cve-exclusions: triage eight kernel CVEs lacking upstream fix data
v4 cover cve-exclusions: triage eight kernel CVEs lacking upstream fix data
This is v4 of the kernel CVE triage from Paul Barker's "linux-yocto CVEs in need of triage" request, reworked according to his review of v3 [1].
Changes since v3:
- Seven entries adopt the comment and CVE_STATUS wordings suggested in [1], including triage dates and distribution tracker links in the .inc comments; the CVE-2022-1247 entry was approved as-is and is unchanged. Commit message detail flagged as unnecessary or time-consuming to validate is dropped. One deviation: the CVE-2023-6238 status reads "Proposed fix was not merged" rather than "withdrawn" - the fix was backed out by the nvme maintainer, not withdrawn by its author - matching the comment above the entry.
- CVE-2022-0400 stays out of this series as agreed. Red Hat PSIRT has since answered the request for details (ticket PSIRTSUPT-22046) and named the affected code; it is the issue fixed in v6.13 that upstream tracks as CVE-2024-49568, with the details recorded on the public bug [2]. A separate patch records the fixed-version status.
Summary of the eight verdicts:
fixed-version CVE-2022-1247 6.17, rose_neigh refcount conversion
unpatched CVE-2019-14899 weak host model, no upstream fix
CVE-2021-3714 inherent to KSM deduplication
CVE-2021-3864 proposed fixes not merged
CVE-2022-4543 EntryBleed, no fix proposed
CVE-2023-3397 JFS UAF, proposed fix withdrawn
CVE-2023-6238 NVMe passthrough, fix not merged
CVE-2023-6240 Marvin oracle, fixed only in RHELAI assistance is disclosed with the AI-Generated trailer on each patch.
Once these are settled I can prepare the wrynose and scarthgap backports.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
[2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
Junjie Cao (8):
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2019-14899
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3714
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3864
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-1247
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-4543
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-3397
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6238
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6240
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v4 1/8 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2019-14899
A network-adjacent attacker can send packets addressed to a host's VPN tunnel address over the physical interface. Because Linux uses the weak host model by default, the host replies, which lets the attacker infer the tunnel address, confirm active connections and eventually inject into the tunneled TCP stream.
No upstream kernel fix exists. Ubuntu has the fix deferred since 2019-12-13, Debian does not track it against the kernel, and Red Hat scopes it to openvpn:
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2019-14899
Record it unpatched so it stays visible rather than excluded.
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
v4:
- use the review's comment and status wording; drop the mitigation discussion
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +5 -0
@@ -192,3 +192,8 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-68195] = "fixed-version: Fixed from 6.18" # Fix https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4b64fda4d30a83a7f00e92a0c8a1d47699609f3 # Backport https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75c5d9bce072abbbc09b701a49869ac23c34a906 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-71145] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed from v6.18.3" + +# Triaged August 2026 - no upstream fix, Ubuntu fix deferred +# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14899] = "unpatched: Consequence of the default weak host \ +model, no upstream fix"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v4 2/8 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3714
In reply to Junjie CaoKSM merges identical anonymous pages across processes. An attacker who can place chosen page-sized content in a victim's memory can detect the merge through the timing of the resulting copy-on-write fault, and so leak memory contents.
There is no upstream fix; removing the side channel means removing deduplication. Distribution trackers describe it the same way - Debian marks src:linux unfixed with "Inherent design limitation, can be avoided by not using KSM", Red Hat closed its bug WONTFIX, and Ubuntu records no upstream fix as of 2024-06-17:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1931327
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3714
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
v4:
- use the review's comment and status wording; drop the KSM runtime opt-in paragraph
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +9 -0
@@ -197,3 +197,12 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-71145] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed from v6.18.3" # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14899] = "unpatched: Consequence of the default weak host \ model, no upstream fix" + +# Triaged August 2026 - no upstream fix, Debian says "Inherent design +# limitation, can be avoided by not using KSM", Red Hat closed their bug as +# WONTFIX. +# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714 +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1931327 +# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3714 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3714] = "unpatched: Timing side channel inherent to Kernel \ +Same-page Merging (KSM) page deduplication"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v4 3/8 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3864
In reply to Junjie Caobegin_new_exec() resets dumpability to owner-dumpable whenever the real and effective ids match at exec time. A binary exec'd by a setuid program that has already called setuid(0) therefore becomes dumpable as root, and with a relative core_pattern plus an attacker-controlled working directory the resulting core file can be dropped into a privileged directory such as /etc/logrotate.d.
