Skip to contentSkip to conversation

implement getrandom() in vDSO

PATCH Superseded Jason A. Donenfeld 3 participants 14 messages Dec 5, 2022 – Dec 6, 2022

Subsystems (26)

v11 of 14 Superseded Latest is v14 →

lore
Share & tools
lore

Jason A. Donenfeld

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

v11 cover implement getrandom() in vDSO

Changes v10->v11:
-----------------
- Adhemerval's latest glibc patch currently lives here:
https://github.com/zatrazz/glibc/commits/azanella/getrandom-vdso
It's still in flux (he hasn't posted it to glibc-alpha yet), but that should still give some idea.

- Substantially increase documentation detail throughout.

- Numerous fixes to style and clarity.

- Add two kselftests - one for the chacha20 assembly implementation, which compares its output to that of libsodium, and one for the actual vDSO function and vgetrandom_alloc() syscall, which also has some built-in quick & dirty benchmarking functionality.

- Add reserved unsigned long addr argument to syscall, for future use.

- Enforce that flags, addr, and *size_per_each are all zero on input, so that they can actually be used in the future.

- Use VM_LOCKONFAULT|VM_NORESERVE so that memory isn't wasted until it's used.

- Set VM_DONTDUMP to prevent state from being written out to core dumps.

- Do mapping and flag setting all in one operation, so that it's not racy, and so that dropping the mm lock between operations isn't required.

- Due to the above, there's no longer any purpose in selecting VGETRANDOM_ALLOC_SYSCALL, so remove that.

- Don't update *num or *size_per_each until the mapping has succeeded.

- Introduce vdso_kernel_ulong type for representing the long type that the kernel uses, even when in 32-bit compat code on a 64-bit kernel.

- Don't use 'bool' type in the vDSO page, in case of compiler quirks resulting in a different interpretation of the type in different compilation contexts.

--------------

Two statements:

1) Userspace wants faster cryptographically secure random numbers of arbitrary size, big or small.

2) Userspace is currently unable to safely roll its own RNG with the same security profile as getrandom().

Statement (1) has been debated for years, with arguments ranging from "we need faster cryptographically secure card shuffling!" to "the only things that actually need good randomness are keys, which are few and far between" to "actually, TLS CBC nonces are frequent" and so on. I don't intend to wade into that debate substantially, except to note that recently glibc added arc4random(), whose goal is to return a cryptographically secure uint32_t, and there are real user reports of it being too slow. So here we are.

Statement (2) is more interesting. The kernel is the nexus of all entropic inputs that influence the RNG. It is in the best position, and probably the only position, to decide anything at all about the current state of the RNG and of its entropy. One of the things it uniquely knows about is when reseeding is necessary.

For example, when a virtual machine is forked, restored, or duplicated, it's imparative that the RNG doesn't generate the same outputs. For this reason, there's a small protocol between hypervisors and the kernel that indicates this has happened, alongside some ID, which the RNG uses to immediately reseed, so as not to return the same numbers. Were userspace to expand a getrandom() seed from time T1 for the next hour, and at some point T2 < hour, the virtual machine forked, userspace would continue to provide the same numbers to two (or more) different virtual machines, resulting in potential cryptographic catastrophe. Something similar happens on resuming from hibernation (or even suspend), with various compromise scenarios there in mind.

There's a more general reason why userspace rolling its own RNG from a getrandom() seed is fraught. There's a lot of attention paid to this particular Linuxism we have of the RNG being initialized and thus non-blocking or uninitialized and thus blocking until it is initialized. These are our Two Big States that many hold to be the holy differentiating factor between safe and not safe, between cryptographically secure and garbage. The fact is, however, that the distinction between these two states is a hand-wavy wishy-washy inexact approximation. Outside of a few exceptional cases (e.g. a HW RNG is available), we actually don't really ever know with any rigor at all when the RNG is safe and ready (nor when it's compromised). We do the best we can to "estimate" it, but entropy estimation is fundamentally impossible in the general case. So really, we're just doing guess work, and hoping it's good and conservative enough. Let's then assume that there's always some potential error involved in this differentiator.

In fact, under the surface, the RNG is engineered around a different principal, and that is trying to *use* new entropic inputs regularly and at the right specific moments in time. For example, close to boot time, the RNG reseeds itself more often than later. At certain events, like VM fork, the RNG reseeds itself immediately. The various heuristics for when the RNG will use new entropy and how often is really a core aspect of what the RNG has some potential to do decently enough (and something that will probably continue to improve in the future from random.c's present set of algorithms). So in your mind, put away the metal attachment to the Two Big States, which represent an approximation with a potential margin of error. Instead keep in mind that the RNG's primary operating heuristic is how often and exactly when it's going to reseed.

So, if userspace takes a seed from getrandom() at point T1, and uses it for the next hour (or N megabytes or some other meaningless metric), during that time, potential errors in the Two Big States approximation are amplified. During that time potential reseeds are being lost, forgotten, not reflected in the output stream. That's not good.

The simplest statement you could make is that userspace RNGs that expand a getrandom() seed at some point T1 are nearly always *worse*, in some way, than just calling getrandom() every time a random number is desired.

For those reasons, after some discussion on libc-alpha, glibc's arc4random() now just calls getrandom() on each invocation. That's trivially safe, and gives us latitude to then make the safe thing faster without becoming unsafe at our leasure. Card shuffling isn't particularly fast, however.

How do we rectify this? By putting a safe implementation of getrandom() in the vDSO, which has access to whatever information a particular iteration of random.c is using to make its decisions. I use that careful language of "particular iteration of random.c", because the set of things that a vDSO getrandom() implementation might need for making decisions as good as the kernel's will likely change over time. This isn't just a matter of exporting certain *data* to userspace. We're not going to commit to a "data API" where the various heuristics used are exposed, locking in how the kernel works for decades to come, and then leave it to various userspaces to roll something on top and shoot themselves in the foot and have all sorts of complexity disasters. Rather, vDSO getrandom() is supposed to be the *same exact algorithm* that runs in the kernel, except it's been hoisted into userspace as much as possible. And so vDSO getrandom() and kernel getrandom() will always mirror each other hermetically.

API-wise, the vDSO gains this function:

  ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);

The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to some state allocated with vgetrandom_alloc(), explained below. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior.

Then, we introduce a new syscall:

void *vgetrandom_alloc(unsigned int *num, unsigned int *size_per_each,

                         unsigned long addr, unsigned int flags);

This takes a hinted number of opaque states in num, and returns a pointer to an array of opaque states, the number actually allocated back in num, and the size in bytes of each one in size_per_each, enabling a libc to slice up the returned array into a state per each thread. (The flags and addr arguments, as well as the *size_per_each input value, are reserved for the future and are forced to be zero for now.)

Libc is expected to allocate a chunk of these on first use, and then dole them out to threads as they're created, allocating more when needed. The returned address of the first state may be passed to munmap(2) with a length of num * size_per_each, in order to deallocate the memory.

