implement getrandom() in vDSO
Subsystems (21)
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerv9 cover implement getrandom() in vDSO
Changes v8->v9:
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- Allocate system call number on all architectures, and split that off into a separate commit (2/4).
- Declare missing prototype in syscalls.h.
Changes v7->v8:
--------------
- Move lib/vdso/getrandom.h to include/vdso/getrandom.h in order to avoid #include "../../../../../../../../../../../......".
- Make use of two Kconfig symbols, VDSO_GETRANDOM and VGETRANDOM_ALLOC_SYSCALL, to handle selecting dependencies and conditionalizing code.
- Rename chacha20_blocks_nostack assembly function to __arch_chacha20_blocks_nostack, which allows removing the awkward C inline wrapper function.
- Save a byte per instruction by using movups instead of movdqu, and don't bother clearing registers that hold public constants.
- Add basic signal handling reentrancy protection to vDSO function.
- Invalidate RNG generation counter if key-refresh syscall fails.
- Reduce the defines in getrandom.c, which in turn requires using INT_MAX & PAGE_MASK explicitly rather than the MAX_RW_COUNT macro.
- Make use of 100 columns when it makes sense, and reformat various bits of code for clarity.
- Thoroughly document functions and add kernel-doc comments to several key functions.
- Hoist out repeated sizeof(struct vgetrandom_state) into variable.
- Rename memcpy_and_zero to memcpy_and_zero_src, and define helper macro outside of function.
- Separate all x86 work, including syscall wiring, into the x86 commit, so that the first two commits of this series are purely generic.
Changes v6->v7:
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- VERY EXCITING! There is now a rudimentary glibc implementation for this from one of the glibc maintainers, Adhemerval Zanella (CC'd). A commit that works with with this latest v7 revision is here:
https://github.com/bminor/glibc/commit/247ec6dd77ec2a047163fe3a1b60e57880464b39
- Pass an unsigned int * instead of an unsigned long * for the syscall, to avoid having to add a compat syscall.
- Use ordinary function framing in assembly, rather than kernel-specific framing.
- Don't hardcode the number '2', but derive it at compile time with the expression sizeof(state->batch_key) / CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, as well as adding a BUILD_BUG_ON() in case that doesn't divide cleanly.
Changes v5->v6:
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- Fix various build errors for odd configurations.
- Do not leak any secrets onto the stack at all, to account for possibility of fork()ing in a multithreaded scenario, which would ruin forward secrecy. Instead provide a arch-specific implementation that doesn't need stack space.
- Prevent page alignment from overflowing variable, and clamp to acceptable limits.
- Read/write unaligned bytes using get/put_unaligned.
- Add extensive comments to vDSO function explaining subtle aspects.
- Account for fork() races when writing generation counter.
Changes v4->v5:
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- Add example code to vDSO addition commit showing intended use and interaction with allocations.
- Reset buffer to beginning when retrying.
- Rely on generation counter never being zero for fork detection, rather than adding extra boolean.
- Make use of __ARCH_WANT_VGETRANDOM_ALLOC macro around new syscall so that it's condition by archs that actually choose to add this, and don't forget to bump __NR_syscalls.
- Separate __cvdso_getrandom() into __cvdso_getrandom() and __cvdso_getrandom_data() so that powerpc can make a more efficient call.
Changes v3->v4:
--------------
- Split up into small series rather than one big patch.
- Use proper ordering in generation counter reads.
- Make properly generic, not just a hairball with x86, by moving symbols into correct files.
Changes v2->v3:
--------------
Big changes:
Thomas' previous objection was two-fold: 1) vgetrandom should really have the same function signature as getrandom, in addition to all of the same behavior, and 2) having vgetrandom_alloc be a vDSO function doesn't make sense, because it doesn't actually need anything from the VDSO data page and it doesn't correspond to an existing syscall.
After a discussion at Plumbers this last week, we devised the following ways to fix these: 1) we make the opque state argument be the last argument of vgetrandom, rather than the first one, since the real syscall ignores the additional argument, and that way all the registers are the same, and no behavior changes; and 2) we make vgetrandom_alloc a syscall, rather than a vDSO function, which also gives it added flexibility for the future, which is good.
