Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
Subsystems (4)
v5 cover Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the guest starts running.
OVMF already reserves designated area for secret injection (in its AmdSev package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not available in the guest kernel.
The patch series keeps the address of the EFI-provided memory for injected secrets, and optionally exposes the secrets to userspace via securityfs using a new efi_secret kernel module.
The first patch in EFI keeps the address of the secret area as passed in the EFI configuration table. The second patch is a quirk fix for older firmwares didn't mark the secrets page as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE. The third patch introduces the new efi_secret module that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files, and allows clearing out secrets with a file unlink interface. The last patch documents the data flow of confidential computing secret injection.
As a usage example, consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. The guest application reads the secret from the efi_secret filesystem and proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed computations on the content.
In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a confidential (memory-encrypted) guest.
This has been tested with AMD SEV and SEV-ES guests, but the kernel side of handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore might be usable (perhaps with minor changes) for any confidential computing hardware that can publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.
To enable this functionality, set CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m when building the guest kernel.
Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:
# modprobe efi_secret # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# xxd /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61 these-are-the-ka 00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405 ta-secrets...... 00000020: 0607 ..
# rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret total 0 drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4
---
v5 changes:
- Simplify EFI code: instead of copying the secret area, the firmware marks the secret area as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, and then the uefi_init() code just keeps the pointer as it appears in the EFI configuration table. The use of reserved pages is similar to the AMD SEV-SNP patches for handling SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages.
- In order to handle OVMF releases out there which mark the confidential computing secrets page as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA, add efi/libstub code that detects this and fixes the E820 map to reserve this page.
- In the efi_secret module code, map the secrets page using ioremap_encrypted (again, similar to the AMD SEV-SNP guest patches for accessing SNP-Secrets and SNP-CPUID pages).
- Add documentation in Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v4 changes:
- Guard all the new EFI and efi-stub code (patches 1+2) with #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET (thanks Greg KH). Selecting CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m (patch 3) will enable the EFI parts as well.
- Guard call to clflush_cache_range() with #ifdef CONFIG_X86 (Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>)
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
v3 changes:
- Rename the module to efi_secret
- Remove the exporting of clean_cache_range
- Use clflush_cache_range in wipe_memory
- Document function wipe_memory
- Initialize efi.coco_secret to EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR to correctly detect when there's no secret area published in the EFI configuration tables
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]
v2 changes:
- Export clean_cache_range()
- When deleteing a secret, call clean_cache_range() after explicit_memzero
- Add Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-sev_secret
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-coco/[email protected]/
Dov Murik (4):
efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area
virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation
.../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret | 50 +++ Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst | 103 ++++++ Documentation/security/coco/index.rst | 9 + Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 + drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 28 ++ drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 341 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 7 + 14 files changed, 581 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/index.rst create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
base-commit: 42eb8fdac2fc5d62392dcfcf0253753e821a97b0
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v5 1/4 efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
Confidential computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) allows a guest owner to inject secrets into the VMs memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them.
Firmware support for secret injection is available in OVMF, which reserves a memory area for secret injection and includes a pointer to it the in EFI config table entry LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_TABLE_GUID.
If EFI exposes such a table entry, uefi_init() will keep a pointer to the EFI config table entry in efi.coco_secret, so it can be used later by the kernel (specifically drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret). It will also appear in the kernel log as "CocoSecret=ADDRESS"; for example:
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II
[ 0.000000] efi: CocoSecret=0x7f22e680 SMBIOS=0x7f541000 ACPI=0x7f77e000 ACPI 2.0=0x7f77e014 MEMATTR=0x7ea0c018The new functionality can be enabled with CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET=y.
--- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 +++ drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 7 +++++++ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +3 -0
@@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS &efi.mokvar_table,#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + &efi.coco_secret, +#endif };u64 efi_setup;/* efi setup_data physical address */
drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +16 -0
@@ -284,3 +284,19 @@ config EFI_CUSTOM_SSDT_OVERLAYS See Documentation/admin-guide/acpi/ssdt-overlays.rst for more information. + +config EFI_COCO_SECRET + bool "EFI Confidential Computing Secret Area Support" + depends on EFI + help + Confidential Computing platforms (such as AMD SEV) allow the + Guest Owner to securely inject secrets during guest VM launch. + The secrets are placed in a designated EFI reserved memory area. + + In order to use the secrets in the kernel, the location of the secret + area (as published in the EFI config table) must be kept. + + If you say Y here, the address of the EFI secret area will be kept + for usage inside the kernel. This will allow the + virt/coco/efi_secret module to access the secrets, which in turn + allows userspace programs to access the injected secrets.