We very intentionally do *not* leave state allocation up to the caller of vgetrandom, but provide vgetrandom_alloc for that allocation. There are too many weird things that can go wrong, and it's important that vDSO does not provide too generic of a mechanism. It's not going to store its state in just any old memory address. It'll do it only in ones it allocates.

Right now this means it's a mlock'd page with WIPEONFORK set. In the future maybe there will be other interesting page flags or anti-heartbleed measures, or other platform-specific kernel-specific things that can be set from the syscall. Again, it's important that the kernel has a say in how this works rather than agreeing to operate on any old address; memory isn't neutral.

The interesting meat of the implementation is in lib/vdso/getrandom.c, as generic C code, and it aims to mainly follow random.c's buffered fast key erasure logic. Before the RNG is initialized, it falls back to the syscall. Right now it uses a simple generation counter to make its decisions on reseeding (though this could be made more extensive over time).

The actual place that has the most work to do is in all of the other files. Most of the vDSO shared page infrastructure is centered around gettimeofday, and so the main structs are all in arrays for different timestamp types, and attached to time namespaces, and so forth. I've done the best I could to add onto this in an unintrusive way.

In my test results, performance is pretty stellar (around 15x for uint32_t generation), and it seems to be working. There's an extended example in the second commit of this series, showing how the syscall and the vDSO function are meant to be used together.

Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Adhemerval Zanella Netto <[email protected]>
Cc Carlos O'Donell <[email protected]>
Cc Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

Jason A. Donenfeld (4):
random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
arch: allocate vgetrandom_alloc() syscall number
random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation

 MAINTAINERS                                   |   2 +
 arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl        |   1 +
 arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl                    |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h               |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h             |   2 +
 arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         |   1 +
 arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         |   1 +
 arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl   |   1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl     |   1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl     |   1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl     |   1 +
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       |   1 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl      |   1 +
 arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         |   1 +
 arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl           |   1 +
 arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl        |   1 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl        |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl        |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile                  |   3 +-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S                |   2 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S       | 177 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c              |  17 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h         |  55 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h          |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h                   |  16 +
 arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl       |   1 +
 drivers/char/random.c                         | 137 +++++++++
 include/linux/syscalls.h                      |   3 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h             |   5 +-
 include/vdso/datapage.h                       |  12 +
 include/vdso/getrandom.h                      |  44 +++
 include/vdso/types.h                          |  35 +++
 kernel/sys_ni.c                               |   3 +
 lib/vdso/Kconfig                              |   5 +
 lib/vdso/getrandom.c                          | 205 +++++++++++++
 tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h       |   5 +-
 .../arch/mips/entry/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl  |   1 +
 .../arch/powerpc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl   |   1 +
 .../perf/arch/s390/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl |   1 +
 .../arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl    |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/.gitignore       |   2 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/Makefile         |  11 +
 .../testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c |  43 +++
 .../selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c      | 279 ++++++++++++++++++
 45 files changed, 1084 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h
 create mode 100644 include/vdso/getrandom.h
 create mode 100644 include/vdso/types.h
 create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v11 1/4 random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall

The vDSO getrandom() works over an opaque per-thread state of an unexported size, which must be marked as MADV_WIPEONFORK and be mlock()'d for proper operation. Over time, the nuances of these allocations may change or grow or even differ based on architectural features.

The syscall has the signature:

void *vgetrandom_alloc(unsigned int *num, unsigned int *size_per_each,

		         unsigned long addr, unsigned int flags);

This takes a hinted number of opaque states in num, and returns a pointer to an array of opaque states, the number actually allocated back in num, and the size in bytes of each one in size_per_each, enabling a libc to slice up the returned array into a state per each thread. (The flags and addr arguments, as well as the *size_per_each input value, are reserved for the future and are forced to be zero zero for now.)

Libc is expected to allocate a chunk of these on first use, and then dole them out to threads as they're created, allocating more when needed. The returned address of the first state may be passed to munmap(2) with a length of num * size_per_each, in order to deallocate the memory.

We very intentionally do *not* leave state allocation for vDSO getrandom() up to userspace itself, but rather provide this new syscall for such allocations. vDSO getrandom() must not store its state in just any old memory address, but rather just ones that the kernel specially allocates for it, leaving the particularities of those allocations up to the kernel.

The allocation of states is intended to be integrated into libc's thread management. As an illustrative example, the following code might be used to do the same outside of libc. Though, vgetrandom_alloc() is not expected to be exposed outside of libc, and the pthread usage here is expected to be elided into libc internals. This allocation scheme is very naive and does not shrink; other implementations may choose to be more complex.

static void *vgetrandom_alloc(unsigned int *num, unsigned int *size_per_each) {
*size_per_each = 0; /* Must be zero on input. */
return (void *)syscall(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, &num, &size_per_each,
0 /* reserved @addr */, 0 /* reserved @flags */);
}

  static struct {
    pthread_mutex_t lock;
    void **states;
    size_t len, cap;
  } grnd_allocator = {
    .lock = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER
  };

  static void *vgetrandom_get_state(void)
  {
    void *state = NULL;
    pthread_mutex_lock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
    if (!grnd_allocator.len) {
      size_t new_cap;
      unsigned int num = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN); /* Could be arbitrary, just a hint. */
      unsigned int size_per_each;
      void *new_block = vgetrandom_alloc(&num, &size_per_each);
      void *new_states;

      if (new_block == MAP_FAILED)
        goto out;
      new_cap = grnd_allocator.cap + num;
      new_states = reallocarray(grnd_allocator.states, new_cap, sizeof(*grnd_allocator.states));
      if (!new_states) {
        munmap(new_block, num * size_per_each);
        goto out;
      }
      grnd_allocator.cap = new_cap;
      grnd_allocator.states = new_states;

      for (size_t i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
        grnd_allocator.states[i] = new_block;
        new_block += size_per_each;
      }
      grnd_allocator.len = num;
    }
    state = grnd_allocator.states[--grnd_allocator.len];
  out:
    pthread_mutex_unlock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
    return state;
  }

  static void vgetrandom_put_state(void *state)
  {
    if (!state)
      return;
    pthread_mutex_lock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
    grnd_allocator.states[grnd_allocator.len++] = state;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
  }
---
 MAINTAINERS              |   1 +
 drivers/char/random.c    | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/syscalls.h |   3 +
 include/vdso/getrandom.h |  16 +++++
 kernel/sys_ni.c          |   3 +
 lib/vdso/Kconfig         |   5 ++
 6 files changed, 158 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/vdso/getrandom.h
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
index 256f03904987..3894f947a507 100644
@@ -17287,6 +17287,7 @@ T:	git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git
 S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/char/random.c
 F:	drivers/virt/vmgenid.c
+F:	include/vdso/getrandom.h
 
 RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM
 M:	Matt Porter <[email protected]>
drivers/char/random.c +130 -0

