5.15.34-rc1 review
Subsystems (6)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 141/277 parisc: Fix CPU affinity for Lasi, WAX and Dino chips
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 939fc856676c266c3bc347c1c1661872a3725c0f ]
Add the missing logic to allow Lasi, WAX and Dino to set the CPU affinity. This fixes IRQ migration to other CPUs when a CPU is shutdown which currently holds the IRQs for one of those chips.
--- drivers/parisc/dino.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- drivers/parisc/gsc.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/parisc/gsc.h | 1 + drivers/parisc/lasi.c | 7 +++---- drivers/parisc/wax.c | 7 +++---- 5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/parisc/dino.c +33 -8
@@ -142,9 +142,8 @@ struct dino_device {struct pci_hba_data hba;/* 'C' inheritance - must be first */ spinlock_t dinosaur_pen; -unsigned long txn_addr;/* EIR addr to generate interrupt */ -u32 txn_data;/* EIR data assign to each dino */ u32 imr;/* IRQ's which are enabled */ +struct gsc_irq gsc_irq;int global_irq[DINO_LOCAL_IRQS ];/* map IMR bit to global irq */ #ifdef DINO_DEBUG unsigned int dino_irr0;/* save most recent IRQ line stat */
@@ -339,14 +338,43 @@ static void dino_unmask_irq(struct irq_data *d)if (tmp &DINO_MASK_IRQ (local_irq)) {DBG (KERN_WARNING "%s(): IRQ asserted! (ILR 0x%x)\n" , __func__, tmp); -gsc_writel (dino_dev->txn_data, dino_dev->txn_addr); +gsc_writel (dino_dev->gsc_irq.txn_data, dino_dev->gsc_irq.txn_addr); } } +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +static int dino_set_affinity_irq (struct irq_data *d,const struct cpumask *dest, +bool force) +{ +struct dino_device *dino_dev =irq_data_get_irq_chip_data (d); +struct cpumask tmask; +int cpu_irq; +u32 eim; + +if (!cpumask_and (&tmask, dest, cpu_online_mask)) +return -EINVAL ; + + cpu_irq =cpu_check_affinity (d, &tmask); +if (cpu_irq <0 ) +return cpu_irq; + + dino_dev->gsc_irq.txn_addr =txn_affinity_addr (d->irq, cpu_irq); + eim = ((u32 ) dino_dev->gsc_irq.txn_addr) | dino_dev->gsc_irq.txn_data; +__raw_writel (eim, dino_dev->hba.base_addr+DINO_IAR0 ); + +irq_data_update_effective_affinity (d, &tmask); + +return IRQ_SET_MASK_OK ; +} +#endif +static struct irq_chip dino_interrupt_type = { .name ="GSC-PCI" , .irq_unmask = dino_unmask_irq, .irq_mask = dino_mask_irq, +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP + .irq_set_affinity = dino_set_affinity_irq, +#endif };
@@ -806,7 +834,6 @@ static int __init dino_common_init(struct parisc_device *dev, {int status;u32 eim; -struct gsc_irq gsc_irq;struct resource *res;pcibios_register_hba (&dino_dev->hba);
@@ -821,10 +848,8 @@ static int __init dino_common_init(struct parisc_device *dev,** still only has 11 IRQ input lines - just map some of them ** to a different processor. */ - dev->irq =gsc_alloc_irq (&gsc_irq); - dino_dev->txn_addr = gsc_irq.txn_addr; - dino_dev->txn_data = gsc_irq.txn_data; - eim = ((u32 ) gsc_irq.txn_addr) | gsc_irq.txn_data; + dev->irq =gsc_alloc_irq (&dino_dev->gsc_irq); + eim = ((u32 ) dino_dev->gsc_irq.txn_addr) | dino_dev->gsc_irq.txn_data;/* ** Dino needs a PA "IRQ" to get a processor's attention.
drivers/parisc/gsc.c +31 -0
@@ -135,10 +135,41 @@ static void gsc_asic_unmask_irq(struct irq_data *d)*/ } +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +static int gsc_set_affinity_irq (struct irq_data *d,const struct cpumask *dest, +bool force) +{ +struct gsc_asic *gsc_dev =irq_data_get_irq_chip_data (d); +struct cpumask tmask; +int cpu_irq; + +if (!cpumask_and (&tmask, dest, cpu_online_mask)) +return -EINVAL ; + + cpu_irq =cpu_check_affinity (d, &tmask); +if (cpu_irq <0 ) +return cpu_irq; + + gsc_dev->gsc_irq.txn_addr =txn_affinity_addr (d->irq, cpu_irq); + gsc_dev->eim = ((u32 ) gsc_dev->gsc_irq.txn_addr) | gsc_dev->gsc_irq.txn_data; + +/* switch IRQ's for devices below LASI/WAX to other CPU */ +gsc_writel (gsc_dev->eim, gsc_dev->hpa +OFFSET_IAR ); + +irq_data_update_effective_affinity (d, &tmask); + +return IRQ_SET_MASK_OK ; +} +#endif + +static struct irq_chip gsc_asic_interrupt_type = { .name ="GSC-ASIC" , .irq_unmask = gsc_asic_unmask_irq, .irq_mask = gsc_asic_mask_irq, +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP + .irq_set_affinity = gsc_set_affinity_irq, +#endif };int gsc_assign_irq (struct irq_chip *type,void *data)
drivers/parisc/gsc.h +1 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct gsc_asic {int version;int type;int eim; +struct gsc_irq gsc_irq;int global_irq[32 ]; };
drivers/parisc/lasi.c +3 -4
@@ -163,7 +163,6 @@ static int __init lasi_init_chip(struct parisc_device *dev) {extern void (*chassis_power_off)(void );struct gsc_asic *lasi; -struct gsc_irq gsc_irq;int ret; lasi =kzalloc (sizeof (*lasi),GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -185,7 +184,7 @@ static int __init lasi_init_chip(struct parisc_device *dev)lasi_init_irq (lasi);/* the IRQ lasi should use */ - dev->irq =gsc_alloc_irq (&gsc_irq); + dev->irq =gsc_alloc_irq (&lasi->gsc_irq);if (dev->irq <0 ) {printk (KERN_ERR "%s(): cannot get GSC irq\n" , __func__);
@@ -193,9 +192,9 @@ static int __init lasi_init_chip(struct parisc_device *dev)return -EBUSY ; } - lasi->eim = ((u32 ) gsc_irq.txn_addr) | gsc_irq.txn_data; + lasi->eim = ((u32 ) lasi->gsc_irq.txn_addr) | lasi->gsc_irq.txn_data; - ret =request_irq (gsc_irq.irq, gsc_asic_intr,0 ,"lasi" , lasi); + ret =request_irq (lasi->gsc_irq.irq, gsc_asic_intr,0 ,"lasi" , lasi);if (ret <0 ) {kfree (lasi);return ret;
drivers/parisc/wax.c +3 -4
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ static int __init wax_init_chip(struct parisc_device *dev) {struct gsc_asic *wax;struct parisc_device *parent; -struct gsc_irq gsc_irq;int ret; wax =kzalloc (sizeof (*wax),GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -85,7 +84,7 @@ static int __init wax_init_chip(struct parisc_device *dev)wax_init_irq (wax);/* the IRQ wax should use */ - dev->irq =gsc_claim_irq (&gsc_irq,WAX_GSC_IRQ ); + dev->irq =gsc_claim_irq (&wax->gsc_irq,WAX_GSC_IRQ );if (dev->irq <0 ) {printk (KERN_ERR "%s(): cannot get GSC irq\n" , __func__);
@@ -93,9 +92,9 @@ static int __init wax_init_chip(struct parisc_device *dev)return -EBUSY ; } - wax->eim = ((u32 ) gsc_irq.txn_addr) | gsc_irq.txn_data; + wax->eim = ((u32 ) wax->gsc_irq.txn_addr) | wax->gsc_irq.txn_data; - ret =request_irq (gsc_irq.irq, gsc_asic_intr,0 ,"wax" , wax); + ret =request_irq (wax->gsc_irq.irq, gsc_asic_intr,0 ,"wax" , wax);if (ret <0 ) {kfree (wax);return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 142/277 parisc: Fix patch code locking and flushing
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: John David Anglin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a9fe7fa7d874a536e0540469f314772c054a0323 ]
This change fixes the following:
1) The flags variable is not initialized. Always use raw_spin_lock_irqsave and raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore to serialize patching.
2) flush_kernel_vmap_range is primarily intended for DMA flushes. Since __patch_text_multiple is often called with interrupts disabled, it is better to directly call flush_kernel_dcache_range_asm and flush_kernel_icache_range_asm. This avoids an extra call.
3) The final call to flush_icache_range is unnecessary.
--- arch/parisc/kernel/patch.c | 25 +++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/patch.c +11 -14
@@ -40,10 +40,7 @@ static void __kprobes *patch_map(void *addr, int fixmap, unsigned long *flags, *need_unmap =1 ;set_fixmap (fixmap,page_to_phys (page)); -if (flags) -raw_spin_lock_irqsave (&patch_lock, *flags); -else -__acquire (&patch_lock); +raw_spin_lock_irqsave (&patch_lock, *flags);return (void *) (__fix_to_virt (fixmap) + (uintaddr & ~PAGE_MASK )); }
@@ -52,10 +49,7 @@ static void __kprobes patch_unmap(int fixmap, unsigned long *flags) {clear_fixmap (fixmap); -if (flags) -raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&patch_lock, *flags); -else -__release (&patch_lock); +raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&patch_lock, *flags); }void __kprobes __patch_text_multiple (void *addr,u32 *insn,unsigned int len)
@@ -67,8 +61,9 @@ void __kprobes __patch_text_multiple(void *addr, u32 *insn, unsigned int len)int mapped;/* Make sure we don't have any aliases in cache */ -flush_kernel_vmap_range (addr, len); -flush_icache_range (start, end); +flush_kernel_dcache_range_asm (start, end); +flush_kernel_icache_range_asm (start, end); +flush_tlb_kernel_range (start, end); p = fixmap =patch_map (addr,FIX_TEXT_POKE0 , &flags, &mapped);
@@ -81,8 +76,10 @@ void __kprobes __patch_text_multiple(void *addr, u32 *insn, unsigned int len)* We're crossing a page boundary, so * need to remap */ -flush_kernel_vmap_range ((void *)fixmap, - (p-fixmap) *sizeof (*p)); +flush_kernel_dcache_range_asm ((unsigned long )fixmap, + (unsigned long )p); +flush_tlb_kernel_range ((unsigned long )fixmap, + (unsigned long )p);if (mapped)patch_unmap (FIX_TEXT_POKE0 , &flags); p = fixmap = patch_map(addr, FIX_TEXT_POKE0, &flags,
@@ -90,10 +87,10 @@ void __kprobes __patch_text_multiple(void *addr, u32 *insn, unsigned int len) } } -flush_kernel_vmap_range ((void *)fixmap, (p-fixmap) *sizeof (*p)); +flush_kernel_dcache_range_asm ((unsigned long )fixmap, (unsigned long )p); +flush_tlb_kernel_range ((unsigned long )fixmap, (unsigned long )p);if (mapped)patch_unmap (FIX_TEXT_POKE0 , &flags); -flush_icache_range (start, end); }void __kprobes __patch_text (void *addr,u32 insn)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 143/277 mm: fix race between MADV_FREE reclaim and blkdev direct IO read
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <[email protected]>
commit 6c8e2a256915a223f6289f651d6b926cd7135c9e upstream.
Problem:
=======
Userspace might read the zero-page instead of actual data from a direct IO read on a block device if the buffers have been called madvise(MADV_FREE) on earlier (this is discussed below) due to a race between page reclaim on MADV_FREE and blkdev direct IO read.
- Race condition:
==============
During page reclaim, the MADV_FREE page check in try_to_unmap_one() checks if the page is not dirty, then discards its rmap PTE(s) (vs. remap back if the page is dirty).
However, after try_to_unmap_one() returns to shrink_page_list(), it might keep the page _anyway_ if page_ref_freeze() fails (it expects exactly _one_ page reference, from the isolation for page reclaim).
Well, blkdev_direct_IO() gets references for all pages, and on READ operations it only sets them dirty _later_.
So, if MADV_FREE'd pages (i.e., not dirty) are used as buffers for direct IO read from block devices, and page reclaim happens during __blkdev_direct_IO[_simple]() exactly AFTER bio_iov_iter_get_pages() returns, but BEFORE the pages are set dirty, the situation happens.
The direct IO read eventually completes. Now, when userspace reads the buffers, the PTE is no longer there and the page fault handler do_anonymous_page() services that with the zero-page, NOT the data!
A synthetic reproducer is provided.
- Page faults:
===========
If page reclaim happens BEFORE bio_iov_iter_get_pages() the issue doesn't happen, because that faults-in all pages as writeable, so do_anonymous_page() sets up a new page/rmap/PTE, and that is used by direct IO. The userspace reads don't fault as the PTE is there (thus zero-page is not used/setup).
But if page reclaim happens AFTER it / BEFORE setting pages dirty, the PTE is no longer there; the subsequent page faults can't help:
The data-read from the block device probably won't generate faults due to DMA (no MMU) but even in the case it wouldn't use DMA, that happens on different virtual addresses (not user-mapped addresses) because struct bio_vec stores struct page to figure addresses out (which are different from user-mapped addresses) for the read.
Thus userspace reads (to user-mapped addresses) still fault, then do_anonymous_page() gets another struct page that would address/ map to other memory than the struct page used by struct bio_vec for the read. (The original struct page is not available, since it wasn't freed, as page_ref_freeze() failed due to more page refs. And even if it were available, its data cannot be trusted anymore.)
Solution:
========
One solution is to check for the expected page reference count in try_to_unmap_one().
There should be one reference from the isolation (that is also checked in shrink_page_list() with page_ref_freeze()) plus one or more references from page mapping(s) (put in discard: label). Further references mean that rmap/PTE cannot be unmapped/nuked.
(Note: there might be more than one reference from mapping due to fork()/clone() without CLONE_VM, which use the same struct page for references, until the copy-on-write page gets copied.)
So, additional page references (e.g., from direct IO read) now prevent the rmap/PTE from being unmapped/dropped; similarly to the page is not freed per shrink_page_list()/page_ref_freeze()).
- Races and Barriers:
==================
The new check in try_to_unmap_one() should be safe in races with bio_iov_iter_get_pages() in get_user_pages() fast and slow paths, as it's done under the PTE lock.
The fast path doesn't take the lock, but it checks if the PTE has changed and if so, it drops the reference and leaves the page for the slow path (which does take that lock).
The fast path requires synchronization w/ full memory barrier: it writes the page reference count first then it reads the PTE later, while try_to_unmap() writes PTE first then it reads page refcount.
And a second barrier is needed, as the page dirty flag should not be read before the page reference count (as in __remove_mapping()). (This can be a load memory barrier only; no writes are involved.)
Call stack/comments:
- try_to_unmap_one()
- page_vma_mapped_walk()
- map_pte() # see pte_offset_map_lock():
pte_offset_map()
spin_lock()
- ptep_get_and_clear() # write PTE
- smp_mb() # (new barrier) GUP fast path
- page_ref_count() # (new check) read refcount
- page_vma_mapped_walk_done() # see pte_unmap_unlock():
pte_unmap()
spin_unlock()- bio_iov_iter_get_pages()
- __bio_iov_iter_get_pages()
- iov_iter_get_pages()
- get_user_pages_fast()
- internal_get_user_pages_fast()
# fast path
- lockless_pages_from_mm()
- gup_{pgd,p4d,pud,pmd,pte}_range()
ptep = pte_offset_map() # not _lock()
pte = ptep_get_lockless(ptep)
page = pte_page(pte)
try_grab_compound_head(page) # inc refcount
# (RMW/barrier # on success)
if (pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep)) # read PTE
put_compound_head(page) # dec refcount
# go slow path
# slow path
- __gup_longterm_unlocked()
- get_user_pages_unlocked()
- __get_user_pages_locked()
- __get_user_pages()
- follow_{page,p4d,pud,pmd}_mask()
- follow_page_pte()
ptep = pte_offset_map_lock() pte = *ptep
page = vm_normal_page(pte)
try_grab_page(page) # inc refcount
pte_unmap_unlock()
- Huge Pages:
==========
Regarding transparent hugepages, that logic shouldn't change, as MADV_FREE (aka lazyfree) pages are PageAnon() && !PageSwapBacked() (madvise_free_pte_range() -> mark_page_lazyfree() -> lru_lazyfree_fn()) thus should reach shrink_page_list() -> split_huge_page_to_list() before try_to_unmap[_one](), so it deals with normal pages only.
(And in case unlikely/TTU_SPLIT_HUGE_PMD/split_huge_pmd_address() happens, which should not or be rare, the page refcount should be greater than
mapcount: the head page is referenced by tail pages. That also prevents checking the head page then incorrectly call page_remove_rmap(subpage) for a tail page, that isn't even in the shrink_page_list()'s page_list (an effect of split huge pmd/pmvw), as it might happen today in this unlikely scenario.)
MADV_FREE'd buffers:
===================
So, back to the "if MADV_FREE pages are used as buffers" note. The case is arguable, and subject to multiple interpretations.
The madvise(2) manual page on the MADV_FREE advice value says:
1) 'After a successful MADV_FREE ... data will be lost when the kernel frees the pages.'
2) 'the free operation will be canceled if the caller writes into the page' / 'subsequent writes ... will succeed and then [the] kernel cannot free those dirtied pages'
3) 'If there is no subsequent write, the kernel can free the pages at any time.'
Thoughts, questions, considerations... respectively:
1) Since the kernel didn't actually free the page (page_ref_freeze() failed), should the data not have been lost? (on userspace read.)
2) Should writes performed by the direct IO read be able to cancel the free operation?
- Should the direct IO read be considered as 'the caller' too, as it's been requested by 'the caller'?
- Should the bio technique to dirty pages on return to userspace (bio_check_pages_dirty() is called/used by __blkdev_direct_IO()) be considered in another/special way here?
3) Should an upcoming write from a previously requested direct IO read be considered as a subsequent write, so the kernel should not free the pages? (as it's known at the time of page reclaim.)
And lastly:
Technically, the last point would seem a reasonable consideration and balance, as the madvise(2) manual page apparently (and fairly) seem to assume that 'writes' are memory access from the userspace process (not explicitly considering writes from the kernel or its corner cases; again, fairly).. plus the kernel fix implementation for the corner case of the largely 'non-atomic write' encompassed by a direct IO read operation, is relatively simple; and it helps.
Reproducer:
==========
@ test.c (simplified, but works)
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main() {
int fd, i;
char *buf;
fd = open(DEV, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
buf = mmap(NULL, BUF_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
for (i = 0; i < BUF_SIZE; i += PAGE_SIZE)
buf[i] = 1; // init to non-zero
madvise(buf, BUF_SIZE, MADV_FREE);
read(fd, buf, BUF_SIZE);
for (i = 0; i < BUF_SIZE; i += PAGE_SIZE)
printf("%p: 0x%x\n", &buf[i], buf[i]);
return 0;
}@ block/fops.c (formerly fs/block_dev.c)
+#include <linux/swap.h>
...
... __blkdev_direct_IO[_simple](...)
{
...
+ if (!strcmp(current->comm, "good"))
+ shrink_all_memory(ULONG_MAX);
+
ret = bio_iov_iter_get_pages(...);
+
+ if (!strcmp(current->comm, "bad"))
+ shrink_all_memory(ULONG_MAX);
...
}@ shell
# NUM_PAGES=4
# PAGE_SIZE=$(getconf PAGE_SIZE)
# yes | dd of=test.img bs=${PAGE_SIZE} count=${NUM_PAGES}
# DEV=$(losetup -f --show test.img)
# gcc -DDEV=\"$DEV\" \
-DBUF_SIZE=$((PAGE_SIZE * NUM_PAGES)) \
-DPAGE_SIZE=${PAGE_SIZE} \
test.c -o test
# od -tx1 $DEV
0000000 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a
*
0040000
# mv test good
# ./good
0x7f7c10418000: 0x79
0x7f7c10419000: 0x79
0x7f7c1041a000: 0x79
0x7f7c1041b000: 0x79
# mv good bad
# ./bad
0x7fa1b8050000: 0x0
0x7fa1b8051000: 0x0
0x7fa1b8052000: 0x0
0x7fa1b8053000: 0x0Note: the issue is consistent on v5.17-rc3, but it's intermittent with the support of MADV_FREE on v4.5 (60%-70% error; needs swap). [wrap do_direct_IO() in do_blockdev_direct_IO() @ fs/direct-io.c].
- v5.17-rc3:
# for i in {1..1000}; do ./good; done \
| cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
4000 0x79 # mv good bad
# for i in {1..1000}; do ./bad; done \
| cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
4000 0x0 # free | grep Swap
Swap: 0 0 0- v4.5:
# for i in {1..1000}; do ./good; done \
| cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
4000 0x79 # mv good bad
# for i in {1..1000}; do ./bad; done \
| cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
2702 0x0
1298 0x79 # swapoff -av
swapoff /swap # for i in {1..1000}; do ./bad; done \
| cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
4000 0x79Ceph/TCMalloc:
=============
For documentation purposes, the use case driving the analysis/fix is Ceph on Ubuntu 18.04, as the TCMalloc library there still uses MADV_FREE to release unused memory to the system from the mmap'ed page heap (might be committed back/used again; it's not munmap'ed.) - PageHeap::DecommitSpan() -> TCMalloc_SystemRelease() -> madvise() - PageHeap::CommitSpan() -> TCMalloc_SystemCommit() -> do nothing.
Note: TCMalloc switched back to MADV_DONTNEED a few commits after the release in Ubuntu 18.04 (google-perftools/gperftools 2.5), so the issue just 'disappeared' on Ceph on later Ubuntu releases but is still present in the kernel, and can be hit by other use cases.
The observed issue seems to be the old Ceph bug #22464 [1], where checksum mismatches are observed (and instrumentation with buffer dumps shows zero-pages read from mmap'ed/MADV_FREE'd page ranges).
The issue in Ceph was reasonably deemed a kernel bug (comment #50) and mostly worked around with a retry mechanism, but other parts of Ceph could still hit that (rocksdb). Anyway, it's less likely to be hit again as TCMalloc switched out of MADV_FREE by default.
(Some kernel versions/reports from the Ceph bug, and relation with the MADV_FREE introduction/changes; TCMalloc versions not checked.)
- 4.4 good
- 4.5 (madv_free: introduction)
- 4.9 bad
- 4.10 good? maybe a swapless system
- 4.12 (madv_free: no longer free instantly on swapless systems)
- 4.13 bad
[1] https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/22464
Thanks:
======
Several people contributed to analysis/discussions/tests/reproducers in the first stages when drilling down on ceph/tcmalloc/linux kernel:
- Dan Hill
- Dan Streetman
- Dongdong Tao
- Gavin Guo
- Gerald Yang
- Heitor Alves de Siqueira
- Ioanna Alifieraki
- Jay Vosburgh
- Matthew Ruffell
- Ponnuvel Palaniyappan
Reviews, suggestions, corrections, comments:
- Minchan Kim
- Yu Zhao
- Huang, Ying
- John Hubbard
- Christoph Hellwig
[mfo: backport: replace folio/test_flag with page/flag equivalents;
real Fixes: 854e9ed09ded ("mm: support madvise(MADV_FREE)") in v4.]
--- mm/rmap.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/rmap.c +24 -1
@@ -1570,7 +1570,30 @@ static bool try_to_unmap_one(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma,/* MADV_FREE page check */ if (!PageSwapBacked (page)) { -if (!PageDirty (page)) { +int ref_count, map_count; + +/* +* Synchronize with gup_pte_range(): +* - clear PTE; barrier; read refcount +* - inc refcount; barrier; read PTE +*/ +smp_mb (); + + ref_count =page_ref_count (page); + map_count =page_mapcount (page); + +/* +* Order reads for page refcount and dirty flag +* (see comments in __remove_mapping()). +*/ +smp_rmb (); + +/* +* The only page refs must be one from isolation +* plus the rmap(s) (dropped by discard:). +*/ +if (ref_count ==1 + map_count && + !PageDirty (page)) {/* Invalidate as we cleared the pte */ mmu_notifier_invalidate_range (mm, address, address +PAGE_SIZE );
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 144/277 rtc: mc146818-lib: change return values of mc146818_get_time()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mateusz Jończyk <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d35786b3a28dee20b12962ae2dd365892a99ed1a ]
No function is checking mc146818_get_time() return values yet, so correct them to make them more customary.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-mc146818-lib.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-mc146818-lib.c +2 -2
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ unsigned int mc146818_get_time(struct rtc_time *time)if (WARN_ON_ONCE ((CMOS_READ (RTC_VALID ) &0x40 ) !=0 )) {spin_unlock_irqrestore (&rtc_lock, flags);memset (time,0xff ,sizeof (*time)); -return 0 ; +return -EIO ; }/*
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ unsigned int mc146818_get_time(struct rtc_time *time) time->tm_mon--; -return RTC_24H ; +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (mc146818_get_time);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 145/277 rtc: Check return value from mc146818_get_time()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mateusz Jończyk <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0dd8d6cb9eddfe637bcd821bbfd40ebd5a0737b9 ]
There are 4 users of mc146818_get_time() and none of them was checking the return value from this function. Change this.
Print the appropriate warnings in callers of mc146818_get_time() instead of in the function mc146818_get_time() itself, in order not to add strings to rtc-mc146818-lib.c, which is kind of a library.
The callers of alpha_rtc_read_time() and cmos_read_time() may use the contents of (struct rtc_time *) even when the functions return a failure code. Therefore, set the contents of (struct rtc_time *) to 0x00, which looks more sensible then 0xff and aligns with the (possibly stale?) comment in cmos_read_time:
/* * If pm_trace abused the RTC for storage, set the timespec to 0, * which tells the caller that this RTC value is unusable. */
For consistency, do this in mc146818_get_time().
Note: hpet_rtc_interrupt() may call mc146818_get_time() many times a second. It is very unlikely, though, that the RTC suddenly stops working and mc146818_get_time() would consistently fail.
Only compile-tested on alpha.
--- arch/alpha/kernel/rtc.c | 7 ++++++- arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c | 8 ++++++-- drivers/base/power/trace.c | 6 +++++- drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c | 9 ++++++++- drivers/rtc/rtc-mc146818-lib.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/alpha/kernel/rtc.c +6 -1
@@ -80,7 +80,12 @@ init_rtc_epoch(void)static int alpha_rtc_read_time (struct device *dev,struct rtc_time *tm) { -mc146818_get_time (tm); +int ret =mc146818_get_time (tm); + +if (ret <0 ) { +dev_err_ratelimited (dev,"unable to read current time\n" ); +return ret; + }/* Adjust for non-default epochs. It's easier to depend on the generic __get_rtc_time and adjust the epoch here than create
arch/x86/kernel/hpet.c +6 -2
@@ -1435,8 +1435,12 @@ irqreturn_t hpet_rtc_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)hpet_rtc_timer_reinit ();memset (&curr_time,0 ,sizeof (struct rtc_time )); -if (hpet_rtc_flags & (RTC_UIE |RTC_AIE )) -mc146818_get_time (&curr_time); +if (hpet_rtc_flags & (RTC_UIE |RTC_AIE )) { +if (unlikely (mc146818_get_time (&curr_time) <0 )) { +pr_err_ratelimited ("unable to read current time from RTC\n" ); +return IRQ_HANDLED ; + } + }if (hpet_rtc_flags &RTC_UIE && curr_time.tm_sec != hpet_prev_update_sec) {
drivers/base/power/trace.c +5 -1
@@ -120,7 +120,11 @@ static unsigned int read_magic_time(void)struct rtc_time time;unsigned int val; -mc146818_get_time (&time); +if (mc146818_get_time (&time) <0 ) { +pr_err ("Unable to read current time from RTC\n" ); +return 0 ; + } +pr_info ("RTC time: %ptRt, date: %ptRd\n" , &time, &time); val = time.tm_year;/* 100 years */ if (val >100 )
drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c +8 -1
@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ static inline void cmos_write_bank2(unsigned char val, unsigned char addr)static int cmos_read_time (struct device *dev,struct rtc_time *t) { +int ret; +/* * If pm_trace abused the RTC for storage, set the timespec to 0, * which tells the caller that this RTC value is unusable.
@@ -229,7 +231,12 @@ static int cmos_read_time(struct device *dev, struct rtc_time *t)if (!pm_trace_rtc_valid ())return -EIO ; -mc146818_get_time (t); + ret =mc146818_get_time (t); +if (ret <0 ) { +dev_err_ratelimited (dev,"unable to read current time\n" ); +return ret; + } +return 0 ; }
drivers/rtc/rtc-mc146818-lib.c +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ unsigned int mc146818_get_time(struct rtc_time *time)/* Ensure that the RTC is accessible. Bit 6 must be 0! */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE ((CMOS_READ (RTC_VALID ) &0x40 ) !=0 )) {spin_unlock_irqrestore (&rtc_lock, flags); -memset (time,0xff ,sizeof (*time)); +memset (time,0 ,sizeof (*time));return -EIO ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 146/277 rtc: mc146818-lib: fix RTC presence check
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mateusz Jończyk <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ea6fa4961aab8f90a8aa03575a98b4bda368d4b6 ]
To prevent an infinite loop in mc146818_get_time(), commit 211e5db19d15 ("rtc: mc146818: Detect and handle broken RTCs") added a check for RTC availability. Together with a later fix, it checked if bit 6 in register 0x0d is cleared.
This, however, caused a false negative on a motherboard with an AMD SB710 southbridge; according to the specification [1], bit 6 of register 0x0d of this chipset is a scratchbit. This caused a regression in Linux 5.11 - the RTC was determined broken by the kernel and not used by rtc-cmos.c [3]. This problem was also reported in Fedora [4].
As a better alternative, check whether the UIP ("Update-in-progress") bit is set for longer then 10ms. If that is the case, then apparently the RTC is either absent (and all register reads return 0xff) or broken. Also limit the number of loop iterations in mc146818_get_time() to 10 to prevent an infinite loop there.
The functions mc146818_get_time() and mc146818_does_rtc_work() will be refactored later in this patch series, in order to fix a separate problem with reading / setting the RTC alarm time. This is done so to avoid a confusion about what is being fixed when.
In a previous approach to this problem, I implemented a check whether the RTC_HOURS register contains a value <= 24. This, however, sometimes did not work correctly on my Intel Kaby Lake laptop. According to Intel's documentation [2], "the time and date RAM locations (0-9) are disconnected from the external bus" during the update cycle so reading this register without checking the UIP bit is incorrect.
[1] AMD SB700/710/750 Register Reference Guide, page 308,
https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2012/10/43009_sb7xx_rrg_pub_1.00.pdf
[2] 7th Generation Intel ® Processor Family I/O for U/Y Platforms [...] Datasheet Volume 1 of 2, page 209
Intel's Document Number: 334658-006,
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/datasheets/7th-and-8th-gen-core-family-mobile-u-y-processor-lines-i-o-datasheet-vol-1.pdf
[3] Functions in arch/x86/kernel/rtc.c apparently were using it.
[4] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1936688
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c | 10 ++++------ drivers/rtc/rtc-mc146818-lib.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/linux/mc146818rtc.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c +4 -6
@@ -800,16 +800,14 @@ cmos_do_probe(struct device *dev, struct resource *ports, int rtc_irq)rename_region (ports,dev_name (&cmos_rtc.rtc->dev)); -spin_lock_irq (&rtc_lock); - -/* Ensure that the RTC is accessible. Bit 6 must be 0! */ -if ((CMOS_READ (RTC_VALID ) &0x40 ) !=0 ) { -spin_unlock_irq (&rtc_lock); -dev_warn (dev,"not accessible\n" ); +if (!mc146818_does_rtc_work ()) { +dev_warn (dev,"broken or not accessible\n" ); retval = -ENXIO ; goto cleanup1; } +spin_lock_irq (&rtc_lock); +if (!(flags &CMOS_RTC_FLAGS_NOFREQ )) {/* force periodic irq to CMOS reset default of 1024Hz; *
drivers/rtc/rtc-mc146818-lib.c +30 -4
@@ -8,10 +8,36 @@#include <linux/acpi.h> #endif +/* +* If the UIP (Update-in-progress) bit of the RTC is set for more then +* 10ms, the RTC is apparently broken or not present. +*/ +bool mc146818_does_rtc_work (void ) +{ +int i; +unsigned char val; +unsigned long flags; + +for (i =0 ; i <10 ; i++) { +spin_lock_irqsave (&rtc_lock, flags); + val =CMOS_READ (RTC_FREQ_SELECT ); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&rtc_lock, flags); + +if ((val &RTC_UIP ) ==0 ) +return true; + +mdelay (1 ); + } + +return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (mc146818_does_rtc_work); +unsigned int mc146818_get_time (struct rtc_time *time) {unsigned char ctrl;unsigned long flags; +unsigned int iter_count =0 ;unsigned char century =0 ;bool retry;
@@ -20,13 +46,13 @@ unsigned int mc146818_get_time(struct rtc_time *time)#endif again: -spin_lock_irqsave (&rtc_lock, flags); -/* Ensure that the RTC is accessible. Bit 6 must be 0! */ -if (WARN_ON_ONCE ((CMOS_READ (RTC_VALID ) &0x40 ) !=0 )) { -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&rtc_lock, flags); +if (iter_count >10 ) {memset (time,0 ,sizeof (*time));return -EIO ; } + iter_count++; + +spin_lock_irqsave (&rtc_lock, flags);/* * Check whether there is an update in progress during which the
include/linux/mc146818rtc.h +1 -0
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ struct cmos_rtc_board_info {#define RTC_IO_EXTENT_USED RTC_IO_EXTENT#endif /* ARCH_RTC_LOCATION */ +bool mc146818_does_rtc_work (void );unsigned int mc146818_get_time (struct rtc_time *time);int mc146818_set_time (struct rtc_time *time);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 147/277 drm/amdgpu: fix off by one in amdgpu_gfx_kiq_acquire()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1647b54ed55d4d48c7199d439f8834626576cbe9 ]
This post-op should be a pre-op so that we do not pass -1 as the bit number to test_bit(). The current code will loop downwards from 63 to -1. After changing to a pre-op, it loops from 63 to 0.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gfx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gfx.c +1 -1
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static int amdgpu_gfx_kiq_acquire(struct amdgpu_device *adev,* adev->gfx.mec.num_pipe_per_mec * adev->gfx.mec.num_queue_per_pipe; -while (queue_bit-- >= 0) { +while (--queue_bit >= 0) { if (test_bit(queue_bit, adev->gfx.mec.queue_bitmap)) continue;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 148/277 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Fix potential crash on module unload
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Guilherme G. Piccoli <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 792f232d57ff28bbd5f9c4abe0466b23d5879dc8 ]
The vmbus driver relies on the panic notifier infrastructure to perform some operations when a panic event is detected. Since vmbus can be built as module, it is required that the driver handles both registering and unregistering such panic notifier callback.
After commit 74347a99e73a ("x86/Hyper-V: Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback") though, the panic notifier registration is done unconditionally in the module initialization routine whereas the unregistering procedure is conditionally guarded and executes only if HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE capability is set.
This patch fixes that by unconditionally unregistering the panic notifier in the module's exit routine as well.
--- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +7 -2
@@ -2776,10 +2776,15 @@ static void __exit vmbus_exit(void)if (ms_hyperv.misc_features &HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE ) {kmsg_dump_unregister (&hv_kmsg_dumper);unregister_die_notifier (&hyperv_die_block); -atomic_notifier_chain_unregister (&panic_notifier_list, - &hyperv_panic_block); } +/* +* The panic notifier is always registered, hence we should +* also unconditionally unregister it here as well. +*/ +atomic_notifier_chain_unregister (&panic_notifier_list, + &hyperv_panic_block); +free_page ((unsigned long )hv_panic_page);unregister_sysctl_table (hv_ctl_table_hdr); hv_ctl_table_hdr =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 149/277 Revert "NFSv4: Handle the special Linux file open access mode"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: ChenXiaoSong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ab0fc21bc7105b54bafd85bd8b82742f9e68898a ]
This reverts commit 44942b4e457beda00981f616402a1a791e8c616e.
After secondly opening a file with O_ACCMODE|O_DIRECT flags, nfs4_valid_open_stateid() will dereference NULL nfs4_state when lseek().
Reproducer:
1. mount -t nfs -o vers=4.2 $server_ip:/ /mnt/
2. fd = open("/mnt/file", O_ACCMODE|O_DIRECT|O_CREAT)
3. close(fd)
4. fd = open("/mnt/file", O_ACCMODE|O_DIRECT)
5. lseek(fd)
--- fs/nfs/inode.c | 1 - fs/nfs/nfs4file.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/inode.c +0 -1
@@ -1167,7 +1167,6 @@ int nfs_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)nfs_fscache_open_file (inode, filp);return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (nfs_open);/* * This function is called whenever some part of NFS notices that
fs/nfs/nfs4file.c +1 -1
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ nfs4_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)return err;if ((openflags &O_ACCMODE ) ==3 ) -return nfs_open (inode, filp); + openflags--;/* We can't create new files here */ openflags &= ~(O_CREAT |O_EXCL );
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 150/277 NFSv4: fix open failure with O_ACCMODE flag
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: ChenXiaoSong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b243874f6f9568b2daf1a00e9222cacdc15e159c ]
open() with O_ACCMODE|O_DIRECT flags secondly will fail.
Reproducer:
1. mount -t nfs -o vers=4.2 $server_ip:/ /mnt/
2. fd = open("/mnt/file", O_ACCMODE|O_DIRECT|O_CREAT)
3. close(fd)
4. fd = open("/mnt/file", O_ACCMODE|O_DIRECT)
Server nfsd4_decode_share_access() will fail with error nfserr_bad_xdr when client use incorrect share access mode of 0.
Fix this by using NFS4_SHARE_ACCESS_BOTH share access mode in client, just like firstly opening.
--- fs/nfs/dir.c | 10 ---------- fs/nfs/internal.h | 10 ++++++++++ fs/nfs/nfs4file.c | 6 ++++-- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/dir.c +0 -10
@@ -1835,16 +1835,6 @@ const struct dentry_operations nfs4_dentry_operations = { };EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (nfs4_dentry_operations); -static fmode_t flags_to_mode (int flags) -{ -fmode_t res = (__force fmode_t )flags &FMODE_EXEC ; -if ((flags &O_ACCMODE ) !=O_WRONLY ) - res |=FMODE_READ ; -if ((flags &O_ACCMODE ) !=O_RDONLY ) - res |=FMODE_WRITE ; -return res; -} -static struct nfs_open_context *create_nfs_open_context (struct dentry *dentry,int open_flags,struct file *filp) {return alloc_nfs_open_context (dentry,flags_to_mode (open_flags), filp);
fs/nfs/internal.h +10 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,16 @@ static inline bool nfs_lookup_is_soft_revalidate(const struct dentry *dentry)return true; } +static inline fmode_t flags_to_mode (int flags) +{ +fmode_t res = (__force fmode_t )flags &FMODE_EXEC ; +if ((flags &O_ACCMODE ) !=O_WRONLY ) + res |=FMODE_READ ; +if ((flags &O_ACCMODE ) !=O_RDONLY ) + res |=FMODE_WRITE ; +return res; +} +/* * Note: RFC 1813 doesn't limit the number of auth flavors that * a server can return, so make something up.
fs/nfs/nfs4file.c +4 -2
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ nfs4_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)struct dentry *parent =NULL ;struct inode *dir;unsigned openflags = filp->f_flags; +fmode_t f_mode;struct iattr attr;int err;
@@ -50,8 +51,9 @@ nfs4_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)if (err)return err; + f_mode = filp->f_mode;if ((openflags &O_ACCMODE ) ==3 ) - openflags--; + f_mode |=flags_to_mode (openflags);/* We can't create new files here */ openflags &= ~(O_CREAT |O_EXCL );
@@ -59,7 +61,7 @@ nfs4_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) parent =dget_parent (dentry); dir =d_inode (parent); - ctx =alloc_nfs_open_context (file_dentry (filp), filp->f_mode, filp); + ctx =alloc_nfs_open_context (file_dentry (filp), f_mode, filp); err =PTR_ERR (ctx);if (IS_ERR (ctx)) goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 151/277 scsi: sr: Fix typo in CDROM(CLOSETRAY|EJECT) handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kevin Groeneveld <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bc5519c18a32ce855bb51b9f5eceb77a9489d080 ]
Commit 2e27f576abc6 ("scsi: scsi_ioctl: Call scsi_cmd_ioctl() from scsi_ioctl()") seems to have a typo as it is checking ret instead of cmd in the if statement checking for CDROMCLOSETRAY and CDROMEJECT. This changes the behaviour of these ioctls as the cdrom_ioctl handling of these is more restrictive than the scsi_ioctl version.
--- drivers/scsi/sr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/sr.c +1 -1
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ static int sr_block_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode, unsigned cmd,scsi_autopm_get_device (sdev); -if (ret !=CDROMCLOSETRAY && ret !=CDROMEJECT ) { +if (cmd !=CDROMCLOSETRAY && cmd !=CDROMEJECT ) { ret =cdrom_ioctl (&cd->cdi, bdev, mode, cmd, arg);if (ret != -ENOSYS ) goto put;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 152/277 scsi: core: Fix sbitmap depth in scsi_realloc_sdev_budget_map()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: John Garry <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit eaba83b5b8506bbc9ee7ca2f10aeab3fff3719e7 ]
In commit edb854a3680b ("scsi: core: Reallocate device's budget map on queue depth change"), the sbitmap for the device budget map may be reallocated after the slave device depth is configured.
When the sbitmap is reallocated we use the result from scsi_device_max_queue_depth() for the sbitmap size, but don't resize to match the actual device queue depth.
Fix by resizing the sbitmap after reallocating the budget sbitmap. We do this instead of init'ing the sbitmap to the device queue depth as the user may want to change the queue depth later via sysfs or other.
--- drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c +5 -0
@@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ static int scsi_realloc_sdev_budget_map(struct scsi_device *sdev,int ret;struct sbitmap sb_backup; + depth = min_t(unsigned int, depth, scsi_device_max_queue_depth(sdev)); +/* * realloc if new shift is calculated, which is caused by setting * up one new default queue depth after calling ->slave_configure
@@ -229,6 +231,9 @@ static int scsi_realloc_sdev_budget_map(struct scsi_device *sdev,scsi_device_max_queue_depth (sdev), new_shift,GFP_KERNEL , sdev->request_queue->node, false, true); +if (!ret) +sbitmap_resize (&sdev->budget_map, depth); +if (need_free) {if (ret) sdev->budget_map = sb_backup;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 153/277 scsi: zorro7xx: Fix a resource leak in zorro7xx_remove_one()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 16ed828b872d12ccba8f07bcc446ae89ba662f9c ]
The error handling path of the probe releases a resource that is not freed in the remove function. In some cases, a ioremap() must be undone.
Add the missing iounmap() call in the remove function.
--- drivers/scsi/zorro7xx.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/zorro7xx.c +2 -0
@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ static void zorro7xx_remove_one(struct zorro_dev *z)scsi_remove_host (host);NCR_700_release (host); +if (host->base >0x01000000 ) +iounmap (hostdata->base);kfree (hostdata);free_irq (host->irq, host);zorro_release_device (z);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 154/277 vdpa/mlx5: Rename control VQ workqueue to vdpa wq
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eli Cohen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 218bdd20e56cab41a68481bc10c551ae3e0a24fb ]
A subesequent patch will use the same workqueue for executing other work not related to control VQ. Rename the workqueue and the work queue entry used to convey information to the workqueue.
--- drivers/vdpa/mlx5/core/mlx5_vdpa.h | 2 +- drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/vdpa/mlx5/core/mlx5_vdpa.h +1 -1
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ struct mlx5_control_vq {unsigned short head; }; -struct mlx5_ctrl_wq_ent { +struct mlx5_vdpa_wq_ent {struct work_struct work;struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev; };
drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c +4 -4
@@ -1573,14 +1573,14 @@ static void mlx5_cvq_kick_handler(struct work_struct *work) {virtio_net_ctrl_ack status =VIRTIO_NET_ERR ;struct virtio_net_ctrl_hdr ctrl; -struct mlx5_ctrl_wq_ent *wqent; +struct mlx5_vdpa_wq_ent *wqent;struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev;struct mlx5_control_vq *cvq;struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev;size_t read, write;int err; - wqent = container_of(work, struct mlx5_ctrl_wq_ent, work); + wqent = container_of(work, struct mlx5_vdpa_wq_ent, work); mvdev = wqent->mvdev; ndev =to_mlx5_vdpa_ndev (mvdev); cvq = &mvdev->cvq;
@@ -1632,7 +1632,7 @@ static void mlx5_vdpa_kick_vq(struct vdpa_device *vdev, u16 idx)struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev =to_mvdev (vdev);struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev =to_mlx5_vdpa_ndev (mvdev);struct mlx5_vdpa_virtqueue *mvq; -struct mlx5_ctrl_wq_ent *wqent; +struct mlx5_vdpa_wq_ent *wqent;if (!is_index_valid (mvdev, idx))return ;
@@ -2502,7 +2502,7 @@ static int mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(struct vdpa_mgmt_dev *v_mdev, const char *name)if (err) goto err_mr; - mvdev->wq =create_singlethread_workqueue ("mlx5_vdpa_ctrl_wq" ); + mvdev->wq =create_singlethread_workqueue ("mlx5_vdpa_wq" );if (!mvdev->wq) { err = -ENOMEM ; goto err_res2;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 155/277 vdpa/mlx5: Propagate link status from device to vdpa driver
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eli Cohen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit edf747affc41a18ccc3a616813d4c2b6d38b46ce ]
Add code to register to hardware asynchronous events. Use this mechanism to track link status events coming from the device and update the config struct.
After doing link status change, call the vdpa callback to notify of the link status change.
--- drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c +92 -2
@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ struct mlx5_vdpa_net {bool setup;u16 mtu;u32 cur_num_vqs; +struct notifier_block nb; +struct vdpa_callback config_cb; };static void free_resources (struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev);
@@ -1868,6 +1870,7 @@ static u64 mlx5_vdpa_get_features(struct vdpa_device *vdev) ndev->mvdev.mlx_features |=BIT_ULL (VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ ); ndev->mvdev.mlx_features |=BIT_ULL (VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_MAC_ADDR ); ndev->mvdev.mlx_features |=BIT_ULL (VIRTIO_NET_F_MQ ); + ndev->mvdev.mlx_features |=BIT_ULL (VIRTIO_NET_F_STATUS );print_features (mvdev, ndev->mvdev.mlx_features, false);return ndev->mvdev.mlx_features;
@@ -1980,8 +1983,10 @@ static int mlx5_vdpa_set_features(struct vdpa_device *vdev, u64 features)static void mlx5_vdpa_set_config_cb (struct vdpa_device *vdev,struct vdpa_callback *cb) { -/* not implemented */ -mlx5_vdpa_warn (to_mvdev (vdev),"set config callback not supported\n" ); +struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev =to_mvdev (vdev); +struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev =to_mlx5_vdpa_ndev (mvdev); + + ndev->config_cb = *cb; }#define MLX5_VDPA_MAX_VQ_ENTRIES 256
@@ -2433,6 +2438,82 @@ struct mlx5_vdpa_mgmtdev {struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev; }; +static u8 query_vport_state (struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev,u8 opmod,u16 vport) +{ +u32 out[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW (query_vport_state_out)] = {}; +u32 in[MLX5_ST_SZ_DW (query_vport_state_in)] = {}; +int err; + +MLX5_SET (query_vport_state_in, in, opcode,MLX5_CMD_OP_QUERY_VPORT_STATE ); +MLX5_SET (query_vport_state_in, in, op_mod, opmod); +MLX5_SET (query_vport_state_in, in, vport_number, vport); +if (vport) +MLX5_SET (query_vport_state_in, in, other_vport,1 ); + + err =mlx5_cmd_exec_inout (mdev, query_vport_state, in, out); +if (err) +return 0 ; + +return MLX5_GET (query_vport_state_out, out, state); +} + +static bool get_link_state (struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev) +{ +if (query_vport_state (mvdev->mdev,MLX5_VPORT_STATE_OP_MOD_VNIC_VPORT ,0 ) == +VPORT_STATE_UP ) +return true; + +return false; +} + +static void update_carrier (struct work_struct *work) +{ +struct mlx5_vdpa_wq_ent *wqent; +struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev; +struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev; + + wqent = container_of(work, struct mlx5_vdpa_wq_ent, work); + mvdev = wqent->mvdev; + ndev =to_mlx5_vdpa_ndev (mvdev); +if (get_link_state (mvdev)) + ndev->config.status |=cpu_to_mlx5vdpa16 (mvdev,VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP ); +else + ndev->config.status &=cpu_to_mlx5vdpa16 (mvdev, ~VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP ); + +if (ndev->config_cb.callback) + ndev->config_cb.callback (ndev->config_cb.private); + +kfree (wqent); +} + +static int event_handler (struct notifier_block *nb,unsigned long event,void *param) +{ + struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev = container_of(nb, struct mlx5_vdpa_net, nb); +struct mlx5_eqe *eqe = param; +int ret =NOTIFY_DONE ; +struct mlx5_vdpa_wq_ent *wqent; + +if (event ==MLX5_EVENT_TYPE_PORT_CHANGE ) { +switch (eqe->sub_type) { +case MLX5_PORT_CHANGE_SUBTYPE_DOWN : +case MLX5_PORT_CHANGE_SUBTYPE_ACTIVE : + wqent =kzalloc (sizeof (*wqent),GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!wqent) +return NOTIFY_DONE ; + + wqent->mvdev = &ndev->mvdev; +INIT_WORK (&wqent->work, update_carrier); +queue_work (ndev->mvdev.wq, &wqent->work); + ret =NOTIFY_OK ; +break ; +default : +return NOTIFY_DONE ; + } +return ret; + } +return ret; +} +static int mlx5_vdpa_dev_add (struct vdpa_mgmt_dev *v_mdev,const char *name) { struct mlx5_vdpa_mgmtdev *mgtdev = container_of(v_mdev, struct mlx5_vdpa_mgmtdev, mgtdev);
@@ -2477,6 +2558,11 @@ static int mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(struct vdpa_mgmt_dev *v_mdev, const char *name)if (err) goto err_mtu; +if (get_link_state (mvdev)) + ndev->config.status |=cpu_to_mlx5vdpa16 (mvdev,VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP ); +else + ndev->config.status &=cpu_to_mlx5vdpa16 (mvdev, ~VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP ); +if (!is_zero_ether_addr (config->mac)) { pfmdev =pci_get_drvdata (pci_physfn (mdev->pdev)); err =mlx5_mpfs_add_mac (pfmdev, config->mac);
@@ -2508,6 +2594,8 @@ static int mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(struct vdpa_mgmt_dev *v_mdev, const char *name) goto err_res2; } + ndev->nb.notifier_call = event_handler; +mlx5_notifier_register (mdev, &ndev->nb); ndev->cur_num_vqs =2 *mlx5_vdpa_max_qps (max_vqs); mvdev->vdev.mdev = &mgtdev->mgtdev; err =_vdpa_register_device (&mvdev->vdev, ndev->cur_num_vqs +1 );
@@ -2538,7 +2626,9 @@ static void mlx5_vdpa_dev_del(struct vdpa_mgmt_dev *v_mdev, struct vdpa_device * { struct mlx5_vdpa_mgmtdev *mgtdev = container_of(v_mdev, struct mlx5_vdpa_mgmtdev, mgtdev);struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev =to_mvdev (dev); +struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev =to_mlx5_vdpa_ndev (mvdev); +mlx5_notifier_unregister (mvdev->mdev, &ndev->nb);destroy_workqueue (mvdev->wq);_vdpa_unregister_device (dev); mgtdev->ndev =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 156/277 vdpa: mlx5: prevent cvq work from hogging CPU
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 55ebf0d60e3cc6c9e8593399e185842c00e12f36 ]
A userspace triggerable infinite loop could happen in mlx5_cvq_kick_handler() if userspace keeps sending a huge amount of cvq requests.
Fixing this by introducing a quota and re-queue the work if we're out of the budget (currently the implicit budget is one) . While at it, using a per device work struct to avoid on demand memory allocation for cvq.
--- drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c | 21 +++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c +9 -12
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ struct mlx5_vdpa_net {u32 cur_num_vqs;struct notifier_block nb;struct vdpa_callback config_cb; +struct mlx5_vdpa_wq_ent cvq_ent; };static void free_resources (struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev);
@@ -1587,10 +1588,10 @@ static void mlx5_cvq_kick_handler(struct work_struct *work) ndev =to_mlx5_vdpa_ndev (mvdev); cvq = &mvdev->cvq;if (!(ndev->mvdev.actual_features &BIT_ULL (VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VQ ))) - goto out; +return ;if (!cvq->ready) - goto out; +return ;while (true) { err = vringh_getdesc_iotlb(&cvq->vring, &cvq->riov, &cvq->wiov, &cvq->head,
@@ -1624,9 +1625,10 @@ static void mlx5_cvq_kick_handler(struct work_struct *work)if (vringh_need_notify_iotlb (&cvq->vring))vringh_notify (&cvq->vring); + +queue_work (mvdev->wq, &wqent->work); +break ; } -out: -kfree (wqent); }static void mlx5_vdpa_kick_vq (struct vdpa_device *vdev,u16 idx)
@@ -1634,7 +1636,6 @@ static void mlx5_vdpa_kick_vq(struct vdpa_device *vdev, u16 idx)struct mlx5_vdpa_dev *mvdev =to_mvdev (vdev);struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev =to_mlx5_vdpa_ndev (mvdev);struct mlx5_vdpa_virtqueue *mvq; -struct mlx5_vdpa_wq_ent *wqent;if (!is_index_valid (mvdev, idx))return ;
@@ -1643,13 +1644,7 @@ static void mlx5_vdpa_kick_vq(struct vdpa_device *vdev, u16 idx)if (!mvdev->cvq.ready)return ; - wqent =kzalloc (sizeof (*wqent),GFP_ATOMIC ); -if (!wqent) -return ; - - wqent->mvdev = mvdev; -INIT_WORK (&wqent->work, mlx5_cvq_kick_handler); -queue_work (mvdev->wq, &wqent->work); +queue_work (mvdev->wq, &ndev->cvq_ent.work);return ; }
@@ -2588,6 +2583,8 @@ static int mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(struct vdpa_mgmt_dev *v_mdev, const char *name)if (err) goto err_mr; + ndev->cvq_ent.mvdev = mvdev; +INIT_WORK (&ndev->cvq_ent.work, mlx5_cvq_kick_handler); mvdev->wq =create_singlethread_workqueue ("mlx5_vdpa_wq" );if (!mvdev->wq) { err = -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 157/277 net: sfc: add missing xdp queue reinitialization
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 059a47f1da93811d37533556d67e72f2261b1127 ]
After rx/tx ring buffer size is changed, kernel panic occurs when it acts XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT.
When tx/rx ring buffer size is changed(ethtool -G), sfc driver reallocates and reinitializes rx and tx queues and their buffer (tx_queue->buffer).
But it misses reinitializing xdp queues(efx->xdp_tx_queues). So, while it is acting XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT, it uses the uninitialized tx_queue->buffer.
A new function efx_set_xdp_channels() is separated from efx_set_channels() to handle only xdp queues.
Splat looks like:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002a
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#4] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G D 5.17.0+ #55 e8beeee8289528f11357029357cf
Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e45c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc]
RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea506895c0 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001139b10ce RDI: ffff92ea506895c0
RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001139b110d R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001139b10ce R15: ffff92ea506895c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80
CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e85c60 EFLAGS: 00010297
PKRU: 55555554
RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea50689700 RCX: ffffffffc0330870
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001145a90ce RDI: ffff92ea50689700
RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001145a910d R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040
R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001145a90ce R15: ffff92ea50689700
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810005 CR4: 00000000007706e0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
efx_xdp_tx_buffers+0x12b/0x3d0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
__efx_rx_packet+0x5c3/0x930 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
efx_rx_packet+0x28c/0x2e0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
efx_ef10_ev_process+0x5f8/0xf40 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]
? enqueue_task_fair+0x95/0x550
efx_poll+0xc4/0x360 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5]--- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/efx_channels.c | 146 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 81 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/efx_channels.c +81 -65
@@ -763,6 +763,85 @@ void efx_remove_channels(struct efx_nic *efx)kfree (efx->xdp_tx_queues); } +static int efx_set_xdp_tx_queue (struct efx_nic *efx,int xdp_queue_number, +struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue) +{ +if (xdp_queue_number >= efx->xdp_tx_queue_count) +return -EINVAL ; + +netif_dbg (efx, drv, efx->net_dev, +"Channel %u TXQ %u is XDP %u, HW %u\n" , + tx_queue->channel->channel, tx_queue->label, + xdp_queue_number, tx_queue->queue); + efx->xdp_tx_queues[xdp_queue_number] = tx_queue; +return 0 ; +} + +static void efx_set_xdp_channels (struct efx_nic *efx) +{ +struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue; +struct efx_channel *channel; +unsigned int next_queue =0 ; +int xdp_queue_number =0 ; +int rc; + +/* We need to mark which channels really have RX and TX +* queues, and adjust the TX queue numbers if we have separate +* RX-only and TX-only channels. +*/ +efx_for_each_channel (channel, efx) { +if (channel->channel < efx->tx_channel_offset) +continue ; + +if (efx_channel_is_xdp_tx (channel)) { +efx_for_each_channel_tx_queue (tx_queue, channel) { + tx_queue->queue = next_queue++; + rc =efx_set_xdp_tx_queue (efx, xdp_queue_number, + tx_queue); +if (rc ==0 ) + xdp_queue_number++; + } + }else { +efx_for_each_channel_tx_queue (tx_queue, channel) { + tx_queue->queue = next_queue++; +netif_dbg (efx, drv, efx->net_dev, +"Channel %u TXQ %u is HW %u\n" , + channel->channel, tx_queue->label, + tx_queue->queue); + } + +/* If XDP is borrowing queues from net stack, it must +* use the queue with no csum offload, which is the +* first one of the channel +* (note: tx_queue_by_type is not initialized yet) +*/ +if (efx->xdp_txq_queues_mode == +EFX_XDP_TX_QUEUES_BORROWED ) { + tx_queue = &channel->tx_queue[0 ]; + rc =efx_set_xdp_tx_queue (efx, xdp_queue_number, + tx_queue); +if (rc ==0 ) + xdp_queue_number++; + } + } + } +WARN_ON (efx->xdp_txq_queues_mode ==EFX_XDP_TX_QUEUES_DEDICATED && + xdp_queue_number != efx->xdp_tx_queue_count); +WARN_ON (efx->xdp_txq_queues_mode !=EFX_XDP_TX_QUEUES_DEDICATED && + xdp_queue_number > efx->xdp_tx_queue_count); + +/* If we have more CPUs than assigned XDP TX queues, assign the already +* existing queues to the exceeding CPUs +*/ + next_queue =0 ; +while (xdp_queue_number < efx->xdp_tx_queue_count) { + tx_queue = efx->xdp_tx_queues[next_queue++]; + rc =efx_set_xdp_tx_queue (efx, xdp_queue_number, tx_queue); +if (rc ==0 ) + xdp_queue_number++; + } +} +int efx_realloc_channels (struct efx_nic *efx,u32 rxq_entries,u32 txq_entries) {struct efx_channel *other_channel[EFX_MAX_CHANNELS ], *channel;
@@ -837,6 +916,7 @@ int efx_realloc_channels(struct efx_nic *efx, u32 rxq_entries, u32 txq_entries)efx_init_napi_channel (efx->channel[i]); } +efx_set_xdp_channels (efx); out:/* Destroy unused channel structures */ for (i =0 ; i < efx->n_channels; i++) {
@@ -872,26 +952,9 @@ int efx_realloc_channels(struct efx_nic *efx, u32 rxq_entries, u32 txq_entries) goto out; } -static inline int -efx_set_xdp_tx_queue (struct efx_nic *efx,int xdp_queue_number, -struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue) -{ -if (xdp_queue_number >= efx->xdp_tx_queue_count) -return -EINVAL ; - -netif_dbg (efx, drv, efx->net_dev,"Channel %u TXQ %u is XDP %u, HW %u\n" , - tx_queue->channel->channel, tx_queue->label, - xdp_queue_number, tx_queue->queue); - efx->xdp_tx_queues[xdp_queue_number] = tx_queue; -return 0 ; -} -int efx_set_channels (struct efx_nic *efx) { -struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue;struct efx_channel *channel; -unsigned int next_queue =0 ; -int xdp_queue_number;int rc; efx->tx_channel_offset =
@@ -909,61 +972,14 @@ int efx_set_channels(struct efx_nic *efx)return -ENOMEM ; } -/* We need to mark which channels really have RX and TX -* queues, and adjust the TX queue numbers if we have separate -* RX-only and TX-only channels. -*/ - xdp_queue_number =0 ;efx_for_each_channel (channel, efx) {if (channel->channel < efx->n_rx_channels) channel->rx_queue.core_index = channel->channel;else channel->rx_queue.core_index =-1 ; - -if (channel->channel >= efx->tx_channel_offset) { -if (efx_channel_is_xdp_tx (channel)) { -efx_for_each_channel_tx_queue (tx_queue, channel) { - tx_queue->queue = next_queue++; - rc =efx_set_xdp_tx_queue (efx, xdp_queue_number, tx_queue); -if (rc ==0 ) - xdp_queue_number++; - } - }else { -efx_for_each_channel_tx_queue (tx_queue, channel) { - tx_queue->queue = next_queue++; -netif_dbg (efx, drv, efx->net_dev,"Channel %u TXQ %u is HW %u\n" , - channel->channel, tx_queue->label, - tx_queue->queue); - } - -/* If XDP is borrowing queues from net stack, it must use the queue -* with no csum offload, which is the first one of the channel -* (note: channel->tx_queue_by_type is not initialized yet) -*/ -if (efx->xdp_txq_queues_mode ==EFX_XDP_TX_QUEUES_BORROWED ) { - tx_queue = &channel->tx_queue[0 ]; - rc =efx_set_xdp_tx_queue (efx, xdp_queue_number, tx_queue); -if (rc ==0 ) - xdp_queue_number++; - } - } - } } -WARN_ON (efx->xdp_txq_queues_mode ==EFX_XDP_TX_QUEUES_DEDICATED && - xdp_queue_number != efx->xdp_tx_queue_count); -WARN_ON (efx->xdp_txq_queues_mode !=EFX_XDP_TX_QUEUES_DEDICATED && - xdp_queue_number > efx->xdp_tx_queue_count); -/* If we have more CPUs than assigned XDP TX queues, assign the already -* existing queues to the exceeding CPUs -*/ - next_queue =0 ; -while (xdp_queue_number < efx->xdp_tx_queue_count) { - tx_queue = efx->xdp_tx_queues[next_queue++]; - rc =efx_set_xdp_tx_queue (efx, xdp_queue_number, tx_queue); -if (rc ==0 ) - xdp_queue_number++; - } +efx_set_xdp_channels (efx); rc =netif_set_real_num_tx_queues (efx->net_dev, efx->n_tx_channels);if (rc)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 158/277 net/tls: fix slab-out-of-bounds bug in decrypt_internal
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ziyang Xuan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9381fe8c849cfbe50245ac01fc077554f6eaa0e2 ]
The memory size of tls_ctx->rx.iv for AES128-CCM is 12 setting in tls_set_sw_offload(). The return value of crypto_aead_ivsize() for "ccm(aes)" is 16. So memcpy() require 16 bytes from 12 bytes memory space will trigger slab-out-of-bounds bug as following:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls] Read of size 16 at addr ffff888114e84e60 by task tls/10911 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44 print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5db ? decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls] kasan_report+0xab/0x120 ? decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls] kasan_check_range+0xf9/0x1e0 memcpy+0x20/0x60 decrypt_internal+0x385/0xc40 [tls] ? tls_get_rec+0x2e0/0x2e0 [tls] ? process_rx_list+0x1a5/0x420 [tls] ? tls_setup_from_iter.constprop.0+0x2e0/0x2e0 [tls] decrypt_skb_update+0x9d/0x400 [tls] tls_sw_recvmsg+0x3c8/0xb50 [tls] Allocated by task 10911: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 tls_set_sw_offload+0x2eb/0xa20 [tls] tls_setsockopt+0x68c/0x700 [tls] __sys_setsockopt+0xfe/0x1b0
Replace the crypto_aead_ivsize() with prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size when memcpy() iv value in TLS_1_3_VERSION scenario.
--- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/tls/tls_sw.c +1 -1
@@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ static int decrypt_internal(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,if (prot->version ==TLS_1_3_VERSION || prot->cipher_type ==TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 )memcpy (iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv, -crypto_aead_ivsize (ctx->aead_recv)); + prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size);else memcpy (iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv, prot->salt_size);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 159/277 vrf: fix packet sniffing for traffic originating from ip tunnels
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eyal Birger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 012d69fbfcc739f846766c1da56ef8b493b803b5 ]
in commit 048939088220
("vrf: add mac header for tunneled packets when sniffer is attached") an Ethernet header was cooked for traffic originating from tunnel devices.
However, the header is added based on whether the mac_header is unset and ignores cases where the device doesn't expose a mac header to upper layers, such as in ip tunnels like ipip and gre.
Traffic originating from such devices still appears garbled when capturing on the vrf device.
Fix by observing whether the original device exposes a header to upper layers, similar to the logic done in af_packet.
In addition, skb->mac_len needs to be adjusted after adding the Ethernet header for the skb_push/pull() surrounding dev_queue_xmit_nit() to work on these packets.
--- drivers/net/vrf.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/vrf.c +11 -4
@@ -1265,6 +1265,7 @@ static int vrf_prepare_mac_header(struct sk_buff *skb, eth = (struct ethhdr *)skb->data;skb_reset_mac_header (skb); +skb_reset_mac_len (skb);/* we set the ethernet destination and the source addresses to the * address of the VRF device.
@@ -1294,9 +1295,9 @@ static int vrf_prepare_mac_header(struct sk_buff *skb,*/ static int vrf_add_mac_header_if_unset (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *vrf_dev, -u16 proto) +u16 proto,struct net_device *orig_dev) { -if (skb_mac_header_was_set (skb)) +if (skb_mac_header_was_set (skb) &&dev_has_header (orig_dev))return 0 ;return vrf_prepare_mac_header (skb, vrf_dev, proto);
@@ -1402,6 +1403,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip6_rcv(struct net_device *vrf_dev,/* if packet is NDISC then keep the ingress interface */ if (!is_ndisc) { +struct net_device *orig_dev = skb->dev; +vrf_rx_stats (vrf_dev, skb->len); skb->dev = vrf_dev; skb->skb_iif = vrf_dev->ifindex;
@@ -1410,7 +1413,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip6_rcv(struct net_device *vrf_dev,int err; err =vrf_add_mac_header_if_unset (skb, vrf_dev, -ETH_P_IPV6 ); +ETH_P_IPV6 , + orig_dev);if (likely (!err)) {skb_push (skb, skb->mac_len);dev_queue_xmit_nit (skb, vrf_dev);
@@ -1440,6 +1444,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip6_rcv(struct net_device *vrf_dev,static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip_rcv (struct net_device *vrf_dev,struct sk_buff *skb) { +struct net_device *orig_dev = skb->dev; + skb->dev = vrf_dev; skb->skb_iif = vrf_dev->ifindex;IPCB (skb)->flags |=IPSKB_L3SLAVE ;
@@ -1460,7 +1466,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip_rcv(struct net_device *vrf_dev,if (!list_empty (&vrf_dev->ptype_all)) {int err; - err =vrf_add_mac_header_if_unset (skb, vrf_dev,ETH_P_IP ); + err =vrf_add_mac_header_if_unset (skb, vrf_dev,ETH_P_IP , + orig_dev);if (likely (!err)) {skb_push (skb, skb->mac_len);dev_queue_xmit_nit (skb, vrf_dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 160/277 skbuff: fix coalescing for page_pool fragment recycling
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jean-Philippe Brucker <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1effe8ca4e34c34cdd9318436a4232dcb582ebf4 ]
Fix a use-after-free when using page_pool with page fragments. We encountered this problem during normal RX in the hns3 driver:
(1) Initially we have three descriptors in the RX queue. The first one
allocates PAGE1 through page_pool, and the other two allocate one
half of PAGE2 each. Page references look like this:
RX_BD1 _______ PAGE1
RX_BD2 _______ PAGE2
RX_BD3 _________/(2) Handle RX on the first descriptor. Allocate SKB1, eventually added to the receive queue by tcp_queue_rcv().
(3) Handle RX on the second descriptor. Allocate SKB2 and pass it to
netif_receive_skb():
netif_receive_skb(SKB2)
ip_rcv(SKB2)
SKB3 = skb_clone(SKB2)
SKB2 and SKB3 share a reference to PAGE2 through
skb_shinfo()->dataref. The other ref to PAGE2 is still held by
RX_BD3:
SKB2 ---+- PAGE2
SKB3 __/ /
RX_BD3 _________/(3b) Now while handling TCP, coalesce SKB3 with SKB1:
tcp_v4_rcv(SKB3)
tcp_try_coalesce(to=SKB1, from=SKB3) // succeeds
kfree_skb_partial(SKB3)
skb_release_data(SKB3) // drops one dataref
SKB1 _____ PAGE1
\____
SKB2 _____ PAGE2
/
RX_BD3 _________/
In skb_try_coalesce(), __skb_frag_ref() takes a page reference to PAGE2, where it should instead have increased the page_pool frag reference, pp_frag_count. Without coalescing, when releasing both SKB2 and SKB3, a single reference to PAGE2 would be dropped. Now when releasing SKB1 and SKB2, two references to PAGE2 will be dropped, resulting in underflow.
(3c) Drop SKB2:
af_packet_rcv(SKB2)
consume_skb(SKB2)
skb_release_data(SKB2) // drops second dataref
page_pool_return_skb_page(PAGE2) // drops one pp_frag_count
SKB1 _____ PAGE1
\____
PAGE2
/
RX_BD3 _________/(4) Userspace calls recvmsg()
Copies SKB1 and releases it. Since SKB3 was coalesced with SKB1, we release the SKB3 page as well:
tcp_eat_recv_skb(SKB1)
skb_release_data(SKB1)
page_pool_return_skb_page(PAGE1)
page_pool_return_skb_page(PAGE2) // drops second pp_frag_count
(5) PAGE2 is freed, but the third RX descriptor was still using it! In our case this causes IOMMU faults, but it would silently corrupt memory if the IOMMU was disabled.
