Adds starting the idle domain privileged
v3 cover Adds starting the idle domain privileged
This series makes it so that the idle domain is started privileged under the default policy, which the SILO policy inherits, and under the flask policy. It then introduces a new one-way XSM hook, xsm_transition_running, that is hooked by an XSM policy to transition the idle domain to its running privilege level.
Changes in v3:
- renamed *_transition_running() to *_set_system_active()
- changed the XSM hook set_system_active() from void to int return
- added ASSERT check for the expected privilege level each XSM policy expected
- replaced a check against is_privileged in each arch with checking the return value from the call to xsm_set_system_active()
Changes in v2:
- renamed flask_domain_runtime_security() to flask_transition_running()
- added the missed assignment of self_sid
Daniel P. Smith (2):
xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup
flask: implement xsm_set_system_active
tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if | 6 ++++++ tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te | 1 + tools/flask/policy/policy/initial_sids | 1 + xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/common/sched/core.c | 7 ++++++- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 17 +++++++++++++++ xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 ++++++ xen/xsm/dummy.c | 1 + xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- xen/xsm/flask/policy/initial_sids | 1 + 11 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v3 1/2 xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup
There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protected by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook, xsm_set_system_active, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.
For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to xsm_set_system_active.
--- xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/common/sched/core.c | 7 ++++++- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 ++++++ xen/xsm/dummy.c | 1 + xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +3 -0
@@ -1048,6 +1048,9 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,/* Hide UART from DOM0 if we're using it */ serial_endboot (); +if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 ) +panic ("xsm: unable to set hypervisor to SYSTEM_ACTIVE privilege\n" ); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active;for_each_domain ( d )
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +3 -0
@@ -621,6 +621,9 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)void *va;unsigned long start, end; +if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 ) +panic ("xsm: unable to set hypervisor to SYSTEM_ACTIVE privilege\n" ); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active;domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller (dom0);
xen/common/sched/core.c +6 -1
@@ -3021,7 +3021,12 @@ void __init scheduler_init(void) sched_ratelimit_us =SCHED_DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_US ; } - idle_domain =domain_create (DOMID_IDLE ,NULL ,0 ); +/* +* idle dom is created privileged to ensure unrestricted access during +* setup and will be demoted by xsm_transition_running when setup is +* complete +*/ + idle_domain =domain_create (DOMID_IDLE ,NULL , CDF_privileged);BUG_ON (IS_ERR (idle_domain));BUG_ON (nr_cpu_ids >ARRAY_SIZE (idle_vcpu)); idle_domain->vcpu = idle_vcpu;
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +17 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,23 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action( } } +static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_set_system_active(void) +{ +struct domain *d = current->domain; + +ASSERT (d->is_privileged); + +if ( d->domain_id !=DOMID_IDLE ) + { +printk ("xsm_set_system_active: should only be called by idle domain\n" ); +return -EPERM ; + } + + d->is_privileged = false; + +return 0 ; +} + static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_security_domaininfo(struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info) {
xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +6 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum xsm_default xsm_default_t;* !!! WARNING !!! */ struct xsm_ops { +int (*set_system_active)(void );void (*security_domaininfo)(struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info);int (*domain_create)(struct domain *d,uint32_t ssidref);
@@ -208,6 +209,11 @@ extern struct xsm_ops xsm_ops;#ifndef XSM_NO_WRAPPERS +static inline int xsm_set_system_active (void ) +{ +return alternative_call (xsm_ops.set_system_active); +} +static inline void xsm_security_domaininfo (struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info) {
xen/xsm/dummy.c +1 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <xsm/dummy.h> static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber dummy_ops = { + .set_system_active = xsm_set_system_active, .security_domaininfo = xsm_security_domaininfo, .domain_create = xsm_domain_create, .getdomaininfo = xsm_getdomaininfo,
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +21 -0
@@ -186,6 +186,26 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)return 0 ; } +static int cf_check flask_set_system_active(void) +{ +struct domain *d = current->domain; + +if ( d->domain_id !=DOMID_IDLE ) + { +printk ("xsm_set_system_active should only be called by idle domain\n" ); +return -EPERM ; + } + +/* +* While is_privileged has no significant meaning under flask, set to false +* as there are times in hypervisor code privilege checks check this +* directly instead of going through XSM. +*/ + d->is_privileged = false; + +return 0 ; +} + static void cf_check flask_domain_free_security(struct domain *d) {struct domain_security_struct *dsec = d->ssid;
@@ -1766,6 +1786,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_argo_send(#endif static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber flask_ops = { + .set_system_active = flask_set_system_active, .security_domaininfo = flask_security_domaininfo, .domain_create = flask_domain_create, .getdomaininfo = flask_getdomaininfo,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup
Quoted 11 lines · Daniel P. Smith
There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protected by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook,
xsm_set_system_active, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.
