Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
Subsystems (4)
v6 cover Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running.
OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel.
The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs using a new efi_secret kernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the EFI driver) if the secret area is populated.
The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in the EFI configuration table. The second patch is a quirk fix for older firmwares didn't mark the secrets page as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE. The third patch introduces the new efi_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface. The fourth patch auto-loads the efi_secret module during startup if the injected secrets area is populated. The last patch documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection.
As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the efi_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.
In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.
To enable this functionality, set CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m when building the guest kernel.
Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# xxd /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61 these-are-the-ka 00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405 ta-secrets...... 00000020: 0607 ..
# rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4
---
v6 changes:
- Autoload the efi_secret module if the secret area is populated (thanks Greg KH).
- efi_secret: Depend on X86_64 because we use ioremap_encrypted() which is only defined for this arch.
- efi_secret.c: Remove unneeded tableheader_guid local variable.
- Documentation fixes.
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v5 changes:
- Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware marks the secret area as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then the uefi_init() code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages.
- In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the confidential computing secrets page as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve this page.
- In the efi_secret module code, map the secrets page using ioremap_encrypted (again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages).
- Add documentation in Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v4 changes:
- Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET (thanks Greg KH). Selecting CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m (patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well.
- Guard call to clflush_cache_range() with #ifdef CONFIG_X86 (Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>)
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v3 changes:
- Rename the module to efi_secret
- Remove the exporting of clean_cache_range
- Use clflush_cache_range in wipe_memory
- Document function wipe_memory
- Initialize efi.coco_secret to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR to correctly detect when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tables
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]
v2 changes:
- Export clean_cache_range()
- When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero
- Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
Dov Murik (5):
efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area
virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation
.../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret | 51 +++ Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst | 102 ++++++ Documentation/security/coco/index.rst | 9 + Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 58 +++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 28 ++ drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 14 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 337 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 10 + 16 files changed, 642 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/index.rst create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
base-commit: 42eb8fdac2fc5d62392dcfcf0253753e821a97b0
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 1/5 efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them.
Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID.
If EFI exposes such a table entry, uefi_init() will keep a pointer to the EFI config table entry in efi.coco_secret, so it can be used later by the kernel (specifically drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret). It will also appear in the kernel log as "CocoSecret=ADDRESS"; for example:
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II
[ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f22e680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea0c018The new functionality can be enabled with CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET=y.
--- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 +++ drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 10 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +3 -0
@@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS &efi.mokvar_table,#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + &efi.coco_secret, +#endif };u64 efi_setup;/* efi setup_data physical address */
drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +16 -0
@@ -284,3 +284,19 @@ config EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS See Documentation/admin-guide/acpi/ssdt-overlays.rst for more information. + +config EFI_COCO_SECRET + bool "EFI Confidential Computing Secret Area Support" + depends on EFI + help + Confidential Computing platforms (such as AMD SEV) allow the + Guest Owner to securely inject secrets during guest VM launch. + The secrets are placed in a designated EFI reserved memory area. + + In order to use the secrets in the kernel, the location of the secret + area (as published in the EFI config table) must be kept. + + If you say Y here, the address of the EFI secret area will be kept + for usage inside the kernel. This will allow the + virt/coco/efi_secret module to access the secrets, which in turn + allows userspace programs to access the injected secrets.
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +6 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = {#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS .mokvar_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + .coco_secret = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, +#endif };EXPORT_SYMBOL (efi);
@@ -528,6 +531,9 @@ static const efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] __initconst = {#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS {LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID, &efi.mokvar_table, "MOKvar" }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + {LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID, &efi.coco_secret, "CocoSecret" }, #endif {}, };
include/linux/efi.h +10 -0
@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);#define LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x888eb0c6, 0x8ede, 0x4ff5, 0xa8, 0xf0, 0x9a, 0xee, 0x5c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc2)#define LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID EFI_GUID(0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, 0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68)#define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3, 0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89) +#define LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID EFI_GUID(0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, 0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47)/* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55)
@@ -550,6 +551,7 @@ extern struct efi {unsigned long tpm_log;/* TPM2 Event Log table */ unsigned long tpm_final_log;/* TPM2 Final Events Log table */ unsigned long mokvar_table;/* MOK variable config table */ +unsigned long coco_secret;/* Confidential computing secret table */ efi_get_time_t *get_time;efi_set_time_t *set_time;
@@ -1283,4 +1285,12 @@ static inline struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *efi_mokvar_entry_find( }#endif +struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area { +u64 base_pa; +u64 size; +}; + +/* Header of a populated EFI secret area */ +#define EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID EFI_GUID(0x1e74f542, 0x71dd, 0x4d66, 0x96, 0x3e, 0xef, 0x42, 0x87, 0xff, 0x17, 0x3b) +#endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 2/5 efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area
In reply to Dov MurikSome older firmware declare the confidential computing secret area as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA region. Fix this up by treating this memory region as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, as it should be.