154 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/syscalls.h +3 -0
index a34b0f9a9972..dc13b0715836 100644
@@ -1006,6 +1006,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
 			    void __user *uargs);
 asmlinkage long sys_getrandom(char __user *buf, size_t count,
 			      unsigned int flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_vgetrandom_alloc(unsigned int __user *num,
+				     unsigned int __user *size_per_each,
+				     unsigned long addr, unsigned int flags);
 asmlinkage long sys_memfd_create(const char __user *uname_ptr, unsigned int flags);
 asmlinkage long sys_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size);
 asmlinkage long sys_execveat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
include/vdso/getrandom.h new file +16 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e3ceb1976386
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H
+#define _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H
+
+/**
+ * struct vgetrandom_state - State used by vDSO getrandom() and allocated by vgetrandom_alloc().
+ *
+ * Currently empty, as the vDSO getrandom() function has not yet been implemented.
+ */
+struct vgetrandom_state { int placeholder; };
+
+#endif /* _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H */
kernel/sys_ni.c +3 -0
index 860b2dcf3ac4..f28196cb919b 100644
@@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_free);
 /* memfd_secret */
 COND_SYSCALL(memfd_secret);
 
+/* random */
+COND_SYSCALL(vgetrandom_alloc);
+
 /*
  * Architecture specific weak syscall entries.
  */
lib/vdso/Kconfig +5 -0
index d883ac299508..3b394fa83f65 100644
@@ -31,3 +31,8 @@ config GENERIC_VDSO_TIME_NS
 	  VDSO
 
 endif
+
+config VDSO_GETRANDOM
+	bool
+	help
+	  Selected by architectures that support vDSO getrandom().
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v11 1/4] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall

* Jason A. Donenfeld:

Quoted 38 lines
drivers/char/random.c +38 -0
+/********************************************************************
+ *
+ * vDSO support helpers.
+ *
+ * The actual vDSO function is defined over in lib/vdso/getrandom.c,
+ * but this section contains the kernel-mode helpers to support that.
+ *
+ ********************************************************************/
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM
+/**
+ * sys_vgetrandom_alloc - Allocate opaque states for use with vDSO getrandom().
+ *
+ * @num:	   On input, a pointer to a suggested hint of how many states to
+ * 		   allocate, and on return the number of states actually allocated.
+ *
+ * @size_per_each: On input, must be zero. On return, the size of each state allocated,
+ * 		   so that the caller can split up the returned allocation into
+ * 		   individual states.
+ *
+ * @addr:	   Reserved, must be zero.
+ *
+ * @flags:	   Reserved, must be zero.
+ *
+ * The getrandom() vDSO function in userspace requires an opaque state, which
+ * this function allocates by mapping a certain number of special pages into
+ * the calling process. It takes a hint as to the number of opaque states
+ * desired, and provides the caller with the number of opaque states actually
+ * allocated, the size of each one in bytes, and the address of the first
+ * state, which may be split up into @num states of @size_per_each bytes each,
+ * by adding @size_per_each to the returned first state @num times.
+ *
+ * Returns the address of the first state in the allocation on success, or a
+ * negative error value on failure.
+ *
+ * The returned address of the first state may be passed to munmap(2) with a
+ * length of `(size_t)num * (size_t)size_per_each`, in order to deallocate the
+ * memory, after which it is invalid to pass it to vDSO getrandom().

drivers/char/random.c int __cold execute_with_initialized_rng(struct notifier_block *nb)

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/char/random.c +10 -0
+ *
+ * States allocated by this function must not be dereferenced, written, read,
+ * or otherwise manipulated. The *only* supported operations are:
+ *   - Splitting up the states in intervals of @size_per_each, no more than
+ *     @num times from the first state.
+ *   - Passing a state to the getrandom() vDSO function's @opaque_state
+ *     parameter, but not passing the same state at the same time to two such
+ *     calls.
+ *   - Passing the first state to munmap(2), as described above.
+ * All other uses are undefined behavior, which is subject to change or removal

Suggest: “Passing the first state *and total length* to munmap(2)”

Rest of the documentation looks good to me. It addresses my concerns about future evolution of this interface.

Thanks,
Florian

author maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v11 1/4] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall

Quoted 4 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 2 lines

+ * - Passing the first state to munmap(2), as described above.
+ * All other uses are undefined behavior, which is subject to change or removal

Suggest: “Passing the first state *and total length* to munmap(2)”

Will do.

Quoted 2 lines

Rest of the documentation looks good to me. It addresses my concerns about future evolution of this interface.

Great! So hopefully the api is more or less settled now, and we can turn attention to the glibc part.

Jason

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v11 1/4] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall

In reply to Jason A. Donenfeld

drivers/char/random.c int __cold execute_with_initialized_rng(struct notifier_block *nb) · line 272

Quoted 10 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
drivers/char/random.c +10 -0
+       mm->def_flags |=
+               /*
+                * Don't allow state to be written to swap, to preserve forward secrecy.
+                * This works in conjunction with MAP_LOCKED in do_mmap(), below, which
+                * actually does the locking (and associated permission check and accounting).
+                * Here, VM_LOCKONFAULT together with VM_NORESERVE simply make the mlocking
+                * happen the first time it's actually used, the same as when calling
+                * mlock2(MLOCK_ONFAULT) from userspace.
+                */
+               VM_LOCKONFAULT | VM_NORESERVE |

Have you checked the interaction with this line in dup_mmap()? "tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);"

As the mlock.2 manpage says, "Memory locks are not inherited by a child created via fork(2)". I think the intention here is that the VMA should stay unswappable after fork(), right?

Of course, trying to reserve more mlocked memory in fork() would also be problematic...

author maintainer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v11 1/4] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall

Hi Jann,

Quoted 15 lines · Jann Horn

Review

Quoted 10 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+       mm->def_flags |=
+               /*
+                * Don't allow state to be written to swap, to preserve forward secrecy.
+                * This works in conjunction with MAP_LOCKED in do_mmap(), below, which
+                * actually does the locking (and associated permission check and accounting).
+                * Here, VM_LOCKONFAULT together with VM_NORESERVE simply make the mlocking
+                * happen the first time it's actually used, the same as when calling
+                * mlock2(MLOCK_ONFAULT) from userspace.
+                */
+               VM_LOCKONFAULT | VM_NORESERVE |

Have you checked the interaction with this line in dup_mmap()? "tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);"

Quoted 6 lines

As the mlock.2 manpage says, "Memory locks are not inherited by a child created via fork(2)". I think the intention here is that the VMA should stay unswappable after fork(), right?

Of course, trying to reserve more mlocked memory in fork() would also be problematic...

Thanks for pointing that out! Indeed that seems problematic. Fortunately, the use of WIPEONFORK at the same time as LOCKONFAULT means that memory doesn't actually need to be reserved in fork() itself. So something like the below seems correct and doable.

