Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Subsystems (13)
v6 cover Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Currently access to perf_events, i915_perf and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel is open only for a privileged process [1] with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability enabled in the process effective set [2].
This patch set introduces CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least
privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMON intends to meet the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to mass users of a system, and securely unblock applicability and scalability of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN process use cases.
CAP_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [2] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
Possible alternative solution to this system security hardening, capabilities balancing task of making performance monitoring and observability operations more accessible could be to use the existing CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to govern system performance monitoring and observability subsystems. However CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability still provides users with more credentials than are required for secure performance monitoring and observability operations and this excess is avoided by the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
Although software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate those issues following the official embargoed hardware issues mitigation procedure [3]. The bugs in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [4] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability operations. Finally, the patch set is shaped in the way that simplifies backtracking procedure of possible induced issues [5] as much as possible.
The patch set is for tip perf/core repository:git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip perf/core
sha1: 56ee04aa63285d6bc8a995a26e2441ae3d419bcd
---
Changes in v6:
- avoided noaudit checks in perfmon_capable() to explicitly advertise CAP_PERFMON usage thru audit logs to secure system performance monitoring and observability
Changes in v5:
- renamed CAP_SYS_PERFMON to CAP_PERFMON
- extended perfmon_capable() with noaudit checks
Changes in v4:
- converted perfmon_capable() into an inline function
- made perf_events kprobes, uprobes, hw breakpoints and namespaces data available to CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes
- applied perfmon_capable() to drivers/perf and drivers/oprofile
- extended __cmd_ftrace() with support of CAP_SYS_PERFMON
Changes in v3:
- implemented perfmon_capable() macros aggregating required capabilities checks Changes in v2:
- made perf_events trace points available to CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes
- made perf_event_paranoid_check() treat CAP_SYS_PERFMON equally to CAP_SYS_ADMIN
- applied CAP_SYS_PERFMON to i915_perf, bpf_trace, powerpc and parisc system performance monitoring and observability related subsystems
---
Alexey Budankov (10):
capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++-- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++++++------- drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +++-- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 16 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
---
Testing and validation (Intel Skylake, 8 cores, Fedora 29, 5.5.0-rc3+, x86_64):
libcap library [6], [7], [8] and Perf tool can be used to apply CAP_PERFMON capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability beyond the scope permitted by the system wide perf_event_paranoid kernel setting [9] and below are the steps for evaluation:
- patch, build and boot the kernel
- patch, build Perf tool e.g. to /home/user/perf
...
# git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git libcap
# pushd libcap
# patch libcap/include/uapi/linux/capabilities.h with [PATCH 1]
# make
# pushd progs
# ./setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf
# ./setcap -v "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" /home/user/perf
/home/user/perf: OK
# ./getcap /home/user/perf
/home/user/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep
# echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
2
...
$ /home/user/perf top
... works as expected ...
$ cat /proc/`pidof perf`/status
Name: perf
Umask: 0002
State: S (sleeping)
Tgid: 2958
Ngid: 0
Pid: 2958
PPid: 9847
TracerPid: 0
Uid: 500 500 500 500
Gid: 500 500 500 500
FDSize: 256
...
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000004400080000
CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000
cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog
CapBnd: 0000007fffffffff
CapAmb: 0000000000000000
NoNewPrivs: 0
Seccomp: 0
Speculation_Store_Bypass: thread vulnerable
Cpus_allowed: ff
Cpus_allowed_list: 0-7
...Usage of cap_perfmon effectively avoids unused credentials excess:
- with cap_sys_admin:
CapEff: 0000007fffffffff => 01111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111
- with cap_perfmon:
CapEff: 0000004400080000 => 01000100 00000000 00001000 00000000 00000000
38 34 19
perfmon syslog sys_ptrace---
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/perf-security.html
[2] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[4] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
[5] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/management-style.html#decisions
[6] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html
[7] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git
[8] https://sites.google.com/site/fullycapable/, posix_1003.1e-990310.pdf
[9] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v6 1/10 capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring and observability subsystems.
CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to mass users of a system, and securely unblocks applicability and scalability of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN process use cases.
CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.
Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues following the official embargoed hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring and observability operations.
