6.12.78-rc1 review
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 280/460 Octeontx2-af: Add proper checks for fwdata
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hariprasad Kelam <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4a3dba48188208e4f66822800e042686784d29d1 ]
firmware populates MAC address, link modes (supported, advertised) and EEPROM data in shared firmware structure which kernel access via MAC block(CGX/RPM).
Accessing fwdata, on boards booted with out MAC block leading to kernel panics.
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP [ 10.460721] Modules linked in: [ 10.463779] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 174 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc5-00154-g76ec646abdf7-dirty #3 PREEMPT [ 10.474045] Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN98XX board (DT) [ 10.479793] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn [ 10.484159] pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 10.491124] pc : rvu_sdp_init+0x18/0x114 [ 10.495051] lr : rvu_probe+0xe58/0x1d18
--- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_cgx.c | 3 +++ drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_sdp.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_cgx.c +3 -0
@@ -1224,6 +1224,9 @@ int rvu_mbox_handler_cgx_set_link_mode(su8 cgx_idx, lmac;void *cgxd; +if (!rvu->fwdata) +return LMAC_AF_ERR_FIRMWARE_DATA_NOT_MAPPED ; +if (!is_cgx_config_permitted (rvu, req->hdr.pcifunc))return -EPERM ;
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_sdp.c +1 -1
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ int rvu_sdp_init(struct rvu *rvu)struct rvu_pfvf *pfvf;u32 i =0 ; -if (rvu->fwdata->channel_data.valid) { +if (rvu->fwdata && rvu->fwdata->channel_data.valid) { sdp_pf_num[0 ] =0 ; pfvf = &rvu->pf[sdp_pf_num[0 ]]; pfvf->sdp_info = &rvu->fwdata->channel_data.info;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 281/460 io_uring/uring_cmd: fix too strict requirement on ioctl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Asbj�rn Sloth T�nnesen" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 600b665b903733bd60334e86031b157cc823ee55 ]
Attempting SOCKET_URING_OP_SETSOCKOPT on an AF_NETLINK socket resulted in an -EOPNOTSUPP, as AF_NETLINK doesn't have an ioctl in its struct proto, but only in struct proto_ops.
Prior to the blamed commit, io_uring_cmd_sock() only had two cmd_op operations, both requiring ioctl, thus the check was warranted.
Since then, 4 new cmd_op operations have been added, none of which depend on ioctl. This patch moves the ioctl check, so it only applies to the original operations.
AFAICT, the ioctl requirement was unintentional, and it wasn't visible in the blamed patch within 3 lines of context.
--- io_uring/uring_cmd.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
io_uring/uring_cmd.c +6 -3
@@ -338,16 +338,19 @@ int io_uring_cmd_sock(struct io_uring_cmstruct proto *prot =READ_ONCE (sk->sk_prot);int ret, arg =0 ; -if (!prot || !prot->ioctl) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -switch (cmd->cmd_op) {case SOCKET_URING_OP_SIOCINQ : +if (!prot || !prot->ioctl) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + ret = prot->ioctl (sk,SIOCINQ , &arg);if (ret)return ret;return arg;case SOCKET_URING_OP_SIOCOUTQ : +if (!prot || !prot->ioctl) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + ret = prot->ioctl (sk,SIOCOUTQ , &arg);if (ret)return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 282/460 x86/uprobes: Fix XOL allocation failure for 32-bit tasks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d55c571e4333fac71826e8db3b9753fadfbead6a ]
This script
#!/usr/bin/bash
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
echo 'void main(void) {}' > TEST.c
# -fcf-protection to ensure that the 1st endbr32 insn can't be emulated gcc -m32 -fcf-protection=branch TEST.c -o test
bpftrace -e 'uprobe:./test:main {}' -c ./test
"hangs", the probed ./test task enters an endless loop.
The problem is that with randomize_va_space == 0 get_unmapped_area(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE) called by xol_add_vma() can not just return the "addr == TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE" hint, this addr is used by the stack vma.
arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() doesn't take TIF_ADDR32 into account and in_32bit_syscall() is false, this leads to info.high_limit > TASK_SIZE. vm_unmapped_area() happily returns the high address > TASK_SIZE and then get_unmapped_area() returns -ENOMEM after the "if (addr > TASK_SIZE - len)" check.
handle_swbp() doesn't report this failure (probably it should) and silently restarts the probed insn. Endless loop.
I think that the right fix should change the x86 get_unmapped_area() paths to rely on TIF_ADDR32 rather than in_32bit_syscall(). Note also that if CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y, in_x32_syscall() falsely returns true in this case because ->orig_ax = -1.
But we need a simple fix for -stable, so this patch just sets TS_COMPAT if the probed task is 32-bit to make in_ia32_syscall() true.
--- arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/uprobes.h | 1 + kernel/events/uprobes.c | 10 +++++++--- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +24 -0
@@ -1223,3 +1223,27 @@ bool arch_uretprobe_is_alive(struct retuelse return regs->sp <= ret->stack; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION +unsigned long arch_uprobe_get_xol_area (void ) +{ +struct thread_info *ti =current_thread_info (); +unsigned long vaddr; + +/* +* HACK: we are not in a syscall, but x86 get_unmapped_area() paths +* ignore TIF_ADDR32 and rely on in_32bit_syscall() to calculate +* vm_unmapped_area_info.high_limit. +* +* The #ifdef above doesn't cover the CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y case, +* but in this case in_32bit_syscall() -> in_x32_syscall() always +* (falsely) returns true because ->orig_ax == -1. +*/ +if (test_thread_flag (TIF_ADDR32 )) + ti->status |=TS_COMPAT ; + vaddr =get_unmapped_area (NULL ,TASK_SIZE -PAGE_SIZE ,PAGE_SIZE ,0 ,0 ); + ti->status &= ~TS_COMPAT ; + +return vaddr; +} +#endif
include/linux/uprobes.h +1 -0
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ extern void arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(structextern void uprobe_handle_trampoline (struct pt_regs *regs);extern void *arch_uprobe_trampoline (unsigned long *psize);extern unsigned long uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr (void ); +extern unsigned long arch_uprobe_get_xol_area (void );#else /* !CONFIG_UPROBES */ struct uprobes_state { };
kernel/events/uprobes.c +7 -3
@@ -1493,6 +1493,12 @@ static const struct vm_special_mapping x .fault = xol_fault, }; +unsigned long __weak arch_uprobe_get_xol_area (void ) +{ +/* Try to map as high as possible, this is only a hint. */ +return get_unmapped_area (NULL ,TASK_SIZE -PAGE_SIZE ,PAGE_SIZE ,0 ,0 ); +} +/* Slot allocation for XOL */ static int xol_add_vma (struct mm_struct *mm,struct xol_area *area) {
@@ -1508,9 +1514,7 @@ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct }if (!area->vaddr) { -/* Try to map as high as possible, this is only a hint. */ - area->vaddr =get_unmapped_area (NULL ,TASK_SIZE -PAGE_SIZE , -PAGE_SIZE ,0 ,0 ); + area->vaddr =arch_uprobe_get_xol_area ();if (IS_ERR_VALUE (area->vaddr)) { ret = area->vaddr; goto fail;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 283/460 platform/x86/amd/pmc: Add support for Van Gogh SoC
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Antheas Kapenekakis <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit db4a3f0fbedb0398f77b9047e8b8bb2b49f355bb ]
The ROG Xbox Ally (non-X) SoC features a similar architecture to the Steam Deck. While the Steam Deck supports S3 (s2idle causes a crash), this support was dropped by the Xbox Ally which only S0ix suspend.
Since the handler is missing here, this causes the device to not suspend and the AMD GPU driver to crash while trying to resume afterwards due to a power hang.
--- drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c | 3 +++ drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c +3 -0
@@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ static void amd_pmc_get_ip_info(struct aswitch (dev->cpu_id) {case AMD_CPU_ID_PCO :case AMD_CPU_ID_RN : +case AMD_CPU_ID_VG :case AMD_CPU_ID_YC :case AMD_CPU_ID_CB : dev->num_ips =12 ;
@@ -765,6 +766,7 @@ static int amd_pmc_get_os_hint(struct amcase AMD_CPU_ID_PCO :return MSG_OS_HINT_PCO ;case AMD_CPU_ID_RN : +case AMD_CPU_ID_VG :case AMD_CPU_ID_YC :case AMD_CPU_ID_CB :case AMD_CPU_ID_PS :
@@ -977,6 +979,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id pmc_pc { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, AMD_CPU_ID_PCO) }, { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, AMD_CPU_ID_RV) }, { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, AMD_CPU_ID_SP) }, + { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, AMD_CPU_ID_VG) }, { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M20H_ROOT) }, { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M60H_ROOT) }, { }
drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.h +1 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ void amd_mp2_stb_deinit(struct amd_pmc_d#define AMD_CPU_ID_RN 0x1630#define AMD_CPU_ID_PCO AMD_CPU_ID_RV#define AMD_CPU_ID_CZN AMD_CPU_ID_RN +#define AMD_CPU_ID_VG 0x1645#define AMD_CPU_ID_YC 0x14B5#define AMD_CPU_ID_CB 0x14D8#define AMD_CPU_ID_PS 0x14E8
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 284/460 mptcp: pm: in-kernel: always set ID as avail when rm endp
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <[email protected]>
commit d191101dee25567c2af3b28565f45346c33d65f5 upstream.
Syzkaller managed to find a combination of actions that was generating this warning:
WARNING: net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 at __mark_subflow_endp_available net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 [inline], CPU#1: syz.7.48/2535 WARNING: net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 at mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1446 [inline], CPU#1: syz.7.48/2535 WARNING: net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 at mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags_all net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1474 [inline], CPU#1: syz.7.48/2535 WARNING: net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 at mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags+0x5de/0x640 net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1538, CPU#1: syz.7.48/2535 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2535 Comm: syz.7.48 Not tainted 6.18.0-03987-gea5f5e676cf5 #17 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__mark_subflow_endp_available net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1074 [inline] RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1446 [inline] RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags_all net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1474 [inline] RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags+0x5de/0x640 net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c:1538 Code: 89 c7 e8 c5 8c 73 fe e9 f7 fd ff ff 49 83 ef 80 e8 b7 8c 73 fe 4c 89 ff be 03 00 00 00 e8 4a 29 e3 fe eb ac e8 a3 8c 73 fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 3d ff ff ff e8 95 8c 73 fe b8 a1 ff ff ff eb 1a e8 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc9001535b820 EFLAGS: 00010287 netdevsim0: tun_chr_ioctl cmd 1074025677 RAX: ffffffff82da294d RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000080000 RDX: ffffc900096d0000 RSI: 00000000000006d6 RDI: 00000000000006d7 netdevsim0: linktype set to 823 RBP: ffff88802cdb2240 R08: 00000000000104ae R09: ffffffffffffffff R10: ffffffff82da27d4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88801246d8c0 R14: ffffc9001535b8b8 R15: ffff88802cdb1800 FS: 00007fc6ac5a76c0(0000) GS:ffff8880f90c8000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 netlink: 'syz.3.50': attribute type 5 has an invalid length. CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 netlink: 1232 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `syz.3.50'. CR2: 0000200000010000 CR3: 0000000025b1a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> mptcp_pm_set_flags net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:277 [inline] mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags_doit+0x1d7/0x210 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:282 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x117/0x180 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x3a8/0x3f0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x16d/0x240 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x3e9/0x4c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344 netlink_sendmsg+0x4ab/0x5b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0xf0 net/socket.c:733 ____sys_sendmsg+0x272/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2608 ___sys_sendmsg+0x2de/0x320 net/socket.c:2662 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2694 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2699 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2697 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2697 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xed/0x360 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fc6adb66f6d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fc6ac5a6ff8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc6addf5fa0 RCX: 00007fc6adb66f6d RDX: 0000000000048084 RSI: 00002000000002c0 RDI: 000000000000000e RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 netlink: 'syz.5.51': attribute type 2 has an invalid length. R13: 00007fff25e91fe0 R14: 00007fc6ac5a7ce4 R15: 00007fff25e920d7 </TASK>
The actions that caused that seem to be:
- Create an MPTCP endpoint for address A without any flags
- Create a new MPTCP connection from address A
- Remove the MPTCP endpoint: the corresponding subflows will be removed
- Recreate the endpoint with the same ID, but with the subflow flag
- Change the same endpoint to add the fullmesh flag
In this case, msk->pm.local_addr_used has been kept to 0 as expected, but the corresponding bit in msk->pm.id_avail_bitmap was still unset after having removed the endpoint, causing the splat later on.
When removing an endpoint, the corresponding endpoint ID was only marked as available for "signal" types with an announced address, plus all "subflow" types, but not the other types like an endpoint corresponding to the initial subflow. In these cases, re-creating an endpoint with the same ID didn't signal/create anything. Here, adding the fullmesh flag was creating the splat when calling __mark_subflow_endp_available() from mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh(), because msk->pm.local_addr_used was set to 0 while the ID was marked as used.
To fix this issue, the corresponding bit in msk->pm.id_avail_bitmap can always be set as available when removing an MPTCP in-kernel endpoint. In other words, moving the call to __set_bit() to do it in all cases, except for "subflow" types where this bit is handled in a dedicated helper.
Note: instead of adding a new spin_(un)lock_bh that would be taken in all cases, do all the actions requiring the spin lock under the same block.
This modification potentially fixes another issue reported by syzbot, see [1]. But without a reproducer or more details about what exactly happened before, it is hard to confirm.
[ Conflict in pm_netlink.c, because commit 8617e85e04bd ("mptcp: pm:
split in-kernel PM specific code") is not in this version, and move code from pm_netlink.c to pm_kernel.c. Also, commit 636113918508 ("mptcp: pm: remove '_nl' from mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_received") renamed mptcp_pm_nl_rm_subflow_received() to mptcp_pm_rm_subflow(). Apart from that, the same patch can be applied in pm_netlink.c. ]
--- net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c | 20 ++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +8 -12
@@ -1599,10 +1599,8 @@ static bool mptcp_pm_remove_anno_addr(st ret =remove_anno_list_by_saddr (msk, addr);if (ret || force) {spin_lock_bh (&msk->pm.lock); -if (ret) { -__set_bit (addr->id, msk->pm.id_avail_bitmap); +if (ret) msk->pm.add_addr_signaled--; - }mptcp_pm_remove_addr (msk, &list);spin_unlock_bh (&msk->pm.lock); }
@@ -1640,17 +1638,15 @@ static int mptcp_nl_remove_subflow_and_s !(entry->flags & MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_IMPLICIT)); list.ids[0 ] =mptcp_endp_get_local_id (msk, addr); -if (remove_subflow) { -spin_lock_bh (&msk->pm.lock); -mptcp_pm_nl_rm_subflow_received (msk, &list); -spin_unlock_bh (&msk->pm.lock); - } -if (entry->flags &MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_SUBFLOW ) { -spin_lock_bh (&msk->pm.lock); +spin_lock_bh (&msk->pm.lock); +if (remove_subflow) +mptcp_pm_nl_rm_subflow_received (msk, &list); +if (entry->flags &MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_SUBFLOW )__mark_subflow_endp_available (msk, list.ids[0 ]); -spin_unlock_bh (&msk->pm.lock); - } +else /* mark endp ID as available, e.g. Signal or MPC endp */ +__set_bit (addr->id, msk->pm.id_avail_bitmap); +spin_unlock_bh (&msk->pm.lock);if (msk->mpc_endpoint_id == entry->addr.id) msk->mpc_endpoint_id =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 285/460 net: stmmac: remove support for lpi_intr_o
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Russell King (Oracle)" <[email protected]>
commit 14eb64db8ff07b58a35b98375f446d9e20765674 upstream.
The dwmac databook for v3.74a states that lpi_intr_o is a sideband signal which should be used to ungate the application clock, and this signal is synchronous to the receive clock. The receive clock can run at 2.5, 25 or 125MHz depending on the media speed, and can stop under the control of the link partner. This means that the time it takes to clear is dependent on the negotiated media speed, and thus can be 8, 40, or 400ns after reading the LPI control and status register.
It has been observed with some aggressive link partners, this clock can stop while lpi_intr_o is still asserted, meaning that the signal remains asserted for an indefinite period that the local system has no direct control over.
The LPI interrupts will still be signalled through the main interrupt path in any case, and this path is not dependent on the receive clock.
This, since we do not gate the application clock, and the chances of adding clock gating in the future are slim due to the clocks being ill-defined, lpi_intr_o serves no useful purpose. Remove the code which requests the interrupt, and all associated code.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/common.h | 1 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-intel.c | 4 -- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-loongson.c | 7 --- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac.h | 2 - drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 36 ------------------ drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_platform.c | 8 ---- include/linux/stmmac.h | 1 7 files changed, 59 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/common.h +0 -1
@@ -374,7 +374,6 @@ enum request_irq_err {REQ_IRQ_ERR_SFTY ,REQ_IRQ_ERR_SFTY_UE ,REQ_IRQ_ERR_SFTY_CE , -REQ_IRQ_ERR_LPI ,REQ_IRQ_ERR_WOL ,REQ_IRQ_ERR_MAC , REQ_IRQ_ERR_NO,
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-intel.c +0 -4
@@ -618,7 +618,6 @@ static int intel_mgbe_common_data(struct/* Setup MSI vector offset specific to Intel mGbE controller */ plat->msi_mac_vec =29 ; - plat->msi_lpi_vec =28 ; plat->msi_sfty_ce_vec =27 ; plat->msi_sfty_ue_vec =26 ; plat->msi_rx_base_vec =0 ;
@@ -1004,8 +1003,6 @@ static int stmmac_config_multi_msi(struc res->irq =pci_irq_vector (pdev, plat->msi_mac_vec);if (plat->msi_wol_vec <STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX ) res->wol_irq =pci_irq_vector (pdev, plat->msi_wol_vec); -if (plat->msi_lpi_vec <STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX ) - res->lpi_irq =pci_irq_vector (pdev, plat->msi_lpi_vec);if (plat->msi_sfty_ce_vec <STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX ) res->sfty_ce_irq =pci_irq_vector (pdev, plat->msi_sfty_ce_vec);if (plat->msi_sfty_ue_vec <STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX )
@@ -1087,7 +1084,6 @@ static int intel_eth_pci_probe(struct pc*/ plat->msi_mac_vec =STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX ; plat->msi_wol_vec =STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX ; - plat->msi_lpi_vec =STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX ; plat->msi_sfty_ce_vec =STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX ; plat->msi_sfty_ue_vec =STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX ; plat->msi_rx_base_vec =STMMAC_MSI_VEC_MAX ;
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-loongson.c +0 -7
@@ -476,13 +476,6 @@ static int loongson_dwmac_dt_config(stru res->wol_irq = res->irq; } - res->lpi_irq =of_irq_get_byname (np,"eth_lpi" ); -if (res->lpi_irq <0 ) { -dev_err (&pdev->dev,"IRQ eth_lpi not found\n" ); - ret = -ENODEV ; - goto err_put_node; - } - ret =device_get_phy_mode (&pdev->dev);if (ret <0 ) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"phy_mode not found\n" );
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac.h +0 -2
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ struct stmmac_resources {void __iomem *addr;u8 mac[ETH_ALEN ];int wol_irq; -int lpi_irq;int irq;int sfty_irq;int sfty_ce_irq;
@@ -314,7 +313,6 @@ struct stmmac_priv {bool wol_irq_disabled;int clk_csr;struct timer_list eee_ctrl_timer; -int lpi_irq;int eee_enabled;int eee_active;int tx_lpi_timer;
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c +0 -36
@@ -3580,10 +3580,6 @@ static void stmmac_free_irq(struct net_dfree_irq (priv->sfty_ce_irq, dev); fallthrough;case REQ_IRQ_ERR_SFTY_CE : -if (priv->lpi_irq >0 && priv->lpi_irq != dev->irq) -free_irq (priv->lpi_irq, dev); - fallthrough; -case REQ_IRQ_ERR_LPI :if (priv->wol_irq >0 && priv->wol_irq != dev->irq)free_irq (priv->wol_irq, dev); fallthrough;
@@ -3642,24 +3638,6 @@ static int stmmac_request_irq_multi_msi( } } -/* Request the LPI IRQ in case of another line -* is used for LPI -*/ -if (priv->lpi_irq >0 && priv->lpi_irq != dev->irq) { - int_name = priv->int_name_lpi; -sprintf (int_name,"%s:%s" , dev->name,"lpi" ); - ret =request_irq (priv->lpi_irq, - stmmac_mac_interrupt, -0 , int_name, dev); -if (unlikely (ret <0 )) { -netdev_err (priv->dev, -"%s: alloc lpi MSI %d (error: %d)\n" , - __func__, priv->lpi_irq, ret); - irq_err =REQ_IRQ_ERR_LPI ; - goto irq_error; - } - } -/* Request the common Safety Feature Correctible/Uncorrectible * Error line in case of another line is used */
@@ -3800,19 +3778,6 @@ static int stmmac_request_irq_single(str } } -/* Request the IRQ lines */ -if (priv->lpi_irq >0 && priv->lpi_irq != dev->irq) { - ret =request_irq (priv->lpi_irq, stmmac_interrupt, -IRQF_SHARED , dev->name, dev); -if (unlikely (ret <0 )) { -netdev_err (priv->dev, -"%s: ERROR: allocating the LPI IRQ %d (%d)\n" , - __func__, priv->lpi_irq, ret); - irq_err =REQ_IRQ_ERR_LPI ; - goto irq_error; - } - } -/* Request the common Safety Feature Correctible/Uncorrectible * Error line in case of another line is used */
@@ -7576,7 +7541,6 @@ int stmmac_dvr_probe(struct device *devi priv->dev->irq = res->irq; priv->wol_irq = res->wol_irq; - priv->lpi_irq = res->lpi_irq; priv->sfty_irq = res->sfty_irq; priv->sfty_ce_irq = res->sfty_ce_irq; priv->sfty_ue_irq = res->sfty_ue_irq;
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_platform.c +0 -8
@@ -733,14 +733,6 @@ int stmmac_get_platform_resources(struct stmmac_res->wol_irq = stmmac_res->irq; } - stmmac_res->lpi_irq = -platform_get_irq_byname_optional (pdev,"eth_lpi" ); -if (stmmac_res->lpi_irq <0 ) { -if (stmmac_res->lpi_irq == -EPROBE_DEFER ) -return -EPROBE_DEFER ; -dev_info (&pdev->dev,"IRQ eth_lpi not found\n" ); - } - stmmac_res->sfty_irq =platform_get_irq_byname_optional (pdev,"sfty" );if (stmmac_res->sfty_irq <0 ) {
include/linux/stmmac.h +0 -1
@@ -268,7 +268,6 @@ struct plat_stmmacenet_data {int int_snapshot_num;int msi_mac_vec;int msi_wol_vec; -int msi_lpi_vec;int msi_sfty_ce_vec;int msi_sfty_ue_vec;int msi_rx_base_vec;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 286/460 f2fs: compress: change the first parameter of page_array_{alloc,free} to sbi
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhiguo Niu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8e2a9b656474d67c55010f2c003ea2cf889a19ff ]
No logic changes, just cleanup and prepare for fixing the UAF issue in f2fs_free_dic.
--- fs/f2fs/compress.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/compress.c +20 -20
@@ -23,20 +23,18 @@static struct kmem_cache *cic_entry_slab;static struct kmem_cache *dic_entry_slab; -static void *page_array_alloc (struct inode *inode,int nr) +static void *page_array_alloc (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,int nr) { -struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_I_SB (inode);unsigned int size =sizeof (struct page *) * nr;if (likely (size <= sbi->page_array_slab_size))return f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc (sbi->page_array_slab, -GFP_F2FS_ZERO , false,F2FS_I_SB (inode)); +GFP_F2FS_ZERO , false, sbi);return f2fs_kzalloc (sbi, size,GFP_NOFS ); } -static void page_array_free (struct inode *inode,void *pages,int nr) +static void page_array_free (struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,void *pages,int nr) { -struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_I_SB (inode);unsigned int size =sizeof (struct page *) * nr;if (!pages)
@@ -147,13 +145,13 @@ int f2fs_init_compress_ctx(struct compreif (cc->rpages)return 0 ; - cc->rpages =page_array_alloc (cc->inode, cc->cluster_size); + cc->rpages =page_array_alloc (F2FS_I_SB (cc->inode), cc->cluster_size);return cc->rpages ?0 : -ENOMEM ; }void f2fs_destroy_compress_ctx (struct compress_ctx *cc,bool reuse) { -page_array_free (cc->inode, cc->rpages, cc->cluster_size); +page_array_free (F2FS_I_SB (cc->inode), cc->rpages, cc->cluster_size); cc->rpages =NULL ; cc->nr_rpages =0 ; cc->nr_cpages =0 ;
@@ -616,6 +614,7 @@ static void *f2fs_vmap(struct page **pagstatic int f2fs_compress_pages (struct compress_ctx *cc) { +struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_I_SB (cc->inode);struct f2fs_inode_info *fi =F2FS_I (cc->inode);const struct f2fs_compress_ops *cops = f2fs_cops[fi->i_compress_algorithm];
@@ -636,7 +635,7 @@ static int f2fs_compress_pages(struct co cc->nr_cpages =DIV_ROUND_UP (max_len,PAGE_SIZE ); cc->valid_nr_cpages = cc->nr_cpages; - cc->cpages =page_array_alloc (cc->inode, cc->nr_cpages); + cc->cpages =page_array_alloc (sbi, cc->nr_cpages);if (!cc->cpages) { ret = -ENOMEM ; goto destroy_compress_ctx;
@@ -711,7 +710,7 @@ out_free_cpages:if (cc->cpages[i])f2fs_compress_free_page (cc->cpages[i]); } -page_array_free (cc->inode, cc->cpages, cc->nr_cpages); +page_array_free (sbi, cc->cpages, cc->nr_cpages); cc->cpages =NULL ; destroy_compress_ctx:if (cops->destroy_compress_ctx)
@@ -1325,7 +1324,7 @@ static int f2fs_write_compressed_pages(s cic->magic =F2FS_COMPRESSED_PAGE_MAGIC ; cic->inode = inode;atomic_set (&cic->pending_pages, cc->valid_nr_cpages); - cic->rpages =page_array_alloc (cc->inode, cc->cluster_size); + cic->rpages =page_array_alloc (sbi, cc->cluster_size);if (!cic->rpages) goto out_put_cic;
@@ -1427,13 +1426,13 @@ unlock_continue:spin_unlock (&fi->i_size_lock);f2fs_put_rpages (cc); -page_array_free (cc->inode, cc->cpages, cc->nr_cpages); +page_array_free (sbi, cc->cpages, cc->nr_cpages); cc->cpages =NULL ;f2fs_destroy_compress_ctx (cc, false);return 0 ; out_destroy_crypt: -page_array_free (cc->inode, cic->rpages, cc->cluster_size); +page_array_free (sbi, cic->rpages, cc->cluster_size);for (--i; i >=0 ; i--) {if (!cc->cpages[i])
@@ -1454,7 +1453,7 @@ out_free:f2fs_compress_free_page (cc->cpages[i]); cc->cpages[i] =NULL ; } -page_array_free (cc->inode, cc->cpages, cc->nr_cpages); +page_array_free (sbi, cc->cpages, cc->nr_cpages); cc->cpages =NULL ;return -EAGAIN ; }
@@ -1484,7 +1483,7 @@ void f2fs_compress_write_end_io(struct bend_page_writeback (cic->rpages[i]); } -page_array_free (cic->inode, cic->rpages, cic->nr_rpages); +page_array_free (sbi, cic->rpages, cic->nr_rpages);kmem_cache_free (cic_entry_slab, cic); }
@@ -1623,7 +1622,7 @@ static int f2fs_prepare_decomp_mem(strucif (!allow_memalloc_for_decomp (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), pre_alloc))return 0 ; - dic->tpages =page_array_alloc (dic->inode, dic->cluster_size); + dic->tpages =page_array_alloc (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), dic->cluster_size);if (!dic->tpages)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -1683,7 +1682,7 @@ struct decompress_io_ctx *f2fs_alloc_dicif (!dic)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - dic->rpages =page_array_alloc (cc->inode, cc->cluster_size); + dic->rpages =page_array_alloc (sbi, cc->cluster_size);if (!dic->rpages) {kmem_cache_free (dic_entry_slab, dic);return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM );
@@ -1704,7 +1703,7 @@ struct decompress_io_ctx *f2fs_alloc_dic dic->rpages[i] = cc->rpages[i]; dic->nr_rpages = cc->cluster_size; - dic->cpages =page_array_alloc (dic->inode, dic->nr_cpages); + dic->cpages =page_array_alloc (sbi, dic->nr_cpages);if (!dic->cpages) { ret = -ENOMEM ; goto out_free;
@@ -1734,6 +1733,7 @@ static void f2fs_free_dic(struct decompr bool bypass_destroy_callback) {int i; +struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode);f2fs_release_decomp_mem (dic, bypass_destroy_callback, true);
@@ -1745,7 +1745,7 @@ static void f2fs_free_dic(struct decomprcontinue ;f2fs_compress_free_page (dic->tpages[i]); } -page_array_free (dic->inode, dic->tpages, dic->cluster_size); +page_array_free (sbi, dic->tpages, dic->cluster_size); }if (dic->cpages) {
@@ -1754,10 +1754,10 @@ static void f2fs_free_dic(struct decomprcontinue ;f2fs_compress_free_page (dic->cpages[i]); } -page_array_free (dic->inode, dic->cpages, dic->nr_cpages); +page_array_free (sbi, dic->cpages, dic->nr_cpages); } -page_array_free (dic->inode, dic->rpages, dic->nr_rpages); +page_array_free (sbi, dic->rpages, dic->nr_rpages);kmem_cache_free (dic_entry_slab, dic); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 287/460 f2fs: compress: fix UAF of f2fs_inode_info in f2fs_free_dic
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zhiguo Niu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 39868685c2a94a70762bc6d77dc81d781d05bff5 ]
The decompress_io_ctx may be released asynchronously after I/O completion. If this file is deleted immediately after read, and the kworker of processing post_read_wq has not been executed yet due to high workloads, It is possible that the inode(f2fs_inode_info) is evicted and freed before it is used f2fs_free_dic.
The UAF case as below:
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_decompress_end_io
- f2fs_put_dic
- queue_work
add free_dic work to post_read_wq
- do_unlink
- iput
- evict
- call_rcu
This file is deleted after read.
Thread C kworker to process post_read_wq
- rcu_do_batch
- f2fs_free_inode
- kmem_cache_free
inode is freed by rcu
- process_scheduled_works
- f2fs_late_free_dic
- f2fs_free_dic
- f2fs_release_decomp_mem
read (dic->inode)->i_compress_algorithm
This patch store compress_algorithm and sbi in dic to avoid inode UAF.
In addition, the previous solution is deprecated in [1] may cause system hang.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
[ Keep the original f2fs_vmalloc(workspace_size) in v6.12.y instead of f2fs_vmalloc(dic->sbi, workspace_size) per commit 54ca9be0bc58 ("f2fs: introduce FAULT_VMALLOC"). ]
--- fs/f2fs/compress.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++------------------- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
fs/f2fs/compress.c +19 -19
@@ -211,13 +211,13 @@ static int lzo_decompress_pages(struct d ret =lzo1x_decompress_safe (dic->cbuf->cdata, dic->clen, dic->rbuf, &dic->rlen);if (ret !=LZO_E_OK ) { -f2fs_err_ratelimited (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), +f2fs_err_ratelimited (dic->sbi,"lzo decompress failed, ret:%d" , ret);return -EIO ; }if (dic->rlen !=PAGE_SIZE << dic->log_cluster_size) { -f2fs_err_ratelimited (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), +f2fs_err_ratelimited (dic->sbi,"lzo invalid rlen:%zu, expected:%lu" , dic->rlen,PAGE_SIZE << dic->log_cluster_size);return -EIO ;
@@ -291,13 +291,13 @@ static int lz4_decompress_pages(struct d ret =LZ4_decompress_safe (dic->cbuf->cdata, dic->rbuf, dic->clen, dic->rlen);if (ret <0 ) { -f2fs_err_ratelimited (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), +f2fs_err_ratelimited (dic->sbi,"lz4 decompress failed, ret:%d" , ret);return -EIO ; }if (ret !=PAGE_SIZE << dic->log_cluster_size) { -f2fs_err_ratelimited (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), +f2fs_err_ratelimited (dic->sbi,"lz4 invalid ret:%d, expected:%lu" , ret,PAGE_SIZE << dic->log_cluster_size);return -EIO ;
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ static int zstd_init_decompress_ctx(stru stream =zstd_init_dstream (max_window_size, workspace, workspace_size);if (!stream) { -f2fs_err_ratelimited (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), +f2fs_err_ratelimited (dic->sbi,"%s zstd_init_dstream failed" , __func__);vfree (workspace);return -EIO ;
@@ -461,14 +461,14 @@ static int zstd_decompress_pages(struct ret =zstd_decompress_stream (stream, &outbuf, &inbuf);if (zstd_is_error (ret)) { -f2fs_err_ratelimited (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), +f2fs_err_ratelimited (dic->sbi,"%s zstd_decompress_stream failed, ret: %d" , __func__,zstd_get_error_code (ret));return -EIO ; }if (dic->rlen != outbuf.pos) { -f2fs_err_ratelimited (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), +f2fs_err_ratelimited (dic->sbi,"%s ZSTD invalid rlen:%zu, expected:%lu" , __func__, dic->rlen,PAGE_SIZE << dic->log_cluster_size);
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ static void f2fs_release_decomp_mem(struvoid f2fs_decompress_cluster (struct decompress_io_ctx *dic,bool in_task) { -struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode); +struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = dic->sbi;struct f2fs_inode_info *fi =F2FS_I (dic->inode);const struct f2fs_compress_ops *cops = f2fs_cops[fi->i_compress_algorithm];
@@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ void f2fs_end_read_compressed_page(struc {struct decompress_io_ctx *dic = (struct decompress_io_ctx *)page_private (page); -struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode); +struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = dic->sbi;dec_page_count (sbi,F2FS_RD_DATA );
@@ -1615,14 +1615,13 @@ static inline bool allow_memalloc_for_destatic int f2fs_prepare_decomp_mem (struct decompress_io_ctx *dic,bool pre_alloc) { -const struct f2fs_compress_ops *cops = - f2fs_cops[F2FS_I (dic->inode)->i_compress_algorithm]; +const struct f2fs_compress_ops *cops = f2fs_cops[dic->compress_algorithm];int i; -if (!allow_memalloc_for_decomp (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), pre_alloc)) +if (!allow_memalloc_for_decomp (dic->sbi, pre_alloc))return 0 ; - dic->tpages =page_array_alloc (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), dic->cluster_size); + dic->tpages =page_array_alloc (dic->sbi, dic->cluster_size);if (!dic->tpages)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -1652,10 +1651,9 @@ static int f2fs_prepare_decomp_mem(strucstatic void f2fs_release_decomp_mem (struct decompress_io_ctx *dic,bool bypass_destroy_callback,bool pre_alloc) { -const struct f2fs_compress_ops *cops = - f2fs_cops[F2FS_I (dic->inode)->i_compress_algorithm]; +const struct f2fs_compress_ops *cops = f2fs_cops[dic->compress_algorithm]; -if (!allow_memalloc_for_decomp (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode), pre_alloc)) +if (!allow_memalloc_for_decomp (dic->sbi, pre_alloc))return ;if (!bypass_destroy_callback && cops->destroy_decompress_ctx)
@@ -1690,6 +1688,8 @@ struct decompress_io_ctx *f2fs_alloc_dic dic->magic =F2FS_COMPRESSED_PAGE_MAGIC ; dic->inode = cc->inode; + dic->sbi = sbi; + dic->compress_algorithm =F2FS_I (cc->inode)->i_compress_algorithm;atomic_set (&dic->remaining_pages, cc->nr_cpages); dic->cluster_idx = cc->cluster_idx; dic->cluster_size = cc->cluster_size;
@@ -1733,7 +1733,8 @@ static void f2fs_free_dic(struct decompr bool bypass_destroy_callback) {int i; -struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode); +/* use sbi in dic to avoid UFA of dic->inode*/ +struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = dic->sbi;f2fs_release_decomp_mem (dic, bypass_destroy_callback, true);
@@ -1776,8 +1777,7 @@ static void f2fs_put_dic(struct decompref2fs_free_dic (dic, false); }else {INIT_WORK (&dic->free_work, f2fs_late_free_dic); -queue_work (F2FS_I_SB (dic->inode)->post_read_wq, - &dic->free_work); +queue_work (dic->sbi->post_read_wq, &dic->free_work); } } }
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +2 -0
@@ -1525,6 +1525,7 @@ struct compress_io_ctx {struct decompress_io_ctx {u32 magic;/* magic number to indicate page is compressed */ struct inode *inode;/* inode the context belong to */ +struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi;/* f2fs_sb_info pointer */ pgoff_t cluster_idx;/* cluster index number */ unsigned int cluster_size;/* page count in cluster */ unsigned int log_cluster_size;/* log of cluster size */
@@ -1565,6 +1566,7 @@ struct decompress_io_ctx {bool failed;/* IO error occurred before decompression? */ bool need_verity;/* need fs-verity verification after decompression? */ +unsigned char compress_algorithm;/* backup algorithm type */ void *private;/* payload buffer for specified decompression algorithm */ void *private2;/* extra payload buffer */ struct work_struct verity_work;/* work to verify the decompressed pages */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 288/460 f2fs: fix to avoid migrating empty section
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d625a2b08c089397d3a03bff13fa8645e4ec7a01 ]
It reports a bug from device w/ zufs:
F2FS-fs (dm-64): Inconsistent segment (173822) type [1, 0] in SSA and SIT F2FS-fs (dm-64): Stopped filesystem due to reason: 4
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_expand_inode_data
- f2fs_allocate_pinning_section
- f2fs_gc_range
- do_garbage_collect w/ segno #x
- writepage
- f2fs_allocate_data_block
- new_curseg
- allocate segno #x
The root cause is: fallocate on pinning file may race w/ block allocation as above, result in do_garbage_collect() from fallocate() may migrate segment which is just allocated by a log, the log will update segment type in its in-memory structure, however GC will get segment type from on-disk SSA block, once segment type changes by log, we can detect such inconsistency, then shutdown filesystem.
In this case, on-disk SSA shows type of segno #173822 is 1 (SUM_TYPE_NODE), however segno #173822 was just allocated as data type segment, so in-memory SIT shows type of segno #173822 is 0 (SUM_TYPE_DATA).
Change as below to fix this issue:
- check whether current section is empty before gc
- add sanity checks on do_garbage_collect() to avoid any race case, result in migrating segment used by log.
- btw, it fixes misc issue in printed logs: "SSA and SIT" -> "SIT and SSA".
[ Use IS_CURSEC instead of is_cursec according to commit c1cfc87e49525 ("f2fs: introduce is_cur{seg,sec}()"). ]
--- fs/f2fs/gc.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/f2fs/gc.c +15 -1
@@ -1805,6 +1805,13 @@ static int do_garbage_collect(struct f2f GET_SUM_BLOCK(sbi, segno));f2fs_put_page (sum_page,0 ); +if (IS_CURSEC (sbi,GET_SEC_FROM_SEG (sbi, segno))) { +f2fs_err (sbi,"%s: segment %u is used by log" , + __func__, segno); +f2fs_bug_on (sbi,1 ); + goto skip; + } +if (get_valid_blocks (sbi, segno, false) ==0 ) goto freed; if (gc_type == BG_GC && __is_large_section(sbi) &&
@@ -1815,7 +1822,7 @@ static int do_garbage_collect(struct f2f sum =page_address (sum_page);if (type !=GET_SUM_TYPE ((&sum->footer))) { -f2fs_err (sbi,"Inconsistent segment (%u) type [%d, %d] in SSA and SIT" , +f2fs_err (sbi,"Inconsistent segment (%u) type [%d, %d] in SIT and SSA" , segno, type,GET_SUM_TYPE ((&sum->footer)));f2fs_stop_checkpoint (sbi, false,STOP_CP_REASON_CORRUPTED_SUMMARY );
@@ -2079,6 +2086,13 @@ int f2fs_gc_range(struct f2fs_sb_info *s .iroot = RADIX_TREE_INIT(gc_list.iroot, GFP_NOFS), }; +/* +* avoid migrating empty section, as it can be allocated by +* log in parallel. +*/ +if (!get_valid_blocks (sbi, segno, true)) +continue ; +if (IS_CURSEC (sbi,GET_SEC_FROM_SEG (sbi, segno)))continue ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 289/460 blk-throttle: fix access race during throttle policy activation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Han Guangjiang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bd9fd5be6bc0836820500f68fff144609fbd85a9 ]
On repeated cold boots we occasionally hit a NULL pointer crash in blk_should_throtl() when throttling is consulted before the throttle policy is fully enabled for the queue. Checking only q->td != NULL is insufficient during early initialization, so blkg_to_pd() for the throttle policy can still return NULL and blkg_to_tg() becomes NULL, which later gets dereferenced.
