implement getrandom() in vDSO
Subsystems (8)
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerv6 cover implement getrandom() in vDSO
Changes v5->v6:
--------------
- Fix various build errors for odd configurations.
- Do not leak any secrets onto the stack at all, to account for possibility of fork()ing in a multithreaded scenario, which would ruin forward secrecy. Instead provide a arch-specific implementation that doesn't need stack space.
- Prevent page alignment from overflowing variable, and clamp to acceptable limits.
- Read/write unaligned bytes using get/put_unaligned.
- Add extensive comments to vDSO function explaining subtle aspects.
- Account for fork() races when writing generation counter.
Changes v4->v5:
--------------
- Add example code to vDSO addition commit showing intended use and interaction with allocations.
- Reset buffer to beginning when retrying.
- Rely on generation counter never being zero for fork detection, rather than adding extra boolean.
- Make use of __ARCH_WANT_VGETRANDOM_ALLOC macro around new syscall so that it's condition by archs that actually choose to add this, and don't forget to bump __NR_syscalls.
- Separate __cvdso_getrandom() into __cvdso_getrandom() and __cvdso_getrandom_data() so that powerpc can make a more efficient call.
Changes v3->v4:
--------------
- Split up into small series rather than one big patch.
- Use proper ordering in generation counter reads.
- Make properly generic, not just a hairball with x86, by moving symbols into correct files.
Changes v2->v3:
--------------
Big changes:
Thomas' previous objection was two-fold: 1) vgetrandom should really have the same function signature as getrandom, in addition to all of the same behavior, and 2) having vgetrandom_alloc be a vDSO function doesn't make sense, because it doesn't actually need anything from the VDSO data page and it doesn't correspond to an existing syscall.
After a discussion at Plumbers this last week, we devised the following ways to fix these: 1) we make the opque state argument be the last argument of vgetrandom, rather than the first one, since the real syscall ignores the additional argument, and that way all the registers are the same, and no behavior changes; and 2) we make vgetrandom_alloc a syscall, rather than a vDSO function, which also gives it added flexibility for the future, which is good.
Making those changes also reduced the size of this patch a bit.
Smaller changes:
- Properly add buffer offset position.
- Don't EXPORT_SYMBOL for vDSO code.
- Account for timens and vvar being in swapped pages.
--------------
Two statements:
1) Userspace wants faster cryptographically secure random numbers of arbitrary size, big or small.
2) Userspace is currently unable to safely roll its own RNG with the same security profile as getrandom().
Statement (1) has been debated for years, with arguments ranging from "we need faster cryptographically secure card shuffling!" to "the only things that actually need good randomness are keys, which are few and far between" to "actually, TLS CBC nonces are frequent" and so on. I don't intend to wade into that debate substantially, except to note that recently glibc added arc4random(), whose goal is to return a cryptographically secure uint32_t, and there are real user reports of it being too slow. So here we are.
Statement (2) is more interesting. The kernel is the nexus of all entropic inputs that influence the RNG. It is in the best position, and probably the only position, to decide anything at all about the current state of the RNG and of its entropy. One of the things it uniquely knows about is when reseeding is necessary.
For example, when a virtual machine is forked, restored, or duplicated, it's imparative that the RNG doesn't generate the same outputs. For this reason, there's a small protocol between hypervisors and the kernel that indicates this has happened, alongside some ID, which the RNG uses to immediately reseed, so as not to return the same numbers. Were userspace to expand a getrandom() seed from time T1 for the next hour, and at some point T2 < hour, the virtual machine forked, userspace would continue to provide the same numbers to two (or more) different virtual machines, resulting in potential cryptographic catastrophe. Something similar happens on resuming from hibernation (or even suspend), with various compromise scenarios there in mind.
There's a more general reason why userspace rolling its own RNG from a getrandom() seed is fraught. There's a lot of attention paid to this particular Linuxism we have of the RNG being initialized and thus non-blocking or uninitialized and thus blocking until it is initialized. These are our Two Big States that many hold to be the holy differentiating factor between safe and not safe, between cryptographically secure and garbage. The fact is, however, that the distinction between these two states is a hand-wavy wishy-washy inexact approximation. Outside of a few exceptional cases (e.g. a HW RNG is available), we actually don't really ever know with any rigor at all when the RNG is safe and ready (nor when it's compromised). We do the best we can to "estimate" it, but entropy estimation is fundamentally impossible in the general case. So really, we're just doing guess work, and hoping it's good and conservative enough. Let's then assume that there's always some potential error involved in this differentiator.
In fact, under the surface, the RNG is engineered around a different principal, and that is trying to *use* new entropic inputs regularly and at the right specific moments in time. For example, close to boot time, the RNG reseeds itself more often than later. At certain events, like VM fork, the RNG reseeds itself immediately. The various heuristics for when the RNG will use new entropy and how often is really a core aspect of what the RNG has some potential to do decently enough (and something that will probably continue to improve in the future from random.c's present set of algorithms). So in your mind, put away the metal attachment to the Two Big States, which represent an approximation with a potential margin of error. Instead keep in mind that the RNG's primary operating heuristic is how often and exactly when it's going to reseed.
So, if userspace takes a seed from getrandom() at point T1, and uses it for the next hour (or N megabytes or some other meaningless metric), during that time, potential errors in the Two Big States approximation are amplified. During that time potential reseeds are being lost, forgotten, not reflected in the output stream. That's not good.
The simplest statement you could make is that userspace RNGs that expand a getrandom() seed at some point T1 are nearly always *worse*, in some way, than just calling getrandom() every time a random number is desired.
For those reasons, after some discussion on libc-alpha, glibc's arc4random() now just calls getrandom() on each invocation. That's trivially safe, and gives us latitude to then make the safe thing faster without becoming unsafe at our leasure. Card shuffling isn't particularly fast, however.
How do we rectify this? By putting a safe implementation of getrandom() in the vDSO, which has access to whatever information a particular iteration of random.c is using to make its decisions. I use that careful language of "particular iteration of random.c", because the set of things that a vDSO getrandom() implementation might need for making decisions as good as the kernel's will likely change over time. This isn't just a matter of exporting certain *data* to userspace. We're not going to commit to a "data API" where the various heuristics used are exposed, locking in how the kernel works for decades to come, and then leave it to various userspaces to roll something on top and shoot themselves in the foot and have all sorts of complexity disasters. Rather, vDSO getrandom() is supposed to be the *same exact algorithm* that runs in the kernel, except it's been hoisted into userspace as much as possible. And so vDSO getrandom() and kernel getrandom() will always mirror each other hermetically.