Jason

kernel/fork.c +3 -1
index ec57cae58ff1..cd53ffff615d 100644
@@ -656,7 +656,9 @@ static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm,
 			tmp->anon_vma = NULL;
 		} else if (anon_vma_fork(tmp, mpnt))
 			goto fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork;
-		tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);
+		if ((tmp->vm_flags & (VM_LOCKONFAULT | VM_WIPEONFORK)) !=
+		    (VM_LOCKONFAULT | VM_WIPEONFORK))
+			tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);
 		file = tmp->vm_file;
 		if (file) {
 			struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v11 1/4] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall

* Jason A. Donenfeld:

Quoted 37 lines

Hi Jann,

Quoted 15 lines · Jann Horn

Review

Quoted 10 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+       mm->def_flags |=
+               /*
+                * Don't allow state to be written to swap, to preserve forward secrecy.
+                * This works in conjunction with MAP_LOCKED in do_mmap(), below, which
+                * actually does the locking (and associated permission check and accounting).
+                * Here, VM_LOCKONFAULT together with VM_NORESERVE simply make the mlocking
+                * happen the first time it's actually used, the same as when calling
+                * mlock2(MLOCK_ONFAULT) from userspace.
+                */
+               VM_LOCKONFAULT | VM_NORESERVE |

Have you checked the interaction with this line in dup_mmap()? "tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);"

Quoted 6 lines

As the mlock.2 manpage says, "Memory locks are not inherited by a child created via fork(2)". I think the intention here is that the VMA should stay unswappable after fork(), right?

Of course, trying to reserve more mlocked memory in fork() would also be problematic...

Thanks for pointing that out! Indeed that seems problematic. Fortunately, the use of WIPEONFORK at the same time as LOCKONFAULT means that memory doesn't actually need to be reserved in fork() itself. So something like the below seems correct and doable.

Jason

kernel/fork.c +0 -0
index ec57cae58ff1..cd53ffff615d 100644

kernel/fork.c static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, · line 664

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/fork.c +3 -1
@@ -656,7 +656,9 @@ static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm,
 			tmp->anon_vma = NULL;
 		} else if (anon_vma_fork(tmp, mpnt))
 			goto fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork;
-		tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);
+		if ((tmp->vm_flags & (VM_LOCKONFAULT | VM_WIPEONFORK)) !=
+		    (VM_LOCKONFAULT | VM_WIPEONFORK))
+			tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);
 		file = tmp->vm_file;
 		if (file) {
 			struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;

Still it's a bit concerning that calling getrandom (the libc function) now apparently can kill the process if the system is under severe memory pressure. In many cases, that's okay, but we wouldn't want that for PID 1, for example. vm.overcommit_memory=2 mode is supposed to prevent such crashes, and I think NORESERVE (not shown here) sidesteps that.

Thanks,
Florian

author maintainer
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v11 1/4] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall

Hi Florian,

Quoted 47 lines · Florian Weimer

* Jason A. Donenfeld:

Quoted 45 lines

Hi Jann,

Quoted 15 lines · Jann Horn

Review

Quoted 10 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+       mm->def_flags |=
+               /*
+                * Don't allow state to be written to swap, to preserve forward secrecy.
+                * This works in conjunction with MAP_LOCKED in do_mmap(), below, which
+                * actually does the locking (and associated permission check and accounting).
+                * Here, VM_LOCKONFAULT together with VM_NORESERVE simply make the mlocking
+                * happen the first time it's actually used, the same as when calling
+                * mlock2(MLOCK_ONFAULT) from userspace.
+                */
+               VM_LOCKONFAULT | VM_NORESERVE |

Have you checked the interaction with this line in dup_mmap()? "tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);"

Quoted 6 lines

As the mlock.2 manpage says, "Memory locks are not inherited by a child created via fork(2)". I think the intention here is that the VMA should stay unswappable after fork(), right?

Of course, trying to reserve more mlocked memory in fork() would also be problematic...

Thanks for pointing that out! Indeed that seems problematic. Fortunately, the use of WIPEONFORK at the same time as LOCKONFAULT means that memory doesn't actually need to be reserved in fork() itself. So something like the below seems correct and doable.

Jason

kernel/fork.c +3 -1
index ec57cae58ff1..cd53ffff615d 100644
@@ -656,7 +656,9 @@ static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm,
 			tmp->anon_vma = NULL;
 		} else if (anon_vma_fork(tmp, mpnt))
 			goto fail_nomem_anon_vma_fork;
-		tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);
+		if ((tmp->vm_flags & (VM_LOCKONFAULT | VM_WIPEONFORK)) !=
+		    (VM_LOCKONFAULT | VM_WIPEONFORK))
+			tmp->vm_flags &= ~(VM_LOCKED | VM_LOCKONFAULT);
 		file = tmp->vm_file;
Quoted 8 lines

kernel/fork.c static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, · line 664

Quoted 2 lines
kernel/fork.c +0 -0
 		if (file) {
 			struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;

Still it's a bit concerning that calling getrandom (the libc function) now apparently can kill the process if the system is under severe memory pressure. In many cases, that's okay, but we wouldn't want that for PID 1, for example. vm.overcommit_memory=2 mode is supposed to prevent such crashes, and I think NORESERVE (not shown here) sidesteps that.

Right. Setting VM_NORESERVE this way sidesteps it. Passing MAP_NORESERVE to do_mmap() would make it respect vm.overcommit_memory=2, but then we'd face problems at fork() time, as Jann pointed out, when we might go down the path of trying to mlock memory from the fork() handler, and that seems not so desirable. But moreover, the overcommitment potentially makes the allocation scheme a lot simpler for libcs. Do any init daemons actually use vm.overcommit_memory=2? Is this actually something to care about?

If this isn't something we really care about so much, then my little diff above should suffice, and this all remains very simple. I suspect that's the case, because there are several VMAs that get set with VM_NORESERVE already in the kernel.

If this is something we need to care about, then perhaps it's worth rethinking the problem space from its basic goals:

- This memory must not be written to swap. Even if we added some flag to zero that part of swap when paging back in, that wouldn't cut it, because it's often very hard to "truly" zero out disk writes (and nobody wants to TRIM so often). (Rationale: forward secrecy.)

- It would be "nice" if untouched allocations didn't actually take up any memory.

- This needs to be wiped on fork.

Complications thus far encountered:

- VM_LOCKED|VM_LOCKONFAULT isn't inherited by forks.

- You're worried about forcing VM_LOCKONFAULT (rightfully or wrongly, as yet established).

However, there are two useful characteristics of this series that we might be able to exploit in order to arrive at a solution:

1) Due to being wiped during fork(), the code is already robust to having the contents of those pages zeroed out midway through.

2) In the absolute worst case of whatever contingency we're coding for, we have the option to fallback to the getrandom() syscall, and everything is fine.

So, putting together the basic goals with the complications thus far encountered, and trying to make use of (1) and (2), what if we introduce a VM_DROPPABLE flag. The semantics would be:

a) It never is written out to swap.
b) No memory is pre-reserved / committed.
c) Under memory pressure, mm can just drop the pages and make them zero.
d) If there's not enough memory to service a page fault, it's not fatal, and no signal is sent. Instead, writes are simply lost, and reads return zero, as if the page was dropped.
e) It is inherited by fork.
f) The pages are zeroed on fork (like VM_WIPEONFORK).
g) It doesn't count against the mlock budget, since nothing is locked.