Change the logic that checks whether pp_recycle SKBs can be coalesced. We still reject differing pp_recycle between 'from' and 'to' SKBs, but in order to avoid the situation described above, we also reject coalescing when both 'from' and 'to' are pp_recycled and 'from' is cloned.
The new logic allows coalescing a cloned pp_recycle SKB into a page refcounted one, because in this case the release (4) will drop the right reference, the one taken by skb_try_coalesce().
--- net/core/skbuff.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/core/skbuff.c +11 -4
@@ -5390,11 +5390,18 @@ bool skb_try_coalesce(struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *from,if (skb_cloned (to))return false; -/* The page pool signature of struct page will eventually figure out -* which pages can be recycled or not but for now let's prohibit slab -* allocated and page_pool allocated SKBs from being coalesced. +/* In general, avoid mixing slab allocated and page_pool allocated +* pages within the same SKB. However when @to is not pp_recycle and +* @from is cloned, we can transition frag pages from page_pool to +* reference counted. +* +* On the other hand, don't allow coalescing two pp_recycle SKBs if +* @from is cloned, in case the SKB is using page_pool fragment +* references (PP_FLAG_PAGE_FRAG). Since we only take full page +* references for cloned SKBs at the moment that would result in +* inconsistent reference counts. */ -if (to->pp_recycle != from->pp_recycle) +if (to->pp_recycle != (from->pp_recycle && !skb_cloned (from)))return false;if (len <=skb_tailroom (to)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 161/277 ice: Clear default forwarding VSI during VSI release
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bd8c624c0cd59de0032752ba3001c107bba97f7b ]
VSI is set as default forwarding one when promisc mode is set for PF interface, when PF is switched to switchdev mode or when VF driver asks to enable allmulticast or promisc mode for the VF interface (when vf-true-promisc-support priv flag is off). The third case is buggy because in that case VSI associated with VF remains as default one after VF removal.
Reproducer:
1. Create VF
echo 1 > sys/class/net/ens7f0/device/sriov_numvfs
2. Enable allmulticast or promisc mode on VF ip link set ens7f0v0 allmulticast on
ip link set ens7f0v0 promisc on
3. Delete VF
echo 0 > sys/class/net/ens7f0/device/sriov_numvfs
4. Try to enable promisc mode on PF
ip link set ens7f0 promisc on
Although it looks that promisc mode on PF is enabled the opposite is true because ice_vsi_sync_fltr() responsible for IFF_PROMISC handling first checks if any other VSI is set as default forwarding one and if so the function does not do anything. At this point it is not possible to enable promisc mode on PF without re-probe device.
To resolve the issue this patch clear default forwarding VSI during ice_vsi_release() when the VSI to be released is the default one.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_lib.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_lib.c +2 -0
@@ -2923,6 +2923,8 @@ int ice_vsi_release(struct ice_vsi *vsi) } } +if (ice_is_vsi_dflt_vsi (pf->first_sw, vsi)) +ice_clear_dflt_vsi (pf->first_sw);ice_fltr_remove_all (vsi);ice_rm_vsi_lan_cfg (vsi->port_info, vsi->idx); err =ice_rm_vsi_rdma_cfg (vsi->port_info, vsi->idx);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 162/277 mctp: Fix check for dev_hard_header() result
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Matt Johnston <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 60be976ac45137657b7b505d7e0d44d0e51accb7 ]
dev_hard_header() returns the length of the header, so we need to test for negative errors rather than non-zero.
--- net/mctp/route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/mctp/route.c +1 -1
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static int mctp_route_output(struct mctp_route *route, struct sk_buff *skb) rc =dev_hard_header (skb, skb->dev,ntohs (skb->protocol), daddr, skb->dev->dev_addr, skb->len); -if (rc) { +if (rc <0 ) {kfree_skb (skb);return -EHOSTUNREACH ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 163/277 net: ipv4: fix route with nexthop object delete warning
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6bf92d70e690b7ff12b24f4bfff5e5434d019b82 ]
FRR folks have hit a kernel warning[1] while deleting routes[2] which is caused by trying to delete a route pointing to a nexthop id without specifying nhid but matching on an interface. That is, a route is found but we hit a warning while matching it. The warning is from fib_info_nh() in include/net/nexthop.h because we run it on a fib_info with nexthop object. The call chain is:
inet_rtm_delroute -> fib_table_delete -> fib_nh_match (called with a
nexthop fib_info and also with fc_oif set thus calling fib_info_nh on the fib_info and triggering the warning). The fix is to not do any matching in that branch if the fi has a nexthop object because those are managed separately. I.e. we should match when deleting without nh spec and should fail when deleting a nexthop route with old-style nh spec because nexthop objects are managed separately, e.g.:
$ ip r show 1.2.3.4/32 1.2.3.4 nhid 12 via 192.168.11.2 dev dummy0
$ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32 $ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32 nhid 12 <both should work>
$ ip r del 1.2.3.4/32 dev dummy0 <should fail with ESRCH>
[1]
[ 523.462226] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 523.462230] WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 22893 at include/net/nexthop.h:468 fib_nh_match+0x210/0x460 [ 523.462236] Modules linked in: dummy rpcsec_gss_krb5 xt_socket nf_socket_ipv4 nf_socket_ipv6 ip6table_raw iptable_raw bpf_preload xt_statistic ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs xt_mark nf_tables xt_nat veth nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype br_netfilter overlay dm_crypt nfsv3 nfs fscache netfs vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack 8021q garp mrp ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bridge stp llc rfcomm snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer rpcrdma rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core ip6table_filter xt_comment ip6_tables vboxnetadp(OE) vboxnetflt(OE) vboxdrv(OE) qrtr bnep binfmt_misc xfs vfat fat squashfs loop nvidia_drm(POE) nvidia_modeset(POE) nvidia_uvm(POE) nvidia(POE) intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi btusb btrtl iwlmvm uvcvideo btbcm snd_hda_intel edac_mce_amd [ 523.462274] videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops btintel snd_intel_dspcfg videobuf2_v4l2 snd_intel_sdw_acpi bluetooth snd_usb_audio snd_hda_codec mac80211 snd_usbmidi_lib joydev snd_hda_core videobuf2_common kvm_amd snd_rawmidi snd_hwdep snd_seq videodev ccp snd_seq_device libarc4 ecdh_generic mc snd_pcm kvm iwlwifi snd_timer drm_kms_helper snd cfg80211 cec soundcore irqbypass rapl wmi_bmof i2c_piix4 rfkill k10temp pcspkr acpi_cpufreq nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc drm zram ip_tables crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel nvme sp5100_tco r8169 nvme_core wmi ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler fuse [ 523.462300] CPU: 14 PID: 22893 Comm: ip Tainted: P OE 5.16.18-200.fc35.x86_64 #1 [ 523.462302] Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7C37/MPG X570 GAMING EDGE WIFI (MS-7C37), BIOS 1.C0 10/29/2020 [ 523.462303] RIP: 0010:fib_nh_match+0x210/0x460 [ 523.462304] Code: 7c 24 20 48 8b b5 90 00 00 00 e8 bb ee f4 ff 48 8b 7c 24 20 41 89 c4 e8 ee eb f4 ff 45 85 e4 0f 85 2e fe ff ff e9 4c ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 17 ff ff ff 3c 0a 0f 85 61 fe ff ff 48 8b b5 98 00 00 00 [ 523.462306] RSP: 0018:ffffaa53d4d87928 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 523.462307] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffaa53d4d87a90 RCX: ffffaa53d4d87bb0 [ 523.462308] RDX: ffff9e3d2ee6be80 RSI: ffffaa53d4d87a90 RDI: ffffffff920ed380 [ 523.462309] RBP: ffff9e3d2ee6be80 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 523.462310] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000031 [ 523.462310] R13: 0000000000000020 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff9e3d331054e0 [ 523.462311] FS: 00007f245517c1c0(0000) GS:ffff9e492ed80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 523.462313] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 523.462313] CR2: 000055e5dfdd8268 CR3: 00000003ef488000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 523.462315] Call Trace: [ 523.462316] <TASK> [ 523.462320] fib_table_delete+0x1a9/0x310 [ 523.462323] inet_rtm_delroute+0x93/0x110 [ 523.462325] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x133/0x370 [ 523.462327] ? _copy_to_iter+0xb5/0x6f0 [ 523.462330] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x110/0x110 [ 523.462331] netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0xf0 [ 523.462334] netlink_unicast+0x211/0x330 [ 523.462336] netlink_sendmsg+0x23f/0x480 [ 523.462338] sock_sendmsg+0x5e/0x60 [ 523.462340] ____sys_sendmsg+0x22c/0x270 [ 523.462341] ? import_iovec+0x17/0x20 [ 523.462343] ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x59/0x90 [ 523.462344] ? __mod_lruvec_page_state+0x85/0x110 [ 523.462348] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0 [ 523.462350] ? netlink_seq_start+0x70/0x70 [ 523.462352] ? __dentry_kill+0x13a/0x180 [ 523.462354] ? __fput+0xff/0x250 [ 523.462356] __sys_sendmsg+0x49/0x80 [ 523.462358] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 523.462361] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 523.462364] RIP: 0033:0x7f24552aa337 [ 523.462365] Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 [ 523.462366] RSP: 002b:00007fff7f05a838 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 523.462368] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000006245bf91 RCX: 00007f24552aa337 [ 523.462368] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff7f05a8a0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 523.462369] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 523.462370] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 523.462370] R13: 00007fff7f05ce08 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055e5dfdd1040 [ 523.462373] </TASK> [ 523.462374] ---[ end trace ba537bc16f6bf4ed ]---
[2] https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/issues/6412
--- net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c +6 -1
@@ -887,8 +887,13 @@ int fib_nh_match(struct net *net, struct fib_config *cfg, struct fib_info *fi, }if (cfg->fc_oif || cfg->fc_gw_family) { -struct fib_nh *nh =fib_info_nh (fi,0 ); +struct fib_nh *nh; + +/* cannot match on nexthop object attributes */ +if (fi->nh) +return 1 ; + nh =fib_info_nh (fi,0 );if (cfg->fc_encap) {if (fib_encap_match (net, cfg->fc_encap_type, cfg->fc_encap, nh, cfg, extack))
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 164/277 net: stmmac: Fix unset max_speed difference between DT and non-DT platforms
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c21cabb0fd0b54b8b54235fc1ecfe1195a23bcb2 ]
In commit 9cbadf094d9d ("net: stmmac: support max-speed device tree property"), when DT platforms don't set "max-speed", max_speed is set to -1; for non-DT platforms, it stays the default 0.
Prior to commit eeef2f6b9f6e ("net: stmmac: Start adding phylink support"), the check for a valid max_speed setting was to check if it was greater than zero. This commit got it right, but subsequent patches just checked for non-zero, which is incorrect for DT platforms.
In commit 92c3807b9ac3 ("net: stmmac: convert to phylink_get_linkmodes()") the conversion switched completely to checking for non-zero value as a valid value, which caused 1000base-T to stop getting advertised by default.
Instead of trying to fix all the checks, simply leave max_speed alone if DT property parsing fails.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_platform.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_platform.c +1 -2
@@ -431,8 +431,7 @@ stmmac_probe_config_dt(struct platform_device *pdev, u8 *mac) plat->phylink_node = np;/* Get max speed of operation from device tree */ -if (of_property_read_u32 (np,"max-speed" , &plat->max_speed)) - plat->max_speed =-1 ; +of_property_read_u32 (np,"max-speed" , &plat->max_speed); plat->bus_id =of_alias_get_id (np,"ethernet" );if (plat->bus_id <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 165/277 drm/imx: imx-ldb: Check for null pointer after calling kmemdup
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jiasheng Jiang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8027a9ad9b3568c5eb49c968ad6c97f279d76730 ]
As the possible failure of the allocation, kmemdup() may return NULL pointer.
Therefore, it should be better to check the return value of kmemdup() and return error if fails.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/imx/imx-ldb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/imx/imx-ldb.c +2 -0
@@ -572,6 +572,8 @@ static int imx_ldb_panel_ddc(struct device *dev, edidp =of_get_property (child,"edid" , &edid_len);if (edidp) { channel->edid =kmemdup (edidp, edid_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!channel->edid) +return -ENOMEM ; }else if (!channel->panel) {/* fallback to display-timings node */ ret = of_get_drm_display_mode(child,
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 166/277 drm/imx: Fix memory leak in imx_pd_connector_get_modes
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: José Expósito <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bce81feb03a20fca7bbdd1c4af16b4e9d5c0e1d3 ]
Avoid leaking the display mode variable if of_get_drm_display_mode fails.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1443943 ("Resource leak")
--- drivers/gpu/drm/imx/parallel-display.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/imx/parallel-display.c +3 -1
@@ -75,8 +75,10 @@ static int imx_pd_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector) ret =of_get_drm_display_mode (np, &imxpd->mode, &imxpd->bus_flags,OF_USE_NATIVE_MODE ); -if (ret) +if (ret) { +drm_mode_destroy (connector->dev, mode);return ret; + }drm_mode_copy (mode, &imxpd->mode); mode->type |=DRM_MODE_TYPE_DRIVER |DRM_MODE_TYPE_PREFERRED ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 167/277 drm/imx: dw_hdmi-imx: Fix bailout in error cases of probe
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Liu Ying <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e8083acc3f8cc2097917018e947fd4c857f60454 ]
In dw_hdmi_imx_probe(), if error happens after dw_hdmi_probe() returns successfully, dw_hdmi_remove() should be called where necessary as bailout.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/imx/dw_hdmi-imx.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/imx/dw_hdmi-imx.c +7 -1
@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ static int dw_hdmi_imx_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)struct device_node *np = pdev->dev.of_node;const struct of_device_id *match =of_match_node (dw_hdmi_imx_dt_ids, np);struct imx_hdmi *hdmi; +int ret; hdmi =devm_kzalloc (&pdev->dev,sizeof (*hdmi),GFP_KERNEL );if (!hdmi)
@@ -243,10 +244,15 @@ static int dw_hdmi_imx_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) hdmi->bridge =of_drm_find_bridge (np);if (!hdmi->bridge) {dev_err (hdmi->dev,"Unable to find bridge\n" ); +dw_hdmi_remove (hdmi->hdmi);return -ENODEV ; } -return component_add (&pdev->dev, &dw_hdmi_imx_ops); + ret =component_add (&pdev->dev, &dw_hdmi_imx_ops); +if (ret) +dw_hdmi_remove (hdmi->hdmi); + +return ret; }static int dw_hdmi_imx_remove (struct platform_device *pdev)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 168/277 regulator: rtq2134: Fix missing active_discharge_on setting
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Axel Lin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 17049bf9de55a42ee96fd34520aff8a484677675 ]
The active_discharge_on setting was missed, so output discharge resistor is always disabled. Fix it.
--- drivers/regulator/rtq2134-regulator.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/regulator/rtq2134-regulator.c +1 -0
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ static const unsigned int rtq2134_buck_ramp_delay_table[] = { .enable_mask = RTQ2134_VOUTEN_MASK, \ .active_discharge_reg = RTQ2134_REG_BUCK##_id##_CFG0, \ .active_discharge_mask = RTQ2134_ACTDISCHG_MASK, \ + .active_discharge_on = RTQ2134_ACTDISCHG_MASK, \ .ramp_reg = RTQ2134_REG_BUCK##_id##_RSPCFG, \ .ramp_mask = RTQ2134_RSPUP_MASK, \ .ramp_delay_table = rtq2134_buck_ramp_delay_table, \
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 169/277 regulator: atc260x: Fix missing active_discharge_on setting
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Axel Lin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2316f0fc0ad2aa87a568ceaf3d76be983ee555c3 ]
Without active_discharge_on setting, the SWITCH1 discharge enable control is always disabled. Fix it.
--- drivers/regulator/atc260x-regulator.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/regulator/atc260x-regulator.c +1 -0
@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ enum atc2603c_reg_ids { .bypass_mask = BIT(5), \ .active_discharge_reg = ATC2603C_PMU_SWITCH_CTL, \ .active_discharge_mask = BIT(1), \ + .active_discharge_on = BIT(1), \ .owner = THIS_MODULE, \ }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 170/277 arch/arm64: Fix topology initialization for core scheduling
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Phil Auld <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5524cbb1bfcdff0cad0aaa9f94e6092002a07259 ]
Arm64 systems rely on store_cpu_topology() to call update_siblings_masks() to transfer the toplogy to the various cpu masks. This needs to be done before the call to notify_cpu_starting() which tells the scheduler about each cpu found, otherwise the core scheduling data structures are setup in a way that does not match the actual topology.
With smt_mask not setup correctly we bail on cpumask_weight(smt_mask) == 1 for !leaders in:
notify_cpu_starting()
cpuhp_invoke_callback_range()
sched_cpu_starting()
sched_core_cpu_starting()
which leads to rq->core not being correctly set for !leader-rq's.
Without this change stress-ng (which enables core scheduling in its prctl tests in newer versions -- i.e. with PR_SCHED_CORE support) causes a warning and then a crash (trimmed for legibility):
[ 1853.805168] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1853.809784] task_rq(b)->core != rq->core [ 1853.809792] WARNING: CPU: 117 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/fair.c:11102 cfs_prio_less+0x1b4/0x1c4 ... [ 1854.015210] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010 ... [ 1854.231256] Call trace: [ 1854.233689] pick_next_task+0x3dc/0x81c [ 1854.237512] __schedule+0x10c/0x4cc [ 1854.240988] schedule_idle+0x34/0x54
--- arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c +1 -1
@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ asmlinkage notrace void secondary_start_kernel(void)* Log the CPU info before it is marked online and might get read. */ cpuinfo_store_cpu (); +store_cpu_topology (cpu);/* * Enable GIC and timers.
@@ -242,7 +243,6 @@ asmlinkage notrace void secondary_start_kernel(void)ipi_setup (cpu); -store_cpu_topology (cpu);numa_add_cpu (cpu);/*
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 171/277 bnxt_en: Synchronize tx when xdp redirects happen on same ring
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pavan Chebbi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4f81def272de17dc4bbd89ac38f49b2676c9b3d2 ]
If there are more CPUs than the number of TX XDP rings, multiple XDP redirects can select the same TX ring based on the CPU on which XDP redirect is called. Add locking when needed and use static key to decide whether to take the lock.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 7 +++++++ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h | 2 ++ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c | 8 ++++++++ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c +7 -0
@@ -3234,6 +3234,7 @@ static int bnxt_alloc_tx_rings(struct bnxt *bp) } qidx = bp->tc_to_qidx[j]; ring->queue_id = bp->q_info[qidx].queue_id; +spin_lock_init (&txr->xdp_tx_lock);if (i < bp->tx_nr_rings_xdp)continue ;if (i % bp->tx_nr_rings_per_tc == (bp->tx_nr_rings_per_tc -1 ))
@@ -10246,6 +10247,12 @@ static int __bnxt_open_nic(struct bnxt *bp, bool irq_re_init, bool link_re_init)if (irq_re_init)udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf (bp->dev); +if (bp->tx_nr_rings_xdp <num_possible_cpus ()) { +if (!static_key_enabled (&bnxt_xdp_locking_key)) +static_branch_enable (&bnxt_xdp_locking_key); + }else if (static_key_enabled (&bnxt_xdp_locking_key)) { +static_branch_disable (&bnxt_xdp_locking_key); + }set_bit (BNXT_STATE_OPEN , &bp->state);bnxt_enable_int (bp);/* Enable TX queues */
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h +2 -0
@@ -791,6 +791,8 @@ struct bnxt_tx_ring_info {u32 dev_state;struct bnxt_ring_struct tx_ring_struct; +/* Synchronize simultaneous xdp_xmit on same ring */ +spinlock_t xdp_tx_lock; };#define BNXT_LEGACY_COAL_CMPL_PARAMS \
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c +8 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@#include "bnxt.h" #include "bnxt_xdp.h" +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (bnxt_xdp_locking_key); +struct bnxt_sw_tx_bd *bnxt_xmit_bd (struct bnxt *bp,struct bnxt_tx_ring_info *txr,dma_addr_t mapping,u32 len)
@@ -227,6 +229,9 @@ int bnxt_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int num_frames, ring =smp_processor_id () % bp->tx_nr_rings_xdp; txr = &bp->tx_ring[ring]; +if (static_branch_unlikely (&bnxt_xdp_locking_key)) +spin_lock (&txr->xdp_tx_lock); +for (i =0 ; i < num_frames; i++) {struct xdp_frame *xdp = frames[i];
@@ -250,6 +255,9 @@ int bnxt_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int num_frames,bnxt_db_write (bp, &txr->tx_db, txr->tx_prod); } +if (static_branch_unlikely (&bnxt_xdp_locking_key)) +spin_unlock (&txr->xdp_tx_lock); +return nxmit; }
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.h +2 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@#ifndef BNXT_XDP_H #define BNXT_XDP_H +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (bnxt_xdp_locking_key); +struct bnxt_sw_tx_bd *bnxt_xmit_bd (struct bnxt *bp,struct bnxt_tx_ring_info *txr,dma_addr_t mapping,u32 len);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 172/277 bnxt_en: reserve space inside receive page for skb_shared_info
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit facc173cf700e55b2ad249ecbd3a7537f7315691 ]
Insufficient space was being reserved in the page used for packet reception, so the interface MTU could be set too large to still have room for the contents of the packet when doing XDP redirect. This resulted in the following message when redirecting a packet between 3520 and 3822 bytes with an MTU of 3822:
[311815.561880] XDP_WARN: xdp_update_frame_from_buff(line:200): Driver BUG: missing reserved tailroom
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h +2 -1
@@ -584,7 +584,8 @@ struct nqe_cn {#define BNXT_MAX_MTU 9500#define BNXT_MAX_PAGE_MODE_MTU \ ((unsigned int)PAGE_SIZE - VLAN_ETH_HLEN - NET_IP_ALIGN - \ - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM) + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - \ + SKB_DATA_ALIGN((unsigned int)sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)))#define BNXT_MIN_PKT_SIZE 52
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 173/277 bnxt_en: Prevent XDP redirect from running when stopping TX queue
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ray Jui <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 27d4073f8d9af0340362554414f4961643a4f4de ]
Add checks in the XDP redirect callback to prevent XDP from running when the TX ring is undergoing shutdown.
Also remove redundant checks in the XDP redirect callback to validate the txr and the flag that indicates the ring supports XDP. The modulo arithmetic on 'tx_nr_rings_xdp' already guarantees the derived TX ring is an XDP ring. txr is also guaranteed to be valid after checking BNXT_STATE_OPEN and within RCU grace period.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c +4 -2
@@ -229,14 +229,16 @@ int bnxt_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int num_frames, ring =smp_processor_id () % bp->tx_nr_rings_xdp; txr = &bp->tx_ring[ring]; +if (READ_ONCE (txr->dev_state) ==BNXT_DEV_STATE_CLOSING ) +return -EINVAL ; +if (static_branch_unlikely (&bnxt_xdp_locking_key))spin_lock (&txr->xdp_tx_lock);for (i =0 ; i < num_frames; i++) {struct xdp_frame *xdp = frames[i]; -if (!txr || !bnxt_tx_avail (bp, txr) || - !(bp->bnapi[ring]->flags &BNXT_NAPI_FLAG_XDP )) +if (!bnxt_tx_avail (bp, txr))break ; mapping = dma_map_single(&pdev->dev, xdp->data, xdp->len,
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 174/277 sfc: Do not free an empty page_ring
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Martin Habets <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 458f5d92df4807e2a7c803ed928369129996bf96 ]
When the page_ring is not used page_ptr_mask is 0. Do not dereference page_ring[0] in this case.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/rx_common.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/rx_common.c +3 -0
@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static void efx_fini_rx_recycle_ring(struct efx_rx_queue *rx_queue)struct efx_nic *efx = rx_queue->efx;int i; +if (unlikely (!rx_queue->page_ring)) +return ; +/* Unmap and release the pages in the recycle ring. Remove the ring. */ for (i =0 ; i <= rx_queue->page_ptr_mask; i++) {struct page *page = rx_queue->page_ring[i];
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 175/277 RDMA/mlx5: Dont remove cache MRs when a delay is needed
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Aharon Landau <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 84c2362fb65d69c721fec0974556378cbb36a62b ]
Don't remove MRs from the cache if need to delay the removal.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c +3 -1
@@ -536,8 +536,10 @@ static void __cache_work_func(struct mlx5_cache_ent *ent)spin_lock_irq (&ent->lock);if (ent->disabled) goto out; -if (need_delay) +if (need_delay) {queue_delayed_work (cache->wq, &ent->dwork,300 *HZ ); + goto out; + }remove_cache_mr_locked (ent);queue_adjust_cache_locked (ent); }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 176/277 RDMA/mlx5: Add a missing update of cache->last_add
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Aharon Landau <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1d735eeee63a0beb65180ca0224f239cc0c9f804 ]
Update cache->last_add when returning an MR to the cache so that the cache work won't remove it.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c +1 -0
@@ -635,6 +635,7 @@ static void mlx5_mr_cache_free(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr) {struct mlx5_cache_ent *ent = mr->cache_ent; +WRITE_ONCE (dev->cache.last_add, jiffies);spin_lock_irq (&ent->lock);list_add_tail (&mr->list, &ent->head); ent->available_mrs++;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 177/277 IB/cm: Cancel mad on the DREQ event when the state is MRA_REP_RCVD
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mark Zhang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 107dd7beba403a363adfeb3ffe3734fe38a05cce ]
On the passive side when the disconnectReq event comes, if the current state is MRA_REP_RCVD, it needs to cancel the MAD before entering the DREQ_RCVD and TIMEWAIT states, otherwise the destroy_id may block until this mad will reach timeout.
--- drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/core/cm.c +1 -2
@@ -2824,6 +2824,7 @@ static int cm_dreq_handler(struct cm_work *work)switch (cm_id_priv->id.state) {case IB_CM_REP_SENT :case IB_CM_DREQ_SENT : +case IB_CM_MRA_REP_RCVD :ib_cancel_mad (cm_id_priv->msg);break ;case IB_CM_ESTABLISHED :
@@ -2831,8 +2832,6 @@ static int cm_dreq_handler(struct cm_work *work) cm_id_priv->id.lap_state == IB_CM_MRA_LAP_RCVD)ib_cancel_mad (cm_id_priv->msg);break ; -case IB_CM_MRA_REP_RCVD : -break ;case IB_CM_TIMEWAIT :atomic_long_inc (&work->port->counters[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES ] [CM_DREQ_COUNTER ]);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 178/277 IB/rdmavt: add lock to call to rvt_error_qp to prevent a race condition
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Niels Dossche <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4d809f69695d4e7d1378b3a072fa9aef23123018 ]
The documentation of the function rvt_error_qp says both r_lock and s_lock need to be held when calling that function. It also asserts using lockdep that both of those locks are held. However, the commit I referenced in Fixes accidentally makes the call to rvt_error_qp in rvt_ruc_loopback no longer covered by r_lock. This results in the lockdep assertion failing and also possibly in a race condition.
--- drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/sw/rdmavt/qp.c +5 -1
@@ -3190,7 +3190,11 @@ void rvt_ruc_loopback(struct rvt_qp *sqp)spin_lock_irqsave (&sqp->s_lock, flags);rvt_send_complete (sqp, wqe, send_status);if (sqp->ibqp.qp_type ==IB_QPT_RC ) { -int lastwqe =rvt_error_qp (sqp,IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR ); +int lastwqe; + +spin_lock (&sqp->r_lock); + lastwqe =rvt_error_qp (sqp,IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR ); +spin_unlock (&sqp->r_lock); sqp->s_flags &= ~RVT_S_BUSY ;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&sqp->s_lock, flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 179/277 sctp: count singleton chunks in assoc user stats
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jamie Bainbridge <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e3d37210df5c41c51147a2d5d465de1a4d77be7a ]
Singleton chunks (INIT, HEARTBEAT PMTU probes, and SHUTDOWN- COMPLETE) are not counted in SCTP_GET_ASOC_STATS "sas_octrlchunks" counter available to the assoc owner.
These are all control chunks so they should be counted as such.
Add counting of singleton chunks so they are properly accounted for.
--- net/sctp/outqueue.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sctp/outqueue.c +5 -1
@@ -911,6 +911,7 @@ static void sctp_outq_flush_ctrl(struct sctp_flush_ctx *ctx) ctx->asoc->base.sk->sk_err = -error;return ; } + ctx->asoc->stats.octrlchunks++;break ;case SCTP_CID_ABORT :
@@ -935,7 +936,10 @@ static void sctp_outq_flush_ctrl(struct sctp_flush_ctx *ctx)case SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT :if (chunk->pmtu_probe) { -sctp_packet_singleton (ctx->transport, chunk, ctx->gfp); + error =sctp_packet_singleton (ctx->transport, + chunk, ctx->gfp); +if (!error) + ctx->asoc->stats.octrlchunks++;break ; } fallthrough;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 180/277 dpaa2-ptp: Fix refcount leak in dpaa2_ptp_probe
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2b04bd4f03bba021959ca339314f6739710f0954 ]
This node pointer is returned by of_find_compatible_node() with refcount incremented. Calling of_node_put() to aovid the refcount leak.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-ptp.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-ptp.c +3 -1
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int dpaa2_ptp_probe(struct fsl_mc_device *mc_dev) base =of_iomap (node,0 );if (!base) { err = -ENOMEM ; - goto err_close; + goto err_put; } err =fsl_mc_allocate_irqs (mc_dev);
@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ static int dpaa2_ptp_probe(struct fsl_mc_device *mc_dev)fsl_mc_free_irqs (mc_dev); err_unmap:iounmap (base); +err_put: +of_node_put (node); err_close:dprtc_close (mc_dev->mc_io,0 , mc_dev->mc_handle); err_free_mcp:
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 181/277 ice: Set txq_teid to ICE_INVAL_TEID on ring creation
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Anatolii Gerasymenko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ccfee1822042b87e5135d33cad8ea353e64612d2 ]
When VF is freshly created, but not brought up, ring->txq_teid value is by default set to 0.
But 0 is a valid TEID. On some platforms the Root Node of Tx scheduler has a TEID = 0. This can cause issues as shown below.
The proper way is to set ring->txq_teid to ICE_INVAL_TEID (0xFFFFFFFF).
Testing Hints:
echo 1 > /sys/class/net/ens785f0/device/sriov_numvfs ip link set dev ens785f0v0 up
ip link set dev ens785f0v0 down
If we have freshly created VF and quickly turn it on and off, so there would be no time to reach VIRTCHNL_OP_CONFIG_VSI_QUEUES stage, then VIRTCHNL_OP_DISABLE_QUEUES stage will fail with error:
[ 639.531454] disable queue 89 failed 14 [ 639.532233] Failed to disable LAN Tx queues, error: ICE_ERR_AQ_ERROR [ 639.533107] ice 0000:02:00.0: Failed to stop Tx ring 0 on VSI 5
The reason for the fail is that we are trying to send AQ command to delete queue 89, which has never been created and receive an "invalid argument" error from firmware.
As this queue has never been created, it's teid and ring->txq_teid have default value 0.ice_dis_vsi_txq has a check against non-existent queues:
node = ice_sched_find_node_by_teid(pi->root, q_teids[i]); if (!node)
continue;
But on some platforms the Root Node of Tx scheduler has a teid = 0. Hence, ice_sched_find_node_by_teid finds a node with teid = 0 (it is pi->root), and we go further to submit an erroneous request to firmware.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_lib.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_lib.c +1 -0
@@ -1306,6 +1306,7 @@ static int ice_vsi_alloc_rings(struct ice_vsi *vsi) ring->tx_tstamps = &pf->ptp.port.tx; ring->dev = dev; ring->count = vsi->num_tx_desc; + ring->txq_teid =ICE_INVAL_TEID ;WRITE_ONCE (vsi->tx_rings[i], ring); }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 182/277 ice: Do not skip not enabled queues in ice_vc_dis_qs_msg
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Anatolii Gerasymenko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 05ef6813b234db3196f083b91db3963f040b65bb ]
Disable check for queue being enabled in ice_vc_dis_qs_msg, because there could be a case when queues were created, but were not enabled. We still need to delete those queues.
Normal workflow for VF looks like:
Enable path:VIRTCHNL_OP_ADD_ETH_ADDR (opcode 10)VIRTCHNL_OP_CONFIG_VSI_QUEUES (opcode 6)VIRTCHNL_OP_ENABLE_QUEUES (opcode 8)
Disable path:VIRTCHNL_OP_DISABLE_QUEUES (opcode 9)VIRTCHNL_OP_DEL_ETH_ADDR (opcode 11)
The issue appears only in stress conditions when VF is enabled and disabled very fast.
Eventually there will be a case, when queues are created by VIRTCHNL_OP_CONFIG_VSI_QUEUES, but are not enabled by VIRTCHNL_OP_ENABLE_QUEUES.
In turn, these queues are not deleted by VIRTCHNL_OP_DISABLE_QUEUES, because there is a check whether queues are enabled in ice_vc_dis_qs_msg.
When we bring up the VF again, we will see the "Failed to set LAN Tx queue context" error during VIRTCHNL_OP_CONFIG_VSI_QUEUES step. This happens because old 16 queues were not deleted and VF requests to create 16 more, but ice_sched_get_free_qparent in ice_ena_vsi_txq would fail to find a parent node for first newly requested queue (because all nodes are allocated to 16 old queues).
Testing Hints:
Just enable and disable VF fast enough, so it would be disabled before reaching VIRTCHNL_OP_ENABLE_QUEUES.
while true; do
ip link set dev ens785f0v0 up
sleep 0.065 # adjust delay value for you machine ip link set dev ens785f0v0 down
done
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c +2 -2
@@ -3335,9 +3335,9 @@ static int ice_vc_dis_qs_msg(struct ice_vf *vf, u8 *msg) goto error_param; } -/* Skip queue if not enabled */ if (!test_bit (vf_q_id, vf->txq_ena)) -continue ; +dev_dbg (ice_pf_to_dev (vsi->back),"Queue %u on VSI %u is not enabled, but stopping it anyway\n" , + vf_q_id, vsi->vsi_num);ice_fill_txq_meta (vsi, ring, &txq_meta);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 183/277 ipv6: Fix stats accounting in ip6_pkt_drop
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Ahern <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1158f79f82d437093aeed87d57df0548bdd68146 ]
VRF devices are the loopbacks for VRFs, and a loopback can not be assigned to a VRF. Accordingly, the condition in ip6_pkt_drop should be '||' not '&&'.
--- net/ipv6/route.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/route.c +1 -1
@@ -4509,7 +4509,7 @@ static int ip6_pkt_drop(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 code, int ipstats_mib_noroutes)struct inet6_dev *idev;int type; -if (netif_is_l3_master (skb->dev) && +if (netif_is_l3_master (skb->dev) || dst->dev == net->loopback_dev) idev =__in6_dev_get_safely (dev_get_by_index_rcu (net,IP6CB (skb)->iif));else
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 184/277 ice: synchronize_rcu() when terminating rings
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f9124c68f05ffdb87a47e3ea6d5fae9dad7cb6eb ]
Unfortunately, the ice driver doesn't respect the RCU critical section that XSK wakeup is surrounded with. To fix this, add synchronize_rcu() calls to paths that destroy resources that might be in use.