API-wise, the vDSO gains this function:
ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);
The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to some state allocated with vgetrandom_alloc(), explained below. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior.
Then, we introduce a new syscall:
void *vgetrandom_alloc([inout] size_t *num, [out] size_t *size_per_each, unsigned int flags);
This takes the desired number of opaque states in num, and returns a pointer to an array of opaque states, the number actually allocated back in num, and the size in bytes of each one in size_per_each, enabling a libc to slice up the returned array into a state per each thread. (The flags argument is always zero for now.) We very intentionally do *not* leave state allocation up to the caller of vgetrandom, but provide vgetrandom_alloc for that allocation. There are too many weird things that can go wrong, and it's important that vDSO does not provide too generic of a mechanism. It's not going to store its state in just any old memory address. It'll do it only in ones it allocates.
Right now this means it's a mlock'd page with WIPEONFORK set. In the future maybe there will be other interesting page flags or anti-heartbleed measures, or other platform-specific kernel-specific things that can be set from the syscall. Again, it's important that the kernel has a say in how this works rather than agreeing to operate on any old address; memory isn't neutral.
The syscall currently accomplishes this with a call to vm_mmap() and then a call to do_madvise(). It'd be nice to do this all at once, but I'm not sure that a helper function exists for that now, and it seems a bit premature to add one, at least for now.
The interesting meat of the implementation is in lib/vdso/getrandom.c, as generic C code, and it aims to mainly follow random.c's buffered fast key erasure logic. Before the RNG is initialized, it falls back to the syscall. Right now it uses a simple generation counter to make its decisions on reseeding (though this could be made more extensive over time).
The actual place that has the most work to do is in all of the other files. Most of the vDSO shared page infrastructure is centered around gettimeofday, and so the main structs are all in arrays for different timestamp types, and attached to time namespaces, and so forth. I've done the best I could to add onto this in an unintrusive way.
In my test results, performance is pretty stellar (around 15x for uint32_t generation), and it seems to be working. There's an extended example in the second commit of this series, showing how the syscall and the vDSO function are meant to be used together.
Jason A. Donenfeld (3):
random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
MAINTAINERS | 2 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 2 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S | 181 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c | 18 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h | 49 +++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h | 16 +++ drivers/char/random.c | 68 +++++++++ include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- include/vdso/datapage.h | 6 + kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 + lib/vdso/Kconfig | 5 + lib/vdso/getrandom.c | 113 +++++++++++++++ lib/vdso/getrandom.h | 23 +++ scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 + tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 +- 20 files changed, 510 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.h
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v6 1/3 random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
The vDSO getrandom() works over an opaque per-thread state of an unexported size, which must be marked as MADV_WIPEONFORK and be mlock()'d for proper operation. Over time, the nuances of these allocations may change or grow or even differ based on architectural features.
The syscall has the signature:
void *vgetrandom_alloc([inout] size_t *num, [out] size_t *size_per_each, unsigned int flags);
This takes the desired number of opaque states in num, and returns a pointer to an array of opaque states, the number actually allocated back in num, and the size in bytes of each one in size_per_each, enabling a libc to slice up the returned array into a state per each thread. (The flags argument is always zero for now.) Libc is expected to allocate a chunk of these on first use, and then dole them out to threads as they're created, allocating more when needed. The following commit shows an example of this, being used in conjunction with the getrandom() vDSO function.
We very intentionally do *not* leave state allocation for vDSO getrandom() up to userspace itself, but rather provide this new syscall for such allocations. vDSO getrandom() must not store its state in just any old memory address, but rather just ones that the kernel specially allocates for it, leaving the particularities of those allocations up to the kernel.
--- MAINTAINERS | 1 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/unistd.h | 1 + drivers/char/random.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 ++- kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 ++ lib/vdso/getrandom.h | 23 ++++++++++ scripts/checksyscalls.sh | 4 ++ tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 7 ++- 10 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.h
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -17287,6 +17287,7 @@ T: git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git S: Maintained F: drivers/char/random.c F: drivers/virt/vmgenid.c +F: lib/vdso/getrandom.h RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM M: Matt Porter <[email protected]>
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ config X86 # select ACPI_LEGACY_TABLES_LOOKUP if ACPI select ACPI_SYSTEM_POWER_STATES_SUPPORT if ACPI + select ADVISE_SYSCALLS if X86_64 select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T if X86_32 select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_INIT select ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 common vgetrandom_alloc sys_vgetrandom_alloc # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@# define __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_PWRITEV64# define __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_PREADV64V2# define __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_PWRITEV64V2 +# define __ARCH_WANT_VGETRANDOM_ALLOC# define X32_NR_syscalls (__NR_x32_syscalls)# define IA32_NR_syscalls (__NR_ia32_syscalls)
drivers/char/random.c +59 -0
83 lines not on this page · raw message
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +6 -1
@@ -886,8 +886,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)#define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450 __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node) +#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_VGETRANDOM_ALLOC +#define __NR_vgetrandom_alloc 451 +__SYSCALL(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, sys_vgetrandom_alloc) +#endif +#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 451 +#define __NR_syscalls 452/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
kernel/sys_ni.c +3 -0
@@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_free);/* memfd_secret */ COND_SYSCALL (memfd_secret); +/* random */ +COND_SYSCALL (vgetrandom_alloc); +/* * Architecture specific weak syscall entries. */
lib/vdso/getrandom.h new file +23 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved. +*/ + +#ifndef _VDSO_LIB_GETRANDOM_H +#define _VDSO_LIB_GETRANDOM_H + +#include <crypto/chacha.h> + +struct vgetrandom_state { +union { +struct { +u8 batch[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE *3 /2 ]; +u32 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE /sizeof (u32)]; + }; +u8 batch_key[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE *2 ]; + }; +unsigned long generation; +u8 pos; +}; + +#endif /* _VDSO_LIB_GETRANDOM_H */
scripts/checksyscalls.sh +4 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ cat << EOF #define __IGNORE_memfd_secret #endif +#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_VGETRANDOM_ALLOC +#define __IGNORE_vgetrandom_alloc +#endif + /* Missing flags argument */ #define __IGNORE_renameat /* renameat2 */
tools/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +6 -1
@@ -886,8 +886,13 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)#define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450 __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node) +#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_VGETRANDOM_ALLOC +#define __NR_vgetrandom_alloc 451 +__SYSCALL(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, sys_vgetrandom_alloc) +#endif +#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 451 +#define __NR_syscalls 452/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
Re: [PATCH v6 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
drivers/char/random.c EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); · line 171
Quoted 8 lines
+ * The
vgetrandom()function in userspace requires an opaque state, which this
+ * function provides to userspace, by mapping a certain number of special pages
+ * into the calling process. It takes a hint as to the number of opaque states
+ * desired, and returns the number of opaque states actually allocated, the
+ * size of each one in bytes, and the address of the first state.