Then, as an emergent restriction, we require that each opaque_state never straddle two pages, by returning a rounded up size_per_each.

What do you think of this plan? It's harder to implement, so I still would prefer the simpler diff I sent to Jann above. But if you're really convinced that disrespecting vm.overcommit_memory=2 is abominable, then maybe this more complicated plan could work. Plus, semantic (g) has its own advantages alone.

I'm CC'ing linux-mm about this matter, as I'm sure they'll have something to contribute here. (And linux-mm@, if your reaction is "why do we need this syscall at all, can't userspace just bla bla bla bla", please read the cover letter of the series, this patch's commit message, and prior discussion on that topic, so we don't have to rehash that.)

Jason

author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH v11 2/4 arch: allocate vgetrandom_alloc() syscall number

In reply to Jason A. Donenfeld

Add vgetrandom_alloc() as syscall 451 (or 561 on alpha) by adding it to all of the various syscall.tbl and unistd.h files.

---
 arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl              | 1 +
 arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl                          | 1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h                     | 2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h                   | 2 ++
 arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl               | 1 +
 arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl               | 1 +
 arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl         | 1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl           | 1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl           | 1 +
 arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl           | 1 +
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl             | 1 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl            | 1 +
 arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl               | 1 +
 arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl                 | 1 +
 arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl              | 1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl              | 1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl              | 1 +
 arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl             | 1 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h                   | 5 ++++-
 tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h             | 5 ++++-
 tools/perf/arch/mips/entry/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 +
 tools/perf/arch/powerpc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl  | 1 +
 tools/perf/arch/s390/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl     | 1 +
 tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl   | 1 +
 24 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 8ebacf37a8cf..a4bfd7b53d6f 100644
@@ -490,3 +490,4 @@
 558	common	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 559	common  futex_waitv                     sys_futex_waitv
 560	common	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_ni_syscall
+561	common	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index ac964612d8b0..e10319cc6c3e 100644
@@ -464,3 +464,4 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	common	futex_waitv			sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -1
index 037feba03a51..64a514f90131 100644
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
 #define __ARM_NR_compat_set_tls		(__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 5)
 #define __ARM_NR_COMPAT_END		(__ARM_NR_COMPAT_BASE + 0x800)
 
-#define __NR_compat_syscalls		451
+#define __NR_compat_syscalls		452
 #endif
 
 #define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h +2 -0
index 604a2053d006..7285b5a830cc 100644
@@ -907,6 +907,8 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_process_mrelease, sys_process_mrelease)
 __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)
 #define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450
 __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node)
+#define __NR_vgetrandom_alloc 451
+__SYSCALL(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, sys_vgetrandom_alloc)
 
 /*
  * Please add new compat syscalls above this comment and update
arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 72c929d9902b..5ed9667051fc 100644
@@ -371,3 +371,4 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	common  futex_waitv                     sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index b1f3940bc298..d9e7ea26dd26 100644
@@ -450,3 +450,4 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	common  futex_waitv                     sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 820145e47350..c109e307a37b 100644
@@ -456,3 +456,4 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	common  futex_waitv                     sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl +1 -0
index 253ff994ed2e..6d47d8231f7d 100644
@@ -389,3 +389,4 @@
 448	n32	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	n32	futex_waitv			sys_futex_waitv
 450	n32	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	n32	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl +1 -0
index 3f1886ad9d80..890e5b51e1fc 100644
@@ -365,3 +365,4 @@
 448	n64	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	n64	futex_waitv			sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	n64	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl +1 -0
index 8f243e35a7b2..de512de148f5 100644
@@ -438,3 +438,4 @@
 448	o32	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	o32	futex_waitv			sys_futex_waitv
 450	o32	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	o32	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 8a99c998da9b..bab1cee627e3 100644
@@ -448,3 +448,4 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	common	futex_waitv			sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index a0be127475b1..e6c04eda2363 100644
@@ -537,3 +537,4 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	common  futex_waitv                     sys_futex_waitv
 450 	nospu	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 799147658dee..5b0b2bea46da 100644
@@ -453,3 +453,4 @@
 448  common	process_mrelease	sys_process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449  common	futex_waitv		sys_futex_waitv			sys_futex_waitv
 450  common	set_mempolicy_home_node	sys_set_mempolicy_home_node	sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451  common	vgetrandom_alloc	sys_vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 2de85c977f54..631f0bac0e9a 100644
@@ -453,3 +453,4 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	common  futex_waitv                     sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 4398cc6fb68d..b4925978adea 100644
@@ -496,3 +496,4 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	common  futex_waitv                     sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +1 -0
index 320480a8db4f..f5f863a33824 100644
@@ -455,3 +455,4 @@
 448	i386	process_mrelease	sys_process_mrelease
 449	i386	futex_waitv		sys_futex_waitv
 450	i386	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	i386	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
index c84d12608cd2..0186f173f0e8 100644
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease	sys_process_mrelease
 449	common	futex_waitv		sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node	sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc	sys_vgetrandom_alloc
 
 #
 # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 52c94ab5c205..14d63a119cc2 100644
@@ -421,3 +421,4 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	common  futex_waitv                     sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +4 -1
index 45fa180cc56a..9d2e299f3e8a 100644
@@ -886,8 +886,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)
 #define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450
 __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node)
 
+#define __NR_vgetrandom_alloc 451
+__SYSCALL(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, sys_vgetrandom_alloc)
+
 #undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 451
+#define __NR_syscalls 452
 
 /*
  * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +4 -1
index 45fa180cc56a..9d2e299f3e8a 100644
@@ -886,8 +886,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)
 #define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450
 __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node)
 
+#define __NR_vgetrandom_alloc 451
+__SYSCALL(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, sys_vgetrandom_alloc)
+
 #undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 451
+#define __NR_syscalls 452
 
 /*
  * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
tools/perf/arch/mips/entry/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl +1 -0
index 3f1886ad9d80..890e5b51e1fc 100644
@@ -365,3 +365,4 @@
 448	n64	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	n64	futex_waitv			sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	n64	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
tools/perf/arch/powerpc/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index e9e0df4f9a61..d58da67a9766 100644
@@ -534,3 +534,4 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449	common  futex_waitv                     sys_futex_waitv
 450 	nospu	set_mempolicy_home_node		sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
tools/perf/arch/s390/entry/syscalls/syscall.tbl +1 -0
index 799147658dee..5b0b2bea46da 100644
@@ -453,3 +453,4 @@
 448  common	process_mrelease	sys_process_mrelease		sys_process_mrelease
 449  common	futex_waitv		sys_futex_waitv			sys_futex_waitv
 450  common	set_mempolicy_home_node	sys_set_mempolicy_home_node	sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451  common	vgetrandom_alloc	sys_vgetrandom_alloc		sys_vgetrandom_alloc
tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
index c84d12608cd2..0186f173f0e8 100644
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@
 448	common	process_mrelease	sys_process_mrelease
 449	common	futex_waitv		sys_futex_waitv
 450	common	set_mempolicy_home_node	sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
+451	common	vgetrandom_alloc	sys_vgetrandom_alloc
 
 #
 # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH v11 3/4 random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

In reply to Jason A. Donenfeld

Provide a generic C vDSO getrandom() implementation, which operates on an opaque state returned by vgetrandom_alloc() and produces random bytes the same way as getrandom(). This has a the API signature:

  ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);

The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to the opaque allocated state. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom() syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior.