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html
--- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +4 -0
@@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const structextern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid (const struct inode *inode,int cap);extern bool file_ns_capable (const struct file *file,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ptracer_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns); +static inline bool perfmon_capable (void ) +{ +return capable (CAP_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +}/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk (const struct dentry *dentry,struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
include/uapi/linux/capability.h +7 -1
@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 +/* +* Allow system performance and observability privileged operations +* using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems +*/ + +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_PERFMON#define cap_valid (x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +2 -2
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap"#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_AUDIT_READ +#if CAP_LAST_CAP >CAP_PERFMON #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Quoted 7 lines · Alexey Budankov
Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++ include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
PATCH v6 2/10 perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/perf_event.h +3 -3
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)static inline int perf_allow_kernel (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL );
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_cpu (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >0 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_CPU );
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint (struct perf_event_attr *attr) { -if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >-1 && !perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;return security_perf_event_open (attr,PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT );
kernel/events/core.c +1 -1
@@ -11186,7 +11186,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, }if (attr.namespaces) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v6 3/10 perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +2 -2
@@ -9088,7 +9088,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/*
@@ -9148,7 +9148,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/*
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 23 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
CAP_PERFMONprivileged process. Providing the access underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via
perf_event_openinterface and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)For backward compatibility reasons access to
perf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
PATCH v6 4/10 perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support
In reply to Alexey BudankovExtend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations. Make perf_event_paranoid_check() and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of CAP_PERFMON capability.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +++-- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c +3 -2
@@ -284,10 +284,11 @@ static int __cmd_ftrace(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace, int argc, const char **argv) .events = POLLIN, }; - if (!perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (!(perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) || + perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) { pr_err("ftrace only works for %s!\n", #ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_SUPPORT - "users with the SYS_ADMIN capability" + "users with the CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability" #else "root" #endif
tools/perf/design.txt +2 -1
@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for their own tasks. A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts -all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. +all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN +privilege. The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero.
tools/perf/util/cap.h +4 -0
@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused)#define CAP_SYSLOG 34#endif +#ifndef CAP_PERFMON +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 +#endif +#endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */
tools/perf/util/evsel.c +5 -5
@@ -2491,14 +2491,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,"You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" -"unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" +"unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" "The current value is %d:\n\n" " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" -">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -" Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" +">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +" Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
tools/perf/util/util.c +1 -0
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void)bool perf_event_paranoid_check (int max_level) {return perf_cap__capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || +perf_cap__capable (CAP_PERFMON ) ||perf_event_paranoid () <= max_level; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v6 04/10] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support
Hi Arnaldo,
Quoted 18 lines · Alexey Budankov
Extend error messages to mention
CAP_PERFMONcapability as an option to substituteCAP_SYS_ADMINcapability for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations. Makeperf_event_paranoid_check()and__cmd_ftrace()to be aware ofCAP_PERFMONcapability.
CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)For backward compatibility reasons access to
perf_eventssubsystem remains open forCAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secureperf_eventsmonitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.
Quoted 8 lines
Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c | 5 +++-- tools/perf/design.txt | 3 ++- tools/perf/util/cap.h | 4 ++++ tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 10 +++++----- tools/perf/util/util.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Could this have you explicit Reviewed-by or Acked-by tag so the changes could be driven into the kernel? Latest v7 is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Thanks,
Alexey
Quoted 83 lines
tools/perf/builtin-ftrace.c +3
-2@@ -284,10 +284,11 @@ static int __cmd_ftrace(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace, int argc, const char **argv) .events = POLLIN, }; - if (!perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (!(perf_cap__capable(CAP_PERFMON) || + perf_cap__capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) { pr_err("ftrace only works for %s!\n", #ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_SUPPORT - "users with the SYS_ADMIN capability" + "users with the CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability" #else "root" #endiftools/perf/design.txt +2
