5.10.265-rc1 review

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zile Xiong <[email protected]>

commit a562d6dc86bdfdd299e1b4734977a8d63e803583 upstream.

vb2_read() and vb2_write() return size_t, but propagate negative errno values from __vb2_perform_fileio().

This relies on implicit signed/unsigned conversions in callers (e.g. vb2_fop_read()) to recover error codes:

    __vb2_perform_fileio() -> -EINVAL
    vb2_read()             -> (size_t)-EINVAL
    vb2_fop_read()         -> -EINVAL

This relies on implicit conversions that are not obvious.

These helpers are exported (EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL) and part of the vb2 API, so changing their return type may affect existing users.

However, they conceptually follow read/write semantics, where ssize_t is typically used to return either a byte count or a negative error code.

Switch vb2_read() and vb2_write() to ssize_t, and update __vb2_perform_fileio() accordingly.

---
 drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-core.c |   12 ++++++------
 include/media/videobuf2-core.h                  |    8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -2706,8 +2706,8 @@ static int __vb2_cleanup_fileio(struct v
  * @nonblock:	mode selector (1 means blocking calls, 0 means nonblocking)
  * @read:	access mode selector (1 means read, 0 means write)
  */
-static size_t __vb2_perform_fileio(struct vb2_queue *q, char __user *data, size_t count,
-		loff_t *ppos, int nonblock, int read)
+static ssize_t __vb2_perform_fileio(struct vb2_queue *q, char __user *data, size_t count,
+				    loff_t *ppos, int nonblock, int read)
 {
 	struct vb2_fileio_data *fileio;
 	struct vb2_fileio_buf *buf;

@@ -2867,15 +2867,15 @@ static size_t __vb2_perform_fileio(struc
 	return ret;
 }
 
-size_t vb2_read(struct vb2_queue *q, char __user *data, size_t count,
-		loff_t *ppos, int nonblocking)
+ssize_t vb2_read(struct vb2_queue *q, char __user *data, size_t count,
+		 loff_t *ppos, int nonblocking)
 {
 	return __vb2_perform_fileio(q, data, count, ppos, nonblocking, 1);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vb2_read);
 
-size_t vb2_write(struct vb2_queue *q, const char __user *data, size_t count,
-		loff_t *ppos, int nonblocking)
+ssize_t vb2_write(struct vb2_queue *q, const char __user *data, size_t count,
+		  loff_t *ppos, int nonblocking)
 {
 	return __vb2_perform_fileio(q, (char __user *) data, count,
 							ppos, nonblocking, 0);

@@ -1040,8 +1040,8 @@ __poll_t vb2_core_poll(struct vb2_queue
  * @ppos:	file handle position tracking pointer
  * @nonblock:	mode selector (1 means blocking calls, 0 means nonblocking)
  */
-size_t vb2_read(struct vb2_queue *q, char __user *data, size_t count,
-		loff_t *ppos, int nonblock);
+ssize_t vb2_read(struct vb2_queue *q, char __user *data, size_t count,
+		 loff_t *ppos, int nonblock);
 /**
  * vb2_read() - implements write() syscall logic.
  * @q:		pointer to &struct vb2_queue with videobuf2 queue.

@@ -1050,8 +1050,8 @@ size_t vb2_read(struct vb2_queue *q, cha
  * @ppos:	file handle position tracking pointer
  * @nonblock:	mode selector (1 means blocking calls, 0 means nonblocking)
  */
-size_t vb2_write(struct vb2_queue *q, const char __user *data, size_t count,
-		loff_t *ppos, int nonblock);
+ssize_t vb2_write(struct vb2_queue *q, const char __user *data, size_t count,
+		  loff_t *ppos, int nonblock);
 
 /**
  * typedef vb2_thread_fnc - callback function for use with vb2_thread.

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>

commit 9aa21e1549db8882ff77b691e7714153df21dff0 upstream.

When platform_device_register() fails in vidtv_bridge_init(), the embedded struct device in vidtv_bridge_dev has already been initialized by device_initialize(), but the failure path returns the error without dropping the device reference for the current platform device:

vidtv_bridge_init()

    -> platform_device_register(&vidtv_bridge_dev)
       -> device_initialize(&vidtv_bridge_dev.dev)
       -> setup_pdev_dma_masks(&vidtv_bridge_dev)
       -> platform_device_add(&vidtv_bridge_dev)

This leads to a reference leak when platform_device_register() fails. Fix this by calling platform_device_put() before returning the error.

The issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review.

---
 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -562,8 +562,10 @@ static int __init vidtv_bridge_init(void
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = platform_device_register(&vidtv_bridge_dev);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		platform_device_put(&vidtv_bridge_dev);
 		return ret;
+	}
 
 	ret = platform_driver_register(&vidtv_bridge_driver);
 	if (ret)

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>

commit 33e2b833c66b890a0d71c4fa82d4c97143f7f75f upstream.

When platform_device_register() fails in vimc_init(), the embedded struct device in vimc_pdev has already been initialized by device_initialize(), but the failure path returns the error without dropping the device reference for the current platform device:

vimc_init()

    -> platform_device_register(&vimc_pdev)
       -> device_initialize(&vimc_pdev.dev)
       -> setup_pdev_dma_masks(&vimc_pdev)
       -> platform_device_add(&vimc_pdev)

This leads to a reference leak when platform_device_register() fails. Fix this by calling platform_device_put() before returning the error.

The issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review.

---
 drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-core.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -350,6 +350,7 @@ static int __init vimc_init(void)
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(&vimc_pdev.dev,
 			"platform device registration failed (err=%d)\n", ret);
+		platform_device_put(&vimc_pdev);
 		return ret;
 	}
 

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

commit c2d1a2130c93f6d758af58590b86b2254c7a1dec upstream.

The vivid_update_format_cap/out() functions must only be called if the capture/output queue are not busy. But for the controls that select the CROP/COMPOSE/SCALE capability that is not checked.

Only when streaming starts will they be set to 'grabbed' and it is impossible to change the control, but between REQBUFS and STREAMON you are still allowed to set these controls. Since vivid_update_format_cap/out will change the format, this can cause unexpected results.

Besides adding these checks, also add a WARN_ON in vivid_update_format_cap/out() if the queue is busy.

I'm 90% certain that this is the cause of this syzbot bug:

https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=dac8f5eaa46837e97b89

But since we never have reproducers, it is hard to be certain. In any case, these checks are needed regardless.

---
 drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-ctrls.c   |   12 ++++++++++++
 drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c |    6 ++++++
 drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-out.c |    6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+)

@@ -464,14 +464,20 @@ static int vivid_vid_cap_s_ctrl(struct v
 		vivid_update_format_cap(dev, true);
 		break;
 	case VIVID_CID_HAS_CROP_CAP:
+		if (vb2_is_busy(&dev->vb_vid_cap_q))
+			return -EBUSY;
 		dev->has_crop_cap = ctrl->val;
 		vivid_update_format_cap(dev, true);
 		break;
 	case VIVID_CID_HAS_COMPOSE_CAP:
+		if (vb2_is_busy(&dev->vb_vid_cap_q))
+			return -EBUSY;
 		dev->has_compose_cap = ctrl->val;
 		vivid_update_format_cap(dev, true);
 		break;
 	case VIVID_CID_HAS_SCALER_CAP:
+		if (vb2_is_busy(&dev->vb_vid_cap_q))
+			return -EBUSY;
 		dev->has_scaler_cap = ctrl->val;
 		vivid_update_format_cap(dev, true);
 		break;

@@ -947,14 +953,20 @@ static int vivid_vid_out_s_ctrl(struct v
 
 	switch (ctrl->id) {
 	case VIVID_CID_HAS_CROP_OUT:
+		if (vb2_is_busy(&dev->vb_vid_out_q))
+			return -EBUSY;
 		dev->has_crop_out = ctrl->val;
 		vivid_update_format_out(dev);
 		break;
 	case VIVID_CID_HAS_COMPOSE_OUT:
+		if (vb2_is_busy(&dev->vb_vid_out_q))
+			return -EBUSY;
 		dev->has_compose_out = ctrl->val;
 		vivid_update_format_out(dev);
 		break;
 	case VIVID_CID_HAS_SCALER_OUT:
+		if (vb2_is_busy(&dev->vb_vid_out_q))
+			return -EBUSY;
 		dev->has_scaler_out = ctrl->val;
 		vivid_update_format_out(dev);
 		break;