+ */drivers/char/random.c +2
-0+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(vgetrandom_alloc, unsigned long __user *, num, + unsigned long __user *, size_per_each, unsigned int, flags)
I think you should make this __u64, so that you get a consistent userspace interface on all architectures, without the need for compat system calls.
Thanks,
Florian
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
Hi Florian,
Quoted 14 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
drivers/char/random.c EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); · line 171
Quoted 8 lines
+ * The
vgetrandom()function in userspace requires an opaque state, which this
+ * function provides to userspace, by mapping a certain number of special pages
+ * into the calling process. It takes a hint as to the number of opaque states
+ * desired, and returns the number of opaque states actually allocated, the
+ * size of each one in bytes, and the address of the first state.
+ */drivers/char/random.c +2
-0+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(vgetrandom_alloc, unsigned long __user *, num, + unsigned long __user *, size_per_each, unsigned int, flags)I think you should make this
__u64, so that you get a consistent userspace interface on all architectures, without the need for compat system calls.
That would be quite unconventional. Most syscalls that take lengths do so with the native register size (unsigned long, size_t), rather than u64. If you can point to a recent trend away from this by indicating some commits that added new syscalls with u64, I'd be happy to be shown otherwise. But AFAIK, that's not the way it's done.
Jason
Re: [PATCH v6 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 18 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 14 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
drivers/char/random.c EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); · line 171
Quoted 8 lines
+ * The
vgetrandom()function in userspace requires an opaque state, which this
+ * function provides to userspace, by mapping a certain number of special pages
+ * into the calling process. It takes a hint as to the number of opaque states
+ * desired, and returns the number of opaque states actually allocated, the
+ * size of each one in bytes, and the address of the first state.
+ */drivers/char/random.c +2
-0+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(vgetrandom_alloc, unsigned long __user *, num, + unsigned long __user *, size_per_each, unsigned int, flags)I think you should make this
__u64, so that you get a consistent userspace interface on all architectures, without the need for compat system calls.
Quoted 5 lines
That would be quite unconventional. Most syscalls that take lengths do so with the native register size (
unsigned long,size_t), rather than u64. If you can point to a recent trend away from this by indicating some commits that added new syscalls with u64, I'd be happy to be shown otherwise. But AFAIK, that's not the way it's done.
See clone3 and struct clone_args. It's more common with pointers, which are now 64 bits unconditionally: struct futex_waitv, struct rseq_cs and struct rseq.
If the length or pointer is a system call argument, widening it to 64 bits is not necessary because zero-extension to the full register eliminates the need for a compat system call. But if you pass the address to a size or pointer, you'll need compat syscalls if you don't make the passed data __u64.
Thanks,
Florian
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
Hi Florian,
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 18 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 14 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
drivers/char/random.c EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); · line 171
Quoted 8 lines
+ * The
vgetrandom()function in userspace requires an opaque state, which this
+ * function provides to userspace, by mapping a certain number of special pages
+ * into the calling process. It takes a hint as to the number of opaque states
+ * desired, and returns the number of opaque states actually allocated, the
+ * size of each one in bytes, and the address of the first state.
+ */drivers/char/random.c +2
-0+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(vgetrandom_alloc, unsigned long __user *, num, + unsigned long __user *, size_per_each, unsigned int, flags)I think you should make this
__u64, so that you get a consistent userspace interface on all architectures, without the need for compat system calls.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
That would be quite unconventional. Most syscalls that take lengths do so with the native register size (
unsigned long,size_t), rather than u64. If you can point to a recent trend away from this by indicating some commits that added new syscalls with u64, I'd be happy to be shown otherwise. But AFAIK, that's not the way it's done.See clone3 and struct
clone_args.
The struct is one thing. But actually, clone3 takes a size_t:
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clone3, struct clone_args __user *, uargs, size_t, size)
I take from this that I too should use size_t rather than unsigned long. And it doesn't seem like there's any compat clone3.
Jason
Re: [PATCH v6 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 29 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 26 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 23 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 14 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
drivers/char/random.c EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); · line 171
Quoted 8 lines
+ * The
vgetrandom()function in userspace requires an opaque state, which this
+ * function provides to userspace, by mapping a certain number of special pages
+ * into the calling process. It takes a hint as to the number of opaque states
+ * desired, and returns the number of opaque states actually allocated, the
+ * size of each one in bytes, and the address of the first state.
+ */drivers/char/random.c +2
-0+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(vgetrandom_alloc, unsigned long __user *, num, + unsigned long __user *, size_per_each, unsigned int, flags)I think you should make this
__u64, so that you get a consistent userspace interface on all architectures, without the need for compat system calls.That would be quite unconventional. Most syscalls that take lengths do so with the native register size (
unsigned long,size_t), rather than u64. If you can point to a recent trend away from this by indicating some commits that added new syscalls with u64, I'd be happy to be shown otherwise. But AFAIK, that's not the way it's done.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
See clone3 and struct
clone_args.The struct is one thing. But actually, clone3 takes a
size_t:
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clone3, struct clone_args __user *, uargs, size_t, size)I take from this that I too should use
size_trather thanunsigned long.And it doesn't seem like there's any compat clone3.
But vgetrandom_alloc does not use unsigned long, but unsigned long *. You need to look at the contents for struct clone_args for comparison.
Thanks,
Florian
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
Hi Florian,
Quoted 35 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 33 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 18 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 14 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
drivers/char/random.c EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes); · line 171
Quoted 8 lines
+ * The
vgetrandom()function in userspace requires an opaque state, which this
+ * function provides to userspace, by mapping a certain number of special pages
+ * into the calling process. It takes a hint as to the number of opaque states
+ * desired, and returns the number of opaque states actually allocated, the
+ * size of each one in bytes, and the address of the first state.
