <[email protected]>
net: txgbe: fix RTNL assertion warning when remove module
Yiyang Chen <[email protected]>
tools/accounting: handle truncated taskstats netlink messages
Prasanna Kumar T S M <[email protected]>
EDAC/versalnet: Fix memory leak in remove and probe error paths
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix rxrpc_input_call_event() to only unshare DATA packets
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix re-decryption of RESPONSE packets
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix error handling in rxgk_extract_token()
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix rxkad crypto unalignment handling
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix conn-level packet handling to unshare RESPONSE packets
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response()
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix potential UAF after skb_unshare() failure
Jonathan Santos <[email protected]>
iio: adc: ad7768-1: remove switch to one-shot mode
Jonathan Santos <[email protected]>
iio: adc: ad7768-1: fix one-shot mode data acquisition
Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: pcmtest: Fix resource leaks in module init error paths
Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
ALSA: pcmtest: fix reference leak on failed device registration
Spencer Payton <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/realtek - Add mute LED support for HP Victus 15-fa2xxx
Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: 6fire: Fix input volume change detection
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: caiaq: Handle probe errors properly
Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: caiaq: Fix control_put() result and cache rollback
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: core: Fix potential data race at fasync handling
Helge Deller <[email protected]>
module.lds.S: Fix modules on 32-bit parisc architecture
Joe Lawrence <[email protected]>
module.lds,codetag: force 0 sh_addr for sections
Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
io_uring/poll: ensure EPOLL_ONESHOT is propagated for EPOLL_URING_WAKE
Longxuan Yu <[email protected]>
io_uring/poll: fix signed comparison in io_poll_get_ownership()
Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
io_uring/zcrx: fix user_struct uaf
Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
io_uring/register: fix ring resizing with mixed/large SQEs/CQEs
David Lechner <[email protected]>
iio: adc: ti-ads7950: use iio_push_to_buffers_with_ts_unaligned()
Naman Jain <[email protected]>
block: relax pgmap check in bio_add_page for compatible zone device pages
Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
io_uring/timeout: check unused sqe fields
Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
io_uring/zcrx: return back two step unregistration
Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
block: fix zone write plugs refcount handling in disk_zone_wplug_schedule_bio_work()
Matthew Brost <[email protected]>
mm/zone_device: do not touch device folio after calling ->folio_free()
Dawei Feng <[email protected]>
rbd: fix null-ptr-deref when device_add_disk() fails
Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
selftests/landlock: Skip stale records in audit_match_record()
Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
selftests/landlock: Fix snprintf truncation checks in audit helpers
Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
selftests/landlock: Fix format warning for __u64 in net_test
Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
selftests/landlock: Drain stale audit records on init
Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
landlock: Allow TSYNC with LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF and fd=-1
Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
landlock: Fix LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF inheritance across fork()
Simon Liebold <[email protected]>
selftests/mqueue: Fix incorrectly named file
Joseph Salisbury <[email protected]>
sched: Use u64 for bandwidth ratio calculations
Tommaso Merciai <[email protected]>
reset: rzv2h-usb2phy: Keep PHY clock enabled for entire device lifetime
Ben Levinsky <[email protected]>
remoteproc: xlnx: Only access buffer information if IPI is buffered
Long Li <[email protected]>
RDMA/mana_ib: Disable RX steering on RSS QP destroy
Rong Bao <[email protected]>
perf annotate: Use jump__delete when freeing LoongArch jumps
Franz Schnyder <[email protected]>
PCI: imx6: Fix reference clock source selection for i.MX95
Aksh Garg <[email protected]>
PCI: cadence: Use cdns_pcie_read_sz() for byte or word read access
Helge Deller <[email protected]>
parisc: Drop ip_fast_csum() inline assembly implementation
Helge Deller <[email protected]>
parisc: _llseek syscall is only available for 32-bit userspace
Robert Beckett <[email protected]>
nvme: respect NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES when wzsl is set
Robert Beckett <[email protected]>
nvme-pci: add NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES for Kingston OM3SGP4
James Kim <[email protected]>
mtd: docg3: fix use-after-free in docg3_release()
Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
mm/hugetlb: fix early boot crash on parameters without '=' separator
SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race
SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
mm/damon/core: fix damon_call() vs kdamond_fn() exit race
Hao Ge <[email protected]>
mm/alloc_tag: clear codetag for pages allocated before page_ext initialization
Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
mfd: stpmic1: Attempt system shutdown twice in case PMIC is confused
Michael Riesch <[email protected]>
media: rockchip: rkcif: comply with minimum number of buffers requirement
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
media: rockchip: rkcif: fix off by one bugs
Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
media: rc: igorplugusb: heed coherency rules
Josh Hunt <[email protected]>
md/raid10: fix deadlock with check operation and nowait requests
Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
KVM: selftests: Fix reserved value WRMSR testcase for multi-feature MSRs
Zhang Yi <[email protected]>
jbd2: fix deadlock in jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()
Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
ipmi:ssif: Clean up kthread on errors
Gao Xiang <[email protected]>
erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents
Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: seq_oss: return full count for successful SEQ_FULLSIZE writes
Harin Lee <[email protected]>
ALSA: ctxfi: Add fallback to default RSR for S/PDIF
Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
ALSA: aoa: Skip devices with no codecs in i2sbus_resume()
Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: aoa: i2sbus: fix OF node lifetime handling
Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: aoa: i2sbus: clear stale prepared state
Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>
mm/zsmalloc: copy KMSAN metadata in zs_page_migrate()
Vasiliy Kovalev <[email protected]>
ext2: reject inodes with zero i_nlink and valid mode in ext2_iget()
Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
net: qrtr: ns: Fix use-after-free in driver remove()
Chen Ni <[email protected]>
media: i2c: imx219: Check return value of devm_gpiod_get_optional() in imx219_probe()
Josh Law <[email protected]>
lib/ts_kmp: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation
Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>
PCI: epf-mhi: Return 0, not remaining timeout, when eDMA ops complete
Elson Serrao <[email protected]>
phy: qcom: m31-eusb2: clear PLL_EN during init
Rong Zhang <[email protected]>
Revert "ALSA: usb: Increase volume range that triggers a warning"
Koichiro Den <[email protected]>
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-ntb: Remove duplicate resource teardown
Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix OTP sysfs read and error handling
Fan Wu <[email protected]>
media: mtk-jpeg: fix use-after-free in release path due to uncancelled work
Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>
net: strparser: fix skb_head leak in strp_abort_strp()
Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>
net: caif: clear client service pointer on teardown
Ziqing Chen <[email protected]>
ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()
Ming Qian <[email protected]>
media: amphion: Fix race between m2m job_abort and device_run
Richard Zhu <[email protected]>
PCI: imx6: Skip waiting for L2/L3 Ready on i.MX6SX
Felix Gu <[email protected]>
EDAC/versalnet: Fix device_node leak in mc_probe()
Sanman Pradhan <[email protected]>
hwmon: (powerz) Fix missing usb_kill_urb() on signal interrupt
Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
of: unittest: fix use-after-free in testdrv_probe()
Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
of: unittest: fix use-after-free in of_unittest_changeset()
Swamil Jain <[email protected]>
dt-bindings: display: ti, am65x-dss: Fix AM62L DSS reg and clock constraints
Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
crypto: pcrypt - Fix handling of MAY_BACKLOG requests
Douya Le <[email protected]>
crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests
Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
spi: ch341: fix memory leaks on probe failures
Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
spi: imx: fix use-after-free on unbind
Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
thermal: core: Fix thermal zone governor cleanup issues
Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
um: drivers: call kernel_strrchr() explicitly in cow_user.c
Prasanna Kumar T S M <[email protected]>
vfio/cdx: Fix NULL pointer dereference in interrupt trigger path
Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
vfio/cdx: Serialize VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS with a per-device mutex
Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
vfio/virtio: Convert list_lock from spinlock to mutex
Michał Winiarski <[email protected]>
vfio/xe: Add a missing vfio_pci_core_release_dev()
Manish Honap <[email protected]>
vfio: selftests: Fix VLA initialisation in vfio_pci_irq_set()
Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>
wifi: mwifiex: fix use-after-free in mwifiex_adapter_cleanup()
Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
wifi: rtw88: check for PCI upstream bridge existence
Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
zram: do not forget to endio for partial discard requests
Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Input: edt-ft5x06 - fix use-after-free in debugfs teardown
Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
ocfs2: split transactions in dio completion to avoid credit exhaustion
Lance Yang <[email protected]>
mm: fix deferred split queue races during migration
Anthony Yznaga <[email protected]>
mm: prevent droppable mappings from being locked
Usama Arif <[email protected]>
mm: migrate: requeue destination folio on deferred split queue
Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>
arm64: mm: Fix rodata=full block mapping support for realm guests
Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
arm64/mm: Enable batched TLB flush in unmap_hotplug_range()
Alistair Popple <[email protected]>
lib: test_hmm: evict device pages on file close to avoid use-after-free
Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>
firmware: google: framebuffer: Do not mark framebuffer as busy
Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <[email protected]>
fs: afs: revert mmap_prepare() change
Miguel Ojeda <[email protected]>
kbuild: rust: allow clippy::uninlined_format_args
Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]>
rust: dma: remove DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING from public attrs
David Carlier <[email protected]>
drm/nouveau: fix nvkm_device leak on aperture removal failure
Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
device property: Make modifications of fwnode "flags" thread safe
Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
driver core: Don't let a device probe until it's ready
Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>
sysfs: attribute_group: Respect is_visible_const() when changing owner
Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>
ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()
Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>
ibmasm: fix OOB reads in command_file_write due to missing size checks
Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>
misc: ibmasm: fix OOB MMIO read in ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt()
Weigang He <[email protected]>
greybus: gb-beagleplay: fix sleep in atomic context in hdlc_tx_frames()
Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]>
greybus: gb-beagleplay: bound bootloader receive buffering
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
leds: qcom-lpg: Check for array overflow when selecting the high resolution
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
drm/nouveau: fix u32 overflow in pushbuf reloc bounds check
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
LoongArch: Add spectre boundry for syscall dispatch table
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: Evaluate packsize caps at the right place
Xu Yang <[email protected]>
usb: chipidea: core: allow ci_irq_handler() handle both ID and VBUS change
Xu Yang <[email protected]>
usb: chipidea: otg: not wait vbus drop if use role_switch
Michal Pecio <[email protected]>
usb: xhci: Make usb_host_endpoint.hcpriv survive endpoint_disable()
Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix Audio Advantage Micro II SPDIF switch
Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: Avoid false E-MU sample-rate notifications
Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: stop parsing UAC2 rates at MAX_NR_RATES
-------------
Diffstat:
.../bindings/display/ti/ti,am65x-dss.yaml | 70 ++--
Documentation/scheduler/sched-ext.rst | 14 +-
Makefile | 5 +-
arch/Kconfig | 7 +
arch/arm/mm/flush.c | 4 +-
arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-uDPU.dtsi | 5 +
arch/arm64/boot/dts/ti/k3-am62-verdin.dtsi | 20 +-
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S | 4 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 +
arch/arm64/kvm/config.c | 4 +-
arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 9 +-
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 81 +++--
arch/loongarch/include/asm/irq_work.h | 2 +-
arch/loongarch/kernel/cpu-probe.c | 7 +
arch/loongarch/kernel/syscall.c | 3 +-
arch/loongarch/kvm/vcpu.c | 2 +-
arch/parisc/Kconfig | 4 +
arch/parisc/include/asm/checksum.h | 89 +----
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +-
arch/parisc/lib/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/parisc/lib/checksum.c | 99 ------
arch/um/drivers/cow_user.c | 8 +-
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 42 +--
arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h | 8 -
arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h | 9 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 201 +++++++-----
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 150 +++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 17 +-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 65 ++--
arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 5 +
block/bio-integrity.c | 6 +-
block/bio.c | 6 +-
block/blk-zoned.c | 12 +-
block/blk.h | 19 ++
certs/extract-cert.c | 6 +-
crypto/acompress.c | 8 +-
crypto/algif_aead.c | 10 +-
crypto/authencesn.c | 5 +
crypto/pcrypt.c | 7 +-
drivers/base/core.c | 39 ++-
drivers/base/dd.c | 20 ++
drivers/block/rbd.c | 6 +-
drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 3 +-
drivers/bus/imx-weim.c | 2 +-
drivers/bus/mhi/host/pci_generic.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 13 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 2 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 6 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 5 +-
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c | 11 +-
drivers/clk/samsung/clk-acpm.c | 4 +-
drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/atmel-ecc.c | 1 +
drivers/crypto/atmel-i2c.c | 4 +-
drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c | 37 ++-
drivers/crypto/atmel-tdes.c | 8 +-
drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_hash.c | 1 +
drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec/sec_algs.c | 2 +-
drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_6xxx/adf_drv.c | 4 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842.c | 10 +-
drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842.h | 4 +-
drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 340 ++++++++++++--------
drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c | 6 +-
drivers/firmware/google/framebuffer-coreboot.c | 12 +-
drivers/firmware/samsung/exynos-acpm-dvfs.c | 4 +-
drivers/firmware/samsung/exynos-acpm-dvfs.h | 4 +-
drivers/firmware/samsung/exynos-acpm-pmic.c | 10 +-
drivers/firmware/samsung/exynos-acpm-pmic.h | 10 +-
drivers/firmware/samsung/exynos-acpm.c | 16 +-
drivers/firmware/samsung/exynos-acpm.h | 2 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ttm.c | 3 +
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/jpeg_v4_0_3.c | 52 ++-
drivers/gpu/drm/imagination/pvr_fw_trace.c | 2 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_drm.c | 2 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c | 2 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/arcpgu.c | 3 +-
drivers/greybus/gb-beagleplay.c | 112 ++++++-
drivers/hid/hid-apple.c | 2 +
drivers/hwmon/isl28022.c | 5 +-
drivers/hwmon/powerz.c | 16 +-
drivers/hwmon/pt5161l.c | 4 +-
drivers/i2c/i2c-core-of.c | 2 +-
drivers/iio/adc/ad7768-1.c | 16 +-
drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads7950.c | 11 +-
drivers/iio/frequency/admv1013.c | 90 +++---
drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c | 3 +
drivers/infiniband/hw/mana/qp.c | 15 +
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c | 3 +-
drivers/input/touchscreen/edt-ft5x06.c | 3 +
drivers/leds/rgb/leds-qcom-lpg.c | 7 +-
drivers/md/dm-raid1.c | 6 +-
drivers/md/md-llbitmap.c | 11 +-
drivers/md/raid10.c | 4 +-
drivers/md/raid5-cache.c | 48 ++-
drivers/md/raid5.c | 8 +-
drivers/media/i2c/imx219.c | 3 +
drivers/media/platform/amphion/vpu_v4l2.c | 9 +-
.../media/platform/mediatek/jpeg/mtk_jpeg_core.c | 1 +
.../platform/renesas/rzv2h-ivc/rzv2h-ivc-video.c | 9 +-
.../media/platform/renesas/rzv2h-ivc/rzv2h-ivc.h | 2 +-
.../platform/rockchip/rkcif/rkcif-capture-mipi.c | 10 +-
.../media/platform/rockchip/rkcif/rkcif-stream.c | 44 +--
drivers/media/rc/igorplugusb.c | 16 +-
drivers/mfd/mfd-core.c | 12 +-
drivers/mfd/sec-acpm.c | 10 +-
drivers/mfd/stpmic1.c | 20 +-
drivers/misc/ibmasm/ibmasmfs.c | 7 +
drivers/misc/ibmasm/lowlevel.c | 12 +-
drivers/misc/ibmasm/remote.c | 5 +
drivers/misc/mei/bus-fixup.c | 6 +-
drivers/misc/mei/hw-me-regs.h | 163 +++++-----
drivers/misc/mei/hw-me.h | 6 -
drivers/misc/mei/pci-me.c | 163 +++++-----
drivers/mmc/core/block.c | 12 +-
drivers/mmc/core/queue.h | 3 +
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-dwcmshc.c | 19 +-
drivers/mtd/devices/docg3.c | 3 +-
drivers/mtd/nand/spi/winbond.c | 4 +-
drivers/mtd/spi-nor/sst.c | 13 +
drivers/net/can/usb/ucan.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h | 6 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c | 69 ++--
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c | 15 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c | 11 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c | 11 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/wangxun/txgbe/txgbe_main.c | 3 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/wangxun/txgbe/txgbe_phy.c | 2 +
drivers/net/gtp.c | 2 +
drivers/net/netconsole.c | 2 +
drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus_provider.c | 4 +-
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/init.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt792x_regs.h | 4 +
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt792x_usb.c | 51 ++-
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/core.c | 28 +-
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c | 3 +-
drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 2 +-
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 2 +
drivers/of/base.c | 2 +-
drivers/of/dynamic.c | 2 +-
drivers/of/platform.c | 2 +-
drivers/of/unittest.c | 4 +-
drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pcie-cadence.h | 56 ++--
drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c | 5 +-
drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-mhi.c | 4 +
drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-ntb.c | 56 +---
drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-m31-eusb2.c | 2 +-
drivers/power/supply/axp288_charger.c | 19 +-
drivers/pwm/pwm-imx-tpm.c | 9 +-
drivers/remoteproc/xlnx_r5_remoteproc.c | 20 +-
drivers/reset/reset-rzv2h-usb2phy.c | 64 ++--
drivers/rtc/rtc-ntxec.c | 2 +-
drivers/scsi/sd.c | 1 +
drivers/spi/spi-ch341.c | 36 ++-
drivers/spi/spi-imx.c | 4 +
drivers/spi/spi.c | 63 ++--
drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c | 7 +-
drivers/usb/chipidea/core.c | 45 +--
drivers/usb/chipidea/otg.c | 7 +-
drivers/usb/host/xhci.c | 1 -
drivers/vfio/cdx/intr.c | 13 +-
drivers/vfio/cdx/main.c | 19 ++
drivers/vfio/cdx/private.h | 3 +
drivers/vfio/pci/virtio/common.h | 2 +-
drivers/vfio/pci/virtio/migrate.c | 33 +-
drivers/vfio/pci/xe/main.c | 1 +
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fb_defio.c | 178 +++++++---
fs/9p/v9fs.c | 4 +
fs/afs/file.c | 12 +-
fs/backing-file.c | 18 +-
fs/ceph/addr.c | 4 +
fs/ceph/dir.c | 6 +-
fs/erofs/decompressor.c | 1 +
fs/erofs/dir.c | 28 +-
fs/erofs/ishare.c | 10 +-
fs/ext2/inode.c | 14 +-
fs/ext4/xattr.c | 6 +-
fs/file_table.c | 43 ++-
fs/fuse/passthrough.c | 2 +-
fs/internal.h | 3 +-
fs/jbd2/revoke.c | 8 +-
fs/nfs/internal.h | 2 +
fs/nfs/nfs4client.c | 4 +-
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 3 +
fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c | 1 +
fs/ntfs3/run.c | 18 +-
fs/ocfs2/aops.c | 74 +++--
fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 2 +-
fs/overlayfs/file.c | 2 +-
fs/sysfs/group.c | 7 +-
fs/udf/super.c | 4 +-
fs/userfaultfd.c | 2 -
fs/xfs/xfs_buf.c | 1 +
fs/xfs/xfs_sysfs.c | 7 +-
fs/xfs/xfs_zone_alloc.h | 4 +
fs/xfs/xfs_zone_gc.c | 17 +
include/asm-generic/codetag.lds.h | 2 +-
include/linux/alloc_tag.h | 2 +
include/linux/backing-file.h | 4 +-
include/linux/damon.h | 2 +
include/linux/device.h | 45 +++
include/linux/fb.h | 4 +-
.../linux/firmware/samsung/exynos-acpm-protocol.h | 40 +--
include/linux/fs.h | 15 +-
include/linux/fwnode.h | 44 ++-
include/linux/hugetlb_inline.h | 2 +-
include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 2 +-
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
include/linux/mm.h | 7 +-
include/linux/pgalloc_tag.h | 2 +-
include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 26 +-
include/linux/sched.h | 4 +
include/linux/security.h | 22 ++
include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h | 9 +-
include/linux/usb.h | 3 +-
include/net/mana/mana.h | 1 +
include/net/mctp.h | 3 +
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 6 +-
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 4 +-
init/main.c | 1 -
io_uring/io_uring.c | 4 +
io_uring/poll.c | 6 +-
io_uring/register.c | 32 +-
io_uring/timeout.c | 4 +
io_uring/zcrx.c | 48 ++-
io_uring/zcrx.h | 4 +
kernel/fork.c | 2 +
kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 13 +-
kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +-
kernel/sched/rt.c | 2 +-
kernel/sched/sched.h | 2 +-
kernel/taskstats.c | 1 +
kernel/trace/fprobe.c | 21 +-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 13 +-
lib/alloc_tag.c | 109 +++++++
lib/test_hmm.c | 112 ++++---
lib/tests/Makefile | 2 +
lib/ts_kmp.c | 18 +-
mm/damon/core.c | 101 +++---
mm/damon/stat.c | 5 +-
mm/huge_memory.c | 15 +-
mm/hugetlb.c | 3 +
mm/internal.h | 42 ++-
mm/memfd_luo.c | 7 +-
mm/memory.c | 53 +--
mm/mempolicy.c | 23 +-
mm/memremap.c | 2 +-
mm/migrate.c | 17 +
mm/mlock.c | 10 +-
mm/page_alloc.c | 15 +-
mm/slub.c | 28 +-
mm/swapfile.c | 21 +-
mm/util.c | 131 ++++----
mm/vma.c | 39 ++-
mm/vmalloc.c | 3 +-
mm/zsmalloc.c | 1 +
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 18 +-
net/bridge/br_arp_nd_proxy.c | 8 +-
net/bridge/br_fdb.c | 28 +-
net/caif/cfsrvl.c | 14 +-
net/ceph/auth.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/icmp.c | 5 +-
net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 3 +
net/ipv6/exthdrs.c | 9 +-
net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c | 9 +
net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 12 +-
net/mctp/route.c | 8 +-
net/mptcp/protocol.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nft_bitwise.c | 3 +-
net/qrtr/ns.c | 79 ++++-
net/rds/rdma.c | 4 -
net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 1 -
net/rxrpc/call_event.c | 20 +-
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 43 ++-
net/rxrpc/io_thread.c | 24 +-
net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c | 3 +-
net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h | 1 +
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 112 +++----
net/rxrpc/skbuff.c | 9 -
net/smc/smc_clc.c | 4 +-
net/strparser/strparser.c | 8 +
rust/kernel/dma.rs | 3 -
scripts/check-uapi.sh | 7 +-
scripts/module.lds.S | 14 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 16 +-
security/apparmor/path.c | 8 +-
security/landlock/cred.c | 6 +-
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 14 +-
security/lsm.h | 1 +
security/lsm_init.c | 9 +
security/security.c | 102 ++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 256 +++++++++++----
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 11 +
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c | 12 +-
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c | 71 ++--
sound/core/control.c | 4 +
sound/core/misc.c | 13 +-
sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_rw.c | 6 +-
sound/drivers/aloop.c | 43 ++-
sound/drivers/pcmtest.c | 19 +-
sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc269.c | 1 +
sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c | 3 +-
sound/usb/6fire/control.c | 10 +-
sound/usb/caiaq/control.c | 52 ++-
sound/usb/caiaq/device.c | 35 +-
sound/usb/caiaq/input.c | 2 +-
sound/usb/endpoint.c | 6 +-
sound/usb/format.c | 2 +-
sound/usb/mixer.c | 7 +-
sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c | 12 +-
tools/accounting/getdelays.c | 41 ++-
tools/accounting/procacct.c | 40 ++-
tools/perf/arch/loongarch/util/Build | 1 -
tools/perf/util/annotate-arch/annotate-loongarch.c | 1 +
tools/perf/util/disasm.c | 2 +-
tools/perf/util/disasm.h | 2 +
tools/testing/ktest/ktest.pl | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/msrs_test.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h | 105 ++++--
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c | 357 +++++++++++++++++++--
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c | 1 -
.../selftests/landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c | 1 -
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c | 77 +++++
.../testing/selftests/mqueue/{setting => settings} | 0
tools/testing/selftests/vfio/lib/vfio_pci_device.c | 4 +-
tools/testing/vma/include/dup.h | 7 +-
tools/testing/vma/include/stubs.h | 13 +-
329 files changed, 4508 insertions(+), 2269 deletions(-)Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/307 mm: prevent droppable mappings from being locked
7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anthony Yznaga <[email protected]>
commit d239462787b072c78eb19fc1f155c3d411256282 upstream.
Droppable mappings must not be lockable. There is a check for VMAs with VM_DROPPABLE set in mlock_fixup() along with checks for other types of unlockable VMAs which ensures this when calling mlock()/mlock2().
For mlockall(MCL_FUTURE), the check for unlockable VMAs is different. In apply_mlockall_flags(), if the flags parameter has MCL_FUTURE set, the current task's mm's default VMA flag field mm->def_flags has VM_LOCKED applied to it. VM_LOCKONFAULT is also applied if MCL_ONFAULT is also set. When these flags are set as default in this manner they are cleared in __mmap_complete() for new mappings that do not support mlock. A check for VM_DROPPABLE in __mmap_complete() is missing resulting in droppable mappings created with VM_LOCKED set. To fix this and reduce that chance of similar bugs in the future, introduce and use vma_supports_mlock().
--- include/linux/hugetlb_inline.h | 2 +- mm/internal.h | 10 ++++++++++ mm/mlock.c | 10 ++++++---- mm/vma.c | 4 +--- tools/testing/vma/include/stubs.h | 5 +++++ 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/linux/hugetlb_inline.h +1 -1
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static inline bool is_vma_hugetlb_flags(#endif -static inline bool is_vm_hugetlb_page (struct vm_area_struct *vma) +static inline bool is_vm_hugetlb_page (const struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return is_vm_hugetlb_flags (vma->vm_flags); }
mm/internal.h +10 -0
@@ -1217,6 +1217,16 @@ static inline struct file *maybe_unlock_ }return fpin; } + +static inline bool vma_supports_mlock (const struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_SPECIAL |VM_DROPPABLE )) +return false; +if (vma_is_dax (vma) ||is_vm_hugetlb_page (vma)) +return false; +return vma !=get_gate_vma (current->mm); +} +#else /* !CONFIG_MMU */ static inline void unmap_mapping_folio (struct folio *folio) { }static inline void mlock_new_folio (struct folio *folio) { }
mm/mlock.c +6 -4
@@ -472,10 +472,12 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vma_iteratint ret =0 ;vm_flags_t oldflags = vma->vm_flags; -if (newflags == oldflags || (oldflags &VM_SPECIAL ) || -is_vm_hugetlb_page (vma) || vma ==get_gate_vma (current->mm) || -vma_is_dax (vma) ||vma_is_secretmem (vma) || (oldflags &VM_DROPPABLE )) -/* don't set VM_LOCKED or VM_LOCKONFAULT and don't count */ +if (newflags == oldflags ||vma_is_secretmem (vma) || + !vma_supports_mlock (vma)) +/* +* Don't set VM_LOCKED or VM_LOCKONFAULT and don't count. +* For secretmem, don't allow the memory to be unlocked. +*/ goto out; vma =vma_modify_flags (vmi, *prev, vma, start, end, &newflags);
mm/vma.c +1 -3
@@ -2589,9 +2589,7 @@ static void __mmap_complete(struct mmap_vm_stat_account (mm, vma->vm_flags, map->pglen);if (vm_flags &VM_LOCKED ) { -if ((vm_flags &VM_SPECIAL ) ||vma_is_dax (vma) || -is_vm_hugetlb_page (vma) || - vma ==get_gate_vma (mm)) +if (!vma_supports_mlock (vma))vm_flags_clear (vma,VM_LOCKED_MASK );else mm->locked_vm += map->pglen;
tools/testing/vma/include/stubs.h +5 -0
@@ -426,3 +426,8 @@ static inline void vma_adjust_trans_huge }static inline void hugetlb_split (struct vm_area_struct *,unsigned long ) {} + +static inline bool vma_supports_mlock (const struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +return false; +}
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 37/307 vfio/virtio: Convert list_lock from spinlock to mutex
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
commit 903570835f12b7436ca0edb0a9ed351c0349121e upstream.
The list_lock spinlock with IRQ disabling was copied from the mlx5 vfio-pci variant driver, where it is justified by a hardirq async command completion callback that accesses the protected lists. The virtio driver has no such interrupt context usage; all list_lock acquisitions occur in process context via file read/write operations or state transitions under state_mutex.
Convert list_lock to a mutex to be consistent with peer vfio-pci variant drivers (hisilicon, pds, qat, xe) which all use mutexes for equivalent migration data protection. This also fixes a mismatched spin_lock()/spin_unlock_irq() pair in virtiovf_read_device_context_chunk() that could incorrectly enable interrupts.