Making those changes also reduced the size of this patch a bit.
Smaller changes:
- Properly add buffer offset position.
- Don't EXPORT_SYMBOL for vDSO code.
- Account for timens and vvar being in swapped pages.
--------------
Two statements:
1) Userspace wants faster cryptographically secure random numbers of arbitrary size, big or small.
2) Userspace is currently unable to safely roll its own RNG with the same security profile as getrandom().
Statement (1) has been debated for years, with arguments ranging from "we need faster cryptographically secure card shuffling!" to "the only things that actually need good randomness are keys, which are few and far between" to "actually, TLS CBC nonces are frequent" and so on. I don't intend to wade into that debate substantially, except to note that recently glibc added arc4random(), whose goal is to return a cryptographically secure uint32_t, and there are real user reports of it being too slow. So here we are.
Statement (2) is more interesting. The kernel is the nexus of all entropic inputs that influence the RNG. It is in the best position, and probably the only position, to decide anything at all about the current state of the RNG and of its entropy. One of the things it uniquely knows about is when reseeding is necessary.
For example, when a virtual machine is forked, restored, or duplicated, it's imparative that the RNG doesn't generate the same outputs. For this reason, there's a small protocol between hypervisors and the kernel that indicates this has happened, alongside some ID, which the RNG uses to immediately reseed, so as not to return the same numbers. Were userspace to expand a getrandom() seed from time T1 for the next hour, and at some point T2 < hour, the virtual machine forked, userspace would continue to provide the same numbers to two (or more) different virtual machines, resulting in potential cryptographic catastrophe. Something similar happens on resuming from hibernation (or even suspend), with various compromise scenarios there in mind.
There's a more general reason why userspace rolling its own RNG from a getrandom() seed is fraught. There's a lot of attention paid to this particular Linuxism we have of the RNG being initialized and thus non-blocking or uninitialized and thus blocking until it is initialized. These are our Two Big States that many hold to be the holy differentiating factor between safe and not safe, between cryptographically secure and garbage. The fact is, however, that the distinction between these two states is a hand-wavy wishy-washy inexact approximation. Outside of a few exceptional cases (e.g. a HW RNG is available), we actually don't really ever know with any rigor at all when the RNG is safe and ready (nor when it's compromised). We do the best we can to "estimate" it, but entropy estimation is fundamentally impossible in the general case. So really, we're just doing guess work, and hoping it's good and conservative enough. Let's then assume that there's always some potential error involved in this differentiator.
In fact, under the surface, the RNG is engineered around a different principal, and that is trying to *use* new entropic inputs regularly and at the right specific moments in time. For example, close to boot time, the RNG reseeds itself more often than later. At certain events, like VM fork, the RNG reseeds itself immediately. The various heuristics for when the RNG will use new entropy and how often is really a core aspect of what the RNG has some potential to do decently enough (and something that will probably continue to improve in the future from random.c's present set of algorithms). So in your mind, put away the metal attachment to the Two Big States, which represent an approximation with a potential margin of error. Instead keep in mind that the RNG's primary operating heuristic is how often and exactly when it's going to reseed.
So, if userspace takes a seed from getrandom() at point T1, and uses it for the next hour (or N megabytes or some other meaningless metric), during that time, potential errors in the Two Big States approximation are amplified. During that time potential reseeds are being lost, forgotten, not reflected in the output stream. That's not good.
The simplest statement you could make is that userspace RNGs that expand a getrandom() seed at some point T1 are nearly always *worse*, in some way, than just calling getrandom() every time a random number is desired.
For those reasons, after some discussion on libc-alpha, glibc's arc4random() now just calls getrandom() on each invocation. That's trivially safe, and gives us latitude to then make the safe thing faster without becoming unsafe at our leasure. Card shuffling isn't particularly fast, however.