Quoted 6 lines
For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to
xsm_set_system_active.Signed-off-by Daniel P. Smith <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup
In reply to Daniel P. SmithQuoted 3 lines · Daniel P. Smith
There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protected by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by
'Some of the hypervisor code can be executed in a system domain that's represented by a per-CPU non-privileged struct domain. To enable...'
Quoted 42 lines
non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook,
xsm_set_system_active, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to
xsm_set_system_active.Signed-off-by Daniel P. Smith <[email protected]>--- xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/common/sched/core.c | 7 ++++++- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 ++++++ xen/xsm/dummy.c | 1 + xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)xen/arch/arm/setup.c +3
-0@@ -1048,6 +1048,9 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,/* Hide UART from DOM0 if we're using it */ serial_endboot (); +if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 ) +panic ("xsm: unable to set hypervisor to SYSTEM_ACTIVE privilege\n" ); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active;for_each_domain ( d )xen/arch/x86/setup.c +0
-0
xen/arch/x86/setup.c static void noreturn init_done(void) · line 624
Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +1
-0@@ -621,6 +621,9 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)void *va;unsigned long start, end; +if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 )
^ extra space.
Since the function returns an error code you might as well add it to the panic message, or else just make the function return bool instead.
Or just make the function void and panic in the handler itself (like in previous versions), as I don't think it's sensible to continue normal execution if xsm_set_system_active fails.
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +2
-0+panic ("xsm: unable to set hypervisor to SYSTEM_ACTIVE privilege\n" ); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active;domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller (dom0);xen/common/sched/core.c +0
-0
xen/common/sched/core.c void __init scheduler_init(void) · line 3026
Quoted 7 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c +3
-1@@ -3021,7 +3021,12 @@ void __init scheduler_init(void) sched_ratelimit_us =SCHED_DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_US ; } - idle_domain =domain_create (DOMID_IDLE ,NULL ,0 ); +/* +* idle dom is created privileged to ensure unrestricted access during +* setup and will be demoted by xsm_transition_running when setup is
s/xsm_transition_running/xsm_set_system_active/
xen/common/sched/core.c void __init scheduler_init(void) · line 3027
Quoted 1 line
xen/common/sched/core.c +1
-0+* complete
Nit: missing full stop according to CODING_STYLE.