The actual vDSO RNG algorithm implemented is the same one implemented by drivers/char/random.c, using the same fast-erasure techniques as that. Should the in-kernel implementation change, so too will the vDSO one.

It requires an implementation of ChaCha20 that does not use any stack, in order to maintain forward secrecy if a multi-threaded program forks (though this does not account for a similar issue with SA_SIGINFO copying registers to the stack), so this is left as an architecture-specific fill-in. Stack-less ChaCha20 is an easy algorithm to implement on a variety of architectures, so this shouldn't be too onerous.

Initially, the state is keyless, and so the first call makes a getrandom() syscall to generate that key, and then uses it for subsequent calls. By keeping track of a generation counter, it knows when its key is invalidated and it should fetch a new one using the syscall. Later, more than just a generation counter might be used.

Since MADV_WIPEONFORK is set on the opaque state, the key and related state is wiped during a fork(), so secrets don't roll over into new processes, and the same state doesn't accidentally generate the same random stream. The generation counter, as well, is always >0, so that the 0 counter is a useful indication of a fork() or otherwise uninitialized state.

If the kernel RNG is not yet initialized, then the vDSO always calls the syscall, because that behavior cannot be emulated in userspace, but fortunately that state is short lived and only during early boot. If it has been initialized, then there is no need to inspect the flags argument, because the behavior does not change post-initialization regardless of the flags value.

Since the opaque state passed to it is mutated, vDSO getrandom() is not reentrant, when used with the same opaque state, which libc should be mindful of.

vgetrandom_alloc() and vDSO getrandom() provide the ability for userspace to generate random bytes quickly and safely, and are intended to be integrated into libc's thread management. As an illustrative example, together with the example code from "random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall", the following code might be used to do the same outside of libc. In a libc, only the non-static vgetrandom() function at the end would be exported as part of a getrandom() implementations, and the various pthread-isms are expected to be elided into libc internals.

  static struct {
    ssize_t(*fn)(void *buf, size_t len, unsigned long flags, void *state);
    pthread_key_t key;
    pthread_once_t initialized;
  } grnd_ctx = {
    .initialized = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT
  };

  static void vgetrandom_init(void)
  {
    if (pthread_key_create(&grnd_ctx.key, vgetrandom_put_state) != 0)
      return;
    grnd_ctx.fn = vdso_sym("LINUX_2.6", "__vdso_getrandom");
  }

  ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buf, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
  {
    void *state;
    pthread_once(&grnd_ctx.initialized, vgetrandom_init);
    if (!grnd_ctx.fn)
      return getrandom(buf, len, flags);
    state = pthread_getspecific(grnd_ctx.key);
    if (!state) {
      state = vgetrandom_get_state();
      if (pthread_setspecific(grnd_ctx.key, state) != 0) {
        vgetrandom_put_state(state);
        state = NULL;
      }
      if (!state)
        return getrandom(buf, len, flags);
    }
    return grnd_ctx.fn(buf, len, flags, state);

}

---
 MAINTAINERS                                   |   1 +
 drivers/char/random.c                         |   7 +
 include/vdso/datapage.h                       |  12 +
 include/vdso/getrandom.h                      |  32 +-
 include/vdso/types.h                          |  35 +++
 lib/vdso/getrandom.c                          | 205 +++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/.gitignore       |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/Makefile         |   2 +
 .../selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c      | 279 ++++++++++++++++++
 9 files changed, 572 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/vdso/types.h
 create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
index 3894f947a507..70dff39fcff9 100644
@@ -17288,6 +17288,7 @@ S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/char/random.c
 F:	drivers/virt/vmgenid.c
 F:	include/vdso/getrandom.h
+F:	lib/vdso/getrandom.c
 
 RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM
 M:	Matt Porter <[email protected]>
drivers/char/random.c +7 -0
index 21692f7f4ea0..caa1893c8096 100644
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 #include <crypto/blake2s.h>
 #ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM
 #include <vdso/getrandom.h>
+#include <vdso/datapage.h>
 #endif
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/irq.h>
@@ -400,6 +401,9 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work)
 	if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
 		++next_gen;
 	WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
+#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM
+	smp_store_release(&_vdso_rng_data.generation, next_gen + 1);
+#endif
 	if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready))
 		crng_init = CRNG_READY;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
@@ -850,6 +854,9 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
 		if (static_key_initialized)
 			execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
 		atomic_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_notifier, 0, NULL);
+#ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM
+		smp_store_release(&_vdso_rng_data.is_ready, true);
+#endif
 		wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
 		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
 		pr_notice("crng init done\n");
include/vdso/datapage.h +12 -0
index 73eb622e7663..d1f800c1c718 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <vdso/time.h>
 #include <vdso/time32.h>
 #include <vdso/time64.h>
+#include <vdso/types.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_VDSO_DATA
 #include <asm/vdso/data.h>
@@ -109,6 +110,16 @@ struct vdso_data {
 	struct arch_vdso_data	arch_data;
 };
 
+/**
+ * struct vdso_rng_data - vdso RNG state information
+ * @generation:	counter representing the number of RNG reseeds
+ * @is_ready:	boolean signaling whether the RNG is initialized
+ */
+struct vdso_rng_data {
+	vdso_kernel_ulong	generation;
+	u8			is_ready;
+};
+
 /*
  * We use the hidden visibility to prevent the compiler from generating a GOT
  * relocation. Not only is going through a GOT useless (the entry couldn't and
@@ -120,6 +131,7 @@ struct vdso_data {
  */
 extern struct vdso_data _vdso_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
 extern struct vdso_data _timens_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
+extern struct vdso_rng_data _vdso_rng_data __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
 
 /*
  * The generic vDSO implementation requires that gettimeofday.h
include/vdso/getrandom.h +30 -2
index e3ceb1976386..7dc93d5f72dc 100644
@@ -6,11 +6,39 @@
 #ifndef _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H
 #define _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H
 