How do we rectify this? By putting a safe implementation of getrandom() in the vDSO, which has access to whatever information a particular iteration of random.c is using to make its decisions. I use that careful language of "particular iteration of random.c", because the set of things that a vDSO getrandom() implementation might need for making decisions as good as the kernel's will likely change over time. This isn't just a matter of exporting certain *data* to userspace. We're not going to commit to a "data API" where the various heuristics used are exposed, locking in how the kernel works for decades to come, and then leave it to various userspaces to roll something on top and shoot themselves in the foot and have all sorts of complexity disasters. Rather, vDSO getrandom() is supposed to be the *same exact algorithm* that runs in the kernel, except it's been hoisted into userspace as much as possible. And so vDSO getrandom() and kernel getrandom() will always mirror each other hermetically.
API-wise, the vDSO gains this function:
ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);
The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to some state allocated with vgetrandom_alloc(), explained below. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior.
Then, we introduce a new syscall:
void *vgetrandom_alloc([inout] unsigned int *num, [out] unsigned int *size_per_each, unsigned int flags);
This takes the desired number of opaque states in num, and returns a pointer to an array of opaque states, the number actually allocated back in num, and the size in bytes of each one in size_per_each, enabling a libc to slice up the returned array into a state per each thread. (The flags argument is always zero for now.) We very intentionally do *not* leave state allocation up to the caller of vgetrandom, but provide vgetrandom_alloc for that allocation. There are too many weird things that can go wrong, and it's important that vDSO does not provide too generic of a mechanism. It's not going to store its state in just any old memory address. It'll do it only in ones it allocates.
Right now this means it's a mlock'd page with WIPEONFORK set. In the future maybe there will be other interesting page flags or anti-heartbleed measures, or other platform-specific kernel-specific things that can be set from the syscall. Again, it's important that the kernel has a say in how this works rather than agreeing to operate on any old address; memory isn't neutral.
The syscall currently accomplishes this with a call to vm_mmap() and then a call to do_madvise(). It'd be nice to do this all at once, but I'm not sure that a helper function exists for that now, and it seems a bit premature to add one, at least for now.
The interesting meat of the implementation is in lib/vdso/getrandom.c, as generic C code, and it aims to mainly follow random.c's buffered fast key erasure logic. Before the RNG is initialized, it falls back to the syscall. Right now it uses a simple generation counter to make its decisions on reseeding (though this could be made more extensive over time).
The actual place that has the most work to do is in all of the other files. Most of the vDSO shared page infrastructure is centered around gettimeofday, and so the main structs are all in arrays for different timestamp types, and attached to time namespaces, and so forth. I've done the best I could to add onto this in an unintrusive way.
In my test results, performance is pretty stellar (around 15x for uint32_t generation), and it seems to be working. There's an extended example in the second commit of this series, showing how the syscall and the vDSO function are meant to be used together.
Jason A. Donenfeld (3):
arch: allocate vgetrandom_alloc() syscall number
random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
MAINTAINERS | 1 + arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 + arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 + arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 2 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S | 177 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c | 17 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h | 55 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h | 16 ++ arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + drivers/char/random.c | 9 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +- include/vdso/datapage.h | 11 + lib/vdso/Kconfig | 7 +- lib/vdso/getrandom.c | 204 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +- .../arch/mips/entry/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + .../arch/powerpc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + .../perf/arch/s390/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + .../arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + 37 files changed, 534 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v9 1/3 arch: allocate vgetrandom_alloc() syscall number
Add vgetrandom_alloc() as syscall 451 (or 561 on alpha) by adding it to all of the various syscall.tbl and unistd.h files.
--- arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 ++ arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 + arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 ++++- tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 ++++- tools/perf/arch/mips/entry/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 + tools/perf/arch/powerpc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + tools/perf/arch/s390/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 + tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + 24 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -490,3 +490,4 @@ 558 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 559 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 560 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_ni_syscall +561 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -464,3 +464,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -1
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@#define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)#define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END (__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800) -#define __NR_compat_syscalls 451 +#define __NR_compat_syscalls 452#endif #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h +2 -0
@@ -907,6 +907,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_process_mrelease, sys_process_mrelease) __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)#define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450 __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node) +#define __NR_vgetrandom_alloc 451 +__SYSCALL (__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, sys_vgetrandom_alloc)/* * Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -371,3 +371,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -450,3 +450,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -456,3 +456,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -389,3 +389,4 @@ 448 n32 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 n32 futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 n32 set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 n32 vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -365,3 +365,4 @@ 448 n64 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 n64 futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 n64 vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -438,3 +438,4 @@ 448 o32 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 o32 futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 o32 set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 o32 vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -448,3 +448,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -537,3 +537,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 nospu set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -453,3 +453,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -453,3 +453,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -496,3 +496,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
@@ -455,3 +455,4 @@ 448 i386 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 i386 futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 i386 set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 i386 vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -421,3 +421,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +4 -1
@@ -886,8 +886,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)#define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450 __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node) +#define __NR_vgetrandom_alloc 451 +__SYSCALL(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, sys_vgetrandom_alloc) +#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 451 +#define __NR_syscalls 452/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +4 -1
@@ -886,8 +886,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)#define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450 __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node) +#define __NR_vgetrandom_alloc 451 +__SYSCALL(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, sys_vgetrandom_alloc) +#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 451 +#define __NR_syscalls 452/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
tools/perf/arch/mips/entry/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -365,3 +365,4 @@ 448 n64 process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 n64 futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 n64 vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
tools/perf/arch/powerpc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -534,3 +534,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 nospu set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
tools/perf/arch/s390/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
@@ -453,3 +453,4 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc
tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v9 2/3 random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldProvide a generic C vDSO getrandom() implementation, which operates on an opaque state returned by vgetrandom_alloc() and produces random bytes the same way as getrandom(). This has a the API signature:
ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);
The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to the opaque allocated state. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom() syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior.
The actual vDSO RNG algorithm implemented is the same one implemented by drivers/char/random.c, using the same fast-erasure techniques as that. Should the in-kernel implementation change, so too will the vDSO one.
It requires an implementation of ChaCha20 that does not use any stack, in order to maintain forward secrecy if a multi-threaded program forks (though this does not account for a similar issue with SA_SIGINFO copying registers to the stack), so this is left as an architecture-specific fill-in. Stack-less ChaCha20 is an easy algorithm to implement on a variety of architectures, so this shouldn't be too onerous.
Initially, the state is keyless, and so the first call makes a getrandom() syscall to generate that key, and then uses it for subsequent calls. By keeping track of a generation counter, it knows when its key is invalidated and it should fetch a new one using the syscall. Later, more than just a generation counter might be used.
Since MADV_WIPEONFORK is set on the opaque state, the key and related state is wiped during a fork(), so secrets don't roll over into new processes, and the same state doesn't accidentally generate the same random stream. The generation counter, as well, is always >0, so that the 0 counter is a useful indication of a fork() or otherwise uninitialized state.
If the kernel RNG is not yet initialized, then the vDSO always calls the syscall, because that behavior cannot be emulated in userspace, but fortunately that state is short lived and only during early boot. If it has been initialized, then there is no need to inspect the flags argument, because the behavior does not change post-initialization regardless of the flags value.
Since the opaque state passed to it is mutated, vDSO getrandom() is not reentrant, when used with the same opaque state, which libc should be mindful of.
vgetrandom_alloc() and vDSO getrandom() together provide the ability for userspace to generate random bytes quickly and safely, and is intended to be integrated into libc's thread management. As an illustrative example, the following code might be used to do the same outside of libc. All of the static functions are to be considered implementation private, including the vgetrandom_alloc() syscall wrapper, which generally shouldn't be exposed outside of libc, with the non-static vgetrandom() function at the end being the exported interface. The various pthread-isms are expected to be elided into libc internals. This per-thread allocation scheme is very naive and does not shrink; other implementations may choose to be more complex.