--- drivers/vfio/pci/virtio/common.h | 2 +- drivers/vfio/pci/virtio/migrate.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++---------------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/vfio/pci/virtio/common.h +1 -1
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ struct virtiovf_migration_file {enum virtiovf_migf_state state;enum virtiovf_load_state load_state;/* synchronize access to the lists */ -spinlock_t list_lock; +struct mutex list_lock;struct list_head buf_list;struct list_head avail_list;struct virtiovf_data_buffer *buf;
drivers/vfio/pci/virtio/migrate.c +17 -16
@@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ end:static void virtiovf_put_data_buffer (struct virtiovf_data_buffer *buf) { -spin_lock_irq (&buf->migf->list_lock); +mutex_lock (&buf->migf->list_lock);list_add_tail (&buf->buf_elm, &buf->migf->avail_list); -spin_unlock_irq (&buf->migf->list_lock); +mutex_unlock (&buf->migf->list_lock); } static int
@@ -170,21 +170,21 @@ virtiovf_get_data_buffer(struct virtiovfINIT_LIST_HEAD (&free_list); -spin_lock_irq (&migf->list_lock); +mutex_lock (&migf->list_lock);list_for_each_entry_safe (buf, temp_buf, &migf->avail_list, buf_elm) {list_del_init (&buf->buf_elm);if (buf->allocated_length >= length) { -spin_unlock_irq (&migf->list_lock); +mutex_unlock (&migf->list_lock); goto found; }/* * Prevent holding redundant buffers. Put in a free -* list and call at the end not under the spin lock +* list and call at the end not under the mutex * (&migf->list_lock) to minimize its scope usage. */ list_add (&buf->buf_elm, &free_list); } -spin_unlock_irq (&migf->list_lock); +mutex_unlock (&migf->list_lock); buf =virtiovf_alloc_data_buffer (migf, length); found:
@@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ static int virtiovf_release_file(structstruct virtiovf_migration_file *migf = filp->private_data;virtiovf_disable_fd (migf); +mutex_destroy (&migf->list_lock);mutex_destroy (&migf->lock);kfree (migf);return 0 ;
@@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ virtiovf_get_data_buff_from_pos(struct vbool found = false; *end_of_data = false; -spin_lock_irq (&migf->list_lock); +mutex_lock (&migf->list_lock);if (list_empty (&migf->buf_list)) { *end_of_data = true; goto end;
@@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ virtiovf_get_data_buff_from_pos(struct v migf->state =VIRTIOVF_MIGF_STATE_ERROR ; end: -spin_unlock_irq (&migf->list_lock); +mutex_unlock (&migf->list_lock);return found ? buf :NULL ; }
@@ -369,10 +370,10 @@ static ssize_t virtiovf_buf_read(struct }if (*pos >= vhca_buf->start_pos + vhca_buf->length) { -spin_lock_irq (&vhca_buf->migf->list_lock); +mutex_lock (&vhca_buf->migf->list_lock);list_del_init (&vhca_buf->buf_elm);list_add_tail (&vhca_buf->buf_elm, &vhca_buf->migf->avail_list); -spin_unlock_irq (&vhca_buf->migf->list_lock); +mutex_unlock (&vhca_buf->migf->list_lock); }return done;
@@ -554,9 +555,9 @@ virtiovf_add_buf_header(struct virtiovf_ header_buf->length =sizeof (header); header_buf->start_pos = header_buf->migf->max_pos; migf->max_pos += header_buf->length; -spin_lock_irq (&migf->list_lock); +mutex_lock (&migf->list_lock);list_add_tail (&header_buf->buf_elm, &migf->buf_list); -spin_unlock_irq (&migf->list_lock); +mutex_unlock (&migf->list_lock);return 0 ; }
@@ -621,9 +622,9 @@ virtiovf_read_device_context_chunk(struc buf->start_pos = buf->migf->max_pos; migf->max_pos += buf->length; -spin_lock (&migf->list_lock); +mutex_lock (&migf->list_lock);list_add_tail (&buf->buf_elm, &migf->buf_list); -spin_unlock_irq (&migf->list_lock); +mutex_unlock (&migf->list_lock);return 0 ; out_header:
@@ -692,7 +693,7 @@ virtiovf_pci_save_device_data(struct virmutex_init (&migf->lock);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&migf->buf_list);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&migf->avail_list); -spin_lock_init (&migf->list_lock); +mutex_init (&migf->list_lock); migf->virtvdev = virtvdev;lockdep_assert_held (&virtvdev->state_mutex);
@@ -1082,7 +1083,7 @@ virtiovf_pci_resume_device_data(struct vmutex_init (&migf->lock);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&migf->buf_list);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&migf->avail_list); -spin_lock_init (&migf->list_lock); +mutex_init (&migf->list_lock); buf =virtiovf_alloc_data_buffer (migf,VIRTIOVF_TARGET_INITIAL_BUF_SIZE );if (IS_ERR (buf)) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/307 vfio/cdx: Serialize VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS with a per-device mutex
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
commit 670e8864b1a218d72f08db40d0103adf38fa1d9b upstream.
vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger() reads vdev->config_msi and operates on the vdev->cdx_irqs array based on its value, but provides no serialization against concurrent VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctls. Two callers can race such that one observes config_msi as set while another clears it and frees cdx_irqs via vfio_cdx_msi_disable(), resulting in a use-after-free of the cdx_irqs array.
Add a cdx_irqs_lock mutex to struct vfio_cdx_device and acquire it in vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(), which is the single chokepoint through which all updates to config_msi, cdx_irqs, and msi_count flow, covering both the ioctl path and the close-device cleanup path. This keeps the test of config_msi atomic with the subsequent enable, disable, or trigger operations.
Drop the pre-call !cdx_irqs test from vfio_cdx_irqs_cleanup() as part of this change: the optimization it provided is redundant with the !config_msi early-return inside vfio_cdx_msi_disable(), and leaving the test in place would be an unsynchronized read of state the new lock is meant to protect.
--- drivers/vfio/cdx/intr.c | 9 ++------- drivers/vfio/cdx/main.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/vfio/cdx/private.h | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/vfio/cdx/intr.c +2 -7
@@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ static int vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(struif (start + count > cdx_dev->num_msi)return -EINVAL ; +guard (mutex)(&vdev->cdx_irqs_lock); +if (!count && (flags &VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE )) {vfio_cdx_msi_disable (vdev);return 0 ;
@@ -206,12 +208,5 @@ int vfio_cdx_set_irqs_ioctl(struct vfio_/* Free All IRQs for the given device */ void vfio_cdx_irqs_cleanup (struct vfio_cdx_device *vdev) { -/* -* Device does not support any interrupt or the interrupts -* were not configured -*/ -if (!vdev->cdx_irqs) -return ; -vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger (vdev,0 ,0 ,0 ,VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE ,NULL ); }
drivers/vfio/cdx/main.c +19 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,23 @@#include "private.h" +static int vfio_cdx_init_dev (struct vfio_device *core_vdev) +{ +struct vfio_cdx_device *vdev = + container_of(core_vdev, struct vfio_cdx_device, vdev); + +mutex_init (&vdev->cdx_irqs_lock); +return 0 ; +} + +static void vfio_cdx_release_dev (struct vfio_device *core_vdev) +{ +struct vfio_cdx_device *vdev = + container_of(core_vdev, struct vfio_cdx_device, vdev); + +mutex_destroy (&vdev->cdx_irqs_lock); +} +static int vfio_cdx_open_device (struct vfio_device *core_vdev) { struct vfio_cdx_device *vdev =
@@ -273,6 +290,8 @@ static int vfio_cdx_mmap(struct vfio_devstatic const struct vfio_device_ops vfio_cdx_ops = { .name ="vfio-cdx" , + .init = vfio_cdx_init_dev, + .release = vfio_cdx_release_dev, .open_device = vfio_cdx_open_device, .close_device = vfio_cdx_close_device, .ioctl = vfio_cdx_ioctl,
drivers/vfio/cdx/private.h +3 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@#ifndef VFIO_CDX_PRIVATE_H #define VFIO_CDX_PRIVATE_H +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#define VFIO_CDX_OFFSET_SHIFT 40static inline u64 vfio_cdx_index_to_offset (u32 index)
@@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ struct vfio_cdx_region {struct vfio_cdx_device {struct vfio_device vdev;struct vfio_cdx_region *regions; +struct mutex cdx_irqs_lock;struct vfio_cdx_irq *cdx_irqs;u32 flags;#define BME_SUPPORT BIT(0)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 39/307 vfio/cdx: Fix NULL pointer dereference in interrupt trigger path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Prasanna Kumar T S M <[email protected]>
commit 5ea5880764cbb164afb17a62e76ca75dc371409d upstream.
Add validation to ensure MSI is configured before accessing cdx_irqs array in vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(). Without this check, userspace can trigger a NULL pointer dereference by calling VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS with VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_BOOL or VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE flags before ever setting up interrupts via VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_EVENTFD.
The vfio_cdx_msi_enable() function allocates the cdx_irqs array and sets config_msi to 1 only when called through the EVENTFD path. The trigger loop (for DATA_BOOL/DATA_NONE) assumed this had already been done, but there was no enforcement of this call ordering.
This matches the protection used in the PCI VFIO driver where vfio_pci_set_msi_trigger() checks irq_is() before the trigger loop.
--- drivers/vfio/cdx/intr.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/vfio/cdx/intr.c +4 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,10 @@ static int vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(strureturn ret; } +/* Ensure MSI is configured before accessing cdx_irqs */ +if (!vdev->config_msi) +return -EINVAL ; +for (i = start; i < start + count; i++) {if (!vdev->cdx_irqs[i].trigger)continue ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 40/307 um: drivers: call kernel_strrchr() explicitly in cow_user.c
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>
commit 91e901c65b4da02a6fd543e3f0049829ae9645b7 upstream.
Building ARCH=um on glibc >= 2.43 fails:
arch/um/drivers/cow_user.c: error: implicit declaration of function 'strrchr' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
glibc 2.43's C23 const-preserving strrchr() macro does not survive UML's global -Dstrrchr=kernel_strrchr remap from arch/um/Makefile. Call kernel_strrchr() directly in cow_user.c so the source no longer depends on the -D rewrite.
--- arch/um/drivers/cow_user.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/um/drivers/cow_user.c +7 -1
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@#include "cow.h" #include "cow_sys.h" +/* +* arch/um/Makefile remaps strrchr to kernel_strrchr; call the kernel +* name directly to avoid glibc >= 2.43's C23 strrchr macro. +*/ +char *kernel_strrchr (const char *,int ); +#define PATH_LEN_V1 256/* unsigned time_t works until year 2106 */
@@ -153,7 +159,7 @@ static int absolutize(char *to, int size errno);return -1 ; } - slash =strrchr (from,'/' ); + slash =kernel_strrchr (from,'/' );if (slash !=NULL ) { *slash ='\0' ;if (chdir (from)) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/307 thermal: core: Fix thermal zone governor cleanup issues
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
commit 41ff66baf81c6541f4f985dd7eac4494d03d9440 upstream.
If thermal_zone_device_register_with_trips() fails after adding a thermal governor to the thermal zone being registered, the governor is not removed from it as appropriate which may lead to a memory leak.
In turn, thermal_zone_device_unregister() calls thermal_set_governor() without acquiring the thermal zone lock beforehand which may race with a governor update via sysfs and may lead to a use-after-free in that case.
Address these issues by adding two thermal_set_governor() calls, one to thermal_release() to remove the governor from the given thermal zone, and one to the thermal zone registration error path to cover failures preceding the thermal zone device registration.
--- drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/thermal/thermal_core.c +4 -3
@@ -964,6 +964,7 @@ static void thermal_release(struct devic sizeof("thermal_zone") - 1)) { tz =to_thermal_zone (dev);thermal_zone_destroy_device_groups (tz); +thermal_set_governor (tz,NULL );mutex_destroy (&tz->lock);complete (&tz->removal); } else if (!strncmp(dev_name(dev), "cooling_device",
@@ -1611,8 +1612,10 @@ thermal_zone_device_register_with_trips(/* sys I/F */ /* Add nodes that are always present via .groups */ result =thermal_zone_create_device_groups (tz); -if (result) +if (result) { +thermal_set_governor (tz,NULL ); goto remove_id; + } result =device_register (&tz->device);if (result)
@@ -1725,8 +1728,6 @@ void thermal_zone_device_unregister(strucancel_delayed_work_sync (&tz->poll_queue); -thermal_set_governor (tz,NULL ); -thermal_thresholds_exit (tz);thermal_remove_hwmon_sysfs (tz);ida_free (&thermal_tz_ida, tz->id);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/307 spi: imx: fix use-after-free on unbind
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit 1c78c2002380a1fe31bfb01a3d5f29809e55a096 upstream.
The SPI subsystem frees the controller and any subsystem allocated driver data as part of deregistration (unless the allocation is device managed).
Take another reference before deregistering the controller so that the driver data is not freed until the driver is done with it.
--- drivers/spi/spi-imx.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/spi/spi-imx.c +4 -0
@@ -2401,6 +2401,8 @@ static void spi_imx_remove(struct platfostruct spi_imx_data *spi_imx =spi_controller_get_devdata (controller);int ret; +spi_controller_get (controller); +spi_unregister_controller (controller); ret =pm_runtime_get_sync (spi_imx->dev);
@@ -2414,6 +2416,8 @@ static void spi_imx_remove(struct platfopm_runtime_disable (spi_imx->dev);spi_imx_sdma_exit (spi_imx); + +spi_controller_put (controller); }static int spi_imx_runtime_resume (struct device *dev)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/307 spi: ch341: fix memory leaks on probe failures
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit b99e3ddb91b499d920e63a2daff8880be68cfe9e upstream.
Make sure to deregister the controller, disable pins, and kill and free the RX URB on probe failures to mirror disconnect and avoid memory leaks and use-after-free.
Also add an explicit URB kill on disconnect for symmetry (even if that is not strictly required as USB core would have stopped it in the current setup).
--- drivers/spi/spi-ch341.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi-ch341.c +25 -11
@@ -173,17 +173,17 @@ static int ch341_probe(struct usb_interf ch341->tx_buf =devm_kzalloc (&udev->dev,CH341_PACKET_LENGTH ,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!ch341->tx_buf) -return -ENOMEM ; +if (!ch341->tx_buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto err_free_urb; + }usb_fill_bulk_urb (ch341->rx_urb, udev, ch341->read_pipe, ch341->rx_buf, ch341->rx_len, ch341_recv, ch341); ret =usb_submit_urb (ch341->rx_urb,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (ret) { -usb_free_urb (ch341->rx_urb); -return -ENOMEM ; - } +if (ret) + goto err_free_urb; ctrl->bus_num =-1 ; ctrl->mode_bits =SPI_CPHA ;
@@ -195,21 +195,34 @@ static int ch341_probe(struct usb_interf ret =ch341_config_stream (ch341);if (ret) -return ret; + goto err_kill_urb; ret =ch341_enable_pins (ch341, true);if (ret) -return ret; + goto err_kill_urb; ret =spi_register_controller (ctrl);if (ret) -return ret; + goto err_disable_pins; ch341->spidev =spi_new_device (ctrl, &chip); -if (!ch341->spidev) -return -ENOMEM ; +if (!ch341->spidev) { + ret = -ENOMEM ; + goto err_unregister; + }return 0 ; + +err_unregister: +spi_unregister_controller (ctrl); +err_disable_pins: +ch341_enable_pins (ch341, false); +err_kill_urb: +usb_kill_urb (ch341->rx_urb); +err_free_urb: +usb_free_urb (ch341->rx_urb); + +return ret; }static void ch341_disconnect (struct usb_interface *intf)
@@ -219,6 +232,7 @@ static void ch341_disconnect(struct usb_spi_unregister_device (ch341->spidev);spi_unregister_controller (ch341->ctrl);ch341_enable_pins (ch341, false); +usb_kill_urb (ch341->rx_urb);usb_free_urb (ch341->rx_urb); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/307 crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Douya Le <[email protected]>
commit 5aa58c3a572b3e3b6c786953339f7978b845cc52 upstream.
AF_ALG AEAD AIO requests currently use the socket-wide IV buffer during request processing. For async requests, later socket activity can update that shared state before the original request has fully completed, which can lead to inconsistent IV handling.
Snapshot the IV into per-request storage when preparing the AEAD request, so in-flight operations no longer depend on mutable socket state.
--- crypto/algif_aead.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
crypto/algif_aead.c +8 -2
@@ -72,8 +72,10 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private;struct crypto_aead *tfm = pask->private;unsigned int as =crypto_aead_authsize (tfm); +unsigned int ivsize =crypto_aead_ivsize (tfm);struct af_alg_async_req *areq;struct scatterlist *rsgl_src, *tsgl_src =NULL ; +void *iv;int err =0 ;size_t used =0 ;/* [in] TX bufs to be en/decrypted */ size_t outlen =0 ;/* [out] RX bufs produced by kernel */
@@ -125,10 +127,14 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket */* Allocate cipher request for current operation. */ areq =af_alg_alloc_areq (sk,sizeof (struct af_alg_async_req ) + -crypto_aead_reqsize (tfm)); +crypto_aead_reqsize (tfm) + ivsize);if (IS_ERR (areq))return PTR_ERR (areq); + iv = (u8 *)aead_request_ctx (&areq->cra_u.aead_req) + +crypto_aead_reqsize (tfm); +memcpy (iv, ctx->iv, ivsize); +/* convert iovecs of output buffers into RX SGL */ err =af_alg_get_rsgl (sk, msg, flags, areq, outlen, &usedpages);if (err)
@@ -187,7 +193,7 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket */* Initialize the crypto operation */ aead_request_set_crypt (&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, used, ctx->iv); + areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, used, iv);aead_request_set_ad (&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen);aead_request_set_tfm (&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/307 crypto: pcrypt - Fix handling of MAY_BACKLOG requests
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
commit 915b692e6cb723aac658c25eb82c58fd81235110 upstream.
MAY_BACKLOG requests can return EBUSY. Handle them by checking for that value and filtering out EINPROGRESS notifications.
--- crypto/pcrypt.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
crypto/pcrypt.c +5 -2
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ static void pcrypt_aead_done(void *data,struct pcrypt_request *preq =aead_request_ctx (req);struct padata_priv *padata =pcrypt_request_padata (preq); +if (err == -EINPROGRESS ) +return ; + padata->info = err;padata_do_serial (padata);
@@ -82,7 +85,7 @@ static void pcrypt_aead_enc(struct padat ret =crypto_aead_encrypt (req); -if (ret == -EINPROGRESS ) +if (ret == -EINPROGRESS || ret == -EBUSY )return ; padata->info = ret;
@@ -133,7 +136,7 @@ static void pcrypt_aead_dec(struct padat ret =crypto_aead_decrypt (req); -if (ret == -EINPROGRESS ) +if (ret == -EINPROGRESS || ret == -EBUSY )return ; padata->info = ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 46/307 dt-bindings: display: ti, am65x-dss: Fix AM62L DSS reg and clock constraints
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Swamil Jain <[email protected]>
commit 9c469240997584449cfac51a75d1d3d71968c76f upstream.
The AM62L DSS [1] support incorrectly used the same register and clock constraints as AM65x, but AM62L has a single video port
Fix this by adding conditional constraints that properly define the register regions and clocks for AM62L DSS (single video port) versus other AM65x variants (dual video port).
[1]: Section 12.7 (Display Subsystem and Peripherals)
--- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/ti/ti,am65x-dss.yaml | 70 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/ti/ti,am65x-dss.yaml +52 -18
@@ -36,34 +36,50 @@ properties: reg: description: Addresses to each DSS memory region described in the SoC's TRM. - items: - - description: common DSS register area - - description: VIDL1 light video plane - - description: VID video plane - - description: OVR1 overlay manager for vp1 - - description: OVR2 overlay manager for vp2 - - description: VP1 video port 1 - - description: VP2 video port 2 - - description: common1 DSS register area + oneOf: + - items: + - description: common DSS register area + - description: VIDL1 light video plane + - description: VID video plane + - description: OVR1 overlay manager for vp1 + - description: OVR2 overlay manager for vp2 + - description: VP1 video port 1 + - description: VP2 video port 2 + - description: common1 DSS register area + - items: + - description: common DSS register area + - description: VIDL1 light video plane + - description: OVR1 overlay manager for vp1 + - description: VP1 video port 1 + - description: common1 DSS register area reg-names: - items: - - const: common - - const: vidl1 - - const: vid - - const: ovr1 - - const: ovr2 - - const: vp1 - - const: vp2 - - const: common1 + oneOf: + - items: + - const: common + - const: vidl1 + - const: vid + - const: ovr1 + - const: ovr2 + - const: vp1 + - const: vp2 + - const: common1 + - items: + - const: common + - const: vidl1 + - const: ovr1 + - const: vp1 + - const: common1 clocks: + minItems: 2 items: - description: fck DSS functional clock - description: vp1 Video Port 1 pixel clock - description: vp2 Video Port 2 pixel clock clock-names: + minItems: 2 items: - const: fck - const: vp1
@@ -179,6 +195,24 @@ allOf: ports: properties: port@1: false + reg: + maxItems: 5 + reg-names: + maxItems: 5 + clocks: + maxItems: 2 + clock-names: + maxItems: 2 + else: + properties: + reg: + minItems: 8 + reg-names: + minItems: 8 + clocks: + minItems: 3 + clock-names: + minItems: 3 - if: properties:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/307 mm: fix deferred split queue races during migration
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lance Yang <[email protected]>
commit 3bac01168982ec3e3bf87efdc1807c7933590a85 upstream.
migrate_folio_move() records the deferred split queue state from src and replays it on dst. Replaying it after remove_migration_ptes(src, dst, 0) makes dst visible before it is requeued, so a concurrent rmap-removal path can mark dst partially mapped and trip the WARN in deferred_split_folio().
Move the requeue before remove_migration_ptes() so dst is back on the deferred split queue before it becomes visible again.
Because migration still holds dst locked at that point, teach deferred_split_scan() to requeue a folio when folio_trylock() fails. Otherwise a fully mapped underused folio can be dequeued by the shrinker and silently lost from split_queue.
--- mm/huge_memory.c | 15 ++++++++++----- mm/migrate.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
mm/huge_memory.c +10 -5
@@ -4456,7 +4456,7 @@ retry: goto next; }if (!folio_trylock (folio)) - goto next; + goto requeue;if (!split_folio (folio)) { did_split = true;if (underused)
@@ -4465,13 +4465,18 @@ retry: }folio_unlock (folio); next: +/* +* If thp_underused() returns false, or if split_folio() +* succeeds, or if split_folio() fails in the case it was +* underused, then consider it used and don't add it back to +* split_queue. +*/ if (did_split || !folio_test_partially_mapped (folio))continue ; +requeue:/* -* Only add back to the queue if folio is partially mapped. -* If thp_underused returns false, or if split_folio fails -* in the case it was underused, then consider it used and -* don't add it back to split_queue. +* Add back partially mapped folios, or underused folios that +* we could not lock this round. */ fqueue =folio_split_queue_lock_irqsave (folio, &flags);if (list_empty (&folio->_deferred_list)) {
mm/migrate.c +9 -9
@@ -1384,6 +1384,15 @@ static int migrate_folio_move(free_folio goto out;/* +* Requeue the destination folio on the deferred split queue if +* the source was on the queue. The source is unqueued in +* __folio_migrate_mapping(), so we recorded the state from +* before move_to_new_folio(). +*/ +if (src_deferred_split) +deferred_split_folio (dst, src_partially_mapped); + +/* * When successful, push dst to LRU immediately: so that if it * turns out to be an mlocked page, remove_migration_ptes() will * automatically build up the correct dst->mlock_count for it.
@@ -1399,15 +1408,6 @@ static int migrate_folio_move(free_folioif (old_page_state &PAGE_WAS_MAPPED )remove_migration_ptes (src, dst,0 ); -/* -* Requeue the destination folio on the deferred split queue if -* the source was on the queue. The source is unqueued in -* __folio_migrate_mapping(), so we recorded the state from -* before move_to_new_folio(). -*/ -if (src_deferred_split) -deferred_split_folio (dst, src_partially_mapped); - out_unlock_both:folio_unlock (dst);folio_set_owner_migrate_reason (dst, reason);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/307 of: unittest: fix use-after-free in of_unittest_changeset()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
commit faecdd423c27f0d6090156a435ba9dbbac0eaddb upstream.
The variable 'parent' is assigned the value of 'nchangeset' earlier in the function, meaning both point to the same struct device_node. The call to of_node_put(nchangeset) can decrement the reference count to zero and free the node if there are no other holders. After that, the code still uses 'parent' to check for the presence of a property and to read a string property, leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by moving the of_node_put() call after the last access to 'parent', avoiding the UAF.
--- drivers/of/unittest.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/of/unittest.c +1 -2
@@ -896,8 +896,6 @@ static void __init of_unittest_changesetunittest (!of_changeset_apply (&chgset),"apply failed\n" ); -of_node_put (nchangeset); -/* Make sure node names are constructed correctly */ unittest ((np =of_find_node_by_path ("/testcase-data/changeset/n2/n21" )),"'%pOF' not added\n" , n21);
@@ -919,6 +917,7 @@ static void __init of_unittest_changesetif (!ret)unittest (strcmp (propstr,"hello" ) ==0 ,"original value not in updated property after revert" ); +of_node_put (nchangeset);of_changeset_destroy (&chgset);of_node_put (n1);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 48/307 of: unittest: fix use-after-free in testdrv_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wentao Liang <[email protected]>
commit 07fd339b2c253205794bea5d9b4b7548a4546c56 upstream.
The function testdrv_probe() retrieves the device_node from the PCI device, applies an overlay, and then immediately calls of_node_put(dn). This releases the reference held by the PCI core, potentially freeing the node if the reference count drops to zero. Later, the same freed pointer 'dn' is passed to of_platform_default_populate(), leading to a use-after-free.
The reference to pdev->dev.of_node is owned by the device model and should not be released by the driver. Remove the erroneous of_node_put() to prevent premature freeing.
--- drivers/of/unittest.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/of/unittest.c +0 -1
@@ -4317,7 +4317,6 @@ static int testdrv_probe(struct pci_dev size = info->dtbo_end - info->dtbo_begin; ret =of_overlay_fdt_apply (info->dtbo_begin, size, &ovcs_id, dn); -of_node_put (dn);if (ret)return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 49/307 hwmon: (powerz) Fix missing usb_kill_urb() on signal interrupt
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sanman Pradhan <[email protected]>
commit b66437cb20a2d9ef201f40b675569f8ea7787c9f upstream.
wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns -ERESTARTSYS when interrupted. This needs to abort the URB and return an error. No data has been received from the device so any reads from the transfer buffer are invalid.
The original code tests !ret, which only catches the timeout case (0). On signal delivery (-ERESTARTSYS), !ret is false so the function skips usb_kill_urb() and falls through to read from the unfilled transfer buffer.
Fix by capturing the return value into a long (matching the function return type) and handling signal (negative) and timeout (zero) cases with separate checks that both call usb_kill_urb() before returning.
--- drivers/hwmon/powerz.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/powerz.c +9 -2
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ static void powerz_usb_cmd_complete(strustatic int powerz_read_data (struct usb_device *udev,struct powerz_priv *priv) { +long rc;int ret;if (!priv->urb)
@@ -127,8 +128,14 @@ static int powerz_read_data(struct usb_dif (ret)return ret; -if (!wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout - (&priv->completion,msecs_to_jiffies (5 ))) { + rc =wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout (&priv->completion, +msecs_to_jiffies (5 )); +if (rc <0 ) { +usb_kill_urb (priv->urb); +return rc; + } + +if (rc ==0 ) {usb_kill_urb (priv->urb);return -EIO ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 50/307 EDAC/versalnet: Fix device_node leak in mc_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>
commit 5c709b376460ff322580c41600e31c02f7cc0307 upstream.
of_parse_phandle() returns a device_node reference that must be released with of_node_put(). The original code never freed r5_core_node on any exit path, causing a memory leak.
Fix this by using the automatic cleanup attribute __free(device_node) which ensures of_node_put() is called when the variable goes out of scope.
--- drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c +2 -2
@@ -868,12 +868,12 @@ static void remove_versalnet(struct mc_pstatic int mc_probe (struct platform_device *pdev) { -struct device_node *r5_core_node;struct mc_priv *priv;struct rproc *rp;int rc; - r5_core_node =of_parse_phandle (pdev->dev.of_node,"amd,rproc" ,0 ); + struct device_node *r5_core_node __free(device_node) = +of_parse_phandle (pdev->dev.of_node,"amd,rproc" ,0 );if (!r5_core_node) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"amd,rproc: invalid phandle\n" );return -EINVAL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 51/307 PCI: imx6: Skip waiting for L2/L3 Ready on i.MX6SX
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Richard Zhu <[email protected]>
commit 5f73cf1db829c21b7fd44a8d2587cd395b1b2d76 upstream.
On i.MX6SX, the LTSSM registers become inaccessible after the PME_Turn_Off message is sent to the link. So there is no way to verify whether the link has entered L2/L3 Ready state or not.
Hence, set IMX_PCIE_FLAG_SKIP_L23_READY flag for i.MX6SX SoC to skip the L2/L3 Ready state polling and let the DWC core wait for 10ms after sending the PME_Turn_Off message as per the PCIe spec r6.0, sec 5.3.3.2.1.
--- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c +1 -0
@@ -1876,6 +1876,7 @@ static const struct imx_pcie_drvdata drv .variant = IMX6SX, .flags =IMX_PCIE_FLAG_IMX_PHY |IMX_PCIE_FLAG_SPEED_CHANGE_WORKAROUND | +IMX_PCIE_FLAG_SKIP_L23_READY | IMX_PCIE_FLAG_SUPPORTS_SUSPEND, .gpr = "fsl,imx6q-iomuxc-gpr", .ltssm_off = IOMUXC_GPR12,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 52/307 media: amphion: Fix race between m2m job_abort and device_run
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ming Qian <[email protected]>
commit 8cd35ceadcfc8c5da2eb7f7ce24525ce9d4ee62e upstream.
Fix kernel panic caused by race condition where v4l2_m2m_ctx_release() frees m2m_ctx while v4l2_m2m_try_run() is about to call device_run with the same context.
Race sequence:
v4l2_m2m_try_run(): v4l2_m2m_ctx_release():
lock/unlock v4l2_m2m_cancel_job()
job_abort()
v4l2_m2m_job_finish()
kfree(m2m_ctx) <- frees ctx
device_run() <- use-after-free crash at 0x538Crash trace:
Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000538 v4l2_m2m_try_run+0x78/0x138 v4l2_m2m_device_run_work+0x14/0x20
The amphion vpu driver does not rely on the m2m framework's device_run callback to perform encode/decode operations.
Fix the race by preventing m2m framework job scheduling entirely:
- Add job_ready callback returning 0 (no jobs ready for m2m framework)
- Remove job_abort callback to avoid the race condition
--- drivers/media/platform/amphion/vpu_v4l2.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/amphion/vpu_v4l2.c +3 -6
@@ -447,17 +447,14 @@ static void vpu_m2m_device_run(void *pri { } -static void vpu_m2m_job_abort (void *priv) +static int vpu_m2m_job_ready (void *priv) { -struct vpu_inst *inst = priv; -struct v4l2_m2m_ctx *m2m_ctx = inst->fh.m2m_ctx; - -v4l2_m2m_job_finish (m2m_ctx->m2m_dev, m2m_ctx); +return 0 ; }static const struct v4l2_m2m_ops vpu_m2m_ops = { .device_run = vpu_m2m_device_run, - .job_abort = vpu_m2m_job_abort + .job_ready = vpu_m2m_job_ready, }; static int vpu_vb2_queue_setup(struct vb2_queue *vq,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 53/307 ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ziqing Chen <[email protected]>
commit e0da8a8cac74f4b9f577979d131f0d2b88a84487 upstream.
snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0).
While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0 error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE's fortified strnlen() first checks maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track of p's object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic before the return value is examined.
Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified strnlen() on an exhausted buffer.
Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone.
--- sound/core/control.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
sound/core/control.c +4 -0
@@ -1574,6 +1574,10 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names(/* check that there are enough valid names */ p = names;for (i =0 ; i < ue->info.value.enumerated.items; ++i) { +if (buf_len ==0 ) { +kvfree (names); +return -EINVAL ; + } name_len =strnlen (p, buf_len);if (name_len ==0 || name_len >=64 || name_len == buf_len) {kvfree (names);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 54/307 net: caif: clear client service pointer on teardown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>
commit f7cf8ece8cee3c1ee361991470cdb1eb65ab02e8 upstream.
caif_connect() can tear down an existing client after remote shutdown by calling caif_disconnect_client() followed by caif_free_client(). caif_free_client() releases the service layer referenced by adap_layer->dn, but leaves that pointer stale.