Full report with proof of concept:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/10/20/2
Two fixes were proposed and neither was merged. Waiman Long's patch was judged "not a particularly effective mitigation" by Eric W. Biederman and the discussion went quiet by early 2022; Wander Lairson Costa's RFC v2 received design feedback and no v3 followed:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
v4:
- use the review's comment and status wording; drop the coredump path analysis paragraph
- quote Biederman's assessment verbatim
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +8 -0
@@ -206,3 +206,11 @@ model, no upstream fix" # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3714 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3714] = "unpatched: Timing side channel inherent to Kernel \ Same-page Merging (KSM) page deduplication" + +# Triaged August 2026 - Two fixes proposed upstream but neither was merged, +# attempts to fix seem to have petered out. Unfixed in Debian/Ubuntu. +# https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ +# https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ +# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3864 +# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3864 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3864] = "unpatched: Proposed fixes were not merged upstream"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v4 5/8 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-4543
In reply to Junjie CaoKPTI clones the kernel entry text into the user page tables at its KASLR-slid address and, on CPUs with PGE, sets the global bit on those entries. The translation survives the CR3 write on kernel exit, and a local attacker can time prefetch instructions across the kernel range to recover the KASLR base in under a second.
Disclosure and write-up:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/12/16/3
https://www.willsroot.io/2022/12/entrybleed.html
The disclosure states that after discussion with [email protected] and linux-distros "a fix for this is currently not available", and none has appeared since; arch/x86/mm/pti.c still clones the entry text and sets _PAGE_GLOBAL on the cloned mapping. Debian notes "Ignored upstream and KASLR is not expected to be resistant to local attacks"; Ubuntu has the fix deferred since 2023-01-10:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-4543
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2022-4543
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
v4:
- use the review's comment and status wording; drop the cpu_entry_area commit reference
- tighten the mechanism wording and the timing claim to match the cited sources
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +9 -0
@@ -222,3 +222,12 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3864] = "unpatched: Proposed fixes were not merged upstream" # Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/d860d1faa6b2ce3becfdb8b0c2b048ad31800061 # Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/da9c9c877597170b929a6121a68dcd3dd9a80f45 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17" + +# Triaged August 2026 - "EntryBleed", discussed with the kernel security team +# but no fix appears to have been published since then. Debian says "Ignored +# upstream and KASLR is not expected to be resistant to local attacks", fix +# deferred in Ubuntu. +# https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/12/16/3 +# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-4543 +# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2022-4543 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-4543] = "unpatched: No fix has been proposed"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v4 4/8 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-1247
In reply to Junjie CaoThe CVE describes a race between rose_connect() and the code that frees a rose_neigh once its count and use fields reach zero. The race in the original report [1] is the one fixed independently in v6.17 by the rose_neigh refcount conversion:
https://git.kernel.org/linus/d860d1faa6b2ce3becfdb8b0c2b048ad31800061
("net: rose: convert 'use' field to refcount_t", v6.17)
https://git.kernel.org/linus/da9c9c877597170b929a6121a68dcd3dd9a80f45
("net: rose: include node references in rose_neigh refcount", v6.17)
The Linux kernel CVE team assigned these commits CVE-2025-39826 and CVE-2025-39827.
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2066799
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
v4:
- simplify the explanation as suggested; reference the original report instead of arguing from the commit diffs
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +8 -0
@@ -214,3 +214,11 @@ Same-page Merging (KSM) page deduplication" # https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3864 # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3864 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3864] = "unpatched: Proposed fixes were not merged upstream" + +# net/rose and rose_connect() were removed entirely in v7.1 (dd8d4bc28ad7). +# The 6.18 kernel on master still carries net/rose; there the race is +# closed by the v6.17 refcount conversion, which upstream tracks as +# CVE-2025-39826 / CVE-2025-39827. +# Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/d860d1faa6b2ce3becfdb8b0c2b048ad31800061 +# Fix https://git.kernel.org/linus/da9c9c877597170b929a6121a68dcd3dd9a80f45 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v4 6/8 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-3397
In reply to Junjie CaotxEnd() in fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c reads the log pointer from the superblock info, drops TXN_LOCK and then takes log->gclock, while lmLogClose() can free that log during umount.