This was addressed in other AF_XDP ZC enabled drivers, for reference see for example commit b3873a5be757 ("net/i40e: Fix concurrency issues between config flow and XSK")
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice.h | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c | 4 +++- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice.h +1 -1
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ static inline struct ice_pf *ice_netdev_to_pf(struct net_device *netdev)static inline bool ice_is_xdp_ena_vsi (struct ice_vsi *vsi) { -return !!vsi->xdp_prog; +return !!READ_ONCE (vsi->xdp_prog); }static inline void ice_set_ring_xdp (struct ice_ring *ring)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c +3 -1
@@ -2612,8 +2612,10 @@ int ice_destroy_xdp_rings(struct ice_vsi *vsi)for (i =0 ; i < vsi->num_xdp_txq; i++)if (vsi->xdp_rings[i]) { -if (vsi->xdp_rings[i]->desc) +if (vsi->xdp_rings[i]->desc) { +synchronize_rcu ();ice_free_tx_ring (vsi->xdp_rings[i]); + }kfree_rcu (vsi->xdp_rings[i], rcu); vsi->xdp_rings[i] =NULL ; }
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c +3 -1
@@ -36,8 +36,10 @@ static void ice_qp_reset_stats(struct ice_vsi *vsi, u16 q_idx)static void ice_qp_clean_rings (struct ice_vsi *vsi,u16 q_idx) {ice_clean_tx_ring (vsi->tx_rings[q_idx]); -if (ice_is_xdp_ena_vsi (vsi)) +if (ice_is_xdp_ena_vsi (vsi)) { +synchronize_rcu ();ice_clean_tx_ring (vsi->xdp_rings[q_idx]); + }ice_clean_rx_ring (vsi->rx_rings[q_idx]); }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 185/277 ice: xsk: fix VSI state check in ice_xsk_wakeup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 72b915a2b444e9247c9d424a840e94263db07c27 ]
ICE_DOWN is dedicated for pf->state. Check for ICE_VSI_DOWN being set on vsi->state in ice_xsk_wakeup().
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_xsk.c +1 -1
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ ice_xsk_wakeup(struct net_device *netdev, u32 queue_id,struct ice_vsi *vsi = np->vsi;struct ice_ring *ring; -if (test_bit (ICE_DOWN , vsi->state)) +if (test_bit (ICE_VSI_DOWN , vsi->state))return -ENETDOWN ;if (!ice_is_xdp_ena_vsi (vsi))
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 186/277 net: openvswitch: dont send internal clone attribute to the userspace.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3f2a3050b4a3e7f32fc0ea3c9b0183090ae00522 ]
'OVS_CLONE_ATTR_EXEC' is an internal attribute that is used for performance optimization inside the kernel. It's added by the kernel while parsing user-provided actions and should not be sent during the flow dump as it's not part of the uAPI.
The issue doesn't cause any significant problems to the ovs-vswitchd process, because reported actions are not really used in the application lifecycle and only supposed to be shown to a human via ovs-dpctl flow dump. However, the action list is still incorrect and causes the following error if the user wants to look at the datapath flows:
# ovs-dpctl add-dp system@ovs-system
# ovs-dpctl add-flow "<flow match>" "clone(ct(commit),0)"
# ovs-dpctl dump-flows
<flow match>, packets:0, bytes:0, used:never,
actions:clone(bad length 4, expected -1 for: action0(01 00 00 00),
ct(commit),0)With the fix:
# ovs-dpctl dump-flows
<flow match>, packets:0, bytes:0, used:never,
actions:clone(ct(commit),0)Additionally fixed an incorrect attribute name in the comment.
--- net/openvswitch/actions.c | 2 +- net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/openvswitch/actions.c +1 -1
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ static int clone(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb,int rem =nla_len (attr);bool dont_clone_flow_key; -/* The first action is always 'OVS_CLONE_ATTR_ARG'. */ +/* The first action is always 'OVS_CLONE_ATTR_EXEC'. */ clone_arg =nla_data (attr); dont_clone_flow_key =nla_get_u32 (clone_arg); actions =nla_next (clone_arg, &rem);
net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c +3 -1
@@ -3429,7 +3429,9 @@ static int clone_action_to_attr(const struct nlattr *attr,if (!start)return -EMSGSIZE ; - err =ovs_nla_put_actions (nla_data (attr), rem, skb); +/* Skipping the OVS_CLONE_ATTR_EXEC that is always the first attribute. */ + attr =nla_next (nla_data (attr), &rem); + err =ovs_nla_put_actions (attr, rem, skb);if (err)nla_nest_cancel (skb, start);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 187/277 net: ethernet: mv643xx: Fix over zealous checking of_get_mac_address()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 11f8e7c122ce013fa745029fa8c94c6db69c2e54 ]
There is often not a MAC address available in an EEPROM accessible by Linux with Marvell devices. Instead the bootload has the MAC address and directly programs it into the hardware. So don't consider an error from of_get_mac_address() has fatal. However, the check was added for the case where there is a MAC address in an the EEPROM, but the EEPROM has not probed yet, and -EPROBE_DEFER is returned. In that case the error should be returned. So make the check specific to this error code.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mv643xx_eth.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mv643xx_eth.c +1 -1
@@ -2747,7 +2747,7 @@ static int mv643xx_eth_shared_of_add_port(struct platform_device *pdev, } ret =of_get_mac_address (pnp, ppd.mac_addr); -if (ret) +if (ret == -EPROBE_DEFER )return ret;mv643xx_eth_property (pnp,"tx-queue-size" , ppd.tx_queue_size);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 188/277 net: openvswitch: fix leak of nested actions
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1f30fb9166d4f15a1aa19449b9da871fe0ed4796 ]
While parsing user-provided actions, openvswitch module may dynamically allocate memory and store pointers in the internal copy of the actions. So this memory has to be freed while destroying the actions.
Currently there are only two such actions: ct() and set(). However, there are many actions that can hold nested lists of actions and ovs_nla_free_flow_actions() just jumps over them leaking the memory.
For example, removal of the flow with the following actions will lead to a leak of the memory allocated by nf_ct_tmpl_alloc():
actions:clone(ct(commit),0)
Non-freed set() action may also leak the 'dst' structure for the tunnel info including device references.
Under certain conditions with a high rate of flow rotation that may cause significant memory leak problem (2MB per second in reporter's case). The problem is also hard to mitigate, because the user doesn't have direct control over the datapath flows generated by OVS.
Fix that by iterating over all the nested actions and freeing everything that needs to be freed recursively.
New build time assertion should protect us from this problem if new actions will be added in the future.
Unfortunately, openvswitch module doesn't use NLA_F_NESTED, so all attributes has to be explicitly checked. sample() and clone() actions are mixing extra attributes into the user-provided action list. That prevents some code generalization too.
--- net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c +90 -5
@@ -2288,6 +2288,62 @@ static struct sw_flow_actions *nla_alloc_flow_actions(int size)return sfa; } +static void ovs_nla_free_nested_actions (const struct nlattr *actions,int len); + +static void ovs_nla_free_check_pkt_len_action (const struct nlattr *action) +{ +const struct nlattr *a; +int rem; + +nla_for_each_nested (a, action, rem) { +switch (nla_type (a)) { +case OVS_CHECK_PKT_LEN_ATTR_ACTIONS_IF_LESS_EQUAL : +case OVS_CHECK_PKT_LEN_ATTR_ACTIONS_IF_GREATER : +ovs_nla_free_nested_actions (nla_data (a),nla_len (a)); +break ; + } + } +} + +static void ovs_nla_free_clone_action (const struct nlattr *action) +{ +const struct nlattr *a =nla_data (action); +int rem =nla_len (action); + +switch (nla_type (a)) { +case OVS_CLONE_ATTR_EXEC : +/* The real list of actions follows this attribute. */ + a =nla_next (a, &rem); +ovs_nla_free_nested_actions (a, rem); +break ; + } +} + +static void ovs_nla_free_dec_ttl_action (const struct nlattr *action) +{ +const struct nlattr *a =nla_data (action); + +switch (nla_type (a)) { +case OVS_DEC_TTL_ATTR_ACTION : +ovs_nla_free_nested_actions (nla_data (a),nla_len (a)); +break ; + } +} + +static void ovs_nla_free_sample_action (const struct nlattr *action) +{ +const struct nlattr *a =nla_data (action); +int rem =nla_len (action); + +switch (nla_type (a)) { +case OVS_SAMPLE_ATTR_ARG : +/* The real list of actions follows this attribute. */ + a =nla_next (a, &rem); +ovs_nla_free_nested_actions (a, rem); +break ; + } +} +static void ovs_nla_free_set_action (const struct nlattr *a) {const struct nlattr *ovs_key =nla_data (a);
@@ -2301,25 +2357,54 @@ static void ovs_nla_free_set_action(const struct nlattr *a) } } -void ovs_nla_free_flow_actions (struct sw_flow_actions *sf_acts) +static void ovs_nla_free_nested_actions (const struct nlattr *actions,int len) {const struct nlattr *a;int rem; -if (!sf_acts) +/* Whenever new actions are added, the need to update this +* function should be considered. +*/ +BUILD_BUG_ON (OVS_ACTION_ATTR_MAX !=23 ); + +if (!actions)return ; -nla_for_each_attr (a, sf_acts->actions, sf_acts->actions_len, rem) { +nla_for_each_attr (a, actions, len, rem) {switch (nla_type (a)) { -case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SET : -ovs_nla_free_set_action (a); +case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_CHECK_PKT_LEN : +ovs_nla_free_check_pkt_len_action (a); +break ; + +case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_CLONE : +ovs_nla_free_clone_action (a);break ; +case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_CT :ovs_ct_free_action (a);break ; + +case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_DEC_TTL : +ovs_nla_free_dec_ttl_action (a); +break ; + +case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SAMPLE : +ovs_nla_free_sample_action (a); +break ; + +case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_SET : +ovs_nla_free_set_action (a); +break ; } } +} + +void ovs_nla_free_flow_actions (struct sw_flow_actions *sf_acts) +{ +if (!sf_acts) +return ; +ovs_nla_free_nested_actions (sf_acts->actions, sf_acts->actions_len);kfree (sf_acts); }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 189/277 rxrpc: fix a race in rxrpc_exit_net()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1946014ca3b19be9e485e780e862c375c6f98bad ]
Current code can lead to the following race:
CPU0 CPU1
rxrpc_exit_net()
rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker()
if (rxnet->live)rxnet->live = false; del_timer_sync(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_timer);
timer_reduce(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_timer, jiffies + delay);
cancel_work_sync(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_work);
rxrpc_exit_net() exits while peer_keepalive_timer is still armed, leading to use-after-free.
syzbot report was:
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: rxrpc_peer_keepalive_timeout+0x0/0xb0
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3660 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0x16e/0x250 lib/debugobjects.c:505 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 3660 Comm: kworker/u4:6 Not tainted 5.17.0-syzkaller-13993-g88e6c0207623 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x16e/0x250 lib/debugobjects.c:505 Code: ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 00 00 00 48 8b 14 dd 00 1c 26 8a 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 00 10 26 8a e8 b1 e7 28 05 <0f> 0b 83 05 15 eb c5 09 01 48 83 c4 18 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000353fb00 EFLAGS: 00010082 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff888029196140 RSI: ffffffff815efad8 RDI: fffff520006a7f52 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff815ea4ae R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ce23e0 R13: ffffffff8a2614e0 R14: ffffffff816628c0 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe1f2908924 CR3: 0000000043720000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __debug_check_no_obj_freed lib/debugobjects.c:992 [inline] debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x301/0x420 lib/debugobjects.c:1023 kfree+0xd6/0x310 mm/slab.c:3809 ops_free_list.part.0+0x119/0x370 net/core/net_namespace.c:176 ops_free_list net/core/net_namespace.c:174 [inline] cleanup_net+0x591/0xb00 net/core/net_namespace.c:598 process_one_work+0x996/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:298 </TASK>
--- net/rxrpc/net_ns.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/net_ns.c +1 -1
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ static __net_exit void rxrpc_exit_net(struct net *net)struct rxrpc_net *rxnet =rxrpc_net (net); rxnet->live = false; -del_timer_sync (&rxnet->peer_keepalive_timer);cancel_work_sync (&rxnet->peer_keepalive_work); +del_timer_sync (&rxnet->peer_keepalive_timer);rxrpc_destroy_all_calls (rxnet);rxrpc_destroy_all_connections (rxnet);rxrpc_destroy_all_peers (rxnet);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 190/277 net: sfc: fix using uninitialized xdp tx_queue
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fb5833d81e4333294add35d3ac7f7f52a7bf107f ]
In some cases, xdp tx_queue can get used before initialization.
1. interface up/down
2. ring buffer size change
When CPU cores are lower than maximum number of channels of sfc driver, it creates new channels only for XDP.
When an interface is up or ring buffer size is changed, all channels are initialized.
But xdp channels are always initialized later.
So, the below scenario is possible.
Packets are received to rx queue of normal channels and it is acted XDP_TX and tx_queue of xdp channels get used.
But these tx_queues are not initialized yet.
If so, TX DMA or queue error occurs.
In order to avoid this problem.
1. initializes xdp tx_queues earlier than other rx_queue in efx_start_channels().
2. checks whether tx_queue is initialized or not in efx_xdp_tx_buffers().
Splat looks like:
sfc 0000:08:00.1 enp8s0f1np1: TX queue 10 spurious TX completion id 250 sfc 0000:08:00.1 enp8s0f1np1: resetting (RECOVER_OR_ALL) sfc 0000:08:00.1 enp8s0f1np1: MC command 0x80 inlen 100 failed rc=-22 (raw=22) arg=789
sfc 0000:08:00.1 enp8s0f1np1: has been disabled
--- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/efx_channels.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/tx.c | 3 +++ drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/tx_common.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/efx_channels.c +1 -1
@@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@ void efx_start_channels(struct efx_nic *efx)struct efx_rx_queue *rx_queue;struct efx_channel *channel; -efx_for_each_channel (channel, efx) { +efx_for_each_channel_rev (channel, efx) {efx_for_each_channel_tx_queue (tx_queue, channel) {efx_init_tx_queue (tx_queue);atomic_inc (&efx->active_queues);
drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/tx.c +3 -0
@@ -443,6 +443,9 @@ int efx_xdp_tx_buffers(struct efx_nic *efx, int n, struct xdp_frame **xdpfs,if (unlikely (!tx_queue))return -EINVAL ; +if (!tx_queue->initialised) +return -EINVAL ; +if (efx->xdp_txq_queues_mode !=EFX_XDP_TX_QUEUES_DEDICATED )HARD_TX_LOCK (efx->net_dev, tx_queue->core_txq, cpu);
drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/tx_common.c +2 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ void efx_fini_tx_queue(struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue)netif_dbg (tx_queue->efx, drv, tx_queue->efx->net_dev,"shutting down TX queue %d\n" , tx_queue->queue); + tx_queue->initialised = false; +if (!tx_queue->buffer)return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 191/277 net: phy: mscc-miim: reject clause 45 register accesses
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Michael Walle <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8d90991e5bf7fdb9f264f5f579d18969913054b7 ]
The driver doesn't support clause 45 register access yet, but doesn't check if the access is a c45 one either. This leads to spurious register reads and writes. Add the check.
--- drivers/net/mdio/mdio-mscc-miim.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/mdio/mdio-mscc-miim.c +6 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ static int mscc_miim_read(struct mii_bus *bus, int mii_id, int regnum)u32 val;int ret; +if (regnum &MII_ADDR_C45 ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + ret =mscc_miim_wait_pending (bus);if (ret) goto out;
@@ -105,6 +108,9 @@ static int mscc_miim_write(struct mii_bus *bus, int mii_id,struct mscc_miim_dev *miim = bus->priv;int ret; +if (regnum &MII_ADDR_C45 ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + ret =mscc_miim_wait_pending (bus);if (ret <0 ) goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 192/277 qede: confirm skb is allocated before using
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jamie Bainbridge <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4e910dbe36508654a896d5735b318c0b88172570 ]
qede_build_skb() assumes build_skb() always works and goes straight to skb_reserve(). However, build_skb() can fail under memory pressure. This results in a kernel panic because the skb to reserve is NULL.
Add a check in case build_skb() failed to allocate and return NULL.
The NULL return is handled correctly in callers to qede_build_skb().
--- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qede/qede_fp.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qede/qede_fp.c +3 -0
@@ -747,6 +747,9 @@ qede_build_skb(struct qede_rx_queue *rxq, buf =page_address (bd->data) + bd->page_offset; skb =build_skb (buf, rxq->rx_buf_seg_size); +if (unlikely (!skb)) +return NULL ; +skb_reserve (skb, pad);skb_put (skb, len);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 193/277 spi: bcm-qspi: fix MSPI only access with bcm_qspi_exec_mem_op()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kamal Dasu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2c7d1b281286c46049cd22b43435cecba560edde ]
This fixes case where MSPI controller is used to access spi-nor flash and BSPI block is not present.
--- drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi-bcm-qspi.c +2 -2
@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ static int bcm_qspi_exec_mem_op(struct spi_mem *mem, addr = op->addr.val; len = op->data.nbytes; -if (bcm_qspi_bspi_ver_three (qspi) == true) { +if (has_bspi (qspi) &&bcm_qspi_bspi_ver_three (qspi) == true) {/* * The address coming into this function is a raw flash offset. * But for BSPI <= V3, we need to convert it to a remapped BSPI
@@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ static int bcm_qspi_exec_mem_op(struct spi_mem *mem, len < 4) mspi_read = true; -if (mspi_read) +if (!has_bspi (qspi) || mspi_read)return bcm_qspi_mspi_exec_mem_op (spi, op); ret =bcm_qspi_bspi_set_mode (qspi, op,0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 194/277 bpf: Support dual-stack sockets in bpf_tcp_check_syncookie
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Maxim Mikityanskiy <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2e8702cc0cfa1080f29fd64003c00a3e24ac38de ]
bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie looks at the IP version in the IP header and validates the address family of the socket. It supports IPv4 packets in AF_INET6 dual-stack sockets.
On the other hand, bpf_tcp_check_syncookie looks only at the address family of the socket, ignoring the real IP version in headers, and validates only the packet size. This implementation has some drawbacks:
1. Packets are not validated properly, allowing a BPF program to trick bpf_tcp_check_syncookie into handling an IPv6 packet on an IPv4 socket.
2. Dual-stack sockets fail the checks on IPv4 packets. IPv4 clients end up receiving a SYNACK with the cookie, but the following ACK gets dropped.
This patch fixes these issues by changing the checks in bpf_tcp_check_syncookie to match the ones in bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie. IP version from the header is taken into account, and it is validated properly with address family.
--- net/core/filter.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +13 -4
@@ -6719,24 +6719,33 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_check_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_lenif (!th->ack || th->rst || th->syn)return -ENOENT ; +if (unlikely (iph_len <sizeof (struct iphdr ))) +return -EINVAL ; +if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow (sk))return -ENOENT ; cookie =ntohl (th->ack_seq) -1 ; -switch (sk->sk_family) { -case AF_INET : -if (unlikely (iph_len <sizeof (struct iphdr ))) +/* Both struct iphdr and struct ipv6hdr have the version field at the +* same offset so we can cast to the shorter header (struct iphdr). +*/ +switch (((struct iphdr *)iph)->version) { +case 4 : +if (sk->sk_family ==AF_INET6 &&ipv6_only_sock (sk))return -EINVAL ; ret =__cookie_v4_check ((struct iphdr *)iph, th, cookie);break ;#if IS_BUILTIN (CONFIG_IPV6 ) -case AF_INET6 : +case 6 :if (unlikely (iph_len <sizeof (struct ipv6hdr )))return -EINVAL ; +if (sk->sk_family !=AF_INET6 ) +return -EINVAL ; + ret =__cookie_v6_check ((struct ipv6hdr *)iph, th, cookie);break ;#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 195/277 drbd: Fix five use after free bugs in get_initial_state
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Lv Yunlong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aadb22ba2f656581b2f733deb3a467c48cc618f6 ]
In get_initial_state, it calls notify_initial_state_done(skb,..) if cb->args[5]==1. If genlmsg_put() failed in notify_initial_state_done(), the skb will be freed by nlmsg_free(skb).
Then get_initial_state will goto out and the freed skb will be used by return value skb->len, which is a uaf bug.
What's worse, the same problem goes even further: skb can also be freed in the notify_*_state_change -> notify_*_state calls below. Thus 4 additional uaf bugs happened.
My patch lets the problem callee functions: notify_initial_state_done and notify_*_state_change return an error code if errors happen. So that the error codes could be propagated and the uaf bugs can be avoid.
v2 reports a compilation warning. This v3 fixed this warning and built successfully in my local environment with no additional warnings.
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1435218/
--- drivers/block/drbd/drbd_int.h | 8 ++--- drivers/block/drbd/drbd_nl.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++---------- drivers/block/drbd/drbd_state.c | 18 +++++------ drivers/block/drbd/drbd_state_change.h | 8 ++--- 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
drivers/block/drbd/drbd_int.h +4 -4
@@ -1642,22 +1642,22 @@ struct sib_info { };void drbd_bcast_event (struct drbd_device *device,const struct sib_info *sib); -extern void notify_resource_state (struct sk_buff *, +extern int notify_resource_state (struct sk_buff *,unsigned int ,struct drbd_resource *,struct resource_info *,enum drbd_notification_type ); -extern void notify_device_state (struct sk_buff *, +extern int notify_device_state (struct sk_buff *,unsigned int ,struct drbd_device *,struct device_info *,enum drbd_notification_type ); -extern void notify_connection_state (struct sk_buff *, +extern int notify_connection_state (struct sk_buff *,unsigned int ,struct drbd_connection *,struct connection_info *,enum drbd_notification_type ); -extern void notify_peer_device_state(struct sk_buff *, +extern int notify_peer_device_state(struct sk_buff *, unsigned int, struct drbd_peer_device *, struct peer_device_info *,
drivers/block/drbd/drbd_nl.c +25 -16
156 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/block/drbd/drbd_state.c +9 -9
@@ -1537,7 +1537,7 @@ int drbd_bitmap_io_from_worker(struct drbd_device *device,return rv; } -void notify_resource_state_change (struct sk_buff *skb, +int notify_resource_state_change (struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned int seq,struct drbd_resource_state_change *resource_state_change,enum drbd_notification_type type)
@@ -1550,10 +1550,10 @@ void notify_resource_state_change(struct sk_buff *skb, .res_susp_fen = resource_state_change->susp_fen[NEW], }; -notify_resource_state (skb, seq, resource, &resource_info, type); +return notify_resource_state (skb, seq, resource, &resource_info, type); } -void notify_connection_state_change (struct sk_buff *skb, +int notify_connection_state_change (struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned int seq,struct drbd_connection_state_change *connection_state_change,enum drbd_notification_type type)
@@ -1564,10 +1564,10 @@ void notify_connection_state_change(struct sk_buff *skb, .conn_role = connection_state_change->peer_role[NEW], }; -notify_connection_state (skb, seq, connection, &connection_info, type); +return notify_connection_state (skb, seq, connection, &connection_info, type); } -void notify_device_state_change (struct sk_buff *skb, +int notify_device_state_change (struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned int seq,struct drbd_device_state_change *device_state_change,enum drbd_notification_type type)
@@ -1577,10 +1577,10 @@ void notify_device_state_change(struct sk_buff *skb, .dev_disk_state = device_state_change->disk_state[NEW], }; -notify_device_state (skb, seq, device, &device_info, type); +return notify_device_state (skb, seq, device, &device_info, type); } -void notify_peer_device_state_change (struct sk_buff *skb, +int notify_peer_device_state_change (struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned int seq,struct drbd_peer_device_state_change *p,enum drbd_notification_type type)
@@ -1594,7 +1594,7 @@ void notify_peer_device_state_change(struct sk_buff *skb, .peer_resync_susp_dependency = p->resync_susp_dependency[NEW], }; -notify_peer_device_state (skb, seq, peer_device, &peer_device_info, type); +return notify_peer_device_state (skb, seq, peer_device, &peer_device_info, type); }static void broadcast_state_change (struct drbd_state_change *state_change)
@@ -1602,7 +1602,7 @@ static void broadcast_state_change(struct drbd_state_change *state_change)struct drbd_resource_state_change *resource_state_change = &state_change->resource[0 ];bool resource_state_has_changed;unsigned int n_device, n_connection, n_peer_device, n_peer_devices; -void (*last_func)(struct sk_buff *,unsigned int ,void *, +int (*last_func)(struct sk_buff *,unsigned int ,void *,enum drbd_notification_type ) =NULL ;void *last_arg =NULL ;
drivers/block/drbd/drbd_state_change.h +4 -4
@@ -44,19 +44,19 @@ extern struct drbd_state_change *remember_old_state(struct drbd_resource *, gfp_extern void copy_old_to_new_state_change (struct drbd_state_change *);extern void forget_state_change (struct drbd_state_change *); -extern void notify_resource_state_change (struct sk_buff *, +extern int notify_resource_state_change (struct sk_buff *,unsigned int ,struct drbd_resource_state_change *,enum drbd_notification_type type); -extern void notify_connection_state_change (struct sk_buff *, +extern int notify_connection_state_change (struct sk_buff *,unsigned int ,struct drbd_connection_state_change *,enum drbd_notification_type type); -extern void notify_device_state_change (struct sk_buff *, +extern int notify_device_state_change (struct sk_buff *,unsigned int ,struct drbd_device_state_change *,enum drbd_notification_type type); -extern void notify_peer_device_state_change (struct sk_buff *, +extern int notify_peer_device_state_change (struct sk_buff *,unsigned int ,struct drbd_peer_device_state_change *,enum drbd_notification_type type);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 196/277 scsi: ufs: ufshpb: Fix a NULL check on list iterator
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xiaomeng Tong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bfb7789bcbd901caead43861461bc8f334c90d3b ]
The list iterator is always non-NULL so the check 'if (!rgn)' is always false and the dev_err() is never called. Move the check outside the loop and determine if 'victim_rgn' is NULL, to fix this bug.
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshpb.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshpb.c +5 -6
@@ -870,12 +870,6 @@ static struct ufshpb_region *ufshpb_victim_lru_info(struct ufshpb_lu *hpb)struct ufshpb_region *rgn, *victim_rgn =NULL ;list_for_each_entry (rgn, &lru_info->lh_lru_rgn, list_lru_rgn) { -if (!rgn) { -dev_err (&hpb->sdev_ufs_lu->sdev_dev, -"%s: no region allocated\n" , - __func__); -return NULL ; - }if (ufshpb_check_srgns_issue_state (hpb, rgn))continue ;
@@ -891,6 +885,11 @@ static struct ufshpb_region *ufshpb_victim_lru_info(struct ufshpb_lu *hpb)break ; } +if (!victim_rgn) +dev_err (&hpb->sdev_ufs_lu->sdev_dev, +"%s: no region allocated\n" , + __func__); +return victim_rgn; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 197/277 io_uring: nospec index for tags on files update
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 34bb77184123ae401100a4d156584f12fa630e5c ]
Don't forget to array_index_nospec() for indexes before updating rsrc tags in __io_sqe_files_update(), just use already safe and precalculated index @i.
--- fs/io_uring.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/io_uring.c +1 -1
@@ -8589,7 +8589,7 @@ static int __io_sqe_files_update(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, err = -EBADF ;break ; } - *io_get_tag_slot (data, up->offset + done) = tag; + *io_get_tag_slot (data, i) = tag;io_fixed_file_set (file_slot, file); err =io_sqe_file_register (ctx, file, i);if (err) {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 198/277 io_uring: dont touch scm_fp_list after queueing skb
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a07211e3001435fe8591b992464cd8d5e3c98c5a ]
It's safer to not touch scm_fp_list after we queued an skb to which it was assigned, there might be races lurking if we screw subtle sync guarantees on the io_uring side.
--- fs/io_uring.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/io_uring.c +6 -2
@@ -8126,8 +8126,12 @@ static int __io_sqe_files_scm(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, int nr, int offset)refcount_add (skb->truesize, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);skb_queue_head (&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb); -for (i =0 ; i < nr_files; i++) -fput (fpl->fp[i]); +for (i =0 ; i < nr; i++) { +struct file *file =io_file_from_index (ctx, i + offset); + +if (file) +fput (file); + } }else {kfree_skb (skb);free_uid (fpl->user);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 199/277 SUNRPC: Handle ENOMEM in call_transmit_status()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d3c15033b240767d0287f1c4a529cbbe2d5ded8a ]
Both call_transmit() and call_bc_transmit() can now return ENOMEM, so let's make sure that we handle the errors gracefully.
--- net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/sunrpc/clnt.c +2 -0
@@ -2202,6 +2202,7 @@ call_transmit_status(struct rpc_task *task)* socket just returned a connection error, * then hold onto the transport lock. */ +case -ENOMEM :case -ENOBUFS :rpc_delay (task,HZ >>2 ); fallthrough;
@@ -2285,6 +2286,7 @@ call_bc_transmit_status(struct rpc_task *task)case -ENOTCONN :case -EPIPE :break ; +case -ENOMEM :case -ENOBUFS :rpc_delay (task,HZ >>2 ); fallthrough;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 200/277 SUNRPC: Handle low memory situations in call_status()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9d82819d5b065348ce623f196bf601028e22ed00 ]
We need to handle ENFILE, ENOBUFS, and ENOMEM, because xprt_wake_pending_tasks() can be called with any one of these due to socket creation failures.
--- net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
net/sunrpc/clnt.c +5 -0
@@ -2369,6 +2369,11 @@ call_status(struct rpc_task *task)case -EPIPE :case -EAGAIN :break ; +case -ENFILE : +case -ENOBUFS : +case -ENOMEM : +rpc_delay (task,HZ >>2 ); +break ;case -EIO :/* shutdown or soft timeout */ goto out_exit;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 201/277 SUNRPC: svc_tcp_sendmsg() should handle errors from xdr_alloc_bvec()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b056fa070814897be32d83b079dbc311375588e7 ]
The allocation is done with GFP_KERNEL, but it could still fail in a low memory situation.
--- net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sunrpc/svcsock.c +3 -1
@@ -1096,7 +1096,9 @@ static int svc_tcp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct xdr_buf *xdr,int ret; *sentp =0 ; -xdr_alloc_bvec (xdr,GFP_KERNEL ); + ret =xdr_alloc_bvec (xdr,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; ret =kernel_sendmsg (sock, &msg, &rm,1 , rm.iov_len);if (ret <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 202/277 iommu/omap: Fix regression in probe for NULL pointer dereference
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 71ff461c3f41f6465434b9e980c01782763e7ad8 ]
Commit 3f6634d997db ("iommu: Use right way to retrieve iommu_ops") started triggering a NULL pointer dereference for some omap variants:
__iommu_probe_device from probe_iommu_group+0x2c/0x38 probe_iommu_group from bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xbc bus_for_each_dev from bus_iommu_probe+0x34/0x2e8 bus_iommu_probe from bus_set_iommu+0x80/0xc8 bus_set_iommu from omap_iommu_init+0x88/0xcc omap_iommu_init from do_one_initcall+0x44/0x24
This is caused by omap iommu probe returning 0 instead of ERR_PTR(-ENODEV) as noted by Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>.
Looks like the regression already happened with an earlier commit 6785eb9105e3 ("iommu/omap: Convert to probe/release_device() call-backs") that changed the function return type and missed converting one place.
--- drivers/iommu/omap-iommu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/omap-iommu.c +1 -1
@@ -1661,7 +1661,7 @@ static struct iommu_device *omap_iommu_probe_device(struct device *dev) num_iommus =of_property_count_elems_of_size (dev->of_node,"iommus" ,sizeof (phandle));if (num_iommus <0 ) -return 0 ; +return ERR_PTR (-ENODEV ); arch_data =kcalloc (num_iommus +1 ,sizeof (*arch_data),GFP_KERNEL );if (!arch_data)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 203/277 perf: arm-spe: Fix perf report --mem-mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: James Clark <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ffab487052054162b3b6c9c6005777ec6cfcea05 ]
Since commit bb30acae4c4dacfa ("perf report: Bail out --mem-mode if mem info is not available") "perf mem report" and "perf report --mem-mode" don't allow opening the file unless one of the events has PERF_SAMPLE_DATA_SRC set.
SPE doesn't have this set even though synthetic memory data is generated after it is decoded. Fix this issue by setting DATA_SRC on SPE events. This has no effect on the data collected because the SPE driver doesn't do anything with that flag and doesn't generate samples.
--- tools/perf/arch/arm64/util/arm-spe.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
tools/perf/arch/arm64/util/arm-spe.c +6 -0
@@ -154,6 +154,12 @@ static int arm_spe_recording_options(struct auxtrace_record *itr,arm_spe_set_timestamp (itr, arm_spe_evsel); } +/* +* Set this only so that perf report knows that SPE generates memory info. It has no effect +* on the opening of the event or the SPE data produced. +*/ +evsel__set_sample_bit (arm_spe_evsel,DATA_SRC ); +/* Add dummy event to keep tracking */ err =parse_events (evlist,"dummy:u" ,NULL );if (err)
Signature · 9 lines
2.35.1 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 204/277 perf tools: Fix perfs libperf_print callback
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aeee9dc53ce405d2161f9915f553114e94e5b677 ]
eprintf() does not expect va_list as the type of the 4th parameter.
Use veprintf() because it does.
--- tools/perf/perf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/perf.c +1 -1
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ void pthread__unblock_sigwinch(void)static int libperf_print (enum libperf_print_level level,const char *fmt,va_list ap) { -return eprintf (level, verbose, fmt, ap); +return veprintf (level, verbose, fmt, ap); }int main (int argc,const char **argv)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 205/277 perf session: Remap buf if there is no space for event
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Denis Nikitin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bc21e74d4775f883ae1f542c1f1dc7205b15d925 ]
If a perf event doesn't fit into remaining buffer space return NULL to remap buf and fetch the event again.
Keep the logic to error out on inadequate input from fuzzing.
This fixes perf failing on ChromeOS (with 32b userspace):
$ perf report -v -i perf.data ... prefetch_event: head=0x1fffff8 event->header_size=0x30, mmap_size=0x2000000: fuzzed or compressed perf.data? Error: failed to process sample
--- tools/perf/util/session.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/session.c +12 -3
@@ -2076,6 +2076,7 @@ prefetch_event(char *buf, u64 head, size_t mmap_size, bool needs_swap, union perf_event *error) { union perf_event *event; +u16 event_size;/* * Ensure we have enough space remaining to read
@@ -2088,15 +2089,23 @@ prefetch_event(char *buf, u64 head, size_t mmap_size,if (needs_swap)perf_event_header__bswap (&event->header); -if (head + event->header.size <= mmap_size) + event_size = event->header.size; +if (head + event_size <= mmap_size)return event;/* We're not fetching the event so swap back again */ if (needs_swap)perf_event_header__bswap (&event->header); -pr_debug ("%s: head=%#" PRIx64" event->header_size=%#x, mmap_size=%#zx:" -" fuzzed or compressed perf.data?\n" ,__func__, head, event->header.size, mmap_size); +/* Check if the event fits into the next mmapped buf. */ +if (event_size <= mmap_size - head % page_size) { +/* Remap buf and fetch again. */ +return NULL ; + } + +/* Invalid input. Event size should never exceed mmap_size. */ +pr_debug ("%s: head=%#" PRIx64" event->header.size=%#x, mmap_size=%#zx:" +" fuzzed or compressed perf.data?\n" , __func__, head, event_size, mmap_size);return error; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 206/277 arm64: Add part number for Arm Cortex-A78AE
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Chanho Park <[email protected]>
commit 83bea32ac7ed37bbda58733de61fc9369513f9f9 upstream.