+#include <crypto/chacha.h>
+#include <vdso/types.h>
+
 /**
  * struct vgetrandom_state - State used by vDSO getrandom() and allocated by vgetrandom_alloc().
  *
- * Currently empty, as the vDSO getrandom() function has not yet been implemented.
+ * @batch:	One and a half ChaCha20 blocks of buffered RNG output.
+ *
+ * @key:	Key to be used for generating next batch.
+ *
+ * @batch_key:	Union of the prior two members, which is exactly two full
+ * 		ChaCha20 blocks in size, so that @batch and @key can be filled
+ * 		together.
+ *
+ * @generation:	Snapshot of @rng_info->generation in the vDSO data page at
+ *		the time @key was generated.
+ *
+ * @pos:	Offset into @batch of the next available random byte.
+ *
+ * @in_use:	Reentrancy guard for reusing a state within the same thread
+ *		due to signal handlers.
  */
-struct vgetrandom_state { int placeholder; };
+struct vgetrandom_state {
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u8	batch[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / 2];
+			u32	key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+		};
+		u8		batch_key[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 2];
+	};
+	vdso_kernel_ulong	generation;
+	u8			pos;
+	bool 			in_use;
+};
 
 #endif /* _VDSO_GETRANDOM_H */
include/vdso/types.h new file +35 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ce131463aeff
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+#ifndef __VDSO_TYPES_H
+#define __VDSO_TYPES_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/**
+ * type vdso_kernel_ulong - unsigned long type that matches kernel's unsigned long
+ *
+ * Data shared between userspace and the kernel must operate the same way in both 64-bit code and in
+ * 32-bit compat code, over the same potentially 64-bit kernel. This type represents the size of an
+ * unsigned long as used by kernel code. This isn't necessarily the same as an unsigned long as used
+ * by userspace, however.
+ *
+ *                 +-------------------+-------------------+------------------+-------------------+
+ *                 | 32-bit userspace  | 32-bit userspace  | 64-bit userspace | 64-bit userspace  |
+ *                 | unsigned long     | vdso_kernel_ulong | unsigned long    | vdso_kernel_ulong |
+ * +---------------+-------------------+-------------------+------------------+-------------------+
+ * | 32-bit kernel | ✓ same size       | ✓ same size       |
+ * | unsigned long |                   |                   |
+ * +---------------+-------------------+-------------------+------------------+-------------------+
+ * | 64-bit kernel | ✘ different size! | ✓ same size       | ✓ same size      | ✓ same size       |
+ * | unsigned long |                   |                   |                  |                   |
+ * +---------------+-------------------+-------------------+------------------+-------------------+
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+typedef u64 vdso_kernel_ulong;
+#else
+typedef u32 vdso_kernel_ulong;
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __VDSO_TYPES_H */
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +205 -0

205 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/.gitignore +1 -0
index a8dc51af5a9c..7dbfdec53f3d 100644
@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ vdso_test_correctness
 vdso_test_gettimeofday
 vdso_test_getcpu
 vdso_standalone_test_x86
+vdso_test_getrandom
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/Makefile +2 -0
index d53a4d8008f9..a33b4d200a32 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ ifeq ($(ARCH),$(filter $(ARCH),x86 x86_64))
 TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_standalone_test_x86
 endif
 TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_correctness
+TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_getrandom
 
 CFLAGS := -std=gnu99
 CFLAGS_vdso_standalone_test_x86 := -nostdlib -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -fno-stack-protector
@@ -33,3 +34,4 @@ $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_correctness: vdso_test_correctness.c
 		vdso_test_correctness.c \
 		-o $@ \
 		$(LDFLAGS_vdso_test_correctness)
+$(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_getrandom: parse_vdso.c
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_getrandom.c new file +279 -0

279 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v11 3/4] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

* Jason A. Donenfeld:

lib/vdso/getrandom.c

Quoted 8 lines
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +7 -0
+retry_generation:
+	/*
+	 * @rng_info->generation must always be read here, as it serializes @state->key with the
+	 * kernel's RNG reseeding schedule.
+	 */
+	current_generation = READ_ONCE(rng_info->generation);
 
+		if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(state->generation) != READ_ONCE(rng_info-

I'm pretty sure you need some sort of barrier here. We have a similar TM-lite construct in glibc ld.so for locating link maps by address, and there the compiler performed reordering.

_dl_find_object miscompilation on powerpc64le
<https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=28745>

I'm not familiar with READ_ONCE, but Documentation/atomic_t.txt suggests it's a “regular LOAD”, and include/asm-generic/rwonce.h concurs. Likewise, the signal safety mechanism needs compiler barriers (signal fences).

I'm also not sure how READ_ONCE realizes atomic 64-bit reads on 32-bit platforms. i386 can do them in user space via the FPU worst-case (if the control word hasn't been corrupted). CMPXCHG8B is not applicable here because it's a read-only mapping. Maybe add a comment at least about that “strong prevailing wind”?

Thanks,
Florian

author maintainer
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v11 3/4] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

Hi Florian,

Quoted 15 lines · Florian Weimer

* Jason A. Donenfeld:

lib/vdso/getrandom.c

Quoted 8 lines
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +7 -0
+retry_generation:
+	/*
+	 * @rng_info->generation must always be read here, as it serializes @state->key with the
+	 * kernel's RNG reseeding schedule.
+	 */
+	current_generation = READ_ONCE(rng_info->generation);
 
+		if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(state->generation) != READ_ONCE(rng_info-

I'm pretty sure you need some sort of barrier here. We have a similar TM-lite construct in glibc ld.so for locating link maps by address, and there the compiler performed reordering.

Quoted 5 lines

_dl_find_object miscompilation on powerpc64le
<https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=28745>

I'm not familiar with READ_ONCE, but Documentation/atomic_t.txt suggests it's a “regular LOAD”, and include/asm-generic/rwonce.h concurs.

Do you mean compiler barriers or SMP barriers?

Quoted 2 lines

Likewise, the signal safety mechanism needs compiler barriers (signal fences).

READ_ONCE() should prevent the compiler from reordering the read.

Quoted 5 lines

I'm also not sure how READ_ONCE realizes atomic 64-bit reads on 32-bit platforms. i386 can do them in user space via the FPU worst-case (if the control word hasn't been corrupted). CMPXCHG8B is not applicable here because it's a read-only mapping. Maybe add a comment at least about that “strong prevailing wind”?

There's read tearing in that case, which isn't super, but perhaps not all together harmful.

Jason

#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v11 3/4] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

* Jason A. Donenfeld:

Quoted 18 lines

Hi Florian,

Quoted 15 lines · Florian Weimer

* Jason A. Donenfeld:

lib/vdso/getrandom.c

Quoted 8 lines
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +7 -0
+retry_generation:
+	/*
+	 * @rng_info->generation must always be read here, as it serializes @state->key with the
+	 * kernel's RNG reseeding schedule.
+	 */
+	current_generation = READ_ONCE(rng_info->generation);
 
+		if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(state->generation) != READ_ONCE(rng_info-

I'm pretty sure you need some sort of barrier here. We have a similar TM-lite construct in glibc ld.so for locating link maps by address, and there the compiler performed reordering.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

_dl_find_object miscompilation on powerpc64le
<https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=28745>

I'm not familiar with READ_ONCE, but Documentation/atomic_t.txt suggests it's a “regular LOAD”, and include/asm-generic/rwonce.h concurs.

Do you mean compiler barriers or SMP barriers?