No fix has been merged. The 2023 proposal was withdrawn by its author ("I think my fix method is not a good solution"), and proposals in 2026 for similar jfs slab use-after-free races are unreviewed:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
A similar use-after-free was reported against 7.0-rc1 in June 2026, with the free stack in lmLogClose() via jfs_umount(), and syzbot has an open slab use-after-free write in lmLogSync(); the txEnd() sequence is unchanged in linux-next 20260727:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ea7ed3bb2f444cb4dfeb
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
v4:
- describe the 2026 proposals and reports as similar races rather than the same one; drop the kernel-cache configuration paragraph; use the review's comment and status wording
- name the open syzbot bug as the lmLogSync write rather than the txEnd write
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +9 -0
@@ -231,3 +231,12 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-1247] = "fixed-version: Fixed from version 6.17" # https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-4543 # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2022-4543 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-4543] = "unpatched: No fix has been proposed" + +# Triaged August 2026 - Originally proposed fix was withdrawn, similar +# slab-use-after-free appears to have been re-found by syzkaller in 2026. +# Unfixed in Debian, "needs evaluation" in Ubuntu. +# https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAJedcCzmx02bfa22QezE8mu-iDsSdSy_oApT2ozCWO8O-8MJEQ@mail.gmail.com/ +# https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ea7ed3bb2f444cb4dfeb +# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-3397 +# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-3397 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-3397] = "unpatched: Proposed fix was withdrawn"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v4 7/8 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6238
In reply to Junjie CaoNVME_IOCTL_IO_CMD and the io_uring passthrough path have never checked the user-supplied metadata length against the number of blocks and the namespace metadata size that the device uses to size the transfer, so the device can DMA past the end of the buffer. 855b7717f44b ("nvme:
fine-granular CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nvme io commands", v6.2) let users with write access to the device node issue the ioctl, turning the missing check into an exposure; kernels before v6.2 are not affected, as Debian concluded independently:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6238
A fix removing unprivileged passthrough was proposed but not merged to mainline, and nvme_map_user_request() still passes the metadata length to blk_rq_integrity_map_user() with no cross-check:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
v4:
- rework the explanation around 855b7717f44b making the ioctl reachable, per review; drop the applied-then-backed-out narrative
- status reads "Proposed fix was not merged" rather than "withdrawn", as flagged on the v3 thread: the fix was backed out by the nvme maintainer, not withdrawn by its author
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +10 -0
@@ -240,3 +240,13 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-4543] = "unpatched: No fix has been proposed" # https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-3397 # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-3397 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-3397] = "unpatched: Proposed fix was withdrawn" + +# Triaged August 2026 - Issue was introduced by kernel commit 855b7717f44b +# ("nvme: fine-granular CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nvme io commands") in Linux v6.2. +# Linux 6.1 and earlier not affected. Unfixed in recent Debian/Ubuntu releases +# which use affected kernels. There was a fix proposed, but it was not merged +# to mainline. +# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6238 +# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-6238 +# https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/ +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6238] = "unpatched: Proposed fix was not merged"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v4 8/8 cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6240
In reply to Junjie Cao"Marvin" is Hubert Kario's Bleichenbacher-style timing oracle research:
https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/
The affected code is the generic software RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 unpadding in crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c. pkcs1pad_decrypt_complete() has three secret-dependent early exits (leading zero byte, block type, minimum padding length) and a loop whose trip count depends on the position of the separator, so the time taken reveals padding validity. There is no constant-time unpadding or implicit-rejection fallback in the tree.
Red Hat classifies it CWE-203 and has shipped fixes only in RHEL errata (RHSA-2024:2758, RHSA-2024:3618 and others); the bugzilla is still NEW. Ubuntu records "appears unfixed in upstream as of 2024.08.24" and Debian lists src:linux vulnerable in all suites:
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-6240
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-6240
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6240
CC: Paul Barker <[email protected]>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
---
v4:
- drop the practical-exposure paragraph; use the review's comment and status wording
- quote Ubuntu's note verbatim
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc +10 -0
@@ -250,3 +250,13 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-3397] = "unpatched: Proposed fix was withdrawn" # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-6238 # https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/[email protected]/ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6238] = "unpatched: Proposed fix was not merged" + +# Triaged August 2026 - "Marvin" attack, Red Hat reports this fixed but the +# exact patch is unidentified (see RHSA-2024:2758, RHSA-2024:3618 & others). +# Unfixed in Debian, "Needs evaluation" in Ubuntu. +# https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/ +# https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2023-6240 +# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-6240 +# https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-6240 +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-6240] = "unpatched: Fixed in RHEL but patch not identified \ +publicly"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 43 lines · Junjie Cao
This is v4 of the kernel CVE triage from Paul Barker's "linux-yocto CVEs in need of triage" request, reworked according to his review of v3 [1].
Changes since v3:
- Seven entries adopt the comment and
CVE_STATUSwordings suggested in [1], including triage dates and distribution tracker links in the .inc comments; the CVE-2022-1247 entry was approved as-is and is unchanged. Commit message detail flagged as unnecessary or time-consuming to validate is dropped. One deviation: the CVE-2023-6238 status reads "Proposed fix was not merged" rather than "withdrawn" - the fix was backed out by the nvme maintainer, not withdrawn by its author - matching the comment above the entry.- CVE-2022-0400 stays out of this series as agreed. Red Hat PSIRT has since answered the request for details (ticket PSIRTSUPT-22046) and named the affected code; it is the issue fixed in v6.13 that upstream tracks as CVE-2024-49568, with the details recorded on the public bug [2]. A separate patch records the fixed-version status.
Summary of the eight verdicts:
fixed-version CVE-2022-1247 6.17, rose_neigh refcount conversion unpatched CVE-2019-14899 weak host model, no upstream fix CVE-2021-3714 inherent to KSM deduplication CVE-2021-3864 proposed fixes not merged CVE-2022-4543 EntryBleed, no fix proposed CVE-2023-3397 JFS UAF, proposed fix withdrawn CVE-2023-6238 NVMe passthrough, fix not merged CVE-2023-6240 Marvin oracle, fixed only in RHELAI assistance is disclosed with the AI-Generated trailer on each patch.
Once these are settled I can prepare the wrynose and scarthgap backports.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
[2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044575v3: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/[email protected]/
Quoted 9 lines
Junjie Cao (8):
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2019-14899
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3714
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3864
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-1247
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-4543
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-3397
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6238
cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6240
These all look good to me now, thanks for working through them!
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Paul Barker