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +6 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = {#ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS .mokvar_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR,#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + .coco_secret = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, +#endif };EXPORT_SYMBOL (efi);
@@ -528,6 +531,9 @@ static const efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] __initconst = {#endif #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS {LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID, &efi.mokvar_table, "MOKvar" }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET + {LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID, &efi.coco_secret, "CocoSecret" }, #endif {}, };
include/linux/efi.h +7 -0
@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);#define LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x888eb0c6, 0x8ede, 0x4ff5, 0xa8, 0xf0, 0x9a, 0xee, 0x5c, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc2)#define LINUX_EFI_INITRD_MEDIA_GUID EFI_GUID(0x5568e427, 0x68fc, 0x4f3d, 0xac, 0x74, 0xca, 0x55, 0x52, 0x31, 0xcc, 0x68)#define LINUX_EFI_MOK_VARIABLE_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc451ed2b, 0x9694, 0x45d3, 0xba, 0xba, 0xed, 0x9f, 0x89, 0x88, 0xa3, 0x89) +#define LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID EFI_GUID(0xadf956ad, 0xe98c, 0x484c, 0xae, 0x11, 0xb5, 0x1c, 0x7d, 0x33, 0x64, 0x47)/* OEM GUIDs */ #define DELLEMC_EFI_RCI2_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x2d9f28a2, 0xa886, 0x456a, 0x97, 0xa8, 0xf1, 0x1e, 0xf2, 0x4f, 0xf4, 0x55)
@@ -550,6 +551,7 @@ extern struct efi {unsigned long tpm_log;/* TPM2 Event Log table */ unsigned long tpm_final_log;/* TPM2 Final Events Log table */ unsigned long mokvar_table;/* MOK variable config table */ +unsigned long coco_secret;/* Confidential computing secret table */ efi_get_time_t *get_time;efi_set_time_t *set_time;
@@ -1283,4 +1285,9 @@ static inline struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *efi_mokvar_entry_find( }#endif +struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area { +u64 base_pa; +u64 size; +}; +#endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v5 2/4 efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area
In reply to Dov MurikSome older firmware declare the confidential computing secret area as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA region. Fix this up by treating this memory region as EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, as it should be.
If that memory region is already EFI_RESERVED_TYPE then this has no effect on the E820 map.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +28 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@const efi_system_table_t *efi_system_table;extern u32 image_offset;static efi_loaded_image_t *image =NULL ; +static u64 efi_coco_secret_phys_addr =U64_MAX ;static efi_status_t preserve_pci_rom_image (efi_pci_io_protocol_t *pci,struct pci_setup_rom **__rom)
@@ -443,6 +444,21 @@ static void add_e820ext(struct boot_params *params, params->hdr.setup_data = (unsigned long )e820ext; } +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET +static void efi_set_coco_secret_phys_addr (void ) +{ +struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area = +get_efi_config_table (LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID ); + +if (!secret_area || secret_area->size ==0 || secret_area->size >=SZ_4G ) +return ; + + efi_coco_secret_phys_addr = secret_area->base_pa; +} +#else +static void efi_set_coco_secret_phys_addr (void ) {} +#endif +static efi_status_t setup_e820 (struct boot_params *params,struct setup_data *e820ext,u32 e820ext_size) {
@@ -494,6 +510,16 @@ setup_e820(struct boot_params *params, struct setup_data *e820ext, u32 e820ext_s e820_type =E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED ; else e820_type =E820_TYPE_RAM ; +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_COCO_SECRET +if (d->phys_addr == efi_coco_secret_phys_addr) +/* +* Fix a quirk in firmwares which don't mark +* the EFI confidential computing area as +* EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, but instead as +* EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA. +*/ + e820_type =E820_TYPE_RESERVED ; +#endif break ;case EFI_ACPI_MEMORY_NVS :
@@ -793,6 +819,8 @@ unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle,efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog (); +efi_set_coco_secret_phys_addr (); +setup_graphics (boot_params);setup_efi_pci (boot_params);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v5 3/4 virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
In reply to Dov MurikThe new efi_secret module exposes the confidential computing (coco) EFI secret area via securityfs interface.
When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under /sys/kernel/security), a "coco/efi_secret" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.
This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's LAUNCH_SECRET command).