When the socket is later destroyed, caif_sock_destructor() calls caif_free_client() again and dereferences the freed service pointer.
Clear the client/service links before releasing the service object so repeated teardown becomes harmless.
--- net/caif/cfsrvl.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/caif/cfsrvl.c +12 -2
@@ -191,10 +191,20 @@ bool cfsrvl_phyid_match(struct cflayer *void caif_free_client (struct cflayer *adap_layer) { +struct cflayer *serv_layer;struct cfsrvl *servl; -if (adap_layer ==NULL || adap_layer->dn ==NULL ) + +if (!adap_layer) +return ; + + serv_layer = adap_layer->dn; +if (!serv_layer)return ; - servl =container_obj (adap_layer->dn); + +layer_set_dn (adap_layer,NULL ); +layer_set_up (serv_layer,NULL ); + + servl =container_obj (serv_layer); servl->release (&servl->layer); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (caif_free_client);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 55/307 net: strparser: fix skb_head leak in strp_abort_strp()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>
commit fe72340daaf1af588be88056faf98965f39e6032 upstream.
When the stream parser is aborted, for example after a message assembly timeout, it can still hold a reference to a partially assembled message in strp->skb_head.
That skb is not released in strp_abort_strp(), which leaks the partially assembled message and can be triggered repeatedly to exhaust memory.
Fix this by freeing strp->skb_head and resetting the parser state in the abort path. Leave strp_stop() unchanged so final cleanup still happens in strp_done() after the work and timer have been synchronized.
--- net/strparser/strparser.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/strparser/strparser.c +8 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,14 @@ static void strp_abort_strp(struct strpa strp->stopped =1 ; +if (strp->skb_head) { +kfree_skb (strp->skb_head); + strp->skb_head =NULL ; + } + + strp->skb_nextp =NULL ; + strp->need_bytes =0 ; +if (strp->sk) {struct sock *sk = strp->sk;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 56/307 media: mtk-jpeg: fix use-after-free in release path due to uncancelled work
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fan Wu <[email protected]>
commit 34c519feef3e4fcff1078dc8bdb25fbbbd10303f upstream.
The mtk_jpeg_release() function frees the context structure (ctx) without first cancelling any pending or running work in ctx->jpeg_work. This creates a race window where the workqueue callback may still be accessing the context memory after it has been freed.
Race condition:
CPU 0 (release) CPU 1 (workqueue)
---------------- ------------------
close()
mtk_jpeg_release()
mtk_jpegenc_worker()
ctx = work->data
// accessing ctx
kfree(ctx) // freed!
access ctx // UAF!The work is queued via queue_work() during JPEG encode/decode operations (via mtk_jpeg_device_run). If the device is closed while work is pending or running, the work handler will access freed memory.
Fix this by calling cancel_work_sync() BEFORE acquiring the mutex. This ordering is critical: if cancel_work_sync() is called after mutex_lock(), and the work handler also tries to acquire the same mutex, it would cause a deadlock.
Note: The open error path does NOT need cancel_work_sync() because INIT_WORK() only initializes the work structure - it does not schedule it. Work is only scheduled later during ioctl operations.
--- drivers/media/platform/mediatek/jpeg/mtk_jpeg_core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/platform/mediatek/jpeg/mtk_jpeg_core.c +1 -0
@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ static int mtk_jpeg_release(struct filestruct mtk_jpeg_dev *jpeg =video_drvdata (file);struct mtk_jpeg_ctx *ctx =mtk_jpeg_file_to_ctx (file); +cancel_work_sync (&ctx->jpeg_work);mutex_lock (&jpeg->lock);v4l2_m2m_ctx_release (ctx->fh.m2m_ctx);v4l2_ctrl_handler_free (&ctx->ctrl_hdl);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/307 ocfs2: split transactions in dio completion to avoid credit exhaustion
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heming Zhao <[email protected]>
commit d647c5b2fbf81560818dacade360abc8c00a9665 upstream.
During ocfs2 dio operations, JBD2 may report warnings via following
call trace:ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent
ocfs2_extend_rotate_transaction
ocfs2_extend_trans
jbd2__journal_restart
start_this_handle
output: JBD2: kworker/6:2 wants too many credits credits:5450 rsv_credits:0 max:5449
To prevent exceeding the credits limit, modify ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() to handle extents in a batch of transaction.
Additionally, relocate ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan(). The orphan inode should only be removed from the orphan list after the extent tree update is complete. This ensures that if a crash occurs in the middle of extent tree updates, we won't leave stale blocks beyond EOF.
This patch also changes the logic for updating the inode size and removing orphan, making it similar to ext4_dio_write_end_io(). Both operations are performed only when everything looks good.
Finally, thanks to Jans and Joseph for providing the bug fix prototype and suggestions.
--- fs/ocfs2/aops.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/aops.c +45 -29
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@#include "namei.h" #include "sysfile.h" +#define OCFS2_DIO_MARK_EXTENT_BATCH 200 +static int ocfs2_symlink_get_block (struct inode *inode,sector_t iblock,struct buffer_head *bh_result,int create) {
@@ -2277,7 +2279,7 @@ static int ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(structstruct ocfs2_alloc_context *meta_ac =NULL ;handle_t *handle =NULL ;loff_t end = offset + bytes; -int ret =0 , credits =0 ; +int ret =0 , credits =0 , batch =0 ;ocfs2_init_dealloc_ctxt (&dealloc);
@@ -2294,18 +2296,6 @@ static int ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(struct goto out; } -/* Delete orphan before acquire i_rwsem. */ -if (dwc->dw_orphaned) { -BUG_ON (dwc->dw_writer_pid !=task_pid_nr (current)); - - end = end >i_size_read (inode) ? end :0 ; - - ret =ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan (osb, inode, di_bh, - !!end, end); -if (ret <0 ) -mlog_errno (ret); - } -down_write (&oi->ip_alloc_sem); di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)di_bh->b_data;
@@ -2326,24 +2316,25 @@ static int ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(struct credits =ocfs2_calc_extend_credits (inode->i_sb, &di->id2.i_list); - handle =ocfs2_start_trans (osb, credits); -if (IS_ERR (handle)) { - ret =PTR_ERR (handle); -mlog_errno (ret); - goto unlock; - } - ret =ocfs2_journal_access_di (handle,INODE_CACHE (inode), di_bh, -OCFS2_JOURNAL_ACCESS_WRITE ); -if (ret) { -mlog_errno (ret); - goto commit; - } -list_for_each_entry (ue, &dwc->dw_zero_list, ue_node) { +if (!handle) { + handle =ocfs2_start_trans (osb, credits); +if (IS_ERR (handle)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (handle); +mlog_errno (ret); + goto unlock; + } + ret =ocfs2_journal_access_di (handle,INODE_CACHE (inode), di_bh, +OCFS2_JOURNAL_ACCESS_WRITE ); +if (ret) { +mlog_errno (ret); + goto commit; + } + } ret =ocfs2_assure_trans_credits (handle, credits);if (ret <0 ) {mlog_errno (ret); -break ; + goto commit; } ret = ocfs2_mark_extent_written(inode, &et, handle, ue->ue_cpos, 1,
@@ -2351,19 +2342,44 @@ static int ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(struct meta_ac, &dealloc);if (ret <0 ) {mlog_errno (ret); -break ; + goto commit; + } + +if (++batch ==OCFS2_DIO_MARK_EXTENT_BATCH ) { +ocfs2_commit_trans (osb, handle); + handle =NULL ; + batch =0 ; } }if (end >i_size_read (inode)) { +if (!handle) { + handle =ocfs2_start_trans (osb, credits); +if (IS_ERR (handle)) { + ret =PTR_ERR (handle); +mlog_errno (ret); + goto unlock; + } + } ret =ocfs2_set_inode_size (handle, inode, di_bh, end);if (ret <0 )mlog_errno (ret); } + commit: -ocfs2_commit_trans (osb, handle); +if (handle) +ocfs2_commit_trans (osb, handle); unlock:up_write (&oi->ip_alloc_sem); + +/* everything looks good, let's start the cleanup */ +if (!ret && dwc->dw_orphaned) { +BUG_ON (dwc->dw_writer_pid !=task_pid_nr (current)); + + ret =ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan (osb, inode, di_bh,0 ,0 ); +if (ret <0 ) +mlog_errno (ret); + }ocfs2_inode_unlock (inode,1 );brelse (di_bh); out:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 57/307 crypto: atmel-sha204a - Fix OTP sysfs read and error handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit 635c3a757a567b2479639237f5f0d4d9439015f1 upstream.
Fix otp_show() to read and print all 64 bytes of the OTP zone. Previously, the loop only printed half of the OTP (32 bytes), and partial output was returned on read errors.
Propagate the actual error from atmel_sha204a_otp_read() instead of producing partial output.
Replace sprintf() with sysfs_emit_at(), which is preferred for formatting sysfs output because it provides safer bounds checking.
--- drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c +11 -9
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/sysfs.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include "atmel-i2c.h"
@@ -120,21 +121,22 @@ static ssize_t otp_show(struct device *d {u16 addr;u8 otp[OTP_ZONE_SIZE ]; -char *str = buf;struct i2c_client *client =to_i2c_client (dev); -int i; +ssize_t len =0 ; +int i, ret; -for (addr =0 ; addr <OTP_ZONE_SIZE /4 ; addr++) { -if (atmel_sha204a_otp_read (client, addr, otp + addr *4 ) <0 ) { +for (addr =0 ; addr <OTP_ZONE_SIZE /4 ; addr++) { + ret =atmel_sha204a_otp_read (client, addr, otp + addr *4 ); +if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (dev,"failed to read otp zone\n" ); -break ; +return ret; } } -for (i =0 ; i < addr*2 ; i++) - str +=sprintf (str,"%02X" , otp[i]); - str +=sprintf (str,"\n" ); -return str - buf; +for (i =0 ; i <OTP_ZONE_SIZE ; i++) + len +=sysfs_emit_at (buf, len,"%02X" , otp[i]); + len +=sysfs_emit_at (buf, len,"\n" ); +return len; }static DEVICE_ATTR_RO (otp);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 58/307 PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-ntb: Remove duplicate resource teardown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Koichiro Den <[email protected]>
commit 3446beddba450c8d6f9aca2f028712ac527fead3 upstream.
epf_ntb_epc_destroy() duplicates the teardown that the caller is supposed to do later. This leads to an oops when .allow_link fails or when .drop_link is performed. Remove the helper.
Also drop pci_epc_put(). EPC device refcounting is tied to configfs EPC group lifetime, and pci_epc_put() in the .drop_link path is sufficient.
--- drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-ntb.c | 56 --------------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-ntb.c +2 -54
@@ -1495,47 +1495,6 @@ err_alloc_peer_mem: }/** -* epf_ntb_epc_destroy_interface() - Cleanup NTB EPC interface -* @ntb: NTB device that facilitates communication between HOST1 and HOST2 -* @type: PRIMARY interface or SECONDARY interface -* -* Unbind NTB function device from EPC and relinquish reference to pci_epc -* for each of the interface. -*/ -static void epf_ntb_epc_destroy_interface (struct epf_ntb *ntb, -enum pci_epc_interface_type type) -{ -struct epf_ntb_epc *ntb_epc; -struct pci_epc *epc; -struct pci_epf *epf; - -if (type <0 ) -return ; - - epf = ntb->epf; - ntb_epc = ntb->epc[type]; -if (!ntb_epc) -return ; - epc = ntb_epc->epc; -pci_epc_remove_epf (epc, epf, type); -pci_epc_put (epc); -} - -/** -* epf_ntb_epc_destroy() - Cleanup NTB EPC interface -* @ntb: NTB device that facilitates communication between HOST1 and HOST2 -* -* Wrapper for epf_ntb_epc_destroy_interface() to cleanup all the NTB interfaces -*/ -static void epf_ntb_epc_destroy (struct epf_ntb *ntb) -{ -enum pci_epc_interface_type type; - -for (type =PRIMARY_INTERFACE ; type <=SECONDARY_INTERFACE ; type++) -epf_ntb_epc_destroy_interface (ntb, type); -} - -/** * epf_ntb_epc_create_interface() - Create and initialize NTB EPC interface * @ntb: NTB device that facilitates communication between HOST1 and HOST2 * @epc: struct pci_epc to which a particular NTB interface should be associated
@@ -1614,15 +1573,8 @@ static int epf_ntb_epc_create(struct epf ret =epf_ntb_epc_create_interface (ntb, epf->sec_epc,SECONDARY_INTERFACE ); -if (ret) { +if (ret)dev_err (dev,"SECONDARY intf: Fail to create NTB EPC\n" ); - goto err_epc_create; - } - -return 0 ; - -err_epc_create: -epf_ntb_epc_destroy_interface (ntb,PRIMARY_INTERFACE );return ret; }
@@ -1887,7 +1839,7 @@ static int epf_ntb_bind(struct pci_epf * ret =epf_ntb_init_epc_bar (ntb);if (ret) {dev_err (dev,"Failed to create NTB EPC\n" ); - goto err_bar_init; +return ret; } ret =epf_ntb_config_spad_bar_alloc_interface (ntb);
@@ -1909,9 +1861,6 @@ static int epf_ntb_bind(struct pci_epf * err_bar_alloc:epf_ntb_config_spad_bar_free (ntb); -err_bar_init: -epf_ntb_epc_destroy (ntb); -return ret; }
@@ -1927,7 +1876,6 @@ static void epf_ntb_unbind(struct pci_epepf_ntb_epc_cleanup (ntb);epf_ntb_config_spad_bar_free (ntb); -epf_ntb_epc_destroy (ntb); }#define EPF_NTB_R (_name) \
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 59/307 Revert "ALSA: usb: Increase volume range that triggers a warning"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rong Zhang <[email protected]>
commit 41d78cb724f4b40b7548af420ccfe524b14023bb upstream.
UAC uses 2 bytes to store volume values, so the maximum volume range is 0xFFFF (65535, val = -32768/32767/1).
The reverted commit bumpped the range of triggering the warning to > 65535, effectively making the range check a no-op. It didn't fix anything but covered any potential problems and deviated from the original intention of the range check.
This reverts commit 6b971191fcfc9e3c2c0143eea22534f1f48dbb62.
--- sound/usb/mixer.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/usb/mixer.c +4 -3
@@ -1820,10 +1820,11 @@ static void __build_feature_ctl(struct u range = (cval->max - cval->min) / cval->res;/* -* There are definitely devices with a range of ~20,000, so let's be -* conservative and allow for a bit more. +* Are there devices with volume range more than 255? I use a bit more +* to be sure. 384 is a resolution magic number found on Logitech +* devices. It will definitively catch all buggy Logitech devices. */ -if (range >65535 ) { +if (range >384 ) {usb_audio_warn (mixer->chip,"Warning! Unlikely big volume range (=%u), cval->res is probably wrong." , range);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 60/307 phy: qcom: m31-eusb2: clear PLL_EN during init
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Elson Serrao <[email protected]>
commit 520a98bdf7ae0130e22d8adced3d69a2e211b41f upstream.
The driver currently sets bit 0 of USB_PHY_CFG1 (PLL_EN) during PHY initialization. According to the M31 EUSB2 PHY hardware documentation, this bit is intended only for test/debug scenarios and does not control mission mode operation. Keeping PLL_EN asserted causes the PHY to draw additional current during USB bus suspend. Clearing this bit results in lower suspend power consumption without affecting normal operation.
Update the driver to leave PLL_EN cleared as recommended by the hardware documentation.
--- drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-m31-eusb2.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-m31-eusb2.c +1 -1
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static const struct m31_phy_tbl_entry m3M31_EUSB_PHY_INIT_CFG (USB_PHY_CFG0 ,UTMI_PHY_CMN_CTRL_OVERRIDE_EN ,1 ),M31_EUSB_PHY_INIT_CFG (USB_PHY_UTMI_CTRL5 ,POR ,1 ),M31_EUSB_PHY_INIT_CFG (USB_PHY_HS_PHY_CTRL_COMMON0 ,PHY_ENABLE ,1 ), -M31_EUSB_PHY_INIT_CFG (USB_PHY_CFG1 ,PLL_EN ,1 ), +M31_EUSB_PHY_INIT_CFG (USB_PHY_CFG1 ,PLL_EN ,0 ), M31_EUSB_PHY_INIT_CFG(USB_PHY_FSEL_SEL, FSEL_SEL, 1), };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 61/307 PCI: epf-mhi: Return 0, not remaining timeout, when eDMA ops complete
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>
commit 36bfc3642b19a98f1302aed4437c331df9b481f0 upstream.
pci_epf_mhi_edma_read() and pci_epf_mhi_edma_write() start DMA operations and wait for completion with a timeout.
On successful completion, they previously returned the remaining timeout, which callers may treat as an error. In particular, mhi_ep_ring_add_element(), which calls pci_epf_mhi_edma_write() via mhi_cntrl->write_sync(), interprets any non-zero return value as failure.
Return 0 on success instead of the remaining timeout to prevent mhi_ep_ring_add_element() from treating successful completion as an error.
--- drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-mhi.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/pci/endpoint/functions/pci-epf-mhi.c +4 -0
@@ -367,6 +367,8 @@ static int pci_epf_mhi_edma_read(structdev_err (dev,"DMA transfer timeout\n" );dmaengine_terminate_sync (chan); ret = -ETIMEDOUT ; + }else { + ret =0 ; } err_unmap:
@@ -438,6 +440,8 @@ static int pci_epf_mhi_edma_write(structdev_err (dev,"DMA transfer timeout\n" );dmaengine_terminate_sync (chan); ret = -ETIMEDOUT ; + }else { + ret =0 ; } err_unmap:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/307 Input: edt-ft5x06 - fix use-after-free in debugfs teardown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
commit f5f9e07060519e2287e99019a6de1eb3ebb65c37 upstream.
The commit 68743c500c6e ("Input: edt-ft5x06 - use per-client debugfs directory") removed the manual debugfs teardown, relying on the I2C core to handle it. However, this creates a window where debugfs files are still accessible after edt_ft5x06_ts_teardown_debugfs() frees tsdata->raw_buffer.
To prevent a use-after-free, protect the freeing of raw_buffer with the device mutex and set raw_buffer to NULL. The debugfs read function already checks if raw_buffer is NULL under the same mutex, so this safely avoids the use-after-free.
--- drivers/input/touchscreen/edt-ft5x06.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/input/touchscreen/edt-ft5x06.c +3 -0
@@ -829,7 +829,10 @@ static void edt_ft5x06_ts_prepare_debugfstatic void edt_ft5x06_ts_teardown_debugfs (struct edt_ft5x06_ts_data *tsdata) { +guard (mutex)(&tsdata->mutex); +kfree (tsdata->raw_buffer); + tsdata->raw_buffer =NULL ; }#else
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/307 zram: do not forget to endio for partial discard requests
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
commit e3668b371329ea036ff022ce8ecc82f8befcf003 upstream.
As reported by Qu Wenruo and Avinesh Kumar, the following
getconf PAGESIZE
65536
blkdiscard -p 4k /dev/zram0
takes literally forever to complete. zram doesn't support partial discards and just returns immediately w/o doing any discard work in such cases. The problem is that we forget to endio on our way out, so blkdiscard sleeps forever in submit_bio_wait(). Fix this by jumping to end_bio label, which does bio_endio().
--- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c +2 -1
@@ -2697,7 +2697,7 @@ static void zram_bio_discard(struct zram*/ if (offset) {if (n <= (PAGE_SIZE - offset)) -return ; + goto end_bio; n -= (PAGE_SIZE - offset); index++;
@@ -2712,6 +2712,7 @@ static void zram_bio_discard(struct zram n -=PAGE_SIZE ; } +end_bio:bio_endio (bio); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/307 wifi: rtw88: check for PCI upstream bridge existence
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
commit eb101d2abdcccb514ca4fccd3b278dd8267374f6 upstream.
pci_upstream_bridge() returns NULL if the device is on a root bus. If 8821CE is installed in the system with such a PCI topology, the probing routine will crash. This has probably been unnoticed as 8821CE is mostly supplied in laptops where there is a PCI-to-PCI bridge located upstream from the device. However the card might be installed on a system with different configuration.
Check if the bridge does exist for the specific workaround to be applied.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static analysis tool.
--- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c +2 -1
@@ -1804,7 +1804,8 @@ int rtw_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, }/* Disable PCIe ASPM L1 while doing NAPI poll for 8821CE */ -if (rtwdev->chip->id ==RTW_CHIP_TYPE_8821C && bridge->vendor ==PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL ) +if (rtwdev->chip->id ==RTW_CHIP_TYPE_8821C && + bridge && bridge->vendor ==PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL ) rtwpci->rx_no_aspm = true;rtw_pci_phy_cfg (rtwdev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/307 wifi: mwifiex: fix use-after-free in mwifiex_adapter_cleanup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Hodges <[email protected]>
commit ae5e95d4157481693be2317e3ffcd84e36010cbb upstream.
The mwifiex_adapter_cleanup() function uses timer_delete() (non-synchronous) for the wakeup_timer before the adapter structure is freed. This is incorrect because timer_delete() does not wait for any running timer callback to complete.
If the wakeup_timer callback (wakeup_timer_fn) is executing when mwifiex_adapter_cleanup() is called, the callback will continue to access adapter fields (adapter->hw_status, adapter->if_ops.card_reset, etc.) which may be freed by mwifiex_free_adapter() called later in the mwifiex_remove_card() path.
Use timer_delete_sync() instead to ensure any running timer callback has completed before returning.
--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/init.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/init.c +1 -1
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ static void mwifiex_invalidate_lists(strstatic void mwifiex_adapter_cleanup (struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter) { -timer_delete (&adapter->wakeup_timer); +timer_delete_sync (&adapter->wakeup_timer);cancel_delayed_work_sync (&adapter->devdump_work);mwifiex_cancel_all_pending_cmd (adapter);wake_up_interruptible (&adapter->cmd_wait_q.wait);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/307 vfio: selftests: Fix VLA initialisation in vfio_pci_irq_set()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Manish Honap <[email protected]>
commit 4f42d716707654134789a0205a050b0d022be948 upstream.
C does not permit an initialiser expression on a variable-length array (C99 Section 6.7.9 constraint: "The type of the entity to be initialized shall not be a variable length array type").
vfio_pci_irq_set() declared:
u8 buf[sizeof(struct vfio_irq_set) + sizeof(int) * count] = {};where count is a runtime function parameter, making buf a VLA.
GCC rejects this with (tried with GCC-9.4.0):
error: variable-sized object may not be initialized
Fix by removing the = {} initialiser and inserting an explicit memset() immediately after the declaration. memset() on a VLA is perfectly legal and achieves the same zero-initialisation on all conforming C implementations.
--- tools/testing/selftests/vfio/lib/vfio_pci_device.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/vfio/lib/vfio_pci_device.c +3 -1
@@ -30,10 +30,12 @@static void vfio_pci_irq_set (struct vfio_pci_device *device,u32 index,u32 vector,u32 count,int *fds) { -u8 buf[sizeof (struct vfio_irq_set ) +sizeof (int ) * count] = {}; +u8 buf[sizeof (struct vfio_irq_set ) +sizeof (int ) * count];struct vfio_irq_set *irq = (void *)&buf;int *irq_fds = (void *)&irq->data; +memset (buf,0 ,sizeof (buf)); + irq->argsz =sizeof (buf); irq->flags =VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TRIGGER ; irq->index = index;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/307 vfio/xe: Add a missing vfio_pci_core_release_dev()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michał Winiarski <[email protected]>
commit 493c7eff3c2ffa94ce3c5e62172948a1e38b491e upstream.
The driver is implementing its own .release(), which means that it needs to call vfio_pci_core_release_dev().
Add the missing call.
--- drivers/vfio/pci/xe/main.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/vfio/pci/xe/main.c +1 -0
@@ -504,6 +504,7 @@ static void xe_vfio_pci_release_dev(stru container_of(core_vdev, struct xe_vfio_pci_core_device, core_device.vdev);mutex_destroy (&xe_vdev->state_mutex); +vfio_pci_core_release_dev (core_vdev); }static const struct vfio_device_ops xe_vfio_pci_ops = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/307 mm: migrate: requeue destination folio on deferred split queue
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Usama Arif <[email protected]>
commit a2e0c0668a3486f96b86c50e02872c8e94fd4f9c upstream.
During folio migration, __folio_migrate_mapping() removes the source folio from the deferred split queue, but the destination folio is never re-queued. This causes underutilized THPs to escape the shrinker after NUMA migration, since they silently drop off the deferred split list.
Fix this by recording whether the source folio was on the deferred split queue and its partially mapped state before move_to_new_folio() unqueues it, and re-queuing the destination folio after a successful migration if it was.
By the time migrate_folio_move() runs, partially mapped folios without a pin have already been split by migrate_pages_batch(). So only two cases remain on the deferred list at this point:
1. Partially mapped folios with a pin (split failed).
2. Fully mapped but potentially underused folios. The recorded partially_mapped state is forwarded to deferred_split_folio() so that the destination folio is correctly re-queued in both cases.
Because THPs are removed from the deferred_list, THP shinker cannot split the underutilized THPs in time. As a result, users will show less free memory than before.
--- mm/migrate.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
mm/migrate.c +17 -0
@@ -1358,6 +1358,8 @@ static int migrate_folio_move(free_folioint rc;int old_page_state =0 ;struct anon_vma *anon_vma =NULL ; +bool src_deferred_split = false; +bool src_partially_mapped = false;struct list_head *prev;__migrate_folio_extract (dst, &old_page_state, &anon_vma);
@@ -1371,6 +1373,12 @@ static int migrate_folio_move(free_folio goto out_unlock_both; } +if (folio_order (src) >1 && + !data_race (list_empty (&src->_deferred_list))) { + src_deferred_split = true; + src_partially_mapped =folio_test_partially_mapped (src); + } + rc =move_to_new_folio (dst, src, mode);if (rc) goto out;
@@ -1391,6 +1399,15 @@ static int migrate_folio_move(free_folioif (old_page_state &PAGE_WAS_MAPPED )remove_migration_ptes (src, dst,0 ); +/* +* Requeue the destination folio on the deferred split queue if +* the source was on the queue. The source is unqueued in +* __folio_migrate_mapping(), so we recorded the state from +* before move_to_new_folio(). +*/ +if (src_deferred_split) +deferred_split_folio (dst, src_partially_mapped); + out_unlock_both:folio_unlock (dst);folio_set_owner_migrate_reason (dst, reason);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 63/307 media: i2c: imx219: Check return value of devm_gpiod_get_optional() in imx219_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen Ni <[email protected]>
commit 943b1f27a3eead21b22e2531a5432ea5910b60eb upstream.
The devm_gpiod_get_optional() function may return an error pointer (ERR_PTR) in case of a genuine failure during GPIO acquisition, not just NULL which indicates the legitimate absence of an optional GPIO.
Add an IS_ERR() check after the function call to catch such errors and propagate them to the probe function, ensuring the driver fails to load safely rather than proceeding with an invalid pointer.
--- drivers/media/i2c/imx219.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/media/i2c/imx219.c +3 -0
@@ -1218,6 +1218,9 @@ static int imx219_probe(struct i2c_clien/* Request optional enable pin */ imx219->reset_gpio =devm_gpiod_get_optional (dev,"reset" ,GPIOD_OUT_HIGH ); +if (IS_ERR (imx219->reset_gpio)) +return dev_err_probe (dev,PTR_ERR (imx219->reset_gpio), +"failed to get reset gpio\n" );/* * The sensor must be powered for imx219_identify_module()
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 72/307 erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gao Xiang <[email protected]>
commit d18a3b5d337fa412a38e776e6b4b857a58836575 upstream.
Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() with unchecked nameoffs.
If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the directory block.
nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of sizeof(struct erofs_dirent) as well [1].
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com
--- fs/erofs/dir.c | 28 +++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/erofs/dir.c +15 -13
@@ -19,20 +19,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct inconst char *de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff;unsigned int de_namelen; -/* the last dirent in the block? */ -if (de +1 >= end) - de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -else +/* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */ +if (de +1 < end) de_namelen =le16_to_cpu (de[1 ].nameoff) - nameoff; +else if (maxsize <= nameoff) + goto err_bogus; +else + de_namelen =strnlen (de_name, maxsize - nameoff); -/* a corrupted entry is found */ -if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize || - de_namelen >EROFS_NAME_LEN ) { -erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" , -EROFS_I (dir)->nid); -DBG_BUGON (1 ); -return -EFSCORRUPTED ; - } +/* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */ +if (!in_range32 (de_namelen,1 ,EROFS_NAME_LEN ) || + nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize) + goto err_bogus; if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen, erofs_nid_to_ino64(EROFS_SB(dir->i_sb),
@@ -42,6 +40,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct in ctx->pos +=sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ); }return 0 ; +err_bogus: +erofs_err (dir->i_sb,"bogus dirent @ nid %llu" ,EROFS_I (dir)->nid); +DBG_BUGON (1 ); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; }static int erofs_readdir (struct file *f,struct dir_context *ctx)
@@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, } nameoff =le16_to_cpu (de->nameoff); -if (nameoff <sizeof (struct erofs_dirent ) || nameoff >= bsz) { +if (!nameoff || nameoff >= bsz || (nameoff %sizeof (*de))) {erofs_err (sb,"invalid de[0].nameoff %u @ nid %llu" , nameoff,EROFS_I (dir)->nid); err = -EFSCORRUPTED ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 73/307 ipmi:ssif: Clean up kthread on errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
commit 75c486cb1bcaa1a3ec3a6438498176a3a4998ae4 upstream.
If an error occurs after the ssif kthread is created, but before the main IPMI code starts the ssif interface, the ssif kthread will not be stopped.
So make sure the kthread is stopped on an error condition if it is running.
--- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c +12 -1
@@ -1268,8 +1268,10 @@ static void shutdown_ssif(void *send_inf ssif_info->stopping = true;timer_delete_sync (&ssif_info->watch_timer);timer_delete_sync (&ssif_info->retry_timer); -if (ssif_info->thread) +if (ssif_info->thread) {kthread_stop (ssif_info->thread); + ssif_info->thread =NULL ; + } }static void ssif_remove (struct i2c_client *client)
@@ -1916,6 +1918,15 @@ static int ssif_probe(struct i2c_client out:if (rv) { +/* +* If ipmi_register_smi() starts the interface, it will +* call shutdown and that will free the thread and set +* it to NULL. Otherwise it must be freed here. +*/ +if (ssif_info->thread) { +kthread_stop (ssif_info->thread); + ssif_info->thread =NULL ; + }if (addr_info) addr_info->client =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 74/307 jbd2: fix deadlock in jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhang Yi <[email protected]>
commit 981fcc5674e67158d24d23e841523eccba19d0e7 upstream.