static void *vgetrandom_alloc(unsigned int *num, unsigned int *size_per_each, unsigned int flags)
{
long ret = syscall(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, &num, &size_per_each, flags);
return ret == -1 ? NULL : (void *)ret;
}
static struct {
pthread_mutex_t lock;
void **states;
size_t len, cap;
} grnd_allocator = {
.lock = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER
};
static void *vgetrandom_get_state(void)
{
void *state = NULL; pthread_mutex_lock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
if (!grnd_allocator.len) {
size_t new_cap;
unsigned int size_per_each, num = 16; /* Just a hint. Could also be nr_cpus. */
void *new_block = vgetrandom_alloc(&num, &size_per_each, 0), *new_states;
if (!new_block)
goto out;
new_cap = grnd_allocator.cap + num;
new_states = reallocarray(grnd_allocator.states, new_cap, sizeof(*grnd_allocator.states));
if (!new_states) {
munmap(new_block, num * size_per_each);
goto out;
}
grnd_allocator.cap = new_cap;
grnd_allocator.states = new_states;
for (size_t i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
grnd_allocator.states[i] = new_block;
new_block += size_per_each;
}
grnd_allocator.len = num;
}
state = grnd_allocator.states[--grnd_allocator.len]; out:
pthread_mutex_unlock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
return state;
}
static void vgetrandom_put_state(void *state)
{
if (!state)
return;
pthread_mutex_lock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
grnd_allocator.states[grnd_allocator.len++] = state;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
}
static struct {
ssize_t(*fn)(void *buf, size_t len, unsigned long flags, void *state);
pthread_key_t key;
pthread_once_t initialized;
} grnd_ctx = {
.initialized = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT
};
static void vgetrandom_init(void)
{
if (pthread_key_create(&grnd_ctx.key, vgetrandom_put_state) != 0)
return;
grnd_ctx.fn = __vdsosym("LINUX_2.6", "__vdso_getrandom");
}
ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buf, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
{
void *state; pthread_once(&grnd_ctx.initialized, vgetrandom_init);
if (!grnd_ctx.fn)
return getrandom(buf, len, flags);
state = pthread_getspecific(grnd_ctx.key);
if (!state) {
state = vgetrandom_get_state();
if (pthread_setspecific(grnd_ctx.key, state) != 0) {
vgetrandom_put_state(state);
state = NULL;
}
if (!state)
return getrandom(buf, len, flags);
}
return grnd_ctx.fn(buf, len, flags, state);}
--- MAINTAINERS | 1 + drivers/char/random.c | 9 ++ include/vdso/datapage.h | 11 +++ lib/vdso/Kconfig | 7 +- lib/vdso/getrandom.c | 204 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 231 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -17288,6 +17288,7 @@ S: Maintained F: drivers/char/random.c F: drivers/virt/vmgenid.c F: include/vdso/getrandom.h +F: lib/vdso/getrandom.c RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM M: Matt Porter <[email protected]>
drivers/char/random.c +9 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@#ifdef CONFIG_VGETRANDOM_ALLOC_SYSCALL #include <vdso/getrandom.h> #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM +#include <vdso/datapage.h> +#endif #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/irq.h> #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
@@ -344,6 +347,9 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work)if (next_gen ==ULONG_MAX ) ++next_gen;WRITE_ONCE (base_crng.generation, next_gen); +#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM +smp_store_release (&_vdso_rng_data.generation, next_gen +1 ); +#endif if (!static_branch_likely (&crng_is_ready)) crng_init =CRNG_READY ;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);
@@ -794,6 +800,9 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)if (static_key_initialized)execute_in_process_context (crng_set_ready, &set_ready);atomic_notifier_call_chain (&random_ready_notifier,0 ,NULL ); +#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM +smp_store_release (&_vdso_rng_data.is_ready, true); +#endif wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN );pr_notice ("crng init done\n" );
include/vdso/datapage.h +11 -0
@@ -109,6 +109,16 @@ struct vdso_data {struct arch_vdso_data arch_data; }; +/** +* struct vdso_rng_data - vdso RNG state information +* @generation: a counter representing the number of RNG reseeds +* @is_ready: whether the RNG is initialized +*/ +struct vdso_rng_data { +unsigned long generation; +bool is_ready; +}; +/* * We use the hidden visibility to prevent the compiler from generating a GOT * relocation. Not only is going through a GOT useless (the entry couldn't and
@@ -120,6 +130,7 @@ struct vdso_data {*/ extern struct vdso_data _vdso_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); extern struct vdso_data _timens_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); +extern struct vdso_rng_data _vdso_rng_data __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));/* * The generic vDSO implementation requires that gettimeofday.h
lib/vdso/Kconfig +6 -1
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ config GENERIC_VDSO_TIME_NS help Selected by architectures which support time namespaces in the VDSO - endif config VGETRANDOM_ALLOC_SYSCALL
@@ -38,3 +37,9 @@ config VGETRANDOM_ALLOC_SYSCALL help Selected by the getrandom() vDSO function, which requires this for state allocation. + +config VDSO_GETRANDOM + bool + select VGETRANDOM_ALLOC_SYSCALL + help + Selected by architectures that support vDSO getrandom().