If that memory region is already EFI_RESERVED_TYPE then this has no effect on the E820 map.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +28 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@const efi_system_table_t *efi_system_table;extern u32 image_offset;static efi_loaded_image_t *image =NULL ; +static u64 efi_coco_secret_phys_addr =U64_MAX ;static efi_status_t preserve_pci_rom_image (efi_pci_io_protocol_t *pci,struct pci_setup_rom **__rom)
@@ -443,6 +444,21 @@ static void add_e820ext(struct boot_params *params, params->hdr.setup_data = (unsigned long )e820ext; } +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET +static void efi_set_coco_secret_phys_addr (void ) +{ +struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area = +get_efi_config_table (LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID ); + +if (!secret_area || secret_area->size ==0 || secret_area->size >=SZ_4G ) +return ; + + efi_coco_secret_phys_addr = secret_area->base_pa; +} +#else +static void efi_set_coco_secret_phys_addr (void ) {} +#endif +static efi_status_t setup_e820 (struct boot_params *params,struct setup_data *e820ext,u32 e820ext_size) {
@@ -494,6 +510,16 @@ setup_e820(struct boot_params *params, struct setup_data *e820ext, u32 e820ext_s e820_type =E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED ; else e820_type =E820_TYPE_RAM ; +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET +if (d->phys_addr == efi_coco_secret_phys_addr) +/* +* Fix a quirk in firmwares which don't mark +* the EFI confidential computing area as +* EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, but instead as +* EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA. +*/ + e820_type =E820_TYPE_RESERVED ; +#endif break ;case EFI_ACPI_MEMORY_NVS :
@@ -793,6 +819,8 @@ unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle,efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (); +efi_set_coco_secret_phys_addr (); +setup_graphics (boot_params);setup_efi_pci (boot_params);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 3/5 virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
In reply to Dov MurikThe new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco) EFI secret area via securityfs interface.
When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under /sys/kernel/security), a "coco/efi_secret" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.
This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).
Removing (unlinking) files in the "coco/efi_secret" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.
--- .../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret | 51 +++ drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 337 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 405 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret new file +51 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +What: security/coco/efi_secret +Date: October 2021 +Contact: Dov Murik <[email protected]> +Description: + Exposes confidential computing (coco) EFI secrets to + userspace via securityfs. + + EFI can declare memory area used by confidential computing + platforms (such as AMD SEV and SEV-ES) for secret injection by + the Guest Owner during VM's launch. The secrets are encrypted + by the Guest Owner and decrypted inside the trusted enclave, + and therefore are not readable by the untrusted host. + + The efi_secret module exposes the secrets to userspace. Each + secret appears as a file under <securityfs>/coco/efi_secret, + where the filename is the GUID of the entry in the secrets + table. This module is loaded automatically by the EFI driver + if the EFI secret area is populated. + + Two operations are supported for the files: read and unlink. + Reading the file returns the content of secret entry. + Unlinking the file overwrites the secret data with zeroes and + removes the entry from the filesystem. A secret cannot be read + after it has been unlinked. + + For example, listing the available secrets:: + + # modprobe efi_secret + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + Reading the secret data by reading a file:: + + # cat /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + the-content-of-the-secret-data + + Wiping a secret by unlinking a file:: + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + Note: The binary format of the secrets table injected by the + Guest Owner is described in + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c under "Structure of + the EFI secret area".
drivers/virt/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -36,4 +36,7 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig" + +source "drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig" + endif
drivers/virt/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += vboxguest/ obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES) += nitro_enclaves/ obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM) += acrn/ +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += coco/efi_secret/
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig new file +11 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +config EFI_SECRET + tristate "EFI secret area securityfs support" + depends on EFI && X86_64 + select EFI_COCO_SECRET + select SECURITYFS + help + This is a driver for accessing the EFI secret area via securityfs. + + To compile this driver as a module, choose M here. + The module will be called efi_secret.