+ */drivers/char/random.c +2
-0+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(vgetrandom_alloc, unsigned long __user *, num, + unsigned long __user *, size_per_each, unsigned int, flags)I think you should make this
__u64, so that you get a consistent userspace interface on all architectures, without the need for compat system calls.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
That would be quite unconventional. Most syscalls that take lengths do so with the native register size (
unsigned long,size_t), rather than u64. If you can point to a recent trend away from this by indicating some commits that added new syscalls with u64, I'd be happy to be shown otherwise. But AFAIK, that's not the way it's done.See clone3 and struct
clone_args.The struct is one thing. But actually, clone3 takes a
size_t:
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clone3, struct clone_args __user *, uargs, size_t, size)I take from this that I too should use
size_trather thanunsigned long.And it doesn't seem like there's any compat clone3.But
vgetrandom_allocdoes not use unsigned long, but unsigned long *. You need to look at the contents for structclone_argsfor comparison.
Ah! I see what you mean; that's a good point. The usual register clearing thing isn't going to happen because these are addresses.
I still am somewhat hesitant, though, because size_t is really the "proper" type to be used. Maybe the compat syscall thing is just a necessary evil?
The other direction would be making this a u32, since 640k ought to be enough for anybody and such, but maybe that'd be a mistake too.
So I'm not sure. Anybody else on the list with experience adding syscalls have an opinion?
Jason
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
Hey again,
Quoted 53 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Hi Florian,
Quoted 35 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 33 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 18 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 14 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Review
Quoted 8 lines
+ * The
vgetrandom()function in userspace requires an opaque state, which this
+ * function provides to userspace, by mapping a certain number of special pages
+ * into the calling process. It takes a hint as to the number of opaque states
+ * desired, and returns the number of opaque states actually allocated, the
+ * size of each one in bytes, and the address of the first state.
+ */(quoted diff) +2
-0+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(vgetrandom_alloc, unsigned long __user *, num, + unsigned long __user *, size_per_each, unsigned int, flags)I think you should make this
__u64, so that you get a consistent userspace interface on all architectures, without the need for compat system calls.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
That would be quite unconventional. Most syscalls that take lengths do so with the native register size (
unsigned long,size_t), rather than u64. If you can point to a recent trend away from this by indicating some commits that added new syscalls with u64, I'd be happy to be shown otherwise. But AFAIK, that's not the way it's done.See clone3 and struct
clone_args.The struct is one thing. But actually, clone3 takes a
size_t:Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clone3, struct clone_args __user *, uargs, size_t, size)I take from this that I too should use
size_trather thanunsigned long.And it doesn't seem like there's any compat clone3.But
vgetrandom_allocdoes not use unsigned long, but unsigned long *. You need to look at the contents for structclone_argsfor comparison.Ah! I see what you mean; that's a good point. The usual register clearing thing isn't going to happen because these are addresses.
I still am somewhat hesitant, though, because
size_tis really the "proper" type to be used. Maybe the compat syscall thing is just a necessary evil?
Quoted 5 lines
The other direction would be making this a u32, since 640k ought to be enough for anybody and such, but maybe that'd be a mistake too.
So I'm not sure. Anybody else on the list with experience adding syscalls have an opinion?
Looks like set_mempolicy, get_mempoliy, and migrate_pages pass an unsigned long pointer and I don't see any compat stuff around it:
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(set_mempolicy, int, mode, const unsigned long __user *, nmask,
unsigned long, maxnode)
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(get_mempolicy, int __user *, policy,
unsigned long __user *, nmask, unsigned long, maxnode, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, flags)
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(migrate_pages, pid_t, pid, unsigned long, maxnode,
const unsigned long __user *, old_nodes, const unsigned long __user *, new_nodes)
In contrast sched_setaffinity and get_robust_list take a unsigned long pointer and does have a compat wrapper:
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sched_setaffinity, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, len,
unsigned long __user *, user_mask_ptr)
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
struct robust_list_head __user * __user *, head_ptr, size_t __user *, len_ptr)
Jason
Arnd Bergmann
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
Quoted 9 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
On Thu, Nov 24, 2022 at 01:24:42PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
Looks like
set_mempolicy,get_mempoliy, andmigrate_pagespass an unsigned long pointer and I don't see any compat stuff around it:SYSCALL_DEFINE3(set_mempolicy, int, mode, const unsigned long
__user*, nmask,
unsigned long, maxnode)
Quoted 7 lines
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(get_mempolicy, int
__user*, policy,
unsigned long__user*, nmask, unsigned long, maxnode, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, flags)SYSCALL_DEFINE4(migrate_pages,
pid_t, pid, unsigned long, maxnode,
const unsigned long__user*,old_nodes, const unsigned long__user*,new_nodes)
Compat handling for these is done all the way down in the pointer access:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/mm/mempolicy.c#n1368
This works here because it's a special bitmap but is not the best approach if you just have a pointer to a single value.
Arnd
Re: [PATCH v6 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldQuoted 35 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Hi Florian,
Quoted 32 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 30 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 27 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 18 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 14 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Review
Quoted 8 lines
+ * The
vgetrandom()function in userspace requires an opaque state, which this
+ * function provides to userspace, by mapping a certain number of special pages
+ * into the calling process. It takes a hint as to the number of opaque states
+ * desired, and returns the number of opaque states actually allocated, the
+ * size of each one in bytes, and the address of the first state.
+ */(quoted diff) +2
-0+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(vgetrandom_alloc, unsigned long __user *, num, + unsigned long __user *, size_per_each, unsigned int, flags)I think you should make this
__u64, so that you get a consistent userspace interface on all architectures, without the need for compat system calls.Quoted 5 lines
That would be quite unconventional. Most syscalls that take lengths do so with the native register size (
unsigned long,size_t), rather than u64. If you can point to a recent trend away from this by indicating some commits that added new syscalls with u64, I'd be happy to be shown otherwise. But AFAIK, that's not the way it's done.See clone3 and struct
clone_args.
For system calls that take structs as arguments we use u64 in the struct for proper alignment so we can extend structs without regressing old kernels. We have a few of those extensible struct system calls.
But we don't really have a lot system calls that pass u64 as a pointer outside of a structure so far. Neither as register and nor as pointer iirc. Passing them as a register arg is problematic because of 32bit arches. But passing as pointer should be fine but it is indeed uncommon.