-1@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ gets schedule to. Per task counters can be created by any user, for their own tasks. A 'pid == -1' and 'cpu == x' counter is a per CPU counter that counts -all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. +all events on CPU-x. Per CPU counters need CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN +privilege. The 'flags' parameter is currently unused and must be zero.tools/perf/util/cap.h +4
-0@@ -29,4 +29,8 @@ static inline bool perf_cap__capable(int cap __maybe_unused)#define CAP_SYSLOG 34#endif +#ifndef CAP_PERFMON +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 +#endif +#endif /* __PERF_CAP_H */ tools/perf/util/evsel.c +5
-5@@ -2491,14 +2491,14 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,"You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n" "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n" "which controls use of the performance events system by\n" -"unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" +"unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n" "The current value is %d:\n\n" " -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n" " Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n" -">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -" Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" -">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" +">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +" Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n" +">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n" "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n" " kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" , target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",tools/perf/util/util.c +1
-0@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ int perf_event_paranoid(void)bool perf_event_paranoid_check (int max_level) {return perf_cap__capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) || +perf_cap__capable (CAP_PERFMON ) ||perf_event_paranoid () <= max_level; }
PATCH v6 5/10 drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to i915_perf monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to i915_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure i915_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_perf.c +6 -7
@@ -3375,10 +3375,10 @@ i915_perf_open_ioctl_locked(struct i915_perf *perf,/* Similar to perf's kernel.perf_paranoid_cpu sysctl option * we check a dev.i915.perf_stream_paranoid sysctl option * to determine if it's ok to access system wide OA counters -* without CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. +* without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ if (privileged_op && - i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { + i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to open i915 perf stream\n" ); ret = -EACCES ; goto err_ctx;
@@ -3571,9 +3571,8 @@ static int read_properties_unlocked(struct i915_perf *perf, }else oa_freq_hz =0 ; -if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate && - !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { -DRM_DEBUG ("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without root privileges\n" , +if (oa_freq_hz > i915_oa_max_sample_rate && !perfmon_capable ()) { +DRM_DEBUG ("OA exponent would exceed the max sampling frequency (sysctl dev.i915.oa_max_sample_rate) %uHz without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges\n" , i915_oa_max_sample_rate);return -EACCES ; }
@@ -3994,7 +3993,7 @@ int i915_perf_add_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,return -EINVAL ; } -if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { +if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to add i915 OA config\n" );return -EACCES ; }
@@ -4141,7 +4140,7 @@ int i915_perf_remove_config_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,return -ENOTSUPP ; } -if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) { +if (i915_perf_stream_paranoid && !perfmon_capable ()) {DRM_DEBUG ("Insufficient privileges to remove i915 OA config\n" );return -EACCES ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v6 6/10 trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +1 -1
@@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info)u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;int ret; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;if (event->attr.type !=PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT )return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v6 06/10] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 12 lines · Alexey Budankov
Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +0
-0
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info) · line 1401
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +1
-1@@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info)u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len;int ret; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;if (event->attr.type !=PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT )return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
PATCH v6 7/10 powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c +2 -2
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int thread_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* Sampling not supported */
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ static int trace_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* Return if this is a couting event */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v6 07/10] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 20 lines · Alexey Budankov
Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c +1
-1@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int thread_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* Sampling not supported */
arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c static int trace_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event) · line 1313
Quoted 8 lines
arch/powerpc/perf/imc-pmu.c +1
-1@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ static int trace_imc_event_init(struct perf_event *event)if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type)return -ENOENT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;/* Return if this is a couting event */
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
PATCH v6 8/10 parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c +1 -1
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,else return -EFAULT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;if (count !=sizeof (uint32_t ))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 28 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to monitoring for
CAP_PERFMONprivileged process. Providing the access underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for
CAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c +0
-0
arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, · line 306
Quoted 8 lines
arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c +1