Compiler barrier.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Likewise, the signal safety mechanism needs compiler barriers (signal fences).

READ_ONCE() should prevent the compiler from reordering the read.

READ_ONCE looks just like a volatile read. Other reads can be ordered around it.

For example, this:

void f1 (int, int, int);

extern int a;
extern int b;

void
f2 (volatile int *p)
{
int a1 = a;
int p1 = *p;
int b1 = b;
return f1 (a1, p1, b1);
}

Turns into:

	.globl	f2
	.type	f2, @function
f2:
	movl	(%rdi), %esi
	movl	b(%rip), %edx
	movl	a(%rip), %edi
	jmp	f1

Looks like compiler reodering to me.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I'm also not sure how READ_ONCE realizes atomic 64-bit reads on 32-bit platforms. i386 can do them in user space via the FPU worst-case (if the control word hasn't been corrupted). CMPXCHG8B is not applicable here because it's a read-only mapping. Maybe add a comment at least about that “strong prevailing wind”?

There's read tearing in that case, which isn't super, but perhaps not all together harmful.

Maybe add a comment that it was considered?

Thanks,
Florian

author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH v11 4/4 x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation

In reply to Jason A. Donenfeld

Hook up the generic vDSO implementation to the x86 vDSO data page. Since the existing vDSO infrastructure is heavily based on the timekeeping functionality, which works over arrays of bases, a new macro is introduced for vvars that are not arrays.

The vDSO function requires a ChaCha20 implementation that does not write to the stack, yet can still do an entire ChaCha20 permutation, so provide this using SSE2, since this is userland code that must work on all x86-64 processors. There's a simple test for this code as well.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile                  |   3 +-
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S                |   2 +
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S       | 177 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c              |  17 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h         |  55 ++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h          |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h                   |  16 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/.gitignore       |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/Makefile         |   9 +
 .../testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c |  43 +++++
 11 files changed, 325 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
index 67745ceab0db..357148c4a3a4 100644
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
 	select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
 	select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO
+	select VDSO_GETRANDOM			if X86_64
 	select HOTPLUG_SMT			if SMP
 	select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
 	select NEED_PER_CPU_EMBED_FIRST_CHUNK
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +2 -1
index 3e88b9df8c8f..2de64e52236a 100644
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_X86_32)		:= y
 VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)	:= y
 
 # files to link into the vdso
-vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o
+vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o vgetrandom.o vgetrandom-chacha.o
 vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o
 vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o
 vobjs-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX)	+= vsgx.o
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx.o = -pg
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetrandom.o = -pg
 
 #
 # X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data.
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S +2 -0
index 4bf48462fca7..1919cc39277e 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ VERSION {
 		clock_getres;
 		__vdso_clock_getres;
 		__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave;
+		getrandom;
+		__vdso_getrandom;
 	local: *;
 	};
 }
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +177 -0

177 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c new file +17 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6045ded5da90
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "../../../../lib/vdso/getrandom.c"
+
+ssize_t __vdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *state);
+
+ssize_t __vdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *state)
+{
+	return __cvdso_getrandom(buffer, len, flags, state);
+}
+
+ssize_t getrandom(void *, size_t, unsigned int, void *)
+	__attribute__((weak, alias("__vdso_getrandom")));
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h new file +55 -0

55 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h +2 -0
index be199a9b2676..71c56586a22f 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 #include <asm/vvar.h>
 
 DEFINE_VVAR(struct vdso_data, _vdso_data);
+DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE(struct vdso_rng_data, _vdso_rng_data);
+
 /*
  * Update the vDSO data page to keep in sync with kernel timekeeping.
  */
arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h +16 -0
index 183e98e49ab9..9d9af37f7cab 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
  */
 #define DECLARE_VVAR(offset, type, name) \
 	EMIT_VVAR(name, offset)
+#define DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE(offset, type, name) \
+	EMIT_VVAR(name, offset)
 
 #else
 
@@ -37,6 +39,10 @@ extern char __vvar_page;
 	extern type timens_ ## name[CS_BASES]				\
 	__attribute__((visibility("hidden")));				\
 
+#define DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE(offset, type, name)				\
+	extern type vvar_ ## name					\
+	__attribute__((visibility("hidden")));				\
+
 #define VVAR(name) (vvar_ ## name)
 #define TIMENS(name) (timens_ ## name)
 
@@ -44,12 +50,22 @@ extern char __vvar_page;
 	type name[CS_BASES]						\
 	__attribute__((section(".vvar_" #name), aligned(16))) __visible
 
+#define DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE(type, name)					\
+	type name							\
+	__attribute__((section(".vvar_" #name), aligned(16))) __visible
+
 #endif
 
 /* DECLARE_VVAR(offset, type, name) */
 
 DECLARE_VVAR(128, struct vdso_data, _vdso_data)
 
+#if !defined(_SINGLE_DATA)
+#define _SINGLE_DATA
+DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE(640, struct vdso_rng_data, _vdso_rng_data)
+#endif
+
 #undef DECLARE_VVAR
+#undef DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE
 
 #endif
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/.gitignore +1 -0
index 7dbfdec53f3d..30d5c8f0e5c7 100644
@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ vdso_test_gettimeofday
 vdso_test_getcpu
 vdso_standalone_test_x86
 vdso_test_getrandom
+vdso_test_chacha
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/Makefile +9 -0
index a33b4d200a32..1b9057974693 100644
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ include ../lib.mk
 
 uname_M := $(shell uname -m 2>/dev/null || echo not)
 ARCH ?= $(shell echo $(uname_M) | sed -e s/i.86/x86/ -e s/x86_64/x86/)
+SODIUM := $(shell pkg-config --libs libsodium 2>/dev/null)
 
 TEST_GEN_PROGS := $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_gettimeofday $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_getcpu
 TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_abi
@@ -12,9 +13,15 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_standalone_test_x86
 endif
 TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_correctness
 TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_getrandom
+ifeq ($(uname_M),x86_64)
+ifneq ($(SODIUM),)
+TEST_GEN_PROGS += $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_chacha
+endif
+endif
 
 CFLAGS := -std=gnu99
 CFLAGS_vdso_standalone_test_x86 := -nostdlib -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables -fno-stack-protector
+CFLAGS_vdso_test_chacha := $(SODIUM) -idirafter $(top_srcdir)/include -idirafter $(top_srcdir)/arch/$(ARCH)/include -D__ASSEMBLY__ -Wa,--noexecstack
 LDFLAGS_vdso_test_correctness := -ldl
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_32),y)
 LDLIBS += -lgcc_s
@@ -35,3 +42,5 @@ $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_correctness: vdso_test_correctness.c
 		-o $@ \
 		$(LDFLAGS_vdso_test_correctness)
 $(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_getrandom: parse_vdso.c
+$(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_chacha: CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_vdso_test_chacha)
+$(OUTPUT)/vdso_test_chacha: $(top_srcdir)/arch/$(ARCH)/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S
tools/testing/selftests/vDSO/vdso_test_chacha.c new file +43 -0

43 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.38.1