Quoted 11 lines
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Quoted 7 lines
The struct is one thing. But actually, clone3 takes a
size_t:
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clone3, struct clone_args __user *, uargs, size_t, size)I take from this that I too should use
size_trather thanunsigned long.And it doesn't seem like there's any compat clone3.But
vgetrandom_allocdoes not use unsigned long, but unsigned long *. You need to look at the contents for structclone_argsfor comparison.
Quoted 6 lines
Ah! I see what you mean; that's a good point. The usual register clearing thing isn't going to happen because these are addresses.
I still am somewhat hesitant, though, because
size_tis really the "proper" type to be used. Maybe the compat syscall thing is just a necessary evil?
We try to avoid adding new compat-requiring syscalls like the plague usually. (At least for new syscalls that don't need to inherit behavior from earlier syscalls they are a revisions of.)
Quoted 3 lines
The other direction would be making this a u32, since 640k ought to be enough for anybody and such, but maybe that'd be a mistake too.
I think making this a size_t is fine. We haven't traditionally used u32 for sizes. All syscalls that pass structs versioned by size use size_t. So I would recommend to stick with that.
Alternatively, you could also introduce a simple struct versioned by size for this system call similar to mount_setatt() and clone3() and so on. This way you don't need to worry about future extensibilty. Just a thought.
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
Hi Christian,
Thanks a bunch for chiming in.
Quoted 4 lines · Christian Brauner
Alternatively, you could also introduce a simple struct versioned by size for this system call similar to
mount_setatt()andclone3()and so on. This way you don't need to worry about future extensibilty. Just a thought.
Briefly considered that, but it seemed a bit heavy for something like this. I'm not super heavily opposed, but just seemed like a bit much.
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(vgetrandom_alloc, unsigned long __user *, num, + unsigned long __user *, size_per_each, unsigned int, flags)I think you should make this
__u64, so that you get a consistent userspace interface on all architectures, without the need for compat system calls.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
That would be quite unconventional. Most syscalls that take lengths do so with the native register size (
unsigned long,size_t), rather than u64. If you can point to a recent trend away from this by indicating some commits that added new syscalls with u64, I'd be happy to be shown otherwise. But AFAIK, that's not the way it's done.See clone3 and struct
clone_args.
Quoted 7 lines
For system calls that take structs as arguments we use u64 in the struct for proper alignment so we can extend structs without regressing old kernels. We have a few of those extensible struct system calls.
But we don't really have a lot system calls that pass u64 as a pointer outside of a structure so far. Neither as register and nor as pointer iirc.
Right, the __u64_aligned business seemed to be mostly about extensibility.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The struct is one thing. But actually, clone3 takes a
size_t:
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clone3, struct clone_args __user *, uargs, size_t, size)I take from this that I too should use
size_trather thanunsigned long.And it doesn't seem like there's any compat clone3.But
vgetrandom_allocdoes not use unsigned long, but unsigned long *. You need to look at the contents for structclone_argsfor comparison.Ah! I see what you mean; that's a good point. The usual register clearing thing isn't going to happen because these are addresses.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I still am somewhat hesitant, though, because
size_tis really the "proper" type to be used. Maybe the compat syscall thing is just a necessary evil?I think making this a
size_tis fine. We haven't traditionally used u32 for sizes. All syscalls that pass structs versioned by size usesize_t. So I would recommend to stick with that.
This isn't quite a struct versioned by size. This is:
void *vgetrandom_alloc([inout] size_t *num, [out] size_t *size_per_each, unsigned int flags);
You give it an input 'num' and some flags (currently flags=0), and it gives you back an output 'num' size, an output 'size_per_each' size, and an opaque pointer value mapping as its return value.
I do like the idea of keeping size_t so that the type is "right". But the other arguments are equally compelling as well, so not sure.
Jason
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/3] random: add vgetrandom_alloc() syscall
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldQuoted 40 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Hi Florian,
Quoted 37 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 35 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 18 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 14 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Review
Quoted 8 lines
+ * The
vgetrandom()function in userspace requires an opaque state, which this
+ * function provides to userspace, by mapping a certain number of special pages
+ * into the calling process. It takes a hint as to the number of opaque states
+ * desired, and returns the number of opaque states actually allocated, the
+ * size of each one in bytes, and the address of the first state.
+ */(quoted diff) +2
-0+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(vgetrandom_alloc, unsigned long __user *, num, + unsigned long __user *, size_per_each, unsigned int, flags)I think you should make this
__u64, so that you get a consistent userspace interface on all architectures, without the need for compat system calls.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
That would be quite unconventional. Most syscalls that take lengths do so with the native register size (
unsigned long,size_t), rather than u64. If you can point to a recent trend away from this by indicating some commits that added new syscalls with u64, I'd be happy to be shown otherwise. But AFAIK, that's not the way it's done.See clone3 and struct
clone_args.The struct is one thing. But actually, clone3 takes a
size_t:
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(clone3, struct clone_args __user *, uargs, size_t, size)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I take from this that I too should use
size_trather thanunsigned long.And it doesn't seem like there's any compat clone3.But
vgetrandom_allocdoes not use unsigned long, but unsigned long *. You need to look at the contents for structclone_argsfor comparison.The other direction would be making this a u32
I think unsigned int is actually a sensible size for what these values should be. That eliminates the problem and potential bikeshed too. So I'll go with that for v+1.
Jason
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v6 2/3 random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldProvide a generic C vDSO getrandom() implementation, which operates on an opaque state returned by vgetrandom_alloc() and produces random bytes the same way as getrandom(). This has a the API signature:
ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);
The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to the opaque allocated state. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom() syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have the exact same behavior.
The actual vDSO RNG algorithm implemented is the same one implemented by drivers/char/random.c, using the same fast-erasure techniques as that. Should the in-kernel implementation change, so too will the vDSO one.
It requires an implementation of ChaCha20 that does not use any stack, in order to maintain forward secrecy, so this is left as an architecture-specific fill-in. Stack-less ChaCha20 is an easy algorithm to implement on a variety of architectures, so this shouldn't be too onerous.
Initially, the state is keyless, and so the first call makes a getrandom() syscall to generate that key, and then uses it for subsequent calls. By keeping track of a generation counter, it knows when its key is invalidated and it should fetch a new one using the syscall. Later, more than just a generation counter might be used.