Commit f76d4c28a46a ("fs/jbd2: use sleeping version of __find_get_block()") changed jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke() to use __find_get_block_nonatomic() which holds the folio lock instead of i_private_lock. This breaks the lock ordering (folio -> buffer) and causes an ABBA deadlock when the filesystem blocksize < pagesize:
T1 T2ext4_mkdir()
ext4_init_new_dir()
ext4_append()
ext4_getblk()
lock_buffer() <- A
sync_blockdev()
blkdev_writepages()
writeback_iter()
writeback_get_folio()
folio_lock() <- B
ext4_journal_get_create_access()
jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()
__find_get_block_nonatomic()
folio_lock() <- B
block_write_full_folio()
lock_buffer() <- A
This can occasionally cause generic/013 to hang.
Fix by only calling __find_get_block_nonatomic() when the passed buffer_head doesn't belong to the bdev, which is the only case that we need to look up its bdev alias. Otherwise, the lookup is redundant since the found buffer_head is equal to the one we passed in.
--- fs/jbd2/revoke.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/jbd2/revoke.c +5 -3
@@ -428,6 +428,7 @@ void jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke(handle_tjournal_t *journal = handle->h_transaction->t_journal;int need_cancel;struct buffer_head *bh =jh2bh (jh); +struct address_space *bh_mapping = bh->b_folio->mapping;jbd2_debug (4 ,"journal_head %p, cancelling revoke\n" , jh);
@@ -464,13 +465,14 @@ void jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke(handle_t* buffer_head? If so, we'd better make sure we clear the * revoked status on any hashed alias too, otherwise the revoke * state machine will get very upset later on. */ -if (need_cancel) { +if (need_cancel && !sb_is_blkdev_sb (bh_mapping->host->i_sb)) {struct buffer_head *bh2; + bh2 =__find_get_block_nonatomic (bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr, bh->b_size);if (bh2) { -if (bh2 != bh) -clear_buffer_revoked (bh2); +WARN_ON_ONCE (bh2 == bh); +clear_buffer_revoked (bh2);__brelse (bh2); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 75/307 KVM: selftests: Fix reserved value WRMSR testcase for multi-feature MSRs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
commit 9396cc1e282a280bcba2e932e03994e0aada4cd8 upstream.
When determining whether or not a WRMSR with reserved bits will #GP or succeed due to the WRMSR not existing per the guest virtual CPU model, expect failure if and only if _all_ features associated with the MSR are unsupported. Checking only the primary feature results in false failures when running on AMD and Hygon CPUs with only one of RDPID or RDTSCP, as AMD/Hygon CPUs ignore MSR_TSC_AUX[63:32], i.e. don't treat the bits as reserved, and so #GP only if the MSR is unsupported.
--- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/msrs_test.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/msrs_test.c +1 -1
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ void guest_test_reserved_val(const struc* If the CPU will truncate the written value (e.g. SYSENTER on AMD), * expect success and a truncated value, not #GP. */ -if (!this_cpu_has (msr->feature) || +if ((!this_cpu_has (msr->feature) && !this_cpu_has (msr->feature2)) || msr->rsvd_val ==fixup_rdmsr_val (msr->index, msr->rsvd_val)) {u8 vec =wrmsr_safe (msr->index, msr->rsvd_val);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 76/307 md/raid10: fix deadlock with check operation and nowait requests
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Hunt <[email protected]>
commit 7d96f3120a7fb7210d21b520c5b6f495da6ba436 upstream.
When an array check is running it will raise the barrier at which point normal requests will become blocked and increment the nr_pending value to signal there is work pending inside of wait_barrier(). NOWAIT requests do not block and so will return immediately with an error, and additionally do not increment nr_pending in wait_barrier(). Upstream change commit 43806c3d5b9b ("raid10: cleanup memleak at raid10_make_request") added a call to raid_end_bio_io() to fix a memory leak when NOWAIT requests hit this condition. raid_end_bio_io() eventually calls allow_barrier() and it will unconditionally do an atomic_dec_and_test(&conf->nr_pending) even though the corresponding increment on nr_pending didn't happen in the NOWAIT case.
This can be easily seen by starting a check operation while an application is doing nowait IO on the same array. This results in a deadlocked state due to nr_pending value underflowing and so the md resync thread gets stuck waiting for nr_pending to == 0.
Output of r10conf state of the array when we hit this condition:
crash> struct r10conf
barrier = 1,
nr_pending = {
counter = -41
},
nr_waiting = 15,
nr_queued = 0,Example of md_sync thread stuck waiting on raise_barrier() and other requests stuck in wait_barrier():
md1_resync
[<0>] raise_barrier+0xce/0x1c0 [<0>] raid10_sync_request+0x1ca/0x1ed0 [<0>] md_do_sync+0x779/0x1110 [<0>] md_thread+0x90/0x160 [<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0 [<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
kworker/u1040:2+flush-253:4
[<0>] wait_barrier+0x1de/0x220 [<0>] regular_request_wait+0x30/0x180 [<0>] raid10_make_request+0x261/0x1000 [<0>] md_handle_request+0x13b/0x230 [<0>] __submit_bio+0x107/0x1f0 [<0>] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x16f/0x390 [<0>] ext4_io_submit+0x24/0x40 [<0>] ext4_do_writepages+0x254/0xc80 [<0>] ext4_writepages+0x84/0x120 [<0>] do_writepages+0x7a/0x260 [<0>] __writeback_single_inode+0x3d/0x300 [<0>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x1dd/0x470 [<0>] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x4c/0xe0 [<0>] wb_writeback+0x18b/0x2d0 [<0>] wb_workfn+0x2a1/0x400 [<0>] process_one_work+0x149/0x330 [<0>] worker_thread+0x2d2/0x410 [<0>] kthread+0xbe/0xf0 [<0>] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [<0>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
--- drivers/md/raid10.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/md/raid10.c +2 -2
@@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ static void raid10_read_request(struct m }if (!regular_request_wait (mddev, conf, bio, r10_bio->sectors)) { -raid_end_bio_io (r10_bio); +free_r10bio (r10_bio);return ; }
@@ -1372,7 +1372,7 @@ static void raid10_write_request(struct sectors = r10_bio->sectors;if (!regular_request_wait (mddev, conf, bio, sectors)) { -raid_end_bio_io (r10_bio); +free_r10bio (r10_bio);return ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 77/307 media: rc: igorplugusb: heed coherency rules
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
commit eac69475b01fe1e861dfe3960b57fa95671c132e upstream.
In a control request, the USB request structure can be subject to DMA on some HCs. Hence it must obey the rules for DMA coherency. Allocate it separately.
--- drivers/media/rc/igorplugusb.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/media/rc/igorplugusb.c +11 -5
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ struct igorplugusb {struct device *dev;struct urb *urb; -struct usb_ctrlrequest request; +struct usb_ctrlrequest *request;struct timer_list timer;
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static void igorplugusb_cmd(struct igorp {int ret; - ir->request.bRequest = cmd; + ir->request->bRequest = cmd; ir->urb->transfer_flags =0 ; ret =usb_submit_urb (ir->urb,GFP_ATOMIC );if (ret && ret != -EPERM )
@@ -164,13 +164,17 @@ static int igorplugusb_probe(struct usb_if (!ir)return -ENOMEM ; + ir->request =kzalloc_obj (*ir->request,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ir->request) + goto fail; + ir->dev = &intf->dev;timer_setup (&ir->timer, igorplugusb_timer,0 ); - ir->request.bRequest =GET_INFRACODE ; - ir->request.bRequestType =USB_TYPE_VENDOR |USB_DIR_IN ; - ir->request.wLength =cpu_to_le16 (MAX_PACKET ); + ir->request->bRequest =GET_INFRACODE ; + ir->request->bRequestType =USB_TYPE_VENDOR |USB_DIR_IN ; + ir->request->wLength =cpu_to_le16 (MAX_PACKET ); ir->urb =usb_alloc_urb (0 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!ir->urb)
@@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ fail:usb_free_urb (ir->urb);rc_free_device (ir->rc);kfree (ir->buf_in); +kfree (ir->request);return ret; }
@@ -243,6 +248,7 @@ static void igorplugusb_disconnect(strucusb_unpoison_urb (ir->urb);usb_free_urb (ir->urb);kfree (ir->buf_in); +kfree (ir->request); }static const struct usb_device_id igorplugusb_table[] = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 78/307 media: rockchip: rkcif: fix off by one bugs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit e4056b84af0fc18c84b4e5741df04ecd8ca17973 upstream.
Change these comparisons from > vs >= to avoid accessing one element beyond the end of the arrays.
While at it, use ARRAY_SIZE instead of the _MAX enum values.
--- drivers/media/platform/rockchip/rkcif/rkcif-capture-mipi.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/rockchip/rkcif/rkcif-capture-mipi.c +5 -5
@@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ static inline unsigned int rkcif_mipi_ge block = interface->index -RKCIF_MIPI_BASE ; -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (block >RKCIF_MIPI_MAX -RKCIF_MIPI_BASE ) || -WARN_ON_ONCE (index >RKCIF_MIPI_REGISTER_MAX )) +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (block >=ARRAY_SIZE (rkcif->match_data->mipi->blocks)) || +WARN_ON_ONCE (index >=ARRAY_SIZE (rkcif->match_data->mipi->regs)))return RKCIF_REGISTER_NOTSUPPORTED ; offset = rkcif->match_data->mipi->blocks[block].offset;
@@ -510,9 +510,9 @@ static inline unsigned int rkcif_mipi_id block = stream->interface->index -RKCIF_MIPI_BASE ; id = stream->id; -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (block >RKCIF_MIPI_MAX -RKCIF_MIPI_BASE ) || -WARN_ON_ONCE (id >RKCIF_ID_MAX ) || -WARN_ON_ONCE (index >RKCIF_MIPI_ID_REGISTER_MAX )) +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (block >=ARRAY_SIZE (rkcif->match_data->mipi->blocks)) || +WARN_ON_ONCE (id >=ARRAY_SIZE (rkcif->match_data->mipi->regs_id)) || +WARN_ON_ONCE (index >=ARRAY_SIZE (rkcif->match_data->mipi->regs_id[id])))return RKCIF_REGISTER_NOTSUPPORTED ; offset = rkcif->match_data->mipi->blocks[block].offset;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 79/307 media: rockchip: rkcif: comply with minimum number of buffers requirement
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Riesch <[email protected]>
commit 48c8292d4445088d8b3c9d639c7982744a94d819 upstream.
Each stream requires CIF_REQ_BUFS_MIN=1 buffers to enable streaming. However, it failed with only one buffer provided.
Comply with the minimum number of buffers requirement and accept exactly one buffer.
--- .../platform/rockchip/rkcif/rkcif-stream.c | 44 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/rockchip/rkcif/rkcif-stream.c +22 -22
@@ -106,42 +106,42 @@ static int rkcif_stream_init_buffers(struct rkcif_stream *stream) {struct v4l2_pix_format_mplane *pix = &stream->pix; - stream->buffers[0 ] =rkcif_stream_pop_buffer (stream); -if (!stream->buffers[0 ]) - goto err_buff_0; - - stream->buffers[1 ] =rkcif_stream_pop_buffer (stream); -if (!stream->buffers[1 ]) - goto err_buff_1; - -if (stream->queue_buffer) { - stream->queue_buffer (stream,0 ); - stream->queue_buffer (stream,1 ); - } - stream->dummy.size = pix->num_planes * pix->plane_fmt[0 ].sizeimage; stream->dummy.vaddr =dma_alloc_attrs (stream->rkcif->dev, stream->dummy.size, &stream->dummy.buffer.buff_addr[0 ],GFP_KERNEL ,DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING );if (!stream->dummy.vaddr) - goto err_dummy; +return -ENOMEM ;for (unsigned int i =1 ; i < pix->num_planes; i++) stream->dummy.buffer.buff_addr[i] = stream->dummy.buffer.buff_addr[i -1 ] + pix->plane_fmt[i -1 ].bytesperline * pix->height; + stream->buffers[0 ] =rkcif_stream_pop_buffer (stream); +if (!stream->buffers[0 ]) + goto err_dummy_free; + + stream->buffers[1 ] =rkcif_stream_pop_buffer (stream); +if (!stream->buffers[1 ]) { + stream->buffers[1 ] = &stream->dummy.buffer; + stream->buffers[1 ]->is_dummy = true; + } + +if (stream->queue_buffer) { + stream->queue_buffer (stream,0 ); + stream->queue_buffer (stream,1 ); + } +return 0 ; -err_dummy: -rkcif_stream_return_buffer (stream->buffers[1 ],VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED ); - stream->buffers[1 ] =NULL ; - -err_buff_1: -rkcif_stream_return_buffer (stream->buffers[0 ],VB2_BUF_STATE_QUEUED ); - stream->buffers[0 ] =NULL ; -err_buff_0: +err_dummy_free: +dma_free_attrs (stream->rkcif->dev, stream->dummy.size, + stream->dummy.vaddr, + stream->dummy.buffer.buff_addr[0 ], +DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING ); + stream->dummy.vaddr =NULL ;return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 80/307 mfd: stpmic1: Attempt system shutdown twice in case PMIC is confused
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
commit ffdc5c51f8bcd0e5e8255ca275a0a3b958475d99 upstream.
Attempt to shut down again, in case the first attempt failed. The STPMIC1 might get confused and the first regmap_update_bits() returns with -ETIMEDOUT / -110 . If that or similar transient failure occurs, try to shut down again. If the second attempt fails, there is some bigger problem, report it to user.
--- drivers/mfd/stpmic1.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mfd/stpmic1.c +18 -2
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@#include <dt-bindings/mfd/st,stpmic1.h> +#define STPMIC1_MAX_RETRIES 2 +#define STPMIC1_MAIN_IRQ 0static const struct regmap_range stpmic1_readable_ranges[] = {
@@ -121,9 +123,23 @@ static const struct regmap_irq_chip stpmstatic int stpmic1_power_off (struct sys_off_data *data) {struct stpmic1 *ddata = data->cb_data; +int ret; + +/* +* Attempt to shut down again, in case the first attempt failed. +* The STPMIC1 might get confused and the first regmap_update_bits() +* returns with -ETIMEDOUT / -110 . If that or similar transient +* failure occurs, try to shut down again. If the second attempt +* fails, there is some bigger problem, report it to user. +*/ +for (int retries =0 ; retries <STPMIC1_MAX_RETRIES ; retries++) { + ret =regmap_update_bits (ddata->regmap,MAIN_CR ,SOFTWARE_SWITCH_OFF , +SOFTWARE_SWITCH_OFF ); +if (!ret) +return NOTIFY_DONE ; + } -regmap_update_bits (ddata->regmap,MAIN_CR , -SOFTWARE_SWITCH_OFF ,SOFTWARE_SWITCH_OFF ); +dev_err (ddata->dev,"Failed to access PMIC I2C bus (%d)\n" , ret);return NOTIFY_DONE ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 81/307 mm/alloc_tag: clear codetag for pages allocated before page_ext initialization
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hao Ge <[email protected]>
commit 6b1842775a460245e97d36d3a67d0cfba7c4ff79 upstream.
Due to initialization ordering, page_ext is allocated and initialized relatively late during boot. Some pages have already been allocated and freed before page_ext becomes available, leaving their codetag uninitialized.
A clear example is in init_section_page_ext(): alloc_page_ext() calls kmemleak_alloc(). If the slab cache has no free objects, it falls back to the buddy allocator to allocate memory. However, at this point page_ext is not yet fully initialized, so these newly allocated pages have no codetag set. These pages may later be reclaimed by KASAN, which causes the warning to trigger when they are freed because their codetag ref is still empty.
Use a global array to track pages allocated before page_ext is fully initialized. The array size is fixed at 8192 entries, and will emit a warning if this limit is exceeded. When page_ext initialization completes, set their codetag to empty to avoid warnings when they are freed later.
This warning is only observed with CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG=Y and mem_profiling_compressed disabled:
[ 9.582133] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 9.582137] alloc_tag was not set [ 9.582139] WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:164 at __pgalloc_tag_sub+0x40f/0x550, CPU#5: systemd/1 [ 9.582190] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 9.582192] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 9.582194] RIP: 0010:__pgalloc_tag_sub+0x40f/0x550 [ 9.582196] Code: 00 00 4c 29 e5 48 8b 05 1f 88 56 05 48 8d 4c ad 00 48 8d 2c c8 e9 87 fd ff ff 0f 0b 0f 0b e9 f3 fe ff ff 48 8d 3d 61 2f ed 03 <67> 48 0f b9 3a e9 b3 fd ff ff 0f 0b eb e4 e8 5e cd 14 02 4c 89 c7 [ 9.582197] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000001f940 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 9.582200] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92000003f2b RCX: 1ffff110200d806c [ 9.582201] RDX: ffff8881006c0360 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff9bc7b460 [ 9.582202] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff3a62324 [ 9.582203] R10: ffffffff9d311923 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffea0004001b00 [ 9.582204] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: ffffea0000000000 R15: ffff8881006c0360 [ 9.582206] FS: 00007ffbbcf2d940(0000) GS:ffff888450479000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 9.582208] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 9.582210] CR2: 000055ee3aa260d0 CR3: 0000000148b67005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 9.582211] PKRU: 55555554 [ 9.582212] Call Trace: [ 9.582213] <TASK> [ 9.582214] ? __pfx___pgalloc_tag_sub+0x10/0x10 [ 9.582216] ? check_bytes_and_report+0x68/0x140 [ 9.582219] __free_frozen_pages+0x2e4/0x1150 [ 9.582221] ? __free_slab+0xc2/0x2b0 [ 9.582224] qlist_free_all+0x4c/0xf0 [ 9.582227] kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x15d/0x180 [ 9.582229] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x69/0x90 [ 9.582232] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x14a/0x500 [ 9.582234] do_getname+0x96/0x310 [ 9.582237] do_readlinkat+0x91/0x2f0 [ 9.582239] ? __pfx_do_readlinkat+0x10/0x10 [ 9.582240] ? get_random_bytes_user+0x1df/0x2c0 [ 9.582244] __x64_sys_readlinkat+0x96/0x100 [ 9.582246] do_syscall_64+0xce/0x650 [ 9.582250] ? __x64_sys_getrandom+0x13a/0x1e0 [ 9.582252] ? __pfx___x64_sys_getrandom+0x10/0x10 [ 9.582254] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650 [ 9.582255] ? ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0 [ 9.582258] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 [ 9.582260] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650 [ 9.582262] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650 [ 9.582264] ? __pfx_fput_close_sync+0x10/0x10 [ 9.582266] ? file_close_fd_locked+0x178/0x2a0 [ 9.582268] ? __x64_sys_faccessat2+0x96/0x100 [ 9.582269] ? __x64_sys_close+0x7d/0xd0 [ 9.582271] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650 [ 9.582273] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650 [ 9.582275] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0 [ 9.582277] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0 [ 9.582279] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 9.582280] RIP: 0033:0x7ffbbda345ee [ 9.582282] Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 29 38 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 0b 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d fa 37 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 9.582284] RSP: 002b:00007ffe2ad8de58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000010b [ 9.582286] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055ee3aa25570 RCX: 00007ffbbda345ee [ 9.582287] RDX: 000055ee3aa25570 RSI: 00007ffe2ad8dee0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c [ 9.582288] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000001001 [ 9.582289] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000033 [ 9.582290] R13: 00007ffe2ad8dee0 R14: 00000000ffffff9c R15: 00007ffe2ad8deb0 [ 9.582292] </TASK> [ 9.582293] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
--- include/linux/alloc_tag.h | 2 include/linux/pgalloc_tag.h | 2 lib/alloc_tag.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/page_alloc.c | 10 +++- 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/alloc_tag.h +2 -0
@@ -163,9 +163,11 @@ static inline void alloc_tag_sub_check(u {WARN_ONCE (ref && !ref->ct,"alloc_tag was not set\n" ); } +void alloc_tag_add_early_pfn (unsigned long pfn);#else static inline void alloc_tag_add_check (union codetag_ref *ref,struct alloc_tag *tag) {}static inline void alloc_tag_sub_check (union codetag_ref *ref) {} +static inline void alloc_tag_add_early_pfn (unsigned long pfn) {}#endif /* Caller should verify both ref and tag to be valid */
include/linux/pgalloc_tag.h +1 -1
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static inline struct alloc_tag *__pgalloif (get_page_tag_ref (page, &ref, &handle)) {alloc_tag_sub_check (&ref); -if (ref.ct) +if (ref.ct && !is_codetag_empty (&ref)) tag =ct_to_alloc_tag (ref.ct);put_page_tag_ref (handle); }
lib/alloc_tag.c +109 -0
124 lines not on this page · raw message
mm/page_alloc.c +9 -1
@@ -1289,10 +1289,18 @@ void __pgalloc_tag_add(struct page *pageunion pgtag_ref_handle handle;union codetag_ref ref; -if (get_page_tag_ref (page, &ref, &handle)) { +if (likely (get_page_tag_ref (page, &ref, &handle))) {alloc_tag_add (&ref, task->alloc_tag,PAGE_SIZE * nr);update_page_tag_ref (handle, &ref);put_page_tag_ref (handle); + }else { +/* +* page_ext is not available yet, record the pfn so we can +* clear the tag ref later when page_ext is initialized. +*/ +alloc_tag_add_early_pfn (page_to_pfn (page)); +if (task->alloc_tag) +alloc_tag_set_inaccurate (task->alloc_tag); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 64/307 net: qrtr: ns: Fix use-after-free in driver remove()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
commit 7809fea20c9404bfcfa6112ec08d1fe1d3520beb upstream.
In the remove callback, if a packet arrives after destroy_workqueue() is called, but before sock_release(), the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback will try to queue the work, causing use-after-free issue.
Fix this issue by saving the default 'sk_data_ready' callback during qrtr_ns_init() and use it to replace the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback at the start of remove(). This ensures that even if a packet arrives after destroy_workqueue(), the work struct will not be dereferenced.
Note that it is also required to ensure that the RX threads are completed before destroying the workqueue, because the threads could be using the qrtr_ns_data_ready() callback.
--- net/qrtr/ns.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
net/qrtr/ns.c +11 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static struct {struct list_head lookups;struct workqueue_struct *workqueue;struct work_struct work; +void (*saved_data_ready)(struct sock *sk);int local_node; } qrtr_ns;
@@ -709,6 +710,7 @@ int qrtr_ns_init(void) goto err_sock; } + qrtr_ns.saved_data_ready = qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_data_ready; qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_data_ready = qrtr_ns_data_ready; sq.sq_port =QRTR_PORT_CTRL ;
@@ -749,6 +751,10 @@ int qrtr_ns_init(void)return 0 ; err_wq: +write_lock_bh (&qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_callback_lock); + qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_data_ready = qrtr_ns.saved_data_ready; +write_unlock_bh (&qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_callback_lock); +destroy_workqueue (qrtr_ns.workqueue); err_sock:sock_release (qrtr_ns.sock);
@@ -758,7 +764,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(qrtr_ns_init);void qrtr_ns_remove (void ) { +write_lock_bh (&qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_callback_lock); + qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_data_ready = qrtr_ns.saved_data_ready; +write_unlock_bh (&qrtr_ns.sock->sk->sk_callback_lock); +cancel_work_sync (&qrtr_ns.work); +synchronize_net ();destroy_workqueue (qrtr_ns.workqueue);/* sock_release() expects the two references that were put during
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 82/307 mm/damon/core: fix damon_call() vs kdamond_fn() exit race
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
commit 55da81663b9642dd046b26dd6f1baddbcf337c1e upstream.
Patch series "mm/damon/core: fix damon_call()/damos_walk() vs kdmond exit race".
damon_call() and damos_walk() can leak memory and/or deadlock when they race with kdamond terminations. Fix those.
This patch (of 2);
When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels all remaining damon_call() requests and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that API callers and API functions themselves can know the context is terminated. damon_call() adds the caller's request to the queue first. After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx->kdamond is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damon_call() starts waiting for the kdamond's handling of the newly added request.
The damon_call() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are protected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damon_call() could race with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.
For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damon_call() requests cancelling. Right after that, damon_call() is called for the context. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the damon_call() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never handles the new request. As a result, the damon_call() caller threads infinitely waits.
Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely call_controls_obsolete. It is protected by the damon_ctx->call_controls_lock, which protects damon_call() requests registration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of remaining damon_call() requests is executed. damon_call() reads the obsolete field under the lock and avoids adding a new request.
After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or cancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context termination check is no longer needed. Remove it together.
Note that the deadlock will not happen when damon_call() is called for repeat mode request. In tis case, damon_call() returns instead of waiting for the handling when the request registration succeeds and it shows the kdamond is running. However, if the request also has dealloc_on_cancel, the request memory would be leaked.
The issue is found by sashiko [1].
--- include/linux/damon.h | 1 + mm/damon/core.c | 45 ++++++++++++++------------------------------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
include/linux/damon.h +1 -0
@@ -805,6 +805,7 @@ struct damon_ctx {/* lists of &struct damon_call_control */ struct list_head call_controls; +bool call_controls_obsolete;struct mutex call_controls_lock;struct damos_walk_control *walk_control;
mm/damon/core.c +14 -31
77 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 83/307 mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
commit 33c3f6c2b48cd84b441dba1ee3e62290e53930f4 upstream.
When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that API callers and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated. damos_walk() adds the caller's request to the queue first. After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx->kdamond is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for the kdamond's handling of the newly added request.
The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are protected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damos_walk() could race with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.
For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk() request cancelling. Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the context. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never handles the new request. As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread infinitely waits.
Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely walk_control_obsolete. It is protected by the damon_ctx->walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request registration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of the remaining damos_walk() request is executed. damos_walk() reads the obsolete field under the lock and avoids adding a new request.
After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or cancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context termination check is no longer needed. Remove it together.
The issue is found by sashiko [1].
--- include/linux/damon.h | 1 + mm/damon/core.c | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/damon.h +1 -0
@@ -809,6 +809,7 @@ struct damon_ctx {struct mutex call_controls_lock;struct damos_walk_control *walk_control; +bool walk_control_obsolete;struct mutex walk_control_lock;/*
mm/damon/core.c +14 -7
@@ -1528,6 +1528,10 @@ int damon_call(struct damon_ctx *ctx, st* passed at least one &damos->apply_interval_us, kdamond marks the request as * completed so that damos_walk() can wakeup and return. * +* Note that this function should be called only after damon_start() with the +* @ctx has succeeded. Otherwise, this function could fall into an indefinite +* wait. +* * Return: 0 on success, negative error code otherwise. */ int damos_walk (struct damon_ctx *ctx,struct damos_walk_control *control)
@@ -1535,19 +1539,16 @@ int damos_walk(struct damon_ctx *ctx, stinit_completion (&control->completion); control->canceled = false;mutex_lock (&ctx->walk_control_lock); +if (ctx->walk_control_obsolete) { +mutex_unlock (&ctx->walk_control_lock); +return -ECANCELED ; + }if (ctx->walk_control) {mutex_unlock (&ctx->walk_control_lock);return -EBUSY ; } ctx->walk_control = control;mutex_unlock (&ctx->walk_control_lock); -if (!damon_is_running (ctx)) { -mutex_lock (&ctx->walk_control_lock); -if (ctx->walk_control == control) - ctx->walk_control =NULL ; -mutex_unlock (&ctx->walk_control_lock); -return -EINVAL ; - }wait_for_completion (&control->completion);if (control->canceled)return -ECANCELED ;
@@ -2731,6 +2732,9 @@ static int kdamond_fn(void *data)mutex_lock (&ctx->call_controls_lock); ctx->call_controls_obsolete = false;mutex_unlock (&ctx->call_controls_lock); +mutex_lock (&ctx->walk_control_lock); + ctx->walk_control_obsolete = false; +mutex_unlock (&ctx->walk_control_lock);complete (&ctx->kdamond_started);kdamond_init_ctx (ctx);
@@ -2839,6 +2843,9 @@ done: ctx->call_controls_obsolete = true;mutex_unlock (&ctx->call_controls_lock);kdamond_call (ctx, true); +mutex_lock (&ctx->walk_control_lock); + ctx->walk_control_obsolete = true; +mutex_unlock (&ctx->walk_control_lock);damos_walk_cancel (ctx);pr_debug ("kdamond (%d) finishes\n" , current->pid);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 84/307 mm/hugetlb: fix early boot crash on parameters without = separator
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit c45b354911d01565156e38d7f6bc07edb51fc34c upstream.
If hugepages, hugepagesz, or default_hugepagesz are specified on the kernel command line without the '=' separator, early parameter parsing passes NULL to hugetlb_add_param(), which dereferences it in strlen() and can crash the system during early boot.
Reject NULL values in hugetlb_add_param() and return -EINVAL instead.
--- mm/hugetlb.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
mm/hugetlb.c +3 -0
@@ -4252,6 +4252,9 @@ static __init int hugetlb_add_param(charsize_t len;char *p; +if (!s) +return -EINVAL ; +if (hugetlb_param_index >=HUGE_MAX_CMDLINE_ARGS )return -EINVAL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 85/307 mtd: docg3: fix use-after-free in docg3_release()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: James Kim <[email protected]>
commit ca19808bc6fac7e29420d8508df569b346b3e339 upstream.
In docg3_release(), the docg3 pointer is obtained from cascade->floors[0]->priv before the loop that calls doc_release_device() on each floor. doc_release_device() frees the docg3 struct via kfree(docg3) at line 1881. After the loop, docg3->cascade->bch dereferences the already-freed pointer.
Fix this by accessing cascade->bch directly, which is equivalent since docg3->cascade points back to the same cascade struct, and is already available as a local variable. This also removes the now-unused docg3 local variable.
--- drivers/mtd/devices/docg3.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/devices/docg3.c +1 -2
@@ -2049,7 +2049,6 @@ err_probe:static void docg3_release (struct platform_device *pdev) {struct docg3_cascade *cascade =platform_get_drvdata (pdev); -struct docg3 *docg3 = cascade->floors[0 ]->priv;int floor;doc_unregister_sysfs (pdev, cascade);
@@ -2057,7 +2056,7 @@ static void docg3_release(struct platforif (cascade->floors[floor])doc_release_device (cascade->floors[floor]); -bch_free (docg3->cascade->bch); +bch_free (cascade->bch); }#ifdef CONFIG_OF
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 86/307 nvme-pci: add NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES for Kingston OM3SGP4
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Robert Beckett <[email protected]>
commit a8eebf9699d69987cc49cec4e4fdb4111ab32423 upstream.
The Kingston OM3SGP42048K2-A00 (PCI ID 2646:502f) firmware has a race condition when processing concurrent write zeroes and DSM (discard) commands, causing spurious "LBA Out of Range" errors and IOMMU page faults at address 0x0.
The issue is reliably triggered by running two concurrent mkfs commands on different partitions of the same drive, which generates interleaved write zeroes and discard operations.
Disable write zeroes for this device, matching the pattern used for other Kingston OM* drives that have similar firmware issues.
--- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +2 -0
@@ -4178,6 +4178,8 @@ static const struct pci_device_id nvme_i .driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES, }, { PCI_DEVICE(0x2646, 0x501E), /* KINGSTON OM3PGP4xxxxQ OS21011 NVMe SSD */ .driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES, }, + { PCI_DEVICE(0x2646, 0x502F), /* KINGSTON OM3SGP4xxxxK NVMe SSD */ + .driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES, }, { PCI_DEVICE(0x1f40, 0x1202), /* Netac Technologies Co. NV3000 NVMe SSD */ .driver_data = NVME_QUIRK_BOGUS_NID, }, { PCI_DEVICE(0x1f40, 0x5236), /* Netac Technologies Co. NV7000 NVMe SSD */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 87/307 nvme: respect NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES when wzsl is set
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Robert Beckett <[email protected]>
commit 40f0496b617b431f8d2dd94d7f785c1121f8a68a upstream.
The NVM Command Set Identify Controller data may report a non-zero Write Zeroes Size Limit (wzsl). When present, nvme_init_non_mdts_limits() unconditionally overrides max_zeroes_sectors from wzsl, even if NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES previously set it to zero.
This effectively re-enables write zeroes for devices that need it disabled, defeating the quirk. Several Kingston OM* drives rely on this quirk to avoid firmware issues with write zeroes commands.
Check for the quirk before applying the wzsl override.
--- drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +1 -1
@@ -3388,7 +3388,7 @@ static int nvme_init_non_mdts_limits(str ctrl->dmrl = id->dmrl; ctrl->dmrsl =le32_to_cpu (id->dmrsl); -if (id->wzsl) +if (id->wzsl && !(ctrl->quirks &NVME_QUIRK_DISABLE_WRITE_ZEROES )) ctrl->max_zeroes_sectors =nvme_mps_to_sectors (ctrl, id->wzsl); free_data:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 88/307 parisc: _llseek syscall is only available for 32-bit userspace
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit da3680f564bd787ce974f9931e6e924d908b3b2a upstream.
--- arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -1
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ # 137 was afs_syscall 138 common setfsuid sys_setfsuid 139 common setfsgid sys_setfsgid -140 common _llseek sys_llseek +140 32 _llseek sys_llseek 141 common getdents sys_getdents compat_sys_getdents 142 common _newselect sys_select compat_sys_select 143 common flock sys_flock
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 89/307 parisc: Drop ip_fast_csum() inline assembly implementation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit 3dd31a370c1dccb580f729af7c580ccb1ae3c0c9 upstream.
The assembly code of ip_fast_csum() triggers unaligned access warnings if the IP header isn't correctly aligned:
Kernel: unaligned access to 0x173d22e76 in inet_gro_receive+0xbc/0x2e8 (iir 0x0e8810b6)
Kernel: unaligned access to 0x173d22e7e in inet_gro_receive+0xc4/0x2e8 (iir 0x0e88109a)
Kernel: unaligned access to 0x173d22e82 in inet_gro_receive+0xc8/0x2e8 (iir 0x0e90109d)
Kernel: unaligned access to 0x173d22e7a in inet_gro_receive+0xd0/0x2e8 (iir 0x0e9810b8)
Kernel: unaligned access to 0x173d22e86 in inet_gro_receive+0xdc/0x2e8 (iir 0x0e8810b8)
We have the option to a) ignore the warnings, b) work around it by adding more code to check for alignment, or c) to switch to the generic implementation and rely on the compiler to optimize the code.
Let's go with c), because a) isn't nice, and b) would effectively lead to an implementation which is basically equal to c).
--- arch/parisc/Kconfig | 3 + arch/parisc/include/asm/checksum.h | 89 --------------------------------- arch/parisc/lib/Makefile | 2 arch/parisc/lib/checksum.c | 99 ------------------------------------- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 187 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/parisc/lib/checksum.c
arch/parisc/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ config GENERIC_BUG config GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS bool +config GENERIC_CSUM + def_bool y + config GENERIC_HWEIGHT bool default y
arch/parisc/include/asm/checksum.h +2 -87
101 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/parisc/lib/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Makefile for parisc-specific library files # -lib-y := lusercopy.o bitops.o checksum.o io.o memset.o memcpy.o \ +lib-y := lusercopy.o bitops.o io.o memset.o memcpy.o \ ucmpdi2.o delay.o obj-y := iomap.o
arch/parisc/lib/checksum.c deleted +0 -99
99 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 90/307 PCI: cadence: Use cdns_pcie_read_sz() for byte or word read access
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aksh Garg <[email protected]>
commit d9cf7154deed71a4f23e81101571c79cdc77be00 upstream.
The commit 18ac51ae9df9 ("PCI: cadence: Implement capability search using PCI core APIs") assumed all the platforms using Cadence PCIe controller support byte and word register accesses. This is not true for all platforms (e.g., TI J721E SoC, which only supports dword register accesses).
This causes capability searches via cdns_pcie_find_capability() to fail on such platforms.
Fix this by using cdns_pcie_read_sz() for config read functions, which properly handles size-aligned accesses. Remove the now-unused byte and word read wrapper functions (cdns_pcie_readw and cdns_pcie_readb).
--- drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pcie-cadence.h | 56 +++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pcie-cadence.h +25 -31
@@ -249,37 +249,6 @@ static inline u32 cdns_pcie_hpa_readl(streturn readl (pcie->reg_base + reg); } -static inline u16 cdns_pcie_readw (struct cdns_pcie *pcie,u32 reg) -{ -return readw (pcie->reg_base + reg); -} - -static inline u8 cdns_pcie_readb (struct cdns_pcie *pcie,u32 reg) -{ -return readb (pcie->reg_base + reg); -} - -static inline int cdns_pcie_read_cfg_byte (struct cdns_pcie *pcie,int where, -u8 *val) -{ - *val =cdns_pcie_readb (pcie, where); -return PCIBIOS_SUCCESSFUL ; -} - -static inline int cdns_pcie_read_cfg_word (struct cdns_pcie *pcie,int where, -u16 *val) -{ - *val =cdns_pcie_readw (pcie, where); -return PCIBIOS_SUCCESSFUL ; -} - -static inline int cdns_pcie_read_cfg_dword (struct cdns_pcie *pcie,int where, -u32 *val) -{ - *val =cdns_pcie_readl (pcie, where); -return PCIBIOS_SUCCESSFUL ; -} -static inline u32 cdns_pcie_read_sz (void __iomem *addr,int size) {void __iomem *aligned_addr =PTR_ALIGN_DOWN (addr,0x4 );
@@ -320,6 +289,31 @@ static inline void cdns_pcie_write_sz(vowritel (val, aligned_addr); } +static inline int cdns_pcie_read_cfg_byte (struct cdns_pcie *pcie,int where, +u8 *val) +{ +void __iomem *addr = pcie->reg_base + where; + + *val =cdns_pcie_read_sz (addr,0x1 ); +return PCIBIOS_SUCCESSFUL ; +} + +static inline int cdns_pcie_read_cfg_word (struct cdns_pcie *pcie,int where, +u16 *val) +{ +void __iomem *addr = pcie->reg_base + where; + + *val =cdns_pcie_read_sz (addr,0x2 ); +return PCIBIOS_SUCCESSFUL ; +} + +static inline int cdns_pcie_read_cfg_dword (struct cdns_pcie *pcie,int where, +u32 *val) +{ + *val =cdns_pcie_readl (pcie, where); +return PCIBIOS_SUCCESSFUL ; +} +/* Root Port register access */ static inline void cdns_pcie_rp_writeb (struct cdns_pcie *pcie,u32 reg,u8 value)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 91/307 PCI: imx6: Fix reference clock source selection for i.MX95
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Franz Schnyder <[email protected]>
commit 88cc4cbe08bba27bb58888d25d336774aa0ccab1 upstream.
In the PCIe PHY init for the i.MX95, the reference clock source selection uses a conditional instead of always passing the mask. This currently breaks functionality if the internal refclk is used.
To fix this issue, always pass IMX95_PCIE_REF_USE_PAD as the mask and clear bit if external refclk is not used. This essentially swaps the parameters.
--- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c +2 -2
@@ -268,8 +268,8 @@ static int imx95_pcie_init_phy(struct im IMX95_PCIE_PHY_CR_PARA_SEL);regmap_update_bits (imx_pcie->iomuxc_gpr,IMX95_PCIE_PHY_GEN_CTRL , - ext ?IMX95_PCIE_REF_USE_PAD :0 , -IMX95_PCIE_REF_USE_PAD ); +IMX95_PCIE_REF_USE_PAD , + ext ?IMX95_PCIE_REF_USE_PAD :0 );regmap_update_bits (imx_pcie->iomuxc_gpr,IMX95_PCIE_SS_RW_REG_0 ,IMX95_PCIE_REF_CLKEN , ext ?0 :IMX95_PCIE_REF_CLKEN );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 65/307 ext2: reject inodes with zero i_nlink and valid mode in ext2_iget()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vasiliy Kovalev <[email protected]>
commit 25947cc5b2374cd5bf627fe3141496444260d04f upstream.
ext2_iget() already rejects inodes with i_nlink == 0 when i_mode is zero or i_dtime is set, treating them as deleted. However, the case of i_nlink == 0 with a non-zero mode and zero dtime slips through. Since ext2 has no orphan list, such a combination can only result from filesystem corruption - a legitimate inode deletion always sets either i_dtime or clears i_mode before freeing the inode.
A crafted image can exploit this gap to present such an inode to the VFS, which then triggers WARN_ON inside drop_nlink() (fs/inode.c) via ext2_unlink(), ext2_rename() and ext2_rmdir():
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 609 at fs/inode.c:336 drop_nlink+0xad/0xd0 fs/inode.c:336 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 609 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1 Call Trace: <TASK> inode_dec_link_count include/linux/fs.h:2518 [inline] ext2_unlink+0x26c/0x300 fs/ext2/namei.c:295 vfs_unlink+0x2fc/0x9b0 fs/namei.c:4477 do_unlinkat+0x53e/0x730 fs/namei.c:4541 __x64_sys_unlink+0xc6/0x110 fs/namei.c:4587 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 646 at fs/inode.c:336 drop_nlink+0xad/0xd0 fs/inode.c:336 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 646 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1 Call Trace: <TASK> inode_dec_link_count include/linux/fs.h:2518 [inline] ext2_rename+0x35e/0x850 fs/ext2/namei.c:374 vfs_rename+0xf2f/0x2060 fs/namei.c:5021 do_renameat2+0xbe2/0xd50 fs/namei.c:5178 __x64_sys_rename+0x7e/0xa0 fs/namei.c:5223 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 634 at fs/inode.c:336 drop_nlink+0xad/0xd0 fs/inode.c:336 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 634 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1 Call Trace: <TASK> inode_dec_link_count include/linux/fs.h:2518 [inline] ext2_rmdir+0xca/0x110 fs/ext2/namei.c:311 vfs_rmdir+0x204/0x690 fs/namei.c:4348 do_rmdir+0x372/0x3e0 fs/namei.c:4407 __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130 fs/namei.c:4577 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK>
Extend the existing i_nlink == 0 check to also catch this case, reporting the corruption via ext2_error() and returning -EFSCORRUPTED. This rejects the inode at load time and prevents it from reaching any of the namei.c paths.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
--- fs/ext2/inode.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext2/inode.c +11 -3
@@ -1430,9 +1430,17 @@ struct inode *ext2_iget (struct super_bl* the test is that same one that e2fsck uses * NeilBrown 1999oct15 */ -if (inode->i_nlink ==0 && (inode->i_mode ==0 || ei->i_dtime)) { -/* this inode is deleted */ - ret = -ESTALE ; +if (inode->i_nlink ==0 ) { +if (inode->i_mode ==0 || ei->i_dtime) { +/* this inode is deleted */ + ret = -ESTALE ; + }else { +ext2_error (sb, __func__, +"inode %lu has zero i_nlink with mode 0%o and no dtime, " +"filesystem may be corrupt" , + ino, inode->i_mode); + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED ; + } goto bad_inode; } inode->i_blocks =le32_to_cpu (raw_inode->i_blocks);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 92/307 perf annotate: Use jump__delete when freeing LoongArch jumps
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rong Bao <[email protected]>
commit a355eefc36c4481188249b067832b40a2c45fa5c upstream.
Currently, the initialization of loongarch_jump_ops does not contain an assignment to its .free field. This causes disasm_line__free() to fall through to ins_ops__delete() for LoongArch jump instructions.
ins_ops__delete() will free ins_operands.source.raw and ins_operands.source.name, and these fields overlaps with ins_operands.jump.raw_comment and ins_operands.jump.raw_func_start. Since in loongarch_jump__parse(), these two fields are populated by strchr()-ing the same buffer, trying to free them will lead to undefined behavior.
This invalid free usually leads to crashes:
Process 1712902 (perf) of user 1000 dumped core.
Stack trace of thread 1712902:
#0 0x00007fffef155c58 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x95c58)
#1 0x00007fffef0f7a94 raise (libc.so.6 + 0x37a94)
#2 0x00007fffef0dd6a8 abort (libc.so.6 + 0x1d6a8)
#3 0x00007fffef145490 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x85490)
#4 0x00007fffef1646f4 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0xa46f4)
#5 0x00007fffef164718 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0xa4718)
#6 0x00005555583a6764 __zfree (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x106764)
#7 0x000055555854fb70 disasm_line__free (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x2afb70)
#8 0x000055555853d618 annotated_source__purge (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x29d618)
#9 0x000055555852300c __hist_entry__tui_annotate (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x28300c)
#10 0x0000555558526718 do_annotate (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x286718)
#11 0x000055555852ed94 evsel__hists_browse (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x28ed94)
#12 0x000055555831fdd0 cmd_report (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x7fdd0)
#13 0x000055555839b644 handle_internal_command (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0xfb644)
#14 0x00005555582fe6ac main (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x5e6ac)
#15 0x00007fffef0ddd90 n/a (libc.so.6 + 0x1dd90)
#16 0x00007fffef0ddf0c __libc_start_main (libc.so.6 + 0x1df0c)
#17 0x00005555582fed10 _start (/home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf + 0x5ed10)
ELF object binary architecture: LoongArch... and it can be confirmed with Valgrind:
==1721834== Invalid free() / delete / delete[] / realloc()
==1721834== at 0x4EA9014: free (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-loongarch64-linux.so)
==1721834== by 0x4106287: __zfree (zalloc.c:13)
==1721834== by 0x42ADC8F: disasm_line__free (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== by 0x429B737: annotated_source__purge (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== by 0x42811EB: __hist_entry__tui_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== by 0x42848D7: do_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== by 0x428CF33: evsel__hists_browse (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== Address 0x7d34303 is 35 bytes inside a block of size 62 alloc'd
==1721834== at 0x4EA59B8: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-loongarch64-linux.so)
==1721834== by 0x6B80B6F: strdup (strdup.c:42)
==1721834== by 0x42AD917: disasm_line__new (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== by 0x42AE5A3: symbol__disassemble_objdump (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== by 0x42AF0A7: symbol__disassemble (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== by 0x429B3CF: symbol__annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== by 0x429C233: symbol__annotate2 (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== by 0x42804D3: __hist_entry__tui_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== by 0x42848D7: do_annotate (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)
==1721834== by 0x428CF33: evsel__hists_browse (in /home/csmantle/dist/linux-arch/tools/perf/perf)This patch adds the missing free() specialization in loongarch_jump_ops, which prevents disasm_line__free() from invoking the default cleanup function.
--- tools/perf/util/annotate-arch/annotate-loongarch.c | 1 + tools/perf/util/disasm.c | 2 +- tools/perf/util/disasm.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/annotate-arch/annotate-loongarch.c +1 -0
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ static int loongarch_jump__parse(const s }static const struct ins_ops loongarch_jump_ops = { + .free = jump__delete, .parse = loongarch_jump__parse, .scnprintf = jump__scnprintf, .is_jump = true,
tools/perf/util/disasm.c +1 -1
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ int jump__scnprintf(const struct ins *in ops->target.offset); } -static void jump__delete (struct ins_operands *ops__maybe_unused ) +void jump__delete (struct ins_operands *ops__maybe_unused ) {/* * The ops->jump.raw_comment and ops->jump.raw_func_start belong to the
tools/perf/util/disasm.h +2 -0
@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ int jump__scnprintf(const struct ins *inint mov__scnprintf (const struct ins *ins,char *bf,size_t size,struct ins_operands *ops,int max_ins_name); +void jump__delete (struct ins_operands *ops); +int symbol__disassemble (struct symbol *sym,struct annotate_args *args);char *expand_tabs (char *line,char **storage,size_t *storage_len);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 93/307 RDMA/mana_ib: Disable RX steering on RSS QP destroy
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Long Li <[email protected]>
commit dbeb256e8dd87233d891b170c0b32a6466467036 upstream.
When an RSS QP is destroyed (e.g. DPDK exit), mana_ib_destroy_qp_rss() destroys the RX WQ objects but does not disable vPort RX steering in firmware. This leaves stale steering configuration that still points to the destroyed RX objects.
If traffic continues to arrive (e.g. peer VM is still transmitting) and the VF interface is subsequently brought up (mana_open), the firmware may deliver completions using stale CQ IDs from the old RX objects. These CQ IDs can be reused by the ethernet driver for new TX CQs, causing RX completions to land on TX CQs:
WARNING: mana_poll_tx_cq+0x1b8/0x220 [mana] (is_sq == false)
WARNING: mana_gd_process_eq_events+0x209/0x290 (cq_table lookup fails)
Fix this by disabling vPort RX steering before destroying RX WQ objects. Note that mana_fence_rqs() cannot be used here because the fence completion is delivered on the CQ, which is polled by user-mode (e.g. DPDK) and not visible to the kernel driver.
Refactor the disable logic into a shared mana_disable_vport_rx() in mana_en, exported for use by mana_ib, replacing the duplicate code. The ethernet driver's mana_dealloc_queues() is also updated to call this common function.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mana/qp.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c | 11 ++++++++++- include/net/mana/mana.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mana/qp.c +15 -0
@@ -822,6 +822,21 @@ static int mana_ib_destroy_qp_rss(struct ndev =mana_ib_get_netdev (qp->ibqp.device, qp->port); mpc =netdev_priv (ndev); +/* Disable vPort RX steering before destroying RX WQ objects. +* Otherwise firmware still routes traffic to the destroyed queues, +* which can cause bogus completions on reused CQ IDs when the +* ethernet driver later creates new queues on mana_open(). +* +* Unlike the ethernet teardown path, mana_fence_rqs() cannot be +* used here because the fence completion CQE is delivered on the +* CQ which is polled by userspace (e.g. DPDK), so there is no way +* for the kernel to wait for fence completion. +* +* This is best effort — if it fails there is not much we can do, +* and mana_cfg_vport_steering() already logs the error. +*/ +mana_disable_vport_rx (mpc); +for (i =0 ; i < (1 << ind_tbl->log_ind_tbl_size); i++) { ibwq = ind_tbl->ind_tbl[i]; wq = container_of(ibwq, struct mana_ib_wq, ibwq);
drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c +10 -1
@@ -2889,6 +2889,13 @@ static void mana_rss_table_init(struct methtool_rxfh_indir_default (i, apc->num_queues); } +int mana_disable_vport_rx (struct mana_port_context *apc) +{ +return mana_cfg_vport_steering (apc,TRI_STATE_FALSE , false, false, + false); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS (mana_disable_vport_rx,"NET_MANA" ); +int mana_config_rss (struct mana_port_context *apc,enum TRI_STATE rx,bool update_hash,bool update_tab) {
@@ -3273,10 +3280,12 @@ static int mana_dealloc_queues(struct ne*/ apc->rss_state =TRI_STATE_FALSE ; - err =mana_config_rss (apc,TRI_STATE_FALSE , false, false); + err =mana_disable_vport_rx (apc);if (err &&mana_en_need_log (apc, err))netdev_err (ndev,"Failed to disable vPort: %d\n" , err); +mana_fence_rqs (apc); +/* Even in err case, still need to cleanup the vPort */ mana_destroy_vport (apc);
include/net/mana/mana.h +1 -0
@@ -568,6 +568,7 @@ struct mana_port_context {netdev_tx_t mana_start_xmit (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *ndev);int mana_config_rss (struct mana_port_context *ac,enum TRI_STATE rx,bool update_hash,bool update_tab); +int mana_disable_vport_rx (struct mana_port_context *apc);int mana_alloc_queues (struct net_device *ndev);int mana_attach (struct net_device *ndev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 94/307 remoteproc: xlnx: Only access buffer information if IPI is buffered
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Levinsky <[email protected]>
commit 38dd6ccfdfbbe865569a52fe1ba9fa1478f672e6 upstream.
In the receive callback check if message is NULL to prevent possibility of crash by NULL pointer dereferencing.
--- drivers/remoteproc/xlnx_r5_remoteproc.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/remoteproc/xlnx_r5_remoteproc.c +11 -9
@@ -232,17 +232,19 @@ static void zynqmp_r5_mb_rx_cb(struct mb ipi = container_of(cl, struct mbox_info, mbox_cl); -/* copy data from ipi buffer to r5_core */ +/* copy data from ipi buffer to r5_core if IPI is buffered. */ ipi_msg = (struct zynqmp_ipi_message *)msg; - buf_msg = (struct zynqmp_ipi_message *)ipi->rx_mc_buf; - len = ipi_msg->len; -if (len >IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX ) { -dev_warn (cl->dev,"msg size exceeded than %d\n" , -IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX ); - len =IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX ; +if (ipi_msg) { + buf_msg = (struct zynqmp_ipi_message *)ipi->rx_mc_buf; + len = ipi_msg->len; +if (len >IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX ) { +dev_warn (cl->dev,"msg size exceeded than %d\n" , +IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX ); + len =IPI_BUF_LEN_MAX ; + } + buf_msg->len = len; +memcpy (buf_msg->data, ipi_msg->data, len); } - buf_msg->len = len; -memcpy (buf_msg->data, ipi_msg->data, len);/* received and processed interrupt ack */ if (mbox_send_message (ipi->rx_chan,NULL ) <0 )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 95/307 reset: rzv2h-usb2phy: Keep PHY clock enabled for entire device lifetime
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tommaso Merciai <[email protected]>
commit 8889b289ce1bd11a5102b9617742a1b93bb4843e upstream.
The driver was disabling the USB2 PHY clock immediately after register initialization in probe() and after each reset operation. This left the PHY unclocked even though it must remain active for USB functionality.
The behavior appeared to work only when another driver (e.g., USB controller) had already enabled the clock, making operation unreliable and hardware-dependent. In configurations where this driver is the sole clock user, USB functionality would fail.
Fix this by:
- Enabling the clock once in probe() via pm_runtime_resume_and_get()
- Removing all pm_runtime_put() calls from assert/deassert/status
- Registering a devm cleanup action to release the clock at removal
- Removed rzv2h_usbphy_assert_helper() and its call in rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_probe()
This ensures the PHY clock remains enabled for the entire device lifetime, preventing instability and aligning with hardware requirements.
--- drivers/reset/reset-rzv2h-usb2phy.c | 64 ++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
drivers/reset/reset-rzv2h-usb2phy.c +18 -46
@@ -49,9 +49,10 @@ static inline struct rzv2h_usb2phy_reset return container_of(rcdev, struct rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_priv, rcdev); } -/* This function must be called only after pm_runtime_resume_and_get() has been called */ -static void rzv2h_usbphy_assert_helper (struct rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_priv *priv) +static int rzv2h_usbphy_reset_assert (struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev, +unsigned long id) { +struct rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_priv *priv =rzv2h_usbphy_rcdev_to_priv (rcdev);const struct rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_of_data *data = priv->data; scoped_guard(spinlock, &priv->lock) {
@@ -60,24 +61,6 @@ static void rzv2h_usbphy_assert_helper(s }usleep_range (11 ,20 ); -} - -static int rzv2h_usbphy_reset_assert (struct reset_controller_dev *rcdev, -unsigned long id) -{ -struct rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_priv *priv =rzv2h_usbphy_rcdev_to_priv (rcdev); -struct device *dev = priv->dev; -int ret; - - ret =pm_runtime_resume_and_get (dev); -if (ret) { -dev_err (dev,"pm_runtime_resume_and_get failed\n" ); -return ret; - } - -rzv2h_usbphy_assert_helper (priv); - -pm_runtime_put (dev);return 0 ; }
@@ -87,14 +70,6 @@ static int rzv2h_usbphy_reset_deassert(s {struct rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_priv *priv =rzv2h_usbphy_rcdev_to_priv (rcdev);const struct rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_of_data *data = priv->data; -struct device *dev = priv->dev; -int ret; - - ret =pm_runtime_resume_and_get (dev); -if (ret) { -dev_err (dev,"pm_runtime_resume_and_get failed\n" ); -return ret; - } scoped_guard(spinlock, &priv->lock) {writel (data->reset_deassert_val, priv->base + data->reset_reg);
@@ -102,8 +77,6 @@ static int rzv2h_usbphy_reset_deassert(swritel (data->reset_release_val, priv->base + data->reset_reg); } -pm_runtime_put (dev); -return 0 ; }
@@ -111,20 +84,10 @@ static int rzv2h_usbphy_reset_status(str unsigned long id) {struct rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_priv *priv =rzv2h_usbphy_rcdev_to_priv (rcdev); -struct device *dev = priv->dev; -int ret;u32 reg; - ret =pm_runtime_resume_and_get (dev); -if (ret) { -dev_err (dev,"pm_runtime_resume_and_get failed\n" ); -return ret; - } - reg =readl (priv->base + priv->data->reset_reg); -pm_runtime_put (dev); -return (reg & priv->data->reset_status_bits) == priv->data->reset_status_bits; }
@@ -141,6 +104,11 @@ static int rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_of_xlate(return 0 ; } +static void rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_pm_runtime_put (void *data) +{ +pm_runtime_put (data); +} +static int rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_probe (struct platform_device *pdev) {const struct rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_of_data *data;
@@ -175,14 +143,14 @@ static int rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_probe(strif (error)return dev_err_probe (dev, error,"pm_runtime_resume_and_get failed\n" ); + error =devm_add_action_or_reset (dev, rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_pm_runtime_put, + dev); +if (error) +return dev_err_probe (dev, error,"unable to register cleanup action\n" ); +for (unsigned int i =0 ; i < data->init_val_count; i++)writel (data->init_vals[i].val, priv->base + data->init_vals[i].reg); -/* keep usb2phy in asserted state */ -rzv2h_usbphy_assert_helper (priv); - -pm_runtime_put (dev); - priv->rcdev.ops = &rzv2h_usbphy_reset_ops; priv->rcdev.of_reset_n_cells =0 ; priv->rcdev.nr_resets =1 ;
@@ -190,7 +158,11 @@ static int rzv2h_usb2phy_reset_probe(str priv->rcdev.of_node = dev->of_node; priv->rcdev.dev = dev; -return devm_reset_controller_register (dev, &priv->rcdev); + error =devm_reset_controller_register (dev, &priv->rcdev); +if (error) +return dev_err_probe (dev, error,"could not register reset controller\n" ); + +return 0 ; }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 96/307 sched: Use u64 for bandwidth ratio calculations
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joseph Salisbury <[email protected]>
commit c6e80201e057dfb7253385e60bf541121bf5dc33 upstream.
to_ratio() computes BW_SHIFT-scaled bandwidth ratios from u64 period and runtime values, but it returns unsigned long. tg_rt_schedulable() also stores the current group limit and the accumulated child sum in unsigned long.
On 32-bit builds, large bandwidth ratios can be truncated and the RT group sum can wrap when enough siblings are present. That can let an overcommitted RT hierarchy pass the schedulability check, and it also narrows the helper result for other callers.
Return u64 from to_ratio() and use u64 for the RT group totals so bandwidth ratios are preserved and compared at full width on both 32-bit and 64-bit builds.
--- kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +- kernel/sched/rt.c | 2 +- kernel/sched/sched.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/core.c +1 -1
@@ -4738,7 +4738,7 @@ void sched_post_fork(struct task_structscx_post_fork (p); } -unsigned long to_ratio (u64 period,u64 runtime) +u64 to_ratio (u64 period,u64 runtime) {if (runtime ==RUNTIME_INF )return BW_UNIT ;
kernel/sched/rt.c +1 -1
@@ -2652,7 +2652,7 @@ static int tg_rt_schedulable(struct task {struct rt_schedulable_data *d = data;struct task_group *child; -unsigned long total, sum =0 ; +u64 total, sum =0 ;u64 period, runtime; period =ktime_to_ns (tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_period);
kernel/sched/sched.h +1 -1
@@ -2899,7 +2899,7 @@ extern void init_cfs_throttle_work(struc#define MAX_BW_BITS (64 - BW_SHIFT)#define MAX_BW ((1ULL << MAX_BW_BITS) - 1) -extern unsigned long to_ratio (u64 period,u64 runtime); +extern u64 to_ratio (u64 period,u64 runtime);extern void init_entity_runnable_average (struct sched_entity *se);extern void post_init_entity_util_avg (struct task_struct *p);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 66/307 mm/zsmalloc: copy KMSAN metadata in zs_page_migrate()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>
commit 4fb61d95ad21c3b6f1c09f357ff49d70abb0535e upstream.
zs_page_migrate() uses copy_page() to copy the contents of a zspage page during migration. However, copy_page() is not instrumented by KMSAN, so the shadow and origin metadata of the destination page are not updated.
As a result, subsequent accesses to the migrated page are reported as use-after-free by KMSAN, despite the data being correctly copied.
Add a kmsan_copy_page_meta() call after copy_page() to propagate the KMSAN metadata to the new page, matching what copy_highpage() does internally.
--- mm/zsmalloc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
mm/zsmalloc.c +1 -0
@@ -1741,6 +1741,7 @@ static int zs_page_migrate(struct page **/ d_addr =kmap_local_zpdesc (newzpdesc);copy_page (d_addr, s_addr); +kmsan_copy_page_meta (zpdesc_page (newzpdesc),zpdesc_page (zpdesc));kunmap_local (d_addr); for (addr = s_addr + offset; addr < s_addr + PAGE_SIZE;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 67/307 ALSA: aoa: i2sbus: clear stale prepared state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
commit 5ed060d5491597490fb53ec69da3edc4b1e8c165 upstream.
The i2sbus PCM code uses pi->active to constrain the sibling stream to an already prepared duplex format and rate in i2sbus_pcm_open().
That state is set from i2sbus_pcm_prepare(), but the current code only clears it on close. As a result, the sibling stream can inherit stale constraints after the prepared state has been torn down.
Clear pi->active when hw_params() or hw_free() tears down the prepared state, and set it again only after prepare succeeds.