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile new file +2 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret.o
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c new file +337 -0
337 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v6 3/5] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
Hi Dov,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on 42eb8fdac2fc5d62392dcfcf0253753e821a97b0]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Dov-Murik/Allow-guest-access-to-EFI-confidential-computing-secret-area/20211129-194749 base: 42eb8fdac2fc5d62392dcfcf0253753e821a97b0 config: x86_64-randconfig-s032-20211206 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20211206/202112061528.k1C2Xe9d-lkp(a)intel.com/config) compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-22) 9.3.0 reproduce: # apt-get install sparse # sparse version: v0.6.4-dirty # https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/ebf498903d5371698bd13ed4005b4d61702f8223 git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux git fetch --no-tags linux-review Dov-Murik/Allow-guest-access-to-EFI-confidential-computing-secret-area/20211129-194749 git checkout ebf498903d5371698bd13ed4005b4d61702f8223 # save the config file to linux build tree mkdir build_dir make W=1 C=1 CF='-fdiagnostic-prefix -D__CHECK_ENDIAN__' O=build_dir ARCH=x86_64 SHELL=/bin/bash drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c:242:13: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) @@ expected unsigned char *ptr @@ got void [noderef] __iomem *secret_data @@
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c:242:13: sparse: expected unsigned char *ptr
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c:242:13: sparse: got void [noderef] __iomem *secret_data
vim +242 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
211
212 static int efi_secret_securityfs_setup(void)
213 {
214 struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
215 int ret = 0, i = 0, bytes_left;
216 unsigned char *ptr;
217 struct secret_header *h;
218 struct secret_entry *e;
219 struct dentry *dent;
220 char guid_str[EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN + 1];
221
222 s->coco_dir = NULL;
223 s->fs_dir = NULL;
224 memset(s->fs_files, 0, sizeof(s->fs_files));
225
226 dent = securityfs_create_dir("coco", NULL);
227 if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
228 pr_err("Error creating coco securityfs directory entry err=%ld\n", PTR_ERR(dent));
229 return PTR_ERR(dent);
230 }
231 s->coco_dir = dent;
232
233 dent = securityfs_create_dir("efi_secret", s->coco_dir);
234 if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
235 pr_err("Error creating efi_secret securityfs directory entry err=%ld\n",
236 PTR_ERR(dent));
237 return PTR_ERR(dent);
238 }
239 d_inode(dent)->i_op = &efi_secret_dir_inode_operations;
240 s->fs_dir = dent;
241
> 242 ptr = s->secret_data;
243 h = (struct secret_header *)ptr;
244 if (efi_guidcmp(h->guid, EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID)) {
245 pr_err("EFI secret area does not start with correct GUID\n");
246 ret = -EINVAL;
247 goto err_cleanup;
248 }
249 if (h->len < sizeof(*h)) {
250 pr_err("EFI secret area reported length is too small\n");
251 ret = -EINVAL;
252 goto err_cleanup;
253 }
254 if (h->len > s->secret_data_len) {
255 pr_err("EFI secret area reported length is too big\n");
256 ret = -EINVAL;
257 goto err_cleanup;
258 }
259
260 bytes_left = h->len - sizeof(*h);
261 ptr += sizeof(*h);
262 while (bytes_left >= (int)sizeof(*e) && i < EFI_SECRET_NUM_FILES) {
263 e = (struct secret_entry *)ptr;
264 if (e->len < sizeof(*e) || e->len > (unsigned int)bytes_left) {
265 pr_err("EFI secret area is corrupted\n");
266 ret = -EINVAL;
267 goto err_cleanup;
268 }
269
270 /* Skip deleted entries (which will have NULL_GUID) */
271 if (efi_guidcmp(e->guid, NULL_GUID)) {
272 efi_guid_to_str(&e->guid, guid_str);
273
274 dent = securityfs_create_file(guid_str, 0440, s->fs_dir, (void *)e,
275 &efi_secret_bin_file_fops);
276 if (IS_ERR(dent)) {
277 pr_err("Error creating efi_secret securityfs entry\n");
278 ret = PTR_ERR(dent);
279 goto err_cleanup;
280 }
281
282 s->fs_files[i++] = dent;
283 }
284 ptr += e->len;
285 bytes_left -= e->len;
286 }
287
288 pr_debug("Created %d entries in efi_secret securityfs\n", i);
289 return 0;
290
291 err_cleanup:
292 efi_secret_securityfs_teardown();
293 return ret;
294 }
295
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
PATCH v6 4/5 efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
In reply to Dov MurikIf the efi_secret module is built, register a late_initcall in the EFI driver which checks whether the EFI secret area is available and populated, and then requests to load the efi_secret module.
This will cause the <securityfs>/coco/efi_secret directory to appear in guests into which secrets were injected; in other cases, the module is not loaded.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 3 ++ 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c
drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_APPLE_PROPERTIES) += apple-properties.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE) += rci2-table.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_EMBEDDED_FIRMWARE) += embedded-firmware.o obj-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += mokvar-table.o +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET) += coco.o fake_map-y += fake_mem.o fake_map-$(CONFIG_X86) += x86_fake_mem.o
drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c new file +58 -0
58 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -9,3 +9,6 @@ config EFI_SECRET To compile this driver as a module, choose M here. The module will be called efi_secret. + + The module is loaded automatically by the EFI driver if the EFI + secret area is populated.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v6 5/5 docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation
In reply to Dov MurikAdd documentation for the efi_secret module which allows access to Confidential Computing injected secrets.
--- Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/security/coco/index.rst | 9 ++ Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/index.rst
Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst new file +102 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +========== +EFI secret +========== + +This document describes how Confidential Computing secret injection is handled +from the firmware to the operating system, in the EFI driver and the efi_secret +kernel module. + + +Introduction +============ + +Confidential Computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted +Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs +memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, +secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the +guest starts running. + +The efi_secret kernel module allows userspace applications to access these +secrets via securityfs. + + +Secret data flow +================ + +The guest firmware may reserve a designated memory area for secret injection, +and publish its location (base GPA and length) in the EFI configuration table +under a ``LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID`` entry +(``adf956ad-e98c-484c-ae11-b51c7d336447``). This memory area should be marked +by the firmware as ``EFI_RESERVED_TYPE``, and therefore the kernel should not +be use it for its own purposes. + +During the VM's launch, the virtual machine manager may inject a secret to that +area. In AMD SEV and SEV-ES this is performed using the +``KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET`` command (see [sev]_). The strucutre of the injected +Guest Owner secret data should be a GUIDed table of secret values; the binary +format is described in ``drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c`` under +"Structure of the EFI secret area". + +On kernel start, the kernel's EFI driver saves the location of the secret area +(taken from the EFI configuration table) in the ``efi.coco_secret`` field. +Later it checks if the secret area is populated: it maps the area and checks +whether its content begins with ``EFI_SECRET_TABLE_HEADER_GUID`` +(``1e74f542-71dd-4d66-963e-ef4287ff173b``). If the secret area is populated, +the EFI driver will autoload the efi_secret kernel module, which exposes the +secretes to userspace applications via securityfs. The details of the +efi_secret filesystem interface are in [efi-secret-abi]_. + + +Application usage example +========================= + +Consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner +provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. +The guest application reads the secret from the efi_secret filesystem and +proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed +computations on the content. + +In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image +because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because +it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). +Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a +confidential (memory-encrypted) guest. + +Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest +to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:: + + # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + total 0 + drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . + drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + # xxd /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + 00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61 these-are-the-ka + 00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405 ta-secrets...... + 00000020: 0607 .. + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + total 0 + drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . + drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + +References +========== + +See [sev-api-spec]_ for more info regarding SEV ``LAUNCH_SECRET`` operation. + +.. [sev] Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst +.. [efi-secret-abi] Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret +.. [sev-api-spec] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf
Documentation/security/coco/index.rst new file +9 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +==================================== +Confidential Computing documentation +==================================== + +.. toctree:: + + efi_secret
Documentation/security/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ Security Documentation tpm/index digsig landlock + coco/index
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Gentle ping for this series.
(also at https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/ )
[+cc Gerd, Lenny]
Thanks,
-Dov
Quoted 166 lines · Dov Murik
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running.
OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit
01726b6d23d4"OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel.The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for injected secrets, and exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs using a new
efi_secretkernel module. The module is autoloaded (by the EFI driver) if the secret area is populated.The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in the EFI configuration table. The second patch is a quirk fix for older firmwares didn't mark the secrets page as
EFI_RESERVED_TYPE. The third patch introduces the newefi_secretmodule that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface. The fourth patch auto-loads theefi_secretmodule during startup if the injected secrets area is populated. The last patch documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection.As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the
efi_secretfilesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.
To enable this functionality, set
CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=mwhen building the guest kernel.Here is a simple example for usage of the
efi_secretmodule in a guest to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..(quoted diff) +0
-4-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910# xxd /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61 these-are-the-ka 00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405 ta-secrets...... 00000020: 0607 ..# rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 ..(quoted diff) +0
-3-r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4
---
v6 changes:
- Autoload theefi_secretmodule if the secret area is populated (thanks Greg KH).
-efi_secret: Depend onX86_64because we useioremap_encrypted()which is only defined for this arch.
-efi_secret.c: Remove unneededtableheader_guidlocal variable.
- Documentation fixes.v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v5 changes:
- Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware marks the secret area asEFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then theuefi_init()code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages.
- In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the confidential computing secrets page asEFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve this page.
- In theefi_secretmodule code, map the secrets page usingioremap_encrypted(again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages).
- Add documentation inDocumentation/security/coco/efi_secret.v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v4 changes:
- Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdefCONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET(thanks Greg KH). SelectingCONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m(patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well.
- Guard call toclflush_cache_range()with #ifdefCONFIG_X86(Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>)v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v3 changes:
- Rename the module toefi_secret
- Remove the exporting ofclean_cache_range
- Useclflush_cache_rangeinwipe_memory
- Document functionwipe_memory
- Initialize efi.coco_secret toEFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDRto correctly detect when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tablesv2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]
v2 changes:
- Exportclean_cache_range()
- When deleteing a secret, callclean_cache_range()afterexplicit_memzero
- AddDocumentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secretv1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
Dov Murik (5):
efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area
virt: Addefi_secretmodule to expose confidential computing secrets
efi: Loadefi_secretmodule if EFI secret area is populated
docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation.../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret | 51 +++ Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst | 102 ++++++ Documentation/security/coco/index.rst | 9 + Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 58 +++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 28 ++ drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 14 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 337 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 10 + 16 files changed, 642 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/index.rst create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.cbase-commit:
42eb8fdac2fc5d62392dcfcf0253753e821a97b0
Quoted 11 lines · Dov Murik
As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the
efi_secretfilesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
So maybe I don't understand the example properly or something's missing but why can't the guest owner simply scp the secrets into the guest? Why is this special thing needed?
