Adds starting the idle domain privileged
cover Adds starting the idle domain privileged
This series makes it so that the idle domain is started privileged under the default policy, which the SILO policy inherits, and under the flask policy. It then introduces a new one-way XSM hook, xsm_transition_running, that is hooked by an XSM policy to transition the idle domain to its running privilege level.
Daniel P. Smith (2):
xsm: create idle domain privieged and demote after setup
flask: implement xsm_transtion_running
tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if | 6 ++++++ tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te | 1 + tools/flask/policy/policy/initial_sids | 1 + xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 6 ++++++ xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 6 ++++++ xen/common/sched/core.c | 7 ++++++- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 12 ++++++++++++ xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 ++++++ xen/xsm/dummy.c | 1 + xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- xen/xsm/flask/policy/initial_sids | 1 + 11 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH 1/2 xsm: create idle domain privieged and demote after setup
There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protectd by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook, xsm_transition_running, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.
For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to xsm_transtion_running.
--- xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 6 ++++++ xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 6 ++++++ xen/common/sched/core.c | 7 ++++++- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 12 ++++++++++++ xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 ++++++ xen/xsm/dummy.c | 1 + xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +6 -0
@@ -1048,6 +1048,12 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,/* Hide UART from DOM0 if we're using it */ serial_endboot (); +xsm_transition_running (); + +/* Ensure idle domain was not left privileged */ +if ( current->domain->is_privileged ) +panic ("idle domain did not properly transition from setup privilege\n" ); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active;for_each_domain ( d )
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +6 -0
@@ -621,6 +621,12 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)void *va;unsigned long start, end; +xsm_transition_running (); + +/* Ensure idle domain was not left privileged */ +if ( current->domain->is_privileged ) +panic ("idle domain did not properly transition from setup privilege\n" ); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active;domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller (dom0);
xen/common/sched/core.c +6 -1
@@ -3021,7 +3021,12 @@ void __init scheduler_init(void) sched_ratelimit_us =SCHED_DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_US ; } - idle_domain =domain_create (DOMID_IDLE ,NULL ,0 ); +/* +* idle dom is created privileged to ensure unrestricted access during +* setup and will be demoted by xsm_transition_running when setup is +* complete +*/ + idle_domain =domain_create (DOMID_IDLE ,NULL , CDF_privileged);BUG_ON (IS_ERR (idle_domain));BUG_ON (nr_cpu_ids >ARRAY_SIZE (idle_vcpu)); idle_domain->vcpu = idle_vcpu;
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +12 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,18 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action( } } +static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_transition_running(void) +{ +struct domain *d = current->domain; + +if ( d->domain_id !=DOMID_IDLE ) +panic ("xsm_transition_running should only be called by idle domain\n" ); + + d->is_privileged = false; + +return ; +} + static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_security_domaininfo(struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info) {
xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +6 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum xsm_default xsm_default_t;* !!! WARNING !!! */ struct xsm_ops { +void (*transition_running)(void );void (*security_domaininfo)(struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info);int (*domain_create)(struct domain *d,uint32_t ssidref);
@@ -208,6 +209,11 @@ extern struct xsm_ops xsm_ops;#ifndef XSM_NO_WRAPPERS +static inline void xsm_transition_running (void ) +{ +alternative_vcall (xsm_ops.transition_running); +} +static inline void xsm_security_domaininfo (struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info) {
xen/xsm/dummy.c +1 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <xsm/dummy.h> static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber dummy_ops = { + .transition_running = xsm_transition_running, .security_domaininfo = xsm_security_domaininfo, .domain_create = xsm_domain_create, .getdomaininfo = xsm_getdomaininfo,
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +15 -0
@@ -186,6 +186,20 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)return 0 ; } +static void cf_check flask_domain_runtime_security(void) +{ +struct domain *d = current->domain; + +if ( d->domain_id !=DOMID_IDLE ) +panic ("xsm_transition_running should only be called by idle domain\n" ); + +/* +* While is_privileged has no significant meaning under flask, +* set to false for the consistency check(s) in the setup code. +*/ + d->is_privileged = false; +} + static void cf_check flask_domain_free_security(struct domain *d) {struct domain_security_struct *dsec = d->ssid;
@@ -1766,6 +1780,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_argo_send(#endif static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber flask_ops = { + .transition_running = flask_domain_runtime_security, .security_domaininfo = flask_security_domaininfo, .domain_create = flask_domain_create, .getdomaininfo = flask_getdomaininfo,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privieged and demote after setup
Quoted 24 lines · Daniel P. Smith
There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protectd by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook,
xsm_transition_running, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to
xsm_transtion_running.Signed-off-by Daniel P. Smith <[email protected]>---
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +0
-0
xen/arch/x86/setup.c static void noreturn init_done(void) · line 628
Quoted 8 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +5
-0@@ -621,6 +621,12 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)void *va;unsigned long start, end; +xsm_transition_running (); + +/* Ensure idle domain was not left privileged */ +if ( current->domain->is_privileged ) +panic ("idle domain did not properly transition from setup privilege\n" );
Checking immediately after the XSM hook seems redundant, though I guess having a sanity check isn't harmful.