Replace the stale FIXME in the duplex constraint comment with a description of the current driver behavior: i2sbus still programs a single shared transport configuration for both directions, so mixed formats are not supported in duplex mode.
--- sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c +44 -11
@@ -165,17 +165,16 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_open(struct i2sbus* currently in use (if any). */ hw->rate_min =5512 ; hw->rate_max =192000 ; -/* if the other stream is active, then we can only -* support what it is currently using. -* FIXME: I lied. This comment is wrong. We can support -* anything that works with the same serial format, ie. -* when recording 24 bit sound we can well play 16 bit -* sound at the same time iff using the same transfer mode. +/* If the other stream is already prepared, keep this stream +* on the same duplex format and rate. +* +* i2sbus_pcm_prepare() still programs one shared transport +* configuration for both directions, so mixed duplex formats +* are not supported here. */ if (other->active) { -/* FIXME: is this guaranteed by the alsa api? */ hw->formats &=pcm_format_to_bits (i2sdev->format); -/* see above, restrict rates to the one we already have */ +/* Restrict rates to the one already in use. */ hw->rate_min = i2sdev->rate; hw->rate_max = i2sdev->rate; }
@@ -283,6 +282,23 @@ void i2sbus_wait_for_stop_both(struct i2 }#endif +static void i2sbus_pcm_clear_active (struct i2sbus_dev *i2sdev,int in) +{ +struct pcm_info *pi; + +guard (mutex)(&i2sdev->lock); + +get_pcm_info (i2sdev, in, &pi,NULL ); + pi->active =0 ; +} + +static inline int i2sbus_hw_params (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, +struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,int in) +{ +i2sbus_pcm_clear_active (snd_pcm_substream_chip (substream), in); +return 0 ; +} +static inline int i2sbus_hw_free (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,int in) {struct i2sbus_dev *i2sdev =snd_pcm_substream_chip (substream);
@@ -291,14 +307,27 @@ static inline int i2sbus_hw_free(structget_pcm_info (i2sdev, in, &pi,NULL );if (pi->dbdma_ring.stopping)i2sbus_wait_for_stop (i2sdev, pi); +i2sbus_pcm_clear_active (i2sdev, in);return 0 ; } +static int i2sbus_playback_hw_params (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, +struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params) +{ +return i2sbus_hw_params (substream, params,0 ); +} +static int i2sbus_playback_hw_free (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) {return i2sbus_hw_free (substream,0 ); } +static int i2sbus_record_hw_params (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, +struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params) +{ +return i2sbus_hw_params (substream, params,1 ); +} +static int i2sbus_record_hw_free (struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) {return i2sbus_hw_free (substream,1 );
@@ -335,7 +364,6 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2sreturn -EINVAL ; runtime = pi->substream->runtime; - pi->active =1 ;if (other->active && ((i2sdev->format != runtime->format) || (i2sdev->rate != runtime->rate)))
@@ -450,9 +478,11 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2s/* early exit if already programmed correctly */ /* not locking these is fine since we touch them only in this function */ -if (in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->serial_format) == sfr - &&in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->data_word_sizes) == dws) +if (in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->serial_format) == sfr && +in_le32 (&i2sdev->intfregs->data_word_sizes) == dws) { + pi->active =1 ;return 0 ; + }/* let's notify the codecs about clocks going away. * For now we only do mastering on the i2s cell... */
@@ -490,6 +520,7 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2sif (cii->codec->switch_clock) cii->codec->switch_clock (cii,CLOCK_SWITCH_SLAVE ); + pi->active =1 ;return 0 ; }
@@ -734,6 +765,7 @@ static snd_pcm_uframes_t i2sbus_playbackstatic const struct snd_pcm_ops i2sbus_playback_ops = { .open = i2sbus_playback_open, .close = i2sbus_playback_close, + .hw_params = i2sbus_playback_hw_params, .hw_free = i2sbus_playback_hw_free, .prepare = i2sbus_playback_prepare, .trigger = i2sbus_playback_trigger,
@@ -802,6 +834,7 @@ static snd_pcm_uframes_t i2sbus_record_pstatic const struct snd_pcm_ops i2sbus_record_ops = { .open = i2sbus_record_open, .close = i2sbus_record_close, + .hw_params = i2sbus_record_hw_params, .hw_free = i2sbus_record_hw_free, .prepare = i2sbus_record_prepare, .trigger = i2sbus_record_trigger,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 68/307 ALSA: aoa: i2sbus: fix OF node lifetime handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
commit 4ec93f070eda6b765b62efcaed9241c3b3b0b6ad upstream.
i2sbus_add_dev() keeps the matched "sound" child pointer after for_each_child_of_node() has dropped the iterator reference. Take an extra reference before saving that node and drop it after the layout-id/device-id lookup is complete.
The function also stores np in dev->sound.ofdev.dev.of_node without taking a reference for the embedded soundbus device. Since i2sbus overrides the embedded platform device release callback, balance that reference explicitly in the local error path and in i2sbus_release_dev().
--- sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c +6 -3
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static void i2sbus_release_dev(struct defor (i = aoa_resource_i2smmio; i <= aoa_resource_rxdbdma; i++)free_irq (i2sdev->interrupts[i], i2sdev);i2sbus_control_remove_dev (i2sdev->control, i2sdev); +of_node_put (i2sdev->sound.ofdev.dev.of_node);mutex_destroy (&i2sdev->lock);kfree (i2sdev); }
@@ -147,7 +148,6 @@ static int i2sbus_get_and_fixup_rsrc(str }/* Returns 1 if added, 0 for otherwise; don't return a negative value! */ -/* FIXME: look at device node refcounting */ static int i2sbus_add_dev (struct macio_dev *macio,struct i2sbus_control *control,struct device_node *np)
@@ -178,8 +178,9 @@ static int i2sbus_add_dev(struct macio_d i =0 ;for_each_child_of_node (np, child) {if (of_node_name_eq (child,"sound" )) { +of_node_put (sound); i++; - sound = child; + sound =of_node_get (child); } }if (i ==1 ) {
@@ -205,6 +206,7 @@ static int i2sbus_add_dev(struct macio_d } } } +of_node_put (sound);/* for the time being, until we can handle non-layout-id * things in some fabric, refuse to attach if there is no * layout-id property or we haven't been forced to attach.
@@ -219,7 +221,7 @@ static int i2sbus_add_dev(struct macio_dmutex_init (&dev->lock);spin_lock_init (&dev->low_lock); dev->sound.ofdev.archdata.dma_mask = macio->ofdev.archdata.dma_mask; - dev->sound.ofdev.dev.of_node = np; + dev->sound.ofdev.dev.of_node =of_node_get (np); dev->sound.ofdev.dev.dma_mask = &dev->sound.ofdev.archdata.dma_mask; dev->sound.ofdev.dev.parent = &macio->ofdev.dev; dev->sound.ofdev.dev.release = i2sbus_release_dev;
@@ -327,6 +329,7 @@ static int i2sbus_add_dev(struct macio_dfor (i=0 ;i<3 ;i++)release_and_free_resource (dev->allocated_resource[i]);mutex_destroy (&dev->lock); +of_node_put (dev->sound.ofdev.dev.of_node);kfree (dev);return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 69/307 ALSA: aoa: Skip devices with no codecs in i2sbus_resume()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thorsten Blum <[email protected]>
commit fd7df93013c5118812e63a52635dc6c3a805a1de upstream.
In i2sbus_resume(), skip devices with an empty codec list, which avoids using an uninitialized 'sysclock_factor' in the 32-bit format path in i2sbus_pcm_prepare().
In i2sbus_pcm_prepare(), replace two list_for_each_entry() loops with a single list_first_entry() now that the codec list is guaranteed to be non-empty by all callers.
--- sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c | 3 +++ sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c | 16 +++++----------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/core.c +3 -0
@@ -408,6 +408,9 @@ static int i2sbus_resume(struct macio_deint err, ret =0 ;list_for_each_entry (i2sdev, &control->list, item) { +if (list_empty (&i2sdev->sound.codec_list)) +continue ; +/* reset i2s bus format etc. */ i2sbus_pcm_prepare_both (i2sdev);
sound/aoa/soundbus/i2sbus/pcm.c +5 -11
@@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2s/* set stop command */ command->command =cpu_to_le16 (DBDMA_STOP ); + cii =list_first_entry (&i2sdev->sound.codec_list, + struct codec_info_item, list); +/* ok, let's set the serial format and stuff */ switch (runtime->format) {/* 16 bit formats */
@@ -418,13 +421,7 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2scase SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_U16_BE :/* FIXME: if we add different bus factors we need to * do more here!! */ - bi.bus_factor =0 ; -list_for_each_entry (cii, &i2sdev->sound.codec_list, list) { - bi.bus_factor = cii->codec->bus_factor; -break ; - } -if (!bi.bus_factor) -return -ENODEV ; + bi.bus_factor = cii->codec->bus_factor; input_16bit =1 ;break ;case SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_S32_BE :
@@ -438,10 +435,7 @@ static int i2sbus_pcm_prepare(struct i2sreturn -EINVAL ; }/* we assume all sysclocks are the same! */ -list_for_each_entry (cii, &i2sdev->sound.codec_list, list) { - bi.sysclock_factor = cii->codec->sysclock_factor; -break ; - } + bi.sysclock_factor = cii->codec->sysclock_factor; if (clock_and_divisors(bi.sysclock_factor, bi.bus_factor,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 70/307 ALSA: ctxfi: Add fallback to default RSR for S/PDIF
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harin Lee <[email protected]>
commit 7d61662197ecdc458e33e475b6ada7f6da61d364 upstream.
spdif_passthru_playback_get_resources() uses atc->pll_rate as the RSR for the MSR calculation loop. However, pll_rate is only updated in atc_pll_init() and not in hw_pll_init(), so it remains 0 after the card init.
When spdif_passthru_playback_setup() skips atc_pll_init() for 32000 Hz, (rsr * desc.msr) always becomes 0, causing the loop to spin indefinitely.
Add fallback to use atc->rsr when atc->pll_rate is 0. This reflects the hardware state, since hw_card_init() already configures the PLL to the default RSR.
--- sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c +2 -1
@@ -794,7 +794,8 @@ static int spdif_passthru_playback_get_rstruct src *src;int err;int n_amixer = apcm->substream->runtime->channels, i; -unsigned int pitch, rsr = atc->pll_rate; +unsigned int pitch; +unsigned int rsr = atc->pll_rate ? atc->pll_rate : atc->rsr;/* first release old resources */ atc_pcm_release_resources (atc, apcm);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 71/307 ALSA: seq_oss: return full count for successful SEQ_FULLSIZE writes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
commit bbc6c0dda54fc0ad8f8aed0b796c23e186e1a188 upstream.
snd_seq_oss_write() currently returns the raw load_patch() callback result for SEQ_FULLSIZE events.
That callback is documented as returning 0 on success and -errno on failure, but snd_seq_oss_write() is the file write path and should report the number of user bytes consumed on success. Some in-tree backends also return backend-specific positive values, which can still be shorter than the original write size.
Return the full byte count for successful SEQ_FULLSIZE writes. Preserve negative errors and convert any nonnegative completion to the original count.
--- sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_rw.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_rw.c +3 -3
@@ -101,9 +101,9 @@ snd_seq_oss_write(struct seq_oss_devinfobreak ; } fmt = (*(unsigned short *)rec.c) &0xffff ; -/* FIXME the return value isn't correct */ -return snd_seq_oss_synth_load_patch (dp, rec.s.dev, - fmt, buf,0 , count); + err =snd_seq_oss_synth_load_patch (dp, rec.s.dev, + fmt, buf,0 , count); +return err <0 ? err : count; }if (ev_is_long (&rec)) {/* extended code */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 62/307 lib/ts_kmp: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Josh Law <[email protected]>
commit 8cdf30813ea8ce881cecc08664144416dbdb3e16 upstream.
The ts_kmp algorithm stores its prefix_tbl[] table and pattern in a single allocation sized from the pattern length. If the prefix_tbl[] size calculation wraps, the resulting allocation can be too small and subsequent pattern copies can overflow it.
Fix this by rejecting zero-length patterns and by using overflow helpers before calculating the combined allocation size.
This fixes a potential heap overflow. The pattern length calculation can wrap during a size_t addition, leading to an undersized allocation. Because the textsearch library is reachable from userspace via Netfilter's xt_string module, this is a security risk that should be backported to LTS kernels.
--- lib/ts_kmp.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
lib/ts_kmp.c +16 -2
@@ -94,8 +94,22 @@ static struct ts_config *kmp_init(conststruct ts_config *conf;struct ts_kmp *kmp;int i; -unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len *sizeof (unsigned int ); -size_t priv_size =sizeof (*kmp) + len + prefix_tbl_len; +unsigned int prefix_tbl_len; +size_t priv_size; + +/* Zero-length patterns would make kmp_find() read beyond kmp->pattern. */ +if (unlikely (!len)) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + +/* +* kmp->pattern is stored immediately after the prefix_tbl[] table. +* Reject lengths that would wrap while sizing either region. +*/ +if (unlikely (check_mul_overflow (len,sizeof (*kmp->prefix_tbl), + &prefix_tbl_len) || +check_add_overflow (sizeof (*kmp), (size_t )len, &priv_size) || +check_add_overflow (priv_size, prefix_tbl_len, &priv_size))) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); conf =alloc_ts_config (priv_size, gfp_mask);if (IS_ERR (conf))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 98/307 landlock: Fix LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF inheritance across fork()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
commit 874c8f83826c95c62c21d9edfe9ef43e5c346724 upstream.
hook_cred_transfer() only copies the Landlock security blob when the source credential has a domain. This is inconsistent with landlock_restrict_self() which can set LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF on a credential without creating a domain (via the ruleset_fd=-1 path): the field is committed but not preserved across fork() because the child's prepare_creds() calls hook_cred_transfer() which skips the copy when domain is NULL.
This breaks the documented use case where a process mutes subdomain logs before forking sandboxed children: the children lose the muting and their domains produce unexpected audit records.
Fix this by unconditionally copying the Landlock credential blob.
--- security/landlock/cred.c | 6 - tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/landlock/cred.c +2 -4
@@ -22,10 +22,8 @@ static void hook_cred_transfer(struct crconst struct landlock_cred_security *const old_llcred =landlock_cred (old); -if (old_llcred->domain) { -landlock_get_ruleset (old_llcred->domain); - *landlock_cred (new) = *old_llcred; - } +landlock_get_ruleset (old_llcred->domain); + *landlock_cred (new) = *old_llcred; } static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new,
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c +88 -0
94 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 107/307 io_uring/zcrx: return back two step unregistration
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
commit e5361d25e241ac3a23177fa74ae91d049bad00d3 upstream.
There are reports where io_uring instance removal takes too long and an ifq reallocation by another zcrx instance fails. Split zcrx destruction into two steps similarly how it was before, first close the queue early but maintain zcrx alive, and then when all inflight requests are completed, drop the main zcrx reference. For extra protection, mark terminated zcrx instances in xarray and warn if we double put them.
--- io_uring/io_uring.c | 4 ++++ io_uring/zcrx.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- io_uring/zcrx.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
io_uring/io_uring.c +4 -0
@@ -2308,6 +2308,10 @@ static __cold void io_ring_exit_work(strstruct io_tctx_node *node;int ret; +mutex_lock (&ctx->uring_lock); +io_terminate_zcrx (ctx); +mutex_unlock (&ctx->uring_lock); +/* * If we're doing polled IO and end up having requests being * submitted async (out-of-line), then completions can come in while
io_uring/zcrx.c +43 -3
73 lines not on this page · raw message
io_uring/zcrx.h +4 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ int io_zcrx_ctrl(struct io_ring_ctx *ctxint io_register_zcrx_ifq (struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,struct io_uring_zcrx_ifq_reg __user *arg);void io_unregister_zcrx_ifqs (struct io_ring_ctx *ctx); +void io_terminate_zcrx (struct io_ring_ctx *ctx);int io_zcrx_recv (struct io_kiocb *req,struct io_zcrx_ifq *ifq,struct socket *sock,unsigned int flags,unsigned issue_flags,unsigned int *len);
@@ -85,6 +86,9 @@ static inline int io_register_zcrx_ifq(sstatic inline void io_unregister_zcrx_ifqs (struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) { } +static inline void io_terminate_zcrx (struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) +{ +}static inline int io_zcrx_recv (struct io_kiocb *req,struct io_zcrx_ifq *ifq,struct socket *sock,unsigned int flags,unsigned issue_flags,unsigned int *len)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 108/307 io_uring/timeout: check unused sqe fields
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
commit 484ae637a3e3d909718de7c07afd3bb34b6b8504 upstream.
Zero check unused SQE fields addr3 and pad2 for timeout and timeout update requests. They're not needed now, but could be used sometime in the future.
--- io_uring/timeout.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
io_uring/timeout.c +4 -0
@@ -449,6 +449,8 @@ int io_timeout_remove_prep(struct io_kioif (unlikely (req->flags & (REQ_F_FIXED_FILE |REQ_F_BUFFER_SELECT )))return -EINVAL ; +if (sqe->addr3 || sqe->__pad2[0 ]) +return -EINVAL ;if (sqe->buf_index || sqe->len || sqe->splice_fd_in)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -521,6 +523,8 @@ static int __io_timeout_prep(struct io_kunsigned flags;u32 off =READ_ONCE (sqe->off); +if (sqe->addr3 || sqe->__pad2[0 ]) +return -EINVAL ;if (sqe->buf_index || sqe->len !=1 || sqe->splice_fd_in)return -EINVAL ;if (off && is_timeout_link)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 109/307 block: relax pgmap check in bio_add_page for compatible zone device pages
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Naman Jain <[email protected]>
commit 41c665aae2b5dbecddddcc8ace344caf630cc7a4 upstream.
bio_add_page() and bio_integrity_add_page() reject pages from different dev_pagemaps entirely, returning 0 even when those pages have compatible DMA mapping requirements. This forces callers to start a new bio when buffers span pgmap boundaries, even though the pages could safely coexist as separate bvec entries.
This matters for guests where memory is registered through devm_memremap_pages() with MEMORY_DEVICE_GENERIC in multiple calls, creating separate dev_pagemaps for each chunk. When a direct I/O buffer spans two such chunks, bio_add_page() rejects the second page, forcing an unnecessary bio split or I/O failure.
Introduce zone_device_pages_compatible() in blk.h to check whether two pages can coexist in the same bio as separate bvec entries. The block DMA iterator (blk_dma_map_iter_start) caches the P2PDMA mapping state from the first segment and applies it to all others, so P2PDMA pages from different pgmaps must not be mixed, and neither must P2PDMA and non-P2PDMA pages. All other combinations (MEMORY_DEVICE_GENERIC pages from different pgmaps, or MEMORY_DEVICE_GENERIC with normal RAM) use the same dma_map_phys path and are safe.
Replace the blanket zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap() rejection with zone_device_pages_compatible(), while keeping zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap() as a merge guard.
Pages from different pgmaps can be added as separate bvec entries but must not be coalesced into the same segment, as that would make it impossible to recover the correct pgmap via page_pgmap().
--- block/bio-integrity.c | 6 +++--- block/bio.c | 6 +++--- block/blk.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
block/bio-integrity.c +3 -3
@@ -167,10 +167,10 @@ int bio_integrity_add_page(struct bio *bif (bip->bip_vcnt >0 ) {struct bio_vec *bv = &bip->bip_vec[bip->bip_vcnt -1 ]; -if (!zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap (bv->bv_page, page)) +if (!zone_device_pages_compatible (bv->bv_page, page))return 0 ; - -if (bvec_try_merge_hw_page (q, bv, page, len, offset)) { +if (zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap (bv->bv_page, page) && +bvec_try_merge_hw_page (q, bv, page, len, offset)) { bip->bip_iter.bi_size += len;return len; }
block/bio.c +3 -3
@@ -1070,10 +1070,10 @@ int bio_add_page(struct bio *bio, structif (bio->bi_vcnt >0 ) {struct bio_vec *bv = &bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt -1 ]; -if (!zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap (bv->bv_page, page)) +if (!zone_device_pages_compatible (bv->bv_page, page))return 0 ; - -if (bvec_try_merge_page (bv, page, len, offset)) { +if (zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap (bv->bv_page, page) && +bvec_try_merge_page (bv, page, len, offset)) { bio->bi_iter.bi_size += len;return len; }
block/blk.h +19 -0
@@ -139,6 +139,25 @@ static inline bool biovec_phys_mergeablereturn true; } +/* +* Check if two pages from potentially different zone device pgmaps can +* coexist as separate bvec entries in the same bio. +* +* The block DMA iterator (blk_dma_map_iter_start) caches the P2PDMA mapping +* state from the first segment and applies it to all subsequent segments, so +* P2PDMA pages from different pgmaps must not be mixed in the same bio. +* +* Other zone device types (FS_DAX, GENERIC) use the same dma_map_phys() path +* as normal RAM. PRIVATE and COHERENT pages never appear in bios. +*/ +static inline bool zone_device_pages_compatible (const struct page *a, +const struct page *b) +{ +if (is_pci_p2pdma_page (a) ||is_pci_p2pdma_page (b)) +return zone_device_pages_have_same_pgmap (a, b); +return true; +} +static inline bool __bvec_gap_to_prev (const struct queue_limits *lim,struct bio_vec *bprv,unsigned int offset) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 110/307 iio: adc: ti-ads7950: use iio_push_to_buffers_with_ts_unaligned()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Lechner <[email protected]>
commit 7806c060cceb2d6895efbb6cff2f2f17cf1ec5de upstream.
Use iio_push_to_buffers_with_ts_unaligned() to avoid unaligned access when writing the timestamp in the rx_buf.
The previous implementation would have been fine on architectures that support 4-byte alignment of 64-bit integers but could cause issues on architectures that require 8-byte alignment.
--- drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads7950.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads7950.c +5 -6
@@ -47,8 +47,6 @@#define TI_ADS7950_MAX_CHAN 16#define TI_ADS7950_NUM_GPIOS 4 -#define TI_ADS7950_TIMESTAMP_SIZE (sizeof(int64_t) / sizeof(__be16)) -/* val = value, dec = left shift, bits = number of bits of the mask */ #define TI_ADS7950_EXTRACT (val, dec, bits) \ (((val) >> (dec)) & ((1 << (bits)) - 1))
@@ -105,8 +103,7 @@ struct ti_ads7950_state {* DMA (thus cache coherency maintenance) may require the * transfer buffers to live in their own cache lines. */ -u16 rx_buf[TI_ADS7950_MAX_CHAN +2 +TI_ADS7950_TIMESTAMP_SIZE ] -__aligned(IIO_DMA_MINALIGN) ; +u16 rx_buf[TI_ADS7950_MAX_CHAN +2 ]__aligned(IIO_DMA_MINALIGN) ;u16 tx_buf[TI_ADS7950_MAX_CHAN +2 ];u16 single_tx;u16 single_rx;
@@ -313,8 +310,10 @@ static irqreturn_t ti_ads7950_trigger_haif (ret <0 ) goto out; -iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp (indio_dev, &st->rx_buf[2 ], -iio_get_time_ns (indio_dev)); +iio_push_to_buffers_with_ts_unaligned (indio_dev, &st->rx_buf[2 ], +sizeof (*st->rx_buf) * +TI_ADS7950_MAX_CHAN , +iio_get_time_ns (indio_dev)); out:mutex_unlock (&st->slock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 111/307 io_uring/register: fix ring resizing with mixed/large SQEs/CQEs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
commit 45cd95763e198d74d369ede43aef0b1955b8dea4 upstream.
The ring resizing only properly handles "normal" sized SQEs or CQEs, if there are pending entries around a resize. This normally should not be the case, but the code is supposed to handle this regardless.
For the mixed SQE/CQE cases, the current copying works fine as they are indexed in the same way. Each half is just copied separately. But for fixed large SQEs and CQEs, the iteration and copy need to take that into account.
--- io_uring/register.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
io_uring/register.c +26 -6
@@ -599,10 +599,20 @@ static int io_register_resize_rings(struif (tail - old_head > p->sq_entries) goto overflow;for (i = old_head; i < tail; i++) { -unsigned src_head = i & (ctx->sq_entries -1 ); -unsigned dst_head = i & (p->sq_entries -1 ); +unsigned index, dst_mask, src_mask; +size_t sq_size; - n.sq_sqes[dst_head] = o.sq_sqes[src_head]; + index = i; + sq_size =sizeof (struct io_uring_sqe ); + src_mask = ctx->sq_entries -1 ; + dst_mask = p->sq_entries -1 ; +if (ctx->flags &IORING_SETUP_SQE128 ) { + index <<=1 ; + sq_size <<=1 ; + src_mask = (ctx->sq_entries <<1 ) -1 ; + dst_mask = (p->sq_entries <<1 ) -1 ; + } +memcpy (&n.sq_sqes[index & dst_mask], &o.sq_sqes[index & src_mask], sq_size); }WRITE_ONCE (n.rings->sq.head, old_head);WRITE_ONCE (n.rings->sq.tail, tail);
@@ -619,10 +629,20 @@ overflow: goto out; }for (i = old_head; i < tail; i++) { -unsigned src_head = i & (ctx->cq_entries -1 ); -unsigned dst_head = i & (p->cq_entries -1 ); +unsigned index, dst_mask, src_mask; +size_t cq_size; - n.rings->cqes[dst_head] = o.rings->cqes[src_head]; + index = i; + cq_size =sizeof (struct io_uring_cqe ); + src_mask = ctx->cq_entries -1 ; + dst_mask = p->cq_entries -1 ; +if (ctx->flags &IORING_SETUP_CQE32 ) { + index <<=1 ; + cq_size <<=1 ; + src_mask = (ctx->cq_entries <<1 ) -1 ; + dst_mask = (p->cq_entries <<1 ) -1 ; + } +memcpy (&n.rings->cqes[index & dst_mask], &o.rings->cqes[index & src_mask], cq_size); }WRITE_ONCE (n.rings->cq.head, old_head);WRITE_ONCE (n.rings->cq.tail, tail);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 112/307 io_uring/zcrx: fix user_struct uaf
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
commit 0fcccfd87152f957fa8312b841f6efef42a05a20 upstream.
io_free_rbuf_ring() usees a struct user_struct, which io_zcrx_ifq_free() puts it down before destroying the ring.
--- io_uring/zcrx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/zcrx.c +1 -1
@@ -565,13 +565,13 @@ static void io_zcrx_ifq_free(struct io_zif (ifq->area)io_zcrx_free_area (ifq, ifq->area); -free_uid (ifq->user);if (ifq->mm_account)mmdrop (ifq->mm_account);if (ifq->dev)put_device (ifq->dev);io_free_rbuf_ring (ifq); +free_uid (ifq->user);mutex_destroy (&ifq->pp_lock);kfree (ifq); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 113/307 io_uring/poll: fix signed comparison in io_poll_get_ownership()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Longxuan Yu <[email protected]>
commit 326941b22806cbf2df1fbfe902b7908b368cce42 upstream.
io_poll_get_ownership() uses a signed comparison to check whether poll_refs has reached the threshold for the slowpath:
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&req->poll_refs) >= IO_POLL_REF_BIAS))
atomic_read() returns int (signed). When IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG (BIT(31)) is set in poll_refs, the value becomes negative in signed arithmetic, so the >= 128 comparison always evaluates to false and the slowpath is never taken.
Fix this by casting the atomic_read() result to unsigned int before the comparison, so that the cancel flag is treated as a large positive value and correctly triggers the slowpath.
--- io_uring/poll.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/poll.c +1 -1
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static bool io_poll_get_ownership_slowpa*/ static inline bool io_poll_get_ownership (struct io_kiocb *req) { -if (unlikely (atomic_read (&req->poll_refs) >=IO_POLL_REF_BIAS )) +if (unlikely ((unsigned int )atomic_read (&req->poll_refs) >=IO_POLL_REF_BIAS ))return io_poll_get_ownership_slowpath (req);return !(atomic_fetch_inc (&req->poll_refs) &IO_POLL_REF_MASK ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 114/307 io_uring/poll: ensure EPOLL_ONESHOT is propagated for EPOLL_URING_WAKE
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
commit 1967f0b1cafdde37aa9e08e6021c14bcc484b7a5 upstream.
Commit:
aacf2f9f382c ("io_uring: fix req->apoll_events")
fixed an issue where poll->events and req->apoll_events weren't synchronized, but then when the commit referenced in Fixes got added, it didn't ensure the same thing.
If we mask in EPOLLONESHOT in the regular EPOLL_URING_WAKE path, then ensure it's done for both. Including a link to the original report below, even though it's mostly nonsense. But it includes a reproducer that does show that IORING_CQE_F_MORE is set in the previous CQE, while no more CQEs will be generated for this request. Just ignore anything that pretends this is security related in any way, it's just the typical AI nonsense.
--- io_uring/poll.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/poll.c +3 -1
@@ -415,8 +415,10 @@ static int io_poll_wake(struct wait_queu* disable multishot as there is a circular dependency between * CQ posting and triggering the event. */ -if (mask &EPOLL_URING_WAKE ) +if (mask &EPOLL_URING_WAKE ) { poll->events |=EPOLLONESHOT ; + req->apoll_events |=EPOLLONESHOT ; + }/* optional, saves extra locking for removal in tw handler */ if (mask && poll->events &EPOLLONESHOT ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 115/307 module.lds,codetag: force 0 sh_addr for sections
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Joe Lawrence <[email protected]>
commit 4afc71bba8b7d7841681e7647ae02f5079aaf28f upstream.
Commit 1ba9f8979426 ("vmlinux.lds: Unify TEXT_MAIN, DATA_MAIN, and related macros") added .text and made .data, .bss, and .rodata sections unconditional in the module linker script, but without an explicit address like the other sections in the same file.
When linking modules with ld.bfd -r, sections defined without an address inherit the location counter, resulting in non-zero sh_addr values in the .ko. Relocatable objects are expected to have sh_addr=0 for these sections and these non-zero addresses confuse elfutils and have been reported to cause segmentation faults in SystemTap [1].
Add the 0 address specifier to all sections in module.lds, including the .codetag.* sections via MOD_SEPARATE_CODETAG_SECTIONS macro.