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000156 ... pc : submit_bio_noacct+0x14c/0x4c8 lr : submit_bio_noacct+0x48/0x4c8 sp : ffff800087f0b690 x29: ffff800087f0b690 x28: 0000000000005f90 x27: ffff00068af393c0 x26: 0000000000080000 x25: 000000000002fbc0 x24: ffff000684ddcc70 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000080000 x19: ffff000684ddcd08 x18: ffffffffffffffff x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80008132a550 x15: 0000ffff98020fff x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 1fffe000d11d7021 x12: ffff000688eb810c x11: ffff00077ec4bb80 x10: ffff000688dcb720 x9 : ffff80008068ef60 x8 : 00000a6fb8a86e85 x7 : 000000000000111e x6 : 0000000000000002 x5 : 0000000000000246 x4 : 0000000000015cff x3 : 0000000000394500 x2 : ffff000682e35e40 x1 : 0000000000364940 x0 : 000000000000001a Call trace: submit_bio_noacct+0x14c/0x4c8 verity_map+0x178/0x2c8 __map_bio+0x228/0x250 dm_submit_bio+0x1c4/0x678 __submit_bio+0x170/0x230 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x16c/0x388 submit_bio_noacct+0x16c/0x4c8 submit_bio+0xb4/0x210 f2fs_submit_read_bio+0x4c/0xf0 f2fs_mpage_readpages+0x3b0/0x5f0 f2fs_readahead+0x90/0xe8
Tighten blk_throtl_activated() to also require that the throttle policy bit is set on the queue:
return q->td != NULL &&
test_bit(blkcg_policy_throtl.plid, q->blkcg_pols);This prevents blk_should_throtl() from accessing throttle group state until policy data has been attached to blkgs.
--- block/blk-cgroup.c | 6 ------ block/blk-cgroup.h | 6 ++++++ block/blk-throttle.c | 6 +----- block/blk-throttle.h | 18 +++++++++++------- 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
block/blk-cgroup.c +0 -6
@@ -110,12 +110,6 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *blkcgreturn task_css (current, io_cgrp_id); } -static bool blkcg_policy_enabled (struct request_queue *q, -const struct blkcg_policy *pol) -{ -return pol &&test_bit (pol->plid, q->blkcg_pols); -} -static void blkg_free_workfn (struct work_struct *work) { struct blkcg_gq *blkg = container_of(work, struct blkcg_gq,
block/blk-cgroup.h +6 -0
@@ -455,6 +455,12 @@ static inline bool blk_cgroup_mergeable( bio_issue_as_root_blkg(rq->bio) == bio_issue_as_root_blkg(bio); } +static inline bool blkcg_policy_enabled (struct request_queue *q, +const struct blkcg_policy *pol) +{ +return pol &&test_bit (pol->plid, q->blkcg_pols); +} +void blk_cgroup_bio_start (struct bio *bio);void blkcg_add_delay (struct blkcg_gq *blkg,u64 now,u64 delta);#else /* CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP */
block/blk-throttle.c +1 -5
@@ -1209,17 +1209,13 @@ static int blk_throtl_init(struct gendisINIT_WORK (&td->dispatch_work, blk_throtl_dispatch_work_fn);throtl_service_queue_init (&td->service_queue); -/* -* Freeze queue before activating policy, to synchronize with IO path, -* which is protected by 'q_usage_counter'. -*/ blk_mq_freeze_queue (disk->queue);blk_mq_quiesce_queue (disk->queue); q->td = td; td->queue = q; -/* activate policy */ +/* activate policy, blk_throtl_activated() will return true */ ret =blkcg_activate_policy (disk, &blkcg_policy_throtl);if (ret) { q->td =NULL ;
block/blk-throttle.h +11 -7
@@ -154,7 +154,13 @@ void blk_throtl_cancel_bios(struct gendistatic inline bool blk_throtl_activated (struct request_queue *q) { -return q->td !=NULL ; +/* +* q->td guarantees that the blk-throttle module is already loaded, +* and the plid of blk-throttle is assigned. +* blkcg_policy_enabled() guarantees that the policy is activated +* in the request_queue. +*/ +return q->td !=NULL &&blkcg_policy_enabled (q, &blkcg_policy_throtl); }static inline bool blk_should_throtl (struct bio *bio)
@@ -162,11 +168,6 @@ static inline bool blk_should_throtl(strstruct throtl_grp *tg;int rw =bio_data_dir (bio); -/* -* This is called under bio_queue_enter(), and it's synchronized with -* the activation of blk-throtl, which is protected by -* blk_mq_freeze_queue(). -*/ if (!blk_throtl_activated (bio->bi_bdev->bd_queue))return false;
@@ -192,7 +193,10 @@ static inline bool blk_should_throtl(strstatic inline bool blk_throtl_bio (struct bio *bio) { - +/* +* block throttling takes effect if the policy is activated +* in the bio's request_queue. +*/ if (!blk_should_throtl (bio))return false;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 290/460 dmaengine: mmp_pdma: Fix race condition in mmp_pdma_residue()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guodong Xu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a143545855bc2c6e1330f6f57ae375ac44af00a7 ]
Add proper locking in mmp_pdma_residue() to prevent use-after-free when accessing descriptor list and descriptor contents.
The race occurs when multiple threads call tx_status() while the tasklet on another CPU is freeing completed descriptors:
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----mmp_pdma_tx_status()mmp_pdma_residue()
-> NO LOCK held
list_for_each_entry(sw, ..)
DMA interrupt
dma_do_tasklet()
-> spin_lock(&desc_lock)
list_move(sw->node, ...)
spin_unlock(&desc_lock) | dma_pool_free(sw) <- FREED!
-> access sw->desc <- UAF!
This issue can be reproduced when running dmatest on the same channel with multiple threads (threads_per_chan > 1).
Fix by protecting the chain_running list iteration and descriptor access with the chan->desc_lock spinlock.
--- drivers/dma/mmp_pdma.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/dma/mmp_pdma.c +6 -0
@@ -763,6 +763,7 @@ static unsigned int mmp_pdma_residue(str {struct mmp_pdma_desc_sw *sw;u32 curr, residue =0 ; +unsigned long flags;bool passed = false;bool cyclic = chan->cyclic_first !=NULL ;
@@ -778,6 +779,8 @@ static unsigned int mmp_pdma_residue(strelse curr =readl (chan->phy->base +DSADR (chan->phy->idx)); +spin_lock_irqsave (&chan->desc_lock, flags); +list_for_each_entry (sw, &chan->chain_running, node) {u32 start, end, len;
@@ -821,6 +824,7 @@ static unsigned int mmp_pdma_residue(strcontinue ;if (sw->async_tx.cookie == cookie) { +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&chan->desc_lock, flags);return residue; }else { residue =0 ;
@@ -828,6 +832,8 @@ static unsigned int mmp_pdma_residue(str } } +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&chan->desc_lock, flags); +/* We should only get here in case of cyclic transactions */ return residue; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 291/460 net: dsa: properly keep track of conduit reference
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 06e219f6a706c367c93051f408ac61417643d2f9 ]
Problem description
-------------------
DSA has a mumbo-jumbo of reference handling of the conduit net device and its kobject which, sadly, is just wrong and doesn't make sense.
There are two distinct problems.
1. The OF path, which uses of_find_net_device_by_node(), never releases the elevated refcount on the conduit's kobject. Nominally, the OF and non-OF paths should result in objects having identical reference counts taken, and it is already suspicious that dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a put_device() call which is missing in dsa_port_parse_of(), but we can actually even verify that an issue exists. With CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, if we run this command "before" and "after" applying this patch:
(unbind the conduit driver for net device eno2) echo 0000:00:00.2 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/fsl_enetc/unbind
we see these lines in the output diff which appear only with the patch applied:
kobject: 'eno2' (ffff002009a3a6b8): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)
kobject: '109' (ffff0020099d59a0): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000)
2. After we find the conduit interface one way (OF) or another (non-OF), it can get unregistered at any time, and DSA remains with a long-lived, but in this case stale, cpu_dp->conduit pointer. Holding the net device's underlying kobject isn't actually of much help, it just prevents it from being freed (but we never need that kobject directly). What helps us to prevent the net device from being unregistered is the parallel netdev reference mechanism (dev_hold() and dev_put()).
Actually we actually use that netdev tracker mechanism implicitly on user ports since commit 2f1e8ea726e9 ("net: dsa: link interfaces with the DSA master to get rid of lockdep warnings"), via netdev_upper_dev_link(). But time still passes at DSA switch probe time between the initial of_find_net_device_by_node() code and the user port creation time, time during which the conduit could unregister itself and DSA wouldn't know about it.
So we have to run of_find_net_device_by_node() under rtnl_lock() to prevent that from happening, and release the lock only with the netdev tracker having acquired the reference.
Do we need to keep the reference until dsa_unregister_switch() / dsa_switch_shutdown()?
1: Maybe yes. A switch device will still be registered even if all user
ports failed to probe, see commit 86f8b1c01a0a ("net: dsa: Do not make user port errors fatal"), and the cpu_dp->conduit pointers remain valid. I haven't audited all call paths to see whether they will actually use the conduit in lack of any user port, but if they do, it seems safer to not rely on user ports for that reference.
2. Definitely yes. We support changing the conduit which a user port is associated to, and we can get into a situation where we've moved all user ports away from a conduit, thus no longer hold any reference to it via the net device tracker. But we shouldn't let it go nonetheless
- see the next change in relation to dsa_tree_find_first_conduit() and LAG conduits which disappear.
We have to be prepared to return to the physical conduit, so the CPU port must explicitly keep another reference to it. This is also to
say: the user ports and their CPU ports may not always keep a reference to the same conduit net device, and both are needed.
As for the conduit's kobject for the /sys/class/net/ entry, we don't care about it, we can release it as soon as we hold the net device object itself.
History and blame attribution
-----------------------------
The code has been refactored so many times, it is very difficult to follow and properly attribute a blame, but I'll try to make a short history which I hope to be correct.
We have two distinct probing paths:
- one for OF, introduced in 2016 in commit 83c0afaec7b7 ("net: dsa: Add new binding implementation")
- one for non-OF, introduced in 2017 in commit 71e0bbde0d88 ("net: dsa:
Add support for platform data")
These are both complete rewrites of the original probing paths (which used struct dsa_switch_driver and other weird stuff, instead of regular devices on their respective buses for register access, like MDIO, SPI, I2C etc):
- one for OF, introduced in 2013 in commit 5e95329b701c ("dsa: add device tree bindings to register DSA switches")
- one for non-OF, introduced in 2008 in commit 91da11f870f0 ("net:
Distributed Switch Architecture protocol support")
except for tiny bits and pieces like dsa_dev_to_net_device() which were seemingly carried over since the original commit, and used to this day.
The point is that the original probing paths received a fix in 2015 in the form of commit 679fb46c5785 ("net: dsa: Add missing master netdev dev_put() calls"), but the fix never made it into the "new" (dsa2) probing paths that can still be traced to today, and the fixed probing path was later deleted in 2019 in commit 93e86b3bc842 ("net: dsa: Remove legacy probing support").
That is to say, the new probing paths were never quite correct in this area.
The existence of the legacy probing support which was deleted in 2019 explains why dsa_dev_to_net_device() returns a conduit with elevated refcount (because it was supposed to be released during dsa_remove_dst()). After the removal of the legacy code, the only user of dsa_dev_to_net_device() calls dev_put(conduit) immediately after this function returns. This pattern makes no sense today, and can only be interpreted historically to understand why dev_hold() was there in the first place.
Change details
--------------
Today we have a better netdev tracking infrastructure which we should use. Logically netdev_hold() belongs in common code (dsa_port_parse_cpu(), where dp->conduit is assigned), but there is a tradeoff to be made with the rtnl_lock() section which would become a bit too long if we did that - dsa_port_parse_cpu() also calls request_module(). So we duplicate a bit of logic in order for the callers of dsa_port_parse_cpu() to be the ones responsible of holding the conduit reference and releasing it on error. This shortens the rtnl_lock() section significantly.
In the dsa_switch_probe() error path, dsa_switch_release_ports() will be called in a number of situations, one being where dsa_port_parse_cpu() maybe didn't get the chance to run at all (a different port failed earlier, etc). So we have to test for the conduit being NULL prior to calling netdev_put().
There have still been so many transformations to the code since the blamed commits (rename master -> conduit, commit 0650bf52b31f ("net:
dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown")), that it only makes sense to fix the code using the best methods available today and see how it can be backported to stable later. I suspect the fix cannot even be backported to kernels which lack dsa_switch_shutdown(), and I suspect this is also maybe why the long-lived conduit reference didn't make it into the new DSA probing paths at the time (problems during shutdown).
Because dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a single call site and has to be changed anyway, the logic was just absorbed into the non-OF dsa_port_parse().
Tested on the ocelot/felix switch and on dsa_loop, both on the NXP LS1028A with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y.
--- include/net/dsa.h | 1 net/dsa/dsa.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
include/net/dsa.h +1 -0
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ struct dsa_port {struct devlink_port devlink_port;struct phylink *pl;struct phylink_config pl_config; +netdevice_tracker conduit_tracker;struct dsa_lag *lag;struct net_device *hsr_dev;
net/dsa/dsa.c +34 -25
99 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 292/460 binfmt_misc: restore write access before closing files opened by open_exec()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zilin Guan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 90f601b497d76f40fa66795c3ecf625b6aced9fd ]
bm_register_write() opens an executable file using open_exec(), which internally calls do_open_execat() and denies write access on the file to avoid modification while it is being executed.
However, when an error occurs, bm_register_write() closes the file using filp_close() directly. This does not restore the write permission, which may cause subsequent write operations on the same file to fail.
Fix this by calling exe_file_allow_write_access() before filp_close() to restore the write permission properly.
[ Use allow_write_access() instead of exe_file_allow_write_access() according to commit 0357ef03c94ef
("fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files"). ]
--- fs/binfmt_misc.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/binfmt_misc.c +3 -1
@@ -875,8 +875,10 @@ out:inode_unlock (d_inode (root));if (err) { -if (f) +if (f) { +allow_write_access (f);filp_close (f,NULL ); + }kfree (e);return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 293/460 xfs: get rid of the xchk_xfile_*_descr calls
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 60382993a2e18041f88c7969f567f168cd3b4de3 ]
The xchk_xfile_*_descr macros call kasprintf, which can fail to allocate memory if the formatted string is larger than 16 bytes (or whatever the nofail guarantees are nowadays). Some of them could easily exceed that, and Jiaming Zhang found a few places where that can happen with syzbot.
The descriptions are debugging aids and aren't required to be unique, so let's just pass in static strings and eliminate this path to failure. Note this patch touches a number of commits, most of which were merged between 6.6 and 6.14.
--- fs/xfs/scrub/agheader_repair.c | 13 ++++--------- fs/xfs/scrub/alloc_repair.c | 5 +---- fs/xfs/scrub/attr_repair.c | 20 +++++--------------- fs/xfs/scrub/bmap_repair.c | 6 +----- fs/xfs/scrub/common.h | 18 ------------------ fs/xfs/scrub/dir.c | 13 ++++--------- fs/xfs/scrub/dir_repair.c | 11 +++-------- fs/xfs/scrub/dirtree.c | 11 +++-------- fs/xfs/scrub/ialloc_repair.c | 5 +---- fs/xfs/scrub/nlinks.c | 6 ++---- fs/xfs/scrub/parent.c | 11 +++-------- fs/xfs/scrub/parent_repair.c | 23 ++++++----------------- fs/xfs/scrub/quotacheck.c | 13 +++---------- fs/xfs/scrub/refcount_repair.c | 13 ++----------- fs/xfs/scrub/rmap_repair.c | 5 +---- fs/xfs/scrub/rtsummary.c | 7 ++----- 16 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 139 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/scrub/agheader_repair.c +4 -9
@@ -1720,7 +1720,6 @@ xrep_agi( {struct xrep_agi *ragi;struct xfs_mount *mp = sc->mp; -char *descr;unsigned int i;int error;
@@ -1754,17 +1753,13 @@ xrep_agi(xagino_bitmap_init (&ragi->iunlink_bmp); sc->buf_cleanup = xrep_agi_buf_cleanup; - descr =xchk_xfile_ag_descr (sc,"iunlinked next pointers" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr,0 ,sizeof (xfs_agino_t), - &ragi->iunlink_next); -kfree (descr); + error =xfarray_create ("iunlinked next pointers" ,0 , +sizeof (xfs_agino_t), &ragi->iunlink_next);if (error)return error; - descr =xchk_xfile_ag_descr (sc,"iunlinked prev pointers" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr,0 ,sizeof (xfs_agino_t), - &ragi->iunlink_prev); -kfree (descr); + error =xfarray_create ("iunlinked prev pointers" ,0 , +sizeof (xfs_agino_t), &ragi->iunlink_prev);if (error)return error;
fs/xfs/scrub/alloc_repair.c +1 -4
@@ -849,7 +849,6 @@ xrep_allocbt( {struct xrep_abt *ra;struct xfs_mount *mp = sc->mp; -char *descr;int error;/* We require the rmapbt to rebuild anything. */
@@ -875,11 +874,9 @@ xrep_allocbt( }/* Set up enough storage to handle maximally fragmented free space. */ - descr =xchk_xfile_ag_descr (sc,"free space records" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr, mp->m_sb.sb_agblocks /2 , + error =xfarray_create ("free space records" , mp->m_sb.sb_agblocks /2 ,sizeof (struct xfs_alloc_rec_incore ), &ra->free_records); -kfree (descr);if (error) goto out_ra;
fs/xfs/scrub/attr_repair.c +5 -15
@@ -1531,7 +1531,6 @@ xrep_xattr_setup_scan( struct xrep_xattr **rxp) {struct xrep_xattr *rx; -char *descr;int max_len;int error;
@@ -1557,35 +1556,26 @@ xrep_xattr_setup_scan( goto out_rx;/* Set up some staging for salvaged attribute keys and values */ - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"xattr keys" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr,0 ,sizeof (struct xrep_xattr_key ), + error =xfarray_create ("xattr keys" ,0 ,sizeof (struct xrep_xattr_key ), &rx->xattr_records); -kfree (descr);if (error) goto out_rx; - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"xattr names" ); - error =xfblob_create (descr, &rx->xattr_blobs); -kfree (descr); + error =xfblob_create ("xattr names" , &rx->xattr_blobs);if (error) goto out_keys;if (xfs_has_parent (sc->mp)) {ASSERT (sc->flags &XCHK_FSGATES_DIRENTS ); - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc, -"xattr retained parent pointer entries" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr,0 , + error =xfarray_create ("xattr parent pointer entries" ,0 ,sizeof (struct xrep_xattr_pptr ), &rx->pptr_recs); -kfree (descr);if (error) goto out_values; - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc, -"xattr retained parent pointer names" ); - error =xfblob_create (descr, &rx->pptr_names); -kfree (descr); + error =xfblob_create ("xattr parent pointer names" , + &rx->pptr_names);if (error) goto out_pprecs;
fs/xfs/scrub/bmap_repair.c +1 -5
@@ -800,7 +800,6 @@ xrep_bmap( bool allow_unwritten) {struct xrep_bmap *rb; -char *descr;xfs_extnum_t max_bmbt_recs;bool large_extcount;int error =0 ;
@@ -822,11 +821,8 @@ xrep_bmap(/* Set up enough storage to handle the max records for this fork. */ large_extcount =xfs_has_large_extent_counts (sc->mp); max_bmbt_recs =xfs_iext_max_nextents (large_extcount, whichfork); - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"%s fork mapping records" , - whichfork ==XFS_DATA_FORK ?"data" :"attr" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr, max_bmbt_recs, + error =xfarray_create ("fork mapping records" , max_bmbt_recs,sizeof (struct xfs_bmbt_rec ), &rb->bmap_records); -kfree (descr);if (error) goto out_rb;
fs/xfs/scrub/common.h +0 -18
@@ -202,24 +202,6 @@ static inline bool xchk_could_repair(conint xchk_metadata_inode_forks (struct xfs_scrub *sc);/* -* Helper macros to allocate and format xfile description strings. -* Callers must kfree the pointer returned. -*/ -#define xchk_xfile_descr (sc, fmt, ...) \ - kasprintf(XCHK_GFP_FLAGS, "XFS (%s): " fmt, \ - (sc)->mp->m_super->s_id, ##__VA_ARGS__) -#define xchk_xfile_ag_descr (sc, fmt, ...) \ - kasprintf(XCHK_GFP_FLAGS, "XFS (%s): AG 0x%x " fmt, \ - (sc)->mp->m_super->s_id, \ - (sc)->sa.pag ? (sc)->sa.pag->pag_agno : (sc)->sm->sm_agno, \ - ##__VA_ARGS__) -#define xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc, fmt, ...) \ - kasprintf(XCHK_GFP_FLAGS, "XFS (%s): inode 0x%llx " fmt, \ - (sc)->mp->m_super->s_id, \ - (sc)->ip ? (sc)->ip->i_ino : (sc)->sm->sm_ino, \ - ##__VA_ARGS__) - -/* * Setting up a hook to wait for intents to drain is costly -- we have to take * the CPU hotplug lock and force an i-cache flush on all CPUs once to set it * up, and again to tear it down. These costs add up quickly, so we only want
fs/xfs/scrub/dir.c +4 -9
@@ -1094,22 +1094,17 @@ xchk_directory( sd->xname.name = sd->namebuf;if (xfs_has_parent (sc->mp)) { -char *descr; -/* * Set up some staging memory for dirents that we can't check * due to locking contention. */ - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"slow directory entries" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr,0 ,sizeof (struct xchk_dirent ), - &sd->dir_entries); -kfree (descr); + error =xfarray_create ("slow directory entries" ,0 , +sizeof (struct xchk_dirent ), &sd->dir_entries);if (error) goto out_sd; - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"slow directory entry names" ); - error =xfblob_create (descr, &sd->dir_names); -kfree (descr); + error =xfblob_create ("slow directory entry names" , + &sd->dir_names);if (error) goto out_entries; }
fs/xfs/scrub/dir_repair.c +3 -8
@@ -1782,20 +1782,15 @@ xrep_dir_setup_scan( struct xrep_dir *rd) {struct xfs_scrub *sc = rd->sc; -char *descr;int error;/* Set up some staging memory for salvaging dirents. */ - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"directory entries" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr,0 ,sizeof (struct xrep_dirent ), - &rd->dir_entries); -kfree (descr); + error =xfarray_create ("directory entries" ,0 , +sizeof (struct xrep_dirent ), &rd->dir_entries);if (error)return error; - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"directory entry names" ); - error =xfblob_create (descr, &rd->dir_names); -kfree (descr); + error =xfblob_create ("directory entry names" , &rd->dir_names);if (error) goto out_xfarray;
fs/xfs/scrub/dirtree.c +3 -8
@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ xchk_setup_dirtree( struct xfs_scrub *sc) {struct xchk_dirtree *dl; -char *descr;int error;xchk_fsgates_enable (sc,XCHK_FSGATES_DIRENTS );
@@ -120,16 +119,12 @@ xchk_setup_dirtree(mutex_init (&dl->lock); - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"dirtree path steps" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr,0 ,sizeof (struct xchk_dirpath_step ), - &dl->path_steps); -kfree (descr); + error =xfarray_create ("dirtree path steps" ,0 , +sizeof (struct xchk_dirpath_step ), &dl->path_steps);if (error) goto out_dl; - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"dirtree path names" ); - error =xfblob_create (descr, &dl->path_names); -kfree (descr); + error =xfblob_create ("dirtree path names" , &dl->path_names);if (error) goto out_steps;
fs/xfs/scrub/ialloc_repair.c +1 -4
@@ -804,7 +804,6 @@ xrep_iallocbt( {struct xrep_ibt *ri;struct xfs_mount *mp = sc->mp; -char *descr;xfs_agino_t first_agino, last_agino;int error =0 ;
@@ -823,11 +822,9 @@ xrep_iallocbt(/* Set up enough storage to handle an AG with nothing but inodes. */ xfs_agino_range (mp, sc->sa.pag->pag_agno, &first_agino, &last_agino); last_agino /=XFS_INODES_PER_CHUNK ; - descr =xchk_xfile_ag_descr (sc,"inode index records" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr, last_agino, + error =xfarray_create ("inode index records" , last_agino,sizeof (struct xfs_inobt_rec_incore ), &ri->inode_records); -kfree (descr);if (error) goto out_ri;
fs/xfs/scrub/nlinks.c +2 -4
@@ -995,7 +995,6 @@ xchk_nlinks_setup_scan( struct xchk_nlink_ctrs *xnc) {struct xfs_mount *mp = sc->mp; -char *descr;unsigned long long max_inos;xfs_agnumber_t last_agno = mp->m_sb.sb_agcount -1 ;xfs_agino_t first_agino, last_agino;
@@ -1012,10 +1011,9 @@ xchk_nlinks_setup_scan(*/ xfs_agino_range (mp, last_agno, &first_agino, &last_agino); max_inos =XFS_AGINO_TO_INO (mp, last_agno, last_agino) +1 ; - descr =xchk_xfile_descr (sc,"file link counts" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr,min (XFS_MAXINUMBER +1 , max_inos), + error =xfarray_create ("file link counts" , +min (XFS_MAXINUMBER +1 , max_inos),sizeof (struct xchk_nlink ), &xnc->nlinks); -kfree (descr);if (error) goto out_teardown;
fs/xfs/scrub/parent.c +3 -8
@@ -733,7 +733,6 @@ xchk_parent_pptr( struct xfs_scrub *sc) {struct xchk_pptrs *pp; -char *descr;int error; pp =kvzalloc (sizeof (struct xchk_pptrs ),XCHK_GFP_FLAGS );
@@ -746,16 +745,12 @@ xchk_parent_pptr(* Set up some staging memory for parent pointers that we can't check * due to locking contention. */ - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"slow parent pointer entries" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr,0 ,sizeof (struct xchk_pptr ), - &pp->pptr_entries); -kfree (descr); + error =xfarray_create ("slow parent pointer entries" ,0 , +sizeof (struct xchk_pptr ), &pp->pptr_entries);if (error) goto out_pp; - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"slow parent pointer names" ); - error =xfblob_create (descr, &pp->pptr_names); -kfree (descr); + error =xfblob_create ("slow parent pointer names" , &pp->pptr_names);if (error) goto out_entries;
fs/xfs/scrub/parent_repair.c +6 -17
@@ -1476,7 +1476,6 @@ xrep_parent_setup_scan( struct xrep_parent *rp) {struct xfs_scrub *sc = rp->sc; -char *descr;struct xfs_da_geometry *geo = sc->mp->m_attr_geo;int max_len;int error;
@@ -1504,32 +1503,22 @@ xrep_parent_setup_scan( goto out_xattr_name;/* Set up some staging memory for logging parent pointer updates. */ - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"parent pointer entries" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr,0 ,sizeof (struct xrep_pptr ), - &rp->pptr_recs); -kfree (descr); + error =xfarray_create ("parent pointer entries" ,0 , +sizeof (struct xrep_pptr ), &rp->pptr_recs);if (error) goto out_xattr_value; - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc,"parent pointer names" ); - error =xfblob_create (descr, &rp->pptr_names); -kfree (descr); + error =xfblob_create ("parent pointer names" , &rp->pptr_names);if (error) goto out_recs;/* Set up some storage for copying attrs before the mapping exchange */ - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc, -"parent pointer retained xattr entries" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr,0 ,sizeof (struct xrep_parent_xattr ), - &rp->xattr_records); -kfree (descr); + error =xfarray_create ("parent pointer xattr entries" ,0 , +sizeof (struct xrep_parent_xattr ), &rp->xattr_records);if (error) goto out_names; - descr =xchk_xfile_ino_descr (sc, -"parent pointer retained xattr values" ); - error =xfblob_create (descr, &rp->xattr_blobs); -kfree (descr); + error =xfblob_create ("parent pointer xattr values" , &rp->xattr_blobs);if (error) goto out_attr_keys;
fs/xfs/scrub/quotacheck.c +3 -10
@@ -741,7 +741,6 @@ xqcheck_setup_scan(struct xfs_scrub *sc, struct xqcheck *xqc) { - char *descr; struct xfs_quotainfo *qi = sc->mp->m_quotainfo;unsigned long long max_dquots =XFS_DQ_ID_MAX +1ULL ;int error;
@@ -756,28 +755,22 @@ xqcheck_setup_scan( error = -ENOMEM ;if (xfs_this_quota_on (sc->mp,XFS_DQTYPE_USER )) { - descr =xchk_xfile_descr (sc,"user dquot records" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr, max_dquots, + error =xfarray_create ("user dquot records" , max_dquots,sizeof (struct xqcheck_dquot ), &xqc->ucounts); -kfree (descr);if (error) goto out_teardown; }if (xfs_this_quota_on (sc->mp,XFS_DQTYPE_GROUP )) { - descr =xchk_xfile_descr (sc,"group dquot records" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr, max_dquots, + error =xfarray_create ("group dquot records" , max_dquots,sizeof (struct xqcheck_dquot ), &xqc->gcounts); -kfree (descr);if (error) goto out_teardown; }if (xfs_this_quota_on (sc->mp,XFS_DQTYPE_PROJ )) { - descr =xchk_xfile_descr (sc,"project dquot records" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr, max_dquots, + error =xfarray_create ("project dquot records" , max_dquots,sizeof (struct xqcheck_dquot ), &xqc->pcounts); -kfree (descr);if (error) goto out_teardown; }
fs/xfs/scrub/refcount_repair.c +2 -11
@@ -123,13 +123,7 @@ intxrep_setup_ag_refcountbt ( struct xfs_scrub *sc) { -char *descr; -int error; - - descr =xchk_xfile_ag_descr (sc,"rmap record bag" ); - error =xrep_setup_xfbtree (sc, descr); -kfree (descr); -return error; +return xrep_setup_xfbtree (sc,"rmap record bag" ); }/* Check for any obvious conflicts with this shared/CoW staging extent. */
@@ -705,7 +699,6 @@ xrep_refcountbt( {struct xrep_refc *rr;struct xfs_mount *mp = sc->mp; -char *descr;int error;/* We require the rmapbt to rebuild anything. */
@@ -718,11 +711,9 @@ xrep_refcountbt( rr->sc = sc;/* Set up enough storage to handle one refcount record per block. */ - descr =xchk_xfile_ag_descr (sc,"reference count records" ); - error =xfarray_create (descr, mp->m_sb.sb_agblocks, + error =xfarray_create ("reference count records" , mp->m_sb.sb_agblocks,sizeof (struct xfs_refcount_irec ), &rr->refcount_records); -kfree (descr);if (error) goto out_rr;
fs/xfs/scrub/rmap_repair.c +1 -4
@@ -161,14 +161,11 @@ xrep_setup_ag_rmapbt( struct xfs_scrub *sc) {struct xrep_rmap *rr; -char *descr;int error;xchk_fsgates_enable (sc,XCHK_FSGATES_RMAP ); - descr =xchk_xfile_ag_descr (sc,"reverse mapping records" ); - error =xrep_setup_xfbtree (sc, descr); -kfree (descr); + error =xrep_setup_xfbtree (sc,"reverse mapping records" );if (error)return error;
fs/xfs/scrub/rtsummary.c +2 -5
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ xchk_setup_rtsummary( struct xfs_scrub *sc) {struct xfs_mount *mp = sc->mp; -char *descr;struct xchk_rtsummary *rts;int error;
@@ -62,10 +61,8 @@ xchk_setup_rtsummary(* Create an xfile to construct a new rtsummary file. The xfile allows * us to avoid pinning kernel memory for this purpose. */ - descr =xchk_xfile_descr (sc,"realtime summary file" ); - error =xfile_create (descr,XFS_FSB_TO_B (mp, mp->m_rsumblocks), - &sc->xfile); -kfree (descr); + error =xfile_create ("realtime summary file" , +XFS_FSB_TO_B (mp, mp->m_rsumblocks), &sc->xfile);if (error)return error;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 294/460 erofs: fix inline data read failure for ztailpacking pclusters
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gao Xiang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c134a40f86efb8d6b5a949ef70e06d5752209be5 ]
Compressed folios for ztailpacking pclusters must be valid before adding these pclusters to I/O chains. Otherwise, z_erofs_decompress_pcluster() may assume they are already valid and then trigger a NULL pointer dereference.
It is somewhat hard to reproduce because the inline data is in the same block as the tail of the compressed indexes, which are usually read just before. However, it may still happen if a fatal signal arrives while read_mapping_folio() is running, as shown below:
erofs: (device dm-1): z_erofs_pcluster_begin: failed to get inline data -4
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008
...
pc : z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x4c8/0xa14 lr : z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x160/0xa14 sp : ffffffc08b3eb3a0 x29: ffffffc08b3eb570 x28: ffffffc08b3eb418 x27: 0000000000001000 x26: ffffff8086ebdbb8 x25: ffffff8086ebdbb8 x24: 0000000000000001 x23: 0000000000000008 x22: 00000000fffffffb x21: dead000000000700 x20: 00000000000015e7 x19: ffffff808babb400 x18: ffffffc089edc098 x17: 00000000c006287d x16: 00000000c006287d x15: 0000000000000004 x14: ffffff80ba8f8000 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: 00000006589a77c9 x11: 0000000000000015 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffffffffffffffe0 x3 : 0000000000000020 x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x4c8/0xa14 z_erofs_runqueue+0x908/0x97c z_erofs_read_folio+0x128/0x228 filemap_read_folio+0x68/0x128 filemap_get_pages+0x44c/0x8b4 filemap_read+0x12c/0x5b8 generic_file_read_iter+0x4c/0x15c do_iter_readv_writev+0x188/0x1e0 vfs_iter_read+0xac/0x1a4 backing_file_read_iter+0x170/0x34c ovl_read_iter+0xf0/0x140 vfs_read+0x28c/0x344 ksys_read+0x80/0xf0 __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x34 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x114 el0_svc_common+0x88/0xe4 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x30 el0_svc+0x40/0xa8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0xbc el0t_64_sync+0x1bc/0x1c0
Fix this by reading the inline data before allocating and adding the pclusters to the I/O chains.
--- fs/erofs/zdata.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/erofs/zdata.c +11 -10
@@ -787,6 +787,7 @@ static int z_erofs_pcluster_begin(structstruct super_block *sb = fe->inode->i_sb;erofs_blk_t blknr =erofs_blknr (sb, map->m_pa);struct z_erofs_pcluster *pcl =NULL ; +void *ptr =NULL ;int ret;DBG_BUGON (fe->pcl);
@@ -807,6 +808,14 @@ static int z_erofs_pcluster_begin(struct }else if ((map->m_pa & ~PAGE_MASK ) + map->m_plen >PAGE_SIZE ) {DBG_BUGON (1 );return -EFSCORRUPTED ; + }else { + ptr =erofs_read_metabuf (&map->buf, sb, map->m_pa,EROFS_NO_KMAP ); +if (IS_ERR (ptr)) { +erofs_err (sb,"failed to read inline data %pe @ pa %llu of nid %llu" , + ptr, map->m_pa,EROFS_I (fe->inode)->nid); +return PTR_ERR (ptr); + } + ptr = map->buf.page; }if (pcl) {
@@ -836,16 +845,8 @@ static int z_erofs_pcluster_begin(struct/* bind cache first when cached decompression is preferred */ z_erofs_bind_cache (fe); }else { -void *mptr; - - mptr =erofs_read_metabuf (&map->buf, sb, map->m_pa,EROFS_NO_KMAP ); -if (IS_ERR (mptr)) { - ret =PTR_ERR (mptr); -erofs_err (sb,"failed to get inline data %d" , ret); -return ret; - } -get_page (map->buf.page); -WRITE_ONCE (fe->pcl->compressed_bvecs[0 ].page, map->buf.page); +get_page ((struct page *)ptr); +WRITE_ONCE (fe->pcl->compressed_bvecs[0 ].page, ptr); fe->pcl->pageofs_in = map->m_pa & ~PAGE_MASK ; fe->mode =Z_EROFS_PCLUSTER_FOLLOWED_NOINPLACE ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 295/460 mm: thp: deny THP for files on anonymous inodes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Deepanshu Kartikey <[email protected]>
commit dd085fe9a8ebfc5d10314c60452db38d2b75e609 upstream.
file_thp_enabled() incorrectly allows THP for files on anonymous inodes (e.g. guest_memfd and secretmem). These files are created via alloc_file_pseudo(), which does not call get_write_access() and leaves inode->i_writecount at 0. Combined with S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) being true, they appear as read-only regular files when CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS is enabled, making them eligible for THP collapse.
Anonymous inodes can never pass the inode_is_open_for_write() check since their i_writecount is never incremented through the normal VFS open path. The right thing to do is to exclude them from THP eligibility altogether, since CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS was designed for real filesystem files (e.g. shared libraries), not for pseudo-filesystem inodes.
For guest_memfd, this allows khugepaged and MADV_COLLAPSE to create large folios in the page cache via the collapse path, but the guest_memfd fault handler does not support large folios. This triggers WARN_ON_ONCE(folio_test_large(folio)) in kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping().
For secretmem, collapse_file() tries to copy page contents through the direct map, but secretmem pages are removed from the direct map. This can result in a kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88810284d000
RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0x16/0x130
Call Trace:
collapse_file
hpage_collapse_scan_file
madvise_collapseSecretmem is not affected by the crash on upstream as the memory failure recovery handles the failed copy gracefully, but it still triggers confusing false memory failure reports:
Memory failure: 0x106d96f: recovery action for clean unevictable LRU page: Recovered
Check IS_ANON_FILE(inode) in file_thp_enabled() to deny THP for all anonymous inode files.
[ Ackerley: we don't have IS_ANON_FILE() yet. As guest_memfd does
not apply yet, simply check for secretmem explicitly. ]
--- include/linux/huge_mm.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
include/linux/huge_mm.h +4 -0
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@#include <linux/fs.h> /* only for vma_is_dax() */ #include <linux/kobject.h> +#include <linux/secretmem.h> vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page (struct vm_fault *vmf); int copy_huge_pmd(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct mm_struct *src_mm,
@@ -262,6 +263,9 @@ static inline bool file_thp_enabled(stru inode = vma->vm_file->f_inode; +if (secretmem_mapping (inode->i_mapping)) +return false; +return (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS )) && !inode_is_open_for_write (inode) &&S_ISREG (inode->i_mode); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 296/460 sched_ext: Remove redundant css_put() in scx_cgroup_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cheng-Yang Chou <[email protected]>
commit 1336b579f6079fb8520be03624fcd9ba443c930b upstream.
The iterator css_for_each_descendant_pre() walks the cgroup hierarchy under cgroup_lock(). It does not increment the reference counts on yielded css structs.
According to the cgroup documentation, css_put() should only be used to release a reference obtained via css_get() or css_tryget_online(). Since the iterator does not use either of these to acquire a reference, calling css_put() in the error path of scx_cgroup_init() causes a refcount underflow.
Remove the unbalanced css_put() to prevent a potential Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerability.
--- kernel/sched/ext.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
kernel/sched/ext.c +0 -1
@@ -4319,7 +4319,6 @@ static int scx_cgroup_init(void) ret =SCX_CALL_OP_RET (SCX_KF_UNLOCKED , cgroup_init, css->cgroup, &args);if (ret) { -css_put (css);scx_ops_error ("ops.cgroup_init() failed (%d)" , ret);return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 297/460 io_uring/kbuf: check if target buffer list is still legacy on recycle
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Commit c2c185be5c85d37215397c8e8781abf0a69bec1f upstream.
There's a gap between when the buffer was grabbed and when it potentially gets recycled, where if the list is empty, someone could've upgraded it to a ring provided type. This can happen if the request is forced via io-wq. The legacy recycling is missing checking if the buffer_list still exists, and if it's of the correct type. Add those checks.
--- io_uring/kbuf.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
io_uring/kbuf.c +10 -2
@@ -62,9 +62,17 @@ bool io_kbuf_recycle_legacy(struct io_ki buf = req->kbuf; bl =io_buffer_get_list (ctx, buf->bgid); -list_add (&buf->list, &bl->buf_list); - req->flags &= ~REQ_F_BUFFER_SELECTED ; +/* +* If the buffer list was upgraded to a ring-based one, or removed, +* while the request was in-flight in io-wq, drop it. +*/ req->buf_index = buf->bgid; +if (bl && !(bl->flags &IOBL_BUF_RING )) +list_add (&buf->list, &bl->buf_list); +else +kmem_cache_free (io_buf_cachep, buf); + req->flags &= ~REQ_F_BUFFER_SELECTED ; + req->kbuf =NULL ;io_ring_submit_unlock (ctx, issue_flags);return true;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 298/460 sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
commit b3d99f43c72b56cf7a104a364e7fb34b0702828b upstream.
It turns out that zero_vruntime tracking is broken when there is but a single task running. Current update paths are through __{en,de}queue_entity(), and when there is but a single task, pick_next_task() will always return that one task, and put_prev_set_next_task() will end up in neither function.
This can cause entity_key() to grow indefinitely large and cause overflows, leading to much pain and suffering.
Furtermore, doing update_zero_vruntime() from __{de,en}queue_entity(), which are called from {set_next,put_prev}_entity() has problems because:
- set_next_entity() calls __dequeue_entity() before it does cfs_rq->curr = se. This means the avg_vruntime() will see the removal but not current, missing the entity for accounting.
- put_prev_entity() calls __enqueue_entity() before it does cfs_rq->curr = NULL. This means the avg_vruntime() will see the addition *and* current, leading to double accounting.
Both cases are incorrect/inconsistent.
Noting that avg_vruntime is already called on each {en,de}queue, remove the explicit avg_vruntime() calls (which removes an extra 64bit division for each {en,de}queue) and have avg_vruntime() update zero_vruntime itself.
Additionally, have the tick call avg_vruntime() -- discarding the result, but for the side-effect of updating zero_vruntime.
While there, optimize avg_vruntime() by noting that the average of one value is rather trivial to compute.