xen/arch/x86/setup.c static int cf_check flask_argo_send( · line 1783
Quoted 8 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +1
-0static void cf_check flask_domain_free_security(struct domain *d) {struct domain_security_struct *dsec = d->ssid;@@ -1766,6 +1780,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_argo_send(#endif static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber flask_ops = { + .transition_running = flask_domain_runtime_security,
I'd prefer flask_transition_running. That way grep for the hook name also finds the flask implementation.
Regards,
Jason
Re: [PATCH 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privieged and demote after setup
Quoted 29 lines · Jason Andryuk
Quoted 27 lines · Daniel P. Smith
There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protectd by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook,
xsm_transition_running, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to
xsm_transtion_running.Signed-off-by Daniel P. Smith <[email protected]>---
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +0
-0@@ -621,6 +621,12 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)void *va;unsigned long start, end;
Quoted 8 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c static void noreturn init_done(void) · line 628
Quoted 5 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +5
-0+xsm_transition_running (); + +/* Ensure idle domain was not left privileged */ +if ( current->domain->is_privileged ) +panic ("idle domain did not properly transition from setup privilege\n" );Checking immediately after the XSM hook seems redundant, though I guess having a sanity check isn't harmful.
I was back and forth on this, so I threw it in and figured if there was strong opinions against it I could easily remove and respin the series.
Quoted 11 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c static int cf_check flask_argo_send( · line 1783
Quoted 8 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +1
-0static void cf_check flask_domain_free_security(struct domain *d) {struct domain_security_struct *dsec = d->ssid;@@ -1766,6 +1780,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_argo_send(#endif static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber flask_ops = { + .transition_running = flask_domain_runtime_security,I'd prefer
flask_transition_running. That way grep for the hook name also finds the flask implementation.
Sure.
v/r,
dps
PATCH 2/2 flask: implement xsm_transtion_running
In reply to Daniel P. SmithThis commit implements full support for starting the idle domain privileged by introducing a new flask label xenboot_t which the idle domain is labeled with at creation. It then provides the implementation for the XSM hook xsm_transition_running to relabel the idle domain to the existing xen_t flask label.
In the reference flask policy a new macro, xen_build_domain(target), is introduced for creating policies for dom0less/hyperlaunch allowing the hypervisor to create and assign the necessary resources for domain construction.
--- tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if | 6 ++++++ tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te | 1 + tools/flask/policy/policy/initial_sids | 1 + xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 6 +++++- xen/xsm/flask/policy/initial_sids | 1 + 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if +6 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ define(`create_domain_common', ` setparam altp2mhvm altp2mhvm_op dm }; ') +# xen_build_domain(target) +# Allow a domain to be created at boot by the hypervisor +define(`xen_build_domain', ` + allow xenboot_t $1_channel:event create; +') + # create_domain(priv, target) # Allow a domain to be created directly define(`create_domain', `
tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ attribute mls_priv; ################################################################################ # The hypervisor itself +type xenboot_t, xen_type, mls_priv; type xen_t, xen_type, mls_priv; # Domain 0
tools/flask/policy/policy/initial_sids +1 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ # objects created before the policy is loaded or for objects that do not have a # label defined in some other manner. +sid xenboot gen_context(system_u:system_r:xenboot_t,s0) sid xen gen_context(system_u:system_r:xen_t,s0) sid dom0 gen_context(system_u:system_r:dom0_t,s0) sid domxen gen_context(system_u:system_r:domxen_t,s0)
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +5 -1
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)switch ( d->domain_id ) {case DOMID_IDLE : - dsec->sid =SECINITSID_XEN ; + dsec->sid =SECINITSID_XENBOOT ;break ;case DOMID_XEN : dsec->sid =SECINITSID_DOMXEN ;
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) static void cf_check flask_domain_runtime_security(void) { +struct domain_security_struct *dsec;struct domain *d = current->domain;if ( d->domain_id !=DOMID_IDLE )
@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ static void cf_check flask_domain_runtime_security(void)* set to false for the consistency check(s) in the setup code. */ d->is_privileged = false; + + dsec = d->ssid; + dsec->sid =SECINITSID_XEN ; } static void cf_check flask_domain_free_security(struct domain *d)