Quoted 74 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c +2
-0+*/ + idle_domain =domain_create (DOMID_IDLE ,NULL , CDF_privileged);BUG_ON (IS_ERR (idle_domain));BUG_ON (nr_cpu_ids >ARRAY_SIZE (idle_vcpu)); idle_domain->vcpu = idle_vcpu;xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +17
-0@@ -101,6 +101,23 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action( } } +static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_set_system_active(void) +{ +struct domain *d = current->domain; + +ASSERT (d->is_privileged); + +if ( d->domain_id !=DOMID_IDLE ) + { +printk ("xsm_set_system_active: should only be called by idle domain\n" ); +return -EPERM ; + } + + d->is_privileged = false; + +return 0 ; +} + static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_security_domaininfo(struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info) {xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +6
-0@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum xsm_default xsm_default_t;* !!! WARNING !!! */ struct xsm_ops { +int (*set_system_active)(void );void (*security_domaininfo)(struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info);int (*domain_create)(struct domain *d,uint32_t ssidref);@@ -208,6 +209,11 @@ extern struct xsm_ops xsm_ops;#ifndef XSM_NO_WRAPPERS +static inline int xsm_set_system_active (void ) +{ +return alternative_call (xsm_ops.set_system_active); +} +static inline void xsm_security_domaininfo (struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info) {xen/xsm/dummy.c +1
-0@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <xsm/dummy.h> static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber dummy_ops = { + .set_system_active = xsm_set_system_active, .security_domaininfo = xsm_security_domaininfo, .domain_create = xsm_domain_create, .getdomaininfo = xsm_getdomaininfo,xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +0
-0
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) · line 191
Quoted 6 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +3
-0@@ -186,6 +186,26 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)return 0 ; } +static int cf_check flask_set_system_active(void) +{ +struct domain *d = current->domain;
Nit: you should also add the assert for d->is_privileged, I don't see a reason for the xsm and flask functions to differ in that regard.
Thanks, Roger.
Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup
Quoted 9 lines · Roger Pau Monné
xen/arch/x86/setup.c static void noreturn init_done(void) · line 624
Quoted 7 lines · Daniel P. Smith
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +1
-0@@ -621,6 +621,9 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)void *va;unsigned long start, end; +if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 )^ extra space.
Hmm, did you mean
^ missing space
?
Quoted 13 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c void __init scheduler_init(void) · line 3026
Quoted 10 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c +3
-1@@ -3021,7 +3021,12 @@ void __init scheduler_init(void) sched_ratelimit_us =SCHED_DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_US ; } - idle_domain =domain_create (DOMID_IDLE ,NULL ,0 ); +/* +* idle dom is created privileged to ensure unrestricted access during +* setup and will be demoted by xsm_transition_running when setup is s/xsm_transition_running/xsm_set_system_active/
Quoted 3 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c void __init scheduler_init(void) · line 3027
Quoted 1 line
xen/common/sched/core.c +1
-0+* complete Nit: missing full stop according to
CODING_STYLE.
Not really: A single-sentence comment may omit the full stop (while personally I agree a stop would better be there). Instead starting with a capital letter is mandated.
Jan
Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup
Quoted 8 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 7 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel P. Smith
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +0
-0@@ -621,6 +621,9 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)void *va;unsigned long start, end;
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c static void noreturn init_done(void) · line 624
Quoted 1 line
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +1
-0+if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 )^ extra space.
Hmm, did you mean
^ missing space
?
Indeed. I was switching from a different code context and got confused.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c void __init scheduler_init(void) · line 3026
Quoted 10 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c +3
-1@@ -3021,7 +3021,12 @@ void __init scheduler_init(void) sched_ratelimit_us =SCHED_DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_US ; } - idle_domain =domain_create (DOMID_IDLE ,NULL ,0 ); +/* +* idle dom is created privileged to ensure unrestricted access during +* setup and will be demoted by xsm_transition_running when setup is s/xsm_transition_running/xsm_set_system_active/
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c void __init scheduler_init(void) · line 3027
Quoted 1 line
xen/common/sched/core.c +1
-0+* complete Nit: missing full stop according to
CODING_STYLE.Not really: A single-sentence comment may omit the full stop (while personally I agree a stop would better be there). Instead starting with a capital letter is mandated.
Right, it's a multi line comment but single sentence, and hence the full stop is not mandatory. Sorry for the noise.
Roger.
Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup
In reply to Roger Pau MonnéQuoted 7 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 3 lines · Daniel P. Smith
There are now instances where internal hypervisor logic needs to make resource allocation calls that are protected by XSM checks. The internal hypervisor logic is represented a number of system domains which by designed are represented by
'Some of the hypervisor code can be executed in a system domain that's represented by a per-CPU non-privileged struct domain. To enable...'