Test case:
# taskset -c -p 1 $$
# taskset -c 2 bash -c 'while :; do :; done&'
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/sched/debug | awk '/^cpu#/ {P=0} /^cpu#2,/ {P=1} {if (P) print $0}' | grep -e zero_vruntime -e "^>"PRE:
.zero_vruntime : 31316.407903
Quoted 1 line
R bash 487 50787.345112 E 50789.145972 2.800000 50780.298364 16 120 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 /
.zero_vruntime : 382548.253179
Quoted 1 line
R bash 487 427275.204288 E 427276.003584 2.800000 427268.157540 23 120 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 /
POST:
.zero_vruntime : 17259.709467
Quoted 1 line
R bash 526 17259.709467 E 17262.509467 2.800000 16915.031624 9 120 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 /
.zero_vruntime : 18702.723356
Quoted 1 line
R bash 526 18702.723356 E 18705.523356 2.800000 18358.045513 9 120 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 /
--- kernel/sched/fair.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/fair.c +57 -27
@@ -551,6 +551,21 @@ static inline bool entity_before(const sreturn (s64)(a->deadline - b->deadline) <0 ; } +/* +* Per avg_vruntime() below, cfs_rq::zero_vruntime is only slightly stale +* and this value should be no more than two lag bounds. Which puts it in the +* general order of: +* +* (slice + TICK_NSEC) << NICE_0_LOAD_SHIFT +* +* which is around 44 bits in size (on 64bit); that is 20 for +* NICE_0_LOAD_SHIFT, another 20 for NSEC_PER_MSEC and then a handful for +* however many msec the actual slice+tick ends up begin. +* +* (disregarding the actual divide-by-weight part makes for the worst case +* weight of 2, which nicely cancels vs the fuzz in zero_vruntime not actually +* being the zero-lag point). +*/ static inline s64 entity_key (struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq,struct sched_entity *se) {return (s64)(se->vruntime - cfs_rq->zero_vruntime);
@@ -638,39 +653,61 @@ avg_vruntime_sub(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, }static inline -void avg_vruntime_update (struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq,s64 delta) +void update_zero_vruntime (struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq,s64 delta) {/* -* v' = v + d ==> avg_vruntime' = avg_runtime - d*avg_load +* v' = v + d ==> avg_vruntime' = avg_vruntime - d*avg_load */ cfs_rq->avg_vruntime -= cfs_rq->avg_load * delta; + cfs_rq->zero_vruntime += delta; }/* -* Specifically: avg_runtime() + 0 must result in entity_eligible() := true +* Specifically: avg_vruntime() + 0 must result in entity_eligible() := true * For this to be so, the result of this function must have a left bias. +* +* Called in: +* - place_entity() -- before enqueue +* - update_entity_lag() -- before dequeue +* - entity_tick() +* +* This means it is one entry 'behind' but that puts it close enough to where +* the bound on entity_key() is at most two lag bounds. */ u64 avg_vruntime (struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq) {struct sched_entity *curr = cfs_rq->curr; -s64 avg = cfs_rq->avg_vruntime; -long load = cfs_rq->avg_load; +long weight = cfs_rq->avg_load; +s64 delta =0 ; -if (curr && curr->on_rq) { -unsigned long weight =scale_load_down (curr->load.weight); +if (curr && !curr->on_rq) + curr =NULL ; - avg +=entity_key (cfs_rq, curr) * weight; - load += weight; - } +if (weight) { +s64 runtime = cfs_rq->avg_vruntime; + +if (curr) { +unsigned long w =scale_load_down (curr->load.weight); + + runtime +=entity_key (cfs_rq, curr) * w; + weight += w; + } -if (load) {/* sign flips effective floor / ceiling */ -if (avg <0 ) - avg -= (load -1 ); - avg =div_s64 (avg, load); +if (runtime <0 ) + runtime -= (weight -1 ); + + delta =div_s64 (runtime, weight); + }else if (curr) { +/* +* When there is but one element, it is the average. +*/ + delta = curr->vruntime - cfs_rq->zero_vruntime; } -return cfs_rq->zero_vruntime + avg; +update_zero_vruntime (cfs_rq, delta); + +return cfs_rq->zero_vruntime; }/*
@@ -744,16 +781,6 @@ int entity_eligible(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rreturn vruntime_eligible (cfs_rq, se->vruntime); } -static void update_zero_vruntime (struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq) -{ -u64 vruntime =avg_vruntime (cfs_rq); -s64 delta = (s64)(vruntime - cfs_rq->zero_vruntime); - -avg_vruntime_update (cfs_rq, delta); - - cfs_rq->zero_vruntime = vruntime; -} -static inline u64 cfs_rq_min_slice (struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq) {struct sched_entity *root =__pick_root_entity (cfs_rq);
@@ -824,7 +851,6 @@ RB_DECLARE_CALLBACKS(static, min_vruntimstatic void __enqueue_entity (struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq,struct sched_entity *se) {avg_vruntime_add (cfs_rq, se); -update_zero_vruntime (cfs_rq); se->min_vruntime = se->vruntime; se->min_slice = se->slice; rb_add_augmented_cached(&se->run_node, &cfs_rq->tasks_timeline,
@@ -836,7 +862,6 @@ static void __dequeue_entity(struct cfs_rb_erase_augmented_cached (&se->run_node, &cfs_rq->tasks_timeline, &min_vruntime_cb);avg_vruntime_sub (cfs_rq, se); -update_zero_vruntime (cfs_rq); }struct sched_entity *__pick_root_entity (struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
@@ -5700,6 +5725,11 @@ entity_tick(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, strucupdate_load_avg (cfs_rq, curr,UPDATE_TG );update_cfs_group (curr); +/* +* Pulls along cfs_rq::zero_vruntime. +*/ +avg_vruntime (cfs_rq); +#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_HRTICK /* * queued ticks are scheduled to match the slice, so don't bother
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 299/460 s390/stackleak: Fix __stackleak_poison() inline assembly constraint
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
commit 674c5ff0f440a051ebf299d29a4c013133d81a65 upstream.
The __stackleak_poison() inline assembly comes with a "count" operand where the "d" constraint is used. "count" is used with the exrl instruction and "d" means that the compiler may allocate any register from 0 to 15.
If the compiler would allocate register 0 then the exrl instruction would not or the value of "count" into the executed instruction - resulting in a stackframe which is only partially poisoned.
Use the correct "a" constraint, which excludes register 0 from register allocation.
--- arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h +1 -1
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_" j 4f\n" "3: mvc 8(1,%[addr]),0(%[addr])\n" "4:\n" - : [addr] "+&a" (erase_low), [count] "+&d" (count), [tmp] "=&a" (tmp) + : [addr] "+&a" (erase_low), [count] "+&a" (count), [tmp] "=&a" (tmp) : [poison] "d" (poison) : "memory", "cc" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 300/460 s390/xor: Fix xor_xc_2() inline assembly constraints
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
commit f775276edc0c505dc0f782773796c189f31a1123 upstream.
The inline assembly constraints for xor_xc_2() are incorrect. "bytes", "p1", and "p2" are input operands, while all three of them are modified within the inline assembly. Given that the function consists only of this inline assembly it seems unlikely that this may cause any problems, however fix this in any case.
--- arch/s390/lib/xor.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/s390/lib/xor.c +2 -2
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ static void xor_xc_2(unsigned long bytes" j 3f\n" "2: xc 0(1,%1),0(%2)\n" "3:\n" - : : "d" (bytes), "a" (p1), "a" (p2) - : "0", "1", "cc", "memory"); + : "+d" (bytes), "+a" (p1), "+a" (p2) + : : "0", "1", "cc", "memory"); } static void xor_xc_3(unsigned long bytes, unsigned long * __restrict p1,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 301/460 drm/i915/alpm: ALPM disable fixes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Högander <[email protected]>
commit eb4a7139e97374f42b7242cc754e77f1623fbcd5 upstream.
PORT_ALPM_CTL is supposed to be written only before link training. Remove writing it from ALPM disable.
Also clearing ALPM_CTL_ALPM_AUX_LESS_ENABLE and is not about disabling ALPM but switching to AUX-Wake ALPM. Stop touching this bit on ALPM disable.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c | 7 +------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c +1 -6
@@ -2114,12 +2114,7 @@ static void intel_psr_disable_locked(str/* Panel Replay on eDP is always using ALPM aux less. */ if (intel_dp->psr.panel_replay_enabled &&intel_dp_is_edp (intel_dp)) {intel_de_rmw (display,ALPM_CTL (display, cpu_transcoder), -ALPM_CTL_ALPM_ENABLE | -ALPM_CTL_ALPM_AUX_LESS_ENABLE ,0 ); - -intel_de_rmw (display, -PORT_ALPM_CTL (display, cpu_transcoder), -PORT_ALPM_CTL_ALPM_AUX_LESS_ENABLE ,0 ); +ALPM_CTL_ALPM_ENABLE ,0 ); }/* Disable PSR on Sink */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 302/460 drm/i915/psr: Repeat Selective Update area alignment
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Högander <[email protected]>
commit 1be2fca84f520105413d0d89ed04bb0ff742ab16 upstream.
Currently we are aligning Selective Update area to cover cursor fully if needed only once. It may happen that cursor is in Selective Update area after pipe alignment and after that covering cursor plane only partially. Fix this by looping alignment as long as alignment isn't needed anymore.
v2:
- do not unecessarily loop if cursor was already fully covered
- rename aligned as su_area_changed
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c +38 -12
@@ -2385,12 +2385,13 @@ static void clip_area_update(struct drm_ overlap_damage_area->y2 = damage_area->y2; } -static void intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alignment (struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state) +static bool intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alignment (struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state) {struct intel_display *display =to_intel_display (crtc_state);struct drm_i915_private *dev_priv =to_i915 (crtc_state->uapi.crtc->dev);const struct drm_dsc_config *vdsc_cfg = &crtc_state->dsc.config;u16 y_alignment; +bool su_area_changed = false;/* ADLP aligns the SU region to vdsc slice height in case dsc is enabled */ if (crtc_state->dsc.compression_enable &&
@@ -2399,10 +2400,18 @@ static void intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alelse y_alignment = crtc_state->su_y_granularity; - crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y1 -= crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y1 % y_alignment; -if (crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y2 % y_alignment) +if (crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y1 % y_alignment) { + crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y1 -= crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y1 % y_alignment; + su_area_changed = true; + } + +if (crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y2 % y_alignment) { crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y2 = ((crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y2 / y_alignment) +1 ) * y_alignment; + su_area_changed = true; + } + +return su_area_changed; }/*
@@ -2487,7 +2496,7 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct istruct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state =intel_atomic_get_new_crtc_state (state, crtc);struct intel_plane_state *new_plane_state, *old_plane_state;struct intel_plane *plane; -bool full_update = false, cursor_in_su_area = false; +bool full_update = false, su_area_changed;int i, ret;if (!crtc_state->enable_psr2_sel_fetch)
@@ -2599,15 +2608,32 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct iif (ret)return ret; -/* -* Adjust su area to cover cursor fully as necessary (early -* transport). This needs to be done after -* drm_atomic_add_affected_planes to ensure visible cursor is added into -* affected planes even when cursor is not updated by itself. -*/ -intel_psr2_sel_fetch_et_alignment (state, crtc, &cursor_in_su_area); +do { +bool cursor_in_su_area; -intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alignment (crtc_state); +/* +* Adjust su area to cover cursor fully as necessary +* (early transport). This needs to be done after +* drm_atomic_add_affected_planes to ensure visible +* cursor is added into affected planes even when +* cursor is not updated by itself. +*/ +intel_psr2_sel_fetch_et_alignment (state, crtc, &cursor_in_su_area); + + su_area_changed =intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alignment (crtc_state); + +/* +* If the cursor was outside the SU area before +* alignment, the alignment step (which only expands +* SU) may pull the cursor partially inside, so we +* must run ET alignment again to fully cover it. But +* if the cursor was already fully inside before +* alignment, expanding the SU area won't change that, +* so no further work is needed. +*/ +if (cursor_in_su_area) +break ; + }while (su_area_changed);/* * Now that we have the pipe damaged area check if it intersect with
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 303/460 drm/amd/display: Add pixel_clock to amd_pp_display_configuration
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>
commit b515dcb0dc4e85d8254f5459cfb32fce88dacbfb upstream.
This commit adds the pixel_clock field to the display config struct so that power management (DPM) can use it.
We currently don't have a proper bandwidth calculation on old GPUs with DCE 6-10 because dce_calcs only supports DCE 11+. So the power management (DPM) on these GPUs may need to make ad-hoc decisions for display based on the pixel clock.
Also rename sym_clock to pixel_clock in dm_pp_single_disp_config to avoid confusion with other code where the sym_clock refers to the DisplayPort symbol clock.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_pp_smu.c | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce110/dce110_clk_mgr.c | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dm_services_types.h | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/include/dm_pp_interface.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_pp_smu.c +1 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ bool dm_pp_apply_display_requirements(const struct dm_pp_single_disp_config *dc_cfg = &pp_display_cfg->disp_configs[i]; adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.displays[i].controller_id = dc_cfg->pipe_idx +1 ; + adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.displays[i].pixel_clock = dc_cfg->pixel_clock; }amdgpu_dpm_display_configuration_change (adev, &adev->pm.pm_display_cfg);
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/clk_mgr/dce110/dce110_clk_mgr.c +1 -1
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ void dce110_fill_display_configs( stream->link->cur_link_settings.link_rate; cfg->link_settings.link_spread = stream->link->cur_link_settings.link_spread; - cfg->sym_clock = stream->phy_pix_clk; + cfg->pixel_clock = stream->phy_pix_clk;/* Round v_refresh*/ cfg->v_refresh = stream->timing.pix_clk_100hz *100 ; cfg->v_refresh /= stream->timing.h_total;
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dm_services_types.h +1 -1
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ struct dm_pp_single_disp_config {uint32_t src_height;uint32_t src_width;uint32_t v_refresh; -uint32_t sym_clock;/* HDMI only */ +uint32_t pixel_clock;/* Pixel clock in KHz (for HDMI only: normalized) */ struct dc_link_settings link_settings;/* DP only */ };
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/include/dm_pp_interface.h +1 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct single_display_configuration {uint32_t view_resolution_cy;enum amd_pp_display_config_type displayconfigtype;uint32_t vertical_refresh;/* for active display */ +uint32_t pixel_clock;/* Pixel clock in KHz (for HDMI only: normalized) */ };#define MAX_NUM_DISPLAY 32
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 304/460 drm/amd/pm: Use pm_display_cfg in legacy DPM (v2)
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Timur Kristóf <[email protected]>
commit 9d73b107a61b73e7101d4b728ddac3d2c77db111 upstream.
This commit is necessary for DC to function well with chips that use the legacy power management code, ie. SI and KV. Communicate display information from DC to the legacy PM code.
Currently DC uses pm_display_cfg to communicate power management requirements from the display code to the DPM code. However, the legacy (non-DC) code path used different fields and therefore could not take into account anything from DC.
Change the legacy display code to fill the same pm_display_cfg struct as DC and use the same in the legacy DPM code.
To ease review and reduce churn, this commit does not yet delete the now unneeded code, that is done in the next commit.
v2:
Rebase.
Fix single_display in amdgpu_dpm_pick_power_state.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/amdgpu_dpm_internal.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/inc/amdgpu_dpm_internal.h | 2 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/kv_dpm.c | 4 - drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/legacy_dpm.c | 6 +- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/si_dpm.c | 65 +++++++--------------- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/amd_powerplay.c | 11 --- 6 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/amdgpu_dpm_internal.c +67 -0
@@ -100,3 +100,70 @@ u32 amdgpu_dpm_get_vrefresh(struct amdgpreturn vrefresh; } + +void amdgpu_dpm_get_display_cfg (struct amdgpu_device *adev) +{ +struct drm_device *ddev =adev_to_drm (adev); +struct amd_pp_display_configuration *cfg = &adev->pm.pm_display_cfg; +struct single_display_configuration *display_cfg; +struct drm_crtc *crtc; +struct amdgpu_crtc *amdgpu_crtc; +struct amdgpu_connector *conn; +int num_crtcs =0 ; +int vrefresh; +u32 vblank_in_pixels, vblank_time_us; + + cfg->min_vblank_time =0xffffffff ;/* if the displays are off, vblank time is max */ + +if (adev->mode_info.num_crtc && adev->mode_info.mode_config_initialized) { +list_for_each_entry (crtc, &ddev->mode_config.crtc_list, head) { + amdgpu_crtc =to_amdgpu_crtc (crtc); + +/* The array should only contain active displays. */ +if (!amdgpu_crtc->enabled) +continue ; + + conn =to_amdgpu_connector (amdgpu_crtc->connector); + display_cfg = &adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.displays[num_crtcs++]; + +if (amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode.clock) { + vrefresh =drm_mode_vrefresh (&amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode); + + vblank_in_pixels = + amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode.crtc_htotal * + (amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode.crtc_vblank_end - + amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode.crtc_vdisplay + + (amdgpu_crtc->v_border *2 )); + + vblank_time_us = + vblank_in_pixels *1000 / amdgpu_crtc->hw_mode.clock; + +/* The legacy (non-DC) code has issues with mclk switching +* with refresh rates over 120 Hz. Disable mclk switching. +*/ +if (vrefresh >120 ) + vblank_time_us =0 ; + +/* Find minimum vblank time. */ +if (vblank_time_us < cfg->min_vblank_time) + cfg->min_vblank_time = vblank_time_us; + +/* Find vertical refresh rate of first active display. */ +if (!cfg->vrefresh) + cfg->vrefresh = vrefresh; + } + +if (amdgpu_crtc->crtc_id < cfg->crtc_index) { +/* Find first active CRTC and its line time. */ + cfg->crtc_index = amdgpu_crtc->crtc_id; + cfg->line_time_in_us = amdgpu_crtc->line_time; + } + + display_cfg->controller_id = amdgpu_crtc->crtc_id; + display_cfg->pixel_clock = conn->pixelclock_for_modeset; + } + } + + cfg->display_clk = adev->clock.default_dispclk; + cfg->num_display = num_crtcs; +}
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/inc/amdgpu_dpm_internal.h +2 -0
@@ -29,4 +29,6 @@ u32 amdgpu_dpm_get_vblank_time(struct amu32 amdgpu_dpm_get_vrefresh (struct amdgpu_device *adev); +void amdgpu_dpm_get_display_cfg (struct amdgpu_device *adev); +#endif
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/kv_dpm.c +2 -2
@@ -2299,7 +2299,7 @@ static void kv_apply_state_adjust_rules(if (pi->sys_info.nb_dpm_enable) { force_high = (mclk >= pi->sys_info.nbp_memory_clock[3 ]) || - pi->video_start || (adev->pm.dpm.new_active_crtc_count >=3 ) || + pi->video_start || (adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.num_display >=3 ) || pi->disable_nb_ps3_in_battery; ps->dpm0_pg_nb_ps_lo = force_high ?0x2 :0x3 ; ps->dpm0_pg_nb_ps_hi =0x2 ;
@@ -2358,7 +2358,7 @@ static int kv_calculate_nbps_level_settireturn 0 ; force_high = ((mclk >= pi->sys_info.nbp_memory_clock[3 ]) || - (adev->pm.dpm.new_active_crtc_count >=3 ) || pi->video_start); + (adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.num_display >=3 ) || pi->video_start);if (force_high) {for (i = pi->lowest_valid; i <= pi->highest_valid; i++)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/legacy_dpm.c +3 -3
@@ -797,8 +797,7 @@ static struct amdgpu_ps *amdgpu_dpm_pickint i;struct amdgpu_ps *ps;u32 ui_class; -bool single_display = (adev->pm.dpm.new_active_crtc_count <2 ) ? - true : false; +bool single_display = adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.num_display <2 ;/* check if the vblank period is too short to adjust the mclk */ if (single_display && adev->powerplay.pp_funcs->vblank_too_short) {
@@ -994,7 +993,8 @@ void amdgpu_legacy_dpm_compute_clocks(vo {struct amdgpu_device *adev = (struct amdgpu_device *)handle; -amdgpu_dpm_get_active_displays (adev); +if (!adev->dc_enabled) +amdgpu_dpm_get_display_cfg (adev);amdgpu_dpm_change_power_state_locked (adev); }
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/si_dpm.c +22 -43
150 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/amd_powerplay.c +1 -10
@@ -1569,16 +1569,7 @@ static void pp_pm_compute_clocks(void *hstruct amdgpu_device *adev = hwmgr->adev;if (!adev->dc_enabled) { -amdgpu_dpm_get_active_displays (adev); - adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.num_display = adev->pm.dpm.new_active_crtc_count; - adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.vrefresh =amdgpu_dpm_get_vrefresh (adev); - adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.min_vblank_time =amdgpu_dpm_get_vblank_time (adev); -/* we have issues with mclk switching with -* refresh rates over 120 hz on the non-DC code. -*/ -if (adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.vrefresh >120 ) - adev->pm.pm_display_cfg.min_vblank_time =0 ; - +amdgpu_dpm_get_display_cfg (adev);pp_display_configuration_change (handle, &adev->pm.pm_display_cfg); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 305/460 drm/amdgpu: Add basic validation for RAS header
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lijo Lazar <[email protected]>
commit 5df0d6addb7e9b6f71f7162d1253762a5be9138e upstream.
If RAS header read from EEPROM is corrupted, it could result in trying to allocate huge memory for reading the records. Add some validation to header fields.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ras_eeprom.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ras_eeprom.c +18 -2
@@ -1362,15 +1362,31 @@ int amdgpu_ras_eeprom_init(struct amdgpu__decode_table_header_from_buf (hdr, buf); -if (hdr->version ==RAS_TABLE_VER_V2_1 ) { +switch (hdr->version) { +case RAS_TABLE_VER_V2_1 : control->ras_num_recs =RAS_NUM_RECS_V2_1 (hdr); control->ras_record_offset =RAS_RECORD_START_V2_1 ; control->ras_max_record_count =RAS_MAX_RECORD_COUNT_V2_1 ; - }else { +break ; +case RAS_TABLE_VER_V1 : control->ras_num_recs =RAS_NUM_RECS (hdr); control->ras_record_offset =RAS_RECORD_START ; control->ras_max_record_count =RAS_MAX_RECORD_COUNT ; +break ; +default : +dev_err (adev->dev, +"RAS header invalid, unsupported version: %u" , + hdr->version); +return -EINVAL ; } + +if (control->ras_num_recs > control->ras_max_record_count) { +dev_err (adev->dev, +"RAS header invalid, records in header: %u max allowed :%u" , + control->ras_num_recs, control->ras_max_record_count); +return -EINVAL ; + } + control->ras_fri =RAS_OFFSET_TO_INDEX (control, hdr->first_rec_offset);if (hdr->header ==RAS_TABLE_HDR_VAL ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 306/460 NFSD: Hold net reference for the lifetime of /proc/fs/nfs/exports fd
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
commit e7fcf179b82d3a3730fd8615da01b087cc654d0b upstream.
The /proc/fs/nfs/exports proc entry is created at module init and persists for the module's lifetime. exports_proc_open() captures the caller's current network namespace and stores its svc_export_cache in seq->private, but takes no reference on the namespace. If the namespace is subsequently torn down (e.g. container destruction after the opener does setns() to a different namespace), nfsd_net_exit() calls nfsd_export_shutdown() which frees the cache. Subsequent reads on the still-open fd dereference the freed cache_detail, walking a freed hash table.
Hold a reference on the struct net for the lifetime of the open file descriptor. This prevents nfsd_net_exit() from running -- and thus prevents nfsd_export_shutdown() from freeing the cache -- while any exports fd is open. cache_detail already stores its net pointer (cd->net, set by cache_create_net()), so exports_release() can retrieve it without additional per-file storage.
--- fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c +12 -2
@@ -152,9 +152,19 @@ static int exports_net_open(struct net * seq = file->private_data; seq->private = nn->svc_export_cache; +get_net (net);return 0 ; } +static int exports_release (struct inode *inode,struct file *file) +{ +struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; +struct cache_detail *cd = seq->private; + +put_net (cd->net); +return seq_release (inode, file); +} +static int exports_nfsd_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *file) {return exports_net_open (inode->i_sb->s_fs_info, file);
@@ -164,7 +174,7 @@ static const struct file_operations expo .open = exports_nfsd_open, .read = seq_read, .llseek = seq_lseek, - .release = seq_release, + .release = exports_release, };static int export_features_show (struct seq_file *m,void *v)
@@ -1456,7 +1466,7 @@ static const struct proc_ops exports_pro .proc_open = exports_proc_open, .proc_read = seq_read, .proc_lseek = seq_lseek, - .proc_release = seq_release, + .proc_release = exports_release, };static int create_proc_exports_entry (void )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 307/460 nfsd: fix heap overflow in NFSv4.0 LOCK replay cache
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
commit 5133b61aaf437e5f25b1b396b14242a6bb0508e2 upstream.
The NFSv4.0 replay cache uses a fixed 112-byte inline buffer (rp_ibuf[NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE]) to store encoded operation responses. This size was calculated based on OPEN responses and does not account for LOCK denied responses, which include the conflicting lock owner as a variable-length field up to 1024 bytes (NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT).
When a LOCK operation is denied due to a conflict with an existing lock that has a large owner, nfsd4_encode_operation() copies the full encoded response into the undersized replay buffer via read_bytes_from_xdr_buf() with no bounds check. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds write of up to 944 bytes past the end of the buffer, corrupting adjacent heap memory.
This can be triggered remotely by an unauthenticated attacker with two cooperating NFSv4.0 clients: one sets a lock with a large owner string, then the other requests a conflicting lock to provoke the denial.
We could fix this by increasing NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE to allow for a full opaque, but that would increase the size of every stateowner, when most lockowners are not that large.
Instead, fix this by checking the encoded response length against NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE before copying into the replay buffer. If the response is too large, set rp_buflen to 0 to skip caching the replay payload. The status is still cached, and the client already received the correct response on the original request.
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 9 +++++++-- fs/nfsd/state.h | 17 ++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +7 -2
@@ -5809,9 +5809,14 @@ nfsd4_encode_operation(struct nfsd4_compint len = xdr->buf->len - (op_status_offset +XDR_UNIT ); so->so_replay.rp_status = op->status; - so->so_replay.rp_buflen = len; -read_bytes_from_xdr_buf (xdr->buf, op_status_offset +XDR_UNIT , +if (len <=NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE ) { + so->so_replay.rp_buflen = len; +read_bytes_from_xdr_buf (xdr->buf, + op_status_offset +XDR_UNIT , so->so_replay.rp_buf, len); + }else { + so->so_replay.rp_buflen =0 ; + } } status: op->status = nfsd4_map_status(op->status,
fs/nfsd/state.h +12 -5
@@ -473,11 +473,18 @@ struct nfs4_client_reclaim {struct xdr_netobj cr_princhash; }; -/* A reasonable value for REPLAY_ISIZE was estimated as follows: -* The OPEN response, typically the largest, requires -* 4(status) + 8(stateid) + 20(changeinfo) + 4(rflags) + 8(verifier) + -* 4(deleg. type) + 8(deleg. stateid) + 4(deleg. recall flag) + -* 20(deleg. space limit) + ~32(deleg. ace) = 112 bytes +/* +* REPLAY_ISIZE is sized for an OPEN response with delegation: +* 4(status) + 8(stateid) + 20(changeinfo) + 4(rflags) + +* 8(verifier) + 4(deleg. type) + 8(deleg. stateid) + +* 4(deleg. recall flag) + 20(deleg. space limit) + +* ~32(deleg. ace) = 112 bytes +* +* Some responses can exceed this. A LOCK denial includes the conflicting +* lock owner, which can be up to 1024 bytes (NFS4_OPAQUE_LIMIT). Responses +* larger than REPLAY_ISIZE are not cached in rp_ibuf; only rp_status is +* saved. Enlarging this constant increases the size of every +* nfs4_stateowner. */ #define NFSD4_REPLAY_ISIZE 112
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 308/460 selftests/hid: fix compilation when bpf_wq and hid_device are not exported
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
commit 5d4c6c132ea9a967d48890dd03e6a786c060e968 upstream.
This can happen in situations when CONFIG_HID_SUPPORT is set to no, or some complex situations where struct bpf_wq is not exported.
So do the usual dance of hiding them before including vmlinux.h, and then redefining them and make use of CO-RE to have the correct offsets.
--- tools/testing/selftests/hid/progs/hid_bpf_helpers.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/hid/progs/hid_bpf_helpers.h +12 -0
@@ -6,8 +6,10 @@#define __HID_BPF_HELPERS_H/* "undefine" structs and enums in vmlinux.h, because we "override" them below */ +#define bpf_wq bpf_wq___not_used#define hid_bpf_ctx hid_bpf_ctx___not_used#define hid_bpf_ops hid_bpf_ops___not_used +#define hid_device hid_device___not_used#define hid_report_type hid_report_type___not_used#define hid_class_request hid_class_request___not_used#define hid_bpf_attach_flags hid_bpf_attach_flags___not_used
@@ -24,8 +26,10 @@#include "vmlinux.h" +#undef bpf_wq#undef hid_bpf_ctx#undef hid_bpf_ops +#undef hid_device#undef hid_report_type#undef hid_class_request#undef hid_bpf_attach_flags
@@ -52,6 +56,14 @@ enum hid_report_type { HID_REPORT_TYPES, }; +struct hid_device { +unsigned int id; +} __attribute__((preserve_access_index)); + +struct bpf_wq { +__u64 __opaque[2 ]; +}; +struct hid_bpf_ctx {struct hid_device *hid;__u32 allocated_size;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 309/460 HID: bpf: prevent buffer overflow in hid_hw_request
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
commit 2b658c1c442ec1cd9eec5ead98d68662c40fe645 upstream.
right now the returned value is considered to be always valid. However, when playing with HID-BPF, the return value can be arbitrary big, because it's the return value of dispatch_hid_bpf_raw_requests(), which calls the struct_ops and we have no guarantees that the value makes sense.
--- drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_dispatch.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/bpf/hid_bpf_dispatch.c +2 -0
@@ -450,6 +450,8 @@ hid_bpf_hw_request(struct hid_bpf_ctx *c (u64 )(long )ctx, true); /* prevent infinite recursions */ +if (ret > size) + ret = size;if (ret >0 )memcpy (buf, dma_data, ret);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 310/460 sunrpc: fix cache_request leak in cache_release
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
commit 17ad31b3a43b72aec3a3d83605891e1397d0d065 upstream.
When a reader's file descriptor is closed while in the middle of reading a cache_request (rp->offset != 0), cache_release() decrements the request's readers count but never checks whether it should free the request.
In cache_read(), when readers drops to 0 and CACHE_PENDING is clear, the cache_request is removed from the queue and freed along with its buffer and cache_head reference. cache_release() lacks this cleanup.
The only other path that frees requests with readers == 0 is cache_dequeue(), but it runs only when CACHE_PENDING transitions from set to clear. If that transition already happened while readers was still non-zero, cache_dequeue() will have skipped the request, and no subsequent call will clean it up.
Add the same cleanup logic from cache_read() to cache_release(): after decrementing readers, check if it reached 0 with CACHE_PENDING clear, and if so, dequeue and free the cache_request.
--- net/sunrpc/cache.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/cache.c +21 -5
@@ -1049,14 +1049,25 @@ static int cache_release(struct inode *istruct cache_reader *rp = filp->private_data;if (rp) { +struct cache_request *rq =NULL ; +spin_lock (&queue_lock);if (rp->offset) {struct cache_queue *cq; -for (cq= &rp->q; &cq->list != &cd->queue; - cq = list_entry(cq->list.next, struct cache_queue, list)) +for (cq = &rp->q; &cq->list != &cd->queue; + cq =list_entry (cq->list.next, + struct cache_queue, list))if (!cq->reader) { - container_of(cq, struct cache_request, q) - ->readers--; +struct cache_request *cr = +container_of (cq, + struct cache_request, q); + cr->readers--; +if (cr->readers ==0 && + !test_bit (CACHE_PENDING , + &cr->item->flags)) { +list_del (&cr->q.list); + rq = cr; + }break ; } rp->offset =0 ;
@@ -1064,9 +1075,14 @@ static int cache_release(struct inode *ilist_del (&rp->q.list);spin_unlock (&queue_lock); +if (rq) { +cache_put (rq->item, cd); +kfree (rq->buf); +kfree (rq); + } + filp->private_data =NULL ;kfree (rp); - }if (filp->f_mode &FMODE_WRITE ) {atomic_dec (&cd->writers);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 311/460 nvdimm/bus: Fix potential use after free in asynchronous initialization
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
commit a8aec14230322ed8f1e8042b6d656c1631d41163 upstream.
Dingisoul with KASAN reports a use after free if device_add() fails in nd_async_device_register().
Commit b6eae0f61db2 ("libnvdimm: Hold reference on parent while scheduling async init") correctly added a reference on the parent device to be held until asynchronous initialization was complete. However, if device_add() results in an allocation failure the ref count of the device drops to 0 prior to the parent pointer being accessed. Thus resulting in use after free.
The bug bot AI correctly identified the fix. Save a reference to the parent pointer to be used to drop the parent reference regardless of the outcome of device_add().
--- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +3 -2
@@ -489,14 +489,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nd_synchronize);static void nd_async_device_register (void *d,async_cookie_t cookie) {struct device *dev = d; +struct device *parent = dev->parent;if (device_add (dev) !=0 ) {dev_err (dev,"%s: failed\n" , __func__);put_device (dev); }put_device (dev); -if (dev->parent) -put_device (dev->parent); +if (parent) +put_device (parent); }static void nd_async_device_unregister (void *d,async_cookie_t cookie)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 312/460 LoongArch: Give more information if kmem access failed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>
commit a47f0754bdd01f971c9715acdbdd3a07515c8f83 upstream.
If memory access such as copy_{from, to}_kernel_nofault() failed, its users do not know what happened, so it is very useful to print the exception code for such cases. Furthermore, it is better to print the caller function to know where is the entry.
Here are the low level call chains:
copy_from_kernel_nofault()
copy_from_kernel_nofault_loop()
__get_kernel_nofault() copy_to_kernel_nofault()
copy_to_kernel_nofault_loop()
__put_kernel_nofault()--- arch/loongarch/include/asm/uaccess.h | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/loongarch/include/asm/uaccess.h +12 -2
@@ -196,8 +196,13 @@ do { \ \__get_kernel_common (*((type *)(dst)),sizeof (type), \ (__force type *)(src)); \ -if (unlikely (__gu_err)) \ +if (unlikely (__gu_err)) { \ +pr_info ("%s: memory access failed, ecode 0x%x\n" , \ + __func__,read_csr_excode ()); \ +pr_info ("%s: the caller is %pS\n" , \ + __func__,__builtin_return_address (0 )); \ goto err_label; \ + } \ }while (0 ) #define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \
@@ -207,8 +212,13 @@ do { \ \ __pu_val = *(__force type *)(src); \__put_kernel_common (((type *)(dst)),sizeof (type)); \ -if (unlikely (__pu_err)) \ +if (unlikely (__pu_err)) { \ +pr_info ("%s: memory access failed, ecode 0x%x\n" , \ + __func__,read_csr_excode ()); \ +pr_info ("%s: the caller is %pS\n" , \ + __func__,__builtin_return_address (0 )); \ goto err_label; \ + } \ }while (0 ) extern unsigned long __copy_user(void *to, const void *from, __kernel_size_t n);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 313/460 NFC: nxp-nci: allow GPIOs to sleep
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Ray <[email protected]>
commit 55dc632ab2ac2889b15995a9eef56c753d48ebc7 upstream.
Allow the firmware and enable GPIOs to sleep.
This fixes a `WARN_ON' and allows the driver to operate GPIOs which are connected to I2C GPIO expanders.
-- >8 --
kernel: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2636 at drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c:3880 gpiod_set_value+0x88/0x98 -- >8 --
--- drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/i2c.c +2 -2
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ static int nxp_nci_i2c_set_mode(void *ph {struct nxp_nci_i2c_phy *phy = (struct nxp_nci_i2c_phy *) phy_id; -gpiod_set_value (phy->gpiod_fw, (mode ==NXP_NCI_MODE_FW ) ?1 :0 ); -gpiod_set_value (phy->gpiod_en, (mode !=NXP_NCI_MODE_COLD ) ?1 :0 ); +gpiod_set_value_cansleep (phy->gpiod_fw, (mode ==NXP_NCI_MODE_FW ) ?1 :0 ); +gpiod_set_value_cansleep (phy->gpiod_en, (mode !=NXP_NCI_MODE_COLD ) ?1 :0 );usleep_range (10000 ,15000 );if (mode ==NXP_NCI_MODE_COLD )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 314/460 net: macb: fix use-after-free access to PTP clock
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
commit 8da13e6d63c1a97f7302d342c89c4a56a55c7015 upstream.
PTP clock is registered on every opening of the interface and destroyed on every closing. However it may be accessed via get_ts_info ethtool call which is possible while the interface is just present in the kernel.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ptp_clock_index+0x47/0x50 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:426 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880194345cc by task syz.0.6/948 CPU: 1 PID: 948 Comm: syz.0.6 Not tainted 6.1.164+ #109 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.1-0-g3208b098f51a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xba lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:316 [inline] print_report+0x17f/0x496 mm/kasan/report.c:420 kasan_report+0xd9/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:524 ptp_clock_index+0x47/0x50 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:426 gem_get_ts_info+0x138/0x1e0 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c:3349 macb_get_ts_info+0x68/0xb0 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c:3371 __ethtool_get_ts_info+0x17c/0x260 net/ethtool/common.c:558 ethtool_get_ts_info net/ethtool/ioctl.c:2367 [inline] __dev_ethtool net/ethtool/ioctl.c:3017 [inline] dev_ethtool+0x2b05/0x6290 net/ethtool/ioctl.c:3095 dev_ioctl+0x637/0x1070 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:510 sock_do_ioctl+0x20d/0x2c0 net/socket.c:1215 sock_ioctl+0x577/0x6d0 net/socket.c:1320 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18c/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:76 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 </TASK> Allocated by task 457: kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:699 [inline] ptp_clock_register+0x144/0x10e0 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:235 gem_ptp_init+0x46f/0x930 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c:375 macb_open+0x901/0xd10 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c:2920 __dev_open+0x2ce/0x500 net/core/dev.c:1501 __dev_change_flags+0x56a/0x740 net/core/dev.c:8651 dev_change_flags+0x92/0x170 net/core/dev.c:8722 do_setlink+0xaf8/0x3a80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2833 __rtnl_newlink+0xbf4/0x1940 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3608 rtnl_newlink+0x63/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3655 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3c6/0xed0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6150 netlink_rcv_skb+0x15d/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2511 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x6d7/0xa30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344 netlink_sendmsg+0x97e/0xeb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1872 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x14b/0x180 net/socket.c:730 __sys_sendto+0x320/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2152 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2164 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2160 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2160 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:76 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 938: kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1729 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1755 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3687 [inline] __kmem_cache_free+0xbc/0x320 mm/slub.c:3700 device_release+0xa0/0x240 drivers/base/core.c:2507 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:681 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:712 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] kobject_put+0x1cd/0x350 lib/kobject.c:729 put_device+0x1b/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:3805 ptp_clock_unregister+0x171/0x270 drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:391 gem_ptp_remove+0x4e/0x1f0 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c:404 macb_close+0x1c8/0x270 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c:2966 __dev_close_many+0x1b9/0x310 net/core/dev.c:1585 __dev_close net/core/dev.c:1597 [inline] __dev_change_flags+0x2bb/0x740 net/core/dev.c:8649 dev_change_flags+0x92/0x170 net/core/dev.c:8722 dev_ifsioc+0x151/0xe00 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:326 dev_ioctl+0x33e/0x1070 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:572 sock_do_ioctl+0x20d/0x2c0 net/socket.c:1215 sock_ioctl+0x577/0x6d0 net/socket.c:1320 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18c/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:76 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
Set the PTP clock pointer to NULL after unregistering.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_ptp.c +3 -1
@@ -355,8 +355,10 @@ void gem_ptp_remove(struct net_device *n {struct macb *bp =netdev_priv (ndev); -if (bp->ptp_clock) +if (bp->ptp_clock) {ptp_clock_unregister (bp->ptp_clock); + bp->ptp_clock =NULL ; + }gem_ptp_clear_timer (bp);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 315/460 parisc: Flush correct cache in cacheflush() syscall
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit 2c98a8fbd6aa647414c6248dacf254ebe91c79ad upstream.
The assembly flush instructions were swapped for I- and D-cache flags:
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(cacheflush, ...)
{
if (cache & DCACHE) {
"fic ...\n"
}
if (cache & ICACHE && error == 0) {
"fdc ...\n"
}Fix it by using fdc for DCACHE, and fic for ICACHE flushing.
--- arch/parisc/kernel/cache.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/parisc/kernel/cache.c +2 -2
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(cacheflush, unsigned lon#else "1: cmpb,<<,n %0,%2,1b\n" #endif -" fic,m %3(%4,%0)\n" +" fdc,m %3(%4,%0)\n" "2: sync\n" ASM_EXCEPTIONTABLE_ENTRY_EFAULT (1b ,2b ,"%1" ) : "+r" (start), "+r" (error)
@@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(cacheflush, unsigned lon#else "1: cmpb,<<,n %0,%2,1b\n" #endif -" fdc,m %3(%4,%0)\n" +" fic,m %3(%4,%0)\n" "2: sync\n" ASM_EXCEPTIONTABLE_ENTRY_EFAULT (1b ,2b ,"%1" ) : "+r" (start), "+r" (error)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 316/460 mac80211: fix crash in ieee80211_chan_bw_change for AP_VLAN stations
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
commit 672e5229e1ecfc2a3509b53adcb914d8b024a853 upstream.
ieee80211_chan_bw_change() iterates all stations and accesses link->reserved.oper via sta->sdata->link[link_id]. For stations on AP_VLAN interfaces (e.g. 4addr WDS clients), sta->sdata points to the VLAN sdata, whose link never participates in chanctx reservations. This leaves link->reserved.oper zero-initialized with chan == NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference in __ieee80211_sta_cap_rx_bw() when accessing chandef->chan->band during CSA.
Resolve the VLAN sdata to its parent AP sdata using get_bss_sdata() before accessing link data.