@@ -385,6 +385,12 @@ void vivid_update_format_cap(struct vivi
 	unsigned size;
 	u64 pixelclock;
 
+	/*
+	 * This resets the format, so must never be called while vb2_is_busy().
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON(vb2_is_busy(&dev->vb_vid_cap_q)))
+		return;
+
 	switch (dev->input_type[dev->input]) {
 	case WEBCAM:
 	default:

@@ -222,6 +222,12 @@ void vivid_update_format_out(struct vivi
 	unsigned size, p;
 	u64 pixelclock;
 
+	/*
+	 * This resets the format, so must never be called while vb2_is_busy().
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON(vb2_is_busy(&dev->vb_vid_out_q)))
+		return;
+
 	switch (dev->output_type[dev->output]) {
 	case SVID:
 	default:

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tristan Madani <[email protected]>

commit 44126b6994eeb28f2103b638e698f40a1244f327 upstream.

aggr_recv_addba_req_evt() logs a debug message when the firmware-supplied win_sz is outside [AGGR_WIN_SZ_MIN, AGGR_WIN_SZ_MAX] but does not return. The out-of-range win_sz is then used in TID_WINDOW_SZ() to compute a kzalloc size and stored in rxtid->hold_q_sz, leading to zero-size or overflowed allocations and subsequent out-of-bounds access.

Clean up any previously active aggregation session for the TID first, then return early when win_sz is out of the valid range, instead of proceeding with a broken allocation size.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath6kl/txrx.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -1722,13 +1722,15 @@ void aggr_recv_addba_req_evt(struct ath6
 
 	rxtid = &aggr_conn->rx_tid[tid];
 
-	if (win_sz < AGGR_WIN_SZ_MIN || win_sz > AGGR_WIN_SZ_MAX)
-		ath6kl_dbg(ATH6KL_DBG_WLAN_RX, "%s: win_sz %d, tid %d\n",
-			   __func__, win_sz, tid);
-
 	if (rxtid->aggr)
 		aggr_delete_tid_state(aggr_conn, tid);
 
+	if (win_sz < AGGR_WIN_SZ_MIN || win_sz > AGGR_WIN_SZ_MAX) {
+		ath6kl_dbg(ATH6KL_DBG_WLAN_RX, "%s: win_sz %d, tid %d\n",
+			   __func__, win_sz, tid);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	rxtid->seq_next = seq_no;
 	hold_q_size = TID_WINDOW_SZ(win_sz) * sizeof(struct skb_hold_q);
 	rxtid->hold_q = kzalloc(hold_q_size, GFP_KERNEL);

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit c3d68e294cbb6a4090bb219d3dcaca85a011809b upstream.

mwifiex_tdls_add_ht_oper() gates its follow-the-AP-bandwidth path on bss_desc->bcn_ht_cap being present, but then dereferences a different pointer, bss_desc->bcn_ht_oper:

	if (ISSUPP_CHANWIDTH40(priv->adapter->hw_dot_11n_dev_cap) &&
	    bss_desc->bcn_ht_cap &&
	    ISALLOWED_CHANWIDTH40(bss_desc->bcn_ht_oper->ht_param))

bcn_ht_cap and bcn_ht_oper are populated independently while parsing the associated AP's beacon in mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(): an AP that advertises an HT Capabilities element but no HT Operation element leaves bcn_ht_cap non-NULL and bcn_ht_oper NULL. Setting up a TDLS link to a peer while associated to such an AP then dereferences the NULL bcn_ht_oper and crashes the kernel. Every other bcn_ht_oper user in the driver NULL-checks it first.

Guard on the pointer that is actually dereferenced.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/tdls.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ mwifiex_tdls_add_ht_oper(struct mwifiex_
 
 	/* follow AP's channel bandwidth */
 	if (ISSUPP_CHANWIDTH40(priv->adapter->hw_dot_11n_dev_cap) &&
-	    bss_desc->bcn_ht_cap &&
+	    bss_desc->bcn_ht_oper &&
 	    ISALLOWED_CHANWIDTH40(bss_desc->bcn_ht_oper->ht_param))
 		ht_oper->ht_param = bss_desc->bcn_ht_oper->ht_param;
 

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Huihui Huang <[email protected]>

commit 4c4c97b60a5e978121d9ee8cb0ab3916e5d6a8de upstream.

wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as

	ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res);

without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes hif_drv->assoc_resp / assoc_resp_info_len straight in) and must be validated before the driver accesses the fixed header.