Removing (unlinking) files in the "coco/efi_secret" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.
--- .../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret | 50 +++ drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 341 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 408 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret new file +50 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +What: security/coco/efi_secret +Date: October 2021 +Contact: Dov Murik <[email protected]> +Description: + Exposes confidential computing (coco) EFI secrets to + userspace via securityfs. + + EFI can declare memory area used by confidential computing + platforms (such as AMD SEV and SEV-ES) for secret injection by + the Guest Owner during VM's launch. The secrets are encrypted + by the Guest Owner and decrypted inside the trusted enclave, + and therefore are not readable by the untrusted host. + + The efi_secret module exposes the secrets to userspace. Each + secret appears as a file under <securityfs>/coco/efi_secret, + where the filename is the GUID of the entry in the secrets + table. + + Two operations are supported for the files: read and unlink. + Reading the file returns the content of secret entry. + Unlinking the file overwrites the secret data with zeroes and + removes the entry from the filesystem. A secret cannot be read + after it has been unlinked. + + For example, listing the available secrets:: + + # modprobe efi_secret + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + Reading the secret data by reading a file:: + + # cat /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + the-content-of-the-secret-data + + Wiping a secret by unlinking a file:: + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + Note: The binary format of the secrets table injected by the + Guest Owner is described in + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c under "Structure of + the EFI secret area".
drivers/virt/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -36,4 +36,7 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig" + +source "drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig" + endif
drivers/virt/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += vboxguest/ obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES) += nitro_enclaves/ obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM) += acrn/ +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += coco/efi_secret/
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig new file +11 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +config EFI_SECRET + tristate "EFI secret area securityfs support" + depends on EFI + select EFI_COCO_SECRET + select SECURITYFS + help + This is a driver for accessing the EFI secret area via securityfs. + + To compile this driver as a module, choose M here. + The module will be called efi_secret.
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile new file +2 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret.o
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c new file +341 -0
341 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
Quoted 116 lines · Dov Murik
The new
efi_secretmodule exposes the confidential computing (coco) EFI secret area via securityfs interface.When the module is loaded (and securityfs is mounted, typically under
/sys/kernel/security), a "coco/efi_secret" directory is created in securityfs. In it, a file is created for each secret entry. The name of each such file is the GUID of the secret entry, and its content is the secret data.This allows applications running in a confidential computing setting to read secrets provided by the guest owner via a secure secret injection mechanism (such as AMD SEV's
LAUNCH_SECRETcommand).Removing (unlinking) files in the "coco/efi_secret" directory will zero out the secret in memory, and remove the filesystem entry. If the module is removed and loaded again, that secret will not appear in the filesystem.
Signed-off-by Dov Murik <[email protected]>--- .../ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret | 50 +++ drivers/virt/Kconfig | 3 + drivers/virt/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c | 341 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 408 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.cDocumentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret new file +50
-0@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +What: security/coco/efi_secret +Date: October 2021 +Contact: Dov Murik <[email protected]> +Description: + Exposes confidential computing (coco) EFI secrets to + userspace via securityfs. + + EFI can declare memory area used by confidential computing + platforms (such as AMD SEV and SEV-ES) for secret injection by + the Guest Owner during VM's launch. The secrets are encrypted + by the Guest Owner and decrypted inside the trusted enclave, + and therefore are not readable by the untrusted host. + + The efi_secret module exposes the secrets to userspace. Each + secret appears as a file under <securityfs>/coco/efi_secret, + where the filename is the GUID of the entry in the secrets + table. + + Two operations are supported for the files: read and unlink. + Reading the file returns the content of secret entry. + Unlinking the file overwrites the secret data with zeroes and + removes the entry from the filesystem. A secret cannot be read + after it has been unlinked. + + For example, listing the available secrets:: + + # modprobe efi_secret + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + Reading the secret data by reading a file:: + + # cat /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + the-content-of-the-secret-data + + Wiping a secret by unlinking a file:: + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + # ls -l /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + Note: The binary format of the secrets table injected by the + Guest Owner is described in + drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c under "Structure of + the EFI secret area".drivers/virt/Kconfig +3
-0@@ -36,4 +36,7 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig" + +source "drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig" + endifdrivers/virt/Makefile +1
-0@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += vboxguest/ obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES) += nitro_enclaves/ obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM) += acrn/ +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += coco/efi_secret/drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig new file +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig line 11
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/Kconfig new file +10
-0+config EFI_SECRET + tristate "EFI secret area securityfs support" + depends on EFI + select EFI_COCO_SECRET + select SECURITYFS + help + This is a driver for accessing the EFI secret area via securityfs. + + To compile this driver as a module, choose M here. + The module will be called efi_secret.