--- net/mac80211/chan.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/mac80211/chan.c +4 -2
@@ -423,14 +423,16 @@ static void ieee80211_chan_bw_change(strrcu_read_lock ();list_for_each_entry_rcu (sta, &local->sta_list, list) { -struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = sta->sdata; +struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;enum ieee80211_sta_rx_bandwidth new_sta_bw;unsigned int link_id;if (!ieee80211_sdata_running (sta->sdata))continue ; -for (link_id =0 ; link_id <ARRAY_SIZE (sta->sdata->link); link_id++) { + sdata =get_bss_sdata (sta->sdata); + +for (link_id =0 ; link_id <ARRAY_SIZE (sdata->link); link_id++) {struct ieee80211_link_data *link =rcu_dereference (sdata->link[link_id]);struct ieee80211_bss_conf *link_conf;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 317/460 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix type confusion in l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lukas Johannes Möller <[email protected]>
commit 15145675690cab2de1056e7ed68e59cbd0452529 upstream.
l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() casts the incoming data to struct l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp (the ECRED *connection* response, 8 bytes with result at offset 6) instead of struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp (2 bytes with result at offset 0).
This causes two problems:
- The sizeof(*rsp) length check requires 8 bytes instead of the correct 2, so valid L2CAP_ECRED_RECONF_RSP packets are rejected with -EPROTO.
- rsp->result reads from offset 6 instead of offset 0, returning wrong data when the packet is large enough to pass the check.
Fix by using the correct type. Also pass the already byte-swapped result variable to BT_DBG instead of the raw __le16 field.
--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +2 -2
@@ -5373,7 +5373,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp u8 *data) {struct l2cap_chan *chan, *tmp; -struct l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp *rsp = (void *) data; +struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp *rsp = (void *)data;u16 result;if (cmd_len <sizeof (*rsp))
@@ -5381,7 +5381,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp result =__le16_to_cpu (rsp->result); -BT_DBG ("result 0x%4.4x" , rsp->result); +BT_DBG ("result 0x%4.4x" , result);if (!result)return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 318/460 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Validate L2CAP_INFO_RSP payload length before access
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lukas Johannes Möller <[email protected]>
commit dd815e6e3918dc75a49aaabac36e4f024d675101 upstream.
l2cap_information_rsp() checks that cmd_len covers the fixed l2cap_info_rsp header (type + result, 4 bytes) but then reads rsp->data without verifying that the payload is present:
- L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK calls get_unaligned_le32(rsp->data), which reads 4 bytes past the header (needs cmd_len >= 8).
- L2CAP_IT_FIXED_CHAN reads rsp->data[0], 1 byte past the header (needs cmd_len >= 5).
A truncated L2CAP_INFO_RSP with result == L2CAP_IR_SUCCESS triggers an out-of-bounds read of adjacent skb data.
Guard each data access with the required payload length check. If the payload is too short, skip the read and let the state machine complete with safe defaults (feat_mask and remote_fixed_chan remain zero from kzalloc), so the info timer cleanup and l2cap_conn_start() still run and the connection is not stalled.
--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +4 -2
@@ -4587,7 +4587,8 @@ static inline int l2cap_information_rsp(switch (type) {case L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK : - conn->feat_mask =get_unaligned_le32 (rsp->data); +if (cmd_len >=sizeof (*rsp) +sizeof (u32)) + conn->feat_mask =get_unaligned_le32 (rsp->data);if (conn->feat_mask &L2CAP_FEAT_FIXED_CHAN ) {struct l2cap_info_req req;
@@ -4606,7 +4607,8 @@ static inline int l2cap_information_rsp(break ;case L2CAP_IT_FIXED_CHAN : - conn->remote_fixed_chan = rsp->data[0 ]; +if (cmd_len >=sizeof (*rsp) +sizeof (rsp->data[0 ])) + conn->remote_fixed_chan = rsp->data[0 ]; conn->info_state |=L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE ; conn->info_ident =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 319/460 smb: client: fix krb5 mount with username option
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>
commit 12b4c5d98cd7ca46d5035a57bcd995df614c14e1 upstream.
Customer reported that some of their krb5 mounts were failing against a single server as the client was trying to mount the shares with wrong credentials. It turned out the client was reusing SMB session from first mount to try mounting the other shares, even though a different username= option had been specified to the other mounts.
By using username mount option along with sec=krb5 to search for principals from keytab is supported by cifs.upcall(8) since cifs-utils-4.8. So fix this by matching username mount option in match_session() even with Kerberos.
For example, the second mount below should fail with -ENOKEY as there is no 'foobar' principal in keytab (/etc/krb5.keytab). The client ends up reusing SMB session from first mount to perform the second one, which is wrong.
``` $ ktutil ktutil: add_entry -password -p testuser -k 1 -e aes256-cts Password for [email protected]: ktutil: write_kt /etc/krb5.keytab ktutil: quit $ klist -ke Keytab name: FILE:/etc/krb5.keytab KVNO Principal ---- ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1 [email protected] (aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96) $ mount.cifs //w22-root2/scratch /mnt/1 -o sec=krb5,username=testuser $ mount.cifs //w22-root2/scratch /mnt/2 -o sec=krb5,username=foobar $ mount -t cifs | grep -Po 'username=\K\w+' testuser testuser ```
--- fs/smb/client/connect.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
fs/smb/client/connect.c +4 -0
@@ -1906,6 +1906,10 @@ static int match_session(struct cifs_sescase Kerberos:if (!uid_eq (ctx->cred_uid, ses->cred_uid))return 0 ; +if (strncmp (ses->user_name ?:"" , + ctx->username ?:"" , +CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN )) +return 0 ;break ;case NTLMv2:case RawNTLMSSP:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 320/460 ksmbd: unset conn->binding on failed binding request
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit 282343cf8a4a5a3603b1cb0e17a7083e4a593b03 upstream.
When a multichannel SMB2_SESSION_SETUP request with SMB2_SESSION_REQ_FLAG_BINDING fails ksmbd sets conn->binding = true but never clears it on the error path. This leaves the connection in a binding state where all subsequent ksmbd_session_lookup_all() calls fall back to the global sessions table. This fix it by clearing conn->binding = false in the error path.
--- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +1 -0
@@ -1954,6 +1954,7 @@ out_err: } }smb2_set_err_rsp (work); + conn->binding = false; }else {unsigned int iov_len;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 321/460 ksmbd: use volume UUID in FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
commit 3a64125730cabc34fccfbc230c2667c2e14f7308 upstream.
Use sb->s_uuid for a proper volume identifier as the primary choice. For filesystems that do not provide a UUID, fall back to stfs.f_fsid obtained from vfs_statfs().
--- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +4 -4
@@ -5438,7 +5438,6 @@ static int smb2_get_info_filesystem(strustruct smb2_query_info_req *req, struct smb2_query_info_rsp *rsp) { - struct ksmbd_session *sess = work->sess; struct ksmbd_conn *conn = work->conn;struct ksmbd_share_config *share = work->tcon->share_conf;int fsinfoclass =0 ;
@@ -5568,10 +5567,11 @@ static int smb2_get_info_filesystem(stru info = (struct object_id_info *)(rsp->Buffer); -if (!user_guest (sess->user)) -memcpy (info->objid,user_passkey (sess->user),16 ); +if (path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid_len ==16 ) +memcpy (info->objid, path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid.b, + path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_uuid_len);else -memset (info->objid,0 ,16 ); +memcpy (info->objid, &stfs.f_fsid,sizeof (stfs.f_fsid)); info->extended_info.magic =cpu_to_le32 (EXTENDED_INFO_MAGIC ); info->extended_info.version =cpu_to_le32 (1 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 322/460 drm/i915/dsc: Add Selective Update register definitions
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Högander <[email protected]>
commit c2c79c6d5b939ae8a42ddb884f576bddae685672 upstream.
Add definitions for DSC_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0_DSC0 and DSC_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0_DSC1 registers. These are for Selective Update Early Transport configuration.
Bspec: 71709
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_vdsc_regs.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_vdsc_regs.h +12 -0
@@ -186,6 +186,18 @@#define DSC_PPS18_NSL_BPG_OFFSET (offset) REG_FIELD_PREP(DSC_PPS18_NSL_BPG_OFFSET_MASK, offset)#define DSC_PPS18_SL_OFFSET_ADJ (offset) REG_FIELD_PREP(DSC_PPS18_SL_OFFSET_ADJ_MASK, offset) +#define _LNL_DSC0_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0_PA 0x78064 +#define _LNL_DSC1_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0_PA 0x78164 +#define _LNL_DSC0_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0_PB 0x78264 +#define _LNL_DSC1_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0_PB 0x78364 +#define LNL_DSC0_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0 (pipe) _MMIO_PIPE((pipe), _LNL_DSC0_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0_PA, _LNL_DSC0_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0_PB) +#define LNL_DSC1_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0 (pipe) _MMIO_PIPE((pipe), _LNL_DSC1_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0_PA, _LNL_DSC1_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0_PB) + +#define DSC_SUPS0_SU_SLICE_ROW_PER_FRAME_MASK REG_GENMASK(31, 20) +#define DSC_SUPS0_SU_SLICE_ROW_PER_FRAME (rows) REG_FIELD_PREP(DSC_SUPS0_SU_SLICE_ROW_PER_FRAME_MASK, (rows)) +#define DSC_SUPS0_SU_PIC_HEIGHT_MASK REG_GENMASK(15, 0) +#define DSC_SUPS0_SU_PIC_HEIGHT (h) REG_FIELD_PREP(DSC_SUPS0_SU_PIC_HEIGHT_MASK, (h)) +/* Icelake Rate Control Buffer Threshold Registers */ #define DSCA_RC_BUF_THRESH_0 _MMIO(0x6B230)#define DSCA_RC_BUF_THRESH_0_UDW _MMIO(0x6B230 + 4)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 323/460 drm/i915/dsc: Add helper for writing DSC Selective Update ET parameters
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Högander <[email protected]>
commit bb5f1cd10101c2567bff4d0e760b74aee7c42f44 upstream.
There are slice row per frame and pic height configuration in DSC Selective Update Parameter Set 1 register. Add helper for configuring these.
v2:
- Add WARN_ON_ONCE if vdsc instances per pipe > 2
- instead of checking vdsc instances per pipe being > 1 check == 2
Bspec: 71709
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_vdsc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_vdsc.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_vdsc.c +23 -0
@@ -723,6 +723,29 @@ void intel_dsc_dp_pps_write(struct intel sizeof(dp_dsc_pps_sdp)); } +void intel_dsc_su_et_parameters_configure (struct intel_dsb *dsb,struct intel_encoder *encoder, +const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state,int su_lines) +{ +struct intel_display *display =to_intel_display (crtc_state); +struct intel_crtc *crtc =to_intel_crtc (crtc_state->uapi.crtc); +const struct drm_dsc_config *vdsc_cfg = &crtc_state->dsc.config; +enum pipe pipe = crtc->pipe; +int vdsc_instances_per_pipe =intel_dsc_get_vdsc_per_pipe (crtc_state); +int slice_row_per_frame = su_lines / vdsc_cfg->slice_height; +u32 val; + +drm_WARN_ON_ONCE (display->drm, su_lines % vdsc_cfg->slice_height); +drm_WARN_ON_ONCE (display->drm, vdsc_instances_per_pipe >2 ); + + val =DSC_SUPS0_SU_SLICE_ROW_PER_FRAME (slice_row_per_frame); + val |=DSC_SUPS0_SU_PIC_HEIGHT (su_lines); + +intel_de_write_dsb (display, dsb,LNL_DSC0_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0 (pipe), val); + +if (vdsc_instances_per_pipe ==2 ) +intel_de_write_dsb (display, dsb,LNL_DSC1_SU_PARAMETER_SET_0 (pipe), val); +} +static i915_reg_t dss_ctl1_reg (struct intel_crtc *crtc,enum transcoder cpu_transcoder) { return is_pipe_dsc(crtc, cpu_transcoder) ?
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_vdsc.h +3 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ struct drm_printer;enum transcoder ;struct intel_crtc ;struct intel_crtc_state ; +struct intel_dsb ;struct intel_encoder ;bool intel_dsc_source_support (const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state);
@@ -29,6 +30,8 @@ void intel_dsc_dsi_pps_write(struct inte const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state);void intel_dsc_dp_pps_write (struct intel_encoder *encoder,const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state); +void intel_dsc_su_et_parameters_configure (struct intel_dsb *dsb,struct intel_encoder *encoder, +const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state,int su_lines);void intel_vdsc_state_dump (struct drm_printer *p,int indent,const struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 324/460 drm/i915/psr: Write DSC parameters on Selective Update in ET mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Högander <[email protected]>
commit 5923a6e0459fdd3edac4ad5abccb24d777d8f1b6 upstream.
There are slice row per frame and pic height parameters in DSC that needs to be configured on every Selective Update in Early Transport mode. Use helper provided by DSC code to configure these on Selective Update when in Early Transport mode. Also fill crtc_state->psr2_su_area with full frame area on full frame update for DSC calculation.
v2: move psr2_su_area under skip_sel_fetch_set_loop label
Bspec: 68927, 71709
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c +11 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@#include "intel_psr.h" #include "intel_psr_regs.h" #include "intel_snps_phy.h" +#include "intel_vdsc.h" #include "skl_universal_plane.h" /**
@@ -2312,6 +2313,12 @@ void intel_psr2_program_trans_man_trk_ctintel_de_write (display,PIPE_SRCSZ_ERLY_TPT (crtc->pipe), crtc_state->pipe_srcsz_early_tpt); + +if (!crtc_state->dsc.compression_enable) +return ; + +intel_dsc_su_et_parameters_configure (NULL , encoder, crtc_state, +drm_rect_height (&crtc_state->psr2_su_area)); } static void psr2_man_trk_ctl_calc(struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state,
@@ -2693,6 +2700,10 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct i } skip_sel_fetch_set_loop: +if (full_update) +clip_area_update (&crtc_state->psr2_su_area, &crtc_state->pipe_src, + &crtc_state->pipe_src); +psr2_man_trk_ctl_calc (crtc_state, full_update); crtc_state->pipe_srcsz_early_tpt =psr2_pipe_srcsz_early_tpt_calc (crtc_state, full_update);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 325/460 s390/zcrypt: Enable AUTOSEL_DOM for CCA serialnr sysfs attribute
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 598bbefa8032cc58b564a81d1ad68bd815c8dc0f ]
The serialnr sysfs attribute for CCA cards when queried always used the default domain for sending the request down to the card. If for any reason exactly this default domain is disabled then the attribute code fails to retrieve the CCA info and the sysfs entry shows an empty string. Works as designed but the serial number is a card attribute and thus it does not matter which domain is used for the query. So if there are other domains on this card available, these could be used.
So extend the code to use AUTOSEL_DOM for the domain value to address any online domain within the card for querying the cca info and thus show the serialnr as long as there is one domain usable regardless of the default domain setting.
--- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 12 +++++++----- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cex4.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c +7 -5
@@ -1665,11 +1665,13 @@ static int fetch_cca_info(u16 cardnr, u1memset (ci,0 ,sizeof (*ci)); -/* get first info from zcrypt device driver about this apqn */ - rc =zcrypt_device_status_ext (cardnr, domain, &devstat); -if (rc) -return rc; - ci->hwtype = devstat.hwtype; +/* if specific domain given, fetch status and hw info for this apqn */ +if (domain !=AUTOSEL_DOM ) { + rc =zcrypt_device_status_ext (cardnr, domain, &devstat); +if (rc) +return rc; + ci->hwtype = devstat.hwtype; + }/* prep page for rule array and var array use */ pg = (u8 *)__get_free_page (GFP_KERNEL );
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cex4.c +1 -2
@@ -85,8 +85,7 @@ static ssize_t cca_serialnr_show(structmemset (&ci,0 ,sizeof (ci)); -if (ap_domain_index >=0 ) -cca_get_info (ac->id, ap_domain_index, &ci, zc->online); +cca_get_info (ac->id,AUTOSEL_DOM , &ci, zc->online);return sysfs_emit (buf,"%s\n" , ci.serial); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 326/460 powerpc64/bpf: Fold bpf_jit_emit_func_call_hlp() into bpf_jit_emit_func_call_rel()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Naveen N Rao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9670f6d2097c4f97e15c67920dfddc664d7ee91c ]
Commit 61688a82e047 ("powerpc/bpf: enable kfunc call") enhanced bpf_jit_emit_func_call_hlp() to handle calls out to module region, where bpf progs are generated. The only difference now between bpf_jit_emit_func_call_hlp() and bpf_jit_emit_func_call_rel() is in handling of the initial pass where target function address is not known. Fold that logic into bpf_jit_emit_func_call_hlp() and rename it to bpf_jit_emit_func_call_rel() to simplify bpf function call JIT code.
We don't actually need to load/restore TOC across a call out to a different kernel helper or to a different bpf program since they all work with the kernel TOC. We only need to do it if we have to call out to a module function. So, guard TOC load/restore with appropriate conditions.
Stable-dep-of: 01b6ac727296 ("powerpc64/bpf: fix kfunc call support")
--- arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c | 61 ++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c +17 -44
@@ -202,14 +202,22 @@ void bpf_jit_build_epilogue(u32 *image,EMIT (PPC_RAW_BLR ()); } -static int -bpf_jit_emit_func_call_hlp (u32 *image,u32 *fimage,struct codegen_context *ctx,u64 func) +int bpf_jit_emit_func_call_rel (u32 *image,u32 *fimage,struct codegen_context *ctx,u64 func) {unsigned long func_addr = func ?ppc_function_entry ((void *)func) :0 ;long reladdr; -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!kernel_text_address (func_addr))) -return -EINVAL ; +/* bpf to bpf call, func is not known in the initial pass. Emit 5 nops as a placeholder */ +if (!func) { +for (int i =0 ; i <5 ; i++) +EMIT (PPC_RAW_NOP ()); +/* elfv1 needs an additional instruction to load addr from descriptor */ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PPC64_ELF_ABI_V1 )) +EMIT (PPC_RAW_NOP ()); +EMIT (PPC_RAW_MTCTR (_R12)); +EMIT (PPC_RAW_BCTRL ()); +return 0 ; + }#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_KERNEL_PCREL reladdr = func_addr - local_paca->kernelbase;
@@ -266,7 +274,8 @@ bpf_jit_emit_func_call_hlp(u32 *image, u* We can clobber r2 since we get called through a * function pointer (so caller will save/restore r2). */ -EMIT (PPC_RAW_LD (_R2,bpf_to_ppc (TMP_REG_2 ),8 )); +if (is_module_text_address (func_addr)) +EMIT (PPC_RAW_LD (_R2,bpf_to_ppc (TMP_REG_2 ),8 )); }else {PPC_LI64 (_R12, func);EMIT (PPC_RAW_MTCTR (_R12));
@@ -276,46 +285,14 @@ bpf_jit_emit_func_call_hlp(u32 *image, u* Load r2 with kernel TOC as kernel TOC is used if function address falls * within core kernel text. */ -EMIT (PPC_RAW_LD (_R2, _R13, offsetof(struct paca_struct , kernel_toc))); +if (is_module_text_address (func_addr)) + EMIT(PPC_RAW_LD(_R2, _R13, offsetof(struct paca_struct, kernel_toc))); }#endif return 0 ; } -int bpf_jit_emit_func_call_rel (u32 *image,u32 *fimage,struct codegen_context *ctx,u64 func) -{ -unsigned int i, ctx_idx = ctx->idx; - -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (func &&is_module_text_address (func))) -return -EINVAL ; - -/* skip past descriptor if elf v1 */ - func +=FUNCTION_DESCR_SIZE ; - -/* Load function address into r12 */ -PPC_LI64 (_R12, func); - -/* For bpf-to-bpf function calls, the callee's address is unknown -* until the last extra pass. As seen above, we use PPC_LI64() to -* load the callee's address, but this may optimize the number of -* instructions required based on the nature of the address. -* -* Since we don't want the number of instructions emitted to increase, -* we pad the optimized PPC_LI64() call with NOPs to guarantee that -* we always have a five-instruction sequence, which is the maximum -* that PPC_LI64() can emit. -*/ -if (!image) -for (i = ctx->idx - ctx_idx; i <5 ; i++) -EMIT (PPC_RAW_NOP ()); - -EMIT (PPC_RAW_MTCTR (_R12)); -EMIT (PPC_RAW_BCTRL ()); - -return 0 ; -} -static int bpf_jit_emit_tail_call (u32 *image,struct codegen_context *ctx,u32 out) {/*
@@ -1102,11 +1079,7 @@ emit_clear:if (ret <0 )return ret; -if (func_addr_fixed) - ret =bpf_jit_emit_func_call_hlp (image, fimage, ctx, func_addr); -else - ret =bpf_jit_emit_func_call_rel (image, fimage, ctx, func_addr); - + ret =bpf_jit_emit_func_call_rel (image, fimage, ctx, func_addr);if (ret)return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 327/460 powerpc64/bpf: fix kfunc call support
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hari Bathini <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 01b6ac72729610ae732ca2a66e3a642e23f6cd60 ]
Commit 61688a82e047 ("powerpc/bpf: enable kfunc call") inadvertently enabled kfunc call support for 32-bit powerpc but that support will not be possible until ABI mismatch between 32-bit powerpc and eBPF is handled in 32-bit powerpc JIT code. Till then, advertise support only for 64-bit powerpc. Also, in powerpc ABI, caller needs to extend the arguments properly based on signedness. The JIT code is responsible for handling this explicitly for kfunc calls as verifier can't handle this for each architecture-specific ABI needs. But this was not taken care of while kfunc call support was enabled for powerpc. Fix it by handling this with bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model() and using zero_extend() & sign_extend() helper functions.
--- arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 2 arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +1 -1
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *fp)bool bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call (void ) { -return true; +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PPC64 ); }bool bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call (void )
arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c +93 -8
119 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 328/460 kprobes: Remove unneeded goto
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5e5b8b49335971b68b54afeb0e7ded004945af07 ]
Remove unneeded gotos. Since the labels referred by these gotos have only one reference for each, we can replace those gotos with the referred code.
Stable-dep-of: 5ef268cb7a0a ("kprobes: Remove unneeded warnings from __arm_kprobe_ftrace()")
--- kernel/kprobes.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
kernel/kprobes.c +21 -24
@@ -1082,20 +1082,18 @@ static int __arm_kprobe_ftrace(struct kpif (*cnt ==0 ) { ret =register_ftrace_function (ops); -if (WARN (ret <0 ,"Failed to register kprobe-ftrace (error %d)\n" , ret)) - goto err_ftrace; +if (WARN (ret <0 ,"Failed to register kprobe-ftrace (error %d)\n" , ret)) { +/* +* At this point, sinec ops is not registered, we should be sefe from +* registering empty filter. +*/ +ftrace_set_filter_ip (ops, (unsigned long )p->addr,1 ,0 ); +return ret; + } } (*cnt)++;return ret; - -err_ftrace: -/* -* At this point, sinec ops is not registered, we should be sefe from -* registering empty filter. -*/ -ftrace_set_filter_ip (ops, (unsigned long )p->addr,1 ,0 ); -return ret; }static int arm_kprobe_ftrace (struct kprobe *p)
@@ -1456,7 +1454,7 @@ _kprobe_addr(kprobe_opcode_t *addr, cons unsigned long offset, bool *on_func_entry) {if ((symbol_name && addr) || (!symbol_name && !addr)) - goto invalid; +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL );if (symbol_name) {/*
@@ -1486,11 +1484,10 @@ _kprobe_addr(kprobe_opcode_t *addr, cons* at the start of the function. */ addr =arch_adjust_kprobe_addr ((unsigned long )addr, offset, on_func_entry); -if (addr) -return addr; +if (!addr) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); -invalid: -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return addr; }static kprobe_opcode_t *kprobe_addr (struct kprobe *p)
@@ -1513,15 +1510,15 @@ static struct kprobe *__get_valid_kprobeif (unlikely (!ap))return NULL ; -if (p != ap) { -list_for_each_entry (list_p, &ap->list, list) -if (list_p == p) -/* kprobe p is a valid probe */ - goto valid; -return NULL ; - } -valid: -return ap; +if (p == ap) +return ap; + +list_for_each_entry (list_p, &ap->list, list) +if (list_p == p) +/* kprobe p is a valid probe */ +return ap; + +return NULL ; }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 329/460 kprobes: Remove unneeded warnings from __arm_kprobe_ftrace()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5ef268cb7a0aac55521fd9881f1939fa94a8988e ]
Remove unneeded warnings for handled errors from __arm_kprobe_ftrace() because all caller handled the error correctly.
--- kernel/kprobes.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/kprobes.c +2 -2
@@ -1077,12 +1077,12 @@ static int __arm_kprobe_ftrace(struct kplockdep_assert_held (&kprobe_mutex); ret =ftrace_set_filter_ip (ops, (unsigned long )p->addr,0 ,0 ); -if (WARN_ONCE (ret <0 ,"Failed to arm kprobe-ftrace at %pS (error %d)\n" , p->addr, ret)) +if (ret <0 )return ret;if (*cnt ==0 ) { ret =register_ftrace_function (ops); -if (WARN (ret <0 ,"Failed to register kprobe-ftrace (error %d)\n" , ret)) { +if (ret <0 ) {/* * At this point, sinec ops is not registered, we should be sefe from * registering empty filter.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 330/460 btrfs: fix transaction abort when snapshotting received subvolumes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e1b18b959025e6b5dbad668f391f65d34b39595a ]
Currently a user can trigger a transaction abort by snapshotting a previously received snapshot a bunch of times until we reach a BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL item overflow (the maximum item size we can store in a leaf). This is very likely not common in practice, but if it happens, it turns the filesystem into RO mode. The snapshot, send and set_received_subvol and subvol_setflags (used by receive) don't require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, just inode_owner_or_capable(). A malicious user could use this to turn a filesystem into RO mode and disrupt a system.
Reproducer script:
$ cat test.sh #!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
# Use smallest node size to make the test faster. mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV mount $DEV $MNT
# Create a subvolume and set it to RO so that it can be used for send. btrfs subvolume create $MNT/sv
touch $MNT/sv/foo
btrfs property set $MNT/sv ro true
# Send and receive the subvolume into snaps/sv.
mkdir $MNT/snaps
btrfs send $MNT/sv | btrfs receive $MNT/snaps
# Now snapshot the received subvolume, which has a received_uuid, a
# lot of times to trigger the leaf overflow.
total=500
for ((i = 1; i <= $total; i++)); do
echo -ne "\rCreating snapshot $i/$total"
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT/snaps/sv $MNT/snaps/sv_$i > /dev/null
done
echoumount $MNT
When running the test:
$ ./test.sh (...) Create subvolume '/mnt/sdi/sv' At subvol /mnt/sdi/sv At subvol sv Creating snapshot 496/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Value too large for defined data type Creating snapshot 497/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system Creating snapshot 498/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system Creating snapshot 499/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system Creating snapshot 500/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system
And in dmesg/syslog:
$ dmesg (...) [251067.627338] BTRFS warning (device sdi): insert uuid item failed -75 (0x4628b21c4ac8d898, 0x2598bee2b1515c91) type 252! [251067.629212] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [251067.630033] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75) [251067.630871] WARNING: fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1907 at create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x52/0x465 [btrfs], CPU#10: btrfs/615235 [251067.632851] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero (...) [251067.644071] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 615235 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.19.0-rc8-btrfs-next-225+ #1 PREEMPT(full) [251067.646165] Tainted: [W]=WARN [251067.646733] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [251067.648735] RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x55/0x465 [btrfs] [251067.649984] Code: f0 48 0f (...) [251067.653313] RSP: 0018:ffffce644908fae8 EFLAGS: 00010292 [251067.653987] RAX: 00000000ffffff01 RBX: ffff8e5639e63a80 RCX: 00000000ffffffd3 [251067.655042] RDX: ffff8e53faa76b00 RSI: 00000000ffffffb5 RDI: ffffffffc0919750 [251067.656077] RBP: ffffce644908fbd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffce644908f820 [251067.657068] R10: ffff8e5adc1fffa8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8e53c0431bd0 [251067.658050] R13: ffff8e5414593600 R14: ffff8e55efafd000 R15: 00000000ffffffb5 [251067.659019] FS: 00007f2a4944b3c0(0000) GS:ffff8e5b27dae000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [251067.660115] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [251067.660943] CR2: 00007ffc5aa57898 CR3: 00000005813a2003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [251067.661972] Call Trace: [251067.662292] <TASK> [251067.662653] create_pending_snapshots+0x97/0xc0 [btrfs] [251067.663413] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x26e/0xc00 [btrfs] [251067.664257] ? btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta+0x35/0x390 [btrfs] [251067.665238] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30 [251067.665837] ? record_root_in_trans+0xa2/0xd0 [btrfs] [251067.666531] btrfs_mksubvol+0x330/0x580 [btrfs] [251067.667145] btrfs_mksnapshot+0x74/0xa0 [btrfs] [251067.667827] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x194/0x1d0 [btrfs] [251067.668595] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x107/0x130 [btrfs] [251067.669479] btrfs_ioctl+0x1580/0x2690 [btrfs] [251067.670093] ? count_memcg_events+0x6d/0x180 [251067.670849] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1a0/0x2a0 [251067.671652] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x92/0xe0 [251067.672406] do_syscall_64+0x50/0xf20 [251067.673129] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [251067.674096] RIP: 0033:0x7f2a495648db [251067.674812] Code: 00 48 89 (...) [251067.678227] RSP: 002b:00007ffc5aa57840 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [251067.679691] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f2a495648db [251067.681145] RDX: 00007ffc5aa588b0 RSI: 0000000050009417 RDI: 0000000000000004 [251067.682511] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [251067.683842] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc5aa59910 [251067.685176] R13: 00007ffc5aa588b0 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 0000000000000006 [251067.686524] </TASK> [251067.686972] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [251067.687890] BTRFS: error (device sdi state A) in create_pending_snapshot:1907: errno=-75 unknown [251067.689049] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): forced readonly [251067.689054] BTRFS warning (device sdi state EA): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. [251067.690119] BTRFS: error (device sdi state EA) in cleanup_transaction:2043: errno=-75 unknown [251067.702028] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): last unmount of filesystem 46dc3975-30a2-4a69-a18f-418b859cccda
Fix this by ignoring -EOVERFLOW errors from btrfs_uuid_tree_add() in the snapshot creation code when attempting to add the BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL item. This is OK because it's not critical and we are still able to delete the snapshot, as snapshot/subvolume deletion ignores if a BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL is missing (see inode.c:btrfs_delete_subvolume()). As for send/receive, we can still do send/receive operations since it always peeks the first root ID in the existing BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL (it could peek any since all snapshots have the same content), and even if the key is missing, it falls back to searching by BTRFS_UUID_KEY_SUBVOL key.
A test case for fstests will be sent soon.
--- fs/btrfs/transaction.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/transaction.c +16 -0
@@ -1894,6 +1894,22 @@ static noinline int create_pending_snaps ret =btrfs_uuid_tree_add (trans, new_root_item->received_uuid,BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL , objectid); +/* +* We are creating of lot of snapshots of the same root that was +* received (has a received UUID) and reached a leaf's limit for +* an item. We can safely ignore this and avoid a transaction +* abort. A deletion of this snapshot will still work since we +* ignore if an item with a BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL key +* is missing (see btrfs_delete_subvolume()). Send/receive will +* work too since it peeks the first root id from the existing +* item (it could peek any), and in case it's missing it +* falls back to search by BTRFS_UUID_KEY_SUBVOL keys. +* Creation of a snapshot does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so +* we don't want users triggering transaction aborts, either +* intentionally or not. +*/ +if (ret == -EOVERFLOW ) + ret =0 ;if (ret && ret != -EEXIST ) {btrfs_abort_transaction (trans, ret); goto fail;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 331/460 batman-adv: avoid OGM aggregation when skb tailroom is insufficient
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yang Yang <[email protected]>
commit 0d4aef630be9d5f9c1227d07669c26c4383b5ad0 upstream.
When OGM aggregation state is toggled at runtime, an existing forwarded packet may have been allocated with only packet_len bytes, while a later packet can still be selected for aggregation. Appending in this case can hit skb_put overflow conditions.
Reject aggregation when the target skb tailroom cannot accommodate the new packet. The caller then falls back to creating a new forward packet instead of appending.
--- net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c +3 -0
@@ -464,6 +464,9 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_can_aggregate(const struct !time_after_eq(aggregation_end_time, forw_packet->send_time))return false; +if (skb_tailroom (forw_packet->skb) < packet_len) +return false; +if (aggregated_bytes >BATADV_MAX_AGGREGATION_BYTES )return false;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 332/460 net: macb: Introduce gem_init_rx_ring()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kevin Hao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1a7124ecd655bcaf1845197fe416aa25cff4c3ea ]
Extract the initialization code for the GEM RX ring into a new function. This change will be utilized in a subsequent patch. No functional changes are introduced.
Stable-dep-of: 718d0766ce4c ("net: macb: Reinitialize tx/rx queue pointer registers and rx ring during resume")
--- drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c +9 -4
@@ -2700,6 +2700,14 @@ static void macb_init_tieoff(struct macb desc->ctrl =0 ; } +static void gem_init_rx_ring (struct macb_queue *queue) +{ + queue->rx_tail =0 ; + queue->rx_prepared_head =0 ; + +gem_rx_refill (queue); +} +static void gem_init_rings (struct macb *bp) {struct macb_queue *queue;
@@ -2717,10 +2725,7 @@ static void gem_init_rings(struct macb * queue->tx_head =0 ; queue->tx_tail =0 ; - queue->rx_tail =0 ; - queue->rx_prepared_head =0 ; - -gem_rx_refill (queue); +gem_init_rx_ring (queue); }macb_init_tieoff (bp);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 333/460 net: macb: Reinitialize tx/rx queue pointer registers and rx ring during resume
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kevin Hao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 718d0766ce4c7634ce62fa78b526ea7263487edd ]
On certain platforms, such as AMD Versal boards, the tx/rx queue pointer registers are cleared after suspend, and the rx queue pointer register is also disabled during suspend if WOL is enabled. Previously, we assumed that these registers would be restored by macb_mac_link_up(). However, in commit bf9cf80cab81, macb_init_buffers() was moved from macb_mac_link_up() to macb_open(). Therefore, we should call macb_init_buffers() to reinitialize the tx/rx queue pointer registers during resume.
Due to the reset of these two registers, we also need to adjust the tx/rx rings accordingly. The tx ring will be handled by gem_shuffle_tx_rings() in macb_mac_link_up(), so we only need to initialize the rx ring here.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c +10 -0
@@ -5527,8 +5527,18 @@ static int __maybe_unused macb_resume(strtnl_unlock (); } +if (!(bp->caps &MACB_CAPS_MACB_IS_EMAC )) +macb_init_buffers (bp); +for (q =0 , queue = bp->queues; q < bp->num_queues; ++q, ++queue) { +if (!(bp->caps &MACB_CAPS_MACB_IS_EMAC )) { +if (macb_is_gem (bp)) +gem_init_rx_ring (queue); +else +macb_init_rx_ring (queue); + } +napi_enable (&queue->napi_rx);napi_enable (&queue->napi_tx); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 334/460 ata: libata-core: disable LPM on ADATA SU680 SSD
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
commit ce5ae93d1a216680460040c7c0465a6e3b629dec upstream.
ADATA SU680 SSDs suffer from NCQ read and write commands timeouts or bus errors when link power management (LPM) is enabled. Flag these devices with the ATA_QUIRK_NOLPM quirk to prevent the use of LPM and avoid these command failures.
--- drivers/ata/libata-core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/ata/libata-core.c +3 -0
@@ -4101,6 +4101,9 @@ static const struct ata_dev_quirks_entry {"ST3320[68]13AS" ,"SD1[5-9]" ,ATA_QUIRK_NONCQ | ATA_QUIRK_FIRMWARE_WARN }, +/* ADATA devices with LPM issues. */ + { "ADATA SU680", NULL, ATA_QUIRK_NOLPM }, +/* Seagate disks with LPM issues */ { "ST1000DM010-2EP102", NULL, ATA_QUIRK_NOLPM }, { "ST2000DM008-2FR102", NULL, ATA_QUIRK_NOLPM },
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 335/460 mmc: sdhci-pci-gli: fix GL9750 DMA write corruption
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthew Schwartz <[email protected]>
commit 2b76e0cc7803e5ab561c875edaba7f6bbd87fbb0 upstream.
The GL9750 SD host controller has intermittent data corruption during DMA write operations. The GM_BURST register's R_OSRC_Lmt field (bits 17:16), which limits outstanding DMA read requests from system memory, is not being cleared during initialization. The Windows driver sets R_OSRC_Lmt to zero, limiting requests to the smallest unit.
Clear R_OSRC_Lmt to match the Windows driver behavior. This eliminates write corruption verified with f3write/f3read tests while maintaining DMA performance.
--- drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-gli.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-pci-gli.c +9 -0
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@#define GLI_9750_MISC_TX1_DLY_VALUE 0x5#define SDHCI_GLI_9750_MISC_SSC_OFF BIT(26) +#define SDHCI_GLI_9750_GM_BURST_SIZE 0x510 +#define SDHCI_GLI_9750_GM_BURST_SIZE_R_OSRC_LMT GENMASK(17, 16) +#define SDHCI_GLI_9750_TUNING_CONTROL 0x540#define SDHCI_GLI_9750_TUNING_CONTROL_EN BIT(4)#define GLI_9750_TUNING_CONTROL_EN_ON 0x1
@@ -271,10 +274,16 @@ static void gli_set_9750(struct sdhci_hou32 misc_value;u32 parameter_value;u32 control_value; +u32 burst_value;u16 ctrl2;gl9750_wt_on (host); +/* clear R_OSRC_Lmt to avoid DMA write corruption */ + burst_value =sdhci_readl (host,SDHCI_GLI_9750_GM_BURST_SIZE ); + burst_value &= ~SDHCI_GLI_9750_GM_BURST_SIZE_R_OSRC_LMT ; +sdhci_writel (host, burst_value,SDHCI_GLI_9750_GM_BURST_SIZE ); + driving_value =sdhci_readl (host,SDHCI_GLI_9750_DRIVING ); pll_value =sdhci_readl (host,SDHCI_GLI_9750_PLL ); sw_ctrl_value =sdhci_readl (host,SDHCI_GLI_9750_SW_CTRL );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 336/460 mmc: sdhci: fix timing selection for 1-bit bus width
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luke Wang <[email protected]>
commit 5e3486e64094c28a526543f1e8aa0d5964b7f02d upstream.
When 1-bit bus width is used with HS200/HS400 capabilities set, mmc_select_hs200() returns 0 without actually switching. This causes mmc_select_timing() to skip mmc_select_hs(), leaving eMMC in legacy mode (26MHz) instead of High Speed SDR (52MHz).
Per JEDEC eMMC spec section 5.3.2, 1-bit mode supports High Speed SDR. Drop incompatible HS200/HS400/UHS/DDR caps early so timing selection falls through to mmc_select_hs() correctly.
--- drivers/mmc/host/sdhci.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci.c +8 -1
@@ -4479,8 +4479,15 @@ int sdhci_setup_host(struct sdhci_host ** their platform code before calling sdhci_add_host(), and we * won't assume 8-bit width for hosts without that CAP. */ -if (!(host->quirks &SDHCI_QUIRK_FORCE_1_BIT_DATA )) +if (host->quirks &SDHCI_QUIRK_FORCE_1_BIT_DATA ) { + host->caps1 &= ~(SDHCI_SUPPORT_SDR104 |SDHCI_SUPPORT_SDR50 |SDHCI_SUPPORT_DDR50 ); +if (host->quirks2 &SDHCI_QUIRK2_CAPS_BIT63_FOR_HS400 ) + host->caps1 &= ~SDHCI_SUPPORT_HS400 ; + mmc->caps2 &= ~(MMC_CAP2_HS200 |MMC_CAP2_HS400 |MMC_CAP2_HS400_ES ); + mmc->caps &= ~(MMC_CAP_DDR |MMC_CAP_UHS ); + }else { mmc->caps |=MMC_CAP_4_BIT_DATA ; + }if (host->quirks2 &SDHCI_QUIRK2_HOST_NO_CMD23 ) mmc->caps &= ~MMC_CAP_CMD23 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 337/460 pmdomain: bcm: bcm2835-power: Increase ASB control timeout
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maíra Canal <[email protected]>
commit b826d2c0b0ecb844c84431ba6b502e744f5d919a upstream.
The bcm2835_asb_control() function uses a tight polling loop to wait for the ASB bridge to acknowledge a request. During intensive workloads, this handshake intermittently fails for V3D's master ASB on BCM2711, resulting in "Failed to disable ASB master for v3d" errors during runtime PM suspend. As a consequence, the failed power-off leaves V3D in a broken state, leading to bus faults or system hangs on later accesses.
As the timeout is insufficient in some scenarios, increase the polling timeout from 1us to 5us, which is still negligible in the context of a power domain transition. Also, replace the open-coded ktime_get_ns()/ cpu_relax() polling loop with readl_poll_timeout_atomic().
--- drivers/pmdomain/bcm/bcm2835-power.c | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/pmdomain/bcm/bcm2835-power.c +4 -8
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/clk.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/iopoll.h> #include <linux/mfd/bcm2835-pm.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/platform_device.h>
@@ -152,7 +153,6 @@ struct bcm2835_power {static int bcm2835_asb_control (struct bcm2835_power *power,u32 reg,bool enable) {void __iomem *base = power->asb; -u64 start;u32 val;switch (reg) {
@@ -165,8 +165,6 @@ static int bcm2835_asb_control(struct bcbreak ; } - start =ktime_get_ns (); -/* Enable the module's async AXI bridges. */ if (enable) { val =readl (base + reg) & ~ASB_REQ_STOP ;
@@ -175,11 +173,9 @@ static int bcm2835_asb_control(struct bc }writel (PM_PASSWORD | val, base + reg); -while (!!(readl (base + reg) &ASB_ACK ) == enable) { -cpu_relax (); -if (ktime_get_ns () - start >=1000 ) -return -ETIMEDOUT ; - } +if (readl_poll_timeout_atomic (base + reg, val, + !!(val &ASB_ACK ) != enable,0 ,5 )) +return -ETIMEDOUT ;return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 338/460 spi: fix use-after-free on controller registration failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit 8634e05b08ead636e926022f4a98416e13440df9 upstream.
Make sure to deregister from driver core also in the unlikely event that per-cpu statistics allocation fails during controller registration to avoid use-after-free (of driver resources) and unclocked register accesses.
--- drivers/spi/spi.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi.c +4 -4
@@ -3367,10 +3367,8 @@ int spi_register_controller(struct spi_cdev_info (dev,"controller is unqueued, this is deprecated\n" ); }else if (ctlr->transfer_one || ctlr->transfer_one_message) { status =spi_controller_initialize_queue (ctlr); -if (status) { -device_del (&ctlr->dev); - goto free_bus_id; - } +if (status) + goto del_ctrl; }/* Add statistics */ ctlr->pcpu_statistics =spi_alloc_pcpu_stats (dev);
@@ -3393,6 +3391,8 @@ int spi_register_controller(struct spi_c destroy_queue:spi_destroy_queue (ctlr); +del_ctrl: +device_del (&ctlr->dev); free_bus_id:mutex_lock (&board_lock);idr_remove (&spi_master_idr, ctlr->bus_num);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 339/460 spi: fix statistics allocation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit dee0774bbb2abb172e9069ce5ffef579b12b3ae9 upstream.
The controller per-cpu statistics is not allocated until after the controller has been registered with driver core, which leaves a window where accessing the sysfs attributes can trigger a NULL-pointer dereference.
Fix this by moving the statistics allocation to controller allocation while tying its lifetime to that of the controller (rather than using implicit devres).
--- drivers/spi/spi.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/spi/spi.c +8 -9
@@ -2940,6 +2940,8 @@ static void spi_controller_release(strucstruct spi_controller *ctlr; ctlr = container_of(dev, struct spi_controller, dev); + +free_percpu (ctlr->pcpu_statistics);kfree (ctlr); }
@@ -3080,6 +3082,12 @@ struct spi_controller *__spi_alloc_contrif (!ctlr)return NULL ; + ctlr->pcpu_statistics =spi_alloc_pcpu_stats (NULL ); +if (!ctlr->pcpu_statistics) { +kfree (ctlr); +return NULL ; + } +device_initialize (&ctlr->dev);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&ctlr->queue);spin_lock_init (&ctlr->queue_lock);
@@ -3370,13 +3378,6 @@ int spi_register_controller(struct spi_cif (status) goto del_ctrl; } -/* Add statistics */ - ctlr->pcpu_statistics =spi_alloc_pcpu_stats (dev); -if (!ctlr->pcpu_statistics) { -dev_err (dev,"Error allocating per-cpu statistics\n" ); - status = -ENOMEM ; - goto destroy_queue; - }mutex_lock (&board_lock);list_add_tail (&ctlr->list, &spi_controller_list);
@@ -3389,8 +3390,6 @@ int spi_register_controller(struct spi_cacpi_register_spi_devices (ctlr);return status; -destroy_queue: -spi_destroy_queue (ctlr); del_ctrl:device_del (&ctlr->dev); free_bus_id:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 340/460 mtd: rawnand: pl353: make sure optimal timings are applied
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Olivier Sobrie <[email protected]>
commit b9465b04de4b90228de03db9a1e0d56b00814366 upstream.
Timings of the nand are adjusted by pl35x_nfc_setup_interface() but actually applied by the pl35x_nand_select_target() function. If there is only one nand chip, the pl35x_nand_select_target() will only apply the timings once since the test at its beginning will always be true after the first call to this function. As a result, the hardware will keep using the default timings set at boot to detect the nand chip, not the optimal ones.
With this patch, we program directly the new timings when pl35x_nfc_setup_interface() is called.
--- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/pl35x-nand-controller.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/pl35x-nand-controller.c +3 -0
@@ -862,6 +862,9 @@ static int pl35x_nfc_setup_interface(strPL35X_SMC_NAND_TAR_CYCLES (tmgs.t_ar) |PL35X_SMC_NAND_TRR_CYCLES (tmgs.t_rr); +writel (plnand->timings, nfc->conf_regs +PL35X_SMC_CYCLES ); +pl35x_smc_update_regs (nfc); +return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 341/460 mtd: rawnand: cadence: Fix error check for dma_alloc_coherent() in cadence_nand_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen Ni <[email protected]>
commit 0410e1a4c545c769c59c6eda897ad5d574d0c865 upstream.
Fix wrong variable used for error checking after dma_alloc_coherent() call. The function checks cdns_ctrl->dma_cdma_desc instead of cdns_ctrl->cdma_desc, which could lead to incorrect error handling.
--- drivers/mtd/nand/raw/cadence-nand-controller.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/cadence-nand-controller.c +1 -1
@@ -2878,7 +2878,7 @@ static int cadence_nand_init(struct cdnssizeof (*cdns_ctrl->cdma_desc), &cdns_ctrl->dma_cdma_desc, GFP_KERNEL); -if (!cdns_ctrl->dma_cdma_desc) +if (!cdns_ctrl->cdma_desc)return -ENOMEM ; cdns_ctrl->buf_size =SZ_16K ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 342/460 mtd: Avoid boot crash in RedBoot partition table parser
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Finn Thain <[email protected]>
commit 8e2f8020270af7777d49c2e7132260983e4fc566 upstream.
Given CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y and a recent compiler,
commit 439a1bcac648 ("fortify: Use __builtin_dynamic_object_size() when available") produces the warning below and an oops.
Searching for RedBoot partition table in 50000000.flash at offset 0x7e0000
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: lib/string_helpers.c:1035 at 0xc029e04c, CPU#0: swapper/0/1
memcmp: detected buffer overflow: 15 byte read of buffer size 14
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.19.0 #1 NONEAs Kees said, "'names' is pointing to the final 'namelen' many bytes of the allocation ... 'namelen' could be basically any length at all. This fortify warning looks legit to me -- this code used to be reading beyond the end of the allocation."
Since the size of the dynamic allocation is calculated with strlen() we can use strcmp() instead of memcmp() and remain within bounds.
--- drivers/mtd/parsers/redboot.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/parsers/redboot.c +3 -3
@@ -270,9 +270,9 @@ nogood:strcpy (names, fl->img->name);#ifdef CONFIG_MTD_REDBOOT_PARTS_READONLY -if (!memcmp (names,"RedBoot" ,8 ) || - !memcmp (names,"RedBoot config" ,15 ) || - !memcmp (names,"FIS directory" ,14 )) { +if (!strcmp (names,"RedBoot" ) || + !strcmp (names,"RedBoot config" ) || + !strcmp (names,"FIS directory" )) { parts[i].mask_flags =MTD_WRITEABLE ; }#endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 343/460 iommu/vt-d: Fix intel iommu iotlb sync hardlockup and retry
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guanghui Feng <[email protected]>
commit fe89277c9ceb0d6af0aa665bcf24a41d8b1b79cd upstream.
During the qi_check_fault process after an IOMMU ITE event, requests at odd-numbered positions in the queue are set to QI_ABORT, only satisfying single-request submissions. However, qi_submit_sync now supports multiple simultaneous submissions, and can't guarantee that the wait_desc will be at an odd-numbered position. Therefore, if an item times out, IOMMU can't re-initiate the request, resulting in an infinite polling wait.
This modifies the process by setting the status of all requests already fetched by IOMMU and recorded as QI_IN_USE status (including wait_desc requests) to QI_ABORT, thus enabling multiple requests to be resubmitted.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c +1 -2
@@ -1313,7 +1313,6 @@ static int qi_check_fault(struct intel_iif (fault &DMA_FSTS_ITE ) { head =readl (iommu->reg +DMAR_IQH_REG ); head = ((head >> shift) -1 +QI_LENGTH ) %QI_LENGTH ; - head |=1 ; tail =readl (iommu->reg +DMAR_IQT_REG ); tail = ((tail >> shift) -1 +QI_LENGTH ) %QI_LENGTH ;
@@ -1330,7 +1329,7 @@ static int qi_check_fault(struct intel_ido {if (qi->desc_status[head] ==QI_IN_USE ) qi->desc_status[head] =QI_ABORT ; - head = (head -2 +QI_LENGTH ) %QI_LENGTH ; + head = (head -1 +QI_LENGTH ) %QI_LENGTH ; }while (head != tail);/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 344/460 serial: 8250_pci: add support for the AX99100
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Martin Roukala (né Peres) <[email protected]>
commit 9c0072bc33d349c83d223e64be30794e11938a6b upstream.
This is found in popular brands such as StarTech.com or Delock, and has been a source of frustration to quite a few people, if I can trust Amazon comments complaining about Linux support via the official out-of-the-tree driver.
--- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_pci.c +17 -0
@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ struct serial_private { };#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_HPE_PCI_SERIAL 0x37e +#define PCIE_VENDOR_ID_ASIX 0x125B +#define PCIE_DEVICE_ID_AX99100 0x9100static const struct pci_device_id pci_use_msi[] = { { PCI_DEVICE_SUB(PCI_VENDOR_ID_NETMOS, PCI_DEVICE_ID_NETMOS_9900,
@@ -149,6 +151,8 @@ static const struct pci_device_id pci_us 0xA000, 0x1000) }, {PCI_DEVICE_SUB (PCI_VENDOR_ID_HP_3PAR ,PCI_DEVICE_ID_HPE_PCI_SERIAL , PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID) }, + { PCI_DEVICE_SUB(PCIE_VENDOR_ID_ASIX, PCIE_DEVICE_ID_AX99100, + 0xA000, 0x1000) }, { } };
@@ -912,6 +916,7 @@ static int pci_netmos_init(struct pci_decase PCI_DEVICE_ID_NETMOS_9912 :case PCI_DEVICE_ID_NETMOS_9922 :case PCI_DEVICE_ID_NETMOS_9900 : +case PCIE_DEVICE_ID_AX99100 : num_serial =pci_netmos_9900_numports (dev);break ;
@@ -2507,6 +2512,14 @@ static struct pci_serial_quirk pci_seria .init = pci_netmos_init, .setup = pci_netmos_9900_setup, }, + { + .vendor = PCIE_VENDOR_ID_ASIX, + .device = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subvendor = PCI_ANY_ID, + .subdevice = PCI_ANY_ID, + .init = pci_netmos_init, + .setup = pci_netmos_9900_setup, + },/* * EndRun Technologies */
@@ -6028,6 +6041,10 @@ static const struct pci_device_id serial0xA000 ,0x3002 , 0, 0, pbn_NETMOS9900_2s_115200 }, + { PCIE_VENDOR_ID_ASIX, PCIE_DEVICE_ID_AX99100, +0xA000 ,0x1000 , + 0, 0, pbn_b0_1_115200 }, +/* * Best Connectivity and Rosewill PCI Multi I/O cards */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 345/460 serial: 8250: Fix TX deadlock when using DMA
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Raul E Rangel <[email protected]>
commit a424a34b8faddf97b5af41689087e7a230f79ba7 upstream.
dmaengine_terminate_async does not guarantee that the __dma_tx_complete callback will run. The callback is currently the only place where dma->tx_running gets cleared. If the transaction is canceled and the callback never runs, then dma->tx_running will never get cleared and we will never schedule new TX DMA transactions again.
This change makes it so we clear dma->tx_running after we terminate the DMA transaction. This is "safe" because serial8250_tx_dma_flush is holding the UART port lock. The first thing the callback does is also grab the UART port lock, so access to dma->tx_running is serialized.
--- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dma.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dma.c +15 -0
@@ -162,7 +162,22 @@ void serial8250_tx_dma_flush(struct uart*/ dma->tx_size =0 ; +/* +* We can't use `dmaengine_terminate_sync` because `uart_flush_buffer` is +* holding the uart port spinlock. +*/ dmaengine_terminate_async (dma->txchan); + +/* +* The callback might or might not run. If it doesn't run, we need to ensure +* that `tx_running` is cleared so that we can schedule new transactions. +* If it does run, then the zombie callback will clear `tx_running` again +* and perform a no-op since `tx_size` was cleared above. +* +* In either case, we ASSUME the DMA transaction will terminate before we +* issue a new `serial8250_tx_dma`. +*/ + dma->tx_running =0 ; }int serial8250_rx_dma (struct uart_8250_port *p)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 346/460 serial: 8250: Add late synchronize_irq() to shutdown to handle DW UART BUSY
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]>
commit e0a368ae79531ff92105a2692f10d83052055856 upstream.
When DW UART is !uart_16550_compatible, it can indicate BUSY at any point (when under constant Rx pressure) unless a complex sequence of steps is performed. Any LCR write can run a foul with the condition that prevents writing LCR while the UART is BUSY, which triggers BUSY_DETECT interrupt that seems unmaskable using IER bits.
Normal flow is that dw8250_handle_irq() handles BUSY_DETECT condition by reading USR register. This BUSY feature, however, breaks the assumptions made in serial8250_do_shutdown(), which runs synchronize_irq() after clearing IER and assumes no interrupts can occur after that point but then proceeds to update LCR, which on DW UART can trigger an interrupt.
If serial8250_do_shutdown() releases the interrupt handler before the handler has run and processed the BUSY_DETECT condition by read the USR register, the IRQ is not deasserted resulting in interrupt storm that triggers "irq x: nobody cared" warning leading to disabling the IRQ.
Add late synchronize_irq() into serial8250_do_shutdown() to ensure BUSY_DETECT from DW UART is handled before port's interrupt handler is released. Alternative would be to add DW UART specific shutdown function but it would mostly duplicate the generic code and the extra synchronize_irq() seems pretty harmless in serial8250_do_shutdown().
--- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +6 -0
@@ -2509,6 +2509,12 @@ void serial8250_do_shutdown(struct uart_* the IRQ chain. */ serial_port_in (port,UART_RX ); +/* +* LCR writes on DW UART can trigger late (unmaskable) IRQs. +* Handle them before releasing the handler. +*/ +synchronize_irq (port->irq); +serial8250_rpm_put (up); up->ops->release_irq (up);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 347/460 serial: uartlite: fix PM runtime usage count underflow on probe
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej Andrzejewski ICEYE <[email protected]>
commit d54801cd509515f674a5aac1d3ea1401d2a05863 upstream.
ulite_probe() calls pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() at the end of probe without holding a corresponding PM runtime reference for non-console ports.
During ulite_assign(), uart_add_one_port() triggers uart_configure_port() which calls ulite_pm() via uart_change_pm(). For non-console ports, the UART core performs a balanced get/put cycle:
uart_change_pm(ON) -> ulite_pm() -> pm_runtime_get_sync() +1
uart_change_pm(OFF) -> ulite_pm() -> pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() -1
This leaves no spare reference for the pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() at the end of probe. The PM runtime core prevents the count from actually going below zero, and instead triggers a
"Runtime PM usage count underflow!" warning.
For console ports the bug is masked: the UART core skips the uart_change_pm(OFF) call, so the UART core's unbalanced get happens to pair with probe's trailing put.
Add pm_runtime_get_noresume() before pm_runtime_enable() to take an explicit probe-owned reference that the trailing pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() can release. This ensures a correct usage count regardless of whether the port is a console.
--- drivers/tty/serial/uartlite.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/tty/serial/uartlite.c +1 -0
@@ -878,6 +878,7 @@ of_err:pm_runtime_use_autosuspend (&pdev->dev);pm_runtime_set_autosuspend_delay (&pdev->dev,UART_AUTOSUSPEND_TIMEOUT );pm_runtime_set_active (&pdev->dev); +pm_runtime_get_noresume (&pdev->dev);pm_runtime_enable (&pdev->dev); ret =ulite_assign (&pdev->dev, id, res->start, irq, pdata);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 348/460 io_uring/kbuf: propagate BUF_MORE through early buffer commit path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Commit 418eab7a6f3c002d8e64d6e95ec27118017019af upstream.
When io_should_commit() returns true (eg for non-pollable files), buffer commit happens at buffer selection time and sel->buf_list is set to NULL. When __io_put_kbufs() generates CQE flags at completion time, it calls __io_put_kbuf_ring() which finds a NULL buffer_list and hence cannot determine whether the buffer was consumed or not. This means that IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE is never set for non-pollable input with incrementally consumed buffers.
Likewise for io_buffers_select(), which always commits upfront and discards the return value of io_kbuf_commit().
Add REQ_F_BUF_MORE to store the result of io_kbuf_commit() during early commit. Then __io_put_kbuf_ring() can check this flag and set IORING_F_BUF_MORE accordingy.
--- include/linux/io_uring_types.h | 3 +++ io_uring/kbuf.c | 6 ++++-- io_uring/kbuf.h | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/io_uring_types.h +3 -0
@@ -467,6 +467,7 @@ enum {REQ_F_BL_EMPTY_BIT ,REQ_F_BL_NO_RECYCLE_BIT ,REQ_F_BUFFERS_COMMIT_BIT , +REQ_F_BUF_MORE_BIT ,/* not a real bit, just to check we're not overflowing the space */ __REQ_F_LAST_BIT,
@@ -547,6 +548,8 @@ enum {REQ_F_BL_NO_RECYCLE =IO_REQ_FLAG (REQ_F_BL_NO_RECYCLE_BIT ),/* buffer ring head needs incrementing on put */ REQ_F_BUFFERS_COMMIT =IO_REQ_FLAG (REQ_F_BUFFERS_COMMIT_BIT ), +/* incremental buffer consumption, more space available */ + REQ_F_BUF_MORE = IO_REQ_FLAG(REQ_F_BUF_MORE_BIT), };typedef void (*io_req_tw_func_t )(struct io_kiocb *req,struct io_tw_state *ts);
io_uring/kbuf.c +4 -2
@@ -175,7 +175,8 @@ static void __user *io_ring_buffer_selec* the transfer completes (or if we get -EAGAIN and must poll of * retry). */ -io_kbuf_commit (req, bl, *len,1 ); +if (!io_kbuf_commit (req, bl, *len,1 )) + req->flags |=REQ_F_BUF_MORE ; req->buf_list =NULL ; }return ret;
@@ -321,7 +322,8 @@ int io_buffers_select(struct io_kiocb *r*/ if (ret >0 ) { req->flags |=REQ_F_BUFFERS_COMMIT |REQ_F_BL_NO_RECYCLE ; -io_kbuf_commit (req, bl, arg->out_len, ret); +if (!io_kbuf_commit (req, bl, arg->out_len, ret)) + req->flags |=REQ_F_BUF_MORE ; } }else { ret =io_provided_buffers_select (req, &arg->out_len, bl, arg->iovs);
io_uring/kbuf.h +3 -1
@@ -165,7 +165,9 @@ static inline bool __io_put_kbuf_ring(st ret =io_kbuf_commit (req, bl, len, nr); req->buf_index = bl->bgid; } - req->flags &= ~REQ_F_BUFFER_RING ; +if (ret && (req->flags &REQ_F_BUF_MORE )) + ret = false; + req->flags &= ~(REQ_F_BUFFER_RING |REQ_F_BUF_MORE );return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 349/460 drm: Fix use-after-free on framebuffers and property blobs when calling drm_dev_unplug
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]>
commit 6bee098b91417654703e17eb5c1822c6dfd0c01d upstream.
When trying to do a rather aggressive test of igt's "xe_module_load --r reload" with a full desktop environment and game running I noticed a few OOPSes when dereferencing freed pointers, related to framebuffers and property blobs after the compositor exits.
Solve this by guarding the freeing in drm_file with drm_dev_enter/exit, and immediately put the references from struct drm_file objects during drm_dev_unplug().
Related warnings for framebuffers on the subtest:
[ 739.713076] ------------[ cut here ]------------
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&dev->mode_config.fb_list))
[ 739.713079] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c:584 at drm_mode_config_cleanup+0x30b/0x320 [drm], CPU#12: xe_module_load/13145
....
[ 739.713328] Call Trace:
[ 739.713330] <TASK>
[ 739.713335] ? intel_pmdemand_destroy_state+0x11/0x20 [xe]
[ 739.713574] ? intel_atomic_global_obj_cleanup+0xe4/0x1a0 [xe]
[ 739.713794] intel_display_driver_remove_noirq+0x51/0xb0 [xe]
[ 739.714041] xe_display_fini_early+0x33/0x50 [xe]
[ 739.714284] devm_action_release+0xf/0x20
[ 739.714294] devres_release_all+0xad/0xf0
[ 739.714301] device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0xa0
[ 739.714305] device_release_driver_internal+0x1b7/0x210
[ 739.714311] device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20
[ 739.714315] unbind_store+0xa6/0xb0
[ 739.714319] drv_attr_store+0x21/0x30
[ 739.714322] sysfs_kf_write+0x48/0x60
[ 739.714328] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x16b/0x240
[ 739.714333] vfs_write+0x266/0x520
[ 739.714341] ksys_write+0x72/0xe0
[ 739.714345] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x20
[ 739.714347] x64_sys_call+0xa15/0xa30
[ 739.714355] do_syscall_64+0xd8/0xab0
[ 739.714361] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53and
[ 739.714459] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 739.714461] xe 0000:67:00.0: [drm] drm_WARN_ON(!list_empty(&fb->filp_head)) [ 739.714464] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_framebuffer.c:833 at drm_framebuffer_free+0x6c/0x90 [drm], CPU#12: xe_module_load/13145 [ 739.714715] RIP: 0010:drm_framebuffer_free+0x7a/0x90 [drm] ... [ 739.714869] Call Trace: [ 739.714871] <TASK> [ 739.714876] drm_mode_config_cleanup+0x26a/0x320 [drm] [ 739.714998] ? __drm_printfn_seq_file+0x20/0x20 [drm] [ 739.715115] ? drm_mode_config_cleanup+0x207/0x320 [drm] [ 739.715235] intel_display_driver_remove_noirq+0x51/0xb0 [xe] [ 739.715576] xe_display_fini_early+0x33/0x50 [xe] [ 739.715821] devm_action_release+0xf/0x20 [ 739.715828] devres_release_all+0xad/0xf0 [ 739.715843] device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0xa0 [ 739.715850] device_release_driver_internal+0x1b7/0x210 [ 739.715856] device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 [ 739.715860] unbind_store+0xa6/0xb0 [ 739.715865] drv_attr_store+0x21/0x30 [ 739.715868] sysfs_kf_write+0x48/0x60 [ 739.715873] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x16b/0x240 [ 739.715878] vfs_write+0x266/0x520 [ 739.715886] ksys_write+0x72/0xe0 [ 739.715890] __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x20 [ 739.715893] x64_sys_call+0xa15/0xa30 [ 739.715900] do_syscall_64+0xd8/0xab0 [ 739.715905] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
and then finally file close blows up:
[ 743.186530] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000122: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 743.186535] CPU: 3 UID: 1000 PID: 3453 Comm: kwin_wayland Tainted: G W 7.0.0-rc1-valkyria+ #110 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)}
[ 743.186537] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 743.186538] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X299 AORUS Gaming 3/X299 AORUS Gaming 3-CF, BIOS F8n 12/06/2021
[ 743.186539] RIP: 0010:drm_framebuffer_cleanup+0x55/0xc0 [drm]
[ 743.186588] Code: d8 72 73 0f b6 42 05 ff c3 39 c3 72 e8 49 8d bd 50 07 00 00 31 f6 e8 3a 80 d3 e1 49 8b 44 24 10 49 8d 7c 24 08 49 8b 54 24 08 <48> 3b 38 0f 85 95 7f 02 00 48 3b 7a 08 0f 85 8b 7f 02 00 48 89 42
[ 743.186589] RSP: 0018:ffffc900085e3cf8 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 743.186591] RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff8217ed03
[ 743.186592] RDX: dead000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88814675ba08
[ 743.186593] RBP: ffffc900085e3d10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 743.186593] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88814675ba00
[ 743.186594] R13: ffff88810d778000 R14: ffff888119f6dca0 R15: ffff88810c660bb0
[ 743.186595] FS: 00007ff377d21280(0000) GS:ffff888cec3f8000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 743.186596] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 743.186596] CR2: 000055690b55e000 CR3: 0000000113586003 CR4: 00000000003706f0
[ 743.186597] Call Trace:
[ 743.186598] <TASK>
[ 743.186603] intel_user_framebuffer_destroy+0x12/0x90 [xe]
[ 743.186722] drm_framebuffer_free+0x3a/0x90 [drm]
[ 743.186750] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x5f/0x120
[ 743.186754] drm_mode_object_put+0x51/0x70 [drm]
[ 743.186786] drm_fb_release+0x105/0x190 [drm]
[ 743.186812] ? rt_mutex_slowunlock+0x3aa/0x410
[ 743.186817] ? rt_spin_lock+0xea/0x1b0
[ 743.186819] drm_file_free+0x1e0/0x2c0 [drm]
[ 743.186843] drm_release_noglobal+0x91/0xf0 [drm]
[ 743.186865] __fput+0x100/0x2e0
[ 743.186869] fput_close_sync+0x40/0xa0
[ 743.186870] __x64_sys_close+0x3e/0x80
[ 743.186873] x64_sys_call+0xa07/0xa30
[ 743.186879] do_syscall_64+0xd8/0xab0
[ 743.186881] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[ 743.186882] RIP: 0033:0x7ff37e567732
[ 743.186884] Code: 08 0f 85 a1 38 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 55 bf 01 00
[ 743.186885] RSP: 002b:00007ffc818169a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
[ 743.186886] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc81816a30 RCX: 00007ff37e567732
[ 743.186887] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000012
[ 743.186888] RBP: 00007ffc818169d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 743.186889] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055d60a7996e0
[ 743.186889] R13: 00007ffc81816a90 R14: 00007ffc81816a90 R15: 000055d60a782a30
[ 743.186892] </TASK>
[ 743.186893] Modules linked in: rfcomm snd_hrtimer xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_tcpudp xt_addrtype nft_compat x_tables nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables overlay cfg80211 bnep mtd_intel_dg snd_hda_codec_intelhdmi mtd snd_hda_codec_hdmi nls_utf8 mxm_wmi intel_wmi_thunderbolt gigabyte_wmi wmi_bmof xe drm_gpuvm drm_gpusvm_helper i2c_algo_bit drm_buddy drm_ttm_helper ttm video drm_suballoc_helper gpu_sched drm_client_lib drm_exec drm_display_helper cec drm_kunit_helpers drm_kms_helper kunit x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp snd_hda_codec_alc882 snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_soc_avs snd_soc_hda_codec snd_hda_ext_core snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_intel_dspcfg snd_soc_core snd_compress ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_timer i2c_i801 i2c_mux snd i2c_smbus btusb btrtl btbcm btmtk btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic rfkill ecc mei_me mei ioatdma dca wmi nfsd drm i2c_dev fuse nfnetlink
[ 743.186938] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---And for property blobs:
void drm_mode_config_cleanup(struct drm_device *dev) {
...
list_for_each_entry_safe(blob, bt, &dev->mode_config.property_blob_list,
head_global) {
drm_property_blob_put(blob);
}Resulting in:
[ 371.072940] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000001ffffffffff
[ 371.072944] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 371.072945] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 371.072947] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 371.072950] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 371.072953] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 3693 Comm: kwin_wayland Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-valkyria+ #111 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)}
[ 371.072956] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X299 AORUS Gaming 3/X299 AORUS Gaming 3-CF, BIOS F8n 12/06/2021
[ 371.072957] RIP: 0010:drm_property_destroy_user_blobs+0x3b/0x90 [drm]
[ 371.073019] Code: 00 00 48 83 ec 10 48 8b 86 30 01 00 00 48 39 c3 74 59 48 89 c2 48 8d 48 c8 48 8b 00 4c 8d 60 c8 eb 04 4c 8d 60 c8 48 8b 71 40 <48> 39 16 0f 85 39 32 01 00 48 3b 50 08 0f 85 2f 32 01 00 48 89 70
[ 371.073021] RSP: 0018:ffffc90006a73de8 EFLAGS: 00010293
[ 371.073022] RAX: 000001ffffffffff RBX: ffff888118a1a930 RCX: ffff8881b92355c0
[ 371.073024] RDX: ffff8881b92355f8 RSI: 000001ffffffffff RDI: ffff888118be4000
[ 371.073025] RBP: ffffc90006a73e08 R08: ffff8881009b7300 R09: ffff888cecc5b000
[ 371.073026] R10: ffffc90006a73e90 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 000001ffffffffc7
[ 371.073027] R13: ffff888118a1a980 R14: ffff88810b366d20 R15: ffff888118a1a970
[ 371.073028] FS: 00007f1faccbb280(0000) GS:ffff888cec2db000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 371.073029] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 371.073030] CR2: 000001ffffffffff CR3: 000000010655c001 CR4: 00000000003706f0
[ 371.073031] Call Trace:
[ 371.073033] <TASK>
[ 371.073036] drm_file_free+0x1df/0x2a0 [drm]
[ 371.073077] drm_release_noglobal+0x7a/0xe0 [drm]
[ 371.073113] __fput+0xe2/0x2b0
[ 371.073118] fput_close_sync+0x40/0xa0
[ 371.073119] __x64_sys_close+0x3e/0x80
[ 371.073122] x64_sys_call+0xa07/0xa30
[ 371.073126] do_syscall_64+0xc0/0x840
[ 371.073130] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[ 371.073132] RIP: 0033:0x7f1fb3501732
[ 371.073133] Code: 08 0f 85 a1 38 ff ff 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 55 bf 01 00
[ 371.073135] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8e6f0278 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
[ 371.073136] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe8e6f0300 RCX: 00007f1fb3501732
[ 371.073137] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000012
[ 371.073138] RBP: 00007ffe8e6f02a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 371.073139] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005585ba46eea0
[ 371.073140] R13: 00007ffe8e6f0360 R14: 00007ffe8e6f0360 R15: 00005585ba458a30
[ 371.073143] </TASK>
[ 371.073144] Modules linked in: rfcomm snd_hrtimer xt_addrtype xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_tcpudp nft_compat x_tables nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_tables overlay cfg80211 bnep snd_hda_codec_intelhdmi snd_hda_codec_hdmi mtd_intel_dg mtd nls_utf8 wmi_bmof mxm_wmi gigabyte_wmi intel_wmi_thunderbolt xe drm_gpuvm drm_gpusvm_helper i2c_algo_bit drm_buddy drm_ttm_helper ttm video drm_suballoc_helper gpu_sched drm_client_lib drm_exec drm_display_helper cec drm_kunit_helpers drm_kms_helper kunit x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp snd_hda_codec_alc882 snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_soc_avs snd_soc_hda_codec snd_hda_ext_core snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_intel_dspcfg snd_soc_core snd_compress ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_timer i2c_i801 btusb i2c_mux i2c_smbus btrtl snd btbcm btmtk btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic rfkill ecc mei_me mei ioatdma dca wmi nfsd drm i2c_dev fuse nfnetlink
[ 371.073198] CR2: 000001ffffffffff
[ 371.073199] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---Add a guard around file close, and ensure the warnings from drm_mode_config do not trigger. Fix those by allowing an open reference to the file descriptor and cleaning up the file linked list entry in drm_mode_config_cleanup().
--- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c | 5 ++++- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c | 9 ++++++--- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c +4 -1
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ static void drm_events_release(struct drvoid drm_file_free (struct drm_file *file) {struct drm_device *dev; +int idx;if (!file)return ;
@@ -236,9 +237,11 @@ void drm_file_free(struct drm_file *filedrm_events_release (file); -if (drm_core_check_feature (dev,DRIVER_MODESET )) { +if (drm_core_check_feature (dev,DRIVER_MODESET ) && +drm_dev_enter (dev, &idx)) {drm_fb_release (file);drm_property_destroy_user_blobs (dev, file); +drm_dev_exit (idx); }if (drm_core_check_feature (dev,DRIVER_SYNCOBJ ))
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c +6 -3
@@ -553,10 +553,13 @@ void drm_mode_config_cleanup(struct drm_*/ WARN_ON (!list_empty (&dev->mode_config.fb_list));list_for_each_entry_safe (fb, fbt, &dev->mode_config.fb_list, head) { -struct drm_printer p =drm_dbg_printer (dev,DRM_UT_KMS ,"[leaked fb]" ); +if (list_empty (&fb->filp_head) ||drm_framebuffer_read_refcount (fb) >1 ) { +struct drm_printer p =drm_dbg_printer (dev,DRM_UT_KMS ,"[leaked fb]" ); -drm_printf (&p,"framebuffer[%u]:\n" , fb->base.id); -drm_framebuffer_print_info (&p,1 , fb); +drm_printf (&p,"framebuffer[%u]:\n" , fb->base.id); +drm_framebuffer_print_info (&p,1 , fb); + } +list_del_init (&fb->filp_head);drm_framebuffer_free (&fb->base.refcount); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 350/460 drm/amd/display: Wrap dcn32_override_min_req_memclk() in DC_FP_{START, END}
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Xi Ruoyao <[email protected]>
commit ebe82c6e75cfc547154d0fd843b0dd6cca3d548f upstream.
[Why]
The dcn32_override_min_req_memclk function is in dcn32_fpu.c, which is compiled with CC_FLAGS_FPU into FP instructions. So when we call it we must use DC_FP_{START,END} to save and restore the FP context, and prepare the FP unit on architectures like LoongArch where the FP unit isn't always on.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/resource/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/resource/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c +3 -0
@@ -1784,7 +1784,10 @@ static bool dml1_validate(struct dc *dc, dc->res_pool->funcs->calculate_wm_and_dlg (dc, context, pipes, pipe_cnt, vlevel); +DC_FP_START ();dcn32_override_min_req_memclk (dc, context); +DC_FP_END (); +dcn32_override_min_req_dcfclk (dc, context);BW_VAL_TRACE_END_WATERMARKS ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 351/460 drm/amdgpu/gmc9.0: add bounds checking for cid
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit f39e1270277f4b06db0b2c6ec9405b6dd766fb13 upstream.
The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c +14 -7
@@ -688,28 +688,35 @@ static int gmc_v9_0_process_interrupt(st }else {switch (amdgpu_ip_version (adev,MMHUB_HWIP ,0 )) {case IP_VERSION (9 ,0 ,0 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_vega10[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_vega10) ? + mmhub_client_ids_vega10[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;case IP_VERSION (9 ,3 ,0 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_vega12[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_vega12) ? + mmhub_client_ids_vega12[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;case IP_VERSION (9 ,4 ,0 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_vega20[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_vega20) ? + mmhub_client_ids_vega20[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;case IP_VERSION (9 ,4 ,1 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_arcturus[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_arcturus) ? + mmhub_client_ids_arcturus[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;case IP_VERSION (9 ,1 ,0 ):case IP_VERSION (9 ,2 ,0 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_raven[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_raven) ? + mmhub_client_ids_raven[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;case IP_VERSION (1 ,5 ,0 ):case IP_VERSION (2 ,4 ,0 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_renoir[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_renoir) ? + mmhub_client_ids_renoir[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;case IP_VERSION (1 ,8 ,0 ):case IP_VERSION (9 ,4 ,2 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_aldebaran[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_aldebaran) ? + mmhub_client_ids_aldebaran[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;default : mmhub_cid =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 352/460 drm/amdgpu/mmhub2.0: add bounds checking for cid
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit 0b26edac4ac5535df1f63e6e8ab44c24fe1acad7 upstream.
The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v2_0.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v2_0.c +6 -3
@@ -154,14 +154,17 @@ mmhub_v2_0_print_l2_protection_fault_staswitch (amdgpu_ip_version (adev,MMHUB_HWIP ,0 )) {case IP_VERSION (2 ,0 ,0 ):case IP_VERSION (2 ,0 ,2 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_navi1x[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_navi1x) ? + mmhub_client_ids_navi1x[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;case IP_VERSION (2 ,1 ,0 ):case IP_VERSION (2 ,1 ,1 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_sienna_cichlid[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_sienna_cichlid) ? + mmhub_client_ids_sienna_cichlid[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;case IP_VERSION (2 ,1 ,2 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_beige_goby[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_beige_goby) ? + mmhub_client_ids_beige_goby[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;default : mmhub_cid =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 353/460 drm/amdgpu/mmhub2.3: add bounds checking for cid
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit a54403a534972af5d9ba5aaa3bb6ead612500ec6 upstream.
The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v2_3.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v2_3.c +2 -1
@@ -94,7 +94,8 @@ mmhub_v2_3_print_l2_protection_fault_stacase IP_VERSION (2 ,3 ,0 ):case IP_VERSION (2 ,4 ,0 ):case IP_VERSION (2 ,4 ,1 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_vangogh[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_vangogh) ? + mmhub_client_ids_vangogh[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;default : mmhub_cid =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 354/460 drm/amdgpu/mmhub3.0.1: add bounds checking for cid
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit 5d4e88bcfef29569a1db224ef15e28c603666c6d upstream.
The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0_1.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0_1.c +2 -1
@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ mmhub_v3_0_1_print_l2_protection_fault_sswitch (amdgpu_ip_version (adev,MMHUB_HWIP ,0 )) {case IP_VERSION (3 ,0 ,1 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_1[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_1) ? + mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_1[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;default : mmhub_cid =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 355/460 drm/amdgpu/mmhub3.0.2: add bounds checking for cid
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit e5e6d67b1ce9764e67aef2d0eef9911af53ad99a upstream.
The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0_2.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0_2.c +2 -1
@@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ mmhub_v3_0_2_print_l2_protection_fault_s"MMVM_L2_PROTECTION_FAULT_STATUS:0x%08X\n" , status); - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_2[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_2) ? + mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_2[cid][rw] :NULL ;dev_err (adev->dev,"\t Faulty UTCL2 client ID: %s (0x%x)\n" , mmhub_cid ? mmhub_cid :"unknown" , cid); dev_err(adev->dev, "\t MORE_FAULTS: 0x%lx\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 356/460 drm/amdgpu/mmhub3.0: add bounds checking for cid
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit cdb82ecbeccb55fae75a3c956b605f7801a30db1 upstream.
The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v3_0.c +2 -1
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ mmhub_v3_0_print_l2_protection_fault_staswitch (amdgpu_ip_version (adev,MMHUB_HWIP ,0 )) {case IP_VERSION (3 ,0 ,0 ):case IP_VERSION (3 ,0 ,1 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_0[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_0) ? + mmhub_client_ids_v3_0_0[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;default : mmhub_cid =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 357/460 drm/amdgpu/mmhub4.1.0: add bounds checking for cid
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit 3cdd405831d8cc50a5eae086403402697bb98a4a upstream.
The value should never exceed the array size as those are the only values the hardware is expected to return, but add checks anyway.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v4_1_0.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mmhub_v4_1_0.c +2 -1
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ mmhub_v4_1_0_print_l2_protection_fault_s status);switch (amdgpu_ip_version (adev,MMHUB_HWIP ,0 )) {case IP_VERSION (4 ,1 ,0 ): - mmhub_cid = mmhub_client_ids_v4_1_0[cid][rw]; + mmhub_cid = cid <ARRAY_SIZE (mmhub_client_ids_v4_1_0) ? + mmhub_client_ids_v4_1_0[cid][rw] :NULL ;break ;default : mmhub_cid =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 358/460 drm/imagination: Fix deadlock in soft reset sequence
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alessio Belle <[email protected]>
commit a55c2a5c8d680156495b7b1e2a9f5a3e313ba524 upstream.
The soft reset sequence is currently executed from the threaded IRQ handler, hence it cannot call disable_irq() which internally waits for IRQ handlers, i.e. itself, to complete.
Use disable_irq_nosync() during a soft reset instead.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/imagination/pvr_power.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/imagination/pvr_power.c +10 -1
@@ -408,7 +408,16 @@ pvr_power_reset(struct pvr_device *pvr_d }/* Disable IRQs for the duration of the reset. */ -disable_irq (pvr_dev->irq); +if (hard_reset) { +disable_irq (pvr_dev->irq); + }else { +/* +* Soft reset is triggered as a response to a FW command to the Host and is +* processed from the threaded IRQ handler. This code cannot (nor needs to) +* wait for any IRQ processing to complete. +*/ +disable_irq_nosync (pvr_dev->irq); + } do { if (hard_reset) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 359/460 drm/radeon: apply state adjust rules to some additional HAINAN vairants
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit 86650ee2241ff84207eaa298ab318533f3c21a38 upstream.
They need a similar workaround.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/si_dpm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/si_dpm.c +3 -1
@@ -2915,9 +2915,11 @@ static void si_apply_state_adjust_rules(if (rdev->family ==CHIP_HAINAN ) {if ((rdev->pdev->revision ==0x81 ) || (rdev->pdev->revision ==0xC3 ) || + (rdev->pdev->device ==0x6660 ) || (rdev->pdev->device ==0x6664 ) || (rdev->pdev->device ==0x6665 ) || - (rdev->pdev->device ==0x6667 )) { + (rdev->pdev->device ==0x6667 ) || + (rdev->pdev->device ==0x666F )) { max_sclk =75000 ; } if ((rdev->pdev->revision == 0xC3) ||
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 360/460 drm/amdgpu: apply state adjust rules to some additional HAINAN vairants
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
commit 9787f7da186ee8143b7b6d914cfa0b6e7fee2648 upstream.
They need a similar workaround.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/si_dpm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/legacy-dpm/si_dpm.c +3 -1
@@ -3440,9 +3440,11 @@ static void si_apply_state_adjust_rules(if (adev->asic_type ==CHIP_HAINAN ) {if ((adev->pdev->revision ==0x81 ) || (adev->pdev->revision ==0xC3 ) || + (adev->pdev->device ==0x6660 ) || (adev->pdev->device ==0x6664 ) || (adev->pdev->device ==0x6665 ) || - (adev->pdev->device ==0x6667 )) { + (adev->pdev->device ==0x6667 ) || + (adev->pdev->device ==0x666F )) { max_sclk =75000 ; } if ((adev->pdev->revision == 0xC3) ||
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 361/460 drm/xe/oa: Allow reading after disabling OA stream
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ashutosh Dixit <[email protected]>
commit 9be6fd9fbd2032b683e51374497768af9aaa228a upstream.
Some OA data might be present in the OA buffer when OA stream is disabled. Allow UMD's to retrieve this data, so that all data till the point when OA stream is disabled can be retrieved.
v2: Update tail pointer after disable (Umesh)
--- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_oa.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_oa.c +5 -2
@@ -520,8 +520,7 @@ static ssize_t xe_oa_read(struct file *fsize_t offset =0 ;int ret; -/* Can't read from disabled streams */ -if (!stream->enabled || !stream->sample) +if (!stream->sample)return -EINVAL ;if (!(file->f_flags &O_NONBLOCK )) {
@@ -1375,6 +1374,10 @@ static void xe_oa_stream_disable(structif (stream->sample)hrtimer_cancel (&stream->poll_check_timer); + +/* Update stream->oa_buffer.tail to allow any final reports to be read */ +if (xe_oa_buffer_check_unlocked (stream)) +wake_up (&stream->poll_wq); }static int xe_oa_enable_preempt_timeslice (struct xe_oa_stream *stream)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 362/460 drm/xe: Open-code GGTT MMIO access protection
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthew Brost <[email protected]>
commit 01f2557aa684e514005541e71a3d01f4cd45c170 upstream.
GGTT MMIO access is currently protected by hotplug (drm_dev_enter), which works correctly when the driver loads successfully and is later unbound or unloaded. However, if driver load fails, this protection is insufficient because drm_dev_unplug() is never called.
Additionally, devm release functions cannot guarantee that all BOs with GGTT mappings are destroyed before the GGTT MMIO region is removed, as some BOs may be freed asynchronously by worker threads.
To address this, introduce an open-coded flag, protected by the GGTT lock, that guards GGTT MMIO access. The flag is cleared during the dev_fini_ggtt devm release function to ensure MMIO access is disabled once teardown begins.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ggtt.c | 10 ++++------ drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ggtt_types.h | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ggtt.c +4 -6
@@ -202,6 +202,8 @@ static void dev_fini_ggtt(void *arg) {struct xe_ggtt *ggtt = arg; +scoped_guard (mutex, &ggtt->lock) + ggtt->flags &= ~XE_GGTT_FLAGS_ONLINE;drain_workqueue (ggtt->wq); }
@@ -261,6 +263,7 @@ int xe_ggtt_init_early(struct xe_ggtt *gif (err)return err; + ggtt->flags |=XE_GGTT_FLAGS_ONLINE ; err =devm_add_action_or_reset (xe->drm.dev, dev_fini_ggtt, ggtt);if (err)return err;
@@ -293,13 +296,10 @@ static void xe_ggtt_initial_clear(structstatic void ggtt_node_remove (struct xe_ggtt_node *node) {struct xe_ggtt *ggtt = node->ggtt; -struct xe_device *xe =tile_to_xe (ggtt->tile);bool bound; -int idx; - - bound =drm_dev_enter (&xe->drm, &idx);mutex_lock (&ggtt->lock); + bound = ggtt->flags &XE_GGTT_FLAGS_ONLINE ;if (bound)xe_ggtt_clear (ggtt, node->base.start, node->base.size);drm_mm_remove_node (&node->base);
@@ -312,8 +312,6 @@ static void ggtt_node_remove(struct xe_gif (node->invalidate_on_remove)xe_ggtt_invalidate (ggtt); -drm_dev_exit (idx); - free_node:xe_ggtt_node_fini (node); }
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ggtt_types.h +4 -1
@@ -25,11 +25,14 @@ struct xe_ggtt {/** @size: Total size of this GGTT */ u64 size; -#define XE_GGTT_FLAGS_64K BIT(0) +#define XE_GGTT_FLAGS_64K BIT(0) +#define XE_GGTT_FLAGS_ONLINE BIT(1)/** * @flags: Flags for this GGTT * Acceptable flags: * - %XE_GGTT_FLAGS_64K - if PTE size is 64K. Otherwise, regular is 4K. +* - %XE_GGTT_FLAGS_ONLINE - is GGTT online, protected by ggtt->lock +* after init */ unsigned int flags;/** @scratch: Internal object allocation used as a scratch page */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 363/460 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting multiple L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_REQ
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
commit 5b3e2052334f2ff6d5200e952f4aa66994d09899 upstream.
Currently the code attempts to accept requests regardless of the command identifier which may cause multiple requests to be marked as pending (FLAG_DEFER_SETUP) which can cause more than L2CAP_ECRED_MAX_CID(5) to be allocated in l2cap_ecred_rsp_defer causing an overflow.
The spec is quite clear that the same identifier shall not be used on subsequent requests:
'Within each signaling channel a different Identifier shall be used for each successive request or indication.'
https://www.bluetooth.com/wp-content/uploads/Files/Specification/HTML/Core-62/out/en/host/logical-link-control-and-adaptation-protocol-specification.html#UUID-32a25a06-4aa4-c6c7-77c5-dcfe3682355d
So this attempts to check if there are any channels pending with the same identifier and rejects if any are found.
--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +9 -1
@@ -5010,7 +5010,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_ecred_conn_req(su16 mtu, mps;__le16 psm;u8 result, rsp_len =0 ; -int i, num_scid; +int i, num_scid =0 ;bool defer = false;if (!enable_ecred)
@@ -5022,6 +5022,14 @@ static inline int l2cap_ecred_conn_req(s result =L2CAP_CR_LE_INVALID_PARAMS ; goto response; } + +/* Check if there are no pending channels with the same ident */ +__l2cap_chan_list_id (conn, cmd->ident, l2cap_ecred_list_defer, + &num_scid); +if (num_scid) { + result =L2CAP_CR_LE_INVALID_PARAMS ; + goto response; + } cmd_len -=sizeof (*req); num_scid = cmd_len /sizeof (u16);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 364/460 ata: libata-scsi: Return residual for emulated SCSI commands
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5251ae224d8d3caa21b28d12408062b6e75cffad ]
The function ata_scsi_rbuf_fill() used to fill the reply buffer of emulated SCSI commands always copies the ATA reply buffer (ata_scsi_rbuf) up to the size of the SCSI command buffer (the transfer length for the command), even if the reply is shorter than the SCSI command buffer. This leads to issuers of the SCSI command to always get a result without any residual (resid is always 0) despite the potentially shorter reply for the command.
Modify all fill actors used by ata_scsi_rbuf_fill() to return the number of bytes filled for the reply and 0 in case of error. Using this value, add a call to scsi_set_resid() in ata_scsi_rbuf_fill() to set the correct residual for the SCSI command when the reply length is shorter than the command buffer.
Stable-dep-of: e6d7eba23b66 ("ata: libata-scsi: report correct sense field pointer in ata_scsiop_maint_in()")
--- drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c +47 -34
@@ -1920,17 +1920,19 @@ static void ata_scsi_rbuf_fill(struct atunsigned int (*actor)(struct ata_device *dev, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd, u8 *rbuf)) { -unsigned int rc;unsigned long flags; +unsigned int len;spin_lock_irqsave (&ata_scsi_rbuf_lock, flags);memset (ata_scsi_rbuf,0 ,ATA_SCSI_RBUF_SIZE ); - rc =actor (dev, cmd, ata_scsi_rbuf); -if (rc ==0 ) { + len =actor (dev, cmd, ata_scsi_rbuf); +if (len) {sg_copy_from_buffer (scsi_sglist (cmd),scsi_sg_count (cmd), ata_scsi_rbuf,ATA_SCSI_RBUF_SIZE ); cmd->result =SAM_STAT_GOOD ; +if (scsi_bufflen (cmd) > len) +scsi_set_resid (cmd,scsi_bufflen (cmd) - len); }spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ata_scsi_rbuf_lock, flags);
@@ -2018,7 +2020,11 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_std(selse memcpy (rbuf +58 , versions,sizeof (versions)); -return 0 ; +/* +* Include all 8 possible version descriptors, even if not all of +* them are popoulated. +*/ +return 96 ; }/**
@@ -2055,7 +2061,8 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_00(st num_pages++; } rbuf[3 ] = num_pages;/* number of supported VPD pages */ -return 0 ; + +return get_unaligned_be16 (&rbuf[2 ]) +4 ; }/**
@@ -2082,7 +2089,8 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_80(stmemcpy (rbuf, hdr,sizeof (hdr));ata_id_string (dev->id, (unsigned char *) &rbuf[4 ],ATA_ID_SERNO ,ATA_ID_SERNO_LEN ); -return 0 ; + +return get_unaligned_be16 (&rbuf[2 ]) +4 ; }/**
@@ -2143,7 +2151,8 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_83(st num +=ATA_ID_WWN_LEN ; } rbuf[3 ] = num -4 ;/* page len (assume less than 256 bytes) */ -return 0 ; + +return get_unaligned_be16 (&rbuf[2 ]) +4 ; }/**
@@ -2180,7 +2189,8 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_89(st rbuf[56 ] =ATA_CMD_ID_ATA ;memcpy (&rbuf[60 ], &dev->id[0 ],512 ); -return 0 ; + +return get_unaligned_be16 (&rbuf[2 ]) +4 ; }/**
@@ -2231,7 +2241,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_b0(stput_unaligned_be32 (1 , &rbuf[28 ]); } -return 0 ; +return get_unaligned_be16 (&rbuf[2 ]) +4 ; }/**
@@ -2261,7 +2271,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_b1(stif (zoned) rbuf[8 ] = (zoned <<4 ); -return 0 ; +return get_unaligned_be16 (&rbuf[2 ]) +4 ; }/**
@@ -2284,7 +2294,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_b2(st rbuf[3 ] =0x4 ; rbuf[5 ] =1 <<6 ;/* TPWS */ -return 0 ; +return get_unaligned_be16 (&rbuf[2 ]) +4 ; }/**
@@ -2304,7 +2314,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_b6(st {if (!ata_dev_is_zac (dev)) {ata_scsi_set_invalid_field (dev, cmd,2 ,0xff ); -return 1 ; +return 0 ; }/*
@@ -2322,7 +2332,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_b6(stput_unaligned_be32 (dev->zac_zones_optimal_nonseq, &rbuf[12 ]);put_unaligned_be32 (dev->zac_zones_max_open, &rbuf[16 ]); -return 0 ; +return get_unaligned_be16 (&rbuf[2 ]) +4 ; }/**
@@ -2346,7 +2356,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_b9(stif (!cpr_log) {ata_scsi_set_invalid_field (dev, cmd,2 ,0xff ); -return 1 ; +return 0 ; }/* SCSI Concurrent Positioning Ranges VPD page: SBC-5 rev 1 or later */
@@ -2360,7 +2370,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_b9(stput_unaligned_be64 (cpr_log->cpr[i].num_lbas, &desc[16 ]); } -return 0 ; +return get_unaligned_be16 (&rbuf[2 ]) +4 ; }/**
@@ -2382,7 +2392,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inquiry(s/* is CmdDt set? */ if (scsicmd[1 ] &2 ) {ata_scsi_set_invalid_field (dev, cmd,1 ,0xff ); -return 1 ; +return 0 ; }/* Is EVPD clear? */
@@ -2410,7 +2420,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_inquiry(sreturn ata_scsiop_inq_b9 (dev, cmd, rbuf);default :ata_scsi_set_invalid_field (dev, cmd,2 ,0xff ); -return 1 ; +return 0 ; } }
@@ -2741,24 +2751,27 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_mode_sens rbuf[3 ] =sizeof (sat_blk_desc);memcpy (rbuf +4 , sat_blk_desc,sizeof (sat_blk_desc)); } - }else { -put_unaligned_be16 (p - rbuf -2 , &rbuf[0 ]); - rbuf[3 ] |= dpofua; -if (ebd) { - rbuf[7 ] =sizeof (sat_blk_desc); -memcpy (rbuf +8 , sat_blk_desc,sizeof (sat_blk_desc)); - } + +return rbuf[0 ] +1 ; } -return 0 ; + +put_unaligned_be16 (p - rbuf -2 , &rbuf[0 ]); + rbuf[3 ] |= dpofua; +if (ebd) { + rbuf[7 ] =sizeof (sat_blk_desc); +memcpy (rbuf +8 , sat_blk_desc,sizeof (sat_blk_desc)); + } + +return get_unaligned_be16 (&rbuf[0 ]) +2 ; invalid_fld:ata_scsi_set_invalid_field (dev, cmd, fp, bp); -return 1 ; +return 0 ; saving_not_supp:ata_scsi_set_sense (dev, cmd,ILLEGAL_REQUEST ,0x39 ,0x0 );/* "Saving parameters not supported" */ -return 1 ; +return 0 ; }/**
@@ -2801,7 +2814,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_read_cap( rbuf[6 ] = sector_size >> (8 *1 ); rbuf[7 ] = sector_size; -return 0 ; +return 8 ; }/*
@@ -2811,7 +2824,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_read_cap(if (scsicmd[0 ] !=SERVICE_ACTION_IN_16 || (scsicmd[1 ] &0x1f ) !=SAI_READ_CAPACITY_16 ) {ata_scsi_set_invalid_field (dev, cmd,1 ,0xff ); -return 1 ; +return 0 ; }/* sector count, 64-bit */
@@ -2846,7 +2859,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_read_cap( } } -return 0 ; +return 16 ; }/**
@@ -2865,7 +2878,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_report_lu { rbuf[3 ] =8 ;/* just one lun, LUN 0, size 8 bytes */ -return 0 ; +return 16 ; }/*
@@ -3593,13 +3606,13 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_maint_in(if ((cdb[1 ] &0x1f ) !=MI_REPORT_SUPPORTED_OPERATION_CODES ) {ata_scsi_set_invalid_field (dev, cmd,1 ,0xff ); -return 1 ; +return 0 ; }if (cdb[2 ] !=1 && cdb[2 ] !=3 ) {ata_dev_warn (dev,"invalid command format %d\n" , cdb[2 ]);ata_scsi_set_invalid_field (dev, cmd,1 ,0xff ); -return 1 ; +return 0 ; }switch (cdb[3 ]) {
@@ -3672,7 +3685,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_maint_in( rbuf[0 ] = rwcdlp; rbuf[1 ] = cdlp | supported; -return 0 ; +return 4 ; }/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 365/460 ata: libata-scsi: report correct sense field pointer in ata_scsiop_maint_in()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e6d7eba23b666d85cacee0643be280d6ce1ebffc ]
Commit 4ab7bb976343 ("ata: libata-scsi: Refactor ata_scsiop_maint_in()") modified ata_scsiop_maint_in() to directly call ata_scsi_set_invalid_field() to set the field pointer of the sense data of a failed MAINTENANCE IN command. However, in the case of an invalid command format, the sense data field incorrectly indicates byte 1 of the CDB. Fix this to indicate byte 2 of the command.
--- drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/ata/libata-scsi.c +1 -1
@@ -3611,7 +3611,7 @@ static unsigned int ata_scsiop_maint_in(if (cdb[2 ] !=1 && cdb[2 ] !=3 ) {ata_dev_warn (dev,"invalid command format %d\n" , cdb[2 ]); -ata_scsi_set_invalid_field (dev, cmd,1 ,0xff ); +ata_scsi_set_invalid_field (dev, cmd,2 ,0xff );return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 366/460 btrfs: log new dentries when logging parent dir of a conflicting inode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9573a365ff9ff45da9222d3fe63695ce562beb24 ]
If we log the parent directory of a conflicting inode, we are not logging the new dentries of the directory, so when we finish we have the parent directory's inode marked as logged but we did not log its new dentries. As a consequence if the parent directory is explicitly fsynced later and it does not have any new changes since we logged it, the fsync is a no-op and after a power failure the new dentries are missing.
Example scenario:
$ mkdir foo
$ sync
$rmdir foo
$ mkdir dir1 $ mkdir dir2
# A file with the same name and parent as the directory we just deleted
# and was persisted in a past transaction. So the deleted directory's # inode is a conflicting inode of this new file's inode. $ touch foo
$ ln foo dir2/link
# The fsync on dir2 will log the parent directory (".") because the
# conflicting inode (deleted directory) does not exists anymore, but it # it does not log its new dentries (dir1). $ xfs_io -c "fsync" dir2
# This fsync on the parent directory is no-op, since the previous fsync
# logged it (but without logging its new dentries). $ xfs_io -c "fsync" .
<power failure>
# After log replay dir1 is missing.
Fix this by ensuring we log new dir dentries whenever we log the parent directory of a no longer existing conflicting inode.
A test case for fstests will follow soon.
--- fs/btrfs/tree-log.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/tree-log.c +6 -0
@@ -5886,6 +5886,7 @@ static int log_conflicting_inodes(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,struct btrfs_root *root, struct btrfs_log_ctx *ctx) { + const bool orig_log_new_dentries = ctx->log_new_dentries;int ret =0 ;/*
@@ -5947,7 +5948,11 @@ static int log_conflicting_inodes(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,* dir index key range logged for the directory. So we * must make sure the deletion is recorded. */ + ctx->log_new_dentries = false; ret =btrfs_log_inode (trans, inode,LOG_INODE_ALL , ctx); +if (!ret && ctx->log_new_dentries) + ret =log_new_dir_dentries (trans, inode, ctx); +btrfs_add_delayed_iput (inode);if (ret)break ;
@@ -5982,6 +5987,7 @@ static int log_conflicting_inodes(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,break ; } + ctx->log_new_dentries = orig_log_new_dentries; ctx->logging_conflict_inodes = false;if (ret)free_conflicting_inodes (ctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 367/460 btrfs: tree-checker: fix misleading root drop_level error message
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: ZhengYuan Huang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fc1cd1f18c34f91e78362f9629ab9fd43b9dcab9 ]
Fix tree-checker error message to report "invalid root drop_level" instead of the misleading "invalid root level".
--- fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c +1 -1
@@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@ static int check_root_item(struct extent_buffer *leaf, struct btrfs_key *key, }if (unlikely (btrfs_root_drop_level (&ri) >=BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL )) {generic_err (leaf, slot, -"invalid root level, have %u expect [0, %u]" , +"invalid root drop_level, have %u expect [0, %u]" ,btrfs_root_drop_level (&ri),BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL -1 );return -EUCLEAN ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 368/460 soc: microchip: mpfs: Fix memory leak in mpfs_sys_controller_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zilin Guan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5a741f8cc6fe62542f955cd8d24933a1b6589cbd ]
In mpfs_sys_controller_probe(), if of_get_mtd_device_by_node() fails, the function returns immediately without freeing the allocated memory for sys_controller, leading to a memory leak.
Fix this by jumping to the out_free label to ensure the memory is properly freed.
Also, consolidate the error handling for the mbox_request_channel() failure case to use the same label.
--- drivers/soc/microchip/mpfs-sys-controller.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/microchip/mpfs-sys-controller.c +9 -4
@@ -142,8 +142,10 @@ static int mpfs_sys_controller_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) sys_controller->flash =of_get_mtd_device_by_node (np);of_node_put (np); -if (IS_ERR (sys_controller->flash)) -return dev_err_probe (dev,PTR_ERR (sys_controller->flash),"Failed to get flash\n" ); +if (IS_ERR (sys_controller->flash)) { + ret =dev_err_probe (dev,PTR_ERR (sys_controller->flash),"Failed to get flash\n" ); + goto out_free; + } no_flash: sys_controller->client.dev = dev;
@@ -155,8 +157,7 @@ static int mpfs_sys_controller_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)if (IS_ERR (sys_controller->chan)) { ret =dev_err_probe (dev,PTR_ERR (sys_controller->chan),"Failed to get mbox channel\n" ); -kfree (sys_controller); -return ret; + goto out_free; }init_completion (&sys_controller->c);
@@ -174,6 +175,10 @@ static int mpfs_sys_controller_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)dev_info (&pdev->dev,"Registered MPFS system controller\n" );return 0 ; + +out_free: +kfree (sys_controller); +return ret; }static void mpfs_sys_controller_remove (struct platform_device *pdev)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 369/460 cache: starfive: fix device node leak in starlink_cache_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3c85234b979af71cb9db5eb976ea08a468415767 ]
of_find_matching_node() returns a device_node with refcount incremented.
Use __free(device_node) attribute to automatically call of_node_put() when the variable goes out of scope, preventing the refcount leak.
--- drivers/cache/starfive_starlink_cache.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/cache/starfive_starlink_cache.c +2 -2
@@ -102,11 +102,11 @@ static const struct of_device_id starlink_cache_ids[] = {static int __init starlink_cache_init (void ) { -struct device_node *np;u32 block_size;int ret; - np =of_find_matching_node (NULL , starlink_cache_ids); + struct device_node *np __free(device_node) = +of_find_matching_node (NULL , starlink_cache_ids);if (!of_device_is_available (np))return -ENODEV ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 370/460 cache: ax45mp: Fix device node reference leak in ax45mp_cache_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0528a348b04b327a4611e29589beb4c9ae81304a ]
In ax45mp_cache_init(), of_find_matching_node() returns a device node with an incremented reference count that must be released with of_node_put(). The current code fails to call of_node_put() which causes a reference leak.
Use the __free(device_node) attribute to ensure automatic cleanup when the variable goes out of scope.
--- drivers/cache/ax45mp_cache.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/cache/ax45mp_cache.c +2 -2
@@ -178,11 +178,11 @@ static const struct of_device_id ax45mp_cache_ids[] = {static int __init ax45mp_cache_init (void ) { -struct device_node *np;struct resource res;int ret; - np =of_find_matching_node (NULL , ax45mp_cache_ids); + struct device_node *np __free(device_node) = +of_find_matching_node (NULL , ax45mp_cache_ids);if (!of_device_is_available (np))return -ENODEV ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 371/460 soc: rockchip: grf: Add missing of_node_put() when returning
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shawn Lin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 24ed11ee5bacf9a9aca18fc6b47667c7f38d578b ]
Fix the smatch checking:drivers/soc/rockchip/grf.c:249 rockchip_grf_init()
warn: inconsistent refcounting 'np->kobj.kref.refcount.refs.counter':
--- drivers/soc/rockchip/grf.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/soc/rockchip/grf.c +1 -0
@@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ static int __init rockchip_grf_init(void) grf =syscon_node_to_regmap (np);if (IS_ERR (grf)) {pr_err ("%s: could not get grf syscon\n" , __func__); +of_node_put (np);return PTR_ERR (grf); }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 372/460 soc: fsl: qbman: fix race condition in qman_destroy_fq
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Richard Genoud <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 014077044e874e270ec480515edbc1cadb976cf2 ]
When QMAN_FQ_FLAG_DYNAMIC_FQID is set, there's a race condition between fq_table[fq->idx] state and freeing/allocating from the pool and WARN_ON(fq_table[fq->idx]) in qman_create_fq() gets triggered.
Indeed, we can have:
Thread A Thread B
qman_destroy_fq() qman_create_fq()
qman_release_fqid()
qman_shutdown_fq()
gen_pool_free()
-- At this point, the fqid is available again --
qman_alloc_fqid()
-- so, we can get the just-freed fqid in thread B --
fq->fqid = fqid;
fq->idx = fqid * 2;
WARN_ON(fq_table[fq->idx]);
fq_table[fq->idx] = fq;
fq_table[fq->idx] = NULL;And adding some logs between qman_release_fqid() and fq_table[fq->idx] = NULL makes the WARN_ON() trigger a lot more.
To prevent that, ensure that fq_table[fq->idx] is set to NULL before gen_pool_free() is called by using smp_wmb().
--- drivers/soc/fsl/qbman/qman.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/fsl/qbman/qman.c +22 -2
@@ -1827,6 +1827,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(qman_create_fq);void qman_destroy_fq (struct qman_fq *fq) { +int leaked; +/* * We don't need to lock the FQ as it is a pre-condition that the FQ be * quiesced. Instead, run some checks.
@@ -1834,11 +1836,29 @@ void qman_destroy_fq(struct qman_fq *fq)switch (fq->state) {case qman_fq_state_parked:case qman_fq_state_oos: -if (fq_isset (fq,QMAN_FQ_FLAG_DYNAMIC_FQID )) -qman_release_fqid (fq->fqid); +/* +* There's a race condition here on releasing the fqid, +* setting the fq_table to NULL, and freeing the fqid. +* To prevent it, this order should be respected: +*/ +if (fq_isset (fq,QMAN_FQ_FLAG_DYNAMIC_FQID )) { + leaked =qman_shutdown_fq (fq->fqid); +if (leaked) +pr_debug ("FQID %d leaked\n" , fq->fqid); + }DPAA_ASSERT (fq_table[fq->idx]); fq_table[fq->idx] =NULL ; + +if (fq_isset (fq,QMAN_FQ_FLAG_DYNAMIC_FQID ) && !leaked) { +/* +* fq_table[fq->idx] should be set to null before +* freeing fq->fqid otherwise it could by allocated by +* qman_alloc_fqid() while still being !NULL +*/ +smp_wmb (); +gen_pool_free (qm_fqalloc, fq->fqid |DPAA_GENALLOC_OFF ,1 ); + }return ;default :break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 373/460 soc: fsl: cpm1: qmc: Fix error check for devm_ioremap_resource() in qmc_qe_init_resources()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen Ni <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3f4e403304186d79fddace860360540fc3af97f9 ]
Fix wrong variable used for error checking after devm_ioremap_resource() call. The function checks qmc->scc_pram instead of qmc->dpram, which could lead to incorrect error handling.
--- drivers/soc/fsl/qe/qmc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/fsl/qe/qmc.c +2 -2
@@ -1777,8 +1777,8 @@ static int qmc_qe_init_resources(struct qmc *qmc, struct platform_device *pdev)return -EINVAL ; qmc->dpram_offset = res->start -qe_muram_dma (qe_muram_addr (0 )); qmc->dpram =devm_ioremap_resource (qmc->dev, res); -if (IS_ERR (qmc->scc_pram)) -return PTR_ERR (qmc->scc_pram); +if (IS_ERR (qmc->dpram)) +return PTR_ERR (qmc->dpram);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 374/460 wifi: mac80211: Fix static_branch_dec() underflow for aql_disable.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b94ae8e0d5fe1bdbbfdc3854ff6ce98f6876a828 ]
syzbot reported static_branch_dec() underflow in aql_enable_write(). [0]
The problem is that aql_enable_write() does not serialise concurrent write()s to the debugfs.
aql_enable_write() checks static_key_false(&aql_disable.key) and later calls static_branch_inc() or static_branch_dec(), but the state may change between the two calls.
aql_disable does not need to track inc/dec.
Let's use static_branch_enable() and static_branch_disable().
[0]:
val == 0
WARNING: kernel/jump_label.c:311 at __static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x107/0x120 kernel/jump_label.c:311, CPU#0: syz.1.3155/20288 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 20288 Comm: syz.1.3155 Tainted: G U L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [U]=USER, [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/24/2026 RIP: 0010:__static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x107/0x120 kernel/jump_label.c:311 Code: f2 c9 ff 5b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 54 f2 c9 ff 48 89 df e8 ac f9 ff ff eb ad e8 45 f2 c9 ff 90 0f 0b 90 eb a2 e8 3a f2 c9 ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 97 48 89 df e8 5c 4b 33 00 e9 36 ff ff ff 0f 1f 80 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b9f7c10 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff9b3e5d40 RCX: ffffffff823c57b4 RDX: ffff8880285a0000 RSI: ffffffff823c5846 RDI: ffff8880285a0000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000000a R13: 1ffff9200173ef88 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc9000b9f7e98 FS: 00007f530dd726c0(0000) GS:ffff8881245e3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000200000001140 CR3: 000000007cc4a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> __static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked kernel/jump_label.c:297 [inline] __static_key_slow_dec kernel/jump_label.c:321 [inline] static_key_slow_dec+0x7c/0xc0 kernel/jump_label.c:336 aql_enable_write+0x2b2/0x310 net/mac80211/debugfs.c:343 short_proxy_write+0x133/0x1a0 fs/debugfs/file.c:383 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:684 ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:793 [inline] __do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:801 [inline] __se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:798 [inline] __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1eb/0x250 fs/read_write.c:798 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc9/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f530cf9aeb9 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f530dd72028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f530d215fa0 RCX: 00007f530cf9aeb9 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000010 RBP: 00007f530d008c1f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 4200000000000005 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f530d216038 R14: 00007f530d215fa0 R15: 00007ffde89fb978 </TASK>
--- net/mac80211/debugfs.c | 14 +++++--------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/mac80211/debugfs.c +5 -9
@@ -327,7 +327,6 @@ static ssize_t aql_enable_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,static ssize_t aql_enable_write (struct file *file,const char __user *user_buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) { -bool aql_disabled =static_key_false (&aql_disable.key);char buf[3 ];size_t len;
@@ -342,15 +341,12 @@ static ssize_t aql_enable_write(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buf,if (len >0 && buf[len -1 ] =='\n' ) buf[len -1 ] =0 ; -if (buf[0 ] =='0' && buf[1 ] =='\0' ) { -if (!aql_disabled) -static_branch_inc (&aql_disable); - }else if (buf[0 ] =='1' && buf[1 ] =='\0' ) { -if (aql_disabled) -static_branch_dec (&aql_disable); - }else { +if (buf[0 ] =='0' && buf[1 ] =='\0' ) +static_branch_enable (&aql_disable); +else if (buf[0 ] =='1' && buf[1 ] =='\0' ) +static_branch_disable (&aql_disable); +else return -EINVAL ; - }return count; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 375/460 wifi: cfg80211: cancel pmsr_free_wk in cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peddolla Harshavardhan Reddy <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6dccbc9f3e1d38565dff7730d2b7d1e8b16c9b09 ]
When the nl80211 socket that originated a PMSR request is closed, cfg80211_release_pmsr() sets the request's nl_portid to zero and schedules pmsr_free_wk to process the abort asynchronously. If the interface is concurrently torn down before that work runs, cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() calls cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort() directly. However, the already- scheduled pmsr_free_wk work item remains pending and may run after the interface has been removed from the driver. This could cause the driver's abort_pmsr callback to operate on a torn-down interface, leading to undefined behavior and potential crashes.
Cancel pmsr_free_wk synchronously in cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down() before calling cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort(). This ensures any pending or in-progress work is drained before interface teardown proceeds, preventing the work from invoking the driver abort callback after the interface is gone.
--- net/wireless/pmsr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/wireless/pmsr.c +1 -0
@@ -647,6 +647,7 @@ void cfg80211_pmsr_wdev_down(struct wireless_dev *wdev) }spin_unlock_bh (&wdev->pmsr_lock); +cancel_work_sync (&wdev->pmsr_free_wk);if (found)cfg80211_pmsr_process_abort (wdev);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 376/460 arm64: dts: renesas: r9a09g057: Add RTC node
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ovidiu Panait <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cfc733da4e79018f88d8ac5f3a5306abbba8ef89 ]
Add RTC node to Renesas RZ/V2H ("R9A09G057") SoC DTSI.
Stable-dep-of: a3f34651de42 ("arm64: dts: renesas: r9a09g057: Remove wdt{0,2,3} nodes")
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/r9a09g057.dtsi | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/r9a09g057.dtsi +15 -0
@@ -241,6 +241,21 @@ wdt3: watchdog@13000400 { status = "disabled"; }; + rtc: rtc@11c00800 { + compatible = "renesas,r9a09g057-rtca3", "renesas,rz-rtca3"; + reg = <0 0x11c00800 0 0x400>; + interrupts = <GIC_SPI 524 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>, + <GIC_SPI 525 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>, + <GIC_SPI 526 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>; + interrupt-names = "alarm", "period", "carry"; + clocks = <&cpg CPG_MOD 0x53>, <&rtxin_clk>; + clock-names = "bus", "counter"; + power-domains = <&cpg>; + resets = <&cpg 0x79>, <&cpg 0x7a>; + reset-names = "rtc", "rtest"; + status = "disabled"; + }; + scif: serial@11c01400 { compatible = "renesas,scif-r9a09g057"; reg = <0 0x11c01400 0 0x400>;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 377/460 arm64: dts: renesas: r9a09g057: Remove wdt{0,2,3} nodes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fabrizio Castro <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a3f34651de4287138c0da19ba321ad72622b4af3 ]
The HW user manual for the Renesas RZ/V2H(P) SoC (a.k.a r9a09g057) states that only WDT1 is supposed to be accessed by the CA55 cores. WDT0 is supposed to be used by the CM33 core, WDT2 is supposed to be used by the CR8 core 0, and WDT3 is supposed to be used by the CR8 core 1.
Remove wdt{0,2,3} from the SoC specific device tree to make it compliant with the specification from the HW manual.
This change is harmless as there are currently no users of the wdt{0,2,3} device tree nodes, only the wdt1 node is actually used.
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/r9a09g057.dtsi | 30 ---------------------- 1 file changed, 30 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/r9a09g057.dtsi +0 -30
@@ -201,16 +201,6 @@ ostm7: timer@12c03000 { status = "disabled"; }; - wdt0: watchdog@11c00400 { - compatible = "renesas,r9a09g057-wdt"; - reg = <0 0x11c00400 0 0x400>; - clocks = <&cpg CPG_MOD 0x4b>, <&cpg CPG_MOD 0x4c>; - clock-names = "pclk", "oscclk"; - resets = <&cpg 0x75>; - power-domains = <&cpg>; - status = "disabled"; - }; - wdt1: watchdog@14400000 { compatible = "renesas,r9a09g057-wdt"; reg = <0 0x14400000 0 0x400>;
@@ -221,26 +211,6 @@ wdt1: watchdog@14400000 { status = "disabled"; }; - wdt2: watchdog@13000000 { - compatible = "renesas,r9a09g057-wdt"; - reg = <0 0x13000000 0 0x400>; - clocks = <&cpg CPG_MOD 0x4f>, <&cpg CPG_MOD 0x50>; - clock-names = "pclk", "oscclk"; - resets = <&cpg 0x77>; - power-domains = <&cpg>; - status = "disabled"; - }; - - wdt3: watchdog@13000400 { - compatible = "renesas,r9a09g057-wdt"; - reg = <0 0x13000400 0 0x400>; - clocks = <&cpg CPG_MOD 0x51>, <&cpg CPG_MOD 0x52>; - clock-names = "pclk", "oscclk"; - resets = <&cpg 0x78>; - power-domains = <&cpg>; - status = "disabled"; - }; - rtc: rtc@11c00800 { compatible = "renesas,r9a09g057-rtca3", "renesas,rz-rtca3"; reg = <0 0x11c00800 0 0x400>;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 378/460 firmware: arm_ffa: Remove vm_id argument in ffa_rxtx_unmap()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yeoreum Yun <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a4e8473b775160f3ce978f621cf8dea2c7250433 ]
According to the FF-A specification (DEN0077, v1.1, §13.7), when FFA_RXTX_UNMAP is invoked from any instance other than non-secure physical, the w1 register must be zero (MBZ). If a non-zero value is supplied in this context, the SPMC must return FFA_INVALID_PARAMETER.
The Arm FF-A driver operates exclusively as a guest or non-secure physical instance where the partition ID is always zero and is not invoked from a hypervisor context where w1 carries a VM ID. In this execution model, the partition ID observed by the driver is always zero, and passing a VM ID is unnecessary and potentially invalid.
Remove the vm_id parameter from ffa_rxtx_unmap() and ensure that the SMC call is issued with w1 implicitly zeroed, as required by the specification. This prevents invalid parameter errors and aligns the implementation with the defined FF-A ABI behavior.
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c +4 -4
@@ -206,12 +206,12 @@ static int ffa_rxtx_map(phys_addr_t tx_buf, phys_addr_t rx_buf, u32 pg_cnt)return 0 ; } -static int ffa_rxtx_unmap (u16 vm_id) +static int ffa_rxtx_unmap (void ) {ffa_value_t ret;invoke_ffa_fn ((ffa_value_t ){ - .a0 =FFA_RXTX_UNMAP , .a1 =PACK_TARGET_INFO (vm_id,0 ), + .a0 =FFA_RXTX_UNMAP , }, &ret);if (ret.a0 ==FFA_ERROR )
@@ -1832,7 +1832,7 @@ static int __init ffa_init(void) cleanup_notifs:ffa_notifications_cleanup (); -ffa_rxtx_unmap (drv_info->vm_id); +ffa_rxtx_unmap (); free_pages:if (drv_info->tx_buffer)free_pages_exact (drv_info->tx_buffer, rxtx_bufsz);
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ static void __exit ffa_exit(void) {ffa_notifications_cleanup ();ffa_partitions_cleanup (); -ffa_rxtx_unmap (drv_info->vm_id); +ffa_rxtx_unmap ();free_pages_exact (drv_info->tx_buffer, drv_info->rxtx_bufsz);free_pages_exact (drv_info->rx_buffer, drv_info->rxtx_bufsz);kfree (drv_info);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 379/460 firmware: arm_scpi: Fix device_node reference leak in probe path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 879c001afbac3df94160334fe5117c0c83b2cf48 ]
A device_node reference obtained from the device tree is not released on all error paths in the arm_scpi probe path. Specifically, a node returned by of_parse_phandle() could be leaked when the probe failed after the node was acquired. The probe function returns early and the shmem reference is not released.
Use __free(device_node) scope-based cleanup to automatically release the reference when the variable goes out of scope.
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/firmware/arm_scpi.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/arm_scpi.c +3 -2
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <linux/bitmap.h> #include <linux/bitfield.h> +#include <linux/cleanup.h> #include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/export.h>
@@ -940,13 +941,13 @@ static int scpi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)int idx = scpi_drvinfo->num_chans;struct scpi_chan *pchan = scpi_drvinfo->channels + idx;struct mbox_client *cl = &pchan->cl; -struct device_node *shmem =of_parse_phandle (np,"shmem" , idx); + struct device_node *shmem __free(device_node) = +of_parse_phandle (np,"shmem" , idx);if (!of_match_node (shmem_of_match, shmem))return -ENXIO ; ret =of_address_to_resource (shmem,0 , &res); -of_node_put (shmem);if (ret) {dev_err (dev,"failed to get SCPI payload mem resource\n" );return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 380/460 Bluetooth: LE L2CAP: Disconnect if received packets SDU exceeds IMTU
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Eggers <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e1d9a66889867c232657a9b6f25d451d7c3ab96f ]
Core 6.0, Vol 3, Part A, 3.4.3:
"If the SDU length field value exceeds the receiver's MTU, the receiver shall disconnect the channel..."
This fixes L2CAP/LE/CFC/BV-26-C (running together with 'l2test -r -P 0x0027 -V le_public -I 100').
--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +7 -3
@@ -6619,8 +6619,10 @@ static int l2cap_ecred_data_rcv(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)return -ENOBUFS ; } -if (chan->imtu < skb->len) { -BT_ERR ("Too big LE L2CAP PDU" ); +if (skb->len > chan->imtu) { +BT_ERR ("Too big LE L2CAP PDU: len %u > %u" , skb->len, + chan->imtu); +l2cap_send_disconn_req (chan,ECONNRESET );return -ENOBUFS ; }
@@ -6646,7 +6648,9 @@ static int l2cap_ecred_data_rcv(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) sdu_len, skb->len, chan->imtu);if (sdu_len > chan->imtu) { -BT_ERR ("Too big LE L2CAP SDU length received" ); +BT_ERR ("Too big LE L2CAP SDU length: len %u > %u" , + skb->len, sdu_len); +l2cap_send_disconn_req (chan,ECONNRESET ); err = -EMSGSIZE ; goto failed; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 381/460 Bluetooth: LE L2CAP: Disconnect if sum of payload sizes exceed SDU
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Eggers <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b6a2bf43aa37670432843bc73ae2a6288ba4d6f8 ]
Core 6.0, Vol 3, Part A, 3.4.3:
"... If the sum of the payload sizes for the K-frames exceeds the specified SDU length, the receiver shall disconnect the channel."
This fixes L2CAP/LE/CFC/BV-27-C (running together with 'l2test -r -P 0x0027 -V le_public').
--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +1 -0
@@ -6686,6 +6686,7 @@ static int l2cap_ecred_data_rcv(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)if (chan->sdu->len + skb->len > chan->sdu_len) {BT_ERR ("Too much LE L2CAP data received" ); +l2cap_send_disconn_req (chan,ECONNRESET ); err = -EINVAL ; goto failed; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 382/460 Bluetooth: SMP: make SM/PER/KDU/BI-04-C happy
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Eggers <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0e4d4dcc1a6e82cc6f9abf32193558efa7e1613d ]
The last test step ("Test with Invalid public key X and Y, all set to 0") expects to get an "DHKEY check failed" instead of "unspecified".
--- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/smp.c +1 -1
@@ -2743,7 +2743,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)if (!test_bit (SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY , &smp->flags) && !crypto_memneq (key, smp->local_pk,64 )) {bt_dev_err (hdev,"Remote and local public keys are identical" ); -return SMP_UNSPECIFIED ; +return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED ; }memcpy (smp->remote_pk, key,64 );
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 383/460 Bluetooth: ISO: Fix defer tests being unstable
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 62bcaa6b351b6dc400f6c6b83762001fd9f5c12d ]
iso-tester defer tests seem to fail with hci_conn_hash_lookup_cig being unable to resolve a cig in set_cig_params_sync due a race where it is run immediatelly before hci_bind_cis is able to set the QoS settings into the hci_conn object.
So this moves the assigning of the QoS settings to be done directly by hci_le_set_cig_params to prevent that from happening again.
--- net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +2 -2
@@ -1868,6 +1868,8 @@ static bool hci_le_set_cig_params(struct hci_conn *conn, struct bt_iso_qos *qos)return false; done: + conn->iso_qos = *qos; +if (hci_cmd_sync_queue (hdev, set_cig_params_sync,UINT_PTR (qos->ucast.cig),NULL ) <0 )return false;
@@ -1934,8 +1936,6 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_bind_cis(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, }hci_conn_hold (cis); - - cis->iso_qos = *qos; cis->state =BT_BOUND ;return cis;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 384/460 Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix hci_le_create_conn_sync
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Grzeschik <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2cabe7ff1001b7a197009cf50ba71701f9cbd354 ]
While introducing hci_le_create_conn_sync the functionality of hci_connect_le was ported to hci_le_create_conn_sync including the disable of the scan before starting the connection.
When this code was run non synchronously the immediate call that was setting the flag HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED had an impact. Since the completion handler for the LE_SCAN_DISABLE was not immediately called. In the completion handler of the LE_SCAN_DISABLE event, this flag is checked to set the state of the hdev to DISCOVERY_STOPPED.
With the synchronised approach the later setting of the HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED flag has not the same effect. The completion handler would immediately fire in the LE_SCAN_DISABLE call, check for the flag, which is then not yet set and do nothing.
To fix this issue and make the function call work as before, we move the setting of the flag HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED before disabling the scan.
--- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +1 -1
@@ -6552,8 +6552,8 @@ static int hci_le_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data)* state. */ if (hci_dev_test_flag (hdev,HCI_LE_SCAN )) { -hci_scan_disable_sync (hdev);hci_dev_set_flag (hdev,HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED ); +hci_scan_disable_sync (hdev); }/* Update random address, but set require_privacy to false so
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 385/460 Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix list corruption and UAF in command complete handlers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wang Tao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 17f89341cb4281d1da0e2fb0de5406ab7c4e25ef ]
Commit 302a1f674c00 ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible UAFs") introduced mgmt_pending_valid(), which not only validates the pending command but also unlinks it from the pending list if it is valid. This change in semantics requires updates to several completion handlers to avoid list corruption and memory safety issues.
This patch addresses two left-over issues from the aforementioned rework:
1. In mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete(), mgmt_pending_remove() is replaced with mgmt_pending_free() in the success path. Since mgmt_pending_valid() already unlinks the command at the beginning of the function, calling mgmt_pending_remove() leads to a double list_del() and subsequent list corruption/kernel panic.
2. In set_mesh_complete(), the use of mgmt_pending_foreach() in the error path is removed. Since the current command is already unlinked by mgmt_pending_valid(), this foreach loop would incorrectly target other pending mesh commands, potentially freeing them while they are still being processed concurrently (leading to UAFs). The redundant mgmt_cmd_status() is also simplified to use cmd->opcode directly.
--- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +2 -5
@@ -2172,10 +2172,7 @@ static void set_mesh_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, int err) sk = cmd->sk;if (status) { -mgmt_cmd_status (cmd->sk, hdev->id,MGMT_OP_SET_MESH_RECEIVER , - status); -mgmt_pending_foreach (MGMT_OP_SET_MESH_RECEIVER , hdev, true, - cmd_status_rsp, &status); +mgmt_cmd_status (cmd->sk, hdev->id, cmd->opcode, status); goto done; }
@@ -5354,7 +5351,7 @@ static void mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev,mgmt_cmd_complete (cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode,mgmt_status (status), &rp,sizeof (rp)); -mgmt_pending_remove (cmd); +mgmt_pending_free (cmd);hci_dev_unlock (hdev); bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "add monitor %d complete, status %d",
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 386/460 Bluetooth: HIDP: Fix possible UAF
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dbf666e4fc9bdd975a61bf682b3f75cb0145eedd ]
This fixes the following trace caused by not dropping l2cap_conn reference when user->remove callback is called:
[ 97.809249] l2cap_conn_free: freeing conn ffff88810a171c00 [ 97.809907] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1419 Comm: repro_standalon Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-dirty #14 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 97.809935] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 97.809947] Call Trace: [ 97.809954] <TASK> [ 97.809961] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) [ 97.809990] l2cap_conn_free (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1808) [ 97.810017] l2cap_conn_del (./include/linux/kref.h:66 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1821 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1798) [ 97.810055] l2cap_disconn_cfm (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7347 (discriminator 1) net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7340 (discriminator 1)) [ 97.810086] ? __pfx_l2cap_disconn_cfm (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7341) [ 97.810117] hci_conn_hash_flush (./include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2152 (discriminator 2) net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2644 (discriminator 2)) [ 97.810148] hci_dev_close_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5360) [ 97.810180] ? __pfx_hci_dev_close_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5285) [ 97.810212] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810242] ? up_write (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:87 (discriminator 5) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2852 (discriminator 5) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:268 (discriminator 5) ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:3391 (discriminator 5) kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1385 (discriminator 5) kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1643 (discriminator 5)) [ 97.810267] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810290] ? rcu_is_watching (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:23 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:457 ./include/linux/context_tracking.h:128 kernel/rcu/tree.c:752) [ 97.810320] hci_unregister_dev (net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:504 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2716) [ 97.810346] vhci_release (drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:691) [ 97.810375] ? __pfx_vhci_release (drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:678) [ 97.810404] __fput (fs/file_table.c:470) [ 97.810430] task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:235) [ 97.810451] ? __pfx_task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:201) [ 97.810472] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810495] ? do_raw_spin_unlock (./include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:128 (discriminator 5) kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:142 (discriminator 5)) [ 97.810527] do_exit (kernel/exit.c:972) [ 97.810547] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810574] ? __pfx_do_exit (kernel/exit.c:897) [ 97.810594] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:470 (discriminator 6) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870 (discriminator 6) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 (discriminator 6)) [ 97.810616] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810639] ? do_raw_spin_lock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:95 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:118 (discriminator 4)) [ 97.810664] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810688] ? find_held_lock (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5350 (discriminator 1)) [ 97.810721] do_group_exit (kernel/exit.c:1093) [ 97.810745] get_signal (kernel/signal.c:3007 (discriminator 1)) [ 97.810772] ? security_file_permission (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:37 security/security.c:2366) [ 97.810803] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810826] ? vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:555) [ 97.810854] ? __pfx_get_signal (kernel/signal.c:2800) [ 97.810880] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810905] ? __pfx_vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:555) [ 97.810932] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.810960] arch_do_signal_or_restart (arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 (discriminator 1)) [ 97.810990] ? __pfx_arch_do_signal_or_restart (arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:334) [ 97.811021] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.811055] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.811078] ? ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:707) [ 97.811106] ? __pfx_ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:707) [ 97.811137] exit_to_user_mode_loop (kernel/entry/common.c:66 kernel/entry/common.c:98) [ 97.811169] ? rcu_is_watching (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:23 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:457 ./include/linux/context_tracking.h:128 kernel/rcu/tree.c:752) [ 97.811192] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.811215] ? trace_hardirqs_off (./include/trace/events/preemptirq.h:36 (discriminator 33) kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:95 (discriminator 33) kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:90 (discriminator 33)) [ 97.811240] do_syscall_64 (./include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:226 ./include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:256 ./include/linux/entry-common.h:325 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100) [ 97.811268] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 97.811292] ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1480 (discriminator 3) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1527 (discriminator 3)) [ 97.811318] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) [ 97.811338] RIP: 0033:0x445cfe [ 97.811352] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x445cd4.
Code starting with the faulting instruction
===========================================
[ 97.811360] RSP: 002b:00007f65c41c6dc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 97.811378] RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00007f65c41c76c0 RCX: 0000000000445cfe [ 97.811391] RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 00007f65c41c6e40 RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 97.811403] RBP: 00007f65c41c7250 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 97.811415] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffffe8 [ 97.811428] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff780a8c00 R15: 00007f65c41c76c0 [ 97.811453] </TASK> [ 98.402453] ================================================================== [ 98.403560] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:199 kernel/locking/mutex.c:694 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776) [ 98.404541] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888113ee40a8 by task khidpd_00050004/1430 [ 98.405361] [ 98.405563] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1430 Comm: khidpd_00050004 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-dirty #14 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 98.405588] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 98.405600] Call Trace: [ 98.405607] <TASK> [ 98.405614] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) [ 98.405641] print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482) [ 98.405667] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.405691] ? __virt_addr_valid (arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:55) [ 98.405724] ? __mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:199 kernel/locking/mutex.c:694 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776) [ 98.405748] kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:597) [ 98.405778] ? __mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:199 kernel/locking/mutex.c:694 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776) [ 98.405807] __mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:199 kernel/locking/mutex.c:694 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776) [ 98.405832] ? do_raw_spin_lock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:95 (discriminator 4) kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:118 (discriminator 4)) [ 98.405859] ? l2cap_unregister_user (./include/linux/list.h:381 (discriminator 2) net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1723 (discriminator 2)) [ 98.405888] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:114) [ 98.405915] ? __pfx___mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:775) [ 98.405939] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.405963] ? lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:470 (discriminator 6) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870 (discriminator 6) kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 (discriminator 6)) [ 98.405984] ? find_held_lock (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5350 (discriminator 1)) [ 98.406015] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.406038] ? lock_release (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5536 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5889 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5875) [ 98.406061] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.406085] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:42 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:119 ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:159 ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:178 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194) [ 98.406107] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.406130] ? __timer_delete_sync (kernel/time/timer.c:1592) [ 98.406158] ? l2cap_unregister_user (./include/linux/list.h:381 (discriminator 2) net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1723 (discriminator 2)) [ 98.406186] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.406210] l2cap_unregister_user (./include/linux/list.h:381 (discriminator 2) net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1723 (discriminator 2)) [ 98.406263] hidp_session_thread (./include/linux/instrumented.h:112 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:400 ./include/linux/refcount.h:389 ./include/linux/refcount.h:432 ./include/linux/refcount.h:450 ./include/linux/kref.h:64 net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:996 net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1305) [ 98.406293] ? __pfx_hidp_session_thread (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1264) [ 98.406323] ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433) [ 98.406340] ? __pfx_hidp_session_wake_function (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1251) [ 98.406370] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.406393] ? find_held_lock (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5350 (discriminator 1)) [ 98.406424] ? __pfx_hidp_session_wake_function (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1251) [ 98.406453] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.406476] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:79 (discriminator 1)) [ 98.406499] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.406523] ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433) [ 98.406539] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.406565] ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433) [ 98.406581] ? __pfx_hidp_session_thread (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1264) [ 98.406610] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:467) [ 98.406627] ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412) [ 98.406645] ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164) [ 98.406674] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153) [ 98.406704] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.406728] ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412) [ 98.406747] ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:258) [ 98.406774] </TASK> [ 98.406780] [ 98.433693] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 98.434405] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888113ee7c40 pfn:0x113ee4 [ 98.435557] flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2) [ 98.436198] raw: 0200000000000000 ffffea0004244308 ffff8881f6f3ebc0 0000000000000000 [ 98.437195] raw: ffff888113ee7c40 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 98.438115] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 98.438951] [ 98.439211] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 98.439871] ffff888113ee3f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 98.440714] ffff888113ee4000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 98.441580] >ffff888113ee4080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 98.442458] ^ [ 98.443011] ffff888113ee4100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 98.443889] ffff888113ee4180: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 98.444768] ================================================================== [ 98.445719] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 98.448074] l2cap_conn_free: freeing conn ffff88810c22b400 [ 98.450012] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1430 Comm: khidpd_00050004 Tainted: G B 7.0.0-rc1-dirty #14 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 98.450040] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE [ 98.450047] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 98.450059] Call Trace: [ 98.450065] <TASK> [ 98.450071] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) [ 98.450099] l2cap_conn_free (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1808) [ 98.450125] l2cap_conn_put (net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1822) [ 98.450154] session_free (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:990) [ 98.450181] hidp_session_thread (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1307) [ 98.450213] ? __pfx_hidp_session_thread (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1264) [ 98.450271] ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433) [ 98.450293] ? __pfx_hidp_session_wake_function (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1251) [ 98.450339] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.450368] ? find_held_lock (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5350 (discriminator 1)) [ 98.450406] ? __pfx_hidp_session_wake_function (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1251) [ 98.450442] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.450471] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:79 (discriminator 1)) [ 98.450499] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.450528] ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433) [ 98.450547] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.450578] ? kthread (kernel/kthread.c:433) [ 98.450598] ? __pfx_hidp_session_thread (net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c:1264) [ 98.450637] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:467) [ 98.450657] ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412) [ 98.450680] ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164) [ 98.450715] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153) [ 98.450752] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 98.450782] ? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412) [ 98.450804] ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:258) [ 98.450836] </TASK>
--- net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c +14 -2
@@ -986,7 +986,8 @@ static void session_free(struct kref *ref)skb_queue_purge (&session->intr_transmit);fput (session->intr_sock->file);fput (session->ctrl_sock->file); -l2cap_conn_put (session->conn); +if (session->conn) +l2cap_conn_put (session->conn);kfree (session); }
@@ -1164,6 +1165,15 @@ static void hidp_session_remove(struct l2cap_conn *conn,down_write (&hidp_session_sem); +/* Drop L2CAP reference immediately to indicate that +* l2cap_unregister_user() shall not be called as it is already +* considered removed. +*/ +if (session->conn) { +l2cap_conn_put (session->conn); + session->conn =NULL ; + } +hidp_session_terminate (session);cancel_work_sync (&session->dev_init);
@@ -1301,7 +1311,9 @@ static int hidp_session_thread(void *arg)* Instead, this call has the same semantics as if user-space tried to * delete the session. */ -l2cap_unregister_user (session->conn, &session->user); +if (session->conn) +l2cap_unregister_user (session->conn, &session->user); +hidp_session_put (session);module_put_and_kthread_exit (0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 387/460 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_unregister_user
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shaurya Rane <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 752a6c9596dd25efd6978a73ff21f3b592668f4a ]
After commit ab4eedb790ca ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix corrupted list in hci_chan_del"), l2cap_conn_del() uses conn->lock to protect access to conn->users. However, l2cap_register_user() and l2cap_unregister_user() don't use conn->lock, creating a race condition where these functions can access conn->users and conn->hchan concurrently with l2cap_conn_del().
This can lead to use-after-free and list corruption bugs, as reported by syzbot.
Fix this by changing l2cap_register_user() and l2cap_unregister_user() to use conn->lock instead of hci_dev_lock(), ensuring consistent locking for the l2cap_conn structure.
--- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 20 ++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +8 -12
@@ -1686,17 +1686,15 @@ static void l2cap_info_timeout(struct work_struct *work)int l2cap_register_user (struct l2cap_conn *conn,struct l2cap_user *user) { -struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;int ret;/* We need to check whether l2cap_conn is registered. If it is not, we -* must not register the l2cap_user. l2cap_conn_del() is unregisters -* l2cap_conn objects, but doesn't provide its own locking. Instead, it -* relies on the parent hci_conn object to be locked. This itself relies -* on the hci_dev object to be locked. So we must lock the hci device -* here, too. */ +* must not register the l2cap_user. l2cap_conn_del() unregisters +* l2cap_conn objects under conn->lock, and we use the same lock here +* to protect access to conn->users and conn->hchan. +*/ -hci_dev_lock (hdev); +mutex_lock (&conn->lock);if (!list_empty (&user->list)) { ret = -EINVAL ;
@@ -1717,16 +1715,14 @@ int l2cap_register_user(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_user *user) ret =0 ; out_unlock: -hci_dev_unlock (hdev); +mutex_unlock (&conn->lock);return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (l2cap_register_user);void l2cap_unregister_user (struct l2cap_conn *conn,struct l2cap_user *user) { -struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; - -hci_dev_lock (hdev); +mutex_lock (&conn->lock);if (list_empty (&user->list)) goto out_unlock;
@@ -1735,7 +1731,7 @@ void l2cap_unregister_user(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_user *user) user->remove (conn, user); out_unlock: -hci_dev_unlock (hdev); +mutex_unlock (&conn->lock); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (l2cap_unregister_user);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 388/460 Bluetooth: qca: fix ROM version reading on WCN3998 chips
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99b2c531e0e797119ae1b9195a8764ee98b00e65 ]
WCN3998 uses a bit different format for rom version:
[ 5.479978] Bluetooth: hci0: setting up wcn399x [ 5.633763] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Product ID :0x0000000a [ 5.645350] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA SOC Version :0x40010224 [ 5.650906] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA ROM Version :0x00001001 [ 5.665173] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Patch Version:0x00006699 [ 5.679356] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA controller version 0x02241001 [ 5.691109] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Downloading qca/crbtfw21.tlv [ 6.680102] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA Downloading qca/crnv21.bin [ 6.842948] Bluetooth: hci0: QCA setup on UART is completed
--- drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c +2 -0
@@ -804,6 +804,8 @@ int qca_uart_setup(struct hci_dev *hdev, uint8_t baudrate,*/ if (soc_type ==QCA_WCN3988 ) rom_ver = ((soc_ver &0x00000f00 ) >>0x05 ) | (soc_ver &0x0000000f ); +else if (soc_type ==QCA_WCN3998 ) + rom_ver = ((soc_ver &0x0000f000 ) >>0x07 ) | (soc_ver &0x0000000f );else rom_ver = ((soc_ver &0x00000f00 ) >>0x04 ) | (soc_ver &0x0000000f );
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 389/460 bridge: cfm: Fix race condition in peer_mep deletion
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hyunwoo Kim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3715a00855316066cdda69d43648336367422127 ]
When a peer MEP is being deleted, cancel_delayed_work_sync() is called on ccm_rx_dwork before freeing. However, br_cfm_frame_rx() runs in softirq context under rcu_read_lock (without RTNL) and can re-schedule ccm_rx_dwork via ccm_rx_timer_start() between cancel_delayed_work_sync() returning and kfree_rcu() being called.
The following is a simple race scenario:
cpu0 cpu1
mep_delete_implementation()
cancel_delayed_work_sync(ccm_rx_dwork);
br_cfm_frame_rx()
// peer_mep still in hlist
if (peer_mep->ccm_defect)
ccm_rx_timer_start()
queue_delayed_work(ccm_rx_dwork)
hlist_del_rcu(&peer_mep->head);
kfree_rcu(peer_mep, rcu);
ccm_rx_work_expired()
// on freed peer_mepTo prevent this, cancel_delayed_work_sync() is replaced with disable_delayed_work_sync() in both peer MEP deletion paths, so that subsequent queue_delayed_work() calls from br_cfm_frame_rx() are silently rejected.
The cc_peer_disable() helper retains cancel_delayed_work_sync() because it is also used for the CC enable/disable toggle path where the work must remain re-schedulable.
--- net/bridge/br_cfm.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_cfm.c +2 -2
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static void mep_delete_implementation(struct net_bridge *br,/* Empty and free peer MEP list */ hlist_for_each_entry_safe (peer_mep, n_store, &mep->peer_mep_list, head) { -cancel_delayed_work_sync (&peer_mep->ccm_rx_dwork); +disable_delayed_work_sync (&peer_mep->ccm_rx_dwork);hlist_del_rcu (&peer_mep->head);kfree_rcu (peer_mep, rcu); }
@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ int br_cfm_cc_peer_mep_remove(struct net_bridge *br, const u32 instance,return -ENOENT ; } -cc_peer_disable (peer_mep); +disable_delayed_work_sync (&peer_mep->ccm_rx_dwork);hlist_del_rcu (&peer_mep->head);kfree_rcu (peer_mep, rcu);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 390/460 net/rose: fix NULL pointer dereference in rose_transmit_link on reconnect
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e1f0a18c9564cdb16523c802e2c6fe5874e3d944 ]
syzkaller reported a bug [1], and the reproducer is available at [2].
ROSE sockets use four sk->sk_state values: TCP_CLOSE, TCP_LISTEN, TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_ESTABLISHED. rose_connect() already rejects calls for TCP_ESTABLISHED (-EISCONN) and TCP_CLOSE with SS_CONNECTING (-ECONNREFUSED), but lacks a check for TCP_SYN_SENT.
When rose_connect() is called a second time while the first connection attempt is still in progress (TCP_SYN_SENT), it overwrites rose->neighbour via rose_get_neigh(). If that returns NULL, the socket is left with rose->state == ROSE_STATE_1 but rose->neighbour == NULL. When the socket is subsequently closed, rose_release() sees ROSE_STATE_1 and calls rose_write_internal() -> rose_transmit_link(skb, NULL), causing a NULL pointer dereference.
Per connect(2), a second connect() while a connection is already in progress should return -EALREADY. Add this missing check for TCP_SYN_SENT to complete the state validation in rose_connect().
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d00f90e0af54102fb271
[2] https://gist.github.com/mrpre/9e6779e0d13e2c66779b1653fef80516
--- net/rose/af_rose.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
net/rose/af_rose.c +5 -0
@@ -810,6 +810,11 @@ static int rose_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_le goto out_release; } +if (sk->sk_state ==TCP_SYN_SENT ) { + err = -EALREADY ; + goto out_release; + } + sk->sk_state =TCP_CLOSE ; sock->state =SS_UNCONNECTED ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 391/460 mpls: add missing unregister_netdevice_notifier to mpls_init
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99600f79b28c83c68bae199a3d8e95049a758308 ]
If mpls_init() fails after registering mpls_dev_notifier, it never gets removed. Add the missing unregister_netdevice_notifier() call to the error handling path.
--- net/mpls/af_mpls.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/mpls/af_mpls.c +1 -0
@@ -2774,6 +2774,7 @@ static int __init mpls_init(void) out_unregister_rtnl_af:rtnl_af_unregister (&mpls_af_ops);dev_remove_pack (&mpls_packet_type); +unregister_netdevice_notifier (&mpls_dev_notifier); out_unregister_pernet:unregister_pernet_subsys (&mpls_net_ops); goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 392/460 netfilter: ctnetlink: remove refcounting in expectation dumpers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1492e3dcb2be3aa46d1963da96aa9593e4e4db5a ]
Same pattern as previous patch: do not keep the expectation object alive via refcount, only store a cookie value and then use that as the skip hint for dump resumption.
AFAICS this has the same issue as the one resolved in the conntrack dumper, when we do
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&exp->use))
to increment the refcount, there is a chance that exp == last, which causes a double-increment of the refcount and subsequent memory leak.
Stable-dep-of: 5cb81eeda909 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: fix use-after-free in ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct()")
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 41 ++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +17 -24
@@ -3146,23 +3146,27 @@ ctnetlink_expect_event(unsigned int events, const struct nf_exp_event *item)return 0 ; }#endif -static int ctnetlink_exp_done (struct netlink_callback *cb) + +static unsigned long ctnetlink_exp_id (const struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp) { -if (cb->args[1 ]) -nf_ct_expect_put ((struct nf_conntrack_expect *)cb->args[1 ]); -return 0 ; +unsigned long id = (unsigned long )exp; + + id +=nf_ct_get_id (exp->master); + id += exp->class; + +return id ? id :1 ; }static int ctnetlink_exp_dump_table (struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlink_callback *cb) {struct net *net =sock_net (skb->sk); -struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, *last;struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg =nlmsg_data (cb->nlh);u_int8_t l3proto = nfmsg->nfgen_family; +unsigned long last_id = cb->args[1 ]; +struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;rcu_read_lock (); - last = (struct nf_conntrack_expect *)cb->args[1 ];for (; cb->args[0 ] < nf_ct_expect_hsize; cb->args[0 ]++) { restart: hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(exp, &nf_ct_expect_hash[cb->args[0]],
@@ -3174,7 +3178,7 @@ ctnetlink_exp_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)continue ;if (cb->args[1 ]) { -if (exp != last) +if (ctnetlink_exp_id (exp) != last_id)continue ; cb->args[1 ] =0 ; }
@@ -3183,9 +3187,7 @@ ctnetlink_exp_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_NEW, exp) < 0) { -if (!refcount_inc_not_zero (&exp->use)) -continue ; - cb->args[1 ] = (unsigned long )exp; + cb->args[1 ] =ctnetlink_exp_id (exp); goto out; } }
@@ -3196,32 +3198,30 @@ ctnetlink_exp_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) } out:rcu_read_unlock (); -if (last) -nf_ct_expect_put (last); -return skb->len; }static int ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table (struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlink_callback *cb) { -struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, *last;struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg =nlmsg_data (cb->nlh);struct nf_conn *ct = cb->data;struct nf_conn_help *help =nfct_help (ct);u_int8_t l3proto = nfmsg->nfgen_family; +unsigned long last_id = cb->args[1 ]; +struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;if (cb->args[0 ])return 0 ;rcu_read_lock (); - last = (struct nf_conntrack_expect *)cb->args[1 ]; + restart:hlist_for_each_entry_rcu (exp, &help->expectations, lnode) {if (l3proto && exp->tuple.src.l3num != l3proto)continue ;if (cb->args[1 ]) { -if (exp != last) +if (ctnetlink_exp_id (exp) != last_id)continue ; cb->args[1 ] =0 ; }
@@ -3229,9 +3229,7 @@ ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_NEW, exp) < 0) { -if (!refcount_inc_not_zero (&exp->use)) -continue ; - cb->args[1 ] = (unsigned long )exp; + cb->args[1 ] =ctnetlink_exp_id (exp); goto out; } }
@@ -3242,9 +3240,6 @@ ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) cb->args[0 ] =1 ; out:rcu_read_unlock (); -if (last) -nf_ct_expect_put (last); -return skb->len; }
@@ -3263,7 +3258,6 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;struct netlink_dump_control c = { .dump = ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table, - .done = ctnetlink_exp_done, }; err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_EXPECT_MASTER,
@@ -3313,7 +3307,6 @@ static int ctnetlink_get_expect(struct sk_buff *skb,else {struct netlink_dump_control c = { .dump = ctnetlink_exp_dump_table, - .done = ctnetlink_exp_done, };return netlink_dump_start (info->sk, skb, info->nlh, &c); }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 393/460 netfilter: ctnetlink: fix use-after-free in ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hyunwoo Kim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5cb81eeda909dbb2def209dd10636b51549a3f8a ]
ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct() stores a conntrack pointer in cb->data for the netlink dump callback ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(), but drops the conntrack reference immediately after netlink_dump_start(). When the dump spans multiple rounds, the second recvmsg() triggers the dump callback which dereferences the now-freed conntrack via nfct_help(ct), leading to a use-after-free on ct->ext.
The bug is that the netlink_dump_control has no .start or .done callbacks to manage the conntrack reference across dump rounds. Other dump functions in the same file (e.g. ctnetlink_get_conntrack) properly use .start/.done callbacks for this purpose.
Fix this by adding .start and .done callbacks that hold and release the conntrack reference for the duration of the dump, and move the nfct_help() call after the cb->args[0] early-return check in the dump callback to avoid dereferencing ct->ext unnecessarily.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table+0x4f/0x2e0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810597ebf0 by task ctnetlink_poc/133 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 133 Comm: ctnetlink_poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2+ #3 PREEMPTLAZY Call Trace: <TASK> ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table+0x4f/0x2e0 netlink_dump+0x333/0x880 netlink_recvmsg+0x3e2/0x4b0 ? aa_sk_perm+0x184/0x450 sock_recvmsg+0xde/0xf0 Allocated by task 133: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x134/0x440 __nf_conntrack_alloc+0xa8/0x2b0 ctnetlink_create_conntrack+0xa1/0x900 ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x3cf/0x7d0 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x48e/0x510 netlink_rcv_skb+0xc9/0x1f0 nfnetlink_rcv+0xdb/0x220 netlink_unicast+0x3ec/0x590 netlink_sendmsg+0x397/0x690 __sys_sendmsg+0xf4/0x180 Freed by task 0: slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0xad/0x1e0 rcu_core+0x5c3/0x9c0
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +25 -1
@@ -3206,7 +3206,7 @@ ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) {struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg =nlmsg_data (cb->nlh);struct nf_conn *ct = cb->data; -struct nf_conn_help *help =nfct_help (ct); +struct nf_conn_help *help;u_int8_t l3proto = nfmsg->nfgen_family;unsigned long last_id = cb->args[1 ];struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp;
@@ -3214,6 +3214,10 @@ ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)if (cb->args[0 ])return 0 ; + help =nfct_help (ct); +if (!help) +return 0 ; +rcu_read_lock (); restart:
@@ -3243,6 +3247,24 @@ ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)return skb->len; } +static int ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct_start (struct netlink_callback *cb) +{ +struct nf_conn *ct = cb->data; + +if (!refcount_inc_not_zero (&ct->ct_general.use)) +return -ENOENT ; +return 0 ; +} + +static int ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct_done (struct netlink_callback *cb) +{ +struct nf_conn *ct = cb->data; + +if (ct) +nf_ct_put (ct); +return 0 ; +} + static int ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
@@ -3258,6 +3280,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;struct netlink_dump_control c = { .dump = ctnetlink_exp_ct_dump_table, + .start = ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct_start, + .done = ctnetlink_dump_exp_ct_done, }; err = ctnetlink_parse_tuple(cda, &tuple, CTA_EXPECT_MASTER,
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 394/460 netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix Content-Length u32 truncation in sip_help_tcp()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lukas Johannes Möller <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fbce58e719a17aa215c724473fd5baaa4a8dc57c ]
sip_help_tcp() parses the SIP Content-Length header with simple_strtoul(), which returns unsigned long, but stores the result in unsigned int clen. On 64-bit systems, values exceeding UINT_MAX are silently truncated before computing the SIP message boundary.
For example, Content-Length 4294967328 (2^32 + 32) is truncated to 32, causing the parser to miscalculate where the current message ends. The loop then treats trailing data in the TCP segment as a second SIP message and processes it through the SDP parser.
Fix this by changing clen to unsigned long to match the return type of simple_strtoul(), and reject Content-Length values that exceed the remaining TCP payload length.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c +5 -1
@@ -1534,11 +1534,12 @@ static int sip_help_tcp(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff, {struct tcphdr *th, _tcph;unsigned int dataoff, datalen; -unsigned int matchoff, matchlen, clen; +unsigned int matchoff, matchlen;unsigned int msglen, origlen;const char *dptr, *end;s16 diff, tdiff =0 ;int ret =NF_ACCEPT ; +unsigned long clen;bool term; if (ctinfo != IP_CT_ESTABLISHED &&
@@ -1573,6 +1574,9 @@ static int sip_help_tcp(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff,if (dptr + matchoff == end)break ; +if (clen > datalen) +break ; + term = false;for (; end +strlen ("\r\n\r\n" ) <= dptr + datalen; end++) { if (end[0] == '\r' && end[1] == '\n' &&
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 395/460 netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_int() CONS case
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jenny Guanni Qu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1e3a3593162c96e8a8de48b1e14f60c3b57fca8a ]
In decode_int(), the CONS case calls get_bits(bs, 2) to read a length value, then calls get_uint(bs, len) without checking that len bytes remain in the buffer. The existing boundary check only validates the 2 bits for get_bits(), not the subsequent 1-4 bytes that get_uint() reads. This allows a malformed H.323/RAS packet to cause a 1-4 byte slab-out-of-bounds read.
Add a boundary check for len bytes after get_bits() and before get_uint().
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c +2 -0
@@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ static int decode_int(struct bitstr *bs, const struct field_t *f,if (nf_h323_error_boundary (bs,0 ,2 ))return H323_ERROR_BOUND ; len =get_bits (bs,2 ) +1 ; +if (nf_h323_error_boundary (bs, len,0 )) +return H323_ERROR_BOUND ;BYTE_ALIGN (bs);if (base && (f->attr &DECODE )) {/* timeToLive */ unsigned int v =get_uint (bs, len) + f->lb;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 396/460 nf_tables: nft_dynset: fix possible stateful expression memleak in error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0548a13b5a145b16e4da0628b5936baf35f51b43 ]
If cloning the second stateful expression in the element via GFP_ATOMIC fails, then the first stateful expression remains in place without being released.
unreferenced object (percpu) 0x607b97e9cab8 (size 16):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294931867 hex dump (first 16 bytes on cpu 3):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 backtrace (crc 0):
pcpu_alloc_noprof+0x453/0xd80 nft_counter_clone+0x9c/0x190 [nf_tables] nft_expr_clone+0x8f/0x1b0 [nf_tables] nft_dynset_new+0x2cb/0x5f0 [nf_tables] nft_rhash_update+0x236/0x11c0 [nf_tables] nft_dynset_eval+0x11f/0x670 [nf_tables] nft_do_chain+0x253/0x1700 [nf_tables] nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x18d/0x270 [nf_tables] nf_hook_slow+0xaa/0x1e0 ip_local_deliver+0x209/0x330
--- include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 2 ++ net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 4 ++-- net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c | 10 +++++++++- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h +2 -0
@@ -873,6 +873,8 @@ struct nft_elem_priv *nft_set_elem_init(const struct nft_set *set, u64 timeout, u64 expiration, gfp_t gfp);int nft_set_elem_expr_clone (const struct nft_ctx *ctx,struct nft_set *set,struct nft_expr *expr_array[]); +void nft_set_elem_expr_destroy (const struct nft_ctx *ctx, +struct nft_set_elem_expr *elem_expr);void nft_set_elem_destroy (const struct nft_set *set,const struct nft_elem_priv *elem_priv,bool destroy_expr);
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +2 -2
@@ -6637,8 +6637,8 @@ static void __nft_set_elem_expr_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, } } -static void nft_set_elem_expr_destroy (const struct nft_ctx *ctx, -struct nft_set_elem_expr *elem_expr) +void nft_set_elem_expr_destroy (const struct nft_ctx *ctx, +struct nft_set_elem_expr *elem_expr) {struct nft_expr *expr;u32 size;
net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c +9 -1
@@ -30,18 +30,26 @@ static int nft_dynset_expr_setup(const struct nft_dynset *priv, const struct nft_set_ext *ext) {struct nft_set_elem_expr *elem_expr =nft_set_ext_expr (ext); +struct nft_ctx ctx = { + .net =read_pnet (&priv->set->net), + .family = priv->set->table->family, + };struct nft_expr *expr;int i;for (i =0 ; i < priv->num_exprs; i++) { expr =nft_setelem_expr_at (elem_expr, elem_expr->size);if (nft_expr_clone (expr, priv->expr_array[i],GFP_ATOMIC ) <0 ) -return -1 ; + goto err_out; elem_expr->size += priv->expr_array[i]->ops->size; }return 0 ; +err_out: +nft_set_elem_expr_destroy (&ctx, elem_expr); + +return -1 ; } static struct nft_elem_priv *nft_dynset_new(struct nft_set *set,
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 397/460 netfilter: nft_ct: drop pending enqueued packets on removal
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 36eae0956f659e48d5366d9b083d9417f3263ddc ]
Packets sitting in nfqueue might hold a reference to:
- templates that specify the conntrack zone, because a percpu area is used and module removal is possible.
- conntrack timeout policies and helper, where object removal leave a stale reference.
Since these objects can just go away, drop enqueued packets to avoid stale reference to them.
If there is a need for finer grain removal, this logic can be revisited to make selective packet drop upon dependencies.
--- net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +4 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.h> +#include "nf_internals.h" struct nft_ct_helper_obj {struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper4;
@@ -527,6 +528,7 @@ static void __nft_ct_set_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_ct *priv)#endif #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_ZONES case NFT_CT_ZONE : +nf_queue_nf_hook_drop (ctx->net);mutex_lock (&nft_ct_pcpu_mutex);if (--nft_ct_pcpu_template_refcnt ==0 )nft_ct_tmpl_put_pcpu ();
@@ -997,6 +999,7 @@ static void nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,struct nft_ct_timeout_obj *priv =nft_obj_data (obj);struct nf_ct_timeout *timeout = priv->timeout; +nf_queue_nf_hook_drop (ctx->net);nf_ct_untimeout (ctx->net, timeout);nf_ct_netns_put (ctx->net, ctx->family);kfree (priv->timeout);
@@ -1129,6 +1132,7 @@ static void nft_ct_helper_obj_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, {struct nft_ct_helper_obj *priv =nft_obj_data (obj); +nf_queue_nf_hook_drop (ctx->net);if (priv->helper4)nf_conntrack_helper_put (priv->helper4);if (priv->helper6)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 398/460 netfilter: xt_CT: drop pending enqueued packets on template removal
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f62a218a946b19bb59abdd5361da85fa4606b96b ]
Templates refer to objects that can go away while packets are sitting in nfqueue refer to:
- helper, this can be an issue on module removal.
- timeout policy, nfnetlink_cttimeout might remove it.
The use of templates with zone and event cache filter are safe, since this just copies values.
Flush these enqueued packets in case the template rule gets removed.
--- net/netfilter/xt_CT.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/xt_CT.c +4 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_zones.h> +#include "nf_internals.h" static inline int xt_ct_target (struct sk_buff *skb,struct nf_conn *ct) {
@@ -283,6 +284,9 @@ static void xt_ct_tg_destroy(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par,struct nf_conn_help *help;if (ct) { +if (info->helper[0 ] || info->timeout[0 ]) +nf_queue_nf_hook_drop (par->net); + help =nfct_help (ct);xt_ct_put_helper (help);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 399/460 netfilter: xt_time: use unsigned int for monthday bit shift
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jenny Guanni Qu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 00050ec08cecfda447e1209b388086d76addda3a ]
The monthday field can be up to 31, and shifting a signed integer 1 by 31 positions (1 << 31) is undefined behavior in C, as the result overflows a 32-bit signed int. Use 1U to ensure well-defined behavior for all valid monthday values.
Change the weekday shift to 1U as well for consistency.
--- net/netfilter/xt_time.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/xt_time.c +2 -2
@@ -227,13 +227,13 @@ time_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)localtime_2 (¤t_time, stamp); -if (!(info->weekdays_match & (1 << current_time.weekday))) +if (!(info->weekdays_match & (1U << current_time.weekday)))return false;/* Do not spend time computing monthday if all days match anyway */ if (info->monthdays_match !=XT_TIME_ALL_MONTHDAYS ) {localtime_3 (¤t_time, stamp); -if (!(info->monthdays_match & (1 << current_time.monthday))) +if (!(info->monthdays_match & (1U << current_time.monthday)))return false; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 400/460 netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: check for zero length in DecodeQ931()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jenny Guanni Qu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f173d0f4c0f689173f8cdac79991043a4a89bf66 ]
In DecodeQ931(), the UserUserIE code path reads a 16-bit length from the packet, then decrements it by 1 to skip the protocol discriminator byte before passing it to DecodeH323_UserInformation(). If the encoded length is 0, the decrement wraps to -1, which is then passed as a large value to the decoder, leading to an out-of-bounds read.
Add a check to ensure len is positive after the decrement.
--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_asn1.c +2 -0
@@ -924,6 +924,8 @@ int DecodeQ931(unsigned char *buf, size_t sz, Q931 *q931)break ; p++; len--; +if (len <=0 ) +break ;return DecodeH323_UserInformation (buf, p, len, &q931->UUIE); }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 401/460 net: bcmgenet: increase WoL poll timeout
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Justin Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6cfc3bc02b977f2fba5f7268e6504d1931a774f7 ]
Some systems require more than 5ms to get into WoL mode. Increase the timeout value to 50ms.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet_wol.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/genet/bcmgenet_wol.c +1 -1
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int bcmgenet_poll_wol_status(struct bcmgenet_priv *priv)while (!(bcmgenet_rbuf_readl (priv,RBUF_STATUS ) &RBUF_STATUS_WOL )) { retries++; -if (retries >5 ) { +if (retries >50 ) {netdev_crit (dev,"polling wol mode timeout\n" );return -ETIMEDOUT ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 402/460 net: mana: fix use-after-free in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() by reordering teardown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dipayaan Roy <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fa103fc8f56954a60699a29215cb713448a39e87 ]
A potential race condition exists in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() where hwc->caller_ctx is freed before the HWC's Completion Queue (CQ) and Event Queue (EQ) are destroyed. This allows an in-flight CQ interrupt handler to dereference freed memory, leading to a use-after-free or NULL pointer dereference in mana_hwc_handle_resp().
mana_smc_teardown_hwc() signals the hardware to stop but does not synchronize against IRQ handlers already executing on other CPUs. The IRQ synchronization only happens in mana_hwc_destroy_cq() via mana_gd_destroy_eq() -> mana_gd_deregister_irq(). Since this runs after kfree(hwc->caller_ctx), a concurrent mana_hwc_rx_event_handler() can dereference freed caller_ctx (and rxq->msg_buf) in mana_hwc_handle_resp().
Fix this by reordering teardown to reverse-of-creation order: destroy the TX/RX work queues and CQ/EQ before freeing hwc->caller_ctx. This ensures all in-flight interrupt handlers complete before the memory they access is freed.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/hw_channel.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/hw_channel.c +3 -3
@@ -778,9 +778,6 @@ void mana_hwc_destroy_channel(struct gdma_context *gc) gc->max_num_cqs =0 ; } -kfree (hwc->caller_ctx); - hwc->caller_ctx =NULL ; -if (hwc->txq)mana_hwc_destroy_wq (hwc, hwc->txq);
@@ -790,6 +787,9 @@ void mana_hwc_destroy_channel(struct gdma_context *gc)if (hwc->cq)mana_hwc_destroy_cq (hwc->gdma_dev->gdma_context, hwc->cq); +kfree (hwc->caller_ctx); + hwc->caller_ctx =NULL ; +mana_gd_free_res_map (&hwc->inflight_msg_res); hwc->num_inflight_msg =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 403/460 sched: idle: Consolidate the handling of two special cases
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f4c31b07b136839e0fb3026f8a5b6543e3b14d2f ]
There are two special cases in the idle loop that are handled inconsistently even though they are analogous.
The first one is when a cpuidle driver is absent and the default CPU idle time power management implemented by the architecture code is used. In that case, the scheduler tick is stopped every time before invoking default_idle_call().
The second one is when a cpuidle driver is present, but there is only one idle state in its table. In that case, the scheduler tick is never stopped at all.
Since each of these approaches has its drawbacks, reconcile them with the help of one simple heuristic. Namely, stop the tick if the CPU has been woken up by it in the previous iteration of the idle loop, or let it tick otherwise.
--- kernel/sched/idle.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/idle.c +21 -9
@@ -155,6 +155,14 @@ static int call_cpuidle(struct cpuidle_driver *drv, struct cpuidle_device *dev,return cpuidle_enter (drv, dev, next_state); } +static void idle_call_stop_or_retain_tick (bool stop_tick) +{ +if (stop_tick ||tick_nohz_tick_stopped ()) +tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick (); +else +tick_nohz_idle_retain_tick (); +} +/** * cpuidle_idle_call - the main idle function *
@@ -164,7 +172,7 @@ static int call_cpuidle(struct cpuidle_driver *drv, struct cpuidle_device *dev,* set, and it returns with polling set. If it ever stops polling, it * must clear the polling bit. */ -static void cpuidle_idle_call (void ) +static void cpuidle_idle_call (bool stop_tick) {struct cpuidle_device *dev =cpuidle_get_device ();struct cpuidle_driver *drv =cpuidle_get_cpu_driver (dev);
@@ -180,7 +188,7 @@ static void cpuidle_idle_call(void) }if (cpuidle_not_available (drv, dev)) { -tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick (); +idle_call_stop_or_retain_tick (stop_tick);default_idle_call (); goto exit_idle;
@@ -215,17 +223,19 @@ static void cpuidle_idle_call(void) next_state =cpuidle_find_deepest_state (drv, dev, max_latency_ns);call_cpuidle (drv, dev, next_state); }else if (drv->state_count >1 ) { -bool stop_tick = true; +/* +* stop_tick is expected to be true by default by cpuidle +* governors, which allows them to select idle states with +* target residency above the tick period length. +*/ + stop_tick = true;/* * Ask the cpuidle framework to choose a convenient idle state. */ next_state =cpuidle_select (drv, dev, &stop_tick); -if (stop_tick ||tick_nohz_tick_stopped ()) -tick_nohz_idle_stop_tick (); -else -tick_nohz_idle_retain_tick (); +idle_call_stop_or_retain_tick (stop_tick); entered_state =call_cpuidle (drv, dev, next_state);/*
@@ -233,7 +243,7 @@ static void cpuidle_idle_call(void)*/ cpuidle_reflect (dev, entered_state); }else { -tick_nohz_idle_retain_tick (); +idle_call_stop_or_retain_tick (stop_tick);/* * If there is only a single idle state (or none), there is
@@ -261,6 +271,7 @@ static void cpuidle_idle_call(void)static void do_idle (void ) {int cpu =smp_processor_id (); +bool got_tick = false;/* * Check if we need to update blocked load
@@ -332,8 +343,9 @@ static void do_idle(void)tick_nohz_idle_restart_tick ();cpu_idle_poll (); }else { -cpuidle_idle_call (); +cpuidle_idle_call (got_tick); } + got_tick =tick_nohz_idle_got_tick ();arch_cpu_idle_exit (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 404/460 PM: runtime: Fix a race condition related to device removal
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 29ab768277617452d88c0607c9299cdc63b6e9ff ]
The following code in pm_runtime_work() may dereference the dev->parent pointer after the parent device has been freed:
/* Maybe the parent is now able to suspend. */
if (parent && !parent->power.ignore_children) {
spin_unlock(&dev->power.lock);
spin_lock(&parent->power.lock);
rpm_idle(parent, RPM_ASYNC);
spin_unlock(&parent->power.lock);
spin_lock(&dev->power.lock);
}Fix this by inserting a flush_work() call in pm_runtime_remove().
Without this patch blktest block/001 triggers the following complaint sporadically:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_acquire+0x70/0x160 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812bef7198 by task kworker/u553:1/3081 Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x80 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x8b/0x310 print_report+0xfd/0x1d7 kasan_report+0xd8/0x1d0 __kasan_check_byte+0x42/0x60 lock_acquire.part.0+0x38/0x230 lock_acquire+0x70/0x160 _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50 rpm_suspend+0xc6a/0xfe0 rpm_idle+0x578/0x770 pm_runtime_work+0xee/0x120 process_one_work+0xde3/0x1410 worker_thread+0x5eb/0xfe0 kthread+0x37b/0x480 ret_from_fork+0x6cb/0x920 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Allocated by task 4314: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3d/0x50 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb0 __kmalloc_noprof+0x311/0x990 scsi_alloc_target+0x122/0xb60 [scsi_mod] __scsi_scan_target+0x101/0x460 [scsi_mod] scsi_scan_channel+0x179/0x1c0 [scsi_mod] scsi_scan_host_selected+0x259/0x2d0 [scsi_mod] store_scan+0x2d2/0x390 [scsi_mod] dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810 do_syscall_64+0xee/0xfc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 Freed by task 4314: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x67/0x80 kfree+0x225/0x6c0 scsi_target_dev_release+0x3d/0x60 [scsi_mod] device_release+0xa3/0x220 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0 put_device+0x17/0x20 scsi_device_dev_release+0xacf/0x12c0 [scsi_mod] device_release+0xa3/0x220 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0 put_device+0x17/0x20 scsi_device_put+0x7f/0xc0 [scsi_mod] sdev_store_delete+0xa5/0x120 [scsi_mod] dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810
--- drivers/base/power/runtime.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/base/power/runtime.c +1 -0
@@ -1856,6 +1856,7 @@ void pm_runtime_reinit(struct device *dev)void pm_runtime_remove (struct device *dev) {__pm_runtime_disable (dev, false); +flush_work (&dev->power.work);pm_runtime_reinit (dev); }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 405/460 bonding: prevent potential infinite loop in bond_header_parse()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b7405dcf7385445e10821777143f18c3ce20fa04 ]
bond_header_parse() can loop if a stack of two bonding devices is setup, because skb->dev always points to the hierarchy top.
Add new "const struct net_device *dev" parameter to (struct header_ops)->parse() method to make sure the recursion is bounded, and that the final leaf parse method is called.
--- drivers/firewire/net.c | 5 +++-- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 8 +++++--- include/linux/etherdevice.h | 3 ++- include/linux/if_ether.h | 3 ++- include/linux/netdevice.h | 6 ++++-- net/ethernet/eth.c | 9 +++------ net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 3 ++- net/mac802154/iface.c | 4 +++- net/phonet/af_phonet.c | 5 ++++- 9 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
drivers/firewire/net.c +3 -2
@@ -257,9 +257,10 @@ static void fwnet_header_cache_update(struct hh_cache *hh,memcpy ((u8 *)hh->hh_data +HH_DATA_OFF (FWNET_HLEN ), haddr, net->addr_len); } -static int fwnet_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned char *haddr) +static int fwnet_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,const struct net_device *dev, +unsigned char *haddr) { -memcpy (haddr, skb->dev->dev_addr,FWNET_ALEN ); +memcpy (haddr, dev->dev_addr,FWNET_ALEN );return FWNET_ALEN ; }
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +5 -3
@@ -1563,9 +1563,11 @@ static int bond_header_create(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *bond_dev,return ret; } -static int bond_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned char *haddr) +static int bond_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb, +const struct net_device *dev, +unsigned char *haddr) { -struct bonding *bond =netdev_priv (skb->dev); +struct bonding *bond =netdev_priv (dev);const struct header_ops *slave_ops;struct slave *slave;int ret =0 ;
@@ -1575,7 +1577,7 @@ static int bond_header_parse(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char *haddr)if (slave) { slave_ops =READ_ONCE (slave->dev->header_ops);if (slave_ops && slave_ops->parse) - ret = slave_ops->parse (skb, haddr); + ret = slave_ops->parse (skb, slave->dev, haddr); }rcu_read_unlock ();return ret;
include/linux/etherdevice.h +2 -1
@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ extern const struct header_ops eth_header_ops;int eth_header (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev,unsigned short type,const void *daddr,const void *saddr,unsigned len); -int eth_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned char *haddr); +int eth_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,const struct net_device *dev, +unsigned char *haddr);int eth_header_cache (const struct neighbour *neigh,struct hh_cache *hh,__be16 type); void eth_header_cache_update(struct hh_cache *hh, const struct net_device *dev,
include/linux/if_ether.h +2 -1
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ static inline struct ethhdr *inner_eth_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb)return (struct ethhdr *)skb_inner_mac_header (skb); } -int eth_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned char *haddr); +int eth_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,const struct net_device *dev, +unsigned char *haddr);extern ssize_t sysfs_format_mac (char *buf,const unsigned char *addr,int len);
include/linux/netdevice.h +4 -2
@@ -308,7 +308,9 @@ struct header_ops {int (*create) (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev,unsigned short type,const void *daddr,const void *saddr,unsigned int len); -int (*parse)(const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned char *haddr); +int (*parse)(const struct sk_buff *skb, +const struct net_device *dev, +unsigned char *haddr);int (*cache)(const struct neighbour *neigh,struct hh_cache *hh,__be16 type); void (*cache_update)(struct hh_cache *hh, const struct net_device *dev,
@@ -3163,7 +3165,7 @@ static inline int dev_parse_header(const struct sk_buff *skb,if (!dev->header_ops || !dev->header_ops->parse)return 0 ; -return dev->header_ops->parse (skb, haddr); +return dev->header_ops->parse (skb, dev, haddr); }static inline __be16 dev_parse_header_protocol (const struct sk_buff *skb)
net/ethernet/eth.c +3 -6
@@ -193,14 +193,11 @@ __be16 eth_type_trans(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (eth_type_trans); -/** -* eth_header_parse - extract hardware address from packet -* @skb: packet to extract header from -* @haddr: destination buffer -*/ -int eth_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned char *haddr) +int eth_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,const struct net_device *dev, +unsigned char *haddr) {const struct ethhdr *eth =eth_hdr (skb); +memcpy (haddr, eth->h_source,ETH_ALEN );return ETH_ALEN ; }
net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +2 -1
@@ -917,7 +917,8 @@ static int ipgre_header(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,return -(t->hlen +sizeof (*iph)); } -static int ipgre_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned char *haddr) +static int ipgre_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,const struct net_device *dev, +unsigned char *haddr) {const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *)skb_mac_header (skb);memcpy (haddr, &iph->saddr,4 );
net/mac802154/iface.c +3 -1
@@ -469,7 +469,9 @@ static int mac802154_header_create(struct sk_buff *skb, }static int -mac802154_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned char *haddr) +mac802154_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb, +const struct net_device *dev, +unsigned char *haddr) {struct ieee802154_hdr hdr;
net/phonet/af_phonet.c +4 -1
@@ -129,9 +129,12 @@ static int pn_header_create(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,return 1 ; } -static int pn_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb,unsigned char *haddr) +static int pn_header_parse (const struct sk_buff *skb, +const struct net_device *dev, +unsigned char *haddr) {const u8 *media =skb_mac_header (skb); + *haddr = *media;return 1 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 406/460 net/smc: fix NULL dereference and UAF in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6d5e4538364b9ceb1ac2941a4deb86650afb3538 ]
Syzkaller reported a panic in smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() [1].
smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP receive path (softirq) via icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock on the clcsock (TCP listening socket). It reads sk_user_data to get the smc_sock pointer. However, when the SMC listen socket is being closed concurrently, smc_close_active() sets clcsock->sk_user_data to NULL under sk_callback_lock, and then the smc_sock itself can be freed via sock_put() in smc_release().
This leads to two issues:
1) NULL pointer dereference: sk_user_data is NULL when accessed.
2) Use-after-free: sk_user_data is read as non-NULL, but the smc_sock is freed before its fields (e.g., queued_smc_hs, ori_af_ops) are accessed.
The race window looks like this (the syzkaller crash [1] triggers via the SYN cookie path: tcp_get_cookie_sock() -> smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(), but the normal tcp_check_req() path has the same race):
CPU A (softirq) CPU B (process ctx)
tcp_v4_rcv()
TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV:
sk = req->rsk_listener
sock_hold(sk)
/* No lock on listener */
smc_close_active():
write_lock_bh(cb_lock)
sk_user_data = NULL
write_unlock_bh(cb_lock)
...
smc_clcsock_release()
sock_put(smc->sk) x2
-> smc_sock freed!
tcp_check_req()
smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock():
smc = user_data(sk)
-> NULL or dangling
smc->queued_smc_hs
-> crash!Note that the clcsock and smc_sock are two independent objects with separate refcounts. TCP stack holds a reference on the clcsock, which keeps it alive, but this does NOT prevent the smc_sock from being freed.
Fix this by using RCU and refcount_inc_not_zero() to safely access smc_sock. Since smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock() is called in the TCP three-way handshake path, taking read_lock_bh on sk_callback_lock is too heavy and would not survive a SYN flood attack. Using rcu_read_lock() is much more lightweight.
- Set SOCK_RCU_FREE on the SMC listen socket so that smc_sock freeing is deferred until after the RCU grace period. This guarantees the memory is still valid when accessed inside rcu_read_lock().
- Use rcu_read_lock() to protect reading sk_user_data.
- Use refcount_inc_not_zero(&smc->sk.sk_refcnt) to pin the smc_sock. If the refcount has already reached zero (close path completed), it returns false and we bail out safely.
Note: smc_hs_congested() has a similar lockless read of sk_user_data without rcu_read_lock(), but it only checks for NULL and accesses the global smc_hs_wq, never dereferencing any smc_sock field, so it is not affected.
Reproducer was verified with mdelay injection and smc_run, the issue no longer occurs with this patch applied.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=827ae2bfb3a3529333e9
--- net/smc/af_smc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ net/smc/smc.h | 5 +++++ net/smc/smc_close.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/smc/af_smc.c +17 -6
@@ -130,7 +130,14 @@ static struct sock *smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,struct smc_sock *smc;struct sock *child; - smc =smc_clcsock_user_data (sk); +rcu_read_lock (); + smc =smc_clcsock_user_data_rcu (sk); +if (!smc || !refcount_inc_not_zero (&smc->sk.sk_refcnt)) { +rcu_read_unlock (); + smc =NULL ; + goto drop; + } +rcu_read_unlock ();if (READ_ONCE (sk->sk_ack_backlog) +atomic_read (&smc->queued_smc_hs) > sk->sk_max_ack_backlog)
@@ -152,11 +159,14 @@ static struct sock *smc_tcp_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,if (inet_csk (child)->icsk_af_ops ==inet_csk (sk)->icsk_af_ops)inet_csk (child)->icsk_af_ops = smc->ori_af_ops; } +sock_put (&smc->sk);return child; drop:dst_release (dst);tcp_listendrop (sk); +if (smc) +sock_put (&smc->sk);return NULL ; }
@@ -253,7 +263,7 @@ static void smc_fback_restore_callbacks(struct smc_sock *smc)struct sock *clcsk = smc->clcsock->sk;write_lock_bh (&clcsk->sk_callback_lock); - clcsk->sk_user_data =NULL ; +rcu_assign_sk_user_data (clcsk,NULL );smc_clcsock_restore_cb (&clcsk->sk_state_change, &smc->clcsk_state_change);smc_clcsock_restore_cb (&clcsk->sk_data_ready, &smc->clcsk_data_ready);
@@ -901,7 +911,7 @@ static void smc_fback_replace_callbacks(struct smc_sock *smc)struct sock *clcsk = smc->clcsock->sk;write_lock_bh (&clcsk->sk_callback_lock); - clcsk->sk_user_data = (void *)((uintptr_t )smc |SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY ); +__rcu_assign_sk_user_data_with_flags (clcsk, smc,SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY );smc_clcsock_replace_cb (&clcsk->sk_state_change, smc_fback_state_change, &smc->clcsk_state_change);
@@ -2663,8 +2673,8 @@ int smc_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)* smc-specific sk_data_ready function */ write_lock_bh (&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock); - smc->clcsock->sk->sk_user_data = - (void *)((uintptr_t )smc |SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY ); +__rcu_assign_sk_user_data_with_flags (smc->clcsock->sk, smc, +SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY );smc_clcsock_replace_cb (&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_data_ready, smc_clcsock_data_ready, &smc->clcsk_data_ready);write_unlock_bh (&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock);
@@ -2685,10 +2695,11 @@ int smc_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)write_lock_bh (&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock);smc_clcsock_restore_cb (&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_data_ready, &smc->clcsk_data_ready); - smc->clcsock->sk->sk_user_data =NULL ; +rcu_assign_sk_user_data (smc->clcsock->sk,NULL );write_unlock_bh (&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock); goto out; } +sock_set_flag (sk,SOCK_RCU_FREE ); sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog; sk->sk_ack_backlog =0 ; sk->sk_state =SMC_LISTEN ;
net/smc/smc.h +5 -0
@@ -346,6 +346,11 @@ static inline struct smc_sock *smc_clcsock_user_data(const struct sock *clcsk) ((uintptr_t )clcsk->sk_user_data & ~SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY ); } +static inline struct smc_sock *smc_clcsock_user_data_rcu (const struct sock *clcsk) +{ +return (struct smc_sock *)rcu_dereference_sk_user_data (clcsk); +} +/* save target_cb in saved_cb, and replace target_cb with new_cb */ static inline void smc_clcsock_replace_cb(void (**target_cb)(struct sock *), void (*new_cb)(struct sock *),
net/smc/smc_close.c +1 -1
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ int smc_close_active(struct smc_sock *smc)write_lock_bh (&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock);smc_clcsock_restore_cb (&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_data_ready, &smc->clcsk_data_ready); - smc->clcsock->sk->sk_user_data =NULL ; +rcu_assign_sk_user_data (smc->clcsock->sk,NULL );write_unlock_bh (&smc->clcsock->sk->sk_callback_lock); rc =kernel_sock_shutdown (smc->clcsock,SHUT_RDWR ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 407/460 net/sched: teql: Fix double-free in teql_master_xmit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 66360460cab63c248ca5b1070a01c0c29133b960 ]
Whenever a TEQL devices has a lockless Qdisc as root, qdisc_reset should be called using the seq_lock to avoid racing with the datapath. Failure to do so may cause crashes like the following:
[ 238.028993][ T318] BUG: KASAN: double-free in skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139) [ 238.029328][ T318] Free of addr ffff88810c67ec00 by task poc_teql_uaf_ke/318 [ 238.029749][ T318] [ 238.029900][ T318] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 318 Comm: poc_teql_ke Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3-00149-ge5b31d988a41 #704 PREEMPT(full) [ 238.029906][ T318] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 238.029910][ T318] Call Trace: [ 238.029913][ T318] <TASK> [ 238.029916][ T318] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) [ 238.029928][ T318] print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482) [ 238.029940][ T318] ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139) [ 238.029944][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) ... [ 238.029957][ T318] ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139) [ 238.029969][ T318] kasan_report_invalid_free (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:563) [ 238.029979][ T318] ? skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139) [ 238.029989][ T318] check_slab_allocation (mm/kasan/common.c:231) [ 238.029995][ T318] kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:2637 (discriminator 1) mm/slub.c:6168 (discriminator 1) mm/slub.c:6298 (discriminator 1)) [ 238.030004][ T318] skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139) ... [ 238.030025][ T318] sk_skb_reason_drop (net/core/skbuff.c:1256) [ 238.030032][ T318] pfifo_fast_reset (./include/linux/ptr_ring.h:171 ./include/linux/ptr_ring.h:309 ./include/linux/skb_array.h:98 net/sched/sch_generic.c:827) [ 238.030039][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) ... [ 238.030054][ T318] qdisc_reset (net/sched/sch_generic.c:1034) [ 238.030062][ T318] teql_destroy (./include/linux/spinlock.h:395 net/sched/sch_teql.c:157) [ 238.030071][ T318] __qdisc_destroy (./include/net/pkt_sched.h:328 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1077) [ 238.030077][ T318] qdisc_graft (net/sched/sch_api.c:1062 net/sched/sch_api.c:1053 net/sched/sch_api.c:1159) [ 238.030089][ T318] ? __pfx_qdisc_graft (net/sched/sch_api.c:1091) [ 238.030095][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 238.030102][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 238.030106][ T318] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 238.030114][ T318] tc_get_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:1529 net/sched/sch_api.c:1556) ... [ 238.072958][ T318] Allocated by task 303 on cpu 5 at 238.026275s: [ 238.073392][ T318] kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58) [ 238.073884][ T318] kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:64 (discriminator 5) mm/kasan/common.c:79 (discriminator 5)) [ 238.074230][ T318] __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:369) [ 238.074578][ T318] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:253 mm/slub.c:4542 mm/slub.c:4869 mm/slub.c:4921) [ 238.076091][ T318] kmalloc_reserve (net/core/skbuff.c:616 (discriminator 107)) [ 238.076450][ T318] __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:713) [ 238.076834][ T318] alloc_skb_with_frags (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 net/core/skbuff.c:6763) [ 238.077178][ T318] sock_alloc_send_pskb (net/core/sock.c:2997) [ 238.077520][ T318] packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:2926 net/packet/af_packet.c:3019 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108) [ 238.081469][ T318] [ 238.081870][ T318] Freed by task 299 on cpu 1 at 238.028496s: [ 238.082761][ T318] kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:58) [ 238.083481][ T318] kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:64 (discriminator 5) mm/kasan/common.c:79 (discriminator 5)) [ 238.085348][ T318] kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:587 (discriminator 1)) [ 238.085900][ T318] __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:287) [ 238.086439][ T318] kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:6168 (discriminator 3) mm/slub.c:6298 (discriminator 3)) [ 238.087007][ T318] skb_release_data (net/core/skbuff.c:1139) [ 238.087491][ T318] consume_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:1451) [ 238.087757][ T318] teql_master_xmit (net/sched/sch_teql.c:358) [ 238.088116][ T318] dev_hard_start_xmit (./include/linux/netdevice.h:5324 ./include/linux/netdevice.h:5333 net/core/dev.c:3871 net/core/dev.c:3887) [ 238.088468][ T318] sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:347) [ 238.088820][ T318] __qdisc_run (net/sched/sch_generic.c:420 (discriminator 1)) [ 238.089166][ T318] __dev_queue_xmit (./include/net/sch_generic.h:229 ./include/net/pkt_sched.h:121 ./include/net/pkt_sched.h:117 net/core/dev.c:4196 net/core/dev.c:4802)
Workflow to reproduce:
1. Initialize a TEQL topology (dummy0 and ifb0 as slaves, teql0 up).
2. Start multiple sender workers continuously transmitting packets through teql0 to drive teql_master_xmit().
3. In parallel, repeatedly delete and re-add the root qdisc on dummy0 and ifb0 via RTNETLINK, forcing frequent teardown and reset activity (teql_destroy() / qdisc_reset()).
4. After running both workloads concurrently for several iterations, KASAN reports slab-use-after-free or double-free in the skb free path.
Fix this by moving dev_reset_queue to sch_generic.h and calling it, instead of qdisc_reset, in teql_destroy since it handles both the lock and lockless cases correctly for root qdiscs.
--- include/net/sch_generic.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/sched/sch_generic.c | 27 --------------------------- net/sched/sch_teql.c | 7 ++----- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
include/net/sch_generic.h +28 -0
@@ -696,6 +696,34 @@ void qdisc_destroy(struct Qdisc *qdisc);void qdisc_put (struct Qdisc *qdisc);void qdisc_put_unlocked (struct Qdisc *qdisc);void qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog (struct Qdisc *qdisc,int n,int len); + +static inline void dev_reset_queue (struct net_device *dev, +struct netdev_queue *dev_queue, +void *_unused) +{ +struct Qdisc *qdisc; +bool nolock; + + qdisc =rtnl_dereference (dev_queue->qdisc_sleeping); +if (!qdisc) +return ; + + nolock = qdisc->flags &TCQ_F_NOLOCK ; + +if (nolock) +spin_lock_bh (&qdisc->seqlock); +spin_lock_bh (qdisc_lock (qdisc)); + +qdisc_reset (qdisc); + +spin_unlock_bh (qdisc_lock (qdisc)); +if (nolock) { +clear_bit (__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state); +clear_bit (__QDISC_STATE_DRAINING, &qdisc->state); +spin_unlock_bh (&qdisc->seqlock); + } +} +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SCHED int qdisc_offload_dump_helper (struct Qdisc *q,enum tc_setup_type type,void *type_data);
net/sched/sch_generic.c +0 -27
@@ -1297,33 +1297,6 @@ static void dev_deactivate_queue(struct net_device *dev, } } -static void dev_reset_queue (struct net_device *dev, -struct netdev_queue *dev_queue, -void *_unused) -{ -struct Qdisc *qdisc; -bool nolock; - - qdisc =rtnl_dereference (dev_queue->qdisc_sleeping); -if (!qdisc) -return ; - - nolock = qdisc->flags &TCQ_F_NOLOCK ; - -if (nolock) -spin_lock_bh (&qdisc->seqlock); -spin_lock_bh (qdisc_lock (qdisc)); - -qdisc_reset (qdisc); - -spin_unlock_bh (qdisc_lock (qdisc)); -if (nolock) { -clear_bit (__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state); -clear_bit (__QDISC_STATE_DRAINING, &qdisc->state); -spin_unlock_bh (&qdisc->seqlock); - } -} -static bool some_qdisc_is_busy (struct net_device *dev) {unsigned int i;
net/sched/sch_teql.c +2 -5
@@ -146,15 +146,12 @@ teql_destroy(struct Qdisc *sch) master->slaves =NEXT_SLAVE (q);if (q == master->slaves) {struct netdev_queue *txq; -spinlock_t *root_lock; txq =netdev_get_tx_queue (master->dev,0 ); master->slaves =NULL ; - root_lock =qdisc_root_sleeping_lock (rtnl_dereference (txq->qdisc)); -spin_lock_bh (root_lock); -qdisc_reset (rtnl_dereference (txq->qdisc)); -spin_unlock_bh (root_lock); +dev_reset_queue (master->dev, + txq,NULL ); } }skb_queue_purge (&dat->q);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 408/460 net: airoha: read default PSE reserved pages value before updating
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1f3e7ff4f296af1f4350f457d5bd82bc825e645a ]
Store the default value for the number of PSE reserved pages in orig_val at the beginning of airoha_fe_set_pse_oq_rsv routine, before updating it with airoha_fe_set_pse_queue_rsv_pages().
Introduce airoha_fe_get_pse_all_rsv utility routine.
Introduced by commit 23020f049327 ("net: airoha: Introduce ethernet support for EN7581 SoC")
Stable-dep-of: d4a533ad249e ("net: airoha: Remove airoha_dev_stop() in airoha_remove()")
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/airoha_eth.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/airoha_eth.c +10 -4
@@ -1116,17 +1116,23 @@ static void airoha_fe_set_pse_queue_rsv_pages(struct airoha_eth *eth, PSE_CFG_WR_EN_MASK | PSE_CFG_OQRSV_SEL_MASK); } +static u32 airoha_fe_get_pse_all_rsv (struct airoha_eth *eth) +{ +u32 val =airoha_fe_rr (eth,REG_FE_PSE_BUF_SET ); + +return FIELD_GET (PSE_ALLRSV_MASK , val); +} +static int airoha_fe_set_pse_oq_rsv (struct airoha_eth *eth,u32 port,u32 queue,u32 val) { -u32 orig_val, tmp, all_rsv, fq_limit; +u32 orig_val =airoha_fe_get_pse_queue_rsv_pages (eth, port, queue); +u32 tmp, all_rsv, fq_limit;airoha_fe_set_pse_queue_rsv_pages (eth, port, queue, val);/* modify all rsv */ - orig_val =airoha_fe_get_pse_queue_rsv_pages (eth, port, queue); - tmp =airoha_fe_rr (eth,REG_FE_PSE_BUF_SET ); - all_rsv =FIELD_GET (PSE_ALLRSV_MASK , tmp); + all_rsv =airoha_fe_get_pse_all_rsv (eth); all_rsv += (val - orig_val);airoha_fe_rmw (eth,REG_FE_PSE_BUF_SET ,PSE_ALLRSV_MASK ,FIELD_PREP (PSE_ALLRSV_MASK , all_rsv));
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 409/460 net: airoha: fix PSE memory configuration in airoha_fe_pse_ports_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8e38e08f2c560328a873c35aff1a0dbea6a7d084 ]
Align PSE memory configuration to vendor SDK. In particular, increase initial value of PSE reserved memory in airoha_fe_pse_ports_init() routine by the value used for the second Packet Processor Engine (PPE2) and do not overwrite the default value.
Introduced by commit 23020f049327 ("net: airoha: Introduce ethernet support for EN7581 SoC")
Stable-dep-of: d4a533ad249e ("net: airoha: Remove airoha_dev_stop() in airoha_remove()")
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/airoha_eth.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/airoha_eth.c +4 -2
@@ -1172,11 +1172,13 @@ static void airoha_fe_pse_ports_init(struct airoha_eth *eth) [FE_PSE_PORT_GDM4] = 2, [FE_PSE_PORT_CDM5] = 2, }; +u32 all_rsv;int q; + all_rsv =airoha_fe_get_pse_all_rsv (eth);/* hw misses PPE2 oq rsv */ -airoha_fe_set (eth,REG_FE_PSE_BUF_SET , -PSE_RSV_PAGES * pse_port_num_queues[FE_PSE_PORT_PPE2 ]); + all_rsv +=PSE_RSV_PAGES * pse_port_num_queues[FE_PSE_PORT_PPE2 ]; +airoha_fe_set (eth,REG_FE_PSE_BUF_SET , all_rsv);/* CMD1 */ for (q =0 ; q < pse_port_num_queues[FE_PSE_PORT_CDM1 ]; q++)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 410/460 net: airoha: Read completion queue data in airoha_qdma_tx_napi_poll()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3affa310de523d63e52ea8e2efb3c476df29e414 ]
In order to avoid any possible race, read completion queue head and pending entry in airoha_qdma_tx_napi_poll routine instead of doing it in airoha_irq_handler. Remove unused airoha_tx_irq_queue unused fields. This is a preliminary patch to add Qdisc offload for airoha_eth driver.
Stable-dep-of: d4a533ad249e ("net: airoha: Remove airoha_dev_stop() in airoha_remove()")
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/airoha_eth.c | 31 +++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/airoha_eth.c +13 -18
@@ -752,11 +752,9 @@ struct airoha_tx_irq_queue {struct airoha_qdma *qdma;struct napi_struct napi; -u32 *q;int size; -int queued; -u16 head; +u32 *q; };struct airoha_hw_stats {
@@ -1655,25 +1653,31 @@ static int airoha_qdma_init_rx(struct airoha_qdma *qdma)static int airoha_qdma_tx_napi_poll (struct napi_struct *napi,int budget) {struct airoha_tx_irq_queue *irq_q; +int id, done =0 , irq_queued;struct airoha_qdma *qdma;struct airoha_eth *eth; -int id, done =0 ; +u32 status, head; irq_q = container_of(napi, struct airoha_tx_irq_queue, napi); qdma = irq_q->qdma; id = irq_q - &qdma->q_tx_irq[0 ]; eth = qdma->eth; -while (irq_q->queued >0 && done < budget) { -u32 qid, last, val = irq_q->q[irq_q->head]; + status =airoha_qdma_rr (qdma,REG_IRQ_STATUS (id)); + head =FIELD_GET (IRQ_HEAD_IDX_MASK , status); + head = head % irq_q->size; + irq_queued =FIELD_GET (IRQ_ENTRY_LEN_MASK , status); + +while (irq_queued >0 && done < budget) { +u32 qid, last, val = irq_q->q[head];struct airoha_queue *q;if (val ==0xff )break ; - irq_q->q[irq_q->head] =0xff ;/* mark as done */ - irq_q->head = (irq_q->head +1 ) % irq_q->size; - irq_q->queued--; + irq_q->q[head] =0xff ;/* mark as done */ + head = (head +1 ) % irq_q->size; + irq_queued--; done++; last =FIELD_GET (IRQ_DESC_IDX_MASK , val);
@@ -2023,20 +2027,11 @@ static irqreturn_t airoha_irq_handler(int irq, void *dev_instance)if (intr[0 ] &INT_TX_MASK ) {for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (qdma->q_tx_irq); i++) { -struct airoha_tx_irq_queue *irq_q = &qdma->q_tx_irq[i]; -u32 status, head; -if (!(intr[0 ] &TX_DONE_INT_MASK (i)))continue ;airoha_qdma_irq_disable (qdma,QDMA_INT_REG_IDX0 ,TX_DONE_INT_MASK (i)); - - status =airoha_qdma_rr (qdma,REG_IRQ_STATUS (i)); - head =FIELD_GET (IRQ_HEAD_IDX_MASK , status); - irq_q->head = head % irq_q->size; - irq_q->queued =FIELD_GET (IRQ_ENTRY_LEN_MASK , status); -napi_schedule (&qdma->q_tx_irq[i].napi); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 411/460 net: airoha: Remove airoha_dev_stop() in airoha_remove()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d4a533ad249e9fbdc2d0633f2ddd60a5b3a9a4ca ]
Do not run airoha_dev_stop routine explicitly in airoha_remove() since ndo_stop() callback is already executed by unregister_netdev() in __dev_close_many routine if necessary and, doing so, we will end up causing an underflow in the qdma users atomic counters. Rely on networking subsystem to stop the device removing the airoha_eth module.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/airoha_eth.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/airoha_eth.c +0 -1
@@ -2784,7 +2784,6 @@ static void airoha_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)if (!port)continue ; -airoha_dev_stop (port->dev);unregister_netdev (port->dev); }free_netdev (eth->napi_dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 412/460 net: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP16 nframes bounds check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tobi Gaertner <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2aa8a4fa8d5b7d0e1ebcec100e1a4d80a1f4b21a ]
cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16() validates that the NDP header and its DPE entries fit within the skb. The first check correctly accounts for ndpoffset:
if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) > skb_in->len)
but the second check omits it:
if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16) +
ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16))) > skb_in->len)
This validates the DPE array size against the total skb length as if the NDP were at offset 0, rather than at ndpoffset. When the NDP is placed near the end of the NTB (large wNdpIndex), the DPE entries can extend past the skb data buffer even though the check passes. cdc_ncm_rx_fixup() then reads out-of-bounds memory when iterating the DPE array.
Add ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to express the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.
--- drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c +3 -2
@@ -1657,6 +1657,7 @@ int cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int ndpoffset)struct usbnet *dev =netdev_priv (skb_in->dev);struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *ndp16;int ret = -EINVAL ; +size_t ndp_len;if ((ndpoffset +sizeof (struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 )) > skb_in->len) { netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "invalid NDP offset <%u>\n",
@@ -1676,8 +1677,8 @@ int cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int ndpoffset) sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16)); ret--;/* we process NDP entries except for the last one */ -if ((sizeof (struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 ) + - ret * (sizeof (struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16 ))) > skb_in->len) { + ndp_len = struct_size_t(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16, dpe16, ret); +if (ndpoffset + ndp_len > skb_in->len) {netif_dbg (dev, rx_err, dev->net,"Invalid nframes = %d\n" , ret); ret = -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 413/460 net: usb: cdc_ncm: add ndpoffset to NDP32 nframes bounds check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tobi Gaertner <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 77914255155e68a20aa41175edeecf8121dac391 ]
The same bounds-check bug fixed for NDP16 in the previous patch also exists in cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp32(). The DPE array size is validated against the total skb length without accounting for ndpoffset, allowing out-of-bounds reads when the NDP32 is placed near the end of the NTB.
Add ndpoffset to the nframes bounds check and use struct_size_t() to express the NDP-plus-DPE-array size more clearly.
Compile-tested only.
--- drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c +3 -2
@@ -1694,6 +1694,7 @@ int cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp32(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int ndpoffset)struct usbnet *dev =netdev_priv (skb_in->dev);struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp32 *ndp32;int ret = -EINVAL ; +size_t ndp_len;if ((ndpoffset +sizeof (struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp32 )) > skb_in->len) { netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "invalid NDP offset <%u>\n",
@@ -1713,8 +1714,8 @@ int cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp32(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int ndpoffset) sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe32)); ret--;/* we process NDP entries except for the last one */ -if ((sizeof (struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp32 ) + - ret * (sizeof (struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe32 ))) > skb_in->len) { + ndp_len = struct_size_t(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp32, dpe32, ret); +if (ndpoffset + ndp_len > skb_in->len) {netif_dbg (dev, rx_err, dev->net,"Invalid nframes = %d\n" , ret); ret = -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 414/460 clsact: Fix use-after-free in init/destroy rollback asymmetry
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a0671125d4f55e1e98d9bde8a0b671941987e208 ]
Fix a use-after-free in the clsact qdisc upon init/destroy rollback asymmetry. The latter is achieved by first fully initializing a clsact instance, and then in a second step having a replacement failure for the new clsact qdisc instance. clsact_init() initializes ingress first and then takes care of the egress part. This can fail midway, for example, via tcf_block_get_ext(). Upon failure, the kernel will trigger the clsact_destroy() callback.
Commit 1cb6f0bae504 ("bpf: Fix too early release of tcx_entry") details the way how the transition is happening. If tcf_block_get_ext on the q->ingress_block ends up failing, we took the tcx_miniq_inc reference count on the ingress side, but not yet on the egress side. clsact_destroy() tests whether the {ingress,egress}_entry was non-NULL. However, even in midway failure on the replacement, both are in fact non-NULL with a valid egress_entry from the previous clsact instance.
What we really need to test for is whether the qdisc instance-specific ingress or egress side previously got initialized. This adds a small helper for checking the miniq initialization called mini_qdisc_pair_inited, and utilizes that upon clsact_destroy() in order to fix the use-after-free scenario. Convert the ingress_destroy() side as well so both are consistent to each other.
--- include/net/sch_generic.h | 5 +++++ net/sched/sch_ingress.c | 14 ++++++++------ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/net/sch_generic.h +5 -0
@@ -1406,6 +1406,11 @@ void mini_qdisc_pair_init(struct mini_Qdisc_pair *miniqp, struct Qdisc *qdisc,void mini_qdisc_pair_block_init (struct mini_Qdisc_pair *miniqp,struct tcf_block *block); +static inline bool mini_qdisc_pair_inited (struct mini_Qdisc_pair *miniqp) +{ +return !!miniqp->p_miniq; +} +void mq_change_real_num_tx (struct Qdisc *sch,unsigned int new_real_tx);int sch_frag_xmit_hook (struct sk_buff *skb,int (*xmit)(struct sk_buff *skb));
net/sched/sch_ingress.c +8 -6
@@ -113,14 +113,15 @@ static void ingress_destroy(struct Qdisc *sch) {struct ingress_sched_data *q =qdisc_priv (sch);struct net_device *dev =qdisc_dev (sch); -struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry =rtnl_dereference (dev->tcx_ingress); +struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry;if (sch->parent !=TC_H_INGRESS )return ;tcf_block_put_ext (q->block, sch, &q->block_info); -if (entry) { +if (mini_qdisc_pair_inited (&q->miniqp)) { + entry =rtnl_dereference (dev->tcx_ingress);tcx_miniq_dec (entry);if (!tcx_entry_is_active (entry)) {tcx_entry_update (dev,NULL , true);
@@ -290,10 +291,9 @@ static int clsact_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt,static void clsact_destroy (struct Qdisc *sch) { +struct bpf_mprog_entry *ingress_entry, *egress_entry;struct clsact_sched_data *q =qdisc_priv (sch);struct net_device *dev =qdisc_dev (sch); -struct bpf_mprog_entry *ingress_entry =rtnl_dereference (dev->tcx_ingress); -struct bpf_mprog_entry *egress_entry =rtnl_dereference (dev->tcx_egress);if (sch->parent !=TC_H_CLSACT )return ;
@@ -301,7 +301,8 @@ static void clsact_destroy(struct Qdisc *sch)tcf_block_put_ext (q->ingress_block, sch, &q->ingress_block_info);tcf_block_put_ext (q->egress_block, sch, &q->egress_block_info); -if (ingress_entry) { +if (mini_qdisc_pair_inited (&q->miniqp_ingress)) { + ingress_entry =rtnl_dereference (dev->tcx_ingress);tcx_miniq_dec (ingress_entry);if (!tcx_entry_is_active (ingress_entry)) {tcx_entry_update (dev,NULL , true);
@@ -309,7 +310,8 @@ static void clsact_destroy(struct Qdisc *sch) } } -if (egress_entry) { +if (mini_qdisc_pair_inited (&q->miniqp_egress)) { + egress_entry =rtnl_dereference (dev->tcx_egress);tcx_miniq_dec (egress_entry);if (!tcx_entry_is_active (egress_entry)) {tcx_entry_update (dev,NULL , false);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 415/460 net: usb: aqc111: Do not perform PM inside suspend callback
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nikola Z. Ivanov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 069c8f5aebe4d5224cf62acc7d4b3486091c658a ]
syzbot reports "task hung in rpm_resume"
This is caused by aqc111_suspend calling
the PM variant of its write_cmd routine.
The simplified call trace looks like this:
rpm_suspend()
usb_suspend_both() - here udev->dev.power.runtime_status == RPM_SUSPENDING
aqc111_suspend() - called for the usb device interface
aqc111_write32_cmd()
usb_autopm_get_interface()
pm_runtime_resume_and_get()
rpm_resume() - here we call rpm_resume() on our parent
rpm_resume() - Here we wait for a status change that will never happen.
At this point we block another task which holds rtnl_lock and locks up the whole networking stack.
Fix this by replacing the write_cmd calls with their _nopm variants
--- drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c +6 -6
@@ -1400,14 +1400,14 @@ static int aqc111_suspend(struct usb_interface *intf, pm_message_t message)aqc111_write16_cmd_nopm (dev,AQ_ACCESS_MAC ,SFR_MEDIUM_STATUS_MODE ,2 , ®16); -aqc111_write_cmd (dev,AQ_WOL_CFG ,0 ,0 , -WOL_CFG_SIZE , &wol_cfg); -aqc111_write32_cmd (dev,AQ_PHY_OPS ,0 ,0 , - &aqc111_data->phy_cfg); +aqc111_write_cmd_nopm (dev,AQ_WOL_CFG ,0 ,0 , +WOL_CFG_SIZE , &wol_cfg); +aqc111_write32_cmd_nopm (dev,AQ_PHY_OPS ,0 ,0 , + &aqc111_data->phy_cfg); }else { aqc111_data->phy_cfg |=AQ_LOW_POWER ; -aqc111_write32_cmd (dev,AQ_PHY_OPS ,0 ,0 , - &aqc111_data->phy_cfg); +aqc111_write32_cmd_nopm (dev,AQ_PHY_OPS ,0 ,0 , + &aqc111_data->phy_cfg);/* Disable RX path */ aqc111_read16_cmd_nopm(dev, AQ_ACCESS_MAC,
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0