The secret below says "...kata-secrets" so this sounds like something-automated-containers-thing where they'd profit from getting secrets automatically supplied to the guest. But I guess there you can scp too...
So what am I missing?
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Ivo Totev, HRB 36809, AG NürnbergHello Boris,
Quoted 13 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 11 lines · Dov Murik
As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the
efi_secretfilesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
Quoted 3 lines
So maybe I don't understand the example properly or something's missing but why can't the guest owner simply scp the secrets into the guest? Why is this special thing needed?
If the Guest Owner chooses to inject secrets via scp, it needs to be sure it is scp-ing to the correct VM - the one that has SEV enabled and was measured at launch.
One way to achieve that would be to inject the guest's SSH private key using the proposed efi_secret mechanism. This way the Guest Owner is sure it is talking to the correct guest and not to some other VM that was started by the untrusted cloud provider (say, with SEV disabled so the cloud provider can steal its memory content).
Quoted 5 lines
The secret below says "...kata-secrets" so this sounds like something-automated-containers-thing where they'd profit from getting secrets automatically supplied to the guest. But I guess there you can scp too...
Indeed this proposed efi_secret module is in use for enabling SEV confidential containers using Kata containers [1], but there's nothing specific in the current patch series about containers. The patch series just exposes the launch-injected SEV secrets to userspace as virtual files (under securityfs).
Quoted 3 lines
So what am I missing?
It boils down to: the confidential guest needs to have access to a secret which the untrusted host can't read, and which is essential for the normal operation of the guest. This secret can be a decryption key, an SSH private key, an API key to a Key Management system, etc. If a malicious cloud provider tries to start that VM without a secret (or with the wrong one), the actual workload that the guest is supposed to run will not execute meaningfully.
The proposed patch series exposes the SEV injected secrets as virtual files, which can later be used as decryption keys (as done in the kata confidential containers use-case), or SSH private keys, or any other possible implementation.
-Dov
Quoted 3 lines · Dov Murik
If the Guest Owner chooses to inject secrets via scp, it needs to be sure it is scp-ing to the correct VM - the one that has SEV enabled and was measured at launch.
Hmm, I'd expect that to be part of the attestation dance. I admit, though, I have only listened about the whole attestation bla from the sidelines so I'm unclear whether that's part of that protocol. I guess Tom and Brijesh should have a better idea here.
Quoted 1 line
One way to achieve that would be to inject the guest's SSH private key
Well, is that "one way" or *the way*?
Quoted 4 lines
using the proposed
efi_secretmechanism. This way the Guest Owner is sure it is talking to the correct guest and not to some other VM that was started by the untrusted cloud provider (say, with SEV disabled so the cloud provider can steal its memory content).
Because we would need *some* way of verifying the owner is talking to the correct guest. And if so, this should be made part of the big picture of SEV guest attestation. Or is this part of that attestation dance?
I guess I'm wondering where in the big picture this fits into?
Quoted 7 lines
Indeed this proposed
efi_secretmodule is in use for enabling SEV confidential containers using Kata containers [1], but there's nothing specific in the current patch series about containers. The patch series just exposes the launch-injected SEV secrets to userspace as virtual files (under securityfs).
So one of the aspects for this is to use it in automated deployments.
Quoted 8 lines
It boils down to: the confidential guest needs to have access to a secret which the untrusted host can't read, and which is essential for the normal operation of the guest. This secret can be a decryption key, an SSH private key, an API key to a Key Management system, etc. If a malicious cloud provider tries to start that VM without a secret (or with the wrong one), the actual workload that the guest is supposed to run will not execute meaningfully.
Quoted 4 lines
The proposed patch series exposes the SEV injected secrets as virtual files, which can later be used as decryption keys (as done in the kata confidential containers use-case), or SSH private keys, or any other possible implementation.
Right, and is this going to be the proper way to authenticate SEV guests to their owners or is this just another technique for safely supplying secrets into the guest?
I hope I'm making some sense here...
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Ivo Totev, HRB 36809, AG NürnbergQuoted 9 lines · * Borislav Petkov ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 3 lines · Dov Murik
If the Guest Owner chooses to inject secrets via scp, it needs to be sure it is scp-ing to the correct VM - the one that has SEV enabled and was measured at launch.
Hmm, I'd expect that to be part of the attestation dance. I admit, though, I have only listened about the whole attestation bla from the sidelines so I'm unclear whether that's part of that protocol. I guess Tom and Brijesh should have a better idea here.
There's more than one type of dance; this partially varies depending on the system (SEV/TDX etc) and also depends on how you depend
to boot your VM (separate kernel or VM disk). Also it's important to
note that when the dance happens varies - in SEV and SEV-ES this happens before the guest executes any code.