Ack, will reword.
Quoted 48 lines
Quoted 42 lines
non-privileged struct domain instances. To enable these logic blocks to function correctly but in a controlled manner, this commit changes the idle domain to be created as a privileged domain under the default policy, which is inherited by the SILO policy, and demoted before transitioning to running. A new XSM hook,
xsm_set_system_active, is introduced to allow each XSM policy type to demote the idle domain appropriately for that policy type.For flask a stub is added to ensure that flask policy system will function correctly with this patch until flask is extended with support for starting the idle domain privileged and properly demoting it on the call to
xsm_set_system_active.Signed-off-by Daniel P. Smith <[email protected]>--- xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 3 +++ xen/common/sched/core.c | 7 ++++++- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 ++++++ xen/xsm/dummy.c | 1 + xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)xen/arch/arm/setup.c +3
-0@@ -1048,6 +1048,9 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,/* Hide UART from DOM0 if we're using it */ serial_endboot (); +if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 ) +panic ("xsm: unable to set hypervisor to SYSTEM_ACTIVE privilege\n" ); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active;for_each_domain ( d )xen/arch/x86/setup.c +0
-0xen/arch/x86/setup.c static void noreturn init_done(void) · line 624
Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +1
-0@@ -621,6 +621,9 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)void *va;unsigned long start, end; +if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 )^ extra space.
Quoted 6 lines
Since the function returns an error code you might as well add it to the panic message, or else just make the function return bool instead.
Or just make the function void and panic in the handler itself (like in previous versions), as I don't think it's sensible to continue normal execution if
xsm_set_system_activefails.
After reflecting on it, I believe that was not the correct action. The policy should handle setting/checking all access control state and fail with an error of why and then allow the hypervisor logic decided what to do with that failure. For the policies that are present today, yes it is an immediate panic. Ultimately this will future proof the interface should a future policy type be introduced with a more varied result that could allow the hypervisor to continue to boot, for instance to a limited and/or debug state.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +2
-0+panic ("xsm: unable to set hypervisor to SYSTEM_ACTIVE privilege\n" ); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active;domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller (dom0);xen/common/sched/core.c +0
-0@@ -3021,7 +3021,12 @@ void __init scheduler_init(void) sched_ratelimit_us =SCHED_DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_US ; }
Quoted 6 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c void __init scheduler_init(void) · line 3026
Quoted 4 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c +3
-1- idle_domain =domain_create (DOMID_IDLE ,NULL ,0 ); +/* +* idle dom is created privileged to ensure unrestricted access during +* setup and will be demoted by xsm_transition_running when setup is s/xsm_transition_running/xsm_set_system_active/
I missed one, apologies.
Quoted 3 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c void __init scheduler_init(void) · line 3027
Quoted 1 line
xen/common/sched/core.c +1
-0+* complete Nit: missing full stop according to
CODING_STYLE.
Ack.