For a frame shorter than the 6-byte fixed header, the subtraction wraps. For a four-byte response the result is truncated to a u16 ies_len of 65534, so kmemdup() then attempts to copy 65534 bytes starting at buffer + sizeof(*res), beyond the valid association-response data (CWE-125). A response shorter than four bytes can also cause an out-of-bounds read of res->status_code at offsets 2 and 3.

Reject frames too short to hold the fixed header before touching the header or computing ies_len. Also set the connection status to a failure on this path: the caller falls through to a "conn_info->status == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS" check after the parser returns, so leaving the status untouched could let a malformed short response be treated as a successful association.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/microchip/wilc1000/hif.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -582,6 +582,11 @@ static s32 wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info(u8
 	u16 ies_len;
 	struct wilc_assoc_resp *res = (struct wilc_assoc_resp *)buffer;
 
+	if (buffer_len < sizeof(*res)) {
+		ret_conn_info->status = WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	ret_conn_info->status = le16_to_cpu(res->status_code);
 	if (ret_conn_info->status == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
 		ies = &buffer[sizeof(*res)];

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fan Wu <[email protected]>

commit 538c51e9d124cf656f2dd0c0394a8545efc7102d upstream.

brcmf_pcie_release_scratchbuffers() frees the shared.scratch and shared.ringupd DMA buffers with dma_free_coherent() but does not clear the pointers afterwards, unlike the sibling release_ringbuffers() which NULLs commonrings/flowrings/idxbuf on release.

Both the bus_reset .reset callback (brcmf_pcie_reset) and brcmf_pcie_remove() call release_scratchbuffers. When reset teardown has run before removal, remove's own teardown would call dma_free_coherent() a second time on the already-freed DMA allocation.

NULL the pointers after free, matching release_ringbuffers(), so a later release observes that the allocation has already been released. This patch makes repeated sequential release safe; the reset-work lifetime is handled separately by the following patch.

This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1246,16 +1246,20 @@ fail:
 static void
 brcmf_pcie_release_scratchbuffers(struct brcmf_pciedev_info *devinfo)
 {
-	if (devinfo->shared.scratch)
+	if (devinfo->shared.scratch) {
 		dma_free_coherent(&devinfo->pdev->dev,
 				  BRCMF_DMA_D2H_SCRATCH_BUF_LEN,
 				  devinfo->shared.scratch,
 				  devinfo->shared.scratch_dmahandle);
-	if (devinfo->shared.ringupd)
+		devinfo->shared.scratch = NULL;
+	}
+	if (devinfo->shared.ringupd) {
 		dma_free_coherent(&devinfo->pdev->dev,
 				  BRCMF_DMA_D2H_RINGUPD_BUF_LEN,
 				  devinfo->shared.ringupd,
 				  devinfo->shared.ringupd_dmahandle);
+		devinfo->shared.ringupd = NULL;
+	}
 }
 
 static int brcmf_pcie_init_scratchbuffers(struct brcmf_pciedev_info *devinfo)

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chengfeng Ye <[email protected]>

commit c783399efc22d035443f1dfbf2a09bf9562aaa5e upstream.

rfcomm_tty_set_termios() tests dlc->session without rfcomm_mutex and later passes the pointer to rfcomm_send_rpn(). The latter dereferences both session->initiator and session->sock. Meanwhile, krfcommd can unlink the DLC and free the session while holding rfcomm_mutex.

The race can proceed as follows:

TTY ioctl task krfcommd
-------------- --------
load dlc->session
enter rfcomm_send_rpn()

                                 lock rfcomm_mutex
                                 clear dlc->session
                                 free session
                                 unlock rfcomm_mutex

read session->initiator

KASAN reported:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rfcomm_send_rpn+0x297/0x2a0
  Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810012a850 by task poc/92

  Call Trace:
   rfcomm_send_rpn+0x297/0x2a0
   rfcomm_tty_set_termios+0x50d/0x850
   tty_set_termios+0x596/0x950
   set_termios+0x46a/0x6e0
   tty_mode_ioctl+0x152/0xbd0
   tty_ioctl+0x915/0x1240
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x1c0

  Allocated by task 92:
   rfcomm_session_add+0x9e/0x2e0
   rfcomm_dlc_open+0x8b1/0xe00
   rfcomm_dev_activate+0x85/0x1a0
   rfcomm_tty_open+0x90/0x280

  Freed by task 68:
   kfree+0x131/0x3c0
   rfcomm_session_del+0x119/0x180
   rfcomm_run+0x737/0x4710

Add rfcomm_dlc_send_rpn(), which holds rfcomm_mutex while it verifies that the DLC is still attached and sends the RPN frame. Have the TTY path use the helper and drop its unlocked session check. This keeps the session valid through both the frame construction and socket send.