--- include/asm-generic/codetag.lds.h | 2 +- scripts/module.lds.S | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/asm-generic/codetag.lds.h +1 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ IF_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING(SECTION_WITH_BOUNDARIES(alloc_tags))#define MOD_SEPARATE_CODETAG_SECTION (_name) \ - .codetag.##_name : { \ + .codetag.##_name 0 : { \ SECTION_WITH_BOUNDARIES(_name) \ }
scripts/module.lds.S +6 -6
@@ -32,30 +32,30 @@ SECTIONS { __jump_table 0 : ALIGN(8) { KEEP(*(__jump_table)) } __ex_table 0 : ALIGN(4) { KEEP(*(__ex_table)) } - __patchable_function_entries : { *(__patchable_function_entries) } + __patchable_function_entries 0 : { *(__patchable_function_entries) } .init.klp_funcs 0 : ALIGN(8) { KEEP(*(.init.klp_funcs)) } .init.klp_objects 0 : ALIGN(8) { KEEP(*(.init.klp_objects)) } #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USES_CFI_TRAPS - __kcfi_traps : { KEEP(*(.kcfi_traps)) } + __kcfi_traps 0 : { KEEP(*(.kcfi_traps)) } #endif - .text : { + .text 0 : { *(.text .text.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*) } - .bss : { + .bss 0 : { *(.bss .bss.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*) *(.bss..L*) } - .data : { + .data 0 : { *(.data .data.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*) *(.data..L*) } - .rodata : { + .rodata 0 : { *(.rodata .rodata.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*) *(.rodata..L*) }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 116/307 module.lds.S: Fix modules on 32-bit parisc architecture
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit 1221365f55281349da4f4ba41c05b57cd15f5c28 upstream.
On the 32-bit parisc architecture, we always used the -ffunction-sections compiler option to tell the compiler to put the functions into seperate text sections. This is necessary, otherwise "big" kernel modules like ext4 or ipv6 fail to load because some branches won't be able to reach their stubs.
Commit 1ba9f8979426 ("vmlinux.lds: Unify TEXT_MAIN, DATA_MAIN, and related macros") broke this for parisc because all text sections will get unconditionally merged now.
Introduce the ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_TEXT_SECTIONS config option which avoids the text section merge for modules, and fix this issue by enabling this option by default for 32-bit parisc.
--- arch/Kconfig | 7 +++++++ arch/parisc/Kconfig | 1 + scripts/module.lds.S | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
arch/Kconfig +7 -0
@@ -1128,6 +1128,13 @@ config ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_DATA_IN_VMALLO For architectures like powerpc/32 which have constraints on module allocation and need to allocate module data outside of module area. +config ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_TEXT_SECTIONS + bool + help + For architectures like 32-bit parisc which require that functions in + modules have to keep code in own text sections (-ffunction-sections) + and to avoid merging all text into one big text section, + config ARCH_WANTS_EXECMEM_LATE bool help
arch/parisc/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config PARISC select HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS + select ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_TEXT_SECTIONS if !64BIT select ARCH_HAS_CPU_CACHE_ALIASING select ARCH_HAS_DMA_ALLOC if PA11 select ARCH_HAS_DMA_OPS
scripts/module.lds.S +2 -0
@@ -41,9 +41,11 @@ SECTIONS { __kcfi_traps 0 : { KEEP(*(.kcfi_traps)) } #endif +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_MODULES_TEXT_SECTIONS .text 0 : { *(.text .text.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*) } +#endif .bss 0 : { *(.bss .bss.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 99/307 landlock: Allow TSYNC with LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF and fd=-1
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
commit e75e38055b9df5eafd663c6db00e634f534dc426 upstream.
LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC does not allow LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with ruleset_fd=-1, preventing a multithreaded process from atomically propagating subdomain log muting to all threads without creating a domain layer. Relax the fd=-1 condition to accept TSYNC alongside LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF, and update the documentation accordingly.
Add flag validation tests for all TSYNC combinations with ruleset_fd=-1, and audit tests verifying both transition directions: muting via TSYNC (logged to not logged) and override via TSYNC (not logged to logged).
--- include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 4 +- security/landlock/syscalls.c | 14 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c | 233 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c | 77 ++++++ 4 files changed, 322 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +3 -1
@@ -116,7 +116,9 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {* ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF``, this flag only affects * future nested domains, not the one being created. It can also be used * with a @ruleset_fd value of -1 to mute subdomain logs without creating a -* domain. +* domain. When combined with %LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC and a +* @ruleset_fd value of -1, this configuration is propagated to all threads +* of the current process. * * The following flag supports policy enforcement in multithreaded processes: *
security/landlock/syscalls.c +9 -5
@@ -512,10 +512,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,/* * It is allowed to set LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with -* -1 as ruleset_fd, but no other flag must be set. +* -1 as ruleset_fd, optionally combined with +* LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC to propagate this configuration to all +* threads. No other flag must be set. */ if (!(ruleset_fd ==-1 && - flags ==LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF )) { + (flags & ~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC ) == +LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF )) {/* Gets and checks the ruleset. */ ruleset =get_ruleset_from_fd (ruleset_fd,FMODE_CAN_READ );if (IS_ERR (ruleset))
@@ -537,9 +540,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,/* * The only case when a ruleset may not be set is if -* LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF is set and ruleset_fd is -1. -* We could optimize this case by not calling commit_creds() if this flag -* was already set, but it is not worth the complexity. +* LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF is set (optionally with +* LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC) and ruleset_fd is -1. We could +* optimize this case by not calling commit_creds() if this flag was +* already set, but it is not worth the complexity. */ if (ruleset) {/*
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c +233 -0
245 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c +77 -0
81 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 117/307 ALSA: core: Fix potential data race at fasync handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 8146cd333d235ed32d48bb803fdf743472d7c783 upstream.
In snd_fasync_work_fn(), which is the offload work for traversing and processing the pending fasync list, the call of kill_fasync() is done outside the snd_fasync_lock for avoiding deadlocks. The problem is that its the references of fasync->on, fasync->signal and fasync->poll are done there also outside the lock. Since these may be modified by snd_kill_fasync() call concurrently from other process, inconsistent values might be passed to kill_fasync(). Although there shouldn't be critical UAF, it's still better to be addressed.
This patch moves the kill_fasync() argument evaluations inside the snd_fasync_lock for avoiding the data races above. The handling in fasync->on flag is optimized in the loop to skip directly.
Also, for more clarity, snd_fasync_free() takes the lock and unlink the pending entry more directly instead of clearing fasync->on flag.
--- sound/core/misc.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/core/misc.c +10 -3
@@ -100,14 +100,18 @@ static LIST_HEAD(snd_fasync_list);static void snd_fasync_work_fn (struct work_struct *work) {struct snd_fasync *fasync; +int signal, poll;spin_lock_irq (&snd_fasync_lock);while (!list_empty (&snd_fasync_list)) { fasync = list_first_entry(&snd_fasync_list, struct snd_fasync, list);list_del_init (&fasync->list); +if (!fasync->on) +continue ; + signal = fasync->signal; + poll = fasync->poll;spin_unlock_irq (&snd_fasync_lock); -if (fasync->on) -kill_fasync (&fasync->fasync, fasync->signal, fasync->poll); +kill_fasync (&fasync->fasync, signal, poll);spin_lock_irq (&snd_fasync_lock); }spin_unlock_irq (&snd_fasync_lock);
@@ -158,7 +162,10 @@ void snd_fasync_free(struct snd_fasync * {if (!fasync)return ; - fasync->on =0 ; + + scoped_guard(spinlock_irq, &snd_fasync_lock) +list_del_init (&fasync->list); +flush_work (&snd_fasync_work);kfree (fasync); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 118/307 ALSA: caiaq: Fix control_put() result and cache rollback
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
commit a3542d1b30f92307f545f2def14e8d988dffdff0 upstream.
control_put() always returns 1 and updates cdev->control_state[] before sending the USB command. It also ignores transport errors from usb_bulk_msg(), snd_usb_caiaq_send_command(), and snd_usb_caiaq_send_command_bank().
That breaks the ALSA .put() contract and can leave control_get() reporting a cached value the device never accepted.
Return 0 for unchanged values, propagate transport failures, and restore the cached byte when the write fails.
--- sound/usb/caiaq/control.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
sound/usb/caiaq/control.c +37 -17
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static int control_put(struct snd_kcontrstruct snd_usb_caiaqdev *cdev =caiaqdev (chip->card);int pos = kcontrol->private_value;int v = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ]; +int ret;unsigned char cmd;switch (cdev->chip.usb_id) {
@@ -103,6 +104,10 @@ static int control_put(struct snd_kcontrif (pos &CNT_INTVAL ) {int i = pos & ~CNT_INTVAL ; +unsigned char old = cdev->control_state[i]; + +if (old == v) +return 0 ; cdev->control_state[i] = v;
@@ -113,10 +118,11 @@ static int control_put(struct snd_kcontr cdev->ep8_out_buf[0 ] = i; cdev->ep8_out_buf[1 ] = v; -usb_bulk_msg (cdev->chip.dev, -usb_sndbulkpipe (cdev->chip.dev,8 ), - cdev->ep8_out_buf,sizeof (cdev->ep8_out_buf), - &actual_len,200 ); + ret =usb_bulk_msg (cdev->chip.dev, +usb_sndbulkpipe (cdev->chip.dev,8 ), + cdev->ep8_out_buf, +sizeof (cdev->ep8_out_buf), + &actual_len,200 ); }else if (cdev->chip.usb_id ==USB_ID (USB_VID_NATIVEINSTRUMENTS ,USB_PID_MASCHINECONTROLLER )) {
@@ -128,21 +134,36 @@ static int control_put(struct snd_kcontr offset =MASCHINE_BANK_SIZE ; } -snd_usb_caiaq_send_command_bank (cdev, cmd, bank, - cdev->control_state + offset, -MASCHINE_BANK_SIZE ); + ret =snd_usb_caiaq_send_command_bank (cdev, cmd, bank, + cdev->control_state + offset, +MASCHINE_BANK_SIZE ); }else { -snd_usb_caiaq_send_command (cdev, cmd, - cdev->control_state,sizeof (cdev->control_state)); + ret =snd_usb_caiaq_send_command (cdev, cmd, + cdev->control_state, +sizeof (cdev->control_state)); } - }else { -if (v) - cdev->control_state[pos /8 ] |=1 << (pos %8 ); -else - cdev->control_state[pos /8 ] &= ~(1 << (pos %8 )); -snd_usb_caiaq_send_command (cdev, cmd, - cdev->control_state,sizeof (cdev->control_state)); +if (ret <0 ) { + cdev->control_state[i] = old; +return ret; + } + }else { +int idx = pos /8 ; +unsigned char mask =1 << (pos %8 ); +unsigned char old = cdev->control_state[idx]; +unsigned char val = v ? (old | mask) : (old & ~mask); + +if (old == val) +return 0 ; + + cdev->control_state[idx] = val; + ret =snd_usb_caiaq_send_command (cdev, cmd, + cdev->control_state, +sizeof (cdev->control_state)); +if (ret <0 ) { + cdev->control_state[idx] = old; +return ret; + } }return 1 ;
@@ -640,4 +661,3 @@ int snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(struct snreturn ret; } -
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 119/307 ALSA: caiaq: Handle probe errors properly
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 28abd224db4a49560b452115bca3672a20e45b2f upstream.
The probe procedure of setup_card() in caiaq driver doesn't treat the error cases gracefully, e.g. the error from snd_card_register() calls snd_card_free() but continues. This would lead to a UAF for the further calls like snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(), as Berk suggested in another patch in the link below.
However, the problem is not only that; in general, this function drops the all error handlings (as it's a void function) although its caller can propagate an error to snd_probe(), which eventually calls snd_card_free() as a proper error path. That said, we should treat each error case in setup_card(), and just return the error code promptly, which is then handled later as a fatal error in snd_probe().
This patch achieves it by changing the setup_card() to return an error code. Also, the superfluous snd_card_free() call is removed, too.
Note that card->private_free can be set still safely at returning an error. All called functions in card_free() have checks of the unassigned resources or NULL checks.
--- sound/usb/caiaq/device.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
sound/usb/caiaq/device.c +24 -9
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ int snd_usb_caiaq_set_auto_msg(struct sn tmp, sizeof(tmp)); } -static void setup_card (struct snd_usb_caiaqdev *cdev) +static int setup_card (struct snd_usb_caiaqdev *cdev) {int ret;char val[4 ];
@@ -325,8 +325,10 @@ static void setup_card(struct snd_usb_casnd_usb_caiaq_send_command (cdev,EP1_CMD_READ_IO ,NULL ,0 );if (!wait_event_timeout (cdev->ep1_wait_queue, - cdev->control_state[0 ] !=0xff ,HZ )) -return ; + cdev->control_state[0 ] !=0xff ,HZ )) { +dev_err (dev,"Read timeout for control state\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }/* fix up some defaults */ if ((cdev->control_state[1] != 2) ||
@@ -347,33 +349,43 @@ static void setup_card(struct snd_usb_ca cdev->spec.num_digital_audio_out + cdev->spec.num_digital_audio_in > 0) { ret =snd_usb_caiaq_audio_init (cdev); -if (ret <0 ) +if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (dev,"Unable to set up audio system (ret=%d)\n" , ret); +return ret; + } }if (cdev->spec.num_midi_in + cdev->spec.num_midi_out >0 ) { ret =snd_usb_caiaq_midi_init (cdev); -if (ret <0 ) +if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (dev,"Unable to set up MIDI system (ret=%d)\n" , ret); +return ret; + } }#ifdef CONFIG_SND_USB_CAIAQ_INPUT ret =snd_usb_caiaq_input_init (cdev); -if (ret <0 ) +if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (dev,"Unable to set up input system (ret=%d)\n" , ret); +return ret; + }#endif /* finally, register the card and all its sub-instances */ ret =snd_card_register (cdev->chip.card);if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (dev,"snd_card_register() returned %d\n" , ret); -snd_card_free (cdev->chip.card); +return ret; } ret =snd_usb_caiaq_control_init (cdev); -if (ret <0 ) +if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (dev,"Unable to set up control system (ret=%d)\n" , ret); +return ret; + } + +return 0 ; }static void card_free (struct snd_card *card)
@@ -499,8 +511,11 @@ static int init_card(struct snd_usb_caiascnprintf (card->longname,sizeof (card->longname),"%s %s (%s)" , cdev->vendor_name, cdev->product_name, usbpath); -setup_card (cdev); card->private_free = card_free; + err =setup_card (cdev); +if (err <0 ) +return err; +return 0 ; err_kill_urb:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 120/307 ALSA: 6fire: Fix input volume change detection
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
commit dc88eef8f55e85e92d016cdf7e291f5560efd79b upstream.
usb6fire_control_input_vol_put() stores the analog capture volume as a signed offset in rt->input_vol[] (-15..+15), but it compares the cached value against the user-visible mixer value (0..30) before subtracting 15.
This mixes two domains in the change detection path. Since the runtime is zero-initialized, the visible default is 15; writing 0 right after probe is ignored, while writing 15 is reported as a change even though the cached value remains 0.
Normalize the user value before comparing it with the cached offset.
--- sound/usb/6fire/control.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
sound/usb/6fire/control.c +6 -4
@@ -290,15 +290,17 @@ static int usb6fire_control_input_vol_pu struct snd_ctl_elem_value *ucontrol) {struct control_runtime *rt =snd_kcontrol_chip (kcontrol); +int vol0 = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] -15 ; +int vol1 = ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ] -15 ;int changed =0 ; -if (rt->input_vol[0 ] != ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ]) { - rt->input_vol[0 ] = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0 ] -15 ; +if (rt->input_vol[0 ] != vol0) { + rt->input_vol[0 ] = vol0; rt->ivol_updated &= ~(1 <<0 ); changed =1 ; } -if (rt->input_vol[1 ] != ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ]) { - rt->input_vol[1 ] = ucontrol->value.integer.value[1 ] -15 ; +if (rt->input_vol[1 ] != vol1) { + rt->input_vol[1 ] = vol1; rt->ivol_updated &= ~(1 <<1 ); changed =1 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 121/307 ALSA: hda/realtek - Add mute LED support for HP Victus 15-fa2xxx
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Spencer Payton <[email protected]>
commit eacda758e3c01db98b5c231f56cf9a6e05ced75c upstream.
The mute LED on this laptop uses ALC245 but requires a quirk to work. This patch enables the existing ALC245_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_COEFBIT quirk for the device.
Tested my Victus 15-fa2xxx (PCI SSID 103c:8dcd).
The LED behaviour works as intended.
--- sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc269.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc269.c +1 -0
@@ -7153,6 +7153,7 @@ static const struct hda_quirk alc269_fixSND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8d90 ,"HP EliteBook 16 G12" ,ALC285_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8d91 ,"HP ZBook Firefly 14 G12" ,ALC285_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8d92 ,"HP ZBook Firefly 16 G12" ,ALC285_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED ), +SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8dcd ,"HP Victus 15-fa2xxx" ,ALC245_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_COEFBIT ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8d9b ,"HP 17 Turbine OmniBook 7 UMA" ,ALC287_FIXUP_CS35L41_I2C_2 ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x103c ,0x8d9c ,"HP 17 Turbine OmniBook 7 DIS" ,ALC287_FIXUP_CS35L41_I2C_2 ), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8d9d, "HP 17 Turbine OmniBook X UMA", ALC287_FIXUP_CS35L41_I2C_2),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 122/307 ALSA: pcmtest: fix reference leak on failed device registration
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>
commit 4ff036f95238f02c87e5d7c0a9d93748582a8950 upstream.
When platform_device_register() fails in mod_init(), the embedded struct device in pcmtst_pdev has already been initialized by device_initialize(), but the failure path returns the error without dropping the device reference for the current platform device:
mod_init()
-> platform_device_register(&pcmtst_pdev)
-> device_initialize(&pcmtst_pdev.dev)
-> setup_pdev_dma_masks(&pcmtst_pdev)
-> platform_device_add(&pcmtst_pdev)This leads to a reference leak when platform_device_register() fails. Fix this by calling platform_device_put() before returning the error.
The issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review.
--- sound/drivers/pcmtest.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/drivers/pcmtest.c +3 -1
@@ -756,8 +756,10 @@ static int __init mod_init(void)if (err)return err; err =platform_device_register (&pcmtst_pdev); -if (err) +if (err) { +platform_device_put (&pcmtst_pdev);return err; + } err =platform_driver_register (&pcmtst_pdrv);if (err)platform_device_unregister (&pcmtst_pdev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 123/307 ALSA: pcmtest: Fix resource leaks in module init error paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cássio Gabriel <[email protected]>
commit d5d5f80416a3a749906c04d56575e2290792654b upstream.
pcmtest allocates its pattern buffers and creates its debugfs tree before registering the platform device and driver, but mod_init() does not release those resources when a later init step fails.
As a result, a debugfs directory creation failure leaks the pattern buffers, while platform_device_register() and platform_driver_register() failures leave both the pattern buffers and the debugfs tree behind. The recent fix for failed device registration only dropped the embedded device reference.
Add the missing cleanup for the debugfs tree and pattern buffers in the remaining module init error paths.
--- sound/drivers/pcmtest.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
sound/drivers/pcmtest.c +12 -3
@@ -754,15 +754,24 @@ static int __init mod_init(void) err =init_debug_files (buf_allocated);if (err) -return err; + goto err_free_patterns; err =platform_device_register (&pcmtst_pdev);if (err) {platform_device_put (&pcmtst_pdev); -return err; + goto err_clear_debug; } err =platform_driver_register (&pcmtst_pdrv); -if (err) +if (err) {platform_device_unregister (&pcmtst_pdev); + goto err_clear_debug; + } + +return 0 ; + +err_clear_debug: +clear_debug_files (); +err_free_patterns: +free_pattern_buffers ();return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 124/307 iio: adc: ad7768-1: fix one-shot mode data acquisition
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jonathan Santos <[email protected]>
commit 8be19e233744961db6069da9c9ab63eb085a0447 upstream.
According to the datasheet, one-shot mode requires a SYNC_IN pulse to trigger a new sample conversion. In the current implementation, No sync pulse was sent after switching to one-shot mode and reinit_completion() was called before mode switching, creating a race condition where spurious interrupts during mode change could trigger completion prematurely.
Fix by sending a sync pulse after configuring one-shot mode and reinit_completion() to ensure it only waits for the actual conversion completion.
--- drivers/iio/adc/ad7768-1.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ad7768-1.c +7 -2
@@ -463,12 +463,17 @@ static int ad7768_scan_direct(struct iiostruct ad7768_state *st =iio_priv (indio_dev);int readval, ret; -reinit_completion (&st->completion); - ret =ad7768_set_mode (st,AD7768_ONE_SHOT );if (ret <0 )return ret; +reinit_completion (&st->completion); + +/* One-shot mode requires a SYNC pulse to generate a new sample */ + ret =ad7768_send_sync_pulse (st); +if (ret) +return ret; + ret =wait_for_completion_timeout (&st->completion,msecs_to_jiffies (1000 ));if (!ret)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 125/307 iio: adc: ad7768-1: remove switch to one-shot mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jonathan Santos <[email protected]>
commit 81fdc3127d013a552465c3bf9829afbed5184406 upstream.
wideband low ripple FIR Filter is not available in one-shot mode. In order to make direct reads work for all filter options, remove the switch for one-shot mode and guarantee device is always in continuous conversion mode.
--- drivers/iio/adc/ad7768-1.c | 21 ++++----------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ad7768-1.c +4 -17
@@ -463,17 +463,8 @@ static int ad7768_scan_direct(struct iiostruct ad7768_state *st =iio_priv (indio_dev);int readval, ret; - ret =ad7768_set_mode (st,AD7768_ONE_SHOT ); -if (ret <0 ) -return ret; -reinit_completion (&st->completion); -/* One-shot mode requires a SYNC pulse to generate a new sample */ - ret =ad7768_send_sync_pulse (st); -if (ret) -return ret; - ret =wait_for_completion_timeout (&st->completion,msecs_to_jiffies (1000 ));if (!ret)
@@ -492,14 +483,6 @@ static int ad7768_scan_direct(struct iioif (st->oversampling_ratio ==8 ) readval >>=8 ; -/* -* Any SPI configuration of the AD7768-1 can only be -* performed in continuous conversion mode. -*/ - ret =ad7768_set_mode (st,AD7768_CONTINUOUS ); -if (ret <0 ) -return ret; -return readval; }
@@ -1257,6 +1240,10 @@ static int ad7768_setup(struct iio_dev *return ret; } + ret =ad7768_set_mode (st,AD7768_CONTINUOUS ); +if (ret) +return ret; +/* For backwards compatibility, try the adi,sync-in-gpios property */ st->gpio_sync_in =devm_gpiod_get_optional (&st->spi->dev,"adi,sync-in" ,GPIOD_OUT_LOW );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 126/307 rxrpc: Fix potential UAF after skb_unshare() failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit 1f2740150f904bfa60e4bad74d65add3ccb5e7f8 upstream.
If skb_unshare() fails to unshare a packet due to allocation failure in rxrpc_input_packet(), the skb pointer in the parent (rxrpc_io_thread()) will be NULL'd out. This will likely cause the call to trace_rxrpc_rx_done() to oops.
Fix this by moving the unsharing down to where rxrpc_input_call_event() calls rxrpc_input_call_packet(). There are a number of places prior to that where we ignore DATA packets for a variety of reasons (such as the call already being complete) for which an unshare is then avoided.
And with that, rxrpc_input_packet() doesn't need to take a pointer to the pointer to the packet, so change that to just a pointer.
--- include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 4 ++-- net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 1 - net/rxrpc/call_event.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- net/rxrpc/io_thread.c | 24 ++---------------------- net/rxrpc/skbuff.c | 9 --------- 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +2 -2
@@ -161,8 +161,6 @@ E_(rxrpc_call_poke_timer_now, "Timer-now")#define rxrpc_skb_traces \ - EM(rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare, "ETN unshare ") \ - EM(rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare_nomem, "ETN unshar-nm") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_get_call_rx, "GET call-rx ") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_get_conn_secured, "GET conn-secd") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_get_conn_work, "GET conn-work") \
@@ -189,6 +187,7 @@ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_purge, "PUT purge ") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_purge_oob, "PUT purge-oob") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_response, "PUT response ") \ + EM(rxrpc_skb_put_response_copy, "PUT resp-cpy ") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_rotate, "PUT rotate ") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_unknown, "PUT unknown ") \EM (rxrpc_skb_see_conn_work,"SEE conn-work" ) \
@@ -197,6 +196,7 @@ EM(rxrpc_skb_see_recvmsg_oob, "SEE recvm-oob") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_see_reject, "SEE reject ") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_see_rotate, "SEE rotate ") \ + EM(rxrpc_skb_see_unshare_nomem, "SEE unshar-nm") \ E_(rxrpc_skb_see_version, "SEE version ")#define rxrpc_local_traces \
net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +0 -1
@@ -1486,7 +1486,6 @@ int rxrpc_server_keyring(struct rxrpc_sovoid rxrpc_kernel_data_consumed (struct rxrpc_call *,struct sk_buff *);void rxrpc_new_skb (struct sk_buff *,enum rxrpc_skb_trace );void rxrpc_see_skb (struct sk_buff *,enum rxrpc_skb_trace ); -void rxrpc_eaten_skb (struct sk_buff *,enum rxrpc_skb_trace );void rxrpc_get_skb (struct sk_buff *,enum rxrpc_skb_trace );void rxrpc_free_skb (struct sk_buff *,enum rxrpc_skb_trace );void rxrpc_purge_queue (struct sk_buff_head *);
net/rxrpc/call_event.c +18 -1
@@ -332,7 +332,24 @@ bool rxrpc_input_call_event(struct rxrpc saw_ack |= sp->hdr.type ==RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ACK ; -rxrpc_input_call_packet (call, skb); +if (sp->hdr.securityIndex !=0 && +skb_cloned (skb)) { +/* Unshare the packet so that it can be +* modified by in-place decryption. +*/ +struct sk_buff *nskb =skb_copy (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); + +if (nskb) { +rxrpc_new_skb (nskb, rxrpc_skb_new_unshared); +rxrpc_input_call_packet (call, nskb); +rxrpc_free_skb (nskb, rxrpc_skb_put_call_rx); + }else { +/* OOM - Drop the packet. */ +rxrpc_see_skb (skb, rxrpc_skb_see_unshare_nomem); + } + }else { +rxrpc_input_call_packet (call, skb); + }rxrpc_free_skb (skb, rxrpc_skb_put_call_rx); did_receive = true; }
net/rxrpc/io_thread.c +2 -22
@@ -192,13 +192,12 @@ static bool rxrpc_extract_abort(struct s/* * Process packets received on the local endpoint */ -static bool rxrpc_input_packet (struct rxrpc_local *local,struct sk_buff **_skb) +static bool rxrpc_input_packet (struct rxrpc_local *local,struct sk_buff *skb) {struct rxrpc_connection *conn;struct sockaddr_rxrpc peer_srx;struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;struct rxrpc_peer *peer =NULL ; -struct sk_buff *skb = *_skb;bool ret = false;skb_pull (skb,sizeof (struct udphdr ));
@@ -244,25 +243,6 @@ static bool rxrpc_input_packet(struct rxreturn rxrpc_bad_message (skb, rxrpc_badmsg_zero_call);if (sp->hdr.seq ==0 )return rxrpc_bad_message (skb, rxrpc_badmsg_zero_seq); - -/* Unshare the packet so that it can be modified for in-place -* decryption. -*/ -if (sp->hdr.securityIndex !=0 ) { - skb =skb_unshare (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); -if (!skb) { -rxrpc_eaten_skb (*_skb, rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare_nomem); - *_skb =NULL ; -return just_discard; - } - -if (skb != *_skb) { -rxrpc_eaten_skb (*_skb, rxrpc_skb_eaten_by_unshare); - *_skb = skb; -rxrpc_new_skb (skb, rxrpc_skb_new_unshared); - sp =rxrpc_skb (skb); - } - }break ;case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE :
@@ -494,7 +474,7 @@ int rxrpc_io_thread(void *data)switch (skb->mark) {case RXRPC_SKB_MARK_PACKET : skb->priority =0 ; -if (!rxrpc_input_packet (local, &skb)) +if (!rxrpc_input_packet (local, skb))rxrpc_reject_packet (local, skb);trace_rxrpc_rx_done (skb->mark, skb->priority);rxrpc_free_skb (skb, rxrpc_skb_put_input);
net/rxrpc/skbuff.c +0 -9
@@ -47,15 +47,6 @@ void rxrpc_get_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, }/* -* Note the dropping of a ref on a socket buffer by the core. -*/ -void rxrpc_eaten_skb (struct sk_buff *skb,enum rxrpc_skb_trace why) -{ -int n =atomic_inc_return (&rxrpc_n_rx_skbs); -trace_rxrpc_skb (skb,0 , n, why); -} - -/* * Note the destruction of a socket buffer. */ void rxrpc_free_skb (struct sk_buff *skb,enum rxrpc_skb_trace why)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 100/307 selftests/landlock: Drain stale audit records on init
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
commit 3647a4977fb73da385e5a29b9775a4749733470d upstream.
Non-audit Landlock tests generate audit records as side effects when audit_enabled is non-zero (e.g. from boot configuration). These records accumulate in the kernel audit backlog while no audit daemon socket is open. When the next test opens a new netlink socket and registers as the audit daemon, the stale backlog is delivered, causing baseline record count checks to fail spuriously.
Fix this by draining all pending records in audit_init() right after setting the receive timeout. The 1-usec SO_RCVTIMEO causes audit_recv() to return -EAGAIN once the backlog is empty, naturally terminating the drain loop.
Domain deallocation records are emitted asynchronously from a work queue, so they may still arrive after the drain. Remove records.domain == 0 checks that are not preceded by audit_match_record() calls, which would otherwise consume stale records before the count. Document this constraint above audit_count_records().
Increasing the drain timeout to catch in-flight deallocation records was considered but rejected: a longer timeout adds latency to every audit_init() call even when no stale record is pending, and any fixed timeout is still not guaranteed to catch all records under load. Removing the unprotected checks is simpler and avoids the spurious failures.