Since MADV_WIPEONFORK is set on the opaque state, the key and related state is wiped during a fork(), so secrets don't roll over into new processes, and the same state doesn't accidentally generate the same random stream. The generation counter, as well, is always >0, so that the 0 counter is a useful indication of a fork() or otherwise uninitialized state.
If the kernel RNG is not yet initialized, then the vDSO always calls the syscall, because that behavior cannot be emulated in userspace, but fortunately that state is short lived and only during early boot. If it has been initialized, then there is no need to inspect the flags argument, because the behavior does not change post-initialization regardless of the flags value.
Since the opaque state passed to it is mutated, vDSO getrandom() is not reentrant, when used with the same opaque state, which libc should be mindful of.
Together with the previous commit that introduces vgetrandom_alloc(), this functionality is intended to be integrated into libc's thread management. As an illustrative example, the following code might be used to do the same outside of libc. All of the static functions are to be considered implementation private, including the vgetrandom_alloc() syscall wrapper, which generally shouldn't be exposed outside of libc, with the non-static vgetrandom() function at the end being the exported interface. The various pthread-isms are expected to be elided into libc internals. This per-thread allocation scheme is very naive and does not shrink; other implementations may choose to be more complex.
static void *vgetrandom_alloc(size_t *num, size_t *size_per_each, unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned long ret = syscall(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, num, size_per_each, flags);
return ret > -4096UL ? NULL : (void *)ret;
}
static struct {
pthread_mutex_t lock;
void **states;
size_t len, cap;
} grnd_allocator = {
.lock = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER
};
static void *vgetrandom_get_state(void)
{
void *state = NULL; pthread_mutex_lock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
if (!grnd_allocator.len) {
size_t new_cap, size_per_each, num = 16; /* Just a hint. */
void *new_block = vgetrandom_alloc(&num, &size_per_each, 0), *new_states;
if (!new_block)
goto out;
new_cap = grnd_allocator.cap + num;
new_states = reallocarray(grnd_allocator.states, new_cap, sizeof(*grnd_allocator.states));
if (!new_states) {
munmap(new_block, num * size_per_each);
goto out;
}
grnd_allocator.cap = new_cap;
grnd_allocator.states = new_states;
for (size_t i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
grnd_allocator.states[i] = new_block;
new_block += size_per_each;
}
grnd_allocator.len = num;
}
state = grnd_allocator.states[--grnd_allocator.len]; out:
pthread_mutex_unlock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
return state;
}
static void vgetrandom_put_state(void *state)
{
if (!state)
return;
pthread_mutex_lock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
grnd_allocator.states[grnd_allocator.len++] = state;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
}
static struct {
ssize_t(*fn)(void *buf, size_t len, unsigned long flags, void *state);
pthread_key_t key;
pthread_once_t initialized;
} grnd_ctx = {
.initialized = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT
};
static void vgetrandom_init(void)
{
if (pthread_key_create(&grnd_ctx.key, vgetrandom_put_state) != 0)
return;
grnd_ctx.fn = __vdsosym("LINUX_2.6", "__vdso_getrandom");
}
ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buf, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
{
void *state; pthread_once(&grnd_ctx.initialized, vgetrandom_init);
if (!grnd_ctx.fn)
return getrandom(buf, len, flags);
state = pthread_getspecific(grnd_ctx.key);
if (!state) {
state = vgetrandom_get_state();
if (pthread_setspecific(grnd_ctx.key, state) != 0) {
vgetrandom_put_state(state);
state = NULL;
}
if (!state)
return getrandom(buf, len, flags);
}
return grnd_ctx.fn(buf, len, flags, state);}
--- MAINTAINERS | 1 + drivers/char/random.c | 9 ++++ include/vdso/datapage.h | 6 +++ lib/vdso/Kconfig | 5 ++ lib/vdso/getrandom.c | 113 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 134 insertions(+) create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -17287,6 +17287,7 @@ T: git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git S: Maintained F: drivers/char/random.c F: drivers/virt/vmgenid.c +F: lib/vdso/getrandom.c F: lib/vdso/getrandom.h RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM
drivers/char/random.c +9 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@#include <asm/irq.h> #include <asm/irq_regs.h> #include <asm/io.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM +#include <vdso/datapage.h> +#endif #include "../../lib/vdso/getrandom.h" /*********************************************************************
@@ -307,6 +310,9 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work)if (next_gen ==ULONG_MAX ) ++next_gen;WRITE_ONCE (base_crng.generation, next_gen); +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM +smp_store_release (&_vdso_rng_data.generation, next_gen +1 ); +#endif if (!static_branch_likely (&crng_is_ready)) crng_init =CRNG_READY ;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);
@@ -756,6 +762,9 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)crng_reseed (NULL );/* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */ if (static_key_initialized)execute_in_process_context (crng_set_ready, &set_ready); +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM +smp_store_release (&_vdso_rng_data.is_ready, true); +#endif wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN );pr_notice ("crng init done\n" );
include/vdso/datapage.h +6 -0
@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ struct vdso_data {struct arch_vdso_data arch_data; }; +struct vdso_rng_data { +unsigned long generation; +bool is_ready; +}; +/* * We use the hidden visibility to prevent the compiler from generating a GOT * relocation. Not only is going through a GOT useless (the entry couldn't and
@@ -120,6 +125,7 @@ struct vdso_data {*/ extern struct vdso_data _vdso_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); extern struct vdso_data _timens_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); +extern struct vdso_rng_data _vdso_rng_data __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));/* * The generic vDSO implementation requires that gettimeofday.h
lib/vdso/Kconfig +5 -0
@@ -30,4 +30,9 @@ config GENERIC_VDSO_TIME_NS Selected by architectures which support time namespaces in the VDSO +config HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM + bool + help + Selected by architectures that support vDSO getrandom(). + endif
lib/vdso/getrandom.c new file +113 -0
113 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
Re: [PATCH v6 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
On 21/11/2022 16.29, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
Cc += linux-api
Quoted 7 lines
if (!new_block)
goto out;
new_cap = grnd_allocator.cap + num;
new_states = reallocarray(grnd_allocator.states, new_cap, sizeof(*grnd_allocator.states));
if (!new_states) {
munmap(new_block, num * size_per_each);Hm. This does leak an implementation detail of vgetrandom_alloc(), namely that it is based on mmap() of that size rounded up to page size. Do we want to commit to this being the proper way of disposing of a succesful vgetrandom_alloc(), or should there also be a vgetrandom_free(void *states, long num, long size_per_each)?