-1@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,else return -EFAULT ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EACCES ;if (count !=sizeof (uint32_t ))
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
PATCH v6 9/10 drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +2 -2
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)if (!attr->exclude_kernel) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT ); -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&perfmon_capable ()) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT );return reg;
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; reg =arm_spe_event_to_pmscr (event); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && +if (!perfmon_capable () && (reg & (BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT ))))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v6 09/10] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 13 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to monitoring for
CAP_PERFMONprivileged process. Providing the access underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
Quoted 9 lines
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for
CAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Quoted 23 lines
drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c +2
-2@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static u64 arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(struct perf_event *event)if (!attr->exclude_kernel) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_E1SPE_SHIFT ); -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR ) &&perfmon_capable ()) reg |=BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT );return reg;@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; reg =arm_spe_event_to_pmscr (event); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && +if (!perfmon_capable () && (reg & (BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PA_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_CX_SHIFT ) |BIT (SYS_PMSCR_EL1_PCT_SHIFT ))))
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
PATCH v6 10/10 drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
In reply to Alexey BudankovOpen access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
--- drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c +1 -1
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int event_buffer_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) {int err = -EPERM ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;if (test_and_set_bit_lock (0 , &buffer_opened))
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v6 10/10] drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Quoted 13 lines · Alexey Budankov
Open access to monitoring for
CAP_PERFMONprivileged process. Providing the access underCAP_PERFMONcapability singly, without the rest ofCAP_SYS_ADMINcredentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
CAP_PERFMONimplements the principal of least privilege for performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)
Quoted 8 lines
For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open for
CAP_SYS_ADMINprivileged processes butCAP_SYS_ADMINusage for secure monitoring is discouraged with respect toCAP_PERFMONcapability.Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Quoted 15 lines
drivers/oprofile/event_buffer.c +1
-1@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int event_buffer_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) {int err = -EPERM ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (!perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;if (test_and_set_bit_lock (0 , &buffer_opened))
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Patchwork
CI[Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev2)
In reply to Alexey Budankov== Series Details ==
== Series Details ==
Series: Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev2)
URL : https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/72273/
State : warning
== Summary ==
$ dim checkpatch origin/drm-tip 00180af79ca9 capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space -:13: WARNING:COMMIT_LOG_LONG_LINE: Possible unwrapped commit description (prefer a maximum 75 chars per line) #13: is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 36 lines checked2b6eefdcee3f perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
-:9: WARNING:COMMIT_LOG_LONG_LINE: Possible unwrapped commit description (prefer a maximum 75 chars per line) #9:CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials,
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 32 lines checked67949e980fe0 perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
-:18: WARNING:COMMIT_LOG_LONG_LINE: Possible unwrapped commit description (prefer a maximum 75 chars per line) #18:
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 16 lines checkede16c0ae49641 perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support
-:13: WARNING:COMMIT_LOG_LONG_LINE: Possible unwrapped commit description (prefer a maximum 75 chars per line) #13:
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 56 lines checked0ded358c0c9a drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
-:12: WARNING:COMMIT_LOG_LONG_LINE: Possible unwrapped commit description (prefer a maximum 75 chars per line) #12:
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 39 lines checked1ec452341389 trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
-:13: WARNING:COMMIT_LOG_LONG_LINE: Possible unwrapped commit description (prefer a maximum 75 chars per line) #13:
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 8 lines checked346f1feb325c powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
-:12: WARNING:COMMIT_LOG_LONG_LINE: Possible unwrapped commit description (prefer a maximum 75 chars per line) #12:
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 16 lines checked80510aa6fcc1 parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
-:12: WARNING:COMMIT_LOG_LONG_LINE: Possible unwrapped commit description (prefer a maximum 75 chars per line) #12:
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 8 lines checkedd4bca6e41e7d drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
-:12: WARNING:COMMIT_LOG_LONG_LINE: Possible unwrapped commit description (prefer a maximum 75 chars per line) #12:
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 16 lines checkede309daf46905 drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
-:13: WARNING:COMMIT_LOG_LONG_LINE: Possible unwrapped commit description (prefer a maximum 75 chars per line) #13:
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 8 lines checked
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
Patchwork
CI[Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev2)
In reply to Alexey Budankov== Series Details ==
== Series Details ==
Series: Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev2)
URL : https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/72273/
State : success
== Summary ==
CI Bug Log - changes from CI_DRM_7827 -> Patchwork_16289
====================================================
Summary
-------
**SUCCESS**
No regressions found.