Add the MIDR part number info for the Arm Cortex-A78AE[1] and add it to spectre-BHB affected list[2].
[1]: https://developer.arm.com/Processors/Cortex-A78AE
[2]: https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Spectre-BHB
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +2 -0
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77 0xD0D#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1 0xD40#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78 0xD41 +#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78AE 0xD42#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1 0xD44#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A510 0xD46#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710 0xD47
@@ -123,6 +124,7 @@#define MIDR_CORTEX_A77 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77)#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1)#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78) +#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78AE MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78AE)#define MIDR_CORTEX_X1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1)#define MIDR_CORTEX_A510 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A510)#define MIDR_CORTEX_A710 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710)
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +1 -0
@@ -853,6 +853,7 @@ u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope)if (scope ==SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU ) {static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_k32_list[] = {MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS (MIDR_CORTEX_A78 ), +MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS (MIDR_CORTEX_A78AE ),MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS (MIDR_CORTEX_A78C ),MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS (MIDR_CORTEX_X1 ),MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS (MIDR_CORTEX_A710 ),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 207/277 scsi: mpt3sas: Fix use after free in _scsih_expander_node_remove()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
commit 87d663d40801dffc99a5ad3b0188ad3e2b4d1557 upstream.
The function mpt3sas_transport_port_remove() called in _scsih_expander_node_remove() frees the port field of the sas_expander structure, leading to the following use-after-free splat from KASAN when the ioc_info() call following that function is executed (e.g. when doing rmmod of the driver module):
[ 3479.371167] ================================================================== [ 3479.378496] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas] [ 3479.386936] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881c037691c by task rmmod/1531 [ 3479.393524] [ 3479.395035] CPU: 18 PID: 1531 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8+ #1436 [ 3479.401712] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-NT, BIOS 2.1 06/02/2021 [ 3479.409263] Call Trace: [ 3479.411743] <TASK> [ 3479.413875] dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 [ 3479.417582] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x120 [ 3479.423389] ? _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas] [ 3479.429469] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf [ 3479.433438] ? _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas] [ 3479.439514] _scsih_expander_node_remove+0x710/0x750 [mpt3sas] [ 3479.445411] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x40 [ 3479.452032] scsih_remove+0x525/0xc90 [mpt3sas] [ 3479.458212] ? mpt3sas_expander_remove+0x1d0/0x1d0 [mpt3sas] [ 3479.465529] ? down_write+0xde/0x150 [ 3479.470746] ? up_write+0x14d/0x460 [ 3479.475840] ? kernfs_find_ns+0x137/0x310 [ 3479.481438] pci_device_remove+0x65/0x110 [ 3479.487013] __device_release_driver+0x316/0x680 [ 3479.493180] driver_detach+0x1ec/0x2d0 [ 3479.498499] bus_remove_driver+0xe7/0x2d0 [ 3479.504081] pci_unregister_driver+0x26/0x250 [ 3479.510033] _mpt3sas_exit+0x2b/0x6cf [mpt3sas] [ 3479.516144] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2fd/0x510 [ 3479.522315] ? free_module+0xaa0/0xaa0 [ 3479.527593] ? __cond_resched+0x1c/0x90 [ 3479.532951] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 [ 3479.539607] ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70 [ 3479.546161] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x110 [ 3479.551828] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 3479.556884] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3479.563402] RIP: 0033:0x7f1fc482483b ... [ 3479.943087] ==================================================================
Fix this by introducing the local variable port_id to store the port ID value before executing mpt3sas_transport_port_remove(). This local variable is then used in the call to ioc_info() instead of dereferencing the freed port structure.
--- drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c +4 -1
@@ -11035,6 +11035,7 @@ _scsih_expander_node_remove(struct MPT3S {struct _sas_port *mpt3sas_port, *next;unsigned long flags; +int port_id;/* remove sibling ports attached to this expander */ list_for_each_entry_safe(mpt3sas_port, next,
@@ -11055,6 +11056,8 @@ _scsih_expander_node_remove(struct MPT3S mpt3sas_port->hba_port); } + port_id = sas_expander->port->port_id; +mpt3sas_transport_port_remove (ioc, sas_expander->sas_address, sas_expander->sas_address_parent, sas_expander->port);
@@ -11062,7 +11065,7 @@ _scsih_expander_node_remove(struct MPT3S"expander_remove: handle(0x%04x), sas_addr(0x%016llx), port:%d\n" , sas_expander->handle, (unsigned long long ) sas_expander->sas_address, - sas_expander->port->port_id); + port_id);spin_lock_irqsave (&ioc->sas_node_lock, flags);list_del (&sas_expander->list);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 208/277 scsi: ufs: ufs-pci: Add support for Intel MTL
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
commit 4049f7acef3eb37c1ea0df45f3ffc29404f4e708 upstream.
Add PCI ID and callbacks to support Intel Meteor Lake (MTL).
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pci.c +17 -0
@@ -428,6 +428,12 @@ static int ufs_intel_adl_init(struct ufsreturn ufs_intel_common_init (hba); } +static int ufs_intel_mtl_init (struct ufs_hba *hba) +{ + hba->caps |=UFSHCD_CAP_CRYPTO |UFSHCD_CAP_WB_EN ; +return ufs_intel_common_init (hba); +} +static struct ufs_hba_variant_ops ufs_intel_cnl_hba_vops = { .name ="intel-pci" , .init = ufs_intel_common_init,
@@ -465,6 +471,16 @@ static struct ufs_hba_variant_ops ufs_in .device_reset = ufs_intel_device_reset, }; +static struct ufs_hba_variant_ops ufs_intel_mtl_hba_vops = { + .name ="intel-pci" , + .init = ufs_intel_mtl_init, + .exit = ufs_intel_common_exit, + .hce_enable_notify = ufs_intel_hce_enable_notify, + .link_startup_notify = ufs_intel_link_startup_notify, + .resume = ufs_intel_resume, + .device_reset = ufs_intel_device_reset, +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP static int ufshcd_pci_restore (struct device *dev) {
@@ -579,6 +595,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id ufshcd { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x98FA), (kernel_ulong_t)&ufs_intel_lkf_hba_vops }, { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x51FF), (kernel_ulong_t)&ufs_intel_adl_hba_vops }, { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x54FF), (kernel_ulong_t)&ufs_intel_adl_hba_vops }, + { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, 0x7E47), (kernel_ulong_t)&ufs_intel_mtl_hba_vops }, { } /* terminate list */ };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 209/277 Revert "mmc: sdhci-xenon: fix annoying 1.8V regulator warning"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pali Rohár <[email protected]>
commit 7e2646ed47542123168d43916b84b954532e5386 upstream.
This reverts commit bb32e1987bc55ce1db400faf47d85891da3c9b9f.
Commit 1a3ed0dc3594 ("mmc: sdhci-xenon: fix 1.8v regulator stabilization") contains proper fix for the issue described in commit bb32e1987bc5 ("mmc:
sdhci-xenon: fix annoying 1.8V regulator warning").
--- drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-xenon.c | 10 ---------- 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-xenon.c +0 -10
@@ -241,16 +241,6 @@ static void xenon_voltage_switch(struct {/* Wait for 5ms after set 1.8V signal enable bit */ usleep_range (5000 ,5500 ); - -/* -* For some reason the controller's Host Control2 register reports -* the bit representing 1.8V signaling as 0 when read after it was -* written as 1. Subsequent read reports 1. -* -* Since this may cause some issues, do an empty read of the Host -* Control2 register here to circumvent this. -*/ -sdhci_readw (host,SDHCI_HOST_CONTROL2 ); }static unsigned int xenon_get_max_clock (struct sdhci_host *host)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 210/277 mmc: block: Check for errors after write on SPI
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Christian Löhle <[email protected]>
commit 5d435933376962b107bd76970912e7e80247dcc7 upstream.
Introduce a SEND_STATUS check for writes through SPI to not mark an unsuccessful write as successful.
Since SPI SD/MMC does not have states, after a write, the card will just hold the line LOW until it is ready again. The driver marks the write therefore as completed as soon as it reads something other than all zeroes.
The driver does not distinguish from a card no longer signalling busy and it being disconnected (and the line being pulled-up by the host). This lead to writes being marked as successful when disconnecting a busy card.
Now the card is ensured to be still connected by an additional CMD13, just like non-SPI is ensured to go back to TRAN state.
While at it and since we already poll for the post-write status anyway, we might as well check for SPIs error bits (any of them).
The disconnecting card problem is reproducable for me after continuous write activity and randomly disconnecting, around every 20-50 tries on SPI DS for some card.
--- drivers/mmc/core/block.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/core/block.c +33 -1
@@ -1880,6 +1880,31 @@ static inline bool mmc_blk_rq_error(stru brq->data.error || brq->cmd.resp[0 ] &CMD_ERRORS ; } +static int mmc_spi_err_check (struct mmc_card *card) +{ +u32 status =0 ; +int err; + +/* +* SPI does not have a TRAN state we have to wait on, instead the +* card is ready again when it no longer holds the line LOW. +* We still have to ensure two things here before we know the write +* was successful: +* 1. The card has not disconnected during busy and we actually read our +* own pull-up, thinking it was still connected, so ensure it +* still responds. +* 2. Check for any error bits, in particular R1_SPI_IDLE to catch a +* just reconnected card after being disconnected during busy. +*/ + err =__mmc_send_status (card, &status,0 ); +if (err) +return err; +/* All R1 and R2 bits of SPI are errors in our case */ +if (status) +return -EIO ; +return 0 ; +} +static int mmc_blk_busy_cb (void *cb_data,bool *busy) {struct mmc_blk_busy_data *data = cb_data;
@@ -1903,9 +1928,16 @@ static int mmc_blk_card_busy(struct mmc_struct mmc_blk_busy_data cb_data;int err; -if (mmc_host_is_spi (card->host) ||rq_data_dir (req) ==READ ) +if (rq_data_dir (req) ==READ )return 0 ; +if (mmc_host_is_spi (card->host)) { + err =mmc_spi_err_check (card); +if (err) + mqrq->brq.data.bytes_xfered =0 ; +return err; + } + cb_data.card = card; cb_data.status =0 ; err = __mmc_poll_for_busy(card, MMC_BLK_TIMEOUT_MS, &mmc_blk_busy_cb,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 211/277 mmc: mmci: stm32: correctly check all elements of sg list
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yann Gautier <[email protected]>
commit 0d319dd5a27183b75d984e3dc495248e59f99334 upstream.
Use sg and not data->sg when checking sg list elements. Else only the first element alignment is checked.
The last element should be checked the same way, for_each_sg already set sg to sg_next(sg).
--- drivers/mmc/host/mmci_stm32_sdmmc.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/mmci_stm32_sdmmc.c +3 -3
@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ static int sdmmc_idma_validate_data(stru* excepted the last element which has no constraint on idmasize */ for_each_sg (data->sg, sg, data->sg_len -1 , i) { -if (!IS_ALIGNED (data->sg->offset,sizeof (u32)) || - !IS_ALIGNED (data->sg->length,SDMMC_IDMA_BURST )) { +if (!IS_ALIGNED (sg->offset,sizeof (u32)) || + !IS_ALIGNED (sg->length,SDMMC_IDMA_BURST )) {dev_err (mmc_dev (host->mmc),"unaligned scatterlist: ofst:%x length:%d\n" , data->sg->offset, data->sg->length);
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static int sdmmc_idma_validate_data(stru } } -if (!IS_ALIGNED (data->sg->offset,sizeof (u32))) { +if (!IS_ALIGNED (sg->offset,sizeof (u32))) {dev_err (mmc_dev (host->mmc),"unaligned last scatterlist: ofst:%x length:%d\n" , data->sg->offset, data->sg->length);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 212/277 mmc: renesas_sdhi: dont overwrite TAP settings when HS400 tuning is complete
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>
commit 03e59b1e2f56245163b14c69e0a830c24b1a3a47 upstream.
When HS400 tuning is complete and HS400 is going to be activated, we have to keep the current number of TAPs and should not overwrite them with a hardcoded value. This was probably a copy&paste mistake when upporting HS400 support from the BSP.
--- drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c +2 -2
@@ -382,10 +382,10 @@ static void renesas_sdhi_hs400_complete( SH_MOBILE_SDHI_SCC_TMPPORT2_HS400OSEL) | sd_scc_read32(host, priv, SH_MOBILE_SDHI_SCC_TMPPORT2)); -/* Set the sampling clock selection range of HS400 mode */ sd_scc_write32 (host, priv,SH_MOBILE_SDHI_SCC_DTCNTL ,SH_MOBILE_SDHI_SCC_DTCNTL_TAPEN | -0x4 <<SH_MOBILE_SDHI_SCC_DTCNTL_TAPNUM_SHIFT ); +sd_scc_read32 (host, priv, +SH_MOBILE_SDHI_SCC_DTCNTL ));/* Avoid bad TAP */ if (bad_taps &BIT (priv->tap_set)) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 213/277 mmc: core: Fixup support for writeback-cache for eMMC and SD
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Michael Wu <[email protected]>
commit 08ebf903af57cda6d773f3dd1671b64f73b432b8 upstream.
During the card initialization process, the mmc core checks whether the eMMC/SD card supports an internal writeback-cache and then enables it inside the card.
Unfortunately, this isn't according to what the mmc core reports to the upper block layer. Instead, the writeback-cache support with REQ_FLUSH and REQ_FUA, are being enabled depending on whether the host supports the CMD23 (MMC_CAP_CMD23) and whether an eMMC supports the reliable-write command.
This is wrong and it may also sound awkward. In fact, it's a remnant from when both eMMC/SD cards didn't have dedicated commands/support to control the internal writeback-cache. In other words, it was the best we could do at that point in time.
To fix the problem, but also without breaking backwards compatibility, let's align the REQ_FLUSH support with whether the writeback-cache became successfully enabled - for both eMMC and SD cards.
Depends-on: 97fce126e279 ("mmc: block: Issue a cache flush only when it's enabled")
--- drivers/mmc/core/block.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/core/block.c +9 -3
@@ -2376,6 +2376,8 @@ static struct mmc_blk_data *mmc_blk_allostruct mmc_blk_data *md;int devidx, ret;char cap_str[10 ]; +bool cache_enabled = false; +bool fua_enabled = false; devidx =ida_simple_get (&mmc_blk_ida,0 , max_devices,GFP_KERNEL );if (devidx <0 ) {
@@ -2457,13 +2459,17 @@ static struct mmc_blk_data *mmc_blk_allo md->flags |=MMC_BLK_CMD23 ; } -if (mmc_card_mmc (card) && - md->flags &MMC_BLK_CMD23 && +if (md->flags &MMC_BLK_CMD23 && ((card->ext_csd.rel_param &EXT_CSD_WR_REL_PARAM_EN ) || card->ext_csd.rel_sectors)) { md->flags |=MMC_BLK_REL_WR ; -blk_queue_write_cache (md->queue.queue, true, true); + fua_enabled = true; + cache_enabled = true; } +if (mmc_cache_enabled (card->host)) + cache_enabled = true; + +blk_queue_write_cache (md->queue.queue, cache_enabled, fua_enabled);string_get_size ((u64 )size,512 ,STRING_UNITS_2 , cap_str,sizeof (cap_str));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 214/277 lz4: fix LZ4_decompress_safe_partial read out of bound
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Guo Xuenan <[email protected]>
commit eafc0a02391b7b36617b36c97c4b5d6832cf5e24 upstream.
When partialDecoding, it is EOF if we've either filled the output buffer or can't proceed with reading an offset for following match.
In some extreme corner cases when compressed data is suitably corrupted, UAF will occur. As reported by KASAN [1], LZ4_decompress_safe_partial may lead to read out of bound problem during decoding. lz4 upstream has fixed it [2] and this issue has been disscussed here [3] before.
current decompression routine was ported from lz4 v1.8.3, bumping lib/lz4 to v1.9.+ is certainly a huge work to be done later, so, we'd better fix it first.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2] https://github.com/lz4/lz4/commit/c5d6f8a8be3927c0bec91bcc58667a6cfad244ad#
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
--- lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
lib/lz4/lz4_decompress.c +6 -2
@@ -271,8 +271,12 @@ static FORCE_INLINE int LZ4_decompress_g ip += length; op += length; -/* Necessarily EOF, due to parsing restrictions */ -if (!partialDecoding || (cpy == oend)) +/* Necessarily EOF when !partialDecoding. +* When partialDecoding, it is EOF if we've either +* filled the output buffer or +* can't proceed with reading an offset for following match. +*/ +if (!partialDecoding || (cpy == oend) || (ip >= (iend -2 )))break ; }else {/* may overwrite up to WILDCOPYLENGTH beyond cpy */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 215/277 highmem: fix checks in __kmap_local_sched_{in,out}
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Max Filippov <[email protected]>
commit 66f133ceab7456c789f70a242991ed1b27ba1c3d upstream.
When CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL is enabled __kmap_local_sched_{in,out} check that even slots in the tsk->kmap_ctrl.pteval are unmapped. The slots are initialized with 0 value, but the check is done with pte_none. 0 pte however does not necessarily mean that pte_none will return true. e.g. on xtensa it returns false, resulting in the following runtime warnings:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:627 __kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108 CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xc/0x40 __warn+0x8f/0x174 warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac __kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108 __schedule+0x71a/0x9c4 preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0 common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93 do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330 handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4 common_exception+0x7f/0x7f WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:664 __kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0 CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xc/0x40 __warn+0x8f/0x174 warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac __kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0 finish_task_switch$isra$0+0x1ce/0x2f8 __schedule+0x86e/0x9c4 preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0 common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93 do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330 handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4 common_exception+0x7f/0x7f
Fix it by replacing !pte_none(pteval) with pte_val(pteval) != 0.
--- mm/highmem.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/highmem.c +2 -2
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ void __kmap_local_sched_out(void)/* With debug all even slots are unmapped and act as guard */ if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL ) && !(i &0x01 )) { -WARN_ON_ONCE (!pte_none (pteval)); +WARN_ON_ONCE (pte_val (pteval) !=0 );continue ; }if (WARN_ON_ONCE (pte_none (pteval)))
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ void __kmap_local_sched_in(void)/* With debug all even slots are unmapped and act as guard */ if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL ) && !(i &0x01 )) { -WARN_ON_ONCE (!pte_none (pteval)); +WARN_ON_ONCE (pte_val (pteval) !=0 );continue ; }if (WARN_ON_ONCE (pte_none (pteval)))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 216/277 mmmremap.c: avoid pointless invalidate_range_start/end on mremap(old_size=0)
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
commit 01e67e04c28170c47700c2c226d732bbfedb1ad0 upstream.
If an mremap() syscall with old_size=0 ends up in move_page_tables(), it will call invalidate_range_start()/invalidate_range_end() unnecessarily, i.e. with an empty range.
This causes a WARN in KVM's mmu_notifier. In the past, empty ranges have been diagnosed to be off-by-one bugs, hence the WARNing. Given the low (so far) number of unique reports, the benefits of detecting more buggy callers seem to outweigh the cost of having to fix cases such as this one, where userspace is doing something silly. In this particular case, an early return from move_page_tables() is enough to fix the issue.
--- mm/mremap.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
mm/mremap.c +3 -0
@@ -486,6 +486,9 @@ unsigned long move_page_tables(struct vmpmd_t *old_pmd, *new_pmd;pud_t *old_pud, *new_pud; +if (!len) +return 0 ; + old_end = old_addr + len;flush_cache_range (vma, old_addr, old_end);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 217/277 mm/mempolicy: fix mpol_new leak in shared_policy_replace
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
commit 4ad099559b00ac01c3726e5c95dc3108ef47d03e upstream.
If mpol_new is allocated but not used in restart loop, mpol_new will be freed via mpol_put before returning to the caller. But refcnt is not initialized yet, so mpol_put could not do the right things and might leak the unused mpol_new. This would happen if mempolicy was updated on the shared shmem file while the sp->lock has been dropped during the memory allocation.
This issue could be triggered easily with the below code snippet if there are many processes doing the below work at the same time:
shmid = shmget((key_t)5566, 1024 * PAGE_SIZE, 0666|IPC_CREAT);
shm = shmat(shmid, 0, 0);
loop many times {
mbind(shm, 1024 * PAGE_SIZE, MPOL_LOCAL, mask, maxnode, 0);
mbind(shm + 128 * PAGE_SIZE, 128 * PAGE_SIZE, MPOL_DEFAULT, mask,
maxnode, 0);
}--- mm/mempolicy.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
mm/mempolicy.c +1 -0
@@ -2561,6 +2561,7 @@ alloc_new: mpol_new =kmem_cache_alloc (policy_cache,GFP_KERNEL );if (!mpol_new) goto err_out; +atomic_set (&mpol_new->refcnt,1 ); goto restart; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 218/277 io_uring: dont check req->file in io_fsync_prep()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
commit ec858afda857e361182ceafc3d2ba2b164b8e889 upstream.
This is a leftover from the really old days where we weren't able to track and error early if we need a file and it wasn't assigned. Kill the check.
--- fs/io_uring.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
fs/io_uring.c +0 -3
@@ -4128,9 +4128,6 @@ static int io_fsync_prep(struct io_kiocb {struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = req->ctx; -if (!req->file) -return -EBADF ; -if (unlikely (ctx->flags &IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL ))return -EINVAL ; if (unlikely(sqe->addr || sqe->ioprio || sqe->buf_index ||
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 219/277 io_uring: defer splice/tee file validity check until command issue
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
commit a3e4bc23d5470b2beb7cc42a86b6a3e75b704c15 upstream.
In preparation for not using the file at prep time, defer checking if this file refers to a valid io_uring instance until issue time.
This also means we can get rid of the cleanup flag for splice and tee.
--- fs/io_uring.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
fs/io_uring.c +21 -28
@@ -623,10 +623,10 @@ struct io_epoll {struct io_splice {struct file *file_out; -struct file *file_in;loff_t off_out;loff_t off_in;u64 len; +int splice_fd_in;unsigned int flags; };
@@ -1452,14 +1452,6 @@ static void io_prep_async_work(struct ioif (def->unbound_nonreg_file) req->work.flags |=IO_WQ_WORK_UNBOUND ; } - -switch (req->opcode) { -case IORING_OP_SPLICE : -case IORING_OP_TEE : -if (!S_ISREG (file_inode (req->splice.file_in)->i_mode)) - req->work.flags |=IO_WQ_WORK_UNBOUND ; -break ; - } }static void io_prep_async_link (struct io_kiocb *req)
@@ -4027,18 +4019,11 @@ static int __io_splice_prep(struct io_kiif (unlikely (req->ctx->flags &IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL ))return -EINVAL ; - sp->file_in =NULL ; sp->len =READ_ONCE (sqe->len); sp->flags =READ_ONCE (sqe->splice_flags); -if (unlikely (sp->flags & ~valid_flags))return -EINVAL ; - - sp->file_in =io_file_get (req->ctx, req,READ_ONCE (sqe->splice_fd_in), - (sp->flags &SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED )); -if (!sp->file_in) -return -EBADF ; - req->flags |=REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP ; + sp->splice_fd_in =READ_ONCE (sqe->splice_fd_in);return 0 ; }
@@ -4053,20 +4038,27 @@ static int io_tee_prep(struct io_kiocb *static int io_tee (struct io_kiocb *req,unsigned int issue_flags) {struct io_splice *sp = &req->splice; -struct file *in = sp->file_in;struct file *out = sp->file_out;unsigned int flags = sp->flags & ~SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED ; +struct file *in;long ret =0 ;if (issue_flags &IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK )return -EAGAIN ; + + in =io_file_get (req->ctx, req, sp->splice_fd_in, + (sp->flags &SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED )); +if (!in) { + ret = -EBADF ; + goto done; + } +if (sp->len) ret =do_tee (in, out, sp->len, flags);if (!(sp->flags &SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED ))io_put_file (in); - req->flags &= ~REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP ; - +done:if (ret != sp->len)req_set_fail (req);io_req_complete (req, ret);
@@ -4085,15 +4077,22 @@ static int io_splice_prep(struct io_kiocstatic int io_splice (struct io_kiocb *req,unsigned int issue_flags) {struct io_splice *sp = &req->splice; -struct file *in = sp->file_in;struct file *out = sp->file_out;unsigned int flags = sp->flags & ~SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED ;loff_t *poff_in, *poff_out; +struct file *in;long ret =0 ;if (issue_flags &IO_URING_F_NONBLOCK )return -EAGAIN ; + in =io_file_get (req->ctx, req, sp->splice_fd_in, + (sp->flags &SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED )); +if (!in) { + ret = -EBADF ; + goto done; + } + poff_in = (sp->off_in ==-1 ) ?NULL : &sp->off_in; poff_out = (sp->off_out ==-1 ) ?NULL : &sp->off_out;
@@ -4102,8 +4101,7 @@ static int io_splice(struct io_kiocb *reif (!(sp->flags &SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED ))io_put_file (in); - req->flags &= ~REQ_F_NEED_CLEANUP ; - +done:if (ret != sp->len)req_set_fail (req);io_req_complete (req, ret);
@@ -6649,11 +6647,6 @@ static void io_clean_op(struct io_kiocbkfree (io->free_iov);break ; } -case IORING_OP_SPLICE : -case IORING_OP_TEE : -if (!(req->splice.flags &SPLICE_F_FD_IN_FIXED )) -io_put_file (req->splice.file_in); -break ;case IORING_OP_OPENAT :case IORING_OP_OPENAT2 :if (req->open.filename)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 220/277 io_uring: implement compat handling for IORING_REGISTER_IOWQ_AFF
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
commit 0f5e4b83b37a96e3643951588ed7176b9b187c0a upstream.
Similarly to the way it is done im mbind syscall.
--- fs/io_uring.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/io_uring.c +9 -1
@@ -10683,7 +10683,15 @@ static int io_register_iowq_aff(struct iif (len >cpumask_size ()) len =cpumask_size (); -if (copy_from_user (new_mask, arg, len)) { +if (in_compat_syscall ()) { + ret =compat_get_bitmap (cpumask_bits (new_mask), + (const compat_ulong_t __user *)arg, + len *8 /* CHAR_BIT */ ); + }else { + ret =copy_from_user (new_mask, arg, len); + } + +if (ret) {free_cpumask_var (new_mask);return -EFAULT ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 221/277 io_uring: fix race between timeout flush and removal
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
commit e677edbcabee849bfdd43f1602bccbecf736a646 upstream.
io_flush_timeouts() assumes the timeout isn't in progress of triggering or being removed/canceled, so it unconditionally removes it from the timeout list and attempts to cancel it.
Leave it on the list and let the normal timeout cancelation take care of it.
--- fs/io_uring.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/io_uring.c +3 -4
@@ -1538,12 +1538,11 @@ static void io_flush_timeouts(struct io_ __must_hold(&ctx->completion_lock) {u32 seq = ctx->cached_cq_tail -atomic_read (&ctx->cq_timeouts); +struct io_kiocb *req, *tmp;spin_lock_irq (&ctx->timeout_lock); -while (!list_empty (&ctx->timeout_list)) { +list_for_each_entry_safe (req, tmp, &ctx->timeout_list, timeout.list) {u32 events_needed, events_got; -struct io_kiocb *req =list_first_entry (&ctx->timeout_list, - struct io_kiocb, timeout.list);if (io_is_timeout_noseq (req))break ;
@@ -1560,7 +1559,6 @@ static void io_flush_timeouts(struct io_if (events_got < events_needed)break ; -list_del_init (&req->timeout.list);io_kill_timeout (req,0 ); } ctx->cq_last_tm_flush = seq;
@@ -6205,6 +6203,7 @@ static int io_timeout_prep(struct io_kioif (get_timespec64 (&data->ts,u64_to_user_ptr (sqe->addr)))return -EFAULT ; +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&req->timeout.list); data->mode =io_translate_timeout_mode (flags);hrtimer_init (&data->timer,io_timeout_get_clock (data), data->mode);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 222/277 x86/pm: Save the MSR validity status at context setup
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
commit 73924ec4d560257004d5b5116b22a3647661e364 upstream.
The mechanism to save/restore MSRs during S3 suspend/resume checks for the MSR validity during suspend, and only restores the MSR if its a valid MSR. This is not optimal, as an invalid MSR will unnecessarily throw an exception for every suspend cycle. The more invalid MSRs, higher the impact will be.
Check and save the MSR validity at setup. This ensures that only valid MSRs that are guaranteed to not throw an exception will be attempted during suspend.
--- arch/x86/power/cpu.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/power/cpu.c +5 -2
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ static void msr_save_context(struct savestruct saved_msr *end = msr + ctxt->saved_msrs.num;while (msr < end) { - msr->valid = !rdmsrl_safe (msr->info.msr_no, &msr->info.reg.q); +if (msr->valid) +rdmsrl (msr->info.msr_no, msr->info.reg.q); msr++; } }
@@ -424,8 +425,10 @@ static int msr_build_context(const u32 * }for (i = saved_msrs->num, j =0 ; i < total_num; i++, j++) { +u64 dummy; + msr_array[i].info.msr_no = msr_id[j]; - msr_array[i].valid = false; + msr_array[i].valid = !rdmsrl_safe (msr_id[j], &dummy); msr_array[i].info.reg.q =0 ; } saved_msrs->num = total_num;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 223/277 x86/speculation: Restore speculation related MSRs during S3 resume
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
commit e2a1256b17b16f9b9adf1b6fea56819e7b68e463 upstream.
After resuming from suspend-to-RAM, the MSRs that control CPU's speculative execution behavior are not being restored on the boot CPU.
These MSRs are used to mitigate speculative execution vulnerabilities. Not restoring them correctly may leave the CPU vulnerable. Secondary CPU's MSRs are correctly being restored at S3 resume by identify_secondary_cpu().
During S3 resume, restore these MSRs for boot CPU when restoring its processor state.
--- arch/x86/power/cpu.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
arch/x86/power/cpu.c +14 -0
@@ -503,10 +503,24 @@ static int pm_cpu_check(const struct x86return ret; } +static void pm_save_spec_msr (void ) +{ +u32 spec_msr_id[] = { +MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL , +MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL , +MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT , +MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL , +MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG , + }; + +msr_build_context (spec_msr_id,ARRAY_SIZE (spec_msr_id)); +} +static int pm_check_save_msr (void ) {dmi_check_system (msr_save_dmi_table);pm_cpu_check (msr_save_cpu_table); +pm_save_spec_msr ();return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 224/277 perf/x86/intel: Update the FRONTEND MSR mask on Sapphire Rapids
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
commit e590928de7547454469693da9bc7ffd562e54b7e upstream.
On Sapphire Rapids, the FRONTEND_RETIRED.MS_FLOWS event requires the FRONTEND MSR value 0x8. However, the current FRONTEND MSR mask doesn't support it.
Update intel_spr_extra_regs[] to support it.
--- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +1 -1
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static struct extra_reg intel_spr_extra_INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x012a ,MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0 ,0x3fffffffffull ,RSP_0 ),INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x012b ,MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_1 ,0x3fffffffffull ,RSP_1 ),INTEL_UEVENT_PEBS_LDLAT_EXTRA_REG (0x01cd ), -INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x01c6 ,MSR_PEBS_FRONTEND ,0x7fff17 ,FE ), +INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x01c6 ,MSR_PEBS_FRONTEND ,0x7fff1f ,FE ),INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x40ad ,MSR_PEBS_FRONTEND ,0x7 ,FE ),INTEL_UEVENT_EXTRA_REG (0x04c2 ,MSR_PEBS_FRONTEND ,0x8 ,FE ),EVENT_EXTRA_END
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 225/277 btrfs: fix qgroup reserve overflow the qgroup limit
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ethan Lien <[email protected]>
commit b642b52d0b50f4d398cb4293f64992d0eed2e2ce upstream.
We use extent_changeset->bytes_changed in qgroup_reserve_data() to record how many bytes we set for EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED state. Currently the bytes_changed is set as "unsigned int", and it will overflow if we try to fallocate a range larger than 4GiB. The result is we reserve less bytes and eventually break the qgroup limit.
Unlike regular buffered/direct write, which we use one changeset for each ordered extent, which can never be larger than 256M. For fallocate, we use one changeset for the whole range, thus it no longer respects the 256M per extent limit, and caused the problem.
The following example test script reproduces the problem:
$ cat qgroup-overflow.sh #!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdj
MNT=/mnt/sdj
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
# Set qgroup limit to 2GiB.
btrfs quota enable $MNT
btrfs qgroup limit 2G $MNT
# Try to fallocate a 3GiB file. This should fail. echo
echo "Try to fallocate a 3GiB file..." fallocate -l 3G $MNT/3G.file
# Try to fallocate a 5GiB file.
echo
echo "Try to fallocate a 5GiB file..."
fallocate -l 5G $MNT/5G.file
# See we break the qgroup limit.
echo
sync
btrfs qgroup show -r $MNT
umount $MNT
When running the test:
$ ./qgroup-overflow.sh (...)
Try to fallocate a 3GiB file...
fallocate: fallocate failed: Disk quota exceeded
Try to fallocate a 5GiB file...
qgroupid rfer excl max_rfer
-------- ---- ---- --------
0/5 5.00GiB 5.00GiB 2.00GiB
Since we have no control of how bytes_changed is used, it's better to set it to u64.
--- fs/btrfs/extent_io.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/extent_io.h +1 -1
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ struct btrfs_bio_ctrl {*/ struct extent_changeset {/* How many bytes are set/cleared in this operation */ -unsigned int bytes_changed; +u64 bytes_changed;/* Changed ranges */ struct ulist range_changed;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 226/277 btrfs: prevent subvol with swapfile from being deleted
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kaiwen Hu <[email protected]>
commit 60021bd754c6ca0addc6817994f20290a321d8d6 upstream.
A subvolume with an active swapfile must not be deleted otherwise it would not be possible to deactivate it.
After the subvolume is deleted, we cannot swapoff the swapfile in this deleted subvolume because the path is unreachable. The swapfile is still active and holding references, the filesystem cannot be unmounted.
The test looks like this:
mkfs.btrfs -f $dev > /dev/null
mount $dev $mnt
btrfs sub create $mnt/subvol
touch $mnt/subvol/swapfile
chmod 600 $mnt/subvol/swapfile
chattr +C $mnt/subvol/swapfile
dd if=/dev/zero of=$mnt/subvol/swapfile bs=1K count=4096 mkswap $mnt/subvol/swapfile
swapon $mnt/subvol/swapfile
btrfs sub delete $mnt/subvol
swapoff $mnt/subvol/swapfile # failed: No such file or directory swapoff --all
unmount $mnt # target is busy.
To prevent above issue, we simply check that whether the subvolume contains any active swapfile, and stop the deleting process. This behavior is like snapshot ioctl dealing with a swapfile.
--- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/inode.c +23 -1
@@ -4450,6 +4450,13 @@ int btrfs_delete_subvolume(struct inode dest->root_key.objectid);return -EPERM ; } +if (atomic_read (&dest->nr_swapfiles)) { +spin_unlock (&dest->root_item_lock); +btrfs_warn (fs_info, +"attempt to delete subvolume %llu with active swapfile" , + root->root_key.objectid); +return -EPERM ; + } root_flags =btrfs_root_flags (&dest->root_item);btrfs_set_root_flags (&dest->root_item, root_flags |BTRFS_ROOT_SUBVOL_DEAD );
@@ -10721,8 +10728,23 @@ static int btrfs_swap_activate(struct sw* set. We use this counter to prevent snapshots. We must increment it * before walking the extents because we don't want a concurrent * snapshot to run after we've already checked the extents. -*/ +* +* It is possible that subvolume is marked for deletion but still not +* removed yet. To prevent this race, we check the root status before +* activating the swapfile. +*/ +spin_lock (&root->root_item_lock); +if (btrfs_root_dead (root)) { +spin_unlock (&root->root_item_lock); + +btrfs_exclop_finish (fs_info); +btrfs_warn (fs_info, +"cannot activate swapfile because subvolume %llu is being deleted" , + root->root_key.objectid); +return -EPERM ; + }atomic_inc (&root->nr_swapfiles); +spin_unlock (&root->root_item_lock); isize =ALIGN_DOWN (inode->i_size, fs_info->sectorsize);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 227/277 spi: core: add dma_map_dev for __spi_unmap_msg()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
commit 409543cec01a84610029d6440c480c3fdd7214fb upstream.
Commit b470e10eb43f ("spi: core: add dma_map_dev for dma device") added dma_map_dev for _spi_map_msg() but missed to add for unmap routine, __spi_unmap_msg(), so add it now.
--- drivers/spi/spi.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/spi/spi.c +4 -0
@@ -1072,11 +1072,15 @@ static int __spi_unmap_msg(struct spi_coif (ctlr->dma_tx) tx_dev = ctlr->dma_tx->device->dev; +else if (ctlr->dma_map_dev) + tx_dev = ctlr->dma_map_dev;else tx_dev = ctlr->dev.parent;if (ctlr->dma_rx) rx_dev = ctlr->dma_rx->device->dev; +else if (ctlr->dma_map_dev) + rx_dev = ctlr->dma_map_dev;else rx_dev = ctlr->dev.parent;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 228/277 arm64: patch_text: Fixup last cpu should be master
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Guo Ren <[email protected]>
commit 31a099dbd91e69fcab55eef4be15ed7a8c984918 upstream.
These patch_text implementations are using stop_machine_cpuslocked infrastructure with atomic cpu_count. The original idea: When the master CPU patch_text, the others should wait for it. But current implementation is using the first CPU as master, which couldn't guarantee the remaining CPUs are waiting. This patch changes the last CPU as the master to solve the potential risk.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/patching.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/patching.c +2 -2
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ static int __kprobes aarch64_insn_patch_int i, ret =0 ;struct aarch64_insn_patch *pp = arg; -/* The first CPU becomes master */ -if (atomic_inc_return (&pp->cpu_count) ==1 ) { +/* The last CPU becomes master */ +if (atomic_inc_return (&pp->cpu_count) ==num_online_cpus ()) {for (i =0 ; ret ==0 && i < pp->insn_cnt; i++) ret =aarch64_insn_patch_text_nosync (pp->text_addrs[i], pp->new_insns[i]);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 229/277 RDMA/hfi1: Fix use-after-free bug for mm struct
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Douglas Miller <[email protected]>
commit 2bbac98d0930e8161b1957dc0ec99de39ade1b3c upstream.
Under certain conditions, such as MPI_Abort, the hfi1 cleanup code may represent the last reference held on the task mm. hfi1_mmu_rb_unregister() then drops the last reference and the mm is freed before the final use in hfi1_release_user_pages(). A new task may allocate the mm structure while it is still being used, resulting in problems. One manifestation is corruption of the mmap_sem counter leading to a hang in down_write(). Another is corruption of an mm struct that is in use by another task.
--- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/mmu_rb.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/mmu_rb.c +6 -0
@@ -80,6 +80,9 @@ void hfi1_mmu_rb_unregister(struct mmu_runsigned long flags;struct list_head del_list; +/* Prevent freeing of mm until we are completely finished. */ +mmgrab (handler->mn.mm); +/* Unregister first so we don't get any more notifications. */ mmu_notifier_unregister (&handler->mn, handler->mn.mm);
@@ -102,6 +105,9 @@ void hfi1_mmu_rb_unregister(struct mmu_rdo_remove (handler, &del_list); +/* Now the mm may be freed. */ +mmdrop (handler->mn.mm); +kfree (handler); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 230/277 gpio: Restrict usage of GPIO chip irq members before initialization
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Shreeya Patel <[email protected]>
commit 5467801f1fcbdc46bc7298a84dbf3ca1ff2a7320 upstream.
GPIO chip irq members are exposed before they could be completely initialized and this leads to race conditions.
One such issue was observed for the gc->irq.domain variable which was accessed through the I2C interface in gpiochip_to_irq() before it could be initialized by gpiochip_add_irqchip(). This resulted in Kernel NULL pointer dereference.
Following are the logs for reference :-
kernel: Call Trace: kernel: gpiod_to_irq+0x53/0x70 kernel: acpi_dev_gpio_irq_get_by+0x113/0x1f0 kernel: i2c_acpi_get_irq+0xc0/0xd0 kernel: i2c_device_probe+0x28a/0x2a0 kernel: really_probe+0xf2/0x460 kernel: RIP: 0010:gpiochip_to_irq+0x47/0xc0
To avoid such scenarios, restrict usage of GPIO chip irq members before they are completely initialized.
--- drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/gpio/driver.h | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c +19 -0
@@ -1368,6 +1368,16 @@ static int gpiochip_to_irq(struct gpio_c {struct irq_domain *domain = gc->irq.domain; +#ifdef CONFIG_GPIOLIB_IRQCHIP +/* +* Avoid race condition with other code, which tries to lookup +* an IRQ before the irqchip has been properly registered, +* i.e. while gpiochip is still being brought up. +*/ +if (!gc->irq.initialized) +return -EPROBE_DEFER ; +#endif +if (!gpiochip_irqchip_irq_valid (gc, offset))return -ENXIO ;
@@ -1552,6 +1562,15 @@ static int gpiochip_add_irqchip(struct gacpi_gpiochip_request_interrupts (gc); +/* +* Using barrier() here to prevent compiler from reordering +* gc->irq.initialized before initialization of above +* GPIO chip irq members. +*/ +barrier (); + + gc->irq.initialized = true; +return 0 ; }
include/linux/gpio/driver.h +9 -0
@@ -225,6 +225,15 @@ struct gpio_irq_chip { unsigned int ngpios);/** +* @initialized: +* +* Flag to track GPIO chip irq member's initialization. +* This flag will make sure GPIO chip irq members are not used +* before they are initialized. +*/ +bool initialized; + +/** * @valid_mask: * * If not %NULL, holds bitmask of GPIOs which are valid to be included
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 231/277 x86/msi: Fix msi message data shadow struct
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Reto Buerki <[email protected]>
commit 59b18a1e65b7a2134814106d0860010e10babe18 upstream.
The x86 MSI message data is 32 bits in total and is either in compatibility or remappable format, see Intel Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O, section 5.1.2.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/msi.h | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/msi.h +11 -8
@@ -12,14 +12,17 @@ int pci_msi_prepare(struct irq_domain *d/* Structs and defines for the X86 specific MSI message format */ typedef struct x86_msi_data { -u32 vector :8 , - delivery_mode :3 , - dest_mode_logical :1 , - reserved :2 , - active_low :1 , - is_level :1 ; - -u32 dmar_subhandle; +union { +struct { +u32 vector :8 , + delivery_mode :3 , + dest_mode_logical :1 , + reserved :2 , + active_low :1 , + is_level :1 ; + }; +u32 dmar_subhandle; + }; } __attribute__ ((packed))arch_msi_msg_data_t ;#define arch_msi_msg_data x86_msi_data
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 232/277 x86/mm/tlb: Revert retpoline avoidance approach
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
commit d39268ad24c0fd0665d0c5cf55a7c1a0ebf94766 upstream.
0day reported a regression on a microbenchmark which is intended to stress the TLB flushing path:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220317090415.GE735@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
It pointed at a commit from Nadav which intended to remove retpoline overhead in the TLB flushing path by taking the 'cond'-ition in on_each_cpu_cond_mask(), pre-calculating it, and incorporating it into 'cpumask'. That allowed the code to use a bunch of earlier direct calls instead of later indirect calls that need a retpoline.
But, in practice, threads can go idle (and into lazy TLB mode where they don't need to flush their TLB) between the early and late calls. It works in this direction and not in the other because TLB-flushing threads tend to hold mmap_lock for write. Contention on that lock causes threads to _go_ idle right in this early/late window.
There was not any performance data in the original commit specific to the retpoline overhead. I did a few tests on a system with retpolines:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
which showed a possible small win. But, that small win pales in comparison with the bigger loss induced on non-retpoline systems.
Revert the patch that removed the retpolines. This was not a clean revert, but it was self-contained enough not to be too painful.
--- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 37 +++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +5 -32
@@ -854,13 +854,11 @@ done: nr_invalidate); } -static bool tlb_is_not_lazy (int cpu) +static bool tlb_is_not_lazy (int cpu,void *data) {return !per_cpu (cpu_tlbstate_shared.is_lazy, cpu); } -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(cpumask_t, flush_tlb_mask); - DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tlb_state_shared, cpu_tlbstate_shared);EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL (cpu_tlbstate_shared);
@@ -889,36 +887,11 @@ STATIC_NOPV void native_flush_tlb_multi(* up on the new contents of what used to be page tables, while * doing a speculative memory access. */ -if (info->freed_tables) { +if (info->freed_tables)on_each_cpu_mask (cpumask, flush_tlb_func, (void *)info, true); - }else { -/* -* Although we could have used on_each_cpu_cond_mask(), -* open-coding it has performance advantages, as it eliminates -* the need for indirect calls or retpolines. In addition, it -* allows to use a designated cpumask for evaluating the -* condition, instead of allocating one. -* -* This code works under the assumption that there are no nested -* TLB flushes, an assumption that is already made in -* flush_tlb_mm_range(). -* -* cond_cpumask is logically a stack-local variable, but it is -* more efficient to have it off the stack and not to allocate -* it on demand. Preemption is disabled and this code is -* non-reentrant. -*/ -struct cpumask *cond_cpumask =this_cpu_ptr (&flush_tlb_mask); -int cpu; - -cpumask_clear (cond_cpumask); - -for_each_cpu (cpu, cpumask) { -if (tlb_is_not_lazy (cpu)) -__cpumask_set_cpu (cpu, cond_cpumask); - } -on_each_cpu_mask (cond_cpumask, flush_tlb_func, (void *)info, true); - } +else +on_each_cpu_cond_mask (tlb_is_not_lazy, flush_tlb_func, + (void *)info,1 , cpumask); } void flush_tlb_multi(const struct cpumask *cpumask,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 233/277 perf/x86/intel: Dont extend the pseudo-encoding to GP counters
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kan Liang <[email protected]>
commit 4a263bf331c512849062805ef1b4ac40301a9829 upstream.
The INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST event (0x0100) doesn't count on SPR. perf stat -e cpu/event=0xc0,umask=0x0/,cpu/event=0x0,umask=0x1/ -C0
Performance counter stats for 'CPU(s) 0':
607,246 cpu/event=0xc0,umask=0x0/
0 cpu/event=0x0,umask=0x1/The encoding for INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST is pseudo-encoding, which doesn't work on the generic counters. However, current perf extends its mask to the generic counters.
The pseudo event-code for a fixed counter must be 0x00. Check and avoid extending the mask for the fixed counter event which using the pseudo-encoding, e.g., ref-cycles and PREC_DIST event.
With the patch,
perf stat -e cpu/event=0xc0,umask=0x0/,cpu/event=0x0,umask=0x1/ -C0
Performance counter stats for 'CPU(s) 0':
583,184 cpu/event=0xc0,umask=0x0/
583,048 cpu/event=0x0,umask=0x1/--- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 6 +++++- arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +5 -1
@@ -5466,7 +5466,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_check_event_constr/* Disabled fixed counters which are not in CPUID */ c->idxmsk64 &= intel_ctrl; -if (c->idxmsk64 !=INTEL_PMC_MSK_FIXED_REF_CYCLES ) +/* +* Don't extend the pseudo-encoding to the +* generic counters +*/ +if (!use_fixed_pseudo_encoding (c->code)) c->idxmsk64 |= (1ULL << num_counters) -1 ; } c->idxmsk64 &=
arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h +5 -0
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ struct x86_pmu_capability {#define INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_SLOTS (INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED + 3)#define INTEL_PMC_MSK_FIXED_SLOTS (1ULL << INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_SLOTS) +static inline bool use_fixed_pseudo_encoding (u64 code) +{ +return !(code &0xff ); +} +/* * We model BTS tracing as another fixed-mode PMC. *
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 234/277 ata: sata_dwc_460ex: Fix crash due to OOB write
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
commit 7aa8104a554713b685db729e66511b93d989dd6a upstream.
the driver uses libata's "tag" values from in various arrays. Since the mentioned patch bumped the ATA_TAG_INTERNAL to 32, the value of the SATA_DWC_QCMD_MAX needs to account for that.
Otherwise ATA_TAG_INTERNAL usage cause similar crashes like this as reported by Tice Rex on the OpenWrt Forum and reproduced (with symbols) here:
| BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000000 | Faulting instruction address: 0xc03ed4b8 | Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] | BE PAGE_SIZE=4K PowerPC 44x Platform | CPU: 0 PID: 362 Comm: scsi_eh_1 Not tainted 5.4.163 #0 | NIP: c03ed4b8 LR: c03d27e8 CTR: c03ed36c | REGS: cfa59950 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.4.163) | MSR: 00021000 <CE,ME> CR: 42000222 XER: 00000000 | DEAR: 00000000 ESR: 00000000 | GPR00: c03d27e8 cfa59a08 cfa55fe0 00000000 0fa46bc0 [...] | [..] | NIP [c03ed4b8] sata_dwc_qc_issue+0x14c/0x254 | LR [c03d27e8] ata_qc_issue+0x1c8/0x2dc | Call Trace: | [cfa59a08] [c003f4e0] __cancel_work_timer+0x124/0x194 (unreliable) | [cfa59a78] [c03d27e8] ata_qc_issue+0x1c8/0x2dc | [cfa59a98] [c03d2b3c] ata_exec_internal_sg+0x240/0x524 | [cfa59b08] [c03d2e98] ata_exec_internal+0x78/0xe0 | [cfa59b58] [c03d30fc] ata_read_log_page.part.38+0x1dc/0x204 | [cfa59bc8] [c03d324c] ata_identify_page_supported+0x68/0x130 | [...]
This is because sata_dwc_dma_xfer_complete() NULLs the dma_pending's next neighbour "chan" (a *dma_chan struct) in this '32' case right here (line ~735):
Quoted 1 line
hsdevp->dma_pending[tag] =
SATA_DWC_DMA_PENDING_NONE;
Then the next time, a dma gets issued; dma_dwc_xfer_setup() passes the NULL'd hsdevp->chan to the dmaengine_slave_config() which then causes the crash.
With this patch, SATA_DWC_QCMD_MAX is now set to ATA_MAX_QUEUE + 1. This avoids the OOB. But please note, there was a worthwhile discussion on what ATA_TAG_INTERNAL and ATA_MAX_QUEUE is. And why there should not be a "fake" 33 command-long queue size.
Ideally, the dw driver should account for the ATA_TAG_INTERNAL. In Damien Le Moal's words: "... having looked at the driver, it is a bigger change than just faking a 33rd "tag" that is in fact not a command tag at all."
--- drivers/ata/sata_dwc_460ex.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/ata/sata_dwc_460ex.c +5 -1
@@ -145,7 +145,11 @@ struct sata_dwc_device {#endif }; -#define SATA_DWC_QCMD_MAX 32 +/* +* Allow one extra special slot for commands and DMA management +* to account for libata internal commands. +*/ +#define SATA_DWC_QCMD_MAX (ATA_MAX_QUEUE + 1)struct sata_dwc_device_port {struct sata_dwc_device *hsdev;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 235/277 perf: qcom_l2_pmu: fix an incorrect NULL check on list iterator
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xiaomeng Tong <[email protected]>
commit 2012a9e279013933885983cbe0a5fe828052563b upstream.
The bug is here:
return cluster;
The list iterator value 'cluster' will *always* be set and non-NULL by list_for_each_entry(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator value will be NULL if the list is empty or no element is found.
To fix the bug, return 'cluster' when found, otherwise return NULL.
--- drivers/perf/qcom_l2_pmu.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/perf/qcom_l2_pmu.c +3 -3
@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ static struct cluster_pmu *l2_cache_asso {u64 mpidr;int cpu_cluster_id; -struct cluster_pmu *cluster =NULL ; +struct cluster_pmu *cluster;/* * This assumes that the cluster_id is in MPIDR[aff1] for
@@ -758,10 +758,10 @@ static struct cluster_pmu *l2_cache_asso cluster->cluster_id);cpumask_set_cpu (cpu, &cluster->cluster_cpus); *per_cpu_ptr (l2cache_pmu->pmu_cluster, cpu) = cluster; -break ; +return cluster; } -return cluster; +return NULL ; }static int l2cache_pmu_online_cpu (unsigned int cpu,struct hlist_node *node)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 236/277 perf/core: Inherit event_caps
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
commit e3265a4386428d3d157d9565bb520aabff8b4bf0 upstream.
It was reported that some perf event setup can make fork failed on ARM64. It was the case of a group of mixed hw and sw events and it failed in perf_event_init_task() due to armpmu_event_init().
The ARM PMU code checks if all the events in a group belong to the same PMU except for software events. But it didn't set the event_caps of inherited events and no longer identify them as software events. Therefore the test failed in a child process.
A simple reproducer is:
$ perf stat -e '{cycles,cs,instructions}' perf bench sched messaging
# Running 'sched/messaging' benchmark:
perf: fork(): Invalid argumentThe perf stat was fine but the perf bench failed in fork(). Let's inherit the event caps from the parent.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
kernel/events/core.c +3 -0
@@ -11596,6 +11596,9 @@ perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event_attr event->state =PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE ; +if (parent_event) + event->event_caps = parent_event->event_caps; +if (event->attr.sigtrap)atomic_set (&event->event_limit,1 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 237/277 irqchip/gic-v3: Fix GICR_CTLR.RWP polling
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
commit 0df6664531a12cdd8fc873f0cac0dcb40243d3e9 upstream.
It turns out that our polling of RWP is totally wrong when checking for it in the redistributors, as we test the *distributor* bit index, whereas it is a different bit number in the RDs... Oopsie boo.
This is embarassing. Not only because it is wrong, but also because it took *8 years* to notice the blunder...
Just fix the damn thing.
--- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c +4 -4
@@ -206,11 +206,11 @@ static inline void __iomem *gic_dist_bas } } -static void gic_do_wait_for_rwp (void __iomem *base) +static void gic_do_wait_for_rwp (void __iomem *base,u32 bit) {u32 count =1000000 ;/* 1s! */ -while (readl_relaxed (base +GICD_CTLR ) &GICD_CTLR_RWP ) { +while (readl_relaxed (base +GICD_CTLR ) & bit) { count--;if (!count) {pr_err_ratelimited ("RWP timeout, gone fishing\n" );
@@ -224,13 +224,13 @@ static void gic_do_wait_for_rwp(void __i/* Wait for completion of a distributor change */ static void gic_dist_wait_for_rwp (void ) { -gic_do_wait_for_rwp (gic_data.dist_base); +gic_do_wait_for_rwp (gic_data.dist_base,GICD_CTLR_RWP ); }/* Wait for completion of a redistributor change */ static void gic_redist_wait_for_rwp (void ) { -gic_do_wait_for_rwp (gic_data_rdist_rd_base ()); +gic_do_wait_for_rwp (gic_data_rdist_rd_base (),GICR_CTLR_RWP ); }#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 238/277 fbdev: Fix unregistering of framebuffers without device
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>
commit 0f525289ff0ddeb380813bd81e0f9bdaaa1c9078 upstream.
OF framebuffers do not have an underlying device in the Linux device hierarchy. Do a regular unregister call instead of hot unplugging such a non-existing device. Fixes a NULL dereference. An example error message on ppc64le is shown below.
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000060 Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000080dfa4 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries [...] CPU: 2 PID: 139 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.17.0-ae085d7f9365 #1 NIP: c00000000080dfa4 LR: c00000000080df9c CTR: c000000000797430 REGS: c000000004132fe0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.17.0-ae085d7f9365) MSR: 8000000002009033 <SF,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28228282 XER: 20000000 CFAR: c00000000000c80c DAR: 0000000000000060 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00000000080df9c c000000004133280 c00000000169d200 0000000000000029 GPR04: 00000000ffffefff c000000004132f90 c000000004132f88 0000000000000000 GPR08: c0000000015658f8 c0000000015cd200 c0000000014f57d0 0000000048228283 GPR12: 0000000000000000 c00000003fffe300 0000000020000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000113fc4a40 0000000000000005 0000000113fcfb80 GPR20: 000001000f7283b0 0000000000000000 c000000000e4a588 c000000000e4a5b0 GPR24: 0000000000000001 00000000000a0000 c008000000db0168 c0000000021f6ec0 GPR28: c0000000016d65a8 c000000004b36460 0000000000000000 c0000000016d64b0 NIP [c00000000080dfa4] do_remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x184/0x1d0 [c000000004133280] [c00000000080df9c] do_remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x17c/0x1d0 (unreliable) [c000000004133350] [c00000000080e4d0] remove_conflicting_framebuffers+0x60/0x150 [c0000000041333a0] [c00000000080e6f4] remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x134/0x1b0 [c000000004133450] [c008000000e70438] drm_aperture_remove_conflicting_pci_framebuffers+0x90/0x100 [drm] [c000000004133490] [c008000000da0ce4] bochs_pci_probe+0x6c/0xa64 [bochs] [...] [c000000004133db0] [c00000000002aaa0] system_call_exception+0x170/0x2d0 [c000000004133e10] [c00000000000c3cc] system_call_common+0xec/0x250
The bug [1] was introduced by commit 27599aacbaef ("fbdev: Hot-unplug firmware fb devices on forced removal"). Most firmware framebuffers have an underlying platform device, which can be hot-unplugged before loading the native graphics driver. OF framebuffers do not (yet) have that device. Fix the code by unregistering the framebuffer as before without a hot unplug.
Tested with 5.17 on qemu ppc64le emulation.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +8 -1
@@ -1581,7 +1581,14 @@ static void do_remove_conflicting_frameb* If it's not a platform device, at least print a warning. A * fix would add code to remove the device from the system. */ -if (dev_is_platform (device)) { +if (!device) { +/* TODO: Represent each OF framebuffer as its own +* device in the device hierarchy. For now, offb +* doesn't have such a device, so unregister the +* framebuffer as before without warning. +*/ +do_unregister_framebuffer (registered_fb[i]); + }else if (dev_is_platform (device)) { registered_fb[i]->forced_out = true;platform_device_unregister (to_platform_device (device)); }else {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 239/277 amd/display: set backlight only if required
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Shirish S <[email protected]>
commit 4052287a75eb3fc0f487fcc5f768a38bede455c8 upstream.
[Why]
comparing pwm bl values (coverted) with user brightness(converted) levels in commit_tail leads to continuous setting of backlight via dmub as they don't to match.
This leads overdrive in queuing of commands to DMCU that sometimes lead to depending on load on DMCU fw:
"[drm:dc_dmub_srv_wait_idle] *ERROR* Error waiting for DMUB idle: status=3"
[How]
Store last successfully set backlight value and compare with it instead of pwm reads which is not what we should compare with.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c | 7 ++++--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c +4 -3
@@ -3522,7 +3522,7 @@ static u32 convert_brightness_to_user(co max - min); } -static int amdgpu_dm_backlight_set_level (struct amdgpu_display_manager *dm, +static void amdgpu_dm_backlight_set_level (struct amdgpu_display_manager *dm,int bl_idx,u32 user_brightness) {
@@ -3550,7 +3550,8 @@ static int amdgpu_dm_backlight_set_levelDRM_DEBUG ("DM: Failed to update backlight on eDP[%d]\n" , bl_idx); } -return rc ?0 :1 ; +if (rc) + dm->actual_brightness[bl_idx] = user_brightness; }static int amdgpu_dm_backlight_update_status (struct backlight_device *bd)
@@ -9316,7 +9317,7 @@ static void amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail/* restore the backlight level */ for (i =0 ; i < dm->num_of_edps; i++) {if (dm->backlight_dev[i] && - (amdgpu_dm_backlight_get_level (dm, i) != dm->brightness[i])) + (dm->actual_brightness[i] != dm->brightness[i]))amdgpu_dm_backlight_set_level (dm, i, dm->brightness[i]); }#endif
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.h +6 -0
@@ -446,6 +446,12 @@ struct amdgpu_display_manager {* cached backlight values. */ u32 brightness[AMDGPU_DM_MAX_NUM_EDP ]; +/** +* @actual_brightness: +* +* last successfully applied backlight values. +*/ +u32 actual_brightness[AMDGPU_DM_MAX_NUM_EDP ]; };enum dsc_clock_force_state {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 240/277 SUNRPC: Prevent immediate close+reconnect
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
commit 3be232f11a3cc9b0ef0795e39fa11bdb8e422a06 upstream.
If we have already set up the socket and are waiting for it to connect, then don't immediately close and retry.
--- net/sunrpc/xprt.c | 3 ++- net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/xprt.c +2 -1
@@ -767,7 +767,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xprt_disconnect_done);*/ static void xprt_schedule_autoclose_locked (struct rpc_xprt *xprt) { -set_bit (XPRT_CLOSE_WAIT , &xprt->state); +if (test_and_set_bit (XPRT_CLOSE_WAIT , &xprt->state)) +return ;if (test_and_set_bit (XPRT_LOCKED , &xprt->state) ==0 )queue_work (xprtiod_workqueue, &xprt->task_cleanup);else if (xprt->snd_task && !test_bit (XPRT_SND_IS_COOKIE , &xprt->state))
net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +1 -1
@@ -2365,7 +2365,7 @@ static void xs_connect(struct rpc_xprt *WARN_ON_ONCE (!xprt_lock_connect (xprt, task, transport)); -if (transport->sock !=NULL ) { +if (transport->sock !=NULL && !xprt_connecting (xprt)) {dprintk ("RPC: xs_connect delayed xprt %p for %lu " "seconds\n" , xprt, xprt->reestablish_timeout /HZ );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 241/277 drm/panel: ili9341: fix optional regulator handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Daniel Mack <[email protected]>
commit d14eb80e27795b7b20060f7b151cdfe39722a813 upstream.
If the optional regulator lookup fails, reset the pointer to NULL. Other functions such as mipi_dbi_poweron_reset_conditional() only do a NULL pointer check and will otherwise dereference the error pointer.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-ilitek-ili9341.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-ilitek-ili9341.c +3 -1
@@ -612,8 +612,10 @@ static int ili9341_dbi_probe(struct spi_int ret; vcc =devm_regulator_get_optional (dev,"vcc" ); -if (IS_ERR (vcc)) +if (IS_ERR (vcc)) {dev_err (dev,"get optional vcc failed\n" ); + vcc =NULL ; + } dbidev =devm_drm_dev_alloc (dev, &ili9341_dbi_driver, struct mipi_dbi_dev, drm);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 242/277 drm/amdgpu/display: change pipe policy for DCN 2.1
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Benjamin Marty <[email protected]>
commit 879791ad8bf3dc5453061cad74776a617b6e3319 upstream.
Fixes crash on MST Hub disconnect.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn21/dcn21_resource.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn21/dcn21_resource.c +1 -1
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ static const struct dc_debug_options deb .clock_trace = true, .disable_pplib_clock_request = true, .min_disp_clk_khz = 100000, - .pipe_split_policy = MPC_SPLIT_DYNAMIC, + .pipe_split_policy = MPC_SPLIT_AVOID_MULT_DISP, .force_single_disp_pipe_split = false, .disable_dcc = DCC_ENABLE, .vsr_support = true,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 243/277 drm/amdgpu/smu10: fix SoC/fclk units in auto mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit 2f25d8ce09b7ba5d769c132ba3d4eb84a941d2cb upstream.
SMU takes clock limits in Mhz units. socclk and fclk were using 10 khz units in some cases. Switch to Mhz units. Fixes higher than required SoC clocks.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/smu10_hwmgr.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/smu10_hwmgr.c +4 -4
@@ -773,13 +773,13 @@ static int smu10_dpm_force_dpm_level(strsmum_send_msg_to_smc_with_parameter (hwmgr, PPSMC_MSG_SetHardMinFclkByFreq, hwmgr->display_config->num_display >3 ? - data->clock_vol_info.vdd_dep_on_fclk->entries[0 ].clk : + (data->clock_vol_info.vdd_dep_on_fclk->entries[0 ].clk /100 ) : min_mclk,NULL );smum_send_msg_to_smc_with_parameter (hwmgr, PPSMC_MSG_SetHardMinSocclkByFreq, - data->clock_vol_info.vdd_dep_on_socclk->entries[0 ].clk, + data->clock_vol_info.vdd_dep_on_socclk->entries[0 ].clk /100 ,NULL ); smum_send_msg_to_smc_with_parameter(hwmgr, PPSMC_MSG_SetHardMinVcn,
@@ -792,11 +792,11 @@ static int smu10_dpm_force_dpm_level(str NULL);smum_send_msg_to_smc_with_parameter (hwmgr, PPSMC_MSG_SetSoftMaxFclkByFreq, - data->clock_vol_info.vdd_dep_on_fclk->entries[index_fclk].clk, + data->clock_vol_info.vdd_dep_on_fclk->entries[index_fclk].clk /100 ,NULL );smum_send_msg_to_smc_with_parameter (hwmgr, PPSMC_MSG_SetSoftMaxSocclkByFreq, - data->clock_vol_info.vdd_dep_on_socclk->entries[index_socclk].clk, + data->clock_vol_info.vdd_dep_on_socclk->entries[index_socclk].clk /100 ,NULL ); smum_send_msg_to_smc_with_parameter(hwmgr, PPSMC_MSG_SetSoftMaxVcn,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 244/277 drm/amdgpu/vcn: Fix the register setting for vcn1
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Emily Deng <[email protected]>
commit 02fc996d5098f4c3f65bdf6cdb6b28e3f29ba789 upstream.
Correct the code error for setting register UVD_GFX10_ADDR_CONFIG. Need to use inst_idx, or it only will set VCN0.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v3_0.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/vcn_v3_0.c +2 -2
@@ -601,8 +601,8 @@ static void vcn_v3_0_mc_resume_dpg_mode( AMDGPU_GPU_PAGE_ALIGN(sizeof(struct amdgpu_fw_shared)), 0, indirect);/* VCN global tiling registers */ -WREG32_SOC15_DPG_MODE (0 ,SOC15_DPG_MODE_OFFSET ( -UVD ,0 , mmUVD_GFX10_ADDR_CONFIG), adev->gfx.config.gb_addr_config,0 , indirect); +WREG32_SOC15_DPG_MODE (inst_idx,SOC15_DPG_MODE_OFFSET ( +UVD , inst_idx, mmUVD_GFX10_ADDR_CONFIG), adev->gfx.config.gb_addr_config,0 , indirect); }static void vcn_v3_0_disable_static_power_gating (struct amdgpu_device *adev,int inst)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 245/277 drm/nouveau/pmu: Add missing callbacks for Tegra devices
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Karol Herbst <[email protected]>
commit 38d4e5cf5b08798f093374e53c2f4609d5382dd5 upstream.
Fixes a crash booting on those platforms with nouveau.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/pmu/gm20b.c | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/pmu/gp102.c | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/pmu/gp10b.c | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/pmu/priv.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/pmu/gm20b.c +1 -0
@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ gm20b_pmu = { .intr = gt215_pmu_intr, .recv = gm20b_pmu_recv, .initmsg = gm20b_pmu_initmsg, + .reset = gf100_pmu_reset, };#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_TEGRA_210_SOC )
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/pmu/gp102.c +1 -1
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@*/ #include "priv.h" -static void +void gp102_pmu_reset (struct nvkm_pmu *pmu) {struct nvkm_device *device = pmu->subdev.device;
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/pmu/gp10b.c +1 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ gp10b_pmu = { .intr = gt215_pmu_intr, .recv = gm20b_pmu_recv, .initmsg = gm20b_pmu_initmsg, + .reset = gp102_pmu_reset, };#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_TEGRA_210_SOC )
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/subdev/pmu/priv.h +1 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int gt215_pmu_send(struct nvkm_pmu *, u3bool gf100_pmu_enabled (struct nvkm_pmu *);void gf100_pmu_reset (struct nvkm_pmu *); +void gp102_pmu_reset (struct nvkm_pmu *pmu);void gk110_pmu_pgob (struct nvkm_pmu *,bool );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 246/277 drm/amdkfd: Create file descriptor after client is added to smi_clients list
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
commit e79a2398e1b2d47060474dca291542368183bc0f upstream.
This ensures userspace cannot prematurely clean-up the client before it is fully initialised which has been proven to cause issues in the past.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_smi_events.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_smi_events.c +15 -9
@@ -270,15 +270,6 @@ int kfd_smi_event_open(struct kfd_dev *dreturn ret; } - ret =anon_inode_getfd (kfd_smi_name, &kfd_smi_ev_fops, (void *)client, -O_RDWR ); -if (ret <0 ) { -kfifo_free (&client->fifo); -kfree (client); -return ret; - } - *fd = ret; -init_waitqueue_head (&client->wait_queue);spin_lock_init (&client->lock); client->events =0 ;
@@ -288,5 +279,20 @@ int kfd_smi_event_open(struct kfd_dev *dlist_add_rcu (&client->list, &dev->smi_clients);spin_unlock (&dev->smi_lock); + ret =anon_inode_getfd (kfd_smi_name, &kfd_smi_ev_fops, (void *)client, +O_RDWR ); +if (ret <0 ) { +spin_lock (&dev->smi_lock); +list_del_rcu (&client->list); +spin_unlock (&dev->smi_lock); + +synchronize_rcu (); + +kfifo_free (&client->fifo); +kfree (client); +return ret; + } + *fd = ret; +return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 247/277 drm/amdgpu: dont use BACO for reset in S3
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit ebc002e3ee78409c42156e62e4e27ad1d09c5a75 upstream.
Seems to cause a reboots or hangs on some systems.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/amdgpu_dpm.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/amdgpu_dpm.c +11 -0
@@ -1045,6 +1045,17 @@ bool amdgpu_dpm_is_baco_supported(structif (!pp_funcs || !pp_funcs->get_asic_baco_capability)return false; +/* Don't use baco for reset in S3. +* This is a workaround for some platforms +* where entering BACO during suspend +* seems to cause reboots or hangs. +* This might be related to the fact that BACO controls +* power to the whole GPU including devices like audio and USB. +* Powering down/up everything may adversely affect these other +* devices. Needs more investigation. +*/ +if (adev->in_s3) +return false;if (pp_funcs->get_asic_baco_capability (pp_handle, &baco_cap))return false;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 248/277 KVM: SVM: Allow AVIC support on system w/ physical APIC ID > 255
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Suravee Suthikulpanit <[email protected]>
commit 4a204f7895878363ca8211f50ec610408c8c70aa upstream.