And if so, what color should the bikeshed really have. I.e.,
- does it need to take that size_per_each parameter which the kernel knows
- should it rather take the product so it can for now be a simple alias for munmap
- should it also have a flags argument just because that's what all well-behaving syscalls have these days...
Also, should vgetrandom_alloc() take a void *hint argument that would/could be passed through to mmap() to give userspace some control over where the memory is located - possibly only in the future, i.e. insist on it being NULL for now, but it could open the possibility for adding e.g. VGRND_MAP_FIXED[_NOREPLACE] that would translate to the corresponding MAP_ flags.
Rasmus
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
Hi Rasmus,
Quoted 12 lines · Rasmus Villemoes
On 21/11/2022 16.29, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
Cc += linux-api
Quoted 7 lines
if (!new_block) goto out; new_cap = grnd_allocator.cap + num; new_states = reallocarray(grnd_allocator.states, new_cap, sizeof(*grnd_allocator.states)); if (!new_states) { munmap(new_block, num * size_per_each);
Quoted 5 lines
Hm. This does leak an implementation detail of
vgetrandom_alloc(), namely that it is based onmmap()of that size rounded up to page size. Do we want to commit to this being the proper way of disposing of a succesfulvgetrandom_alloc(), or should there also be avgetrandom_free(void *states, long num, long size_per_each)?
Yes, this is intentional, and this is exactly what I wanted to do. There are various wrappers of vm_mmap() throughout, mmap being one of them, and they typically then resort to munmap to unmap it. This is how userspace handles memory - maps, always maps. So I think doing that is fine and consistent.
However, your point about it relying on it being a rounded up size isn't correct. munmap will unmap the whole page if the size you pass lies within a page. So num * size_of_each will always do the right thing, without needing to have userspace code round anything up. (From the man
page: "The address addr must be a multiple of the page size (but length need not be). All pages containing a part of the indicated range are unmapped.") And as you can see in my example code, nothing is rounded up. So I don't know why you made that comment.
Quoted 1 line
And if so, what color should the bikeshed really have. I.e.,
No color, thanks.
Quoted 6 lines
Also, should
vgetrandom_alloc()take a void *hint argument that would/could be passed through tommap()to give userspace some control over where the memory is located - possibly only in the future, i.e. insist on it being NULL for now, but it could open the possibility for adding e.g. VGRND_MAP_FIXED[_NOREPLACE] that would translate to the correspondingMAP_flags.
I think adding more control is exactly what this is trying to avoid. It's very intentionally *not* a general allocator function, but something specific for vDSO getrandom(). However, it does already, in this very patchset here, take a (currently unused) flags argument, in case we have the need for later extension.
In the meantime, however, I'm not very interested in complicating this interface into oblivion. Firstly, it ensures nothing will get done. But moreover, this interface needs to be somewhat future-proof, yes, but it does not need to be a general syscall; rather, it's a specific syscall for a specific task.
Jason
Re: [PATCH v6 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
Quoted 21 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Hi Rasmus,
Quoted 12 lines · Rasmus Villemoes
On 21/11/2022 16.29, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
Cc += linux-api
Quoted 7 lines
if (!new_block) goto out; new_cap = grnd_allocator.cap + num; new_states = reallocarray(grnd_allocator.states, new_cap, sizeof(*grnd_allocator.states)); if (!new_states) { munmap(new_block, num * size_per_each);Quoted 5 lines
Hm. This does leak an implementation detail of
vgetrandom_alloc(), namely that it is based onmmap()of that size rounded up to page size. Do we want to commit to this being the proper way of disposing of a succesfulvgetrandom_alloc(), or should there also be avgetrandom_free(void *states, long num, long size_per_each)?
Quoted 5 lines
Yes, this is intentional, and this is exactly what I wanted to do. There are various wrappers of
vm_mmap()throughout, mmap being one of them, and they typically then resort to munmap to unmap it. This is how userspace handles memory - maps, always maps. So I think doing that is fine and consistent.
OK. Perhaps for the benefit of future libc implementors drop a comment somewhere as to how to dealloc the blob.
Quoted 6 lines
However, your point about it relying on it being a rounded up size isn't correct.
munmapwill unmap the whole page if the size you pass lies within a page. Sonum * size_of_eachwill always do the right thing, without needing to have userspace code round anything up. (From the man
page: "The address addr must be a multiple of the page size (but length need not be).
I know, and I never said userspace needed to round anything up.
All pages containing a part of the indicated range are
Quoted 2 lines
unmapped.") And as you can see in my example code, nothing is rounded up. So I don't know why you made that comment.
I made that comment because it's clear from what this does that you get something back that is _at least_ num*size_per_each in size, but what is not clear is that the actual allocation is exactly and will always be that size rounded up to a page size (and no more), so that munmap(num*size_per_each), with its well-known and documented semantics, will DTRT.
Quoted 5 lines
I think adding more control is exactly what this is trying to avoid. It's very intentionally *not* a general allocator function, but something specific for vDSO
getrandom(). However, it does already, in this very patchset here, take a (currently unused) flags argument, in case we have the need for later extension.
OK.
Perhaps you can spend a few more words on why this allocation _needs_ to be MAP_LOCKED? That seems somewhat of a policy thing imposed by the kernel, something that would be better left to the libc or distro or whatnot to request via a flag. I could imagine applications that currently run at the mlock limit start failing after a libc upgrade - which could of course be considered a libc problem, and perhaps it's too unlikely to worry about.
Rasmus
Re: [PATCH v6 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
In reply to Jason A. Donenfeld* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 5 lines
static void *vgetrandom_alloc(size_t *num, size_t *size_per_each, unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned long ret = syscall(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, num, size_per_each, flags);
return ret > -4096UL ? NULL : (void *)ret;
}The traditional syscall function returns -1 on error and set errors, so using unsing long and the 4096 is quite misleading.
Thanks,
Florian
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
Hi Florian,
Quoted 10 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 5 lines
static void *vgetrandom_alloc(size_t *num, size_t *size_per_each, unsigned int flags) { unsigned long ret = syscall(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, num, size_per_each, flags); return ret > -4096UL ? NULL : (void *)ret; }The traditional syscall function returns -1 on error and set errors, so using unsing long and the 4096 is quite misleading.
Not sure I have any idea at all whatsoever about what you're talking about. Firstly, the function you quoted is from the "sample userspace code" in the commit message, so it might not be code for the context you have in mind.