Quoted 77 lines
Quoted 77 lines
xen/common/sched/core.c +2
-0+*/ + idle_domain =domain_create (DOMID_IDLE ,NULL , CDF_privileged);BUG_ON (IS_ERR (idle_domain));BUG_ON (nr_cpu_ids >ARRAY_SIZE (idle_vcpu)); idle_domain->vcpu = idle_vcpu;xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +17
-0@@ -101,6 +101,23 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action( } } +static XSM_INLINE int cf_check xsm_set_system_active(void) +{ +struct domain *d = current->domain; + +ASSERT (d->is_privileged); + +if ( d->domain_id !=DOMID_IDLE ) + { +printk ("xsm_set_system_active: should only be called by idle domain\n" ); +return -EPERM ; + } + + d->is_privileged = false; + +return 0 ; +} + static XSM_INLINE void cf_check xsm_security_domaininfo(struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info) {xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +6
-0@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum xsm_default xsm_default_t;* !!! WARNING !!! */ struct xsm_ops { +int (*set_system_active)(void );void (*security_domaininfo)(struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info);int (*domain_create)(struct domain *d,uint32_t ssidref);@@ -208,6 +209,11 @@ extern struct xsm_ops xsm_ops;#ifndef XSM_NO_WRAPPERS +static inline int xsm_set_system_active (void ) +{ +return alternative_call (xsm_ops.set_system_active); +} +static inline void xsm_security_domaininfo (struct domain *d,struct xen_domctl_getdomaininfo *info) {xen/xsm/dummy.c +1
-0@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <xsm/dummy.h> static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber dummy_ops = { + .set_system_active = xsm_set_system_active, .security_domaininfo = xsm_security_domaininfo, .domain_create = xsm_domain_create, .getdomaininfo = xsm_getdomaininfo,xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +0
-0@@ -186,6 +186,26 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)return 0 ; }
Quoted 6 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) · line 191
Quoted 3 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +3
-0+static int cf_check flask_set_system_active(void) +{ +struct domain *d = current->domain;Nit: you should also add the assert for
d->is_privileged, I don't see a reason for the xsm and flask functions to differ in that regard.
This goes back to an issued I have raised before, is_privileged really encompasses two properties of a domain. Whether the domain is filling the special control domain role versus what accesses the domain has based on the context under which is_control_domain() is called. For instance the function init_domain_msr_policy() uses is_control_domain() not to make an access control decision but configure behavior. Under flask is_privileged no longer reflects the accesses a domain with it set will have, thus whether it is cleared when flask is enabled is irrelevant as far as flask is concerned. For the ASSERT, what matters is that the label was set to xenboot_t on construction and that it was not changed before reaching this point. Or in a short form, when under the default policy the expected state is concerned with is_privilege while for flask it is only the SID.
Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup
Quoted 34 lines · Daniel P. Smith
Quoted 26 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 19 lines · Daniel P. Smith
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +3
-0@@ -1048,6 +1048,9 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,/* Hide UART from DOM0 if we're using it */ serial_endboot (); +if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 ) +panic ("xsm: unable to set hypervisor to SYSTEM_ACTIVE privilege\n" ); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active;for_each_domain ( d )xen/arch/x86/setup.c +0
-0xen/arch/x86/setup.c static void noreturn init_done(void) · line 624
Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +1
-0@@ -621,6 +621,9 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)void *va;unsigned long start, end; +if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 )^ extra space.
Quoted 6 lines
Since the function returns an error code you might as well add it to the panic message, or else just make the function return bool instead.
Or just make the function void and panic in the handler itself (like in previous versions), as I don't think it's sensible to continue normal execution if
xsm_set_system_activefails.
Quoted 8 lines
After reflecting on it, I believe that was not the correct action. The policy should handle setting/checking all access control state and fail with an error of why and then allow the hypervisor logic decided what to do with that failure. For the policies that are present today, yes it is an immediate panic. Ultimately this will future proof the interface should a future policy type be introduced with a more varied result that could allow the hypervisor to continue to boot, for instance to a limited and/or debug state.
That's all fine, but if you return an error code, please print it as part of the panic message. The more information we can add in case of panic, the better.
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
xen/xsm/dummy.c +1
-0@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <xsm/dummy.h> static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber dummy_ops = { + .set_system_active = xsm_set_system_active, .security_domaininfo = xsm_security_domaininfo, .domain_create = xsm_domain_create, .getdomaininfo = xsm_getdomaininfo,xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +0
-0@@ -186,6 +186,26 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)return 0 ; }Quoted 6 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) · line 191
Quoted 3 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +3
-0+static int cf_check flask_set_system_active(void) +{ +struct domain *d = current->domain;Nit: you should also add the assert for
d->is_privileged, I don't see a reason for the xsm and flask functions to differ in that regard.