Expand KVM's mask for the AVIC host physical ID to the full 12 bits defined by the architecture. The number of bits consumed by hardware is model specific, e.g. early CPUs ignored bits 11:8, but there is no way for KVM to enumerate the "true" size. So, KVM must allow using all bits, else it risks rejecting completely legal x2APIC IDs on newer CPUs.
This means KVM relies on hardware to not assign x2APIC IDs that exceed the "true" width of the field, but presumably hardware is smart enough to tie the width to the max x2APIC ID. KVM also relies on hardware to support at least 8 bits, as the legacy xAPIC ID is writable by software. But, those assumptions are unavoidable due to the lack of any way to enumerate the "true" width.
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
[modified due to the conflict caused by the commit 391503528257 ("KVM:
x86: SVM: move avic definitions from AMD's spec to svm.h")]
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c | 7 +------ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c +1 -6
@@ -947,15 +947,10 @@ out:void avic_vcpu_load (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int cpu) {u64 entry; -/* ID = 0xff (broadcast), ID > 0xff (reserved) */ int h_physical_id =kvm_cpu_get_apicid (cpu);struct vcpu_svm *svm =to_svm (vcpu); -/* -* Since the host physical APIC id is 8 bits, -* we can support host APIC ID upto 255. -*/ -if (WARN_ON (h_physical_id >AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_HOST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK )) +if (WARN_ON (h_physical_id & ~AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_HOST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK ))return ; entry =READ_ONCE (*(svm->avic_physical_id_cache));
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1 -1
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ extern struct kvm_x86_nested_ops svm_nes#define AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_BIT 31#define AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_MASK (1 << 31) -#define AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_HOST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK (0xFFULL) +#define AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_HOST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK GENMASK_ULL(11, 0)#define AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_BACKING_PAGE_MASK (0xFFFFFFFFFFULL << 12)#define AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK (1ULL << 62)#define AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_VALID_MASK (1ULL << 63)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 249/277 net/smc: send directly on setting TCP_NODELAY
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dust Li <[email protected]>
commit b70a5cc045197aad9c159042621baf3c015f6cc7 upstream.
In commit ea785a1a573b("net/smc: Send directly when TCP_CORK is cleared"), we don't use delayed work to implement cork.
This patch use the same algorithm, removes the delayed work when setting TCP_NODELAY and send directly in setsockopt(). This also makes the TCP_NODELAY the same as TCP.
--- net/smc/af_smc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/smc/af_smc.c +2 -2
@@ -2419,8 +2419,8 @@ static int smc_setsockopt(struct socket sk->sk_state != SMC_CLOSED) {if (val) {SMC_STAT_INC (smc, ndly_cnt); -mod_delayed_work (smc->conn.lgr->tx_wq, - &smc->conn.tx_work,0 ); +smc_tx_pending (&smc->conn); +cancel_delayed_work (&smc->conn.tx_work); } }break ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 250/277 Revert "selftests: net: Add tls config dependency for tls selftests"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
commit 20695e9a9fd39103d1b0669470ae74030b7aa196 upstream.
This reverts commit d9142e1cf3bbdaf21337767114ecab26fe702d47.
The test is supposed to run cleanly with TLS is disabled, to test compatibility with TCP behavior. I can't repro the failure [1], the problem should be debugged rather than papered over.
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/config | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/net/config +0 -1
@@ -43,5 +43,4 @@ CONFIG_NET_ACT_TUNNEL_KEY=m CONFIG_NET_ACT_MIRRED=m CONFIG_BAREUDP=m CONFIG_IPV6_IOAM6_LWTUNNEL=y -CONFIG_TLS=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SM4=y
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 251/277 bpf: Make remote_port field in struct bpf_sk_lookup 16-bit wide
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]>
commit 9a69e2b385f443f244a7e8b8bcafe5ccfb0866b4 upstream.
remote_port is another case of a BPF context field documented as a 32-bit value in network byte order for which the BPF context access converter generates a load of a zero-padded 16-bit integer in network byte order.
First such case was dst_port in bpf_sock which got addressed in commit 4421a582718a ("bpf: Make dst_port field in struct bpf_sock 16-bit wide").
Loading 4-bytes from the remote_port offset and converting the value with bpf_ntohl() leads to surprising results, as the expected value is shifted by 16 bits.
Reduce the confusion by splitting the field in two - a 16-bit field holding a big-endian integer, and a 16-bit zero-padding anonymous field that follows it.
--- include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 3 ++- net/bpf/test_run.c | 4 ++-- net/core/filter.c | 3 ++- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +2 -1
@@ -6223,7 +6223,8 @@ struct bpf_sk_lookup {__u32 protocol;/* IP protocol (IPPROTO_TCP, IPPROTO_UDP) */ __u32 remote_ip4;/* Network byte order */ __u32 remote_ip6[4 ];/* Network byte order */ -__u32 remote_port;/* Network byte order */ +__be16 remote_port;/* Network byte order */ + __u16 :16 ;/* Zero padding */ __u32 local_ip4;/* Network byte order */ __u32 local_ip6[4 ];/* Network byte order */ __u32 local_port;/* Host byte order */
net/bpf/test_run.c +2 -2
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_sk_lookup(struct bif (!range_is_zero (user_ctx,offsetofend (typeof (*user_ctx), local_port),sizeof (*user_ctx))) goto out; -if (user_ctx->local_port >U16_MAX || user_ctx->remote_port >U16_MAX ) { +if (user_ctx->local_port >U16_MAX ) { ret = -ERANGE ; goto out; }
@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ int bpf_prog_test_run_sk_lookup(struct b ctx.family = (u16 )user_ctx->family; ctx.protocol = (u16 )user_ctx->protocol; ctx.dport = (u16 )user_ctx->local_port; - ctx.sport = (__force __be16 )user_ctx->remote_port; + ctx.sport = user_ctx->remote_port;switch (ctx.family) {case AF_INET :
net/core/filter.c +2 -1
@@ -10540,7 +10540,8 @@ static bool sk_lookup_is_valid_access(in case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_sk_lookup, local_ip4): case bpf_ctx_range_till(struct bpf_sk_lookup, remote_ip6[0], remote_ip6[3]): case bpf_ctx_range_till(struct bpf_sk_lookup, local_ip6[0], local_ip6[3]): - case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_sk_lookup, remote_port): + case offsetof(struct bpf_sk_lookup, remote_port) ... + offsetof(struct bpf_sk_lookup , local_ip4) -1 : case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_sk_lookup, local_port):bpf_ctx_record_field_size (info,sizeof (__u32));return bpf_ctx_narrow_access_ok (off, size,sizeof (__u32));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 252/277 selftests/bpf: Fix u8 narrow load checks for bpf_sk_lookup remote_port
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]>
commit 3c69611b8926f8e74fcf76bd97ae0e5dafbeb26a upstream.
In commit 9a69e2b385f4 ("bpf: Make remote_port field in struct bpf_sk_lookup 16-bit wide") ->remote_port field changed from __u32 to __be16.
However, narrow load tests which exercise 1-byte sized loads from offsetof(struct bpf_sk_lookup, remote_port) were not adopted to reflect the change.
As a result, on little-endian we continue testing loads from addresses:
- (__u8 *)&ctx->remote_port + 3
- (__u8 *)&ctx->remote_port + 4
which map to the zero padding following the remote_port field, and don't break the tests because there is no observable change.
While on big-endian, we observe breakage because tests expect to see zeros for values loaded from:
- (__u8 *)&ctx->remote_port - 1
- (__u8 *)&ctx->remote_port - 2
Above addresses map to ->remote_ip6 field, which precedes ->remote_port, and are populated during the bpf_sk_lookup IPv6 tests.
Unsurprisingly, on s390x we observe:
#136/38 sk_lookup/narrow access to ctx v4:OK
#136/39 sk_lookup/narrow access to ctx v6:FAIL
Fix it by removing the checks for 1-byte loads from offsets outside of the ->remote_port field.
--- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sk_lookup.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sk_lookup.c +1 -2
@@ -404,8 +404,7 @@ int ctx_narrow_access(struct bpf_sk_look/* Narrow loads from remote_port field. Expect SRC_PORT. */ if (LSB (ctx->remote_port,0 ) != ((SRC_PORT >>0 ) &0xff ) || -LSB (ctx->remote_port,1 ) != ((SRC_PORT >>8 ) &0xff ) || -LSB (ctx->remote_port,2 ) !=0 ||LSB (ctx->remote_port,3 ) !=0 ) +LSB (ctx->remote_port,1 ) != ((SRC_PORT >>8 ) &0xff ))return SK_DROP ;if (LSW (ctx->remote_port,0 ) !=SRC_PORT )return SK_DROP ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 253/277 rtc: mc146818-lib: fix signedness bug in mc146818_get_time()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit 7372971c1be5b7d4fdd8ad237798bdc1d1d54162 upstream.
The mc146818_get_time() function returns zero on success or negative a error code on failure. It needs to be type int.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-mc146818-lib.c | 2 +- include/linux/mc146818rtc.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-mc146818-lib.c +1 -1
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ bool mc146818_does_rtc_work(void) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (mc146818_does_rtc_work); -unsigned int mc146818_get_time (struct rtc_time *time) +int mc146818_get_time (struct rtc_time *time) {unsigned char ctrl;unsigned long flags;
include/linux/mc146818rtc.h +1 -1
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ struct cmos_rtc_board_info {#endif /* ARCH_RTC_LOCATION */ bool mc146818_does_rtc_work (void ); -unsigned int mc146818_get_time (struct rtc_time *time); +int mc146818_get_time (struct rtc_time *time);int mc146818_set_time (struct rtc_time *time);#endif /* _MC146818RTC_H */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 254/277 SUNRPC: Dont call connect() more than once on a TCP socket
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
commit 89f42494f92f448747bd8a7ab1ae8b5d5520577d upstream.
Avoid socket state races due to repeated calls to ->connect() using the same socket. If connect() returns 0 due to the connection having completed, but we are in fact in a closing state, then we may leave the XPRT_CONNECTING flag set on the transport.
--- include/linux/sunrpc/xprtsock.h | 1 + net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/linux/sunrpc/xprtsock.h +1 -0
@@ -89,5 +89,6 @@ struct sock_xprt {#define XPRT_SOCK_WAKE_WRITE (5)#define XPRT_SOCK_WAKE_PENDING (6)#define XPRT_SOCK_WAKE_DISCONNECT (7) +#define XPRT_SOCK_CONNECT_SENT (8)#endif /* _LINUX_SUNRPC_XPRTSOCK_H */
net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +11 -10
@@ -2257,6 +2257,7 @@ static int xs_tcp_finish_connecting(stru fallthrough;case -EINPROGRESS :/* SYN_SENT! */ +set_bit (XPRT_SOCK_CONNECT_SENT , &transport->sock_state);if (xprt->reestablish_timeout <XS_TCP_INIT_REEST_TO ) xprt->reestablish_timeout =XS_TCP_INIT_REEST_TO ;break ;
@@ -2282,10 +2283,14 @@ static void xs_tcp_setup_socket(struct wstruct rpc_xprt *xprt = &transport->xprt;int status = -EIO ; -if (!sock) { - sock =xs_create_sock (xprt, transport, -xs_addr (xprt)->sa_family,SOCK_STREAM , -IPPROTO_TCP , true); +if (xprt_connected (xprt)) + goto out; +if (test_and_clear_bit (XPRT_SOCK_CONNECT_SENT , + &transport->sock_state) || + !sock) { +xs_reset_transport (transport); + sock =xs_create_sock (xprt, transport,xs_addr (xprt)->sa_family, +SOCK_STREAM ,IPPROTO_TCP , true);if (IS_ERR (sock)) { status =PTR_ERR (sock); goto out;
@@ -2365,13 +2370,9 @@ static void xs_connect(struct rpc_xprt *WARN_ON_ONCE (!xprt_lock_connect (xprt, task, transport)); -if (transport->sock !=NULL && !xprt_connecting (xprt)) { +if (transport->sock !=NULL ) {dprintk ("RPC: xs_connect delayed xprt %p for %lu " -"seconds\n" , - xprt, xprt->reestablish_timeout /HZ ); - -/* Start by resetting any existing state */ -xs_reset_transport (transport); +"seconds\n" , xprt, xprt->reestablish_timeout /HZ ); delay =xprt_reconnect_delay (xprt);xprt_reconnect_backoff (xprt,XS_TCP_INIT_REEST_TO );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 255/277 Revert "nbd: fix possible overflow on first_minor in nbd_dev_add()"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
commit 7198bfc2017644c6b92d2ecef9b8b8e0363bb5fd upstream.
This reverts commit 6d35d04a9e18990040e87d2bbf72689252669d54.
Both Gabriel and Borislav report that this commit casues a regression with nbd:
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/dev/block/43:0'
Revert it before 5.18-rc1 and we'll investigage this separately in due time.
--- drivers/block/nbd.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/block/nbd.c +12 -12
@@ -1744,6 +1744,17 @@ static struct nbd_device *nbd_dev_add(inrefcount_set (&nbd->refs,0 );INIT_LIST_HEAD (&nbd->list); disk->major =NBD_MAJOR ; + +/* Too big first_minor can cause duplicate creation of +* sysfs files/links, since index << part_shift might overflow, or +* MKDEV() expect that the max bits of first_minor is 20. +*/ + disk->first_minor = index << part_shift; +if (disk->first_minor < index || disk->first_minor >MINORMASK ) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out_free_work; + } + disk->minors =1 << part_shift; disk->fops = &nbd_fops; disk->private_data = nbd;
@@ -1848,19 +1859,8 @@ static int nbd_genl_connect(struct sk_buif (!netlink_capable (skb,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; -if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX ]) { +if (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX ]) index =nla_get_u32 (info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_INDEX ]); - -/* -* Too big first_minor can cause duplicate creation of -* sysfs files/links, since index << part_shift might overflow, or -* MKDEV() expect that the max bits of first_minor is 20. -*/ -if (index <0 || index >MINORMASK >> part_shift) { -printk (KERN_ERR "nbd: illegal input index %d\n" , index); -return -EINVAL ; - } - }if (!info->attrs[NBD_ATTR_SOCKETS ]) {printk (KERN_ERR "nbd: must specify at least one socket\n" );return -EINVAL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 256/277 perf build: Dont use -ffat-lto-objects in the python feature test when building with clang-13
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
commit 3a8a0475861a443f02e3a9b57d044fe2a0a99291 upstream.
Using -ffat-lto-objects in the python feature test when building with clang-13 results in:
clang-13: error: optimization flag '-ffat-lto-objects' is not supported [-Werror,-Wignored-optimization-argument]
error: command '/usr/sbin/clang' failed with exit code 1
cp: cannot stat '/tmp/build/perf/python_ext_build/lib/perf*.so': No such file or directory make[2]: *** [Makefile.perf:639: /tmp/build/perf/python/perf.so] Error 1
Noticed when building on a docker.io/library/archlinux:base container.
--- tools/perf/Makefile.config | 3 +++ tools/perf/util/setup.py | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
tools/perf/Makefile.config +3 -0
@@ -270,6 +270,9 @@ ifdef PYTHON_CONFIG PYTHON_EMBED_LIBADD := $(call grep-libs,$(PYTHON_EMBED_LDOPTS)) -lutil PYTHON_EMBED_CCOPTS := $(shell $(PYTHON_CONFIG_SQ) --includes 2>/dev/null) FLAGS_PYTHON_EMBED := $(PYTHON_EMBED_CCOPTS) $(PYTHON_EMBED_LDOPTS) + ifeq ($(CC_NO_CLANG), 0) + PYTHON_EMBED_CCOPTS := $(filter-out -ffat-lto-objects, $(PYTHON_EMBED_CCOPTS)) + endif endif FEATURE_CHECK_CFLAGS-libpython := $(PYTHON_EMBED_CCOPTS)
tools/perf/util/setup.py +2 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ if cc_is_clang: vars[var] = sub("-fstack-protector-strong", "", vars[var]) if not clang_has_option("-fno-semantic-interposition"): vars[var] = sub("-fno-semantic-interposition", "", vars[var]) + if not clang_has_option("-ffat-lto-objects"): + vars[var] = sub("-ffat-lto-objects", "", vars[var]) from distutils.core import setup, Extension
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 257/277 perf python: Fix probing for some clang command line options
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
commit dd6e1fe91cdd52774ca642d1da75b58a86356b56 upstream.
The clang compiler complains about some options even without a source file being available, while others require one, so use the simple tools/build/feature/test-hello.c file.
Then check for the "is not supported" string in its output, in addition to the "unknown argument" already being looked for.
This was noticed when building with clang-13 where -ffat-lto-objects isn't supported and since we were looking just for "unknown argument" and not providing a source code to clang, was mistakenly assumed as being available and not being filtered to set of command line options provided to clang, leading to a build failure.
--- tools/perf/util/setup.py | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/setup.py +4 -2
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@ -from os import getenv +from os import getenv, path from subprocess import Popen, PIPE from re import sub cc = getenv("CC") cc_is_clang = b"clang version" in Popen([cc.split()[0], "-v"], stderr=PIPE).stderr.readline() +src_feature_tests = getenv('srctree') + '/tools/build/feature' def clang_has_option(option): - return [o for o in Popen([cc, option], stderr=PIPE).stderr.readlines() if b"unknown argument" in o] == [ ] + cc_output = Popen([cc, option, path.join(src_feature_tests, "test-hello.c") ], stderr=PIPE).stderr.readlines() + return [o for o in cc_output if ((b"unknown argument" in o) or (b"is not supported" in o))] == [ ] if cc_is_clang: from distutils.sysconfig import get_config_vars
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 258/277 tools build: Filter out options and warnings not supported by clang
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
commit 41caff459a5b956b3e23ba9ca759dd0629ad3dda upstream.
These make the feature check fail when using clang, so remove them just like is done in tools/perf/Makefile.config to build perf itself.
Adding -Wno-compound-token-split-by-macro to tools/perf/Makefile.config when building with clang is also necessary to avoid these warnings turned into errors (-Werror):
CC /tmp/build/perf/util/scripting-engines/trace-event-perl.o
In file included from util/scripting-engines/trace-event-perl.c:35:
In file included from /usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/perl.h:4085:
In file included from /usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/hv.h:659:
In file included from /usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/hv_func.h:34:
In file included from /usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/sbox32_hash.h:4:
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:150:5: error: '(' and '{' tokens introducing statement expression appear in different macro expansion contexts [-Werror,-Wcompound-token-split-by-macro]
ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(state[0],0x9fade23b);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:80:38: note: expanded from macro 'ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32'
#define ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(v,prime) STMT_START { \
^~~~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/perl.h:737:29: note: expanded from macro 'STMT_START'
# define STMT_START (void)( /* gcc supports "({ STATEMENTS; })" */
^
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:150:5: note: '{' token is here
ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(state[0],0x9fade23b);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:80:49: note: expanded from macro 'ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32'
#define ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(v,prime) STMT_START { \
^
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:150:5: error: '}' and ')' tokens terminating statement expression appear in different macro expansion contexts [-Werror,-Wcompound-token-split-by-macro]
ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(state[0],0x9fade23b);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:87:41: note: expanded from macro 'ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32'
v ^= (v>>23); \
^
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:150:5: note: ')' token is here
ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32(state[0],0x9fade23b);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/zaphod32_hash.h:88:3: note: expanded from macro 'ZAPHOD32_SCRAMBLE32'
} STMT_END
^~~~~~~~
/usr/lib64/perl5/CORE/perl.h:738:21: note: expanded from macro 'STMT_END'
# define STMT_END )
^Please refer to the discussion on the Link: tag below, where Nathan clarifies the situation:
<quote>
acme> And then get to the problems at the end of this message, which seem acme> similar to the problem described here:
acme>
acme> From Nathan Chancellor <>
acme> Subject [PATCH] mwifiex: Remove unnecessary braces from HostCmd_SET_SEQ_NO_BSS_INFO
acme>
acme> https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/9/1/135
acme>
acme> So perhaps in this case its better to disable that acme> -Werror,-Wcompound-token-split-by-macro when building with clang?
Yes, I think that is probably the best solution. As far as I can tell, at least in this file and context, the warning appears harmless, as the "create a GNU C statement expression from two different macros" is very much intentional, based on the presence of PERL_USE_GCC_BRACE_GROUPS. The warning is fixed in upstream Perl by just avoiding creating GNU C statement expressions using STMT_START and STMT_END:
https://github.com/Perl/perl5/issues/18780
https://github.com/Perl/perl5/pull/18984
If I am reading the source code correctly, an alternative to disabling the warning would be specifying -DPERL_GCC_BRACE_GROUPS_FORBIDDEN but it seems like that might end up impacting more than just this site, according to the issue discussion above.
</quote>
--- tools/build/feature/Makefile | 7 +++++++ tools/perf/Makefile.config | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
tools/build/feature/Makefile +7 -0
@@ -216,6 +216,13 @@ PERL_EMBED_LIBADD = $(call grep-libs,$(P PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS = `perl -MExtUtils::Embed -e ccopts 2>/dev/null` FLAGS_PERL_EMBED=$(PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS) $(PERL_EMBED_LDOPTS) +ifeq ($(CC_NO_CLANG), 0) + PERL_EMBED_LDOPTS := $(filter-out -specs=%,$(PERL_EMBED_LDOPTS)) + PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS := $(filter-out -flto=auto -ffat-lto-objects, $(PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS)) + PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS := $(filter-out -specs=%,$(PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS)) + FLAGS_PERL_EMBED += -Wno-compound-token-split-by-macro +endif + $(OUTPUT)test-libperl.bin: $(BUILD) $(FLAGS_PERL_EMBED)
tools/perf/Makefile.config +3 -0
@@ -788,6 +788,9 @@ else LDFLAGS += $(PERL_EMBED_LDFLAGS) EXTLIBS += $(PERL_EMBED_LIBADD) CFLAGS += -DHAVE_LIBPERL_SUPPORT + ifeq ($(CC_NO_CLANG), 0) + CFLAGS += -Wno-compound-token-split-by-macro + endif $(call detected,CONFIG_LIBPERL) endif endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 259/277 tools build: Use $(shell ) instead of `` to get embedded libperls ccopts
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
commit 541f695cbcb6932c22638b06e0cbe1d56177e2e9 upstream.
Just like its done for ldopts and for both in tools/perf/Makefile.config.
Using `` to initialize PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS somehow precludes using:
$(filter-out SOMETHING_TO_FILTER,$(PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS))
And we need to do it to allow for building with versions of clang where some gcc options selected by distros are not available.
--- tools/build/feature/Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/build/feature/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ strip-libs = $(filter-out -l%,$(1)) PERL_EMBED_LDOPTS = $(shell perl -MExtUtils::Embed -e ldopts 2>/dev/null) PERL_EMBED_LDFLAGS = $(call strip-libs,$(PERL_EMBED_LDOPTS)) PERL_EMBED_LIBADD = $(call grep-libs,$(PERL_EMBED_LDOPTS)) -PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS = `perl -MExtUtils::Embed -e ccopts 2>/dev/null` +PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS = $(shell perl -MExtUtils::Embed -e ccopts 2>/dev/null) FLAGS_PERL_EMBED=$(PERL_EMBED_CCOPTS) $(PERL_EMBED_LDOPTS) ifeq ($(CC_NO_CLANG), 0)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 260/277 dmaengine: Revert "dmaengine: shdma: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
commit d143f939a95696d38ff800ada14402fa50ebbd6c upstream.
This reverts commit 455896c53d5b ("dmaengine: shdma: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error") as the patch wrongly reduced the count on error and did not bail out. So drop the count by reverting the patch .
--- drivers/dma/sh/shdma-base.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/dma/sh/shdma-base.c +1 -3
@@ -115,10 +115,8 @@ static dma_cookie_t shdma_tx_submit(stru ret =pm_runtime_get (schan->dev);spin_unlock_irq (&schan->chan_lock); -if (ret <0 ) { +if (ret <0 )dev_err (schan->dev,"%s(): GET = %d\n" , __func__, ret); -pm_runtime_put (schan->dev); - }pm_runtime_barrier (schan->dev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 261/277 KVM: avoid NULL pointer dereference in kvm_dirty_ring_push
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
commit 5593473a1e6c743764b08e3b6071cb43b5cfa6c4 upstream.
kvm_vcpu_release() will call kvm_dirty_ring_free(), freeing ring->dirty_gfns and setting it to NULL. Afterwards, it calls kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy().
However, if closing the file descriptor races with KVM_RUN in such away that vcpu->arch.st.preempted == 0, the following call stack leads to a NULL pointer dereference in kvm_dirty_run_push():
mark_page_dirty_in_slot+0x192/0x270 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3171 kvm_steal_time_set_preempted arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:4600 [inline] kvm_arch_vcpu_put+0x34e/0x5b0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:4618 vcpu_put+0x1b/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:211 vmx_free_vcpu+0xcb/0x130 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6985 kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x76/0x290 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11219 kvm_vcpu_destroy arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441 [inline]
The fix is to release the dirty page ring after kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy has run.
--- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1 -1
@@ -431,8 +431,8 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpvoid kvm_vcpu_destroy (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { -kvm_dirty_ring_free (&vcpu->dirty_ring);kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy (vcpu); +kvm_dirty_ring_free (&vcpu->dirty_ring);/* * No need for rcu_read_lock as VCPU_RUN is the only place that changes
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 262/277 Revert "net/mlx5: Accept devlink user input after driver initialization complete"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: dann frazier <[email protected]>
This reverts commit 9cc25e8529d567e08da98d11f092b21449763144 which is commit 64ea2d0e7263b67d8efc93fa1baace041ed36d1e upstream.
This patch was shown to introduce a regression:
# devlink dev param show pci/0000:24:00.0 name flow_steering_mode
pci/0000:24:00.0:
name flow_steering_mode type driver-specific
values:(flow steering mode description is missing beneath "values:")
# devlink dev param set pci/0000:24:00.0 name flow_steering_mode value smfs cmode runtime Segmentation fault (core dumped)
and also with upstream iproute
# ./iproute2/devlink/devlink dev param set pci/0000:24:00.0 name flow_steering_mode value smfs cmode runtime Configuration mode not supported
Note: Instead of reverting, we could instead also backport commit cf530217408e ("devlink: Notify users when objects are accessible"). However, that makes changes to core devlink code that I'm not sure are suitable for a stable backport.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/devlink.c | 12 ++++++++++-- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c | 2 -- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/sf/dev/driver.c | 2 -- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/devlink.c +10 -2
@@ -793,11 +793,14 @@ int mlx5_devlink_register(struct devlink {int err; - err =devlink_params_register (devlink, mlx5_devlink_params, -ARRAY_SIZE (mlx5_devlink_params)); + err =devlink_register (devlink);if (err)return err; + err =devlink_params_register (devlink, mlx5_devlink_params, +ARRAY_SIZE (mlx5_devlink_params)); +if (err) + goto params_reg_err;mlx5_devlink_set_params_init_values (devlink); err =mlx5_devlink_auxdev_params_register (devlink);
@@ -808,6 +811,7 @@ int mlx5_devlink_register(struct devlinkif (err) goto traps_reg_err; +devlink_params_publish (devlink);return 0 ; traps_reg_err:
@@ -815,13 +819,17 @@ traps_reg_err: auxdev_reg_err:devlink_params_unregister (devlink, mlx5_devlink_params,ARRAY_SIZE (mlx5_devlink_params)); +params_reg_err: +devlink_unregister (devlink);return err; }void mlx5_devlink_unregister (struct devlink *devlink) { +devlink_params_unpublish (devlink);mlx5_devlink_traps_unregister (devlink);mlx5_devlink_auxdev_params_unregister (devlink);devlink_params_unregister (devlink, mlx5_devlink_params,ARRAY_SIZE (mlx5_devlink_params)); +devlink_unregister (devlink); }
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c +0 -2
@@ -1541,7 +1541,6 @@ static int probe_one(struct pci_dev *pdedev_err (&pdev->dev,"mlx5_crdump_enable failed with error code %d\n" , err);pci_save_state (pdev); -devlink_register (devlink);if (!mlx5_core_is_mp_slave (dev))devlink_reload_enable (devlink);return 0 ;
@@ -1564,7 +1563,6 @@ static void remove_one(struct pci_dev *pstruct devlink *devlink =priv_to_devlink (dev);devlink_reload_disable (devlink); -devlink_unregister (devlink);mlx5_crdump_disable (dev);mlx5_drain_health_wq (dev);mlx5_uninit_one (dev);
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/sf/dev/driver.c +0 -2
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ static int mlx5_sf_dev_probe(struct auximlx5_core_warn (mdev,"mlx5_init_one err=%d\n" , err); goto init_one_err; } -devlink_register (devlink);devlink_reload_enable (devlink);return 0 ;
@@ -66,7 +65,6 @@ static void mlx5_sf_dev_remove(struct au devlink =priv_to_devlink (sf_dev->mdev);devlink_reload_disable (devlink); -devlink_unregister (devlink);mlx5_uninit_one (sf_dev->mdev);iounmap (sf_dev->mdev->iseg);mlx5_mdev_uninit (sf_dev->mdev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 263/277 ubsan: remove CONFIG_UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
commit 69d0db01e210e07fe915e5da91b54a867cda040f upstream.
The object-size sanitizer is redundant to -Warray-bounds, and inappropriately performs its checks at run-time when all information needed for the evaluation is available at compile-time, making it quite difficult to use:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=214861
With -Warray-bounds almost enabled globally, it doesn't make sense to keep this around.
--- lib/Kconfig.ubsan | 13 ------------- lib/test_ubsan.c | 22 ---------------------- scripts/Makefile.ubsan | 1 - 3 files changed, 36 deletions(-)
lib/Kconfig.ubsan +0 -13
@@ -112,19 +112,6 @@ config UBSAN_UNREACHABLE This option enables -fsanitize=unreachable which checks for control flow reaching an expected-to-be-unreachable position. -config UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE - bool "Perform checking for accesses beyond the end of objects" - default UBSAN - # gcc hugely expands stack usage with -fsanitize=object-size - # https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjPasyJrDuwDnpHJS2TuQfExwe=px-SzLeN8GFMAQJPmQ@mail.gmail.com/ - depends on !CC_IS_GCC - depends on $(cc-option,-fsanitize=object-size) - help - This option enables -fsanitize=object-size which checks for accesses - beyond the end of objects where the optimizer can determine both the - object being operated on and its size, usually seen with bad downcasts, - or access to struct members from NULL pointers. - config UBSAN_BOOL bool "Perform checking for non-boolean values used as boolean" default UBSAN
lib/test_ubsan.c +0 -22
@@ -79,15 +79,6 @@ static void test_ubsan_load_invalid_valu eval2 = eval; } -static void test_ubsan_null_ptr_deref (void ) -{ -volatile int *ptr =NULL ; -int val; - -UBSAN_TEST (CONFIG_UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE ); - val = *ptr; -} -static void test_ubsan_misaligned_access (void ) {volatile char arr[5 ]__aligned(4) = {1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 };
@@ -98,29 +89,16 @@ static void test_ubsan_misaligned_access *ptr = val; } -static void test_ubsan_object_size_mismatch (void ) -{ -/* "((aligned(8)))" helps this not into be misaligned for ptr-access. */ -volatile int val__aligned(8) =4 ; -volatile long long *ptr, val2; - -UBSAN_TEST (CONFIG_UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE ); - ptr = (long long *)&val; - val2 = *ptr; -} -static const test_ubsan_fp test_ubsan_array[] = { test_ubsan_shift_out_of_bounds, test_ubsan_out_of_bounds, test_ubsan_load_invalid_value, test_ubsan_misaligned_access, - test_ubsan_object_size_mismatch, };/* Excluded because they Oops the module. */ static const test_ubsan_fp skip_ubsan_array[] = { test_ubsan_divrem_overflow, - test_ubsan_null_ptr_deref, };static int __init test_ubsan_init (void )
scripts/Makefile.ubsan +0 -1
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT) += -fsanitize=shift ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO) += -fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_UNREACHABLE) += -fsanitize=unreachable -ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE) += -fsanitize=object-size ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL) += -fsanitize=bool ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM) += -fsanitize=enum ubsan-cflags-$(CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP) += -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 264/277 selftests: cgroup: Make cg_create() use 0755 for permission instead of 0644
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit b09c2baa56347ae65795350dfcc633dedb1c2970 upstream.
0644 is an odd perm to create a cgroup which is a directory. Use the regular 0755 instead. This is necessary for euid switching test case.
--- tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/cgroup_util.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/cgroup_util.c +1 -1
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ int cg_find_unified_root(char *root, sizint cg_create (const char *cgroup) { -return mkdir (cgroup,0644 ); +return mkdir (cgroup,0755 ); }int cg_wait_for_proc_count (const char *cgroup,int count)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 265/277 selftests: cgroup: Test open-time credential usage for migration checks
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit 613e040e4dc285367bff0f8f75ea59839bc10947 upstream.
When a task is writing to an fd opened by a different task, the perm check should use the credentials of the latter task. Add a test for it.
--- tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_core.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_core.c +68 -0
@@ -674,6 +674,73 @@ cleanup:return ret; } +/* +* cgroup migration permission check should be performed based on the +* credentials at the time of open instead of write. +*/ +static int test_cgcore_lesser_euid_open (const char *root) +{ +const uid_t test_euid =65534 ;/* usually nobody, any !root is fine */ +int ret =KSFT_FAIL ; +char *cg_test_a =NULL , *cg_test_b =NULL ; +char *cg_test_a_procs =NULL , *cg_test_b_procs =NULL ; +int cg_test_b_procs_fd =-1 ; +uid_t saved_uid; + + cg_test_a =cg_name (root,"cg_test_a" ); + cg_test_b =cg_name (root,"cg_test_b" ); + +if (!cg_test_a || !cg_test_b) + goto cleanup; + + cg_test_a_procs =cg_name (cg_test_a,"cgroup.procs" ); + cg_test_b_procs =cg_name (cg_test_b,"cgroup.procs" ); + +if (!cg_test_a_procs || !cg_test_b_procs) + goto cleanup; + +if (cg_create (cg_test_a) ||cg_create (cg_test_b)) + goto cleanup; + +if (cg_enter_current (cg_test_a)) + goto cleanup; + +if (chown (cg_test_a_procs, test_euid,-1 ) || +chown (cg_test_b_procs, test_euid,-1 )) + goto cleanup; + + saved_uid =geteuid (); +if (seteuid (test_euid)) + goto cleanup; + + cg_test_b_procs_fd =open (cg_test_b_procs,O_RDWR ); + +if (seteuid (saved_uid)) + goto cleanup; + +if (cg_test_b_procs_fd <0 ) + goto cleanup; + +if (write (cg_test_b_procs_fd,"0" ,1 ) >=0 || errno !=EACCES ) + goto cleanup; + + ret =KSFT_PASS ; + +cleanup: +cg_enter_current (root); +if (cg_test_b_procs_fd >=0 ) +close (cg_test_b_procs_fd); +if (cg_test_b) +cg_destroy (cg_test_b); +if (cg_test_a) +cg_destroy (cg_test_a); +free (cg_test_b_procs); +free (cg_test_a_procs); +free (cg_test_b); +free (cg_test_a); +return ret; +} +#define T (x) { x, #x }struct corecg_test {int (*fn)(const char *root);
@@ -689,6 +756,7 @@ struct corecg_test {T (test_cgcore_proc_migration),T (test_cgcore_thread_migration),T (test_cgcore_destroy), + T(test_cgcore_lesser_euid_open), };#undef T
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 266/277 selftests: cgroup: Test open-time cgroup namespace usage for migration checks
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit bf35a7879f1dfb0d050fe779168bcf25c7de66f5 upstream.
When a task is writing to an fd opened by a different task, the perm check should use the cgroup namespace of the latter task. Add a test for it.
--- tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_core.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 97 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_core.c +97 -0
@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE#include <linux/limits.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> +#include <sched.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <signal.h>
@@ -741,6 +744,99 @@ cleanup:return ret; } +struct lesser_ns_open_thread_arg { +const char *path; +int fd; +int err; +}; + +static int lesser_ns_open_thread_fn (void *arg) +{ +struct lesser_ns_open_thread_arg *targ = arg; + + targ->fd =open (targ->path,O_RDWR ); + targ->err = errno; +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* cgroup migration permission check should be performed based on the cgroup +* namespace at the time of open instead of write. +*/ +static int test_cgcore_lesser_ns_open (const char *root) +{ +static char stack[65536 ]; +const uid_t test_euid =65534 ;/* usually nobody, any !root is fine */ +int ret =KSFT_FAIL ; +char *cg_test_a =NULL , *cg_test_b =NULL ; +char *cg_test_a_procs =NULL , *cg_test_b_procs =NULL ; +int cg_test_b_procs_fd =-1 ; +struct lesser_ns_open_thread_arg targ = { .fd =-1 }; +pid_t pid; +int status; + + cg_test_a =cg_name (root,"cg_test_a" ); + cg_test_b =cg_name (root,"cg_test_b" ); + +if (!cg_test_a || !cg_test_b) + goto cleanup; + + cg_test_a_procs =cg_name (cg_test_a,"cgroup.procs" ); + cg_test_b_procs =cg_name (cg_test_b,"cgroup.procs" ); + +if (!cg_test_a_procs || !cg_test_b_procs) + goto cleanup; + +if (cg_create (cg_test_a) ||cg_create (cg_test_b)) + goto cleanup; + +if (cg_enter_current (cg_test_b)) + goto cleanup; + +if (chown (cg_test_a_procs, test_euid,-1 ) || +chown (cg_test_b_procs, test_euid,-1 )) + goto cleanup; + + targ.path = cg_test_b_procs; + pid =clone (lesser_ns_open_thread_fn, stack +sizeof (stack), +CLONE_NEWCGROUP |CLONE_FILES |CLONE_VM |SIGCHLD , + &targ); +if (pid <0 ) + goto cleanup; + +if (waitpid (pid, &status,0 ) <0 ) + goto cleanup; + +if (!WIFEXITED (status)) + goto cleanup; + + cg_test_b_procs_fd = targ.fd; +if (cg_test_b_procs_fd <0 ) + goto cleanup; + +if (cg_enter_current (cg_test_a)) + goto cleanup; + +if ((status =write (cg_test_b_procs_fd,"0" ,1 )) >=0 || errno !=ENOENT ) + goto cleanup; + + ret =KSFT_PASS ; + +cleanup: +cg_enter_current (root); +if (cg_test_b_procs_fd >=0 ) +close (cg_test_b_procs_fd); +if (cg_test_b) +cg_destroy (cg_test_b); +if (cg_test_a) +cg_destroy (cg_test_a); +free (cg_test_b_procs); +free (cg_test_a_procs); +free (cg_test_b); +free (cg_test_a); +return ret; +} +#define T (x) { x, #x }struct corecg_test {int (*fn)(const char *root);
@@ -757,6 +853,7 @@ struct corecg_test {T (test_cgcore_thread_migration),T (test_cgcore_destroy),T (test_cgcore_lesser_euid_open), + T(test_cgcore_lesser_ns_open), };#undef T
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 267/277 mm: dont skip swap entry even if zap_details specified
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
commit 5abfd71d936a8aefd9f9ccd299dea7a164a5d455 upstream.
Patch series "mm: Rework zap ptes on swap entries", v5.
Patch 1 should fix a long standing bug for zap_pte_range() on zap_details usage. The risk is we could have some swap entries skipped while we should have zapped them.
Migration entries are not the major concern because file backed memory always zap in the pattern that "first time without page lock, then re-zap with page lock" hence the 2nd zap will always make sure all migration entries are already recovered.
However there can be issues with real swap entries got skipped errornoously. There's a reproducer provided in commit message of patch 1 for that.
Patch 2-4 are cleanups that are based on patch 1. After the whole patchset applied, we should have a very clean view of zap_pte_range().
Only patch 1 needs to be backported to stable if necessary.
This patch (of 4):
The "details" pointer shouldn't be the token to decide whether we should skip swap entries.
For example, when the callers specified details->zap_mapping==NULL, it means the user wants to zap all the pages (including COWed pages), then we need to look into swap entries because there can be private COWed pages that was swapped out.
Skipping some swap entries when details is non-NULL may lead to wrongly leaving some of the swap entries while we should have zapped them.
A reproducer of the problem:
===8<===
#define _GNU_SOURCE /* See feature_test_macros(7) */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int page_size;
int shmem_fd;
char *buffer;
void main(void)
{
int ret;
char val;
page_size = getpagesize();
shmem_fd = memfd_create("test", 0);
assert(shmem_fd >= 0);
ret = ftruncate(shmem_fd, page_size * 2);
assert(ret == 0);
buffer = mmap(NULL, page_size * 2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE, shmem_fd, 0);
assert(buffer != MAP_FAILED);
/* Write private page, swap it out */
buffer[page_size] = 1;
madvise(buffer, page_size * 2, MADV_PAGEOUT);
/* This should drop private buffer[page_size] already */
ret = ftruncate(shmem_fd, page_size);
assert(ret == 0);
/* Recover the size */
ret = ftruncate(shmem_fd, page_size * 2);
assert(ret == 0);
/* Re-read the data, it should be all zero */
val = buffer[page_size];
if (val == 0)
printf("Good\n");
else
printf("BUG\n");
}===8<===
We don't need to touch up the pmd path, because pmd never had a issue with swap entries. For example, shmem pmd migration will always be split into pte level, and same to swapping on anonymous.
Add another helper should_zap_cows() so that we can also check whether we should zap private mappings when there's no page pointer specified.
This patch drops that trick, so we handle swap ptes coherently. Meanwhile we should do the same check upon migration entry, hwpoison entry and genuine swap entries too.
To be explicit, we should still remember to keep the private entries if even_cows==false, and always zap them when even_cows==true.
The issue seems to exist starting from the initial commit of git.
--- mm/memory.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/memory.c +19 -6
@@ -1301,6 +1301,17 @@ copy_page_range(struct vm_area_struct *dreturn ret; } +/* Whether we should zap all COWed (private) pages too */ +static inline bool should_zap_cows (struct zap_details *details) +{ +/* By default, zap all pages */ +if (!details) +return true; + +/* Or, we zap COWed pages only if the caller wants to */ +return !details->check_mapping; +} + static unsigned long zap_pte_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
@@ -1396,16 +1407,18 @@ again:continue ; } -/* If details->check_mapping, we leave swap entries. */ -if (unlikely (details)) -continue ; - -if (!non_swap_entry (entry)) +if (!non_swap_entry (entry)) { +/* Genuine swap entry, hence a private anon page */ +if (!should_zap_cows (details)) +continue ; rss[MM_SWAPENTS ]--; -else if (is_migration_entry (entry)) { + }else if (is_migration_entry (entry)) {struct page *page; page =pfn_swap_entry_to_page (entry); +if (details && details->check_mapping && + details->check_mapping !=page_rmapping (page)) +continue ; rss[mm_counter (page)]--; }if (unlikely (!free_swap_and_cache (entry)))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 268/277 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Replace smp_store_mb() with virt_store_mb()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <[email protected]>
commit eaa03d34535872d29004cb5cf77dc9dec1ba9a25 upstream.
Following the recommendation in Documentation/memory-barriers.txt for virtual machine guests.
--- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +3 -3
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ void vmbus_channel_map_relid(struct vmbu* execute: * * (a) In the "normal (i.e., not resuming from hibernation)" path, -* the full barrier in smp_store_mb() guarantees that the store +* the full barrier in virt_store_mb() guarantees that the store * is propagated to all CPUs before the add_channel_work work * is queued. In turn, add_channel_work is queued before the * channel's ring buffer is allocated/initialized and the
@@ -392,14 +392,14 @@ void vmbus_channel_map_relid(struct vmbu* recv_int_page before retrieving the channel pointer from the * array of channels. * -* (b) In the "resuming from hibernation" path, the smp_store_mb() +* (b) In the "resuming from hibernation" path, the virt_store_mb() * guarantees that the store is propagated to all CPUs before * the VMBus connection is marked as ready for the resume event * (cf. check_ready_for_resume_event()). The interrupt handler * of the VMBus driver and vmbus_chan_sched() can not run before * vmbus_bus_resume() has completed execution (cf. resume_noirq). */ -smp_store_mb ( +virt_store_mb ( vmbus_connection.channels[channel->offermsg.child_relid], channel); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 269/277 x86/bug: Prevent shadowing in __WARN_FLAGS
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Vincent Mailhol <[email protected]>
commit 9ce02f0fc68326dd1f87a0a3a4c6ae7fdd39e6f6 upstream.
The macro __WARN_FLAGS() uses a local variable named "f". This being a common name, there is a risk of shadowing other variables.
For example, GCC would yield:
| In file included from ./include/linux/bug.h:5, | from ./include/linux/cpumask.h:14, | from ./arch/x86/include/asm/cpumask.h:5, | from ./arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h:11, | from ./arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:22, | from ./arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h:5, | from ./include/linux/timex.h:65, | from ./include/linux/time32.h:13, | from ./include/linux/time.h:60, | from ./include/linux/stat.h:19, | from ./include/linux/module.h:13, | from virt/lib/irqbypass.mod.c:1: | ./include/linux/rcupdate.h: In function 'rcu_head_after_call_rcu': | ./arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h:80:21: warning: declaration of 'f' shadows a parameter [-Wshadow] | 80 | __auto_type f = BUGFLAG_WARNING|(flags); \ | | ^ | ./include/asm-generic/bug.h:106:17: note: in expansion of macro '__WARN_FLAGS' | 106 | __WARN_FLAGS(BUGFLAG_ONCE | \ | | ^~~~~~~~~~~~ | ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:1007:9: note: in expansion of macro 'WARN_ON_ONCE' | 1007 | WARN_ON_ONCE(func != (rcu_callback_t)~0L); | | ^~~~~~~~~~~~ | In file included from ./include/linux/rbtree.h:24, | from ./include/linux/mm_types.h:11, | from ./include/linux/buildid.h:5, | from ./include/linux/module.h:14, | from virt/lib/irqbypass.mod.c:1: | ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:1001:62: note: shadowed declaration is here | 1001 | rcu_head_after_call_rcu(struct rcu_head *rhp, rcu_callback_t f) | | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^
For reference, sparse also warns about it, c.f. [1].
This patch renames the variable from f to __flags (with two underscore prefixes as suggested in the Linux kernel coding style [2]) in order to prevent collisions.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAFGhKbyifH1a+nAMCvWM88TK6fpNPdzFtUXPmRGnnQeePV+1sw@mail.gmail.com/
[2] Linux kernel coding style, section 12) Macros, Enums and RTL, paragraph 5) namespace collisions when defining local variables in macros resembling functions
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#macros-enums-and-rtl
--- arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h +2 -2
@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@ do { \*/ #define __WARN_FLAGS (flags) \ do { \ - __auto_type f = BUGFLAG_WARNING|(flags); \ + __auto_type __flags = BUGFLAG_WARNING|(flags); \ instrumentation_begin(); \ - _BUG_FLAGS(ASM_UD2, f, ASM_REACHABLE); \ + _BUG_FLAGS(ASM_UD2, __flags, ASM_REACHABLE); \ instrumentation_end(); \ } while (0)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 270/277 sched: Teach the forced-newidle balancer about CPU affinity limitation.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
commit 386ef214c3c6ab111d05e1790e79475363abaa05 upstream.
try_steal_cookie() looks at task_struct::cpus_mask to decide if the task could be moved to `this' CPU. It ignores that the task might be in a migration disabled section while not on the CPU. In this case the task must not be moved otherwise per-CPU assumption are broken.
Use is_cpu_allowed(), as suggested by Peter Zijlstra, to decide if the a task can be moved.
--- kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/sched/core.c +1 -1
@@ -5927,7 +5927,7 @@ static bool try_steal_cookie(int this, iif (p == src->core_pick || p == src->curr) goto next; -if (!cpumask_test_cpu (this, &p->cpus_mask)) +if (!is_cpu_allowed (p, this)) goto next;if (p->core_occupation > dst->idle->core_occupation)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 271/277 x86,static_call: Fix __static_call_return0 for i386
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
commit 1cd5f059d956e6f614ba6666ecdbcf95db05d5f5 upstream.
Paolo reported that the instruction sequence that is used to replace:
call __static_call_return0
namely:
66 66 48 31 c0 data16 data16 xor %rax,%rax
decodes to something else on i386, namely:
66 66 48 data16 dec %ax
31 c0 xor %eax,%eaxWhich is a nonsensical sequence that happens to have the same outcome. *However* an important distinction is that it consists of 2 instructions which is a problem when the thing needs to be overwriten with a regular call instruction again.
As such, replace the instruction with something that decodes the same on both i386 and x86_64.
--- arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c +2 -3
@@ -12,10 +12,9 @@ enum insn_type { };/* -* data16 data16 xorq %rax, %rax - a single 5 byte instruction that clears %rax -* The REX.W cancels the effect of any data16. +* cs cs cs xorl %eax, %eax - a single 5 byte instruction that clears %[er]ax */ -static const u8 xor5rax[] = {0x66 ,0x66 ,0x48 ,0x31 ,0xc0 }; +static const u8 xor5rax[] = {0x2e ,0x2e ,0x2e ,0x31 ,0xc0 };static void __ref __static_call_transform (void *insn,enum insn_type type,void *func) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 272/277 irqchip/gic-v4: Wait for GICR_VPENDBASER.Dirty to clear before descheduling
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
commit af27e41612ec7e5b4783f589b753a7c31a37aac8 upstream.
The way KVM drives GICv4.{0,1} is as follows:
- vcpu_load() makes the VPE resident, instructing the RD to start scanning for interrupts
- just before entering the guest, we check that the RD has finished scanning and that we can start running the vcpu
- on preemption, we deschedule the VPE by making it invalid on the RD
However, we are preemptible between the first two steps. If it so happens *and* that the RD was still scanning, we nonetheless write to the GICR_VPENDBASER register while Dirty is set, and bad things happen (we're in UNPRED land).
This affects both the 4.0 and 4.1 implementations.
Make sure Dirty is cleared before performing the deschedule, meaning that its_clear_vpend_valid() becomes a sort of full VPE residency barrier.
--- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c +19 -9
@@ -3007,18 +3007,12 @@ static int __init allocate_lpi_tables(voreturn 0 ; } -static u64 its_clear_vpend_valid (void __iomem *vlpi_base,u64 clr,u64 set) +static u64 read_vpend_dirty_clear (void __iomem *vlpi_base) {u32 count =1000000 ;/* 1s! */ bool clean;u64 val; - val =gicr_read_vpendbaser (vlpi_base +GICR_VPENDBASER ); - val &= ~GICR_VPENDBASER_Valid; - val &= ~clr; - val |= set; -gicr_write_vpendbaser (val, vlpi_base +GICR_VPENDBASER ); - do { val = gicr_read_vpendbaser(vlpi_base + GICR_VPENDBASER); clean = !(val & GICR_VPENDBASER_Dirty);
@@ -3029,10 +3023,26 @@ static u64 its_clear_vpend_valid(void __ } }while (!clean && count); -if (unlikely (val & GICR_VPENDBASER_Dirty)) { +if (unlikely (!clean))pr_err_ratelimited ("ITS virtual pending table not cleaning\n" ); + +return val; +} + +static u64 its_clear_vpend_valid (void __iomem *vlpi_base,u64 clr,u64 set) +{ +u64 val; + +/* Make sure we wait until the RD is done with the initial scan */ + val =read_vpend_dirty_clear (vlpi_base); + val &= ~GICR_VPENDBASER_Valid; + val &= ~clr; + val |= set; +gicr_write_vpendbaser (val, vlpi_base +GICR_VPENDBASER ); + + val =read_vpend_dirty_clear (vlpi_base); +if (unlikely (val & GICR_VPENDBASER_Dirty)) val |= GICR_VPENDBASER_PendingLast; - }return val; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 273/277 powerpc/64: Fix build failure with allyesconfig in book3s_64_entry.S
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
commit af41d2866f7d75bbb38d487f6ec7770425d70e45 upstream.
Using conditional branches between two files is hasardous, they may get linked too far from each other.
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_entry.o:(.text+0x3ec): relocation truncated to fit: R_PPC64_REL14 (stub) against symbol `system_reset_common' defined in .text section in arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.o
Reorganise the code to use non conditional branches.
--- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_entry.S | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_entry.S +8 -2
@@ -407,10 +407,16 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_DAWR1) */ ld r10,HSTATE_SCRATCH0(r13) cmpwi r10,BOOK3S_INTERRUPT_MACHINE_CHECK - beq machine_check_common + beq .Lcall_machine_check_common cmpwi r10,BOOK3S_INTERRUPT_SYSTEM_RESET - beq system_reset_common + beq .Lcall_system_reset_common b . + +.Lcall_machine_check_common: + b machine_check_common + +.Lcall_system_reset_common: + b system_reset_common #endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 274/277 irqchip/gic, gic-v3: Prevent GSI to SGI translations
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Andre Przywara <[email protected]>
commit 544808f7e21cb9ccdb8f3aa7de594c05b1419061 upstream.
At the moment the GIC IRQ domain translation routine happily converts ACPI table GSI numbers below 16 to GIC SGIs (Software Generated Interrupts aka IPIs). On the Devicetree side we explicitly forbid this translation, actually the function will never return HWIRQs below 16 when using a DT based domain translation.
We expect SGIs to be handled in the first part of the function, and any further occurrence should be treated as a firmware bug, so add a check and print to report this explicitly and avoid lengthy debug sessions.
--- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 6 ++++++ drivers/irqchip/irq-gic.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c +6 -0
@@ -1466,6 +1466,12 @@ static int gic_irq_domain_translate(struif (fwspec->param_count !=2 )return -EINVAL ; +if (fwspec->param[0 ] <16 ) { +pr_err (FW_BUG "Illegal GSI%d translation request\n" , + fwspec->param[0 ]); +return -EINVAL ; + } + *hwirq = fwspec->param[0 ]; *type = fwspec->param[1 ];
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic.c +6 -0
@@ -1085,6 +1085,12 @@ static int gic_irq_domain_translate(struif (fwspec->param_count !=2 )return -EINVAL ; +if (fwspec->param[0 ] <16 ) { +pr_err (FW_BUG "Illegal GSI%d translation request\n" , + fwspec->param[0 ]); +return -EINVAL ; + } + *hwirq = fwspec->param[0 ]; *type = fwspec->param[1 ];
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 275/277 mm/sparsemem: fix mem_section will never be NULL gcc 12 warning
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
commit a431dbbc540532b7465eae4fc8b56a85a9fc7d17 upstream.
The gcc 12 compiler reports a "'mem_section' will never be NULL" warning on the following code:
static inline struct mem_section *__nr_to_section(unsigned long nr)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME
if (!mem_section)
return NULL;
#endif
if (!mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT(nr)])
return NULL;
:It happens with CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME off. The mem_section definition is
#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME
extern struct mem_section **mem_section;
#else
extern struct mem_section mem_section[NR_SECTION_ROOTS][SECTIONS_PER_ROOT];
#endifIn the !CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME case, mem_section is a static 2-dimensional array and so the check "!mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT(nr)]" doesn't make sense.
Fix this warning by moving the "!mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT(nr)]" check up inside the CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME block and adding an explicit NR_SECTION_ROOTS check to make sure that there is no out-of-bound array access.
--- include/linux/mmzone.h | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/mmzone.h +7 -4
@@ -1351,13 +1351,16 @@ static inline unsigned long *section_to_static inline struct mem_section *__nr_to_section (unsigned long nr) { +unsigned long root =SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT (nr); + +if (unlikely (root >=NR_SECTION_ROOTS )) +return NULL ; +#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME -if (!mem_section) +if (!mem_section || !mem_section[root])return NULL ;#endif -if (!mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT (nr)]) -return NULL ; -return &mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT (nr)][nr &SECTION_ROOT_MASK ]; +return &mem_section[root][nr &SECTION_ROOT_MASK ]; }extern size_t mem_section_usage_size (void );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 276/277 static_call: Dont make __static_call_return0 static
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
commit 8fd4ddda2f49a66bf5dd3d0c01966c4b1971308b upstream.
System.map shows that vmlinux contains several instances of __static_call_return0():
c0004fc0 t __static_call_return0 c0011518 t __static_call_return0 c00d8160 t __static_call_return0
arch_static_call_transform() uses the middle one to check whether we are setting a call to __static_call_return0 or not:
c0011520 <arch_static_call_transform>: c0011520: 3d 20 c0 01 lis r9,-16383 <== r9 = 0xc001 << 16 c0011524: 39 29 15 18 addi r9,r9,5400 <== r9 += 0x1518 c0011528: 7c 05 48 00 cmpw r5,r9 <== r9 has value 0xc0011518 here
So if static_call_update() is called with one of the other instances of __static_call_return0(), arch_static_call_transform() won't recognise it.
In order to work properly, global single instance of __static_call_return0() is required.
--- include/linux/static_call.h | 5 kernel/Makefile | 3 kernel/static_call.c | 542 ------------------------------------------- kernel/static_call_inline.c | 543 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 547 insertions(+), 546 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/static_call_inline.c
include/linux/static_call.h +1 -4
@@ -248,10 +248,7 @@ static inline int static_call_text_reserreturn 0 ; } -static inline long __static_call_return0 (void ) -{ -return 0 ; -} +extern long __static_call_return0 (void );#define EXPORT_STATIC_CALL (name) \ EXPORT_SYMBOL(STATIC_CALL_KEY(name)); \
kernel/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_PM) += cpu_pm.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF) += bpf/ obj-$(CONFIG_KCSAN) += kcsan/ obj-$(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK) += scs.o -obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) += static_call.o +obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL) += static_call.o +obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) += static_call_inline.o obj-$(CONFIG_CFI_CLANG) += cfi.o obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += events/
kernel/static_call.c +1 -541
549 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/static_call_inline.c new file +543 -0
543 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 277/277 powerpc: Fix virt_addr_valid() for 64-bit Book3E & 32-bit
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
commit ffa0b64e3be58519ae472ea29a1a1ad681e32f48 upstream.
mpe: On 64-bit Book3E vmalloc space starts at 0x8000000000000000.
Because of the way __pa() works we have:
__pa(0x8000000000000000) == 0, and therefore virt_to_pfn(0x8000000000000000) == 0, and therefore virt_addr_valid(0x8000000000000000) == true
Which is wrong, virt_addr_valid() should be false for vmalloc space. In fact all vmalloc addresses that alias with a valid PFN will return true from virt_addr_valid(). That can cause bugs with hardened usercopy as described below by Kefeng Wang:
When running ethtool eth0 on 64-bit Book3E, a BUG occurred:
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object not in SLUB page?! (offset 0, size 1048)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99
...
usercopy_abort+0x64/0xa0 (unreliable)
__check_heap_object+0x168/0x190
__check_object_size+0x1a0/0x200
dev_ethtool+0x2494/0x2b20
dev_ioctl+0x5d0/0x770
sock_do_ioctl+0xf0/0x1d0
sock_ioctl+0x3ec/0x5a0
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf0/0x160
system_call_exception+0xfc/0x1f0
system_call_common+0xf8/0x200The code shows below,
data = vzalloc(array_size(gstrings.len, ETH_GSTRING_LEN)); copy_to_user(useraddr, data, gstrings.len * ETH_GSTRING_LEN))
The data is alloced by vmalloc(), virt_addr_valid(ptr) will return true on 64-bit Book3E, which leads to the panic.
As commit 4dd7554a6456 ("powerpc/64: Add VIRTUAL_BUG_ON checks for __va and __pa addresses") does, make sure the virt addr above PAGE_OFFSET in the virt_addr_valid() for 64-bit, also add upper limit check to make sure the virt is below high_memory.
Meanwhile, for 32-bit PAGE_OFFSET is the virtual address of the start of lowmem, high_memory is the upper low virtual address, the check is suitable for 32-bit, this will fix the issue mentioned in commit 602946ec2f90 ("powerpc: Set max_mapnr correctly") too.
On 32-bit there is a similar problem with high memory, that was fixed in commit 602946ec2f90 ("powerpc: Set max_mapnr correctly"), but that commit breaks highmem and needs to be reverted.
We can't easily fix __pa(), we have code that relies on its current behaviour. So for now add extra checks to virt_addr_valid().
For 64-bit Book3S the extra checks are not necessary, the combination of virt_to_pfn() and pfn_valid() should yield the correct result, but they are harmless.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/page.h | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/page.h +5 -1
@@ -132,7 +132,11 @@ static inline bool pfn_valid(unsigned lo#define virt_to_page (kaddr) pfn_to_page(virt_to_pfn(kaddr))#define pfn_to_kaddr (pfn) __va((pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT) -#define virt_addr_valid (kaddr) pfn_valid(virt_to_pfn(kaddr)) +#define virt_addr_valid (vaddr) ({ \ + unsigned long _addr = (unsigned long)vaddr; \ + _addr >= PAGE_OFFSET && _addr < (unsigned long)high_memory && \ + pfn_valid(virt_to_pfn(_addr)); \ +})/* * On Book-E parts we need __va to parse the device tree and we can't
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.34 release. There are 277 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Apr 2022 06:28:59 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.34-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.15.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On linux stable-rc 5.15 x86 and i386 builds failed due to below error [1] with config [2].
The finding is when kunit config is enabled the builds pass. CONFIG_KUNIT=y
But with CONFIG_KUNIT not set the builds failed.
x86_64-linux-gnu-ld: mm/kfence/core.o: in function `__kfence_alloc':
core.c:(.text+0x901): undefined reference to `filter_irq_stacks' make[1]: *** [/builds/linux/Makefile:1183: vmlinux] Error 1
I see these three commits, I will bisect and get back to you
2f222c87ceb4 kfence: limit currently covered allocations when pool nearly full e25487912879 kfence: move saving stack trace of allocations into __kfence_alloc()d99355395380 kfence: count unexpectedly skipped allocations
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
[1] https://builds.tuxbuild.com/27h6Ztu4T35pY178Xg8EyAj7gIW/
[2] https://builds.tuxbuild.com/27h6Ztu4T35pY178Xg8EyAj7gIW/config
Quoted 35 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.34 release. There are 277 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Apr 2022 06:28:59 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.34-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.15.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On linux stable-rc 5.15 x86 and i386 builds failed due to below error [1] with config [2].
The finding is when kunit config is enabled the builds pass.
CONFIG_KUNIT=yBut with
CONFIG_KUNITnot set the builds failed.x86_64-linux-gnu-ld:
mm/kfence/core.o: in function `__kfence_alloc':
core.c:(.text+0x901): undefined reference to `filter_irq_stacks' make[1]: *** [/builds/linux/Makefile:1183: vmlinux] Error 1
Quoted 8 lines
I see these three commits, I will bisect and get back to you
2f222c87ceb4kfence: limit currently covered allocations when pool nearly fulle25487912879kfence: move saving stack trace of allocations into__kfence_alloc()d99355395380kfence: count unexpectedly skipped allocations
My guess is that this commit is missing:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=f39f21b3ddc7fc0f87eb6dc75ddc81b5bbfb7672
Thanks,
-- Marco
Hi Marco
Quoted 39 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 37 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.34 release. There are 277 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Apr 2022 06:28:59 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.34-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.15.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On linux stable-rc 5.15 x86 and i386 builds failed due to below error [1] with config [2].
The finding is when kunit config is enabled the builds pass.
CONFIG_KUNIT=yBut with
CONFIG_KUNITnot set the builds failed.x86_64-linux-gnu-ld:
mm/kfence/core.o: in function `__kfence_alloc':
core.c:(.text+0x901): undefined reference to `filter_irq_stacks' make[1]: *** [/builds/linux/Makefile:1183: vmlinux] Error 1
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I see these three commits, I will bisect and get back to you
2f222c87ceb4kfence: limit currently covered allocations when pool nearly fulle25487912879kfence: move saving stack trace of allocations into__kfence_alloc()d99355395380kfence: count unexpectedly skipped allocationsMy guess is that this commit is missing:
This patch is missing Fixes: tag.
For your information, I have reverted the below commit and build pass.
kfence: limit currently covered allocations when pool nearly full
[ Upstream commit 08f6b10630f284755087f58aa393402e15b92977 ]
- Naresh
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks,
-- Marco
Quoted 45 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Hi Marco
Quoted 41 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 39 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.34 release. There are 277 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Apr 2022 06:28:59 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.34-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.15.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On linux stable-rc 5.15 x86 and i386 builds failed due to below error [1] with config [2].
The finding is when kunit config is enabled the builds pass.
CONFIG_KUNIT=yBut with
CONFIG_KUNITnot set the builds failed.x86_64-linux-gnu-ld:
mm/kfence/core.o: in function `__kfence_alloc':
core.c:(.text+0x901): undefined reference to `filter_irq_stacks' make[1]: *** [/builds/linux/Makefile:1183: vmlinux] Error 1I see these three commits, I will bisect and get back to you
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
2f222c87ceb4kfence: limit currently covered allocations when pool nearly fulle25487912879kfence: move saving stack trace of allocations into__kfence_alloc()d99355395380kfence: count unexpectedly skipped allocationsMy guess is that this commit is missing:
This patch is missing Fixes: tag.
No it's not - it was patch 1/N in this series:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 53 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Hi Marco
Quoted 39 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 37 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.34 release. There are 277 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Apr 2022 06:28:59 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.34-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.15.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On linux stable-rc 5.15 x86 and i386 builds failed due to below error [1] with config [2].
The finding is when kunit config is enabled the builds pass.
CONFIG_KUNIT=yBut with
CONFIG_KUNITnot set the builds failed.x86_64-linux-gnu-ld:
mm/kfence/core.o: in function `__kfence_alloc':
core.c:(.text+0x901): undefined reference to `filter_irq_stacks' make[1]: *** [/builds/linux/Makefile:1183: vmlinux] Error 1Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I see these three commits, I will bisect and get back to you
2f222c87ceb4kfence: limit currently covered allocations when pool nearly fulle25487912879kfence: move saving stack trace of allocations into__kfence_alloc()d99355395380kfence: count unexpectedly skipped allocationsMy guess is that this commit is missing:
This patch is missing Fixes: tag.
Quoted 7 lines
For your information, I have reverted the below commit and build pass.
kfence: limit currently covered allocations when pool nearly full
[ Upstream commit
08f6b10630f284755087f58aa393402e15b92977]
I've added the above commit, does that fix the issue?
Hm, I can test that here, let me try it...
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 58 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 57 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Hi Marco
Quoted 39 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 37 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.34 release. There are 277 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Apr 2022 06:28:59 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.34-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.15.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On linux stable-rc 5.15 x86 and i386 builds failed due to below error [1] with config [2].
The finding is when kunit config is enabled the builds pass.
CONFIG_KUNIT=yBut with
CONFIG_KUNITnot set the builds failed.x86_64-linux-gnu-ld:
mm/kfence/core.o: in function `__kfence_alloc':
core.c:(.text+0x901): undefined reference to `filter_irq_stacks' make[1]: *** [/builds/linux/Makefile:1183: vmlinux] Error 1Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I see these three commits, I will bisect and get back to you
2f222c87ceb4kfence: limit currently covered allocations when pool nearly fulle25487912879kfence: move saving stack trace of allocations into__kfence_alloc()d99355395380kfence: count unexpectedly skipped allocationsMy guess is that this commit is missing:
This patch is missing Fixes: tag.
For your information, I have reverted the below commit and build pass.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
kfence: limit currently covered allocations when pool nearly full
[ Upstream commit
08f6b10630f284755087f58aa393402e15b92977]I've added the above commit, does that fix the issue?
Hm, I can test that here, let me try it...
I can't duplicate the failure here with my config, let me try yours...
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 61 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 60 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 59 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Hi Marco
Quoted 39 lines · Marco Elver
Quoted 37 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.34 release. There are 277 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Apr 2022 06:28:59 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.15.34-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.15.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On linux stable-rc 5.15 x86 and i386 builds failed due to below error [1] with config [2].
The finding is when kunit config is enabled the builds pass.
CONFIG_KUNIT=yBut with
CONFIG_KUNITnot set the builds failed.x86_64-linux-gnu-ld:
mm/kfence/core.o: in function `__kfence_alloc':
core.c:(.text+0x901): undefined reference to `filter_irq_stacks' make[1]: *** [/builds/linux/Makefile:1183: vmlinux] Error 1Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I see these three commits, I will bisect and get back to you
2f222c87ceb4kfence: limit currently covered allocations when pool nearly fulle25487912879kfence: move saving stack trace of allocations into__kfence_alloc()d99355395380kfence: count unexpectedly skipped allocationsMy guess is that this commit is missing:
This patch is missing Fixes: tag.
For your information, I have reverted the below commit and build pass.
kfence: limit currently covered allocations when pool nearly full
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
[ Upstream commit
08f6b10630f284755087f58aa393402e15b92977]I've added the above commit, does that fix the issue?
Hm, I can test that here, let me try it...
I can't duplicate the failure here with my config, let me try yours...
Yes, with your config before it fails, after I added the commit it works. I'll push out a -rc2 soon with that added.
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.34 release. There are 277 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Apr 2022 06:28:59 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Building powerpc:skiroot_defconfig ... failed
--------------
Error log:arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c:119:19: error: conflicting types for 'unmap_patch_area'; have 'int(long unsigned int)'
119 | static inline int unmap_patch_area(unsigned long addr)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c:51:13: note: previous declaration of 'unmap_patch_area' with type 'void(long unsigned int)'
51 | static void unmap_patch_area(unsigned long addr);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c:51:13: error: 'unmap_patch_area' used but never defined [-Werror]
Commit 520c23a20890 ("powerpc/code-patching: Pre-map patch area") is the last patch in a series of patches applied to the file since v5.15. It is not tagged for stable, and it does not include a Fixes: tag. I am not sure if it makes sense to apply it on its own. Copying Michael.
Guenter
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 20 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.15.34 release. There are 277 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Apr 2022 06:28:59 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Building powerpc:skiroot_defconfig ... failed
--------------
Error log:arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c:119:19: error: conflicting types for 'unmap_patch_area'; have 'int(long unsigned int)'
119 | static inline intunmap_patch_area(unsigned long addr)| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c:51:13: note: previous declaration of 'unmap_patch_area' with type 'void(long unsigned int)' 51 | static void unmap_patch_area(unsigned long addr); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Quoted 7 lines
arch/powerpc/lib/code-patching.c:51:13: error: 'unmap_patch_area' used but never defined [-Werror]Commit
520c23a20890("powerpc/code-patching: Pre-map patch area") is the last patch in a series of patches applied to the file since v5.15. It is not tagged for stable, and it does not include a Fixes: tag. I am not sure if it makes sense to apply it on its own. Copying Michael.
Yeah, that's not right. I'll drop it from 5.10 and 5.15 (and older), for some reason Sasha skipped 5.16, probably because he saw this build error there.
thanks for the report, I'll push out a -rc2 soon.
greg k-h