Secondly, it's just doing the thing to figure out if the return value is an error value or a pointer. Were we in glibc, we'd write this as:
return INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P(r) ? NULL : (void *) r;
Right? And if you look at the expansion of that glibc macro, it's just:
#define INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P(val) \
((unsigned long int) (val) > -4096UL)So it looks like the same exact thing?
The only difference I could see is that I assign it to a unsigned long ret, while glibc code tends to assign it to a long r? Is that the difference you're pointing out? Except that clearly doesn't matter because it just gets casted to unsigned by that macro anyway?
Confused.
Jason
Re: [PATCH v6 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 11 lines
Hi Florian,
Quoted 8 lines · Florian Weimer
* Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 5 lines
static void *vgetrandom_alloc(size_t *num, size_t *size_per_each, unsigned int flags) { unsigned long ret = syscall(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, num, size_per_each, flags); return ret > -4096UL ? NULL : (void *)ret; }
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The traditional syscall function returns -1 on error and set errors, so using unsing long and the 4096 is quite misleading.
Not sure I have any idea at all whatsoever about what you're talking about. Firstly, the function you quoted is from the "sample userspace code" in the commit message, so it might not be code for the context you have in mind.
I'm talking about the syscall function that is available through userspace via <sys/syscall.h>.
Quoted 11 lines
Secondly, it's just doing the thing to figure out if the return value is an error value or a pointer. Were we in glibc, we'd write this as:
return INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P(r) ? NULL : (void *) r;Right? And if you look at the expansion of that glibc macro, it's just:
#define INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P(val) \ ((unsigned long int) (val) > -4096UL)So it looks like the same exact thing?
syscall already does internally (with a translation to -1, not NULL), so the caller shouldn't do it again. The userspace syscall function does *not* return an error code.
Thanks,
Florian
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation
Hi Florian,
Quoted 10 lines · Florian Weimer
Quoted 6 lines
Right? And if you look at the expansion of that glibc macro, it's just:
#define INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P(val) \ ((unsigned long int) (val) > -4096UL)So it looks like the same exact thing?
syscall already does internally (with a translation to -1, not NULL), so the caller shouldn't do it again. The userspace syscall function does *not* return an error code.
Ahh, okay. Thanks. I'll fix up the example to assume those semantics.
Jason
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v6 3/3 x86: vdso: Wire up getrandom() vDSO implementation
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldHook up the generic vDSO implementation to the x86 vDSO data page. Since the existing vDSO infrastructure is heavily based on the timekeeping functionality, which works over arrays of bases, a new macro is introduced for vvars that are not arrays.
The vDSO function requires a ChaCha20 implementation that does not write to the stack, yet can still do an entire ChaCha20 permutation, so provide this using SSE2, since this is userland code that must work on all x86-64 processors.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 3 +- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 2 + arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S | 181 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c | 18 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h | 49 +++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h | 16 +++ 8 files changed, 271 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO + select HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM if X86_64 select HOTPLUG_SMT if SMP select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING select NEED_PER_CPU_EMBED_FIRST_CHUNK
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ VDSO32-$(CONFIG_X86_32) := y VDSO32-$(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) := y # files to link into the vdso -vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o +vobjs-y := vdso-note.o vclock_gettime.o vgetcpu.o vgetrandom.o vgetrandom-chacha.o vobjs32-y := vdso32/note.o vdso32/system_call.o vdso32/sigreturn.o vobjs32-y += vdso32/vclock_gettime.o vobjs-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX) += vsgx.o
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetcpu.o = -pg CFLAGS_REMOVE_vsgx.o = -pg +CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgetrandom.o = -pg # # X32 processes use x32 vDSO to access 64bit kernel data.
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso.lds.S +2 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ VERSION { clock_getres; __vdso_clock_getres; __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave; + getrandom; + __vdso_getrandom; local: *; }; }
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S new file +181 -0
181 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vgetrandom.c new file +18 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* +* Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved. +*/ +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#include "../../../../lib/vdso/getrandom.c" + +ssize_t __vdso_getrandom (void *buffer,size_t len,unsigned int flags,void *state); + +ssize_t __vdso_getrandom (void *buffer,size_t len,unsigned int flags,void *state) +{ +return __cvdso_getrandom (buffer, len, flags, state); +} + +ssize_t getrandom (void *,size_t ,unsigned int ,void *) + __attribute__((weak,alias ("__vdso_getrandom" )));
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/getrandom.h new file +49 -0
49 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h +2 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@#include <asm/vvar.h> DEFINE_VVAR(struct vdso_data, _vdso_data); +DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE(struct vdso_rng_data, _vdso_rng_data); +/* * Update the vDSO data page to keep in sync with kernel timekeeping. */
arch/x86/include/asm/vvar.h +16 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@*/ #define DECLARE_VVAR (offset, type, name) \ EMIT_VVAR(name, offset) +#define DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE (offset, type, name) \ + EMIT_VVAR(name, offset)#else
@@ -37,6 +39,10 @@ extern char __vvar_page; extern type timens_ ## name[CS_BASES] \ __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); \ +#define DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE (offset, type, name) \ + extern type vvar_ ## name \ + __attribute__((visibility("hidden"))); \ +#define VVAR (name) (vvar_ ## name)#define TIMENS (name) (timens_ ## name)
@@ -44,12 +50,22 @@ extern char __vvar_page; type name[CS_BASES] \ __attribute__((section(".vvar_" #name), aligned(16))) __visible +#define DEFINE_VVAR_SINGLE(type, name) \ + type name \ + __attribute__((section(".vvar_" #name), aligned(16))) __visible +#endif /* DECLARE_VVAR(offset, type, name) */ DECLARE_VVAR(128, struct vdso_data, _vdso_data) +#if !defined(_SINGLE_DATA) +#define _SINGLE_DATA +DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE(640, struct vdso_rng_data, _vdso_rng_data) +#endif +#undef DECLARE_VVAR +#undef DECLARE_VVAR_SINGLE#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerHey folks,
Exciting development: one of the glibc maintainers, Adhemerval, has written up the beginning of an implementation for this series:
https://github.com/zatrazz/glibc/commits/azanella/arc4random-vdso
I assume it'll continue to mature while this patch stews on the list here. But so far in my testing, it works well, and the performance boost is there and real. I've patched it into my system's glibc and am daily driving it.
Jason