So at the end of the dance, the guest owner hands over that secret - but only then does the geust start booting; that secret has to go somewhere to be used by something later.
For example, something might pull out that key and use it to decrypt a disk that then has other secrets on it (e.g. your ssh key).
Dave
Quoted 51 lines
Quoted 1 line
One way to achieve that would be to inject the guest's SSH private key
Well, is that "one way" or *the way*?
Quoted 4 lines
using the proposed
efi_secretmechanism. This way the Guest Owner is sure it is talking to the correct guest and not to some other VM that was started by the untrusted cloud provider (say, with SEV disabled so the cloud provider can steal its memory content).Because we would need *some* way of verifying the owner is talking to the correct guest. And if so, this should be made part of the big picture of SEV guest attestation. Or is this part of that attestation dance?
I guess I'm wondering where in the big picture this fits into?
Quoted 7 lines
Indeed this proposed
efi_secretmodule is in use for enabling SEV confidential containers using Kata containers [1], but there's nothing specific in the current patch series about containers. The patch series just exposes the launch-injected SEV secrets to userspace as virtual files (under securityfs).So one of the aspects for this is to use it in automated deployments.
Quoted 8 lines
It boils down to: the confidential guest needs to have access to a secret which the untrusted host can't read, and which is essential for the normal operation of the guest. This secret can be a decryption key, an SSH private key, an API key to a Key Management system, etc. If a malicious cloud provider tries to start that VM without a secret (or with the wrong one), the actual workload that the guest is supposed to run will not execute meaningfully.
Quoted 4 lines
The proposed patch series exposes the SEV injected secrets as virtual files, which can later be used as decryption keys (as done in the kata confidential containers use-case), or SSH private keys, or any other possible implementation.
Right, and is this going to be the proper way to authenticate SEV guests to their owners or is this just another technique for safely supplying secrets into the guest?
I hope I'm making some sense here...
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss, Boris. SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Ivo Totev, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Quoted 1 line · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
There's more than one type of dance;
So Brijesh and I talked about this a bit yesterday. There's all kinds of dances...
Quoted 1 line
this partially varies depending on the system (SEV/TDX etc)
By "SEV" I guess you mean pre-SNP because SNP attestation is reportedly much better.
TDX I'm being told is not interested in something like that atm. I guess they wanna do something different wrt attestation.
So what we're talking about here is pre-SNP attestation, AFAICT.
Quoted 5 lines
and also depends on how you depend to boot your VM (separate kernel or VM disk). Also it's important to note that when the dance happens varies - in SEV and SEV-ES this happens before the guest executes any code. So at the end of the dance, the guest owner hands over that secret - but only then does the geust start booting;
Right.
Quoted 3 lines
that secret has to go somewhere to be used by something later. For example, something might pull out that key and use it to decrypt a disk that then has other secrets on it (e.g. your ssh key).
That is the other example I heard about.
So, to sum up: this looks like part of a pre-SNP attestation flow, i.e., for SEV and SEV-ES guests.
Follow-up question: is this going to be used by other cloud vendors too? Or am I gonna get another implementation of sharing secrets with a guest which is just a little bit different but sender #2 can't use this one because raisins?
Because that would not be good.
So, is this what cloud vendors using SEV/-ES guests would like to use and what they all agree upon?
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Ivo Totev, HRB 36809, AG NürnbergQuoted 6 lines · * Borislav Petkov ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 1 line · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
There's more than one type of dance;
So Brijesh and I talked about this a bit yesterday. There's all kinds of dances...
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
this partially varies depending on the system (SEV/TDX etc)
By "SEV" I guess you mean pre-SNP because SNP attestation is reportedly much better.
TDX I'm being told is not interested in something like that atm. I guess they wanna do something different wrt attestation.
I thought I saw something in their patch series where they also had a secret that got passed down from EFI? As I remember they had it with an ioctl and something; but it felt to me if it would be great if it was shared.
Quoted 10 lines
So what we're talking about here is pre-SNP attestation, AFAICT.
Quoted 5 lines
and also depends on how you depend to boot your VM (separate kernel or VM disk). Also it's important to note that when the dance happens varies - in SEV and SEV-ES this happens before the guest executes any code. So at the end of the dance, the guest owner hands over that secret - but only then does the geust start booting;
Right.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
that secret has to go somewhere to be used by something later. For example, something might pull out that key and use it to decrypt a disk that then has other secrets on it (e.g. your ssh key).
That is the other example I heard about.
So, to sum up: this looks like part of a pre-SNP attestation flow, i.e., for SEV and SEV-ES guests.
Yeh. SNP is a whole different question.
Quoted 9 lines
Follow-up question: is this going to be used by other cloud vendors too? Or am I gonna get another implementation of sharing secrets with a guest which is just a little bit different but sender #2 can't use this one because raisins?
Because that would not be good.
So, is this what cloud vendors using SEV/-ES guests would like to use and what they all agree upon?