External URL: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/index.html
Known issues
------------
Here are the changes found in Patchwork_16289 that come from known issues:
### IGT changes ###
#### Issues hit ####
* igt@i915_selftest@live_gt_heartbeat:
- fi-bsw-kefka: [PASS][1] -> [DMESG-FAIL][2] ([i915#541])
[1]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/fi-bsw-kefka/igt@i915_selftest@live_gt_heartbeat.html
[2]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/fi-bsw-kefka/igt@i915_selftest@live_gt_heartbeat.html
* igt@kms_addfb_basic@bad-pitch-256:
- fi-icl-dsi: [PASS][3] -> [DMESG-WARN][4] ([i915#109])
[3]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/fi-icl-dsi/igt@[email protected]
[4]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/fi-icl-dsi/igt@[email protected]
#### Possible fixes ####
* igt@i915_selftest@live_blt:
- fi-hsw-4770: [DMESG-FAIL][5] ([i915#553] / [i915#725]) -> [PASS][6]
[5]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/fi-hsw-4770/igt@i915_selftest@live_blt.html
[6]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/fi-hsw-4770/igt@i915_selftest@live_blt.html
* igt@i915_selftest@live_hangcheck:
- fi-icl-u3: [INCOMPLETE][7] ([fdo#108569] / [i915#140]) -> [PASS][8]
[7]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/fi-icl-u3/igt@i915_selftest@live_hangcheck.html
[8]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/fi-icl-u3/igt@i915_selftest@live_hangcheck.html
[fdo#108569]: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=108569
[i915#109]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/109
[i915#140]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/140
[i915#541]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/541
[i915#553]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/553
[i915#725]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/725
Participating hosts (46 -> 42)
------------------------------
Additional (5): fi-bsw-n3050 fi-gdg-551 fi-cfl-8109u fi-ivb-3770 fi-skl-6600u
Missing (9): fi-ilk-m540 fi-kbl-7560u fi-byt-squawks fi-bsw-cyan fi-bwr-2160 fi-ctg-p8600 fi-blb-e6850 fi-byt-clapper fi-bdw-samus
Build changes
-------------
* CI: CI-20190529 -> None
* Linux: CI_DRM_7827 -> Patchwork_16289
CI-20190529: 20190529
CI_DRM_7827: c8969aeacfff681c83a800e82b0f18a6ab3e77ea @ git://anongit.freedesktop.org/gfx-ci/linux
IGT_5389: 966c58649dee31bb5bf2fad92f75ffd365968b81 @ git://anongit.freedesktop.org/xorg/app/intel-gpu-tools
Patchwork_16289: e309daf4690565507b1fe7244ed41217b057ab0f @ git://anongit.freedesktop.org/gfx-ci/linux
== Linux commits ==
e309daf46905 drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process d4bca6e41e7d drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 80510aa6fcc1 parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 346f1feb325c powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 1ec452341389 trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 0ded358c0c9a drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process e16c0ae49641 perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support 67949e980fe0 perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 2b6eefdcee3f perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process 00180af79ca9 capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
== Logs ==
For more details see: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/index.html
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
Patchwork
CI[Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.IGT: success for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev2)
In reply to Alexey Budankov== Series Details ==
== Series Details ==
Series: Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev2)
URL : https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/72273/
State : success
== Summary ==
CI Bug Log - changes from CI_DRM_7827_full -> Patchwork_16289_full
====================================================
Summary
-------
**SUCCESS**
No regressions found.
Known issues
------------
Here are the changes found in Patchwork_16289_full that come from known issues:
### IGT changes ###
#### Issues hit ####
* igt@gem_ctx_persistence@vcs1-mixed-process:
- shard-iclb: [PASS][1] -> [SKIP][2] ([fdo#109276] / [fdo#112080]) +5 similar issues
[1]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb2/igt@[email protected]
[2]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb8/igt@[email protected]
* igt@gem_eio@kms:
- shard-snb: [PASS][3] -> [INCOMPLETE][4] ([i915#82])
[3]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-snb1/igt@[email protected]
[4]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-snb6/igt@[email protected]
* igt@gem_exec_schedule@preempt-other-chain-bsd:
- shard-iclb: [PASS][5] -> [SKIP][6] ([fdo#112146]) +6 similar issues
[5]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb7/igt@[email protected]
[6]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb2/igt@[email protected]
* igt@gem_partial_pwrite_pread@writes-after-reads-snoop:
- shard-hsw: [PASS][7] -> [FAIL][8] ([i915#694])
[7]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-hsw7/igt@[email protected]
[8]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-hsw2/igt@[email protected]
* igt@gem_ppgtt@flink-and-close-vma-leak:
- shard-tglb: [PASS][9] -> [FAIL][10] ([i915#644])
[9]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-tglb6/igt@[email protected]