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +204 -0
204 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v9 3/3 x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldHook up the generic vDSO implementation to the x86 vDSO data page. Since the existing vDSO infrastructure is heavily based on the timekeeping functionality, which works over arrays of bases, a new macro is introduced for vvars that are not arrays.
The vDSO function requires a ChaCha20 implementation that does not write to the stack, yet can still do an entire ChaCha20 permutation, so provide this using SSE2, since this is userland code that must work on all x86-64 processors.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 2 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S | 177 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c | 17 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h | 55 ++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h | 16 +++ 8 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO + select VDSO_GETRANDOM if X86_64 select HOTPLUG_SMT if SMP select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING select NEED_PER_CPU_EMBED_FIRST_CHUNK
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_X86_32) := y VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) := y # files to link into the vdso -vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o +vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o vgetrandom.o vgetrandom-chacha.o vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o vobjs-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX) += vsgx.o
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx.o = -pg +CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetrandom.o = -pg # # X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data.
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S +2 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ VERSION { clock_getres; __vdso_clock_getres; __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave; + getrandom; + __vdso_getrandom; local: *; }; }
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +177 -0
177 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c new file +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* +* Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved. +*/ +#include <linux/types.h> + +#include "../../../../lib/vdso/getrandom.c" + +ssize_t __vdso_getrandom (void *buffer,size_t len,unsigned int flags,void *state); + +ssize_t __vdso_getrandom (void *buffer,size_t len,unsigned int flags,void *state) +{ +return __cvdso_getrandom (buffer, len, flags, state); +} + +ssize_t getrandom (void *,size_t ,unsigned int ,void *) + __attribute__((weak,alias ("__vdso_getrandom" )));
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h new file +55 -0
55 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h +2 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@#include <asm/vvar.h> DEFINE_VVAR(struct vdso_data, _vdso_data); +DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE(struct vdso_rng_data, _vdso_rng_data); +/* * Update the vDSO data page to keep in sync with kernel timekeeping. */
arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h +16 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@*/ #define DECLARE_VVAR (offset, type, name) \ EMIT_VVAR(name, offset) +#define DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE (offset, type, name) \ + EMIT_VVAR(name, offset)#else
@@ -37,6 +39,10 @@ extern char __vvar_page; extern type timens_ ## name[CS_BASES] \ __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); \ +#define DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE (offset, type, name) \ + extern type vvar_ ## name \ + __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); \ +#define VVAR (name) (vvar_ ## name)#define TIMENS (name) (timens_ ## name)
@@ -44,12 +50,22 @@ extern char __vvar_page; type name[CS_BASES] \ __attribute__((section(".vvar_" #name), aligned(16))) __visible +#define DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE(type, name) \ + type name \ + __attribute__((section(".vvar_" #name), aligned(16))) __visible +#endif /* DECLARE_VVAR(offset, type, name) */ DECLARE_VVAR(128, struct vdso_data, _vdso_data) +#if !defined(_SINGLE_DATA) +#define _SINGLE_DATA +DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE(640, struct vdso_rng_data, _vdso_rng_data) +#endif +#undef DECLARE_VVAR +#undef DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1