I'd love to hear from those other cloud vendors; I've not been able to find any detail on how their SEV(-ES) systems actually work.
However, this aims to be just a comms mechanism to pass that secret; so it's pretty low down in the stack and is there for them to use - hopefully it's general enough.
(An interesting question is what exactly gets passed in this key and what it means).
All the contentious stuff I've seen seems to be further up the stack - like who does the attestation and where they get the secrets and how they know what a valid measurement looks like.
Dave
Quoted 8 lines
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss, Boris. SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Ivo Totev, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Quoted 2 lines · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
I thought I saw something in their patch series where they also had a secret that got passed down from EFI?
Probably. I've seen so many TDX patchsets so that I'm completely confused what is what.
Quoted 2 lines
As I remember they had it with an ioctl and something; but it felt to me if it would be great if it was shared.
I guess we could try to share
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
for SNP and TDX.
Quoted 2 lines
I'd love to hear from those other cloud vendors; I've not been able to find any detail on how their SEV(-ES) systems actually work.
Same here.
Quoted 3 lines
However, this aims to be just a comms mechanism to pass that secret; so it's pretty low down in the stack and is there for them to use - hopefully it's general enough.
Exactly!
Quoted 6 lines
(An interesting question is what exactly gets passed in this key and what it means).
All the contentious stuff I've seen seems to be further up the stack - like who does the attestation and where they get the secrets and how they know what a valid measurement looks like.
It would be much much better if all the parties involved would sit down and decide on a common scheme so that implementation can be shared but getting everybody to agree is likely hard...
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Ivo Totev, HRB 36809, AG NürnbergQuoted 31 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
I thought I saw something in their patch series where they also had a secret that got passed down from EFI?
Probably. I've seen so many TDX patchsets so that I'm completely confused what is what.
Quoted 2 lines
As I remember they had it with an ioctl and something; but it felt to me if it would be great if it was shared.
I guess we could try to share
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
for SNP and TDX.
Quoted 2 lines
I'd love to hear from those other cloud vendors; I've not been able to find any detail on how their SEV(-ES) systems actually work.
Same here.
Quoted 3 lines
However, this aims to be just a comms mechanism to pass that secret; so it's pretty low down in the stack and is there for them to use - hopefully it's general enough.
Exactly!
Quoted 3 lines
(An interesting question is what exactly gets passed in this key and what it means).
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
All the contentious stuff I've seen seems to be further up the stack - like who does the attestation and where they get the secrets and how they know what a valid measurement looks like.
It would be much much better if all the parties involved would sit down and decide on a common scheme so that implementation can be shared but getting everybody to agree is likely hard...
I saw a request for other cloud provider input here. A little background for our SEV VMs in GCE we rely on our vTPM for attestation, we do this because of SEV security properties quoting from AMD being to protect guests from a benign but vulnerable hypervisor. So a benign/compliant hypervisor's vTPM wouldn't lie to the guest. So we added a few bits in the PCRs to allow users to see their SEV status in vTPM quotes.
It would be very interesting to offer an attestation solution that doesn't rely on our virtual TPM. But after reading through this cover letter and the linked OVMF patches I am confused what's the high level flow you are working towards? Are you loading in some OVMF using LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, getting the measurement with LAUNCH_MEASURE, then sending that to the customer who can then craft a "secret" (maybe say SSH key) for injection with LAUNCH_SECRET? Thats sounds good but there are a lot details left unattested there, how do you know you will boot from the image loaded with the PSP into a known state? Do you have some documentation I could read through to try and understand a little more and apologies if I missed it.
Quoted 7 lines
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Ivo Totev, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
Quoted 40 lines · Peter Gonda
Quoted 31 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
I thought I saw something in their patch series where they also had a secret that got passed down from EFI?
Probably. I've seen so many TDX patchsets so that I'm completely confused what is what.
Quoted 2 lines
As I remember they had it with an ioctl and something; but it felt to me if it would be great if it was shared.
I guess we could try to share
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
for SNP and TDX.
Quoted 2 lines
I'd love to hear from those other cloud vendors; I've not been able to find any detail on how their SEV(-ES) systems actually work.
Same here.
Quoted 3 lines
However, this aims to be just a comms mechanism to pass that secret; so it's pretty low down in the stack and is there for them to use - hopefully it's general enough.
Exactly!
Quoted 3 lines
(An interesting question is what exactly gets passed in this key and what it means).
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
All the contentious stuff I've seen seems to be further up the stack - like who does the attestation and where they get the secrets and how they know what a valid measurement looks like.
It would be much much better if all the parties involved would sit down and decide on a common scheme so that implementation can be shared but getting everybody to agree is likely hard...
Quoted 7 lines
I saw a request for other cloud provider input here. A little background for our SEV VMs in GCE we rely on our vTPM for attestation, we do this because of SEV security properties quoting from AMD being to protect guests from a benign but vulnerable hypervisor. So a benign/compliant hypervisor's vTPM wouldn't lie to the guest. So we added a few bits in the PCRs to allow users to see their SEV status in vTPM quotes.