[10]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-tglb4/igt@[email protected]
* igt@gem_softpin@noreloc-s3:
- shard-skl: [PASS][11] -> [INCOMPLETE][12] ([i915#69])
[11]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-skl4/igt@[email protected]
[12]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-skl3/igt@[email protected]
* igt@i915_pm_dc@dc6-psr:
- shard-iclb: [PASS][13] -> [FAIL][14] ([i915#454])
[13]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb4/igt@[email protected]
[14]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb4/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_color@pipe-a-ctm-0-5:
- shard-skl: [PASS][15] -> [DMESG-WARN][16] ([i915#109])
[15]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-skl1/igt@[email protected]
[16]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-skl10/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_cursor_crc@pipe-a-cursor-suspend:
- shard-kbl: [PASS][17] -> [DMESG-WARN][18] ([i915#180]) +4 similar issues
[17]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-kbl3/igt@[email protected]
[18]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-kbl7/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_cursor_crc@pipe-b-cursor-64x64-offscreen:
- shard-snb: [PASS][19] -> [SKIP][20] ([fdo#109271]) +1 similar issue
[19]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-snb2/igt@[email protected]
[20]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-snb6/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_frontbuffer_tracking@psr-suspend:
- shard-skl: [PASS][21] -> [INCOMPLETE][22] ([i915#123] / [i915#69])
[21]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-skl1/igt@[email protected]
[22]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-skl3/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_plane@plane-panning-bottom-right-suspend-pipe-a-planes:
- shard-apl: [PASS][23] -> [DMESG-WARN][24] ([i915#180]) +1 similar issue
[23]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-apl7/igt@[email protected]
[24]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-apl6/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_plane_alpha_blend@pipe-a-coverage-7efc:
- shard-skl: [PASS][25] -> [FAIL][26] ([fdo#108145])
[25]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-skl1/igt@[email protected]
[26]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-skl10/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_plane_alpha_blend@pipe-c-coverage-7efc:
- shard-skl: [PASS][27] -> [FAIL][28] ([fdo#108145] / [i915#265]) +1 similar issue
[27]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-skl2/igt@[email protected]
[28]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-skl1/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_psr@psr2_no_drrs:
- shard-iclb: [PASS][29] -> [SKIP][30] ([fdo#109441]) +2 similar issues
[29]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb2/igt@kms_psr@psr2_no_drrs.html
[30]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb8/igt@kms_psr@psr2_no_drrs.html
* igt@perf_pmu@busy-vcs1:
- shard-iclb: [PASS][31] -> [SKIP][32] ([fdo#112080]) +14 similar issues
[31]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb2/igt@[email protected]
[32]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb6/igt@[email protected]
* igt@prime_mmap_coherency@ioctl-errors:
- shard-hsw: [PASS][33] -> [FAIL][34] ([i915#831])
[33]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-hsw1/igt@[email protected]
[34]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-hsw4/igt@[email protected]
* igt@prime_vgem@fence-wait-bsd2:
- shard-iclb: [PASS][35] -> [SKIP][36] ([fdo#109276]) +17 similar issues
[35]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb2/igt@[email protected]
[36]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb6/igt@[email protected]
#### Possible fixes ####
* igt@gem_ctx_persistence@vcs1-queued:
- shard-iclb: [SKIP][37] ([fdo#109276] / [fdo#112080]) -> [PASS][38] +2 similar issues
[37]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb7/igt@[email protected]
[38]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb2/igt@[email protected]
* igt@gem_ctx_shared@exec-single-timeline-bsd:
- shard-iclb: [SKIP][39] ([fdo#110841]) -> [PASS][40]
[39]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb4/igt@[email protected]
[40]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb6/igt@[email protected]
* igt@gem_eio@in-flight-suspend:
- shard-skl: [INCOMPLETE][41] ([i915#69]) -> [PASS][42]
[41]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-skl5/igt@[email protected]
[42]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-skl3/igt@[email protected]
* igt@gem_exec_schedule@independent-bsd2:
- shard-iclb: [SKIP][43] ([fdo#109276]) -> [PASS][44] +19 similar issues
[43]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb5/igt@[email protected]
[44]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb4/igt@[email protected]
* igt@gem_exec_schedule@pi-distinct-iova-bsd:
- shard-iclb: [SKIP][45] ([i915#677]) -> [PASS][46] +1 similar issue
[45]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb4/igt@[email protected]
[46]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb7/igt@[email protected]
* igt@gem_exec_schedule@preemptive-hang-bsd:
- shard-iclb: [SKIP][47] ([fdo#112146]) -> [PASS][48] +4 similar issues
[47]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb2/igt@[email protected]
[48]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb6/igt@[email protected]
