Basic guest memory introspection support
v11 cover Basic guest memory introspection support
I apologize, I've sent this as a duplicate V10.
Here it is, resent (correctly) as V11. Sorry.
As stated originally, we had to modify Xen in order to be able to detect rootkits in HVM guests, in a way that allows an application that runs in dom0 (or a similarly privileged domain) to control what the guest is allowed to do once a threat is detected. This has been done over the mem_event mechanism.
To this end, we needed to:
1. Be able to execute the current instruction without allowing it to write to memory. This is done based on new mem_event response fields sent from the controlling application.
2. Have the guest as responsive as possible amid all the processing. So we had to cache some information with each mem_event sent.
3. Not allow the hypervisor to disable sending information about interesting MSR events.
4. Add an additional mem_event type, namely a VMCALL event - in order to do its work, our application occasionally triggers VMCALLs in the guest (not included in the current series, but included in the initial RFC series).
5. Add an additional libxc function that allows triggering page faults in the guest.
Changes since V9:
- The "xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc" has been reworked to extend HVMOP_inject_trap instead of a new libxc hypercall.
Patches:
xen: Handle resumed instruction based on previous mem_event reply xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
xen, libxc: Force-enable relevant MSR events
xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state
xen: Emulate with no writes
Thanks,
Razvan Cojocaru
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Quoted 2 lines · Razvan Cojocaru
I apologize, I've sent this as a duplicate V10.
Here it is, resent (correctly) as V11. Sorry.
You also have the RFC part on the patchset. Is that intentional? Some maintainers (looks at himself) ignore (well, put it in the 'todo pile' to be exact) patches like that until they are more mature (non-RFC) and then they will review them.
I think the RFC part of the patches has been rubbed up as the design is pretty baked?
Quoted 53 lines
As stated originally, we had to modify Xen in order to be able to detect rootkits in HVM guests, in a way that allows an application that runs in dom0 (or a similarly privileged domain) to control what the guest is allowed to do once a threat is detected. This has been done over the
mem_eventmechanism.To this end, we needed to:
1. Be able to execute the current instruction without allowing it to write to memory. This is done based on new
mem_eventresponse fields sent from the controlling application.2. Have the guest as responsive as possible amid all the processing. So we had to cache some information with each
mem_eventsent.3. Not allow the hypervisor to disable sending information about interesting MSR events.
4. Add an additional
mem_eventtype, namely a VMCALL event - in order to do its work, our application occasionally triggers VMCALLs in the guest (not included in the current series, but included in the initial RFC series).5. Add an additional libxc function that allows triggering page faults in the guest.
Changes since V9:
- The "xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc" has been reworked to extendHVMOP_inject_trapinstead of a new libxc hypercall.Patches:
xen: Handle resumed instruction based on previous
mem_eventreply xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
xen, libxc: Force-enable relevant MSR events
xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state
xen: Emulate with no writesThanks,
Razvan Cojocaru_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
Quoted 11 lines · Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Quoted 2 lines · Razvan Cojocaru
I apologize, I've sent this as a duplicate V10.
Here it is, resent (correctly) as V11. Sorry.You also have the RFC part on the patchset. Is that intentional? Some maintainers (looks at himself) ignore (well, put it in the 'todo pile' to be exact) patches like that until they are more mature (non-RFC) and then they will review them.
I think the RFC part of the patches has been rubbed up as the design is pretty baked?
Thanks for the comment, I was actually going to ask about that. I thought I'd keep the "RFC" in the title until I get Acks for all the patches, and then switch the prefix to "PATCH", but I'm not sure what the etiquette is in these cases.
Also, in this particular case I've reworked the 4/5 patch (the page fault injection patch), so I thought it might be proper to keep the "RFC" part for the whole series.
I'll switch to "PATCH" for the next series.
Thanks,
Razvan Cojocaru
Quoted 10 lines · Razvan Cojocaru
Quoted 9 lines · Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Quoted 2 lines · Razvan Cojocaru
I apologize, I've sent this as a duplicate V10.
Here it is, resent (correctly) as V11. Sorry.You also have the RFC part on the patchset. Is that intentional? Some maintainers (looks at himself) ignore (well, put it in the 'todo pile' to be exact) patches like that until they are more mature (non-RFC) and then they will review them.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I think the RFC part of the patches has been rubbed up as the design is pretty baked?
Thanks for the comment, I was actually going to ask about that. I thought I'd keep the "RFC" in the title until I get Acks for all the patches, and then switch the prefix to "PATCH", but I'm not sure what the etiquette is in these cases.
It varies with maintainers. But with the amount of emails we get I think most folks try to use the 'Del' button (or Ctrl-D) as much as possible.
Quoted 6 lines
Also, in this particular case I've reworked the 4/5 patch (the page fault injection patch), so I thought it might be proper to keep the "RFC" part for the whole series.
I'll switch to "PATCH" for the next series.
Thank you.
Also pls double-check that you have all the toolstack maintainers on the 'To' so they can review the patches (I think those ones need eyeballs as some of the hypervisor ones have been Acked by Jan).
Perhaps even mention in the cover letter what has been reviewed/changed /needs attention to make it easier for maintainers to go right ahead to the meat?
See http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2013-06/msg00357.html
for an example.
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks,
Razvan Cojocaru