Shouldn't this module auto-load only if the efi secret area is present?
What is going to cause the module to be loaded by a distro if it does not have some sort of way to tell userspace what resources it belongs to? Can you trigger off of a DMI or EFI attribute somehow for this?
Otherwise you are going to force distros to modify their init scripts for this functionality, how is that going to happen?
thanks,
greg k-h
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v5 3/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
In reply to Dov MurikThank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
Hi Dov,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on 42eb8fdac2fc5d62392dcfcf0253753e821a97b0]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Dov-Murik/Allow-guest-access-to-EFI-confidential-computing-secret-area/20211118-193724 base: 42eb8fdac2fc5d62392dcfcf0253753e821a97b0 config: riscv-allyesconfig (attached as .config) compiler: riscv64-linux-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/547e54014b34e24cd885e941dd66e3fdece3c0c6
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Dov-Murik/Allow-guest-access-to-EFI-confidential-computing-secret-area/20211118-193724 git checkout 547e54014b34e24cd885e941dd66e3fdece3c0c6
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross ARCH=riscv
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c: In function 'efi_secret_map_area':
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c:181:26: error: implicit declaration of function 'ioremap_encrypted' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
181 | s->secret_data = ioremap_encrypted(secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c:181:24: warning: assignment to 'void *' from 'int' makes pointer from integer without a cast [-Wint-conversion]
181 | s->secret_data = ioremap_encrypted(secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
| ^cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
vim +181 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
157
158 static int efi_secret_map_area(void)
159 {
160 int ret;
161 struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
162 struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area;
163
164 if (efi.coco_secret == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
165 pr_err("Secret area address is not available\n");
166 return -EINVAL;
167 }
168
169 secret_area = memremap(efi.coco_secret, sizeof(*secret_area), MEMREMAP_WB);
170 if (secret_area == NULL) {
171 pr_err("Could not map secret area EFI config entry\n");
172 return -ENOMEM;
173 }
174 if (!secret_area->base_pa || secret_area->size < sizeof(struct secret_header)) {
175 pr_err("Invalid secret area memory location (base_pa=0x%llx size=0x%llx)\n",
176 secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
177 ret = -EINVAL;
178 goto unmap;
179 }
180
> 181 s->secret_data = ioremap_encrypted(secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
182 if (s->secret_data == NULL) {
183 pr_err("Could not map secret area\n");
184 ret = -ENOMEM;
185 goto unmap;
186 }
187
188 s->secret_data_len = secret_area->size;
189 ret = 0;
190
191 unmap:
192 memunmap(secret_area);
193 return ret;
194 }
195
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v5 3/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
In reply to Dov MurikThank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
Hi Dov,
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on 42eb8fdac2fc5d62392dcfcf0253753e821a97b0]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Dov-Murik/Allow-guest-access-to-EFI-confidential-computing-secret-area/20211118-193724 base: 42eb8fdac2fc5d62392dcfcf0253753e821a97b0 config: riscv-allyesconfig (attached as .config) compiler: riscv64-linux-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/547e54014b34e24cd885e941dd66e3fdece3c0c6
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Dov-Murik/Allow-guest-access-to-EFI-confidential-computing-secret-area/20211118-193724 git checkout 547e54014b34e24cd885e941dd66e3fdece3c0c6
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross ARCH=riscv
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c: In function 'efi_secret_map_area':
>> drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c:181:26: error: implicit declaration of function 'ioremap_encrypted' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
181 | s->secret_data = ioremap_encrypted(secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c:181:24: warning: assignment to 'void *' from 'int' makes pointer from integer without a cast [-Wint-conversion]
181 | s->secret_data = ioremap_encrypted(secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
| ^cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
vim +/ioremap_encrypted +181 drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c
157
158 static int efi_secret_map_area(void)
159 {
160 int ret;
161 struct efi_secret *s = efi_secret_get();
162 struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area;
163
164 if (efi.coco_secret == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
165 pr_err("Secret area address is not available\n");
166 return -EINVAL;
167 }
168
169 secret_area = memremap(efi.coco_secret, sizeof(*secret_area), MEMREMAP_WB);
170 if (secret_area == NULL) {
171 pr_err("Could not map secret area EFI config entry\n");
172 return -ENOMEM;
173 }
174 if (!secret_area->base_pa || secret_area->size < sizeof(struct secret_header)) {
175 pr_err("Invalid secret area memory location (base_pa=0x%llx size=0x%llx)\n",
176 secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
177 ret = -EINVAL;
178 goto unmap;
179 }
180
> 181 s->secret_data = ioremap_encrypted(secret_area->base_pa, secret_area->size);
182 if (s->secret_data == NULL) {
183 pr_err("Could not map secret area\n");
184 ret = -ENOMEM;
185 goto unmap;
186 }
187
188 s->secret_data_len = secret_area->size;
189 ret = 0;
190
191 unmap:
192 memunmap(secret_area);
193 return ret;
194 }
195
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all(a)lists.01.org
PATCH v5 4/4 docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation
In reply to Dov MurikAdd documentation for the efi_secret module which allows access to Confidential Computing injected secrets.
--- Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/security/coco/index.rst | 9 ++ Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + 3 files changed, 113 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/security/coco/index.rst
Documentation/security/coco/efi_secret.rst new file +103 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +========== +efi_secret +========== + +This document describes how Confidential Computing secret injection is handled +from the firmware to the operating system. + + +Introduction +============ + +Confidential Computing (coco) hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted +Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs +memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them. In SEV, +secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the +guest starts running. + +The efi_secret kernel module allows userspace applications to access these +secrets via securityfs. + + +Secret data flow +================ + +The guest firmware may reserve a designated memory area for secret injection, +and publish its location (base GPA and length) in the EFI configuration table +under a ``LINUX_EFI_COCO_SECRET_AREA_GUID`` entry +(``adf956ad-e98c-484c-ae11-b51c7d336447``). This memory area should be marked +by the firmware as ``EFI_RESERVED_TYPE``, and therefore the kernel should not +be use it for its own purposes. + +During the VM's launch, the virtual machine manager may inject a secret to that +area. In AMD SEV and SEV-ES this is performed using the +``KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET`` command (see [amd-mem-enc]_). The strucutre of the +injected Guest Owner secret data should be a GUIDed table of secret values; the +binary format is described in ``drivers/virt/coco/efi_secret/efi_secret.c`` +under "Structure of the EFI secret area". + +On kernel start, the kernel's EFI driver saves the location of the secret +memory (taken from the EFI configuration table) in the ``efi.coco_secret`` +field. + +When a userspace application needs to access the secrets inside the guest VM, +it loads the efi_secret kernel module (``CONFIG_EFI_SECRET=m``) which exposes +the secrets via securityfs. The details of the efi_secret filesystem interface +are in [efi-secret-abi]_. + + + +Application usage example +========================= + +Consider a guest performing computations on encrypted files. The Guest Owner +provides the decryption key (= secret) using the secret injection mechanism. +The guest application reads the secret from the efi_secret filesystem and +proceeds to decrypt the files into memory and then performs the needed +computations on the content. + +In this example, the host can't read the files from the disk image +because they are encrypted. Host can't read the decryption key because +it is passed using the secret injection mechanism (= secure channel). +Host can't read the decrypted content from memory because it's a +confidential (memory-encrypted) guest. + +Here is a simple example for usage of the efi_secret module in a guest +to which an EFI secret area with 4 secrets was injected during launch:: + + # modprobe efi_secret + # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + total 0 + drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 . + drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + # xxd /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + 00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61 these-are-the-ka + 00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405 ta-secrets...... + 00000020: 0607 .. + + # rm /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910 + + # ls -la /sys/kernel/security/coco/efi_secret + total 0 + drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 Jun 28 11:55 . + drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 .. + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6 + -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Jun 28 11:54 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2 + + +References +========== + +See [sev-api-spec]_ for more info regarding SEV ``LAUNCH_SECRET`` operation. + +.. [amd-mem-enc] :ref:`Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption <amdmemenc>` +.. [efi-secret-abi] :ref:`Documentation/ABI/testing/securityfs-coco-efi_secret <efisecret>` +.. [sev-api-spec] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf
Documentation/security/coco/index.rst new file +9 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +==================================== +Confidential Computing documentation +==================================== + +.. toctree:: + + efi_secret
Documentation/security/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -17,3 +17,4 @@ Security Documentation tpm/index digsig landlock + coco
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1