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h | 19 +++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c | 2 - tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c | 1 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c | 1 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h +19 -0
@@ -338,6 +338,15 @@ struct audit_records {size_t domain; }; +/* +* WARNING: Do not assert records.domain == 0 without a preceding +* audit_match_record() call. Domain deallocation records are emitted +* asynchronously from kworker threads and can arrive after the drain in +* audit_init(), corrupting the domain count. A preceding audit_match_record() +* call consumes stale records while scanning, making the assertion safe in +* practice because stale deallocation records arrive before the expected access +* records. +*/ static int audit_count_records (int audit_fd,struct audit_records *records) {struct audit_message msg;
@@ -391,6 +400,16 @@ static int audit_init(void)if (err)return -errno; +/* +* Drains stale audit records that accumulated in the kernel backlog +* while no audit daemon socket was open. This happens when non-audit +* Landlock tests generate records while audit_enabled is non-zero (e.g. +* from boot configuration), or when domain deallocation records arrive +* asynchronously after a previous test's socket was closed. +*/ +while (audit_recv (fd,NULL ) ==0 ) + ; +return fd; }
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c +0 -2
@@ -733,7 +733,6 @@ TEST_F(audit_flags, signal) }else {EXPECT_EQ (1 , records.access); } -EXPECT_EQ (0 , records.domain);/* Updates filter rules to match the drop record. */ set_cap (_metadata,CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL );
@@ -922,7 +921,6 @@ TEST_F(audit_exec, signal_and_open)/* Tests that there was no denial until now. */ EXPECT_EQ (0 ,audit_count_records (self->audit_fd, &records));EXPECT_EQ (0 , records.access); -EXPECT_EQ (0 , records.domain);/* * Wait for the child to do a first denied action by layer1 and
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c +0 -1
@@ -342,7 +342,6 @@ TEST_F(audit, trace)/* Makes sure there is no superfluous logged records. */ EXPECT_EQ (0 ,audit_count_records (self->audit_fd, &records));EXPECT_EQ (0 , records.access); -EXPECT_EQ (0 , records.domain); yama_ptrace_scope =get_yama_ptrace_scope ();ASSERT_LE (0 , yama_ptrace_scope);
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c +0 -1
@@ -312,7 +312,6 @@ TEST_F(scoped_audit, connect_to_child)/* Makes sure there is no superfluous logged records. */ EXPECT_EQ (0 ,audit_count_records (self->audit_fd, &records));EXPECT_EQ (0 , records.access); -EXPECT_EQ (0 , records.domain);ASSERT_EQ (0 ,pipe2 (pipe_child,O_CLOEXEC ));ASSERT_EQ (0 ,pipe2 (pipe_parent,O_CLOEXEC ));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 127/307 rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit 34f61a07e0cdefaecd3ec03bb5fb22215643678f upstream.
Fix rxkad_verify_response() to free the ticket and the server key under all circumstances by initialising the ticket pointer to NULL and then making all paths through the function after the first allocation has been done go through a single common epilogue that just releases everything - where all the releases skip on a NULL pointer.
--- net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +42 -61
@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(structstruct rxrpc_crypt session_key;struct key *server_key;time64_t expiry; -void *ticket; +void *ticket =NULL ;u32 version, kvno, ticket_len, level;__be32 csum;int ret, i;
@@ -1162,13 +1162,13 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct ret = -ENOMEM ; response = kzalloc_obj(struct rxkad_response, GFP_NOFS);if (!response) - goto temporary_error; + goto error;if (skb_copy_bits (skb,sizeof (struct rxrpc_wire_header ), response,sizeof (*response)) <0 ) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADPACKETSHORT , -EPROTO , - rxkad_abort_resp_short); - goto protocol_error; + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADPACKETSHORT , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_short); + goto error; } version =ntohl (response->version);
@@ -1178,62 +1178,62 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(structtrace_rxrpc_rx_response (conn, sp->hdr.serial, version, kvno, ticket_len);if (version !=RXKAD_VERSION ) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADINCONSISTENCY , -EPROTO , - rxkad_abort_resp_version); - goto protocol_error; + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADINCONSISTENCY , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_version); + goto error; }if (ticket_len <4 || ticket_len >MAXKRB5TICKETLEN ) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADTICKETLEN , -EPROTO , - rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_len); - goto protocol_error; + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADTICKETLEN , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_len); + goto error; }if (kvno >=RXKAD_TKT_TYPE_KERBEROS_V5 ) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADUNKNOWNKEY , -EPROTO , - rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt); - goto protocol_error; + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADUNKNOWNKEY , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt); + goto error; }/* extract the kerberos ticket and decrypt and decode it */ ret = -ENOMEM ; ticket =kmalloc (ticket_len,GFP_NOFS );if (!ticket) - goto temporary_error_free_resp; + goto error;if (skb_copy_bits (skb,sizeof (struct rxrpc_wire_header ) +sizeof (*response), ticket, ticket_len) <0 ) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADPACKETSHORT , -EPROTO , - rxkad_abort_resp_short_tkt); - goto protocol_error; + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADPACKETSHORT , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_short_tkt); + goto error; } ret =rxkad_decrypt_ticket (conn, server_key, skb, ticket, ticket_len, &session_key, &expiry);if (ret <0 ) - goto temporary_error_free_ticket; + goto error;/* use the session key from inside the ticket to decrypt the * response */ ret =rxkad_decrypt_response (conn, response, &session_key);if (ret <0 ) - goto temporary_error_free_ticket; + goto error;if (ntohl (response->encrypted.epoch) != conn->proto.epoch ||ntohl (response->encrypted.cid) != conn->proto.cid ||ntohl (response->encrypted.securityIndex) != conn->security_ix) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , -EPROTO , - rxkad_abort_resp_bad_param); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_bad_param); + goto error; } csum = response->encrypted.checksum; response->encrypted.checksum =0 ;rxkad_calc_response_checksum (response);if (response->encrypted.checksum != csum) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , -EPROTO , - rxkad_abort_resp_bad_checksum); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_bad_checksum); + goto error; }for (i =0 ; i <RXRPC_MAXCALLS ; i++) {
@@ -1241,38 +1241,38 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(structu32 counter =READ_ONCE (conn->channels[i].call_counter);if (call_id >INT_MAX ) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , -EPROTO , - rxkad_abort_resp_bad_callid); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_bad_callid); + goto error; }if (call_id < counter) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , -EPROTO , - rxkad_abort_resp_call_ctr); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_call_ctr); + goto error; }if (call_id > counter) {if (conn->channels[i].call) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , -EPROTO , + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , -EPROTO , rxkad_abort_resp_call_state); - goto protocol_error_free; + goto error; } conn->channels[i].call_counter = call_id; } }if (ntohl (response->encrypted.inc_nonce) != conn->rxkad.nonce +1 ) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE , -EPROTO , - rxkad_abort_resp_ooseq); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_ooseq); + goto error; } level =ntohl (response->encrypted.level);if (level >RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT ) { -rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADLEVELFAIL , -EPROTO , - rxkad_abort_resp_level); - goto protocol_error_free; + ret =rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADLEVELFAIL , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_level); + goto error; } conn->security_level = level;
@@ -1280,31 +1280,12 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct* this the connection security can be handled in exactly the same way * as for a client connection */ ret =rxrpc_get_server_data_key (conn, &session_key, expiry, kvno); -if (ret <0 ) - goto temporary_error_free_ticket; - -kfree (ticket); -kfree (response); -_leave (" = 0" ); -return 0 ; - -protocol_error_free: -kfree (ticket); -protocol_error: -kfree (response); -key_put (server_key); -return -EPROTO ; -temporary_error_free_ticket: +error:kfree (ticket); -temporary_error_free_resp:kfree (response); -temporary_error: -/* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as -* ENOMEM. We just want to send the challenge again. Note that we -* also come out this way if the ticket decryption fails. -*/ key_put (server_key); +_leave (" = %d" , ret);return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 128/307 rxrpc: Fix conn-level packet handling to unshare RESPONSE packets
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit 24481a7f573305706054c59e275371f8d0fe919f upstream.
The security operations that verify the RESPONSE packets decrypt bits of it in place - however, the sk_buff may be shared with a packet sniffer, which would lead to the sniffer seeing an apparently corrupt packet (actually decrypted).
Fix this by handing a copy of the packet off to the specific security handler if the packet was cloned.
--- net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +28 -1
@@ -240,6 +240,33 @@ static void rxrpc_call_is_secure(structrxrpc_notify_socket (call); } +static int rxrpc_verify_response (struct rxrpc_connection *conn, +struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +int ret; + +if (skb_cloned (skb)) { +/* Copy the packet if shared so that we can do in-place +* decryption. +*/ +struct sk_buff *nskb =skb_copy (skb,GFP_NOFS ); + +if (nskb) { +rxrpc_new_skb (nskb, rxrpc_skb_new_unshared); + ret = conn->security->verify_response (conn, nskb); +rxrpc_free_skb (nskb, rxrpc_skb_put_response_copy); + }else { +/* OOM - Drop the packet. */ +rxrpc_see_skb (skb, rxrpc_skb_see_unshare_nomem); + ret = -ENOMEM ; + } + }else { + ret = conn->security->verify_response (conn, skb); + } + +return ret; +} +/* * connection-level Rx packet processor */
@@ -270,7 +297,7 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rx }spin_unlock_irq (&conn->state_lock); - ret = conn->security->verify_response (conn, skb); + ret =rxrpc_verify_response (conn, skb);if (ret <0 )return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 129/307 rxrpc: Fix rxkad crypto unalignment handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit def304aae2edf321d2671fd6ca766a93c21f877e upstream.
Fix handling of a packet with a misaligned crypto length. Also handle non-ENOMEM errors from decryption by aborting. Further, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE() so that it can't be remotely triggered (a trace line can still be emitted).
--- include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 1 + net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 9 +++++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +1 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ EM(rxkad_abort_1_short_encdata, "rxkad1-short-encdata") \ EM(rxkad_abort_1_short_header, "rxkad1-short-hdr") \ EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_check, "rxkad2-short-check") \ + EM(rxkad_abort_2_crypto_unaligned, "rxkad2-crypto-unaligned") \ EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_data, "rxkad2-short-data") \ EM(rxkad_abort_2_short_header, "rxkad2-short-hdr") \EM (rxkad_abort_2_short_len,"rxkad2-short-len" ) \
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +7 -2
@@ -510,6 +510,9 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(structreturn rxrpc_abort_eproto (call, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , rxkad_abort_2_short_header); +/* Don't let the crypto algo see a misaligned length. */ + sp->len =round_down (sp->len,8 ); +/* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt * directly into the target buffer. */
@@ -543,8 +546,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(structif (sg != _sg)kfree (sg);if (ret <0 ) { -WARN_ON_ONCE (ret != -ENOMEM ); -return ret; +if (ret == -ENOMEM ) +return ret; +return rxrpc_abort_eproto (call, skb,RXKADSEALEDINCON , + rxkad_abort_2_crypto_unaligned); }/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 130/307 rxrpc: Fix error handling in rxgk_extract_token()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit 3476c8bb960f48e49355d6f93fb7673211e0163f upstream.
Fix a missing bit of error handling in rxgk_extract_token(): in the event that rxgk_decrypt_skb() returns -ENOMEM, it should just return that rather than continuing on (for anything else, it generates an abort).
--- net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/rxrpc/rxgk_app.c +1 -0
@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ int rxgk_extract_token(struct rxrpc_connif (ret != -ENOMEM )return rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb, ec, ret, rxgk_abort_resp_tok_dec); +return ret; } ret = conn->security->default_decode_ticket(conn, skb, ticket_offset,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 131/307 rxrpc: Fix re-decryption of RESPONSE packets
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit 0422e7a4883f25101903f3e8105c0808aa5f4ce9 upstream.
If a RESPONSE packet gets a temporary failure during processing, it may end up in a partially decrypted state - and then get requeued for a retry.
Fix this by just discarding the packet; we will send another CHALLENGE packet and thereby elicit a further response. Similarly, discard an incoming CHALLENGE packet if we get an error whilst generating a RESPONSE; the server will send another CHALLENGE.
--- include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 1 - net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 14 ++------------ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +0 -1
@@ -285,7 +285,6 @@ EM(rxrpc_conn_put_unidle, "PUT unidle ") \ EM(rxrpc_conn_put_work, "PUT work ") \ EM(rxrpc_conn_queue_challenge, "QUE chall ") \ - EM(rxrpc_conn_queue_retry_work, "QUE retry-wk") \ EM(rxrpc_conn_queue_rx_work, "QUE rx-work ") \ EM(rxrpc_conn_see_new_service_conn, "SEE new-svc ") \EM (rxrpc_conn_see_reap_service,"SEE reap-svc" ) \
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +2 -12
@@ -389,7 +389,6 @@ again:static void rxrpc_do_process_connection (struct rxrpc_connection *conn) {struct sk_buff *skb; -int ret;if (test_and_clear_bit (RXRPC_CONN_EV_CHALLENGE , &conn->events))rxrpc_secure_connection (conn);
@@ -398,17 +397,8 @@ static void rxrpc_do_process_connection(* connection that each one has when we've finished with it */ while ((skb =skb_dequeue (&conn->rx_queue))) {rxrpc_see_skb (skb, rxrpc_skb_see_conn_work); - ret =rxrpc_process_event (conn, skb); -switch (ret) { -case -ENOMEM : -case -EAGAIN : -skb_queue_head (&conn->rx_queue, skb); -rxrpc_queue_conn (conn, rxrpc_conn_queue_retry_work); -break ; -default : -rxrpc_free_skb (skb, rxrpc_skb_put_conn_work); -break ; - } +rxrpc_process_event (conn, skb); +rxrpc_free_skb (skb, rxrpc_skb_put_conn_work); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 101/307 selftests/landlock: Fix format warning for __u64 in net_test
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
commit a060ac0b8c3345639f5f4a01e2c435d34adf7e3d upstream.
On architectures where __u64 is unsigned long (e.g. powerpc64), using %llx to format a __u64 triggers a -Wformat warning because %llx expects unsigned long long. Cast the argument to unsigned long long.
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c +1 -1
@@ -1356,7 +1356,7 @@ TEST_F(mini, network_access_rights) &net_port, 0)) {TH_LOG ("Failed to add rule with access 0x%llx: %s" , - access,strerror (errno)); + (unsigned long long )access,strerror (errno)); } }EXPECT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 102/307 selftests/landlock: Fix snprintf truncation checks in audit helpers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
commit b566f7a4f0e4f15f78f2e5fac273fa954991e03a upstream.
snprintf() returns the number of characters that would have been written, excluding the terminating NUL byte. When the output is truncated, this return value equals or exceeds the buffer size. Fix matches_log_domain_allocated() and matches_log_domain_deallocated() to detect truncation with ">=" instead of ">".
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h +2 -2
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused matches_log_do log_match_len =snprintf (log_match,sizeof (log_match), log_template, pid); -if (log_match_len >sizeof (log_match)) +if (log_match_len >=sizeof (log_match))return -E2BIG ; return audit_match_record(audit_fd, AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN, log_match,
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused matches_log_do log_match_len =snprintf (log_match,sizeof (log_match), log_template, num_denials); -if (log_match_len >sizeof (log_match)) +if (log_match_len >=sizeof (log_match))return -E2BIG ; return audit_match_record(audit_fd, AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN, log_match,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 103/307 selftests/landlock: Skip stale records in audit_match_record()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
commit 07c2572a87573b2a2f0fd6b9f538cd1aeef2eee7 upstream.
Domain deallocation records are emitted asynchronously from kworker threads (via free_ruleset_work()). Stale deallocation records from a previous test can arrive during the current test's deallocation read loop and be picked up by audit_match_record() instead of the expected record, causing a domain ID mismatch. The audit.layers test (which creates 16 nested domains) is particularly vulnerable because it reads 16 deallocation records in sequence, providing a large window for stale records to interleave.
The same issue affects audit_flags.signal, where deallocation records from a previous test (audit.layers) can leak into the next test and be picked up by audit_match_record() instead of the expected record.
Fix this by continuing to read records when the type matches but the content pattern does not. Stale records are silently consumed, and the loop only stops when both type and pattern match (or the socket times out with -EAGAIN).
Additionally, extend matches_log_domain_deallocated() with an expected_domain_id parameter. When set, the regex pattern includes the specific domain ID as a literal hex value, so that deallocation records for a different domain do not match the pattern at all. This handles the case where the stale record has the same denial count as the expected one (e.g. both have denials=1), which the type+pattern loop alone cannot distinguish. Callers that already know the expected domain ID (from a prior denial or allocation record) now pass it to filter precisely.
When expected_domain_id is set, matches_log_domain_deallocated() also temporarily increases the socket timeout to audit_tv_dom_drop (1 second) to wait for the asynchronous kworker deallocation, and restores audit_tv_default afterward. This removes the need for callers to manage the timeout switch manually.
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h | 84 +++++++++++++++++++------- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c | 34 ++++------ 2 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h +63 -21
@@ -249,9 +249,9 @@ static __maybe_unused char *regex_escapestatic int audit_match_record (int audit_fd,const __u16 type,const char *const pattern,__u64 *domain_id) { -struct audit_message msg; +struct audit_message msg, last_mismatch = {};int ret, err =0 ; -bool matches_record = !type; +int num_type_match =0 ;regmatch_t matches[2 ];regex_t regex;
@@ -259,21 +259,35 @@ static int audit_match_record(int audit_if (ret)return -EINVAL ; -do { +/* +* Reads records until one matches both the expected type and the +* pattern. Type-matching records with non-matching content are +* silently consumed, which handles stale domain deallocation records +* from a previous test emitted asynchronously by kworker threads. +*/ +while (true) {memset (&msg,0 ,sizeof (msg)); err =audit_recv (audit_fd, &msg); -if (err) +if (err) { +if (num_type_match) { +printf ("DATA: %s\n" , last_mismatch.data); +printf ("ERROR: %d record(s) matched type %u" +" but not pattern: %s\n" , + num_type_match, type, pattern); + } goto out; + } + +if (type && msg.header.nlmsg_type != type) +continue ; -if (msg.header.nlmsg_type == type) - matches_record = true; - }while (!matches_record); - - ret =regexec (®ex, msg.data,ARRAY_SIZE (matches), matches,0 ); -if (ret) { -printf ("DATA: %s\n" , msg.data); -printf ("ERROR: no match for pattern: %s\n" , pattern); - err = -ENOENT ; + ret =regexec (®ex, msg.data,ARRAY_SIZE (matches), matches, +0 ); +if (!ret) +break ; + + num_type_match++; + last_mismatch = msg; }if (domain_id) {
@@ -316,21 +330,49 @@ static int __maybe_unused matches_log_do domain_id); } -static int __maybe_unused matches_log_domain_deallocated ( -int audit_fd,unsigned int num_denials,__u64 *domain_id) +/* +* Matches a domain deallocation record. When expected_domain_id is non-zero, +* the pattern includes the specific domain ID so that stale deallocation +* records from a previous test (with a different domain ID) are skipped by +* audit_match_record(), and the socket timeout is temporarily increased to +* audit_tv_dom_drop to wait for the asynchronous kworker deallocation. +*/ +static int __maybe_unused +matches_log_domain_deallocated (int audit_fd,unsigned int num_denials, +__u64 expected_domain_id,__u64 *domain_id) {static const char log_template[] =REGEX_LANDLOCK_PREFIX " status=deallocated denials=%u$" ; -char log_match[sizeof (log_template) +10 ]; -int log_match_len; +static const char log_template_with_id[] = +"^audit([0-9.:]\\+): domain=\\(%llx\\)" +" status=deallocated denials=%u$" ; +char log_match[sizeof (log_template_with_id) +32 ]; +int log_match_len, err; + +if (expected_domain_id) + log_match_len =snprintf (log_match,sizeof (log_match), + log_template_with_id, + (unsigned long long )expected_domain_id, + num_denials); +else + log_match_len =snprintf (log_match,sizeof (log_match), + log_template, num_denials); - log_match_len =snprintf (log_match,sizeof (log_match), log_template, - num_denials);if (log_match_len >=sizeof (log_match))return -E2BIG ; -return audit_match_record (audit_fd,AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN , log_match, - domain_id); +if (expected_domain_id) +setsockopt (audit_fd,SOL_SOCKET ,SO_RCVTIMEO , + &audit_tv_dom_drop,sizeof (audit_tv_dom_drop)); + + err =audit_match_record (audit_fd,AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN , log_match, + domain_id); + +if (expected_domain_id) +setsockopt (audit_fd,SOL_SOCKET ,SO_RCVTIMEO , &audit_tv_default, +sizeof (audit_tv_default)); + +return err; }struct audit_records {
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c +15 -19
@@ -139,23 +139,24 @@ TEST_F(audit, layers) WEXITSTATUS(status) != EXIT_SUCCESS) _metadata->exit_code =KSFT_FAIL ; -/* Purges log from deallocated domains. */ -EXPECT_EQ (0 ,setsockopt (self->audit_fd,SOL_SOCKET ,SO_RCVTIMEO , - &audit_tv_dom_drop,sizeof (audit_tv_dom_drop))); +/* +* Purges log from deallocated domains. Records arrive in LIFO order +* (innermost domain first) because landlock_put_hierarchy() walks the +* chain sequentially in a single kworker context. +*/ for (i =ARRAY_SIZE (*domain_stack) -1 ; i >=0 ; i--) {__u64 deallocated_dom =2 ;EXPECT_EQ (0 ,matches_log_domain_deallocated (self->audit_fd,1 , + (*domain_stack)[i], &deallocated_dom)); EXPECT_EQ((*domain_stack)[i], deallocated_dom) {TH_LOG ("Failed to match domain %llx (#%d)" , - (*domain_stack)[i], i); + (unsigned long long )(*domain_stack)[i], i); } }EXPECT_EQ (0 ,munmap (domain_stack,sizeof (*domain_stack))); -EXPECT_EQ (0 ,setsockopt (self->audit_fd,SOL_SOCKET ,SO_RCVTIMEO , - &audit_tv_default,sizeof (audit_tv_default)));EXPECT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); }
@@ -271,13 +272,9 @@ TEST_F(audit, thread)EXPECT_EQ (0 ,close (pipe_parent[1 ]));ASSERT_EQ (0 ,pthread_join (thread,NULL )); -EXPECT_EQ (0 ,setsockopt (self->audit_fd,SOL_SOCKET ,SO_RCVTIMEO , - &audit_tv_dom_drop,sizeof (audit_tv_dom_drop))); -EXPECT_EQ (0 ,matches_log_domain_deallocated (self->audit_fd,1 , - &deallocated_dom)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,matches_log_domain_deallocated ( + self->audit_fd,1 , denial_dom, &deallocated_dom));EXPECT_EQ (denial_dom, deallocated_dom); -EXPECT_EQ (0 ,setsockopt (self->audit_fd,SOL_SOCKET ,SO_RCVTIMEO , - &audit_tv_default,sizeof (audit_tv_default))); }/*
@@ -753,22 +750,21 @@ TEST_F(audit_flags, signal)if (variant->restrict_flags &LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF ) { +/* +* No deallocation record: denials=0 never matches a real +* record. +*/ EXPECT_EQ (-EAGAIN , -matches_log_domain_deallocated (self->audit_fd,0 , +matches_log_domain_deallocated (self->audit_fd,0 ,0 , &deallocated_dom));EXPECT_EQ (deallocated_dom,2 ); }else { -EXPECT_EQ (0 ,setsockopt (self->audit_fd,SOL_SOCKET ,SO_RCVTIMEO , - &audit_tv_dom_drop, -sizeof (audit_tv_dom_drop)));EXPECT_EQ (0 ,matches_log_domain_deallocated (self->audit_fd,2 , + *self->domain_id, &deallocated_dom));EXPECT_NE (deallocated_dom,2 );EXPECT_NE (deallocated_dom,0 );EXPECT_EQ (deallocated_dom, *self->domain_id); -EXPECT_EQ (0 ,setsockopt (self->audit_fd,SOL_SOCKET ,SO_RCVTIMEO , - &audit_tv_default, -sizeof (audit_tv_default))); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 104/307 rbd: fix null-ptr-deref when device_add_disk() fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dawei Feng <[email protected]>
commit d1fef92e414433ca7b89abf85cb0df42b8d475eb upstream.
do_rbd_add() publishes the device with device_add() before calling device_add_disk(). If device_add_disk() fails after device_add() succeeds, the error path calls rbd_free_disk() directly and then later falls through to rbd_dev_device_release(), which calls rbd_free_disk() again. This double teardown can leave blk-mq cleanup operating on invalid state and trigger a null-ptr-deref in __blk_mq_free_map_and_rqs(), reached from blk_mq_free_tag_set().
Fix this by following the normal remove ordering: call device_del() before rbd_dev_device_release() when device_add_disk() fails after device_add(). That keeps the teardown sequence consistent and avoids re-entering disk cleanup through the wrong path.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available.
We reproduced the bug on v7.0 with a real Ceph backend and a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. The reproducer confines failslab injections to the __add_disk() range and injects fail-nth while mapping an RBD image through /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major.
On the unpatched kernel, fail-nth=4 reliably triggered the fault:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 273 Comm: bash Not tainted 7.0.0-01247-gd60bc1401583 #6 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__blk_mq_free_map_and_rqs+0x8c/0x240 Code: 00 00 48 8b 6b 60 41 89 f4 49 c1 e4 03 4c 01 e5 45 85 ed 0f 85 0a 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 e9 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 31 01 00 00 4c 8b 6d 00 4d 85 ed 0f 84 e2 00 00 RSP: 0018:ff1100000ab0fac8 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ff1100000c4806a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff1100000c4806f4 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffe21c000189001b R10: ff1100000c4800df R11: ff1100006cf37be0 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ff1100000c480700 R15: ff1100000c480004 FS: 00007f0fbe8fe740(0000) GS:ff110000e5851000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe53473b2e0 CR3: 0000000012eef000 CR4: 00000000007516f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> blk_mq_free_tag_set+0x77/0x460 do_rbd_add+0x1446/0x2b80 ? __pfx_do_rbd_add+0x10/0x10 ? lock_acquire+0x18c/0x300 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? sysfs_file_kobj+0xb6/0x1b0 ? __pfx_sysfs_kf_write+0x10/0x10 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x2f4/0x4a0 vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000 ? expand_files+0x51f/0x850 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ksys_write+0xf2/0x1d0 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x690 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f0fbea15907 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffe22346ea8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000058 RCX: 00007f0fbea15907 RDX: 0000000000000058 RSI: 0000563ace6c0ef0 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000563ace6c0ef0 R08: 0000563ace6c0ef0 R09: 6b6435726d694141 R10: 5250337279762f78 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000058 R13: 00007f0fbeb1c780 R14: ff1100000c480700 R15: ff1100000c480004 </TASK>
With this fix applied, rerunning the reproducer over fail-nth=1..256 yields no KASAN reports.
[ idryomov: rename err_out_device_del -> err_out_device ]
--- drivers/block/rbd.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/block/rbd.c +3 -3
@@ -7165,7 +7165,7 @@ static ssize_t do_rbd_add(const char *bu rc =device_add_disk (&rbd_dev->dev, rbd_dev->disk,NULL );if (rc) - goto err_out_cleanup_disk; + goto err_out_device;spin_lock (&rbd_dev_list_lock);list_add_tail (&rbd_dev->node, &rbd_dev_list);
@@ -7179,8 +7179,8 @@ out:module_put (THIS_MODULE );return rc; -err_out_cleanup_disk: -rbd_free_disk (rbd_dev); +err_out_device: +device_del (&rbd_dev->dev); err_out_image_lock:rbd_dev_image_unlock (rbd_dev);rbd_dev_device_release (rbd_dev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 105/307 mm/zone_device: do not touch device folio after calling ->folio_free()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthew Brost <[email protected]>
commit 39928984956037cabd304321cb8f342e47421db5 upstream.
The contents of a device folio can immediately change after calling ->folio_free(), as the folio may be reallocated by a driver with a different order. Instead of touching the folio again to extract the pgmap, use the local stack variable when calling percpu_ref_put_many().
--- mm/memremap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/memremap.c +1 -1
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ void free_zone_device_folio(struct folioif (WARN_ON_ONCE (!pgmap->ops || !pgmap->ops->folio_free))break ; pgmap->ops->folio_free (folio); -percpu_ref_put_many (&folio->pgmap->ref, nr); +percpu_ref_put_many (&pgmap->ref, nr);break ;case MEMORY_DEVICE_GENERIC :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 106/307 block: fix zone write plugs refcount handling in disk_zone_wplug_schedule_bio_work()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
commit 0a8b8af896e0ef83e188e1fe20f98f2bbb1c2459 upstream.
The function disk_zone_wplug_schedule_bio_work() always takes a reference on the zone write plug of the BIO work being scheduled. This ensures that the zone write plug cannot be freed while the BIO work is being scheduled but has not run yet. However, this unconditional reference taking is fragile since the reference taken is released by the BIO work blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() function, which implies that there always must be a 1:1 relation between the work being scheduled and the work running.
Make sure to drop the reference taken when scheduling the BIO work if the work is already scheduled, that is, when queue_work() returns false.
--- block/blk-zoned.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
block/blk-zoned.c +8 -4
@@ -1198,13 +1198,17 @@ static void disk_zone_wplug_schedule_biolockdep_assert_held (&zwplug->lock);/* -* Take a reference on the zone write plug and schedule the submission -* of the next plugged BIO. blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() will release the -* reference we take here. +* Schedule the submission of the next plugged BIO. Taking a reference +* to the zone write plug is required as the bio_work belongs to the +* plug, and thus we must ensure that the write plug does not go away +* while the work is being scheduled but has not run yet. +* blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() will release the reference we take here, +* and we also drop this reference if the work is already scheduled. */ WARN_ON_ONCE (!(zwplug->flags &BLK_ZONE_WPLUG_PLUGGED ));refcount_inc (&zwplug->ref); -queue_work (disk->zone_wplugs_wq, &zwplug->bio_work); +if (!queue_work (disk->zone_wplugs_wq, &zwplug->bio_work)) +disk_put_zone_wplug (zwplug); } static inline void disk_zone_wplug_add_bio(struct gendisk *disk,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 97/307 selftests/mqueue: Fix incorrectly named file
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Simon Liebold <[email protected]>
commit 64fac99037689020ad97e472ae898e96ea3616dc upstream.
Commit 85506aca2eb4 ("selftests/mqueue: Set timeout to 180 seconds") intended to increase the timeout for mq_perf_tests from the default kselftest limit of 45 seconds to 180 seconds.
Unfortunately, the file storing this information was incorrectly named setting instead of settings, causing the kselftest runner not to pick up the limit and keep using the default 45 seconds limit.
Fix this by renaming it to settings to ensure that the kselftest runner uses the increased timeout of 180 seconds for this test.
---
tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/{setting => settings} | 0
tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/setting | 1 -
tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/settings | 1 +
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/{setting => settings} (100%)tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/setting deleted +0 -1
@@ -1 +0,0 @@ -timeout=180
tools/testing/selftests/mqueue/settings new file +1 -0
@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +timeout=180
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 133/307 EDAC/versalnet: Fix memory leak in remove and probe error paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman7.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Prasanna Kumar T S M <[email protected]>
commit 1b6f292cb94d95c9bc22e1efe592daf62c60bc2e upstream.
The mcdi object allocated using kzalloc() in the setup_mcdi() is not freed in the remove path or in probe's error handling path leading to a memory leak. Fix it by freeing the allocated memory.
--- drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/edac/versalnet_edac.c +2 -0
@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ static int mc_probe(struct platform_devi err_init:cdx_mcdi_finish (priv->mcdi); +kfree (priv->mcdi); err_unreg:unregister_rpmsg_driver (&amd_rpmsg_driver);
@@ -938,6 +939,7 @@ static void mc_remove(struct platform_deremove_versalnet (priv);rproc_shutdown (priv->mcdi->r5_rproc);cdx_mcdi_finish (priv->mcdi); +kfree (priv->mcdi); }static const struct of_device_id amd_edac_match[] = {