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implement getrandom() in vDSO

PATCH Superseded Jason A. Donenfeld 2 participants 11 messages Nov 18, 2022 – Nov 19, 2022

Subsystems (7)

v4 of 14 Superseded Latest is v14 →

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Jason A. Donenfeld

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#0 lore raw

v4 cover implement getrandom() in vDSO

Changes v3->v4:
--------------
- Split up into small series rather than one big patch.
- Use proper ordering in generation counter reads.
- Make properly generic, not just a hairball with x86, by moving symbols into correct files.

Changes v2->v3:
--------------

Thomas' previous objection was two-fold: 1) vgetrandom should really have the same function signature as getrandom, in addition to all of the same behavior, and 2) having vgetrandom_alloc be a vDSO function doesn't make sense, because it doesn't actually need anything from the VDSO data page and it doesn't correspond to an existing syscall.

After a discussion at Plumbers this last week, we devised the following ways to fix these: 1) we make the opque state argument be the last argument of vgetrandom, rather than the first one, since the real syscall ignores the additional argument, and that way all the registers are the same, and no behavior changes; and 2) we make vgetrandom_alloc a syscall, rather than a vDSO function, which also gives it added flexibility for the future, which is good.

Making those changes also reduced the size of this patch a bit.

Smaller changes:
- Properly add buffer offset position.
- Don't EXPORT_SYMBOL for vDSO code.
- Account for timens and vvar being in swapped pages.

--------------

Two statements:

1) Userspace wants faster cryptographically secure random numbers of arbitrary size, big or small.

2) Userspace is currently unable to safely roll its own RNG with the same security profile as getrandom().

Statement (1) has been debated for years, with arguments ranging from "we need faster cryptographically secure card shuffling!" to "the only things that actually need good randomness are keys, which are few and far between" to "actually, TLS CBC nonces are frequent" and so on. I don't intend to wade into that debate substantially, except to note that recently glibc added arc4random(), whose goal is to return a cryptographically secure uint32_t, and there are real user reports of it being too slow. So here we are.

Statement (2) is more interesting. The kernel is the nexus of all entropic inputs that influence the RNG. It is in the best position, and probably the only position, to decide anything at all about the current state of the RNG and of its entropy. One of the things it uniquely knows about is when reseeding is necessary.

For example, when a virtual machine is forked, restored, or duplicated, it's imparative that the RNG doesn't generate the same outputs. For this reason, there's a small protocol between hypervisors and the kernel that indicates this has happened, alongside some ID, which the RNG uses to immediately reseed, so as not to return the same numbers. Were userspace to expand a getrandom() seed from time T1 for the next hour, and at some point T2 < hour, the virtual machine forked, userspace would continue to provide the same numbers to two (or more) different virtual machines, resulting in potential cryptographic catastrophe. Something similar happens on resuming from hibernation (or even suspend), with various compromise scenarios there in mind.

There's a more general reason why userspace rolling its own RNG from a getrandom() seed is fraught. There's a lot of attention paid to this particular Linuxism we have of the RNG being initialized and thus non-blocking or uninitialized and thus blocking until it is initialized. These are our Two Big States that many hold to be the holy differentiating factor between safe and not safe, between cryptographically secure and garbage. The fact is, however, that the distinction between these two states is a hand-wavy wishy-washy inexact approximation. Outside of a few exceptional cases (e.g. a HW RNG is available), we actually don't really ever know with any rigor at all when the RNG is safe and ready (nor when it's compromised). We do the best we can to "estimate" it, but entropy estimation is fundamentally impossible in the general case. So really, we're just doing guess work, and hoping it's good and conservative enough. Let's then assume that there's always some potential error involved in this differentiator.

In fact, under the surface, the RNG is engineered around a different principal, and that is trying to *use* new entropic inputs regularly and at the right specific moments in time. For example, close to boot time, the RNG reseeds itself more often than later. At certain events, like VM fork, the RNG reseeds itself immediately. The various heuristics for when the RNG will use new entropy and how often is really a core aspect of what the RNG has some potential to do decently enough (and something that will probably continue to improve in the future from random.c's present set of algorithms). So in your mind, put away the metal attachment to the Two Big States, which represent an approximation with a potential margin of error. Instead keep in mind that the RNG's primary operating heuristic is how often and exactly when it's going to reseed.

So, if userspace takes a seed from getrandom() at point T1, and uses it for the next hour (or N megabytes or some other meaningless metric), during that time, potential errors in the Two Big States approximation are amplified. During that time potential reseeds are being lost, forgotten, not reflected in the output stream. That's not good.

The simplest statement you could make is that userspace RNGs that expand a getrandom() seed at some point T1 are nearly always *worse*, in some way, than just calling getrandom() every time a random number is desired.

For those reasons, after some discussion on libc-alpha, glibc's arc4random() now just calls getrandom() on each invocation. That's trivially safe, and gives us latitude to then make the safe thing faster without becoming unsafe at our leasure. Card shuffling isn't particularly fast, however.

How do we rectify this? By putting a safe implementation of getrandom() in the vDSO, which has access to whatever information a particular iteration of random.c is using to make its decisions. I use that careful language of "particular iteration of random.c", because the set of things that a vDSO getrandom() implementation might need for making decisions as good as the kernel's will likely change over time. This isn't just a matter of exporting certain *data* to userspace. We're not going to commit to a "data API" where the various heuristics used are exposed, locking in how the kernel works for decades to come, and then leave it to various userspaces to roll something on top and shoot themselves in the foot and have all sorts of complexity disasters. Rather, vDSO getrandom() is supposed to be the *same exact algorithm* that runs in the kernel, except it's been hoisted into userspace as much as possible. And so vDSO getrandom() and kernel getrandom() will always mirror each other hermetically.

API-wise, the vDSO gains this function:

  ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);

The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to some state allocated with vgetrandom_alloc(), explained below. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior.

Then, we introduce a new syscall:

  void *vgetrandom_alloc([inout] size_t *num, [out] size_t *size_per_each, unsigned int flags);

This takes the desired number of opaque states in num, and returns a pointer to an array of opaque states, the number actually allocated back in num, and the size in bytes of each one in size_per_each, enabling a libc to slice up the returned array into a state per each thread. (The flags argument is always zero for now.) We very intentionally do *not* leave state allocation up to the caller of vgetrandom, but provide vgetrandom_alloc for that allocation. There are too many weird things that can go wrong, and it's important that vDSO does not provide too generic of a mechanism. It's not going to store its state in just any old memory address. It'll do it only in ones it allocates.

Right now this means it's a mlock'd page with WIPEONFORK set. In the future maybe there will be other interesting page flags or anti-heartbleed measures, or other platform-specific kernel-specific things that can be set from the syscall. Again, it's important that the kernel has a say in how this works rather than agreeing to operate on any old address; memory isn't neutral.

The syscall currently accomplishes this with a call to vm_mmap() and then a call to do_madvise(). It'd be nice to do this all at once, but I'm not sure that a helper function exists for that now, and it seems a bit premature to add one, at least for now.

The interesting meat of the implementation is in lib/vdso/getrandom.c, as generic C code, and it aims to mainly follow random.c's buffered fast key erasure logic. Before the RNG is initialized, it falls back to the syscall. Right now it uses a simple generation counter to make its decisions on reseeding (though this could be made more extensive over time).

The actual place that has the most work to do is in all of the other files. Most of the vDSO shared page infrastructure is centered around gettimeofday, and so the main structs are all in arrays for different timestamp types, and attached to time namespaces, and so forth. I've done the best I could to add onto this in an unintrusive way, but you'll notice almost immediately from glancing at the code that it still needs some untangling work. This also only works on x86 at the moment. I could certainly use a hand with this part.

So far in my test results, performance is pretty stellar (around 15x for uint32_t generation), and it seems to be working.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Adhemerval Zanella Netto <[email protected]>
Cc Carlos O'Donell <[email protected]>

Jason A. Donenfeld (3):
random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation

 MAINTAINERS                            |   2 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig                       |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile           |   3 +-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S         |   2 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c       |  16 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h  |  37 +++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h   |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h            |  16 ++++
 drivers/char/random.c                  |  62 ++++++++++++++
 include/vdso/datapage.h                |   6 ++
 lib/crypto/chacha.c                    |   4 +
 lib/vdso/Kconfig                       |   5 ++
 lib/vdso/getrandom.c                   | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 lib/vdso/getrandom.h                   |  25 ++++++
 16 files changed, 291 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h
 create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c
 create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.h
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/3 random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall

The vDSO getrandom() works over an opaque per-thread state of an unexported size, which must be marked as MADV_WIPEONFORK and be mlock()'d for proper operation. Over time, the nuances of these allocations may change or grow or even differ based on architectural features.

The syscall has the signature:

  void *vgetrandom_alloc([inout] size_t *num, [out] size_t *size_per_each, unsigned int flags);

This takes the desired number of opaque states in num, and returns a pointer to an array of opaque states, the number actually allocated back in num, and the size in bytes of each one in size_per_each, enabling a libc to slice up the returned array into a state per each thread. (The flags argument is always zero for now.) Libc is expected to allocate a chunk of these on first use, and then dole them out to threads as they're created, allocating more when needed.

We very intentionally do *not* leave state allocation for vDSO getrandom() up to userspace itself, but rather provide this new syscall for such allocations. vDSO getrandom() must not store its state in just any old memory address, but rather just ones that the kernel specially allocates for it, leaving the particularities of those allocations up to the kernel.

---
 MAINTAINERS                            |  1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl |  1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl |  1 +
 drivers/char/random.c                  | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 lib/vdso/getrandom.h                   | 25 +++++++++++
 5 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.h
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
index 256f03904987..843dd6a49538 100644
@@ -17287,6 +17287,7 @@ T:	git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git
 S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/char/random.c
 F:	drivers/virt/vmgenid.c
+F:	lib/vdso/getrandom.h
 
 RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM
 M:	Matt Porter <[email protected]>
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
index 320480a8db4f..ea0fbc2ded5e 100644
@@ -455,3 +455,4 @@
 448	i386	process_mrelease	sys_process_mrelease
 449	i386	futex_waitv		sys_futex_waitv
 450	i386	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	i386	vgetrandom_alloc	sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
index c84d12608cd2..0186f173f0e8 100644
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease	sys_process_mrelease
 449	common	futex_waitv		sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node	sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc	sys_vgetrandom_alloc
 
 #
 # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
drivers/char/random.c +57 -0

81 lines not on this page · raw message

lib/vdso/getrandom.h new file +25 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fef7c0261e2b
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _VDSO_LIB_GETRANDOM_H
+#define _VDSO_LIB_GETRANDOM_H
+
+#include <crypto/chacha.h>
+
+struct vgetrandom_state {
+	u64 last_reseed;
+	unsigned long generation;
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+			u8 batch[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / 2];
+		};
+		u8 key_batch[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 2];
+	};
+	u8 pos;
+	bool not_forked;
+};
+
+#endif /* _VDSO_LIB_GETRANDOM_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall

arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl

Quoted 4 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +0 -0
index 320480a8db4f..ea0fbc2ded5e 100644

This also needs to be wired into unistd.h, sys_ni.c, and checksyscalls.sh, with its definition dependent on a new __ARCH_WANT_VGETRANDOM_ALLOC macro symbol, like all the other new syscalls that get added arch-by-arch. I'll do this for v+1.

Jason

author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/3 random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

In reply to Jason A. Donenfeld

Provide a generic C vDSO getrandom() implementation, which operates on an opaque state returned by vgetrandom_alloc() and produces random bytes the same way as getrandom(). This has a the API signature:

  ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);

The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to the opaque allocated state. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom() syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior.

The actual vDSO RNG algorithm implemented is the same one implemented by drivers/char/random.c, using the same fast-erasure techniques as that. Should the in-kernel implementation change, so too will the vDSO one.

Initially, the state is keyless, and so the first call makes a getrandom() syscall to generate that key, and then uses it for subsequent calls. By keeping track of a generation counter, it knows when its key is invalidated and it should fetch a new one using the syscall. Later, more than just a generation counter might be used.

Since MADV_WIPEONFORK is set on the opaque state, the key and related state is wiped during a fork(), so secrets don't roll over into new processes, and the same state doesn't accidentally generate the same random stream. The generation counter, as well, is always >0, so that the 0 counter is a useful indication of a fork() or otherwise uninitialized state.

If the kernel RNG is not yet initialized, then the vDSO always calls the syscall, because that behavior cannot be emulated in userspace, but fortunately that state is short lived and only during early boot. If it has been initialized, then there is no need to inspect the flags argument, because the behavior does not change post-initialization regardless of the flags value.

---
 MAINTAINERS             |   1 +
 drivers/char/random.c   |   5 ++
 include/vdso/datapage.h |   6 +++
 lib/crypto/chacha.c     |   4 ++
 lib/vdso/Kconfig        |   5 ++
 lib/vdso/getrandom.c    | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 130 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
index 843dd6a49538..e0aa33f54c57 100644
@@ -17287,6 +17287,7 @@ T:	git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git
 S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/char/random.c
 F:	drivers/virt/vmgenid.c
+F:	lib/vdso/getrandom.c
 F:	lib/vdso/getrandom.h
 
 RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM
drivers/char/random.c +5 -0
index b83481eb00a9..a62255d852f9 100644
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #include <asm/irq.h>
 #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
+#include <vdso/datapage.h>
 #include "../../lib/vdso/getrandom.h"
 
 /*********************************************************************
@@ -305,6 +306,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work)
 	if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
 		++next_gen;
 	WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM))
+		smp_store_release(&_vdso_rng_data.generation, next_gen + 1);
 	if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready))
 		crng_init = CRNG_READY;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
@@ -754,6 +757,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
 		crng_reseed(NULL); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
 		if (static_key_initialized)
 			execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM))
+			smp_store_release(&_vdso_rng_data.is_ready, true);
 		wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
 		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
 		pr_notice("crng init done\n");
include/vdso/datapage.h +6 -0
index 73eb622e7663..cbacfd923a5c 100644
@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ struct vdso_data {
 	struct arch_vdso_data	arch_data;
 };
 
+struct vdso_rng_data {
+	unsigned long generation;
+	bool is_ready;
+};
+
 /*
  * We use the hidden visibility to prevent the compiler from generating a GOT
  * relocation. Not only is going through a GOT useless (the entry couldn't and
@@ -120,6 +125,7 @@ struct vdso_data {
  */
 extern struct vdso_data _vdso_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
 extern struct vdso_data _timens_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
+extern struct vdso_rng_data _vdso_rng_data __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
 
 /*
  * The generic vDSO implementation requires that gettimeofday.h
lib/crypto/chacha.c +4 -0
index b748fd3d256e..944991bb36c7 100644
@@ -17,8 +17,10 @@ static void chacha_permute(u32 *x, int nrounds)
 {
 	int i;
 
+#ifndef CHACHA_FOR_VDSO_INCLUDE
 	/* whitelist the allowed round counts */
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(nrounds != 20 && nrounds != 12);
+#endif
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nrounds; i += 2) {
 		x[0]  += x[4];    x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[0],  16);
@@ -87,6 +89,7 @@ void chacha_block_generic(u32 *state, u8 *stream, int nrounds)
 
 	state[12]++;
 }
+#ifndef CHACHA_FOR_VDSO_INCLUDE
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_block_generic);
 
 /**
@@ -112,3 +115,4 @@ void hchacha_block_generic(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds)
 	memcpy(&stream[4], &x[12], 16);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_generic);
+#endif
lib/vdso/Kconfig +5 -0
index d883ac299508..c35fac664574 100644
@@ -30,4 +30,9 @@ config GENERIC_VDSO_TIME_NS
 	  Selected by architectures which support time namespaces in the
 	  VDSO
 
+config HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM
+	bool
+	help
+	  Selected by architectures that support vDSO getrandom().
+
 endif
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +109 -0

109 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

Le 18/11/2022 à 18:28, Jason A. Donenfeld a écrit :

Quoted 6 lines

Provide a generic C vDSO getrandom() implementation, which operates on an opaque state returned by vgetrandom_alloc() and produces random bytes the same way as getrandom(). This has a the API signature:

   ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);

...

Quoted 43 lines
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +37 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b253e9247706
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <vdso/datapage.h>
+#include <asm/vdso/getrandom.h>
+#include <asm/vdso/vsyscall.h>
+#include "getrandom.h"
+
+#undef memcpy
+#define memcpy(d,s,l) __builtin_memcpy(d,s,l)
+#undef memset
+#define memset(d,c,l) __builtin_memset(d,c,l)
+
+#define CHACHA_FOR_VDSO_INCLUDE
+#include "../crypto/chacha.c"
+
+static void memcpy_and_zero(void *dst, void *src, size_t len)
+{
+#define CASCADE(type) \
+	while (len >= sizeof(type)) { \
+		*(type *)dst = *(type *)src; \
+		*(type *)src = 0; \
+		dst += sizeof(type); \
+		src += sizeof(type); \
+		len -= sizeof(type); \
+	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+	CASCADE(u64);
+#endif
+	CASCADE(u32);
+	CASCADE(u16);

lib/vdso/getrandom.c line 47

Quoted 10 lines
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +10 -0
+#endif
+	CASCADE(u8);
+#undef CASCADE
+}
+
+static __always_inline ssize_t
+__cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state)
+{
+	struct vgetrandom_state *state = opaque_state;
+	const struct vdso_rng_data *rng_info = __arch_get_vdso_rng_data();

In order to ease wiring up to powerpc, can it be done the same way as commit e876f0b69dc9 ("lib/vdso: Allow architectures to provide the vdso data pointer")

lib/vdso/getrandom.c line 52

Quoted 5 lines
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +5 -0
+	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
+	ssize_t ret = min_t(size_t, MAX_RW_COUNT, len);
+	unsigned long current_generation;
+	size_t batch_len;
+

Thanks,
Christophe

author maintainer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

Hi Christophe,

Quoted 9 lines · Christophe Leroy

lib/vdso/getrandom.c line 47

Quoted 5 lines
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +5 -0
+static __always_inline ssize_t
+__cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state)
+{
+	struct vgetrandom_state *state = opaque_state;
+	const struct vdso_rng_data *rng_info = __arch_get_vdso_rng_data();

In order to ease wiring up to powerpc, can it be done the same way as commit e876f0b69dc9 ("lib/vdso: Allow architectures to provide the vdso data pointer")

It is already. At least I think it is, unless I'm missing a subtle distinction? The call to __arch_get_vdso_rng_data() goes to arch-specific code, implemented in the 3/3 of this patch set for x86 inside of arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h. On powerpc, you'd make a powerpc-specific __arch_get_vdso_rng_data() instead of arch/powerpc/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h.

Or maybe I'm not reading that commit right? The commit message says something about __arch_get_vdso_rng_data() being problematic because of clobbering a register, but then the same commit still seems to call __arch_get_vdso_rng_data()? Is this one of those things where what you'd prefer is that I define an inline function, __cvdso_get_vdso_rng_data(), that by default calls __arch_get_vdso_rng_data(), but can be overridden on powerpc to do some other type of magic? But __arch_get_vdso_rng_data() is already an overiddable inline, so what would the difference be?

Sorry if I'm a bit slow here to grok what's up.

Jason

author maintainer
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

Quoted 1 line · Jason A. Donenfeld

Sorry if I'm a bit slow here to grok what's up.

Okay, I think I see it now. That's a complicated patch for a simple idea because gettime is more complicated than getrandom. I suspect what you want is something like the below, correct? Seems easy enough.

lib/vdso/getrandom.c +8 -2
index b253e9247706..b3282d7cfb53 100644
@@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ static void memcpy_and_zero(void *dst, void *src, size_t len)
 }
 
 static __always_inline ssize_t
-__cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state)
+__cvdso_getrandom_data(const struct vdso_rng_data *rng_info, void *buffer, size_t len,
+		       unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state)
 {
 	struct vgetrandom_state *state = opaque_state;
-	const struct vdso_rng_data *rng_info = __arch_get_vdso_rng_data();
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
 	ssize_t ret = min_t(size_t, MAX_RW_COUNT, len);
 	unsigned long current_generation;
@@ -107,3 +107,9 @@ __cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_sta
 	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
 	goto more_batch;
 }
+
+static __always_inline ssize_t
+__cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state)
+{
+	return __cvdso_getrandom_data(__arch_get_vdso_rng_data(), buffer, len, flags, opaque_state);
+}
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

Le 19/11/2022 à 01:04, Jason A. Donenfeld a écrit :

Quoted 2 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Quoted 1 line

Sorry if I'm a bit slow here to grok what's up.

Maybe I should also have mentionned commit ce7d8056e38b ("powerpc/vdso:
Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation.") for you to have a complete picture.

Quoted 4 lines

Okay, I think I see it now. That's a complicated patch for a simple idea because gettime is more complicated than getrandom. I suspect what you want is something like the below, correct? Seems easy enough.

Yes it is exactly that, powerpc will then call __cvdso_getrandom_data() directly and pass rng_info pointer.

Quoted 29 lines
lib/vdso/getrandom.c +8 -2
index b253e9247706..b3282d7cfb53 100644
@@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ static void memcpy_and_zero(void *dst, void *src, size_t len)
  }
 
  static __always_inline ssize_t
-__cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state)
+__cvdso_getrandom_data(const struct vdso_rng_data *rng_info, void *buffer, size_t len,
+		       unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state)
  {
  	struct vgetrandom_state *state = opaque_state;
-	const struct vdso_rng_data *rng_info = __arch_get_vdso_rng_data();
  	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
  	ssize_t ret = min_t(size_t, MAX_RW_COUNT, len);
  	unsigned long current_generation;
@@ -107,3 +107,9 @@ __cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_sta
  	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
  	goto more_batch;
  }
+
+static __always_inline ssize_t
+__cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state)
+{
+	return __cvdso_getrandom_data(__arch_get_vdso_rng_data(), buffer, len, flags, opaque_state);
+}
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

Quoted 11 lines · Christophe Leroy

Le 19/11/2022 à 01:04, Jason A. Donenfeld a écrit :

Quoted 2 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Quoted 1 line

Sorry if I'm a bit slow here to grok what's up.

Maybe I should also have mentionned commit ce7d8056e38b ("powerpc/vdso:
Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation.") for you to have a complete picture.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Okay, I think I see it now. That's a complicated patch for a simple idea because gettime is more complicated than getrandom. I suspect what you want is something like the below, correct? Seems easy enough.

Yes it is exactly that, powerpc will then call __cvdso_getrandom_data() directly and pass rng_info pointer.

Okay, I'll do that and send out a v+1.

Jason

author maintainer
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

Quoted 12 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Quoted 11 lines · Christophe Leroy

Le 19/11/2022 à 01:04, Jason A. Donenfeld a écrit :

Quoted 2 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Quoted 1 line

Sorry if I'm a bit slow here to grok what's up.

Maybe I should also have mentionned commit ce7d8056e38b ("powerpc/vdso:
Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation.") for you to have a complete picture.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Okay, I think I see it now. That's a complicated patch for a simple idea because gettime is more complicated than getrandom. I suspect what you want is something like the below, correct? Seems easy enough.

Yes it is exactly that, powerpc will then call __cvdso_getrandom_data() directly and pass rng_info pointer.

Okay, I'll do that and send out a v+1.

Alright, new series posted here, with those changes. Let me know if that is workable for you. Since a lot of the vDSO is tied up (currently) with timekeeping stuff, it's a bit tricky adding things to it like this. I've done the best I can to keep it clean and such, but if you want to play around with wiring up powerpc, that might prove to be an interesting exercise in shaking out inconsistencies. New series is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T

Jason

author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH v4 3/3 x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation

In reply to Jason A. Donenfeld

Hook up the generic vDSO implementation to the x86 vDSO data page. Since the existing vDSO infrastructure is heavily based on the timekeeping functionality, which works over arrays of bases, a new macro is introduced for vvars that are not arrays.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                      |  1 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile          |  3 ++-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S        |  2 ++
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c      | 16 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h           | 16 ++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
index 67745ceab0db..210318da7505 100644
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
 	select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
 	select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO
+	select HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM
 	select HOTPLUG_SMT			if SMP
 	select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
 	select NEED_PER_CPU_EMBED_FIRST_CHUNK
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +2 -1
index 3e88b9df8c8f..adc3792dbbac 100644
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_X86_32)		:= y
 VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)	:= y
 
 # files to link into the vdso
-vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
+vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o vgetrandom.o
 vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o
 vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o
 vobjs-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX)	+= vsgx.o
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx.o = -pg
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetrandom.o = -pg
 
 #
 # X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data.
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S +2 -0
index 4bf48462fca7..1919cc39277e 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ VERSION {
 		clock_getres;
 		__vdso_clock_getres;
 		__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave;
+		getrandom;
+		__vdso_getrandom;
 	local: *;
 	};
 }
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c new file +16 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0a0c0ad93cd0
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "../../../../lib/vdso/getrandom.c"
+
+ssize_t __vdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *state)
+{
+	return __cvdso_getrandom(buffer, len, flags, state);
+}
+
+ssize_t getrandom(void *, size_t, unsigned int, void *)
+	__attribute__((weak, alias("__vdso_getrandom")));
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h new file +37 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c414043e975d
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+#ifndef __ASM_VDSO_GETRANDOM_H
+#define __ASM_VDSO_GETRANDOM_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#include <asm/vvar.h>
+
+static __always_inline ssize_t
+getrandom_syscall(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	long ret;
+
+	asm ("syscall" : "=a" (ret) :
+	     "0" (__NR_getrandom), "D" (buffer), "S" (len), "d" (flags) :
+	     "rcx", "r11", "memory");
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#define __vdso_rng_data (VVAR(_vdso_rng_data))
+
+static __always_inline const struct vdso_rng_data *__arch_get_vdso_rng_data(void)
+{
+	if (__vdso_data->clock_mode == VDSO_CLOCKMODE_TIMENS)
+		return (void *)&__vdso_rng_data +
+		       ((void *)&__timens_vdso_data - (void *)&__vdso_data);
+	return &__vdso_rng_data;
+}
+
+#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* __ASM_VDSO_GETRANDOM_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h +2 -0
index be199a9b2676..71c56586a22f 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 #include <asm/vvar.h>
 
 DEFINE_VVAR(struct vdso_data, _vdso_data);
+DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE(struct vdso_rng_data, _vdso_rng_data);
+
 /*
  * Update the vDSO data page to keep in sync with kernel timekeeping.
  */
arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h +16 -0
index 183e98e49ab9..9d9af37f7cab 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
  */
 #define DECLARE_VVAR(offset, type, name) \
 	EMIT_VVAR(name, offset)
+#define DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE(offset, type, name) \
+	EMIT_VVAR(name, offset)
 
 #else
 
@@ -37,6 +39,10 @@ extern char __vvar_page;
 	extern type timens_ ## name[CS_BASES]				\
 	__attribute__((visibility("hidden")));				\
 
+#define DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE(offset, type, name)				\
+	extern type vvar_ ## name					\
+	__attribute__((visibility("hidden")));				\
+
 #define VVAR(name) (vvar_ ## name)
 #define TIMENS(name) (timens_ ## name)
 
@@ -44,12 +50,22 @@ extern char __vvar_page;
 	type name[CS_BASES]						\
 	__attribute__((section(".vvar_" #name), aligned(16))) __visible
 
+#define DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE(type, name)					\
+	type name							\
+	__attribute__((section(".vvar_" #name), aligned(16))) __visible
+
 #endif
 
 /* DECLARE_VVAR(offset, type, name) */
 
 DECLARE_VVAR(128, struct vdso_data, _vdso_data)
 
+#if !defined(_SINGLE_DATA)
+#define _SINGLE_DATA
+DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE(640, struct vdso_rng_data, _vdso_rng_data)
+#endif
+
 #undef DECLARE_VVAR
+#undef DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE
 
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1