Quoted 13 lines
This goes back to an issued I have raised before,
is_privilegedreally encompasses two properties of a domain. Whether the domain is filling the special control domain role versus what accesses the domain has based on the context under whichis_control_domain()is called. For instance the functioninit_domain_msr_policy()usesis_control_domain()not to make an access control decision but configure behavior. Under flaskis_privilegedno longer reflects the accesses a domain with it set will have, thus whether it is cleared when flask is enabled is irrelevant as far as flask is concerned. For the ASSERT, what matters is that the label was set toxenboot_ton construction and that it was not changed before reaching this point. Or in a short form, when under the default policy the expected state is concerned withis_privilegewhile for flask it is only the SID.
I certainly don't care that much, but you do set d->is_privileged = false in flask_set_system_active, hence it would seem logic to expect d->is_privileged == true also?
If not for anything else, just to assert that the function is not called twice.
Thanks, Roger.
Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup
Quoted 44 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 34 lines · Daniel P. Smith
Quoted 26 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 19 lines · Daniel P. Smith
xen/arch/arm/setup.c +3
-0@@ -1048,6 +1048,9 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,/* Hide UART from DOM0 if we're using it */ serial_endboot (); +if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 ) +panic ("xsm: unable to set hypervisor to SYSTEM_ACTIVE privilege\n" ); + system_state = SYS_STATE_active;for_each_domain ( d )xen/arch/x86/setup.c +0
-0xen/arch/x86/setup.c static void noreturn init_done(void) · line 624
Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/setup.c +1
-0@@ -621,6 +621,9 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)void *va;unsigned long start, end; +if (xsm_set_system_active () !=0 )^ extra space.
Quoted 6 lines
Since the function returns an error code you might as well add it to the panic message, or else just make the function return bool instead.
Or just make the function void and panic in the handler itself (like in previous versions), as I don't think it's sensible to continue normal execution if
xsm_set_system_activefails.Quoted 8 lines
After reflecting on it, I believe that was not the correct action. The policy should handle setting/checking all access control state and fail with an error of why and then allow the hypervisor logic decided what to do with that failure. For the policies that are present today, yes it is an immediate panic. Ultimately this will future proof the interface should a future policy type be introduced with a more varied result that could allow the hypervisor to continue to boot, for instance to a limited and/or debug state.
Quoted 3 lines
That's all fine, but if you return an error code, please print it as part of the panic message. The more information we can add in case of panic, the better.
Ack.
Quoted 41 lines
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
xen/xsm/dummy.c +1
-0@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <xsm/dummy.h> static const struct xsm_ops __initconst_cf_clobber dummy_ops = { + .set_system_active = xsm_set_system_active, .security_domaininfo = xsm_security_domaininfo, .domain_create = xsm_domain_create, .getdomaininfo = xsm_getdomaininfo,xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +0
-0@@ -186,6 +186,26 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)return 0 ; }Quoted 6 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) · line 191
Quoted 3 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +3
-0+static int cf_check flask_set_system_active(void) +{ +struct domain *d = current->domain;Nit: you should also add the assert for
d->is_privileged, I don't see a reason for the xsm and flask functions to differ in that regard.Quoted 13 lines
This goes back to an issued I have raised before,
is_privilegedreally encompasses two properties of a domain. Whether the domain is filling the special control domain role versus what accesses the domain has based on the context under whichis_control_domain()is called. For instance the functioninit_domain_msr_policy()usesis_control_domain()not to make an access control decision but configure behavior. Under flaskis_privilegedno longer reflects the accesses a domain with it set will have, thus whether it is cleared when flask is enabled is irrelevant as far as flask is concerned. For the ASSERT, what matters is that the label was set toxenboot_ton construction and that it was not changed before reaching this point. Or in a short form, when under the default policy the expected state is concerned withis_privilegewhile for flask it is only the SID.
Quoted 3 lines
I certainly don't care that much, but you do set
d->is_privileged= false inflask_set_system_active, hence it would seem logic to expectd->is_privileged== true also?
Yes, I did this just for consistency not because there is any significance of is_privilege on the idle domain, in both contexts for which is_privileged is used, when flask is the enforcing policy.
Quoted 2 lines
If not for anything else, just to assert that the function is not called twice.
Under this patch flask_set_system_active() is effectively a no-op, so calling it twice has no effect. In the next patch flask_set_system() becomes a real check and there is an ASSERT on the SID as that is the relevant context under flask and will ensure calling only once.
In the end I can add the ASSERT but it would be adding it for the sake of adding it as it would not be protecting the hypervisor from moving into an incorrect state.
v/r,
dps
Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] xsm: create idle domain privileged and demote after setup
Quoted 44 lines · Daniel P. Smith
Quoted 32 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 17 lines · Daniel P. Smith
Quoted 9 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 8 lines · Daniel P. Smith
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +0
-0@@ -186,6 +186,26 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)return 0 ; }Quoted 6 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) · line 191
Quoted 3 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +3
-0+static int cf_check flask_set_system_active(void) +{ +struct domain *d = current->domain;Nit: you should also add the assert for
d->is_privileged, I don't see a reason for the xsm and flask functions to differ in that regard.Quoted 13 lines
This goes back to an issued I have raised before,
is_privilegedreally encompasses two properties of a domain. Whether the domain is filling the special control domain role versus what accesses the domain has based on the context under whichis_control_domain()is called. For instance the functioninit_domain_msr_policy()usesis_control_domain()not to make an access control decision but configure behavior. Under flaskis_privilegedno longer reflects the accesses a domain with it set will have, thus whether it is cleared when flask is enabled is irrelevant as far as flask is concerned. For the ASSERT, what matters is that the label was set toxenboot_ton construction and that it was not changed before reaching this point. Or in a short form, when under the default policy the expected state is concerned withis_privilegewhile for flask it is only the SID.Quoted 3 lines
I certainly don't care that much, but you do set
d->is_privileged= false inflask_set_system_active, hence it would seem logic to expectd->is_privileged== true also?Yes, I did this just for consistency not because there is any significance of
is_privilegeon the idle domain, in both contexts for whichis_privilegedis used, when flask is the enforcing policy.Quoted 2 lines
If not for anything else, just to assert that the function is not called twice.
Quoted 8 lines
Under this patch
flask_set_system_active()is effectively a no-op, so calling it twice has no effect. In the next patchflask_set_system()becomes a real check and there is an ASSERT on the SID as that is the relevant context under flask and will ensure calling only once.In the end I can add the ASSERT but it would be adding it for the sake of adding it as it would not be protecting the hypervisor from moving into an incorrect state.
If flask_set_system_active() is really a no-op then just adding a comment in that regard and not touching is_privileged would be OK to me, as otherwise I think it's confusing.
In any case I would leave that to the flask maintainers to decide.
Thanks, Roger.
PATCH v3 2/2 flask: implement xsm_set_system_active
In reply to Daniel P. SmithThis commit implements full support for starting the idle domain privileged by introducing a new flask label xenboot_t which the idle domain is labeled with at creation. It then provides the implementation for the XSM hook xsm_set_system_active to relabel the idle domain to the existing xen_t flask label.
In the reference flask policy a new macro, xen_build_domain(target), is introduced for creating policies for dom0less/hyperlaunch allowing the hypervisor to create and assign the necessary resources for domain construction.
--- tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if | 6 ++++++ tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te | 1 + tools/flask/policy/policy/initial_sids | 1 + xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 8 +++++++- xen/xsm/flask/policy/initial_sids | 1 + 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.if +6 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,12 @@ define(`create_domain_common', ` setparam altp2mhvm altp2mhvm_op dm }; ') +# xen_build_domain(target) +# Allow a domain to be created at boot by the hypervisor +define(`xen_build_domain', ` + allow xenboot_t $1_channel:event create; +') + # create_domain(priv, target) # Allow a domain to be created directly define(`create_domain', `
tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ attribute mls_priv; ################################################################################ # The hypervisor itself +type xenboot_t, xen_type, mls_priv; type xen_t, xen_type, mls_priv; # Domain 0
tools/flask/policy/policy/initial_sids +1 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ # objects created before the policy is loaded or for objects that do not have a # label defined in some other manner. +sid xenboot gen_context(system_u:system_r:xenboot_t,s0) sid xen gen_context(system_u:system_r:xen_t,s0) sid dom0 gen_context(system_u:system_r:dom0_t,s0) sid domxen gen_context(system_u:system_r:domxen_t,s0)
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +7 -1
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d)switch ( d->domain_id ) {case DOMID_IDLE : - dsec->sid =SECINITSID_XEN ; + dsec->sid =SECINITSID_XENBOOT ;break ;case DOMID_XEN : dsec->sid =SECINITSID_DOMXEN ;
@@ -188,8 +188,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) static int cf_check flask_set_system_active(void) { +struct domain_security_struct *dsec;struct domain *d = current->domain; + dsec = d->ssid; +ASSERT ( dsec->sid ==SECINITSID_XENBOOT ); +if ( d->domain_id !=DOMID_IDLE ) {printk ("xsm_set_system_active should only be called by idle domain\n" );
@@ -203,6 +207,8 @@ static int cf_check flask_set_system_active(void)*/ d->is_privileged = false; + dsec->self_sid = dsec->sid =SECINITSID_XEN ; +return 0 ; }
xen/xsm/flask/policy/initial_sids +1 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ # # Define initial security identifiers # +sid xenboot sid xen sid dom0 sid domio
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] flask: implement xsm_set_system_active
Quoted 16 lines · Daniel P. Smith
This commit implements full support for starting the idle domain privileged by introducing a new flask label
xenboot_twhich the idle domain is labeled with at creation. It then provides the implementation for the XSM hookxsm_set_system_activeto relabel the idle domain to the existingxen_tflask label.In the reference flask policy a new macro,
xen_build_domain(target), is introduced for creating policies for dom0less/hyperlaunch allowing the hypervisor to create and assign the necessary resources for domain construction.Signed-off-by Daniel P. Smith <[email protected]>---
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) · line 195
Quoted 8 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +3
-0@@ -188,8 +188,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) static int cf_check flask_set_system_active(void) { +struct domain_security_struct *dsec;struct domain *d = current->domain; + dsec = d->ssid; +ASSERT ( dsec->sid ==SECINITSID_XENBOOT );
Extra space before dsec.
With that fixed,
Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] flask: implement xsm_set_system_active
Quoted 24 lines · Jason Andryuk
Quoted 22 lines · Daniel P. Smith
This commit implements full support for starting the idle domain privileged by introducing a new flask label
xenboot_twhich the idle domain is labeled with at creation. It then provides the implementation for the XSM hookxsm_set_system_activeto relabel the idle domain to the existingxen_tflask label.In the reference flask policy a new macro,
xen_build_domain(target), is introduced for creating policies for dom0less/hyperlaunch allowing the hypervisor to create and assign the necessary resources for domain construction.Signed-off-by Daniel P. Smith <[email protected]>---
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +1
-0@@ -188,8 +188,12 @@ static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) static int cf_check flask_set_system_active(void) { +struct domain_security_struct *dsec;struct domain *d = current->domain;
Quoted 4 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c static int cf_check flask_domain_alloc_security(struct domain *d) · line 195
Quoted 2 lines
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +2
-0+ dsec = d->ssid; +ASSERT ( dsec->sid ==SECINITSID_XENBOOT );Extra space before dsec.
Ack.
Quoted 2 lines
With that fixed,
Reviewed-by Jason Andryuk <[email protected]>