xen/xsm/flask/policy/initial_sids +1 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ # # Define initial security identifiers # +sid xenboot sid xen sid dom0 sid domio
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH 2/2] flask: implement xsm_transtion_running
Quoted 24 lines · Daniel P. Smith
This commit implements full support for starting the idle domain privileged by introducing a new flask label
xenboot_twhich the idle domain is labeled with at creation. It then provides the implementation for the XSM hookxsm_transition_runningto relabel the idle domain to the existingxen_tflask label.In the reference flask policy a new macro,
xen_build_domain(target), is introduced for creating policies for dom0less/hyperlaunch allowing the hypervisor to create and assign the necessary resources for domain construction.Signed-off-by Daniel P. Smith <[email protected]>---
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +1
-0@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) static void cf_check flask_domain_runtime_security(void) { +struct domain_security_struct *dsec;struct domain *d = current->domain;if ( d->domain_id !=DOMID_IDLE )
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c static void cf_check flask_domain_runtime_security(void) · line 204
Quoted 6 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +3
-0@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ static void cf_check flask_domain_runtime_security(void)* set to false for the consistency check(s) in the setup code. */ d->is_privileged = false; + + dsec = d->ssid; + dsec->sid =SECINITSID_XEN ;
I think you also want
dsec->self_sid = dsec->sid;
so self also changes to xen_t.
Otherwise I think it looks good,
I was wondering if you were going to require xenboot_t -> xen_t permissions, but manually setting the sid fields side-steps that. That seems nicer than requiring policy rules for the transition.
Hmmm, cross referencing other flask code, often after assigning self_sid there is this call to potentially re-calculate it:
security_transition_sid(dsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DOMAIN,
&dsec->self_sid);
But it isn't used for system domains, so omitting it seems fine.
Regards,
Jason
Re: [PATCH 2/2] flask: implement xsm_transtion_running
Quoted 24 lines · Jason Andryuk
Quoted 22 lines · Daniel P. Smith
This commit implements full support for starting the idle domain privileged by introducing a new flask label
xenboot_twhich the idle domain is labeled with at creation. It then provides the implementation for the XSM hookxsm_transition_runningto relabel the idle domain to the existingxen_tflask label.In the reference flask policy a new macro,
xen_build_domain(target), is introduced for creating policies for dom0less/hyperlaunch allowing the hypervisor to create and assign the necessary resources for domain construction.Signed-off-by Daniel P. Smith <[email protected]>---
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +1
-0@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) static void cf_check flask_domain_runtime_security(void) { +struct domain_security_struct *dsec;struct domain *d = current->domain;
Quoted 12 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c static void cf_check flask_domain_runtime_security(void) · line 204
Quoted 8 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +3
-0if ( d->domain_id !=DOMID_IDLE )@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ static void cf_check flask_domain_runtime_security(void)* set to false for the consistency check(s) in the setup code. */ d->is_privileged = false; + + dsec = d->ssid; + dsec->sid =SECINITSID_XEN ;I think you also want
dsec->self_sid=dsec->sid;
so self also changes toxen_t.
Erg, thanks for the catch.
Quoted 5 lines
Otherwise I think it looks good,
I was wondering if you were going to require
xenboot_t->xen_tpermissions, but manually setting the sid fields side-steps that. That seems nicer than requiring policy rules for the transition.
I was considering it but as I was reflecting on the discussions that were had, this is a one-time, one-way transition. Combine that with the fact that xenboot_t has to be an initial sid (fixed/permnant type) for Xen's flask policy, there is no need to require a transition rule in the policy that can never be changed. And yes, it helps makes things much simpler.( ^_^)
Quoted 6 lines
Hmmm, cross referencing other flask code, often after assigning
self_sidthere is this call to potentially re-calculate it:security_transition_sid(dsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DOMAIN,
&dsec->self_sid);But it isn't used for system domains, so omitting it seems fine.
Hmm, now you have me concerned about decisions residing in the avc from accesses made during domain creation. Let me double check that, but I think it will be needed. I believe the reason it was not needed for the system domains because prior to this no access decisions were made before the domains were labeled.
v/r,
dps