* igt@gem_exec_suspend@basic-s3:
- shard-kbl: [DMESG-WARN][49] ([i915#180]) -> [PASS][50] +2 similar issues
[49]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-kbl4/igt@[email protected]
[50]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-kbl1/igt@[email protected]
* igt@i915_pm_dc@dc5-dpms:
- shard-iclb: [FAIL][51] ([i915#447]) -> [PASS][52]
[51]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb3/igt@[email protected]
[52]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb8/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_cursor_crc@pipe-c-cursor-suspend:
- shard-skl: [INCOMPLETE][53] ([i915#300]) -> [PASS][54]
[53]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-skl4/igt@[email protected]
[54]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-skl9/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_flip@flip-vs-suspend-interruptible:
- shard-skl: [INCOMPLETE][55] ([i915#221]) -> [PASS][56]
[55]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-skl3/igt@[email protected]
[56]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-skl4/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_plane_alpha_blend@pipe-a-constant-alpha-min:
- shard-skl: [FAIL][57] ([fdo#108145]) -> [PASS][58]
[57]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-skl5/igt@[email protected]
[58]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-skl9/igt@[email protected]
* igt@kms_psr@psr2_primary_page_flip:
- shard-iclb: [SKIP][59] ([fdo#109441]) -> [PASS][60] +2 similar issues
[59]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb7/igt@kms_psr@psr2_primary_page_flip.html
[60]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb2/igt@kms_psr@psr2_primary_page_flip.html
* igt@kms_setmode@basic:
- shard-apl: [FAIL][61] ([i915#31]) -> [PASS][62]
[61]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-apl3/igt@[email protected]
[62]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-apl7/igt@[email protected]
* igt@perf_pmu@init-busy-vcs1:
- shard-iclb: [SKIP][63] ([fdo#112080]) -> [PASS][64] +8 similar issues
[63]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-iclb8/igt@[email protected]
[64]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-iclb4/igt@[email protected]
#### Warnings ####
* igt@i915_pm_dc@dc6-psr:
- shard-tglb: [FAIL][65] ([i915#454]) -> [SKIP][66] ([i915#468])
[65]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-tglb6/igt@[email protected]
[66]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-tglb2/igt@[email protected]
* igt@i915_selftest@live_blt:
- shard-hsw: [DMESG-FAIL][67] ([i915#553] / [i915#725]) -> [DMESG-FAIL][68] ([i915#770])
[67]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/CI_DRM_7827/shard-hsw1/igt@i915_selftest@live_blt.html
[68]: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/shard-hsw5/igt@i915_selftest@live_blt.html
[fdo#108145]: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=108145
[fdo#109271]: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109271
[fdo#109276]: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109276
[fdo#109441]: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109441
[fdo#110841]: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=110841
[fdo#112080]: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112080
[fdo#112146]: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112146
[i915#109]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/109
[i915#123]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/123
[i915#180]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/180
[i915#221]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/221
[i915#265]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/265
[i915#300]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/300
[i915#31]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/31
[i915#447]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/447
[i915#454]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/454
[i915#468]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/468
[i915#553]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/553
[i915#644]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/644
[i915#677]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/677
[i915#69]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/69
[i915#694]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/694
[i915#725]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/725
[i915#770]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/770
[i915#82]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/82
[i915#831]: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/issues/831
Participating hosts (10 -> 10)
------------------------------
No changes in participating hosts
Build changes
-------------
* CI: CI-20190529 -> None
* Linux: CI_DRM_7827 -> Patchwork_16289
CI-20190529: 20190529
CI_DRM_7827: c8969aeacfff681c83a800e82b0f18a6ab3e77ea @ git://anongit.freedesktop.org/gfx-ci/linux
IGT_5389: 966c58649dee31bb5bf2fad92f75ffd365968b81 @ git://anongit.freedesktop.org/xorg/app/intel-gpu-tools
Patchwork_16289: e309daf4690565507b1fe7244ed41217b057ab0f @ git://anongit.freedesktop.org/gfx-ci/linux
piglit_4509: fdc5a4ca11124ab8413c7988896eec4c97336694 @ git://anongit.freedesktop.org/piglit
== Logs ==
For more details see: https://intel-gfx-ci.01.org/tree/drm-tip/Patchwork_16289/index.html
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx