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Adds starting the idle domain privileged

PATCH Superseded Daniel P. Smith 3 participants 10 messages Apr 20, 2022 – Apr 21, 2022

v2 of 10 Superseded Latest is v10 →

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover Adds starting the idle domain privileged

This series makes it so that the idle domain is started privileged under the default policy, which the SILO policy inherits, and under the flask policy. It then introduces a new one-way XSM hook, xsm_transition_running, that is hooked by an XSM policy to transition the idle domain to its running privilege level.

Changes in v2:
- renamed flask_domain_runtime_security() to flask_transition_running()
- added the missed assignment of self_sid

Daniel P. Smith (2):
xsm: create idle domain privieged and demote after setup
flask: implement xsm_transtion_running

 tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if      |  6 ++++++
 tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te      |  1 +
 tools/flask/policy/policy/initial_sids |  1 +
 xen/arch/arm/setup.c                   |  6 ++++++
 xen/arch/x86/setup.c                   |  6 ++++++
 xen/common/sched/core.c                |  7 ++++++-
 xen/include/xsm/dummy.h                | 12 ++++++++++++
 xen/include/xsm/xsm.h                  |  6 ++++++
 xen/xsm/dummy.c                        |  1 +
 xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c                  | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 xen/xsm/flask/policy/initial_sids      |  1 +
 11 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 xsm: create idle domain privieged and demote after setup

There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protectd by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook, xsm_transition_running, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.

For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to xsm_transtion_running.

---
 xen/arch/arm/setup.c    |  6 ++++++
 xen/arch/x86/setup.c    |  6 ++++++
 xen/common/sched/core.c |  7 ++++++-
 xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 12 ++++++++++++
 xen/include/xsm/xsm.h   |  6 ++++++
 xen/xsm/dummy.c         |  1 +
 xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c   | 15 +++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +6 -0
index d5d0792ed4..763835aeb5 100644
@@ -1048,6 +1048,12 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,
     /* Hide UART from DOM0 if we're using it */
     serial_endboot();
 
+    xsm_transition_running();
+
+    /* Ensure idle domain was not left privileged */
+    if ( current->domain->is_privileged )
+        panic("idle domain did not properly transition from setup privilege\n");
+
     system_state = SYS_STATE_active;
 
     for_each_domain( d )
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +6 -0
index 6f20e17892..72695dcb07 100644
@@ -621,6 +621,12 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)
     void *va;
     unsigned long start, end;
 
+    xsm_transition_running();
+
+    /* Ensure idle domain was not left privileged */
+    if ( current->domain->is_privileged )
+        panic("idle domain did not properly transition from setup privilege\n");
+
     system_state = SYS_STATE_active;
 
     domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(dom0);
xen/common/sched/core.c +6 -1
index 19ab678181..22a619e260 100644
@@ -3021,7 +3021,12 @@ void __init scheduler_init(void)
         sched_ratelimit_us = SCHED_DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_US;
     }
 
-    idle_domain = domain_create(DOMID_IDLE, NULL, 0);
+    /*
+     * idle dom is created privileged to ensure unrestricted access during
+     * setup and will be demoted by xsm_transition_running when setup is
+     * complete
+     */
+    idle_domain = domain_create(DOMID_IDLE, NULL, CDF_privileged);
     BUG_ON(IS_ERR(idle_domain));
     BUG_ON(nr_cpu_ids > ARRAY_SIZE(idle_vcpu));
     idle_domain->vcpu = idle_vcpu;
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +12 -0
index 58afc1d589..b33f0ec672 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,18 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action(
     }
 }
 
+static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_transition_running(void)
+{
+    struct domain *d = current->domain;
+
+    if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE )
+        panic("xsm_transition_running should only be called by idle domain\n");
+
+    d->is_privileged = false;
+
+    return;
+}
+
 static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_security_domaininfo(
     struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info)
 {
xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +6 -0
index 3e2b7fe3db..a5c06804ab 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum xsm_default xsm_default_t;
  * !!! WARNING !!!
  */
 struct xsm_ops {
+    void (*transition_running)(void);
     void (*security_domaininfo)(struct domain *d,
                                 struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info);
     int (*domain_create)(struct domain *d, uint32_t ssidref);
@@ -208,6 +209,11 @@ extern struct xsm_ops xsm_ops;
 
 #ifndef XSM_NO_WRAPPERS
 
+static inline void xsm_transition_running(void)
+{
+    alternative_vcall(xsm_ops.transition_running);
+}
+
 static inline void xsm_security_domaininfo(
     struct domain *d, struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info)
 {
xen/xsm/dummy.c +1 -0
index 8c044ef615..66f26c6909 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <xsm/dummy.h>
 
 static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber dummy_ops = {
+    .transition_running            = xsm_transition_running,
     .security_domaininfo           = xsm_security_domaininfo,
     .domain_create                 = xsm_domain_create,
     .getdomaininfo                 = xsm_getdomaininfo,
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +15 -0
index 0bf63ffa84..decebc8231 100644
@@ -186,6 +186,20 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)
     return 0;
 }
 
+static void cf_check flask_transition_running(void)
+{
+    struct domain *d = current->domain;
+
+    if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE )
+        panic("xsm_transition_running should only be called by idle domain\n");
+
+    /*
+     * While is_privileged has no significant meaning under flask,
+     * set to false for the consistency check(s) in the setup code.
+     */
+    d->is_privileged = false;
+}
+
 static void cf_check flask_domain_free_security(struct domain *d)
 {
     struct domain_security_struct *dsec = d->ssid;
@@ -1766,6 +1780,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_argo_send(
 #endif
 
 static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber flask_ops = {
+    .transition_running = flask_transition_running,
     .security_domaininfo = flask_security_domaininfo,
     .domain_create = flask_domain_create,
     .getdomaininfo = flask_getdomaininfo,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privieged and demote after setup

Quoted 10 lines · Daniel P. Smith

There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protectd by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook, xsm_transition_running, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.

Quoted 6 lines

For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to xsm_transtion_running.

Looks okay to me, but I'm not sure in how far agreement was reached on taking this route. Just one nit:

Quoted 7 lines
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +1 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,18 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action(
     }
 }
 
+static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_transition_running(void)

xen/include/xsm/dummy.h static always_inline int xsm_default_action( · line 114

Quoted 10 lines
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +10 -0
+{
+    struct domain *d = current->domain;
+
+    if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE )
+        panic("xsm_transition_running should only be called by idle domain\n");
+
+    d->is_privileged = false;
+
+    return;
+}

Please omit such return statements.

Jan

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privieged and demote after setup

Quoted 16 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 15 lines · Daniel P. Smith

There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protectd by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook, xsm_transition_running, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.

For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to xsm_transtion_running.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line

Looks okay to me, but I'm not sure in how far agreement was reached on taking this route. Just one nit:

Thank you. As for the approach, Jason suggested it and Roger stated that if this approach was adopted it would resolve his concerns over __init. If you have a concern with this approach, please let me know so I can ensure it is addressed to the best of my ability.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +0 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,18 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action(
     }
 }
 
Quoted 13 lines

xen/include/xsm/dummy.h static always_inline int xsm_default_action( · line 114

Quoted 11 lines
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +11 -0
+static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_transition_running(void)
+{
+    struct domain *d = current->domain;
+
+    if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE )
+        panic("xsm_transition_running should only be called by idle domain\n");
+
+    d->is_privileged = false;
+
+    return;
+}

Please omit such return statements.

Ack.

v/r,
dps

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privieged and demote after setup

In reply to Daniel P. Smith
Quoted 31 lines · Daniel P. Smith

There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protectd by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook, xsm_transition_running, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.

For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to xsm_transtion_running.

---
 xen/arch/arm/setup.c    |  6 ++++++
 xen/arch/x86/setup.c    |  6 ++++++
 xen/common/sched/core.c |  7 ++++++-
 xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 12 ++++++++++++
 xen/include/xsm/xsm.h   |  6 ++++++
 xen/xsm/dummy.c         |  1 +
 xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c   | 15 +++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +0 -0
index d5d0792ed4..763835aeb5 100644

xen/arch/arm/setup.c void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset, · line 1051

Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +1 -0
@@ -1048,6 +1048,12 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,
     /* Hide UART from DOM0 if we're using it */
     serial_endboot();
 
+    xsm_transition_running();

Could we put depriv or dipriviledge somewhere here? 'transition' seem to ambiguous IMO (but I'm not a native speaker).

xsm_{depriv,demote}_current();

Quoted 48 lines
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +5 -0
+
+    /* Ensure idle domain was not left privileged */
+    if ( current->domain->is_privileged )
+        panic("idle domain did not properly transition from setup privilege\n");
+
     system_state = SYS_STATE_active;
 
     for_each_domain( d )
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +6 -0
index 6f20e17892..72695dcb07 100644
@@ -621,6 +621,12 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)
     void *va;
     unsigned long start, end;
 
+    xsm_transition_running();
+
+    /* Ensure idle domain was not left privileged */
+    if ( current->domain->is_privileged )
+        panic("idle domain did not properly transition from setup privilege\n");
+
     system_state = SYS_STATE_active;
 
     domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(dom0);
xen/common/sched/core.c +6 -1
index 19ab678181..22a619e260 100644
@@ -3021,7 +3021,12 @@ void __init scheduler_init(void)
         sched_ratelimit_us = SCHED_DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_US;
     }
 
-    idle_domain = domain_create(DOMID_IDLE, NULL, 0);
+    /*
+     * idle dom is created privileged to ensure unrestricted access during
+     * setup and will be demoted by xsm_transition_running when setup is
+     * complete
+     */
+    idle_domain = domain_create(DOMID_IDLE, NULL, CDF_privileged);
     BUG_ON(IS_ERR(idle_domain));
     BUG_ON(nr_cpu_ids > ARRAY_SIZE(idle_vcpu));
     idle_domain->vcpu = idle_vcpu;
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +0 -0
index 58afc1d589..b33f0ec672 100644

xen/include/xsm/dummy.h static always_inline int xsm_default_action( · line 109

Quoted 9 lines
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +6 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,18 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action(
     }
 }
 
+static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_transition_running(void)
+{
+    struct domain *d = current->domain;
+
+    if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE )
+        panic("xsm_transition_running should only be called by idle domain\n");

Could you also add a check that d->is_privileged == true?

Thanks, Roger.

#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privieged and demote after setup

Quoted 35 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 34 lines · Daniel P. Smith

There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protectd by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook, xsm_transition_running, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.

For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to xsm_transtion_running.

---
 xen/arch/arm/setup.c    |  6 ++++++
 xen/arch/x86/setup.c    |  6 ++++++
 xen/common/sched/core.c |  7 ++++++-
 xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 12 ++++++++++++
 xen/include/xsm/xsm.h   |  6 ++++++
 xen/xsm/dummy.c         |  1 +
 xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c   | 15 +++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +0 -0
index d5d0792ed4..763835aeb5 100644
@@ -1048,6 +1048,12 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,
     /* Hide UART from DOM0 if we're using it */
     serial_endboot();
 
Quoted 6 lines

xen/arch/arm/setup.c void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset, · line 1051

Quoted 1 line
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +1 -0
+    xsm_transition_running();

Could we put depriv or dipriviledge somewhere here? 'transition' seem to ambiguous IMO (but I'm not a native speaker).

xsm_{depriv,demote}_current();

Let me say this explanation is not to say no but to give context to the concerns. Forms of deprive/demote were considered though when considering the concept proposed was to change the security model where the hypervisor/idle domain were now explicitly being give a new security context, is_privileged and xenboot_t, under which setup is being run. This new xsm hook is to provide a transition point for the XSM policies to set what the running security context should be for the hypervisor/idle domain. The name xsm_transition_running() clearly denotes when/where this hook should be used, where as the name xsm_depriv_current() is more generic and another developer may attempt to use it in a manner it was not intended.

It is possible to consider creating an xsm_depriv_current() that functions in a more generic manner but will likely be more complicated to support general usage, especially for flask where a flask specific "lower" security context must be provided.

If there is still a preference towards xsm_depriv_current() while maintaining the current mechanics as it makes more sense for the majority, I have no issue with that.

Quoted 51 lines
Quoted 51 lines
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +5 -0
+
+    /* Ensure idle domain was not left privileged */
+    if ( current->domain->is_privileged )
+        panic("idle domain did not properly transition from setup privilege\n");
+
     system_state = SYS_STATE_active;
 
     for_each_domain( d )
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +6 -0
index 6f20e17892..72695dcb07 100644
@@ -621,6 +621,12 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)
     void *va;
     unsigned long start, end;
 
+    xsm_transition_running();
+
+    /* Ensure idle domain was not left privileged */
+    if ( current->domain->is_privileged )
+        panic("idle domain did not properly transition from setup privilege\n");
+
     system_state = SYS_STATE_active;
 
     domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(dom0);
xen/common/sched/core.c +6 -1
index 19ab678181..22a619e260 100644
@@ -3021,7 +3021,12 @@ void __init scheduler_init(void)
         sched_ratelimit_us = SCHED_DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_US;
     }
 
-    idle_domain = domain_create(DOMID_IDLE, NULL, 0);
+    /*
+     * idle dom is created privileged to ensure unrestricted access during
+     * setup and will be demoted by xsm_transition_running when setup is
+     * complete
+     */
+    idle_domain = domain_create(DOMID_IDLE, NULL, CDF_privileged);
     BUG_ON(IS_ERR(idle_domain));
     BUG_ON(nr_cpu_ids > ARRAY_SIZE(idle_vcpu));
     idle_domain->vcpu = idle_vcpu;
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +0 -0
index 58afc1d589..b33f0ec672 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,18 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action(
     }
 }
 
Quoted 8 lines

xen/include/xsm/dummy.h static always_inline int xsm_default_action( · line 109

Quoted 6 lines
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +6 -0
+static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_transition_running(void)
+{
+    struct domain *d = current->domain;
+
+    if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE )
+        panic("xsm_transition_running should only be called by idle domain\n");

Could you also add a check that d->is_privileged == true?

Are you thinking along the lines of,

    if ( (!d->is_privileged) || (d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE)
        panic("some message\n");

or is your concern more of,

    if ( !d->is_privileged )
        return;

In my mind the former is legitimate because execution should only arrive here with current->domain being the idle domain and is_privileged set to true. The latter check I feel is extraneous because 1) this hook should only ever be called under the idle domain, thus it should be checked first and should absolutely panic if another domain context is in place. Which leads to, 2) checking if it is not false before setting to false is only protecting against resetting to false for which there could be no side effects this guard would be protecting against.

v/r,
dps

#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privieged and demote after setup

Quoted 43 lines · Daniel P. Smith
Quoted 35 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 34 lines · Daniel P. Smith

There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protectd by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook, xsm_transition_running, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.

For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to xsm_transtion_running.

---
 xen/arch/arm/setup.c    |  6 ++++++
 xen/arch/x86/setup.c    |  6 ++++++
 xen/common/sched/core.c |  7 ++++++-
 xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 12 ++++++++++++
 xen/include/xsm/xsm.h   |  6 ++++++
 xen/xsm/dummy.c         |  1 +
 xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c   | 15 +++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +0 -0
index d5d0792ed4..763835aeb5 100644
@@ -1048,6 +1048,12 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,
     /* Hide UART from DOM0 if we're using it */
     serial_endboot();
 
Quoted 6 lines

xen/arch/arm/setup.c void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset, · line 1051

Quoted 1 line
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +1 -0
+    xsm_transition_running();

Could we put depriv or dipriviledge somewhere here? 'transition' seem to ambiguous IMO (but I'm not a native speaker).

xsm_{depriv,demote}_current();

Quoted 11 lines

Let me say this explanation is not to say no but to give context to the concerns. Forms of deprive/demote were considered though when considering the concept proposed was to change the security model where the hypervisor/idle domain were now explicitly being give a new security context, is_privileged and xenboot_t, under which setup is being run. This new xsm hook is to provide a transition point for the XSM policies to set what the running security context should be for the hypervisor/idle domain. The name xsm_transition_running() clearly denotes when/where this hook should be used, where as the name xsm_depriv_current() is more generic and another developer may attempt to use it in a manner it was not intended.

Hm, I see. I (wrongly) originally understood it was related to making a transition in the running context, rather than the context being changed to the running state.

Maybe xsm_{transition_,set_,}system_active() to better match the system_state?

Albeit now that I understand it's purpose it doesn't feel so weird.

Quoted 40 lines
Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 26 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c +6 -1
index 19ab678181..22a619e260 100644
@@ -3021,7 +3021,12 @@ void __init scheduler_init(void)
         sched_ratelimit_us = SCHED_DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_US;
     }
 
-    idle_domain = domain_create(DOMID_IDLE, NULL, 0);
+    /*
+     * idle dom is created privileged to ensure unrestricted access during
+     * setup and will be demoted by xsm_transition_running when setup is
+     * complete
+     */
+    idle_domain = domain_create(DOMID_IDLE, NULL, CDF_privileged);
     BUG_ON(IS_ERR(idle_domain));
     BUG_ON(nr_cpu_ids > ARRAY_SIZE(idle_vcpu));
     idle_domain->vcpu = idle_vcpu;
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +0 -0
index 58afc1d589..b33f0ec672 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,18 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action(
     }
 }
 
Quoted 8 lines

xen/include/xsm/dummy.h static always_inline int xsm_default_action( · line 109

Quoted 6 lines
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +6 -0
+static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_transition_running(void)
+{
+    struct domain *d = current->domain;
+
+    if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE )
+        panic("xsm_transition_running should only be called by idle domain\n");

Could you also add a check that d->is_privileged == true?

Are you thinking along the lines of,

    if ( (!d->is_privileged) || (d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE)
        panic("some message\n");
Quoted 8 lines

or is your concern more of,

    if ( !d->is_privileged )
        return;

In my mind the former is legitimate because execution should only arrive here with current->domain being the idle domain and is_privileged set to true.

I was thinking about the former, maybe adding it as a separate condition so you can print a specific panic message, or joined with the other if the panic message can be adjusted to fit both conditions.

Thanks, Roger.

#7 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 flask: implement xsm_transtion_running

In reply to Daniel P. Smith

This commit implements full support for starting the idle domain privileged by introducing a new flask label xenboot_t which the idle domain is labeled with at creation. It then provides the implementation for the XSM hook xsm_transition_running to relabel the idle domain to the existing xen_t flask label.

In the reference flask policy a new macro, xen_build_domain(target), is introduced for creating policies for dom0less/hyperlaunch allowing the hypervisor to create and assign the necessary resources for domain construction.

---
 tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if      | 6 ++++++
 tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te      | 1 +
 tools/flask/policy/policy/initial_sids | 1 +
 xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c                  | 7 ++++++-
 xen/xsm/flask/policy/initial_sids      | 1 +
 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if +6 -0
index 5e2aa472b6..4ec676fff1 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ define(`create_domain_common', `
 			setparam altp2mhvm altp2mhvm_op dm };
 ')
 
+# xen_build_domain(target)
+#   Allow a domain to be created at boot by the hypervisor
+define(`xen_build_domain', `
+	allow xenboot_t $1_channel:event create;
+')
+
 # create_domain(priv, target)
 #   Allow a domain to be created directly
 define(`create_domain', `
tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te +1 -0
index 3dbf93d2b8..de98206fdd 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ attribute mls_priv;
 ################################################################################
 
 # The hypervisor itself
+type xenboot_t, xen_type, mls_priv;
 type xen_t, xen_type, mls_priv;
 
 # Domain 0
tools/flask/policy/policy/initial_sids +1 -0
index 6b7b7eff21..ec729d3ba3 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 # objects created before the policy is loaded or for objects that do not have a
 # label defined in some other manner.
 
+sid xenboot gen_context(system_u:system_r:xenboot_t,s0)
 sid xen gen_context(system_u:system_r:xen_t,s0)
 sid dom0 gen_context(system_u:system_r:dom0_t,s0)
 sid domxen gen_context(system_u:system_r:domxen_t,s0)
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +6 -1
index decebc8231..0643654aba 100644
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)
     switch ( d->domain_id )
     {
     case DOMID_IDLE:
-        dsec->sid = SECINITSID_XEN;
+        dsec->sid = SECINITSID_XENBOOT;
         break;
     case DOMID_XEN:
         dsec->sid = SECINITSID_DOMXEN;
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)
 
 static void cf_check flask_transition_running(void)
 {
+    struct domain_security_struct *dsec;
     struct domain *d = current->domain;
 
     if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE )
@@ -198,6 +199,10 @@ static void cf_check flask_transition_running(void)
      * set to false for the consistency check(s) in the setup code.
      */
     d->is_privileged = false;
+
+    dsec = d->ssid;
+    dsec->sid = SECINITSID_XEN;
+    dsec->self_sid = dsec->sid;
 }
 
 static void cf_check flask_domain_free_security(struct domain *d)
xen/xsm/flask/policy/initial_sids +1 -0
index 7eca70d339..e8b55b8368 100644
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #
 # Define initial security identifiers 
 #
+sid xenboot
 sid xen
 sid dom0
 sid domio
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] flask: implement xsm_transtion_running

Quoted 20 lines · Daniel P. Smith
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +2 -1
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)
     switch ( d->domain_id )
     {
     case DOMID_IDLE:
-        dsec->sid = SECINITSID_XEN;
+        dsec->sid = SECINITSID_XENBOOT;
         break;
     case DOMID_XEN:
         dsec->sid = SECINITSID_DOMXEN;
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)
 
 static void cf_check flask_transition_running(void)
 {
+    struct domain_security_struct *dsec;
     struct domain *d = current->domain;
 
     if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE )

xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c static void cf_check flask_transition_running(void) · line 206

Quoted 8 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +4 -0
@@ -198,6 +199,10 @@ static void cf_check flask_transition_running(void)
      * set to false for the consistency check(s) in the setup code.
      */
     d->is_privileged = false;
+
+    dsec = d->ssid;
+    dsec->sid = SECINITSID_XEN;
+    dsec->self_sid = dsec->sid;
 }

If replacing SIDs is an okay thing to do, perhaps assert that the values haven't changed from SECINITSID_XENBOOT prior to replacing them?

Jan

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] flask: implement xsm_transtion_running

Quoted 19 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 18 lines · Daniel P. Smith
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +2 -1
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)
     switch ( d->domain_id )
     {
     case DOMID_IDLE:
-        dsec->sid = SECINITSID_XEN;
+        dsec->sid = SECINITSID_XENBOOT;
         break;
     case DOMID_XEN:
         dsec->sid = SECINITSID_DOMXEN;
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)
 
 static void cf_check flask_transition_running(void)
 {
+    struct domain_security_struct *dsec;
     struct domain *d = current->domain;
 
Quoted 14 lines

xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c static void cf_check flask_transition_running(void) · line 206

Quoted 10 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +4 -0
     if ( d->domain_id != DOMID_IDLE )
@@ -198,6 +199,10 @@ static void cf_check flask_transition_running(void)
      * set to false for the consistency check(s) in the setup code.
      */
     d->is_privileged = false;
+
+    dsec = d->ssid;
+    dsec->sid = SECINITSID_XEN;
+    dsec->self_sid = dsec->sid;
 }

If replacing SIDs is an okay thing to do, perhaps assert that the values haven't changed from SECINITSID_XENBOOT prior to replacing them?

Yes, changing a domain's SID is a legitimate action that could be done today via the FLASK_RELABEL_DOMAIN subop of xsm_op hypercall that ends up calling flask_relabel_domain(), when using flask policy. This is where Jason was concerned if I was going to be using that call to change the SID, which would require a policy rule to allow xenboot_t to relabel itself as xen_t. As flask works today, the system domains use initial SIDs which are effectively compile-time labels, which means the policy rule is a static, fixed rule, i.e. it is not possible to use a different set of labels, that must always be present. This also introduces the risk for a custom policy writer to inadvertently leave the xenboot_t to xen_t transitional rule out resulting in a failed access attempt which would lead to a panic. This is unnecessary pain when we can just handle the transition internal to the hypervisor as that where it is all really occurring.

As for the ASSERT, that is a good point since there is a specific state we are expecting to enter the hook. Pair that with some thinking I have had to do in answering Jason, Roger, and yourself, I am going to rewire the hook to return a success/error return value and move the panic outside the check.

v/r,
dps