Thanks Peter for explaining the GCE approach. If I understand correctly, if the hypervisor is malicious, it could lie to the vTPM and set those "few bits" so it'll look like the VM is running with SEV enabled (whereas in fact it is running without memory encryption). But that's outside the scope, right?
Quoted 13 lines
It would be very interesting to offer an attestation solution that doesn't rely on our virtual TPM. But after reading through this cover letter and the linked OVMF patches I am confused what's the high level flow you are working towards? Are you loading in some OVMF using
LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, getting the measurement withLAUNCH_MEASURE, then sending that to the customer who can then craft a "secret" (maybe say SSH key) for injection withLAUNCH_SECRET? Thats sounds good but there are a lot details left unattested there, how do you know you will boot from the image loaded with the PSP into a known state? Do you have some documentation I could read through to try and understand a little more and apologies if I missed it.
We rely on the OvmfPkg/AmdSev build of OVMF, which is a stripped down firmware that can boot only in one of two ways:
a. direct boot to kernel/initrd/cmdline whose hashes are included in
the LAUNCH_MEASURE data (see [1], [2], [3]).
b. boot to embedded grub (in OVMF) which decrypts an encrypted boot drive
using a secret from LAUNCH_SECRET (see [4] and [5]).
For the current series (efi_secret kernel module), method (a) is the relevant one. The Cloud Provider boots a guest VM with OVMF, and -kernel/-initrd/-append. The content of OVMF and the hashes of kernel/initrd/cmdline are measured in LAUNCH_MEASURE and sent to the Guest Owner (=Customer). If they match, the Guest Owner should perform a LAUNCH_SECRET and inject the secret to a designated SEV launch secrets page.
Then the guest starts running; when the kernel starts the EFI driver saves the address of this page (patch 1), and later exposes the secrets in this page as files in securityfs (patch 3). The secrets can be used by the guest workload in whatever way it needs (examples discussed above: ssh private key; API key to obtain secrets; decryption key for some encrypted files; ...).
Any attempt of a malicious cloud provider to modify OVMF, kernel, initrd, or cmdline will cause the SEV measurement to be wrong.
Note again that the proposed kernel patch series has nothing to do with the measurement sequence -- it assumes the secrets page is already populated, and exposes it to userspace as files.
Hope this explains our approach.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jzP8RlTRErk
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/[email protected]/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/[email protected]/
[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rCsIxzM6C_I
[5] https://blog.hansenpartnership.com/deploying-encrypted-images-for-confidential-computing/
-Dov
Quoted 36 lines · * Peter Gonda ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 35 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
I thought I saw something in their patch series where they also had a secret that got passed down from EFI?
Probably. I've seen so many TDX patchsets so that I'm completely confused what is what.
Quoted 2 lines
As I remember they had it with an ioctl and something; but it felt to me if it would be great if it was shared.
I guess we could try to share
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
for SNP and TDX.
Quoted 2 lines
I'd love to hear from those other cloud vendors; I've not been able to find any detail on how their SEV(-ES) systems actually work.
Same here.
Quoted 3 lines
However, this aims to be just a comms mechanism to pass that secret; so it's pretty low down in the stack and is there for them to use - hopefully it's general enough.
Exactly!
Quoted 6 lines
(An interesting question is what exactly gets passed in this key and what it means).
All the contentious stuff I've seen seems to be further up the stack - like who does the attestation and where they get the secrets and how they know what a valid measurement looks like.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
It would be much much better if all the parties involved would sit down and decide on a common scheme so that implementation can be shared but getting everybody to agree is likely hard...
I saw a request for other cloud provider input here.
Thanks for the reply!
Quoted 7 lines
A little
background for our SEV VMs in GCE we rely on our vTPM for attestation, we do this because of SEV security properties quoting from AMD being to protect guests from a benign but vulnerable hypervisor. So a benign/compliant hypervisor's vTPM wouldn't lie to the guest. So we added a few bits in the PCRs to allow users to see their SEV status in vTPM quotes.
OK, so we're trying to protect from a malicious hypervisor - we don't trust anything on the host (other than the CPU, and it's got to be signing the attestation); we don't think there's a way to do that with a vTPM on plain SEV/SEV-ES
Quoted 11 lines
It would be very interesting to offer an attestation solution that doesn't rely on our virtual TPM. But after reading through this cover letter and the linked OVMF patches I am confused what's the high level flow you are working towards? Are you loading in some OVMF using
LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, getting the measurement withLAUNCH_MEASURE, then sending that to the customer who can then craft a "secret" (maybe say SSH key) for injection withLAUNCH_SECRET? Thats sounds good but there are a lot details left unattested there, how do you know you will boot from the image loaded with the PSP into a known state? Do you have some documentation I could read through to try and understand a little more and apologies if I missed it.
I'll defer to Dov's reply on that.
Dave
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Ivo Totev, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK