implement getrandom() in vDSO
Subsystems (31)
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerv13 cover implement getrandom() in vDSO
Changes v12->v13:
-----------------
- Use helpers in insn-eval.h instead of open coding the same thing via insn.h.
- Due to some enum constants in insn-eval.h clashing with enum constants in an unrelated header that happens to be included by a file this series needs insn-eval.h from, the first patch of this series now renames some enum constants. This is a standalone patch that should probably be applied regardless of the rest of this series.
- Rebase atop the latest random.git master branch, which is itself pretty similar to Linus' tree at the moment.
Changes v11->v12:
-----------------
- In order to avoid mlock()ing pages, and the related rlimit and fork inheritance issues there, Introduce VM_DROPPABLE to prevent swapping while meeting the cache-like requirements of vDSO getrandom().
This has some tenticles in mm/ and arch/x86/ code, so I've marked the two patches for that as still RFC, while the rest of the series is not RFC.
- Mandate that opaque state blobs don't straddle page boundaries, so that VM_DROPPABLE can work on page-level granularity rather than allocation-level granularity.
- Add compiler barriers to vDSO getrandom() to prevent theoretical reordering potential.
- Initialize the trials loop counter in the chacha test.
Changes v10->v11:
-----------------
- Adhemerval's latest glibc patch currently lives here:
https://github.com/zatrazz/glibc/commits/azanella/getrandom-vdso
It's still in flux (he hasn't posted it to glibc-alpha yet), but that should still give some idea.
- Substantially increase documentation detail throughout.
- Numerous fixes to style and clarity.
- Add two kselftests - one for the chacha20 assembly implementation, which compares its output to that of libsodium, and one for the actual vDSO function and vgetrandom_alloc() syscall, which also has some built-in quick & dirty benchmarking functionality.
- Add reserved unsigned long addr argument to syscall, for future use.
- Enforce that flags, addr, and *size_per_each are all zero on input, so that they can actually be used in the future.
- Use VM_LOCKONFAULT|VM_NORESERVE so that memory isn't wasted until it's used.
- Set VM_DONTDUMP to prevent state from being written out to core dumps.
- Do mapping and flag setting all in one operation, so that it's not racy, and so that dropping the mm lock between operations isn't required.
- Due to the above, there's no longer any purpose in selecting VGETRANDOM_ALLOC_SYSCALL, so remove that.
- Don't update *num or *size_per_each until the mapping has succeeded.
- Introduce vdso_kernel_ulong type for representing the long type that the kernel uses, even when in 32-bit compat code on a 64-bit kernel.
- Don't use 'bool' type in the vDSO page, in case of compiler quirks resulting in a different interpretation of the type in different compilation contexts.
--------------
Two statements:
1) Userspace wants faster cryptographically secure random numbers of arbitrary size, big or small.
2) Userspace is currently unable to safely roll its own RNG with the same security profile as getrandom().
Statement (1) has been debated for years, with arguments ranging from "we need faster cryptographically secure card shuffling!" to "the only things that actually need good randomness are keys, which are few and far between" to "actually, TLS CBC nonces are frequent" and so on. I don't intend to wade into that debate substantially, except to note that recently glibc added arc4random(), whose goal is to return a cryptographically secure uint32_t, and there are real user reports of it being too slow. So here we are.
Statement (2) is more interesting. The kernel is the nexus of all entropic inputs that influence the RNG. It is in the best position, and probably the only position, to decide anything at all about the current state of the RNG and of its entropy. One of the things it uniquely knows about is when reseeding is necessary.
For example, when a virtual machine is forked, restored, or duplicated, it's imparative that the RNG doesn't generate the same outputs. For this reason, there's a small protocol between hypervisors and the kernel that indicates this has happened, alongside some ID, which the RNG uses to immediately reseed, so as not to return the same numbers. Were userspace to expand a getrandom() seed from time T1 for the next hour, and at some point T2 < hour, the virtual machine forked, userspace would continue to provide the same numbers to two (or more) different virtual machines, resulting in potential cryptographic catastrophe. Something similar happens on resuming from hibernation (or even suspend), with various compromise scenarios there in mind.
There's a more general reason why userspace rolling its own RNG from a getrandom() seed is fraught. There's a lot of attention paid to this particular Linuxism we have of the RNG being initialized and thus non-blocking or uninitialized and thus blocking until it is initialized. These are our Two Big States that many hold to be the holy differentiating factor between safe and not safe, between cryptographically secure and garbage. The fact is, however, that the distinction between these two states is a hand-wavy wishy-washy inexact approximation. Outside of a few exceptional cases (e.g. a HW RNG is available), we actually don't really ever know with any rigor at all when the RNG is safe and ready (nor when it's compromised). We do the best we can to "estimate" it, but entropy estimation is fundamentally impossible in the general case. So really, we're just doing guess work, and hoping it's good and conservative enough. Let's then assume that there's always some potential error involved in this differentiator.
In fact, under the surface, the RNG is engineered around a different principal, and that is trying to *use* new entropic inputs regularly and at the right specific moments in time. For example, close to boot time, the RNG reseeds itself more often than later. At certain events, like VM fork, the RNG reseeds itself immediately. The various heuristics for when the RNG will use new entropy and how often is really a core aspect of what the RNG has some potential to do decently enough (and something that will probably continue to improve in the future from random.c's present set of algorithms). So in your mind, put away the metal attachment to the Two Big States, which represent an approximation with a potential margin of error. Instead keep in mind that the RNG's primary operating heuristic is how often and exactly when it's going to reseed.
So, if userspace takes a seed from getrandom() at point T1, and uses it for the next hour (or N megabytes or some other meaningless metric), during that time, potential errors in the Two Big States approximation are amplified. During that time potential reseeds are being lost, forgotten, not reflected in the output stream. That's not good.
The simplest statement you could make is that userspace RNGs that expand a getrandom() seed at some point T1 are nearly always *worse*, in some way, than just calling getrandom() every time a random number is desired.
For those reasons, after some discussion on libc-alpha, glibc's arc4random() now just calls getrandom() on each invocation. That's trivially safe, and gives us latitude to then make the safe thing faster without becoming unsafe at our leasure. Card shuffling isn't particularly fast, however.
How do we rectify this? By putting a safe implementation of getrandom() in the vDSO, which has access to whatever information a particular iteration of random.c is using to make its decisions. I use that careful language of "particular iteration of random.c", because the set of things that a vDSO getrandom() implementation might need for making decisions as good as the kernel's will likely change over time. This isn't just a matter of exporting certain *data* to userspace. We're not going to commit to a "data API" where the various heuristics used are exposed, locking in how the kernel works for decades to come, and then leave it to various userspaces to roll something on top and shoot themselves in the foot and have all sorts of complexity disasters. Rather, vDSO getrandom() is supposed to be the *same exact algorithm* that runs in the kernel, except it's been hoisted into userspace as much as possible. And so vDSO getrandom() and kernel getrandom() will always mirror each other hermetically.
API-wise, the vDSO gains this function:
ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);
The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to some state allocated with vgetrandom_alloc(), explained below. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior.
Then, we introduce a new syscall:
void *vgetrandom_alloc(unsigned int *num, unsigned int *size_per_each,
unsigned long addr, unsigned int flags);
This takes a hinted number of opaque states in num, and returns a pointer to an array of opaque states, the number actually allocated back in num, and the size in bytes of each one in size_per_each, enabling a libc to slice up the returned array into a state per each thread. (The flags and addr arguments, as well as the *size_per_each input value, are reserved for the future and are forced to be zero for now.)
Libc is expected to allocate a chunk of these on first use, and then dole them out to threads as they're created, allocating more when needed. The returned address of the first state may be passed to munmap(2) with a length of num * size_per_each, in order to deallocate the memory.
We very intentionally do *not* leave state allocation up to the caller of vgetrandom, but provide vgetrandom_alloc for that allocation. There are too many weird things that can go wrong, and it's important that vDSO does not provide too generic of a mechanism. It's not going to store its state in just any old memory address. It'll do it only in ones it allocates.
Right now this means it uses a new mm flag called VM_DROPPABLE, along with VM_WIPEONFORK. In the future maybe there will be other interesting page flags or anti-heartbleed measures, or other platform-specific kernel-specific things that can be set from the syscall. Again, it's important that the kernel has a say in how this works rather than agreeing to operate on any old address; memory isn't neutral.
The interesting meat of the implementation is in lib/vdso/getrandom.c, as generic C code, and it aims to mainly follow random.c's buffered fast key erasure logic. Before the RNG is initialized, it falls back to the syscall. Right now it uses a simple generation counter to make its decisions on reseeding (though this could be made more extensive over time).
The actual place that has the most work to do is in all of the other files. Most of the vDSO shared page infrastructure is centered around gettimeofday, and so the main structs are all in arrays for different timestamp types, and attached to time namespaces, and so forth. I've done the best I could to add onto this in an unintrusive way.
In my test results, performance is pretty stellar (around 15x for uint32_t generation), and it seems to be working. There's an extended example in the second commit of this series, showing how the syscall and the vDSO function are meant to be used together.
Jason A. Donenfeld (7):
x86: lib: Separate instruction decoder MMIO type from MMIO trace
mm: add VM_DROPPABLE for designating always lazily freeable mappings
x86: mm: Skip faulting instruction for VM_DROPPABLE faults
random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
arch: allocate vgetrandom_alloc() syscall number
random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
MAINTAINERS | 2 + arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 + arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 26 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 2 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S | 177 +++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c | 17 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h | 18 +- arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h | 55 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h | 16 + arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 18 +- arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 20 +- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 ++ arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + drivers/char/random.c | 143 +++++++++ fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 + include/linux/mm.h | 8 + include/linux/mm_types.h | 5 +- include/linux/syscalls.h | 3 + include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 7 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +- include/vdso/datapage.h | 12 + include/vdso/getrandom.h | 44 +++ include/vdso/types.h | 35 +++ kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 + lib/vdso/Kconfig | 6 + lib/vdso/getrandom.c | 224 ++++++++++++++ mm/Kconfig | 3 + mm/memory.c | 6 + mm/mempolicy.c | 3 + mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- mm/rmap.c | 5 +- tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +- .../arch/mips/entry/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + .../arch/powerpc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + .../perf/arch/s390/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + .../arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/Makefile | 11 + .../testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c | 43 +++ .../selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c | 283 ++++++++++++++++++ 59 files changed, 1212 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h create mode 100644 include/vdso/getrandom.h create mode 100644 include/vdso/types.h create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v13 1/7 x86: lib: Separate instruction decoder MMIO type from MMIO trace
Both mmiotrace.h and insn-eval.h define various MMIO_ enum constants. Rename the insn ones to have a INSN_ prefix, so that the headers can be used from the same source file.
---
I sent this already as a separate patch that I'm hoping can land in 6.2 as a fix, and then I can rebase this series on Linus' tree after that
lands: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h | 18 +++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 18 +++++++++--------- arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +13 -13
@@ -386,8 +386,8 @@ static int handle_mmio(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve) {unsigned long *reg, val, vaddr;char buffer[MAX_INSN_SIZE ]; +enum insn_mmio_type mmio;struct insn insn = {}; -enum mmio_type mmio;int size, extend_size;u8 extend_val =0 ;
@@ -402,10 +402,10 @@ static int handle_mmio(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)return -EINVAL ; mmio =insn_decode_mmio (&insn, &size); -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (mmio ==MMIO_DECODE_FAILED )) +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (mmio ==INSN_MMIO_DECODE_FAILED ))return -EINVAL ; -if (mmio !=MMIO_WRITE_IMM && mmio !=MMIO_MOVS ) { +if (mmio !=INSN_MMIO_WRITE_IMM && mmio !=INSN_MMIO_MOVS ) { reg =insn_get_modrm_reg_ptr (&insn, regs);if (!reg)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -426,23 +426,23 @@ static int handle_mmio(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)/* Handle writes first */ switch (mmio) { -case MMIO_WRITE : +case INSN_MMIO_WRITE :memcpy (&val, reg, size);if (!mmio_write (size, ve->gpa, val))return -EIO ;return insn.length; -case MMIO_WRITE_IMM : +case INSN_MMIO_WRITE_IMM : val = insn.immediate.value;if (!mmio_write (size, ve->gpa, val))return -EIO ;return insn.length; -case MMIO_READ : -case MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND : -case MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND : +case INSN_MMIO_READ : +case INSN_MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND : +case INSN_MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND :/* Reads are handled below */ break ; -case MMIO_MOVS : -case MMIO_DECODE_FAILED : +case INSN_MMIO_MOVS : +case INSN_MMIO_DECODE_FAILED :/* * MMIO was accessed with an instruction that could not be * decoded or handled properly. It was likely not using io.h
@@ -459,15 +459,15 @@ static int handle_mmio(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)return -EIO ;switch (mmio) { -case MMIO_READ : +case INSN_MMIO_READ :/* Zero-extend for 32-bit operation */ extend_size = size ==4 ?sizeof (*reg) :0 ;break ; -case MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND : +case INSN_MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND :/* Zero extend based on operand size */ extend_size = insn.opnd_bytes;break ; -case MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND : +case INSN_MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND :/* Sign extend based on operand size */ extend_size = insn.opnd_bytes;if (size ==1 && val &BIT (7 ))
arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h +9 -9
@@ -32,16 +32,16 @@ int insn_fetch_from_user_inatomic(struct pt_regs *regs,bool insn_decode_from_regs (struct insn *insn,struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned char buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE ],int buf_size); -enum mmio_type { -MMIO_DECODE_FAILED , -MMIO_WRITE , -MMIO_WRITE_IMM , -MMIO_READ , -MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND , -MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND , -MMIO_MOVS , +enum insn_mmio_type { +INSN_MMIO_DECODE_FAILED , +INSN_MMIO_WRITE , +INSN_MMIO_WRITE_IMM , +INSN_MMIO_READ , +INSN_MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND , +INSN_MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND , +INSN_MMIO_MOVS , }; -enum mmio_type insn_decode_mmio (struct insn *insn,int *bytes); +enum insn_mmio_type insn_decode_mmio (struct insn *insn,int *bytes);#endif /* _ASM_X86_INSN_EVAL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +9 -9
@@ -1536,32 +1536,32 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio_movs(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio (struct ghcb *ghcb,struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt) {struct insn *insn = &ctxt->insn; +enum insn_mmio_type mmio;unsigned int bytes =0 ; -enum mmio_type mmio;enum es_result ret;u8 sign_byte;long *reg_data; mmio =insn_decode_mmio (insn, &bytes); -if (mmio ==MMIO_DECODE_FAILED ) +if (mmio ==INSN_MMIO_DECODE_FAILED )return ES_DECODE_FAILED ; -if (mmio !=MMIO_WRITE_IMM && mmio !=MMIO_MOVS ) { +if (mmio !=INSN_MMIO_WRITE_IMM && mmio !=INSN_MMIO_MOVS ) { reg_data =insn_get_modrm_reg_ptr (insn, ctxt->regs);if (!reg_data)return ES_DECODE_FAILED ; }switch (mmio) { -case MMIO_WRITE : +case INSN_MMIO_WRITE :memcpy (ghcb->shared_buffer, reg_data, bytes); ret =vc_do_mmio (ghcb, ctxt, bytes, false);break ; -case MMIO_WRITE_IMM : +case INSN_MMIO_WRITE_IMM :memcpy (ghcb->shared_buffer, insn->immediate1.bytes, bytes); ret =vc_do_mmio (ghcb, ctxt, bytes, false);break ; -case MMIO_READ : +case INSN_MMIO_READ : ret =vc_do_mmio (ghcb, ctxt, bytes, true);if (ret)break ;
@@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)memcpy (reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);break ; -case MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND : +case INSN_MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND : ret =vc_do_mmio (ghcb, ctxt, bytes, true);if (ret)break ;
@@ -1581,7 +1581,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)memset (reg_data,0 , insn->opnd_bytes);memcpy (reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);break ; -case MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND : +case INSN_MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND : ret =vc_do_mmio (ghcb, ctxt, bytes, true);if (ret)break ;
@@ -1600,7 +1600,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)memset (reg_data, sign_byte, insn->opnd_bytes);memcpy (reg_data, ghcb->shared_buffer, bytes);break ; -case MMIO_MOVS : +case INSN_MMIO_MOVS : ret =vc_handle_mmio_movs (ctxt, bytes);break ;default :
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c +10 -10
@@ -1595,16 +1595,16 @@ bool insn_decode_from_regs(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs,* Returns: * * Type of the instruction. Size of the memory operand is stored in -* @bytes. If decode failed, MMIO_DECODE_FAILED returned. +* @bytes. If decode failed, INSN_MMIO_DECODE_FAILED returned. */ -enum mmio_type insn_decode_mmio (struct insn *insn,int *bytes) +enum insn_mmio_type insn_decode_mmio (struct insn *insn,int *bytes) { -enum mmio_type type =MMIO_DECODE_FAILED ; +enum insn_mmio_type type =INSN_MMIO_DECODE_FAILED ; *bytes =0 ;if (insn_get_opcode (insn)) -return MMIO_DECODE_FAILED ; +return INSN_MMIO_DECODE_FAILED ;switch (insn->opcode.bytes[0 ]) {case 0x88 :/* MOV m8,r8 */
@@ -1613,7 +1613,7 @@ enum mmio_type insn_decode_mmio(struct insn *insn, int *bytes)case 0x89 :/* MOV m16/m32/m64, r16/m32/m64 */ if (!*bytes) *bytes = insn->opnd_bytes; - type =MMIO_WRITE ; + type =INSN_MMIO_WRITE ;break ;case 0xc6 :/* MOV m8, imm8 */
@@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ enum mmio_type insn_decode_mmio(struct insn *insn, int *bytes)case 0xc7 :/* MOV m16/m32/m64, imm16/imm32/imm64 */ if (!*bytes) *bytes = insn->opnd_bytes; - type =MMIO_WRITE_IMM ; + type =INSN_MMIO_WRITE_IMM ;break ;case 0x8a :/* MOV r8, m8 */
@@ -1631,7 +1631,7 @@ enum mmio_type insn_decode_mmio(struct insn *insn, int *bytes)case 0x8b :/* MOV r16/r32/r64, m16/m32/m64 */ if (!*bytes) *bytes = insn->opnd_bytes; - type =MMIO_READ ; + type =INSN_MMIO_READ ;break ;case 0xa4 :/* MOVS m8, m8 */
@@ -1640,7 +1640,7 @@ enum mmio_type insn_decode_mmio(struct insn *insn, int *bytes)case 0xa5 :/* MOVS m16/m32/m64, m16/m32/m64 */ if (!*bytes) *bytes = insn->opnd_bytes; - type =MMIO_MOVS ; + type =INSN_MMIO_MOVS ;break ;case 0x0f :/* Two-byte instruction */
@@ -1651,7 +1651,7 @@ enum mmio_type insn_decode_mmio(struct insn *insn, int *bytes)case 0xb7 :/* MOVZX r32/r64, m16 */ if (!*bytes) *bytes =2 ; - type =MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND ; + type =INSN_MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND ;break ;case 0xbe :/* MOVSX r16/r32/r64, m8 */
@@ -1660,7 +1660,7 @@ enum mmio_type insn_decode_mmio(struct insn *insn, int *bytes)case 0xbf :/* MOVSX r32/r64, m16 */ if (!*bytes) *bytes =2 ; - type =MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND ; + type =INSN_MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND ;break ; }break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v13 2/7 mm: add VM_DROPPABLE for designating always lazily freeable mappings
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldThe vDSO getrandom() implementation works with a buffer allocated with a new system call that has certain requirements:
- It shouldn't be written to core dumps.
* Easy: VM_DONTDUMP.
- It should be zeroed on fork.
* Easy: VM_WIPEONFORK.
- It shouldn't be written to swap.
* Uh-oh: mlock is rlimited.
* Uh-oh: mlock isn't inherited by forks.
- It shouldn't reserve actual memory, but it also shouldn't crash when page faulting in memory if none is available
* Uh-oh: MAP_NORESERVE respects vm.overcommit_memory=2.
* Uh-oh: VM_NORESERVE means segfaults.
It turns out that the vDSO getrandom() function has three really nice characteristics that we can exploit to solve this problem:
1) Due to being wiped during fork(), the vDSO code is already robust to having the contents of the pages it reads zeroed out midway through the function's execution.
2) In the absolute worst case of whatever contingency we're coding for, we have the option to fallback to the getrandom() syscall, and everything is fine.
3) The buffers the function uses are only ever useful for a maximum of 60 seconds -- a sort of cache, rather than a long term allocation.
These characteristics mean that we can introduce VM_DROPPABLE, which has the following semantics:
a) It never is written out to swap.
b) Under memory pressure, mm can just drop the pages (so that they're zero when read back again).
c) If there's not enough memory to service a page fault, it's not fatal, and no signal is sent. Instead, writes are simply lost.
d) It is inherited by fork.
e) It doesn't count against the mlock budget, since nothing is locked.
This is fairly simple to implement, with the one snag that we have to use 64-bit VM_* flags, but this shouldn't be a problem, since the only consumers will probably be 64-bit anyway.
This way, allocations used by vDSO getrandom() can use:
VM_DROPPABLE | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_WIPEONFORK | VM_NORESERVE
And there will be no problem with OOMing, crashing on overcommitment, using memory when not in use, not wiping on fork(), coredumps, or writing out to swap.
At the moment, rather than skipping writes on OOM, the fault handler just returns to userspace, and the instruction is retried. This isn't terrible, but it's not quite what is intended. The actual instruction skipping has to be implemented arch-by-arch, but so does this whole vDSO series, so that's fine. The following commit addresses it for x86.
--- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++ include/linux/mm.h | 8 ++++++++ include/trace/events/mmflags.h | 7 +++++++ mm/Kconfig | 3 +++ mm/memory.c | 4 ++++ mm/mempolicy.c | 3 +++ mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- mm/rmap.c | 5 +++-- 8 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/proc/task_mmu.c +3 -0
@@ -711,6 +711,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma) #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR [ilog2(VM_UFFD_MINOR)] = "ui",#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */ +#ifdef CONFIG_NEED_VM_DROPPABLE + [ilog2(VM_DROPPABLE)] = "dp", +#endif };size_t i;
include/linux/mm.h +8 -0
@@ -315,11 +315,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5 37/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4) +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -335,6 +337,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#endif #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_NEED_VM_DROPPABLE +# define VM_DROPPABLE VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 +#else +# define VM_DROPPABLE 0 +#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_X86 )# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC )
include/trace/events/mmflags.h +7 -0
@@ -163,6 +163,12 @@ IF_HAVE_PG_SKIP_KASAN_POISON(PG_skip_kasan_poison, "skip_kasan_poison")# define IF_HAVE_UFFD_MINOR (flag, name)#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_NEED_VM_DROPPABLE +# define IF_HAVE_VM_DROPPABLE (flag, name) {flag, name}, +#else +# define IF_HAVE_VM_DROPPABLE (flag, name) +#endif +#define __def_vmaflag_names \ {VM_READ, "read" }, \ {VM_WRITE, "write" }, \
@@ -195,6 +201,7 @@ IF_HAVE_VM_SOFTDIRTY(VM_SOFTDIRTY, "softdirty" ) \ {VM_MIXEDMAP, "mixedmap" }, \ {VM_HUGEPAGE, "hugepage" }, \ {VM_NOHUGEPAGE, "nohugepage" }, \ +IF_HAVE_VM_DROPPABLE(VM_DROPPABLE, "droppable" ) \ {VM_MERGEABLE, "mergeable" } \#define show_vma_flags (flags) \
mm/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -1030,6 +1030,9 @@ config ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS bool config ARCH_HAS_PKEYS bool +config NEED_VM_DROPPABLE + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + bool config ARCH_USES_PG_ARCH_X bool
mm/memory.c +4 -0
@@ -5220,6 +5220,10 @@ vm_fault_t handle_mm_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,lru_gen_exit_fault (); +/* If the mapping is droppable, then errors due to OOM aren't fatal. */ +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_DROPPABLE ) + ret &= ~VM_FAULT_OOM ; +if (flags &FAULT_FLAG_USER ) {mem_cgroup_exit_user_fault ();/*
mm/mempolicy.c +3 -0
@@ -2172,6 +2172,9 @@ struct folio *vma_alloc_folio(gfp_t gfp, int order, struct vm_area_struct *vma,int preferred_nid;nodemask_t *nmask; +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_DROPPABLE ) + gfp |= __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY; + pol =get_vma_policy (vma, addr);if (pol->mode ==MPOL_INTERLEAVE ) {
mm/mprotect.c +1 -1
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma, may_expand_vm(mm, oldflags, nrpages))return -ENOMEM ;if (!(oldflags & (VM_ACCOUNT |VM_WRITE |VM_HUGETLB | -VM_SHARED |VM_NORESERVE ))) { +VM_SHARED |VM_NORESERVE |VM_DROPPABLE ))) { charged = nrpages;if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm (mm, charged))return -ENOMEM ;
mm/rmap.c +3 -2
@@ -1294,7 +1294,8 @@ void page_add_new_anon_rmap(struct page *page,int nr;VM_BUG_ON_VMA (address < vma->vm_start || address >= vma->vm_end, vma); -__SetPageSwapBacked (page); +if (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_DROPPABLE )) +__SetPageSwapBacked (page);if (likely (!PageCompound (page))) {/* increment count (starts at -1) */
@@ -1683,7 +1684,7 @@ static bool try_to_unmap_one(struct folio *folio, struct vm_area_struct *vma,* plus the rmap(s) (dropped by discard:). */ if (ref_count ==1 + map_count && - !folio_test_dirty (folio)) { + (!folio_test_dirty (folio) || (vma->vm_flags &VM_DROPPABLE ))) {/* Invalidate as we cleared the pte */ mmu_notifier_invalidate_range (mm, address, address +PAGE_SIZE );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v13 3/7 x86: mm: Skip faulting instruction for VM_DROPPABLE faults
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldThe prior commit introduced VM_DROPPABLE, but in a limited form where the faulting instruction was retried instead of skipped. Finish that up with the platform-specific aspect of skipping the actual instruction.
This works by copying userspace's %rip to a stack buffer of size MAX_INSN_SIZE, decoding it, and then adding the length of the decoded instruction to userspace's %rip. In the event any of these fail, just fallback to not advancing %rip and trying again.
--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/mm_types.h | 5 ++++- mm/memory.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +19 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@#include <asm/kvm_para.h> /* kvm_handle_async_pf */ #include <asm/vdso.h> /* fixup_vdso_exception() */ #include <asm/irq_stack.h> +#include <asm/insn.h> /* struct insn */ +#include <asm/insn-eval.h> /* insn_fetch_from_user(), ... */ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <asm/trace/exceptions.h>
@@ -1454,6 +1456,23 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, }mmap_read_unlock (mm); + +if (fault &VM_FAULT_SKIP_INSN ) { +u8 buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE ]; +struct insn insn; +int nr_copied; + + nr_copied =insn_fetch_from_user (regs, buf); +if (nr_copied <=0 ) +return ; + +if (!insn_decode_from_regs (&insn, regs, buf, nr_copied)) +return ; + + regs->ip += insn.length; +return ; + } +if (likely (!(fault &VM_FAULT_ERROR )))return ;
include/linux/mm_types.h +4 -1
@@ -945,6 +945,7 @@ typedef __bitwise unsigned int vm_fault_t;* fsync() to complete (for synchronous page faults * in DAX) * @VM_FAULT_COMPLETED: ->fault completed, meanwhile mmap lock released +* @VM_FAULT_SKIP_INSN: ->handle the fault by skipping faulting instruction * @VM_FAULT_HINDEX_MASK: mask HINDEX value * */
@@ -962,6 +963,7 @@ enum vm_fault_reason {VM_FAULT_DONE_COW = (__force vm_fault_t )0x001000 ,VM_FAULT_NEEDDSYNC = (__force vm_fault_t )0x002000 ,VM_FAULT_COMPLETED = (__force vm_fault_t )0x004000 , +VM_FAULT_SKIP_INSN = (__force vm_fault_t )0x008000 , VM_FAULT_HINDEX_MASK = (__force vm_fault_t)0x0f0000, };
@@ -985,7 +987,8 @@ enum vm_fault_reason { { VM_FAULT_RETRY, "RETRY" }, \ { VM_FAULT_FALLBACK, "FALLBACK" }, \ { VM_FAULT_DONE_COW, "DONE_COW" }, \ - { VM_FAULT_NEEDDSYNC, "NEEDDSYNC" } + { VM_FAULT_NEEDDSYNC, "NEEDDSYNC" }, \ + { VM_FAULT_SKIP_INSN, "SKIP_INSN" } struct vm_special_mapping {const char *name;/* The name, e.g. "[vdso]". */
mm/memory.c +3 -1
@@ -5221,8 +5221,10 @@ vm_fault_t handle_mm_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,lru_gen_exit_fault ();/* If the mapping is droppable, then errors due to OOM aren't fatal. */ -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_DROPPABLE ) +if ((ret &VM_FAULT_OOM ) && (vma->vm_flags &VM_DROPPABLE )) { ret &= ~VM_FAULT_OOM ; + ret |=VM_FAULT_SKIP_INSN ; + }if (flags &FAULT_FLAG_USER ) {mem_cgroup_exit_user_fault ();
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v13 4/7 random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldThe vDSO getrandom() works over an opaque per-thread state of an unexported size, which must be marked VM_WIPEONFORK, VM_DONTDUMP, VM_NORESERVE, and VM_DROPPABLE for proper operation. Over time, the nuances of these allocations may change or grow or even differ based on architectural features.
The syscall has the signature:
void *vgetrandom_alloc(unsigned int *num, unsigned int *size_per_each,
unsigned long addr, unsigned int flags);
This takes a hinted number of opaque states in num, and returns a pointer to an array of opaque states, the number actually allocated back in num, and the size in bytes of each one in size_per_each, enabling a libc to slice up the returned array into a state per each thread, while ensuring that no single state straddles a page boundary. (The flags and addr arguments, as well as the *size_per_each input value, are reserved for the future and are forced to be zero zero for now.)
Libc is expected to allocate a chunk of these on first use, and then dole them out to threads as they're created, allocating more when needed. The returned address of the first state may be passed to munmap(2) with a length of num * size_per_each, in order to deallocate the memory.
We very intentionally do *not* leave state allocation for vDSO getrandom() up to userspace itself, but rather provide this new syscall for such allocations. vDSO getrandom() must not store its state in just any old memory address, but rather just ones that the kernel specially allocates for it, leaving the particularities of those allocations up to the kernel.
The allocation of states is intended to be integrated into libc's thread management. As an illustrative example, the following code might be used to do the same outside of libc. Though, vgetrandom_alloc() is not expected to be exposed outside of libc, and the pthread usage here is expected to be elided into libc internals. This allocation scheme is very naive and does not shrink; other implementations may choose to be more complex.
static void *vgetrandom_alloc(unsigned int *num, unsigned int *size_per_each) {
*size_per_each = 0; /* Must be zero on input. */
return (void *)syscall(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, &num, &size_per_each,
0 /* reserved @addr */, 0 /* reserved @flags */);
}
static struct {
pthread_mutex_t lock;
void **states;
size_t len, cap;
} grnd_allocator = {
.lock = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER
};
static void *vgetrandom_get_state(void)
{
void *state = NULL; pthread_mutex_lock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
if (!grnd_allocator.len) {
size_t new_cap;
size_t page_size = getpagesize();
unsigned int num = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN); /* Could be arbitrary, just a hint. */
unsigned int size_per_each;
void *new_block = vgetrandom_alloc(&num, &size_per_each);
void *new_states;
if (new_block == MAP_FAILED)
goto out;
new_cap = grnd_allocator.cap + num;
new_states = reallocarray(grnd_allocator.states, new_cap, sizeof(*grnd_allocator.states));
if (!new_states) {
munmap(new_block, num * size_per_each);
goto out;
}
grnd_allocator.cap = new_cap;
grnd_allocator.states = new_states;
for (size_t i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
grnd_allocator.states[i] = new_block;
if (((uintptr_t)new_block & (page_size - 1)) + size_per_each > page_size)
new_block = (void *)(((uintptr_t)new_block + page_size) & (page_size - 1));
else
new_block += size_per_each;
}
grnd_allocator.len = num;
}
state = grnd_allocator.states[--grnd_allocator.len]; out:
pthread_mutex_unlock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
return state;
}
static void vgetrandom_put_state(void *state)
{
if (!state)
return;
pthread_mutex_lock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
grnd_allocator.states[grnd_allocator.len++] = state;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
}--- MAINTAINERS | 1 + drivers/char/random.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/syscalls.h | 3 + include/vdso/getrandom.h | 16 +++++ kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 + lib/vdso/Kconfig | 6 ++ 6 files changed, 165 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/vdso/getrandom.h
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -17517,6 +17517,7 @@ T: git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git S: Maintained F: drivers/char/random.c F: drivers/virt/vmgenid.c +F: include/vdso/getrandom.h RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM M: Matt Porter <[email protected]>
drivers/char/random.c +136 -0
160 lines not on this page · raw message
include/linux/syscalls.h +3 -0
@@ -1008,6 +1008,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void __user *uargs);asmlinkage long sys_getrandom (char __user *buf,size_t count,unsigned int flags); +asmlinkage long sys_vgetrandom_alloc (unsigned int __user *num, +unsigned int __user *size_per_each, +unsigned long addr,unsigned int flags);asmlinkage long sys_memfd_create (const char __user *uname_ptr,unsigned int flags);asmlinkage long sys_bpf (int cmd,union bpf_attr *attr,unsigned int size); asmlinkage long sys_execveat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
include/vdso/getrandom.h new file +16 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved. +*/ + +#ifndef _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H +#define _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H + +/** +* struct vgetrandom_state - State used by vDSO getrandom() and allocated by vgetrandom_alloc(). +* +* Currently empty, as the vDSO getrandom() function has not yet been implemented. +*/ +struct vgetrandom_state {int placeholder; }; + +#endif /* _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H */
kernel/sys_ni.c +3 -0
@@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_free);/* memfd_secret */ COND_SYSCALL (memfd_secret); +/* random */ +COND_SYSCALL (vgetrandom_alloc); +/* * Architecture specific weak syscall entries. */
lib/vdso/Kconfig +6 -0
@@ -31,3 +31,9 @@ config GENERIC_VDSO_TIME_NS VDSO endif + +config VDSO_GETRANDOM + bool + select NEED_VM_DROPPABLE + help + Selected by architectures that support vDSO getrandom().
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v13 5/7 arch: allocate vgetrandom_alloc() syscall number
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldAdd vgetrandom_alloc() as syscall 451 (or 561 on alpha) by adding it to all of the various syscall.tbl and unistd.h files.
--- arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 ++ arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 + arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 ++++- tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 ++++- tools/perf/arch/mips/entry/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + tools/perf/arch/powerpc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + tools/perf/arch/s390/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + 24 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -490,3 +490,4 @@ 558 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 559 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 560 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_ni_syscall +561 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -464,3 +464,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -1
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@#define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)#define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800) -#define __NR_compat_syscalls 451 +#define __NR_compat_syscalls 452#endif #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h +2 -0
@@ -907,6 +907,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_process_mrelease, sys_process_mrelease) __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)#define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450 __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node) +#define __NR_vgetrandom_alloc 451 +__SYSCALL (__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, sys_vgetrandom_alloc)/* * Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -371,3 +371,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -450,3 +450,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -456,3 +456,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -389,3 +389,4 @@ 448 n32 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 n32 futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 n32 set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 n32 vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -365,3 +365,4 @@ 448 n64 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 n64 futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 n64 vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -438,3 +438,4 @@ 448 o32 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 o32 futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 o32 set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 o32 vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -448,3 +448,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -537,3 +537,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 nospu set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -453,3 +453,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -453,3 +453,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -496,3 +496,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -455,3 +455,4 @@ 448 i386 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 i386 futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 i386 set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 i386 vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -421,3 +421,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +4 -1
@@ -886,8 +886,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)#define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450 __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node) +#define __NR_vgetrandom_alloc 451 +__SYSCALL(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, sys_vgetrandom_alloc) +#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 451 +#define __NR_syscalls 452/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +4 -1
@@ -886,8 +886,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)#define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450 __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node) +#define __NR_vgetrandom_alloc 451 +__SYSCALL(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, sys_vgetrandom_alloc) +#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 451 +#define __NR_syscalls 452/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
tools/perf/arch/mips/entry/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -365,3 +365,4 @@ 448 n64 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 n64 futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 n64 vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
tools/perf/arch/powerpc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -534,3 +534,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 nospu set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
tools/perf/arch/s390/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -453,3 +453,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v13 6/7 random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldProvide a generic C vDSO getrandom() implementation, which operates on an opaque state returned by vgetrandom_alloc() and produces random bytes the same way as getrandom(). This has a the API signature:
ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);
The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to the opaque allocated state. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom() syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior.
The actual vDSO RNG algorithm implemented is the same one implemented by drivers/char/random.c, using the same fast-erasure techniques as that. Should the in-kernel implementation change, so too will the vDSO one.
It requires an implementation of ChaCha20 that does not use any stack, in order to maintain forward secrecy if a multi-threaded program forks (though this does not account for a similar issue with SA_SIGINFO copying registers to the stack), so this is left as an architecture-specific fill-in. Stack-less ChaCha20 is an easy algorithm to implement on a variety of architectures, so this shouldn't be too onerous.
Initially, the state is keyless, and so the first call makes a getrandom() syscall to generate that key, and then uses it for subsequent calls. By keeping track of a generation counter, it knows when its key is invalidated and it should fetch a new one using the syscall. Later, more than just a generation counter might be used.
Since MADV_WIPEONFORK is set on the opaque state, the key and related state is wiped during a fork(), so secrets don't roll over into new processes, and the same state doesn't accidentally generate the same random stream. The generation counter, as well, is always >0, so that the 0 counter is a useful indication of a fork() or otherwise uninitialized state.
If the kernel RNG is not yet initialized, then the vDSO always calls the syscall, because that behavior cannot be emulated in userspace, but fortunately that state is short lived and only during early boot. If it has been initialized, then there is no need to inspect the flags argument, because the behavior does not change post-initialization regardless of the flags value.
Since the opaque state passed to it is mutated, vDSO getrandom() is not reentrant, when used with the same opaque state, which libc should be mindful of.
vgetrandom_alloc() and vDSO getrandom() provide the ability for userspace to generate random bytes quickly and safely, and are intended to be integrated into libc's thread management. As an illustrative example, together with the example code from "random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall", the following code might be used to do the same outside of libc. In a libc, only the non-static vgetrandom() function at the end would be exported as part of a getrandom() implementations, and the various pthread-isms are expected to be elided into libc internals.
static struct {
ssize_t(*fn)(void *buf, size_t len, unsigned long flags, void *state);
pthread_key_t key;
pthread_once_t initialized;
} grnd_ctx = {
.initialized = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT
};
static void vgetrandom_init(void)
{
if (pthread_key_create(&grnd_ctx.key, vgetrandom_put_state) != 0)
return;
grnd_ctx.fn = vdso_sym("LINUX_2.6", "__vdso_getrandom");
}
ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buf, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
{
void *state; pthread_once(&grnd_ctx.initialized, vgetrandom_init);
if (!grnd_ctx.fn)
return getrandom(buf, len, flags);
state = pthread_getspecific(grnd_ctx.key);
if (!state) {
state = vgetrandom_get_state();
if (pthread_setspecific(grnd_ctx.key, state) != 0) {
vgetrandom_put_state(state);
state = NULL;
}
if (!state)
return getrandom(buf, len, flags);
}
return grnd_ctx.fn(buf, len, flags, state);}
--- MAINTAINERS | 1 + drivers/char/random.c | 7 + include/vdso/datapage.h | 12 + include/vdso/getrandom.h | 32 +- include/vdso/types.h | 35 +++ lib/vdso/getrandom.c | 224 ++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/Makefile | 2 + .../selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c | 283 ++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 595 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/vdso/types.h create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -17518,6 +17518,7 @@ S: Maintained F: drivers/char/random.c F: drivers/virt/vmgenid.c F: include/vdso/getrandom.h +F: lib/vdso/getrandom.c RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM M: Matt Porter <[email protected]>
drivers/char/random.c +7 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@#include <crypto/blake2s.h> #ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM #include <vdso/getrandom.h> +#include <vdso/datapage.h> #endif #include <asm/archrandom.h> #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -407,6 +408,9 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work)if (next_gen ==ULONG_MAX ) ++next_gen;WRITE_ONCE (base_crng.generation, next_gen); +#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM +smp_store_release (&_vdso_rng_data.generation, next_gen +1 ); +#endif if (!static_branch_likely (&crng_is_ready)) crng_init =CRNG_READY ;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);
@@ -857,6 +861,9 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)if (static_key_initialized)execute_in_process_context (crng_set_ready, &set_ready);atomic_notifier_call_chain (&random_ready_notifier,0 ,NULL ); +#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM +smp_store_release (&_vdso_rng_data.is_ready, true); +#endif wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN );pr_notice ("crng init done\n" );
include/vdso/datapage.h +12 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <vdso/time.h> #include <vdso/time32.h> #include <vdso/time64.h> +#include <vdso/types.h> #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_VDSO_DATA #include <asm/vdso/data.h>
@@ -109,6 +110,16 @@ struct vdso_data {struct arch_vdso_data arch_data; }; +/** +* struct vdso_rng_data - vdso RNG state information +* @generation: counter representing the number of RNG reseeds +* @is_ready: boolean signaling whether the RNG is initialized +*/ +struct vdso_rng_data { +vdso_kernel_ulong generation; +u8 is_ready; +}; +/* * We use the hidden visibility to prevent the compiler from generating a GOT * relocation. Not only is going through a GOT useless (the entry couldn't and
@@ -120,6 +131,7 @@ struct vdso_data {*/ extern struct vdso_data _vdso_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); extern struct vdso_data _timens_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); +extern struct vdso_rng_data _vdso_rng_data __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));/* * The generic vDSO implementation requires that gettimeofday.h
include/vdso/getrandom.h +30 -2
@@ -6,11 +6,39 @@#ifndef _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H#define _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H +#include <crypto/chacha.h> +#include <vdso/types.h> +/** * struct vgetrandom_state - State used by vDSO getrandom() and allocated by vgetrandom_alloc(). * -* Currently empty, as the vDSO getrandom() function has not yet been implemented. +* @batch: One and a half ChaCha20 blocks of buffered RNG output. +* +* @key: Key to be used for generating next batch. +* +* @batch_key: Union of the prior two members, which is exactly two full +* ChaCha20 blocks in size, so that @batch and @key can be filled +* together. +* +* @generation: Snapshot of @rng_info->generation in the vDSO data page at +* the time @key was generated. +* +* @pos: Offset into @batch of the next available random byte. +* +* @in_use: Reentrancy guard for reusing a state within the same thread +* due to signal handlers. */ -struct vgetrandom_state {int placeholder; }; +struct vgetrandom_state { +union { +struct { +u8 batch[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE *3 /2 ]; +u32 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE /sizeof (u32)]; + }; +u8 batch_key[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE *2 ]; + }; +vdso_kernel_ulong generation; +u8 pos; +bool in_use; +};#endif /* _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H */
include/vdso/types.h new file +35 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved. +*/ +#ifndef __VDSO_TYPES_H +#define __VDSO_TYPES_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +/** +* type vdso_kernel_ulong - unsigned long type that matches kernel's unsigned long +* +* Data shared between userspace and the kernel must operate the same way in both 64-bit code and in +* 32-bit compat code, over the same potentially 64-bit kernel. This type represents the size of an +* unsigned long as used by kernel code. This isn't necessarily the same as an unsigned long as used +* by userspace, however. +* +* +-------------------+-------------------+------------------+-------------------+ +* | 32-bit userspace | 32-bit userspace | 64-bit userspace | 64-bit userspace | +* | unsigned long | vdso_kernel_ulong | unsigned long | vdso_kernel_ulong | +* +---------------+-------------------+-------------------+------------------+-------------------+ +* | 32-bit kernel | ✓ same size | ✓ same size | +* | unsigned long | | | +* +---------------+-------------------+-------------------+------------------+-------------------+ +* | 64-bit kernel | ✘ different size! | ✓ same size | ✓ same size | ✓ same size | +* | unsigned long | | | | | +* +---------------+-------------------+-------------------+------------------+-------------------+ +*/ +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT +typedef u64 vdso_kernel_ulong ; +#else +typedef u32 vdso_kernel_ulong ; +#endif + +#endif /* __VDSO_TYPES_H */
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +224 -0
224 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ vdso_test_correctness vdso_test_gettimeofday vdso_test_getcpu vdso_standalone_test_x86 +vdso_test_getrandom
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ ifeq ($(ARCH),$(filter $(ARCH),x86 x86_64)) TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_standalone_test_x86 endif TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_correctness +TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_getrandom CFLAGS := -std=gnu99 CFLAGS_vdso_standalone_test_x86 := -nostdlib -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -fno-stack-protector
@@ -33,3 +34,4 @@ $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_correctness: vdso_test_correctness.c vdso_test_correctness.c \ -o $@ \ $(LDFLAGS_vdso_test_correctness) +$(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_getrandom: parse_vdso.c
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c new file +283 -0
283 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Re: [PATCH v13 6/7] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
Quoted 22 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
drivers/char/random.c +1
-0@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@#include <crypto/blake2s.h> #ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM #include <vdso/getrandom.h> +#include <vdso/datapage.h> #endif #include <asm/archrandom.h> #include <asm/processor.h> @@ -407,6 +408,9 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work)/* * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one, * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX, * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize. */ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;
drivers/char/random.c static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work) · line 413
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/char/random.c +3
-0if (next_gen ==ULONG_MAX ) ++next_gen;WRITE_ONCE (base_crng.generation, next_gen); +#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM +smp_store_release (&_vdso_rng_data.generation, next_gen +1 ); +#endif
It's confusing that "uninitialized generation" is ULONG_MAX in the per-cpu crngs, but 0 in the vdso_rng_data. That results in a weird off-by one thing, where the vdso_rng_data generation number has to be 1 higher.
Would it be possible to use 0 for both?
- Eric
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v13 6/7] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
Quoted 34 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 22 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
drivers/char/random.c +1
-0@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@#include <crypto/blake2s.h> #ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM #include <vdso/getrandom.h> +#include <vdso/datapage.h> #endif #include <asm/archrandom.h> #include <asm/processor.h> @@ -407,6 +408,9 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work)/* * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one, * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX, * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize. */ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags); memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;drivers/char/random.c static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work) · line 413
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/char/random.c +3
-0if (next_gen ==ULONG_MAX ) ++next_gen;WRITE_ONCE (base_crng.generation, next_gen); +#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM +smp_store_release (&_vdso_rng_data.generation, next_gen +1 ); +#endif It's confusing that "uninitialized generation" is
ULONG_MAXin the per-cpu crngs, but 0 in thevdso_rng_data. That results in a weird off-by one thing, where thevdso_rng_datageneration number has to be 1 higher.
Quoted 1 line
Would it be possible to use 0 for both?
It might be, but this will involve some changes to how the batching works too, so I think I'd like to do that separately, if at all. However, I'll add a comment there noting what's happening so it's a bit less confusing.
Jason
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v13 7/7 x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldHook up the generic vDSO implementation to the x86 vDSO data page. Since the existing vDSO infrastructure is heavily based on the timekeeping functionality, which works over arrays of bases, a new macro is introduced for vvars that are not arrays.
The vDSO function requires a ChaCha20 implementation that does not write to the stack, yet can still do an entire ChaCha20 permutation, so provide this using SSE2, since this is userland code that must work on all x86-64 processors. There's a simple test for this code as well.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 2 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S | 177 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c | 17 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h | 55 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h | 16 ++ tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/Makefile | 9 + .../testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c | 43 +++++ 11 files changed, 325 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO + select VDSO_GETRANDOM if X86_64 select HOTPLUG_SMT if SMP select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING select NEED_PER_CPU_EMBED_FIRST_CHUNK
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_X86_32) := y VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) := y # files to link into the vdso -vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o +vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o vgetrandom.o vgetrandom-chacha.o vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o vobjs-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX) += vsgx.o
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx.o = -pg +CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetrandom.o = -pg # # X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data.
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S +2 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ VERSION { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave; #endif + getrandom; + __vdso_getrandom; local: *; }; }
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +177 -0
177 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c new file +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* +* Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved. +*/ +#include <linux/types.h> + +#include "../../../../lib/vdso/getrandom.c" + +ssize_t __vdso_getrandom (void *buffer,size_t len,unsigned int flags,void *state); + +ssize_t __vdso_getrandom (void *buffer,size_t len,unsigned int flags,void *state) +{ +return __cvdso_getrandom (buffer, len, flags, state); +} + +ssize_t getrandom (void *,size_t ,unsigned int ,void *) + __attribute__((weak,alias ("__vdso_getrandom" )));
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h new file +55 -0
55 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h +2 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@#include <asm/vvar.h> DEFINE_VVAR(struct vdso_data, _vdso_data); +DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE(struct vdso_rng_data, _vdso_rng_data); +/* * Update the vDSO data page to keep in sync with kernel timekeeping. */
arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h +16 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@*/ #define DECLARE_VVAR (offset, type, name) \ EMIT_VVAR(name, offset) +#define DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE (offset, type, name) \ + EMIT_VVAR(name, offset)#else
@@ -37,6 +39,10 @@ extern char __vvar_page; extern type timens_ ## name[CS_BASES] \ __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); \ +#define DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE (offset, type, name) \ + extern type vvar_ ## name \ + __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); \ +#define VVAR (name) (vvar_ ## name)#define TIMENS (name) (timens_ ## name)
@@ -44,12 +50,22 @@ extern char __vvar_page; type name[CS_BASES] \ __attribute__((section(".vvar_" #name), aligned(16))) __visible +#define DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE(type, name) \ + type name \ + __attribute__((section(".vvar_" #name), aligned(16))) __visible +#endif /* DECLARE_VVAR(offset, type, name) */ DECLARE_VVAR(128, struct vdso_data, _vdso_data) +#if !defined(_SINGLE_DATA) +#define _SINGLE_DATA +DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE(640, struct vdso_rng_data, _vdso_rng_data) +#endif +#undef DECLARE_VVAR +#undef DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE#endif
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ vdso_test_gettimeofday vdso_test_getcpu vdso_standalone_test_x86 vdso_test_getrandom +vdso_test_chacha
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/Makefile +9 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ include ../lib.mk uname_M := $(shell uname -m 2>/dev/null || echo not) ARCH ?= $(shell echo $(uname_M) | sed -e s/i.86/x86/ -e s/x86_64/x86/) +SODIUM := $(shell pkg-config --libs libsodium 2>/dev/null) TEST_GEN_PROGS := $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_gettimeofday $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_getcpu TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_abi
@@ -12,9 +13,15 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_standalone_test_x86 endif TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_correctness TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_getrandom +ifeq ($(uname_M),x86_64) +ifneq ($(SODIUM),) +TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_chacha +endif +endif CFLAGS := -std=gnu99 CFLAGS_vdso_standalone_test_x86 := -nostdlib -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -fno-stack-protector +CFLAGS_vdso_test_chacha := $(SODIUM) -idirafter $(top_srcdir)/include -idirafter $(top_srcdir)/arch/$(ARCH)/include -D__ASSEMBLY__ -Wa,--noexecstack LDFLAGS_vdso_test_correctness := -ldl ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_32),y) LDLIBS += -lgcc_s
@@ -35,3 +42,5 @@ $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_correctness: vdso_test_correctness.c -o $@ \ $(LDFLAGS_vdso_test_correctness) $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_getrandom: parse_vdso.c +$(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_chacha: CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_vdso_test_chacha) +$(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_chacha: $(top_srcdir)/arch/$(ARCH)/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c new file +43 -0
43 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Re: [PATCH v13 7/7] x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
Quoted 8 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +2
-0@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/*
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S line 12
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +10
-0+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved. + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/frame.h> + +.section .rodata.cst16.CONSTANTS, "aM", @progbits, 16 +.align 16 +CONSTANTS: .octa 0x6b20657479622d323320646e61707865 +.text
For simplicity, maybe leave off the section mergeability stuff and just have plain ".section .rodata"?
Quoted 17 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +17
-0+/* + * Very basic SSE2 implementation of ChaCha20. Produces a given positive number + * of blocks of output with a nonce of 0, taking an input key and 8-byte + * counter. Importantly does not spill to the stack. Its arguments are: + * + * rdi: output bytes + * rsi: 32-byte key input + * rdx: 8-byte counter input/output + * rcx: number of 64-byte blocks to write to output + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_chacha20_blocks_nostack) + +#define output %rdi +#define key %rsi +#define counter %rdx +#define nblocks %rcx +#define i %al
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S line 40
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +10
-0+#define state0 %xmm0 +#define state1 %xmm1 +#define state2 %xmm2 +#define state3 %xmm3 +#define copy0 %xmm4 +#define copy1 %xmm5 +#define copy2 %xmm6 +#define copy3 %xmm7 +#define temp %xmm8 +#define one %xmm9
It would be worth mentioning in the function comment that none of the xmm registers are callee-save. That was not obvious to me. I know that on arm64, *kernel* code doesn't need to save/restore NEON registers, so it's not something that arch/arm64/crypto/ does. But, it *is* needed in arm64 userspace code. So I was worried that something similar would apply to x86_64, but it seems not.
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S line 99
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +6
-0+ /* state1[0,1,2,3] = state1[0,3,2,1] */ + pshufd $0x39,state1,state1 + /* state2[0,1,2,3] = state2[1,0,3,2] */ + pshufd $0x4e,state2,state2 + /* state3[0,1,2,3] = state3[2,1,0,3] */ + pshufd $0x93,state3,state3
The comments don't match the pshufd constants. The code is correct but the comments are not. They should be:
/* state1[0,1,2,3] = state1[1,2,3,0] */ pshufd $0x39,state1,state1 /* state2[0,1,2,3] = state2[2,3,0,1] */ pshufd $0x4e,state2,state2 /* state3[0,1,2,3] = state3[3,0,1,2] */ pshufd $0x93,state3,state3
Quoted 21 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +21
-0+ /* state0 += state1, state3 = rotl32(state3 ^ state0, 16) */ + paddd state1,state0 + pxor state0,state3 + movdqa state3,temp + pslld $16,temp + psrld $16,state3 + por temp,state3 + + /* state2 += state3, state1 = rotl32(state1 ^ state2, 12) */ + paddd state3,state2 + pxor state2,state1 + movdqa state1,temp + pslld $12,temp + psrld $20,state1 + por temp,state1 + + /* state0 += state1, state3 = rotl32(state3 ^ state0, 8) */ + paddd state1,state0 + pxor state0,state3 + movdqa state3,temp + pslld $8,temp
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S line 92
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +10
-0+ psrld $24,state3 + por temp,state3 + + /* state2 += state3, state1 = rotl32(state1 ^ state2, 7) */ + paddd state3,state2 + pxor state2,state1 + movdqa state1,temp + pslld $7,temp + psrld $25,state1 + por temp,state1
The above sequence of 24 instructions is repeated twice, so maybe it should be a macro (".chacha_round"?).
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S line 138
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +6
-0+ /* state1[0,1,2,3] = state1[2,1,0,3] */ + pshufd $0x93,state1,state1 + /* state2[0,1,2,3] = state2[1,0,3,2] */ + pshufd $0x4e,state2,state2 + /* state3[0,1,2,3] = state3[0,3,2,1] */ + pshufd $0x39,state3,state3
Similarly, the above comments are wrong. They should be:
/* state1[0,1,2,3] = state1[3,0,1,2] */ pshufd $0x93,state1,state1 /* state2[0,1,2,3] = state2[2,3,0,1] */ pshufd $0x4e,state2,state2 /* state3[0,1,2,3] = state3[1,2,3,0] */ pshufd $0x39,state3,state3
- Eric
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v13 7/7] x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
Quoted 14 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 13 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +7
-0@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved. + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/frame.h>
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arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S line 12
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arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +5
-0+ +.section .rodata.cst16.CONSTANTS, "aM", @progbits, 16 +.align 16 +CONSTANTS: .octa 0x6b20657479622d323320646e61707865 +.textFor simplicity, maybe leave off the section mergeability stuff and just have plain ".section .rodata"?
I guess nothing is going to get merged anyway, so sure, why not.
Quoted 5 lines
It would be worth mentioning in the function comment that none of the xmm registers are callee-save. That was not obvious to me. I know that on arm64, *kernel* code doesn't need to save/restore NEON registers, so it's not something that
arch/arm64/crypto/does. But, it *is* needed in arm64 userspace code. So I was worried that something similar would apply tox86_64, but it seems not.
I'll add a comment.
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S line 99
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arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +6
-0+ /* state1[0,1,2,3] = state1[0,3,2,1] */ + pshufd $0x39,state1,state1 + /* state2[0,1,2,3] = state2[1,0,3,2] */ + pshufd $0x4e,state2,state2 + /* state3[0,1,2,3] = state3[2,1,0,3] */ + pshufd $0x93,state3,state3The comments don't match the pshufd constants. The code is correct but the comments are not. They should be:
Er, I swapped the endian when writing the comment. The code is fine though, yea. Fixed, thanks.
Quoted 2 lines
The above sequence of 24 instructions is repeated twice, so maybe it should be a macro (".chacha_round"?).
Not really a fan of the indirection when reading for something simple like this.
Thanks for the review.
Jason