---
 include/net/bluetooth/rfcomm.h |    3 +++
 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c    |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/tty.c     |    7 +++----
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -229,6 +229,9 @@ int rfcomm_send_rpn(struct rfcomm_sessio
 			u8 bit_rate, u8 data_bits, u8 stop_bits,
 			u8 parity, u8 flow_ctrl_settings,
 			u8 xon_char, u8 xoff_char, u16 param_mask);
+int rfcomm_dlc_send_rpn(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, u8 bit_rate, u8 data_bits,
+			u8 stop_bits, u8 parity, u8 flow_ctrl_settings,
+			u8 xon_char, u8 xoff_char, u16 param_mask);
 
 /* ---- RFCOMM DLCs (channels) ---- */
 struct rfcomm_dlc *rfcomm_dlc_alloc(gfp_t prio);

@@ -1027,6 +1027,23 @@ int rfcomm_send_rpn(struct rfcomm_sessio
 	return rfcomm_send_frame(s, buf, ptr - buf);
 }
 
+int rfcomm_dlc_send_rpn(struct rfcomm_dlc *d, u8 bit_rate, u8 data_bits,
+			u8 stop_bits, u8 parity, u8 flow_ctrl_settings,
+			u8 xon_char, u8 xoff_char, u16 param_mask)
+{
+	int err = -ENOTCONN;
+
+	rfcomm_lock();
+	if (d->session)
+		err = rfcomm_send_rpn(d->session, 1, d->dlci, bit_rate,
+				      data_bits, stop_bits, parity,
+				      flow_ctrl_settings, xon_char, xoff_char,
+				      param_mask);
+	rfcomm_unlock();
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 static int rfcomm_send_rls(struct rfcomm_session *s, int cr, u8 dlci, u8 status)
 {
 	struct rfcomm_hdr *hdr;

@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ static void rfcomm_tty_set_termios(struc
 
 	BT_DBG("tty %p termios %p", tty, old);
 
-	if (!dev || !dev->dlc || !dev->dlc->session)
+	if (!dev || !dev->dlc)
 		return;
 
 	/* Handle turning off CRTSCTS */

@@ -987,9 +987,8 @@ static void rfcomm_tty_set_termios(struc
 	}
 
 	if (changes)
-		rfcomm_send_rpn(dev->dlc->session, 1, dev->dlc->dlci, baud,
-				data_bits, stop_bits, parity,
-				RFCOMM_RPN_FLOW_NONE, x_on, x_off, changes);
+		rfcomm_dlc_send_rpn(dev->dlc, baud, data_bits, stop_bits, parity,
+				    RFCOMM_RPN_FLOW_NONE, x_on, x_off, changes);
 }
 
 static void rfcomm_tty_throttle(struct tty_struct *tty)

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 16cc4f5c1c4b9e45eca7f7deefa5410a292db599 upstream.

The stop value is derived from bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable is an unsigned long. If bprm->p drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes zero the loop condition index >= stop is always true.

After the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and bprm->page[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array. The pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to kmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that lands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn't terminate either...

Getting there only requires bprm->p < PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU bprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only constraint on how far bprm->p is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e. that each individual string still fits in what is left.

bprm->p starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a single argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves it in the first page:

Oops - load access fault [#1]

  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1
  epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8
   ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae
   s4 : ffffffffffffffff   s2 : 0000000000000000
   a1 : ffffffdc98000000   a2 : 0000000000001000
  status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005
  [<801a5324>] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8
  [<800d5f6a>] load_flat_binary+0x43a/0x65e
  [<800a2de4>] bprm_execve+0x1d4/0x316
  [<800a351a>] do_execveat_common+0x12e/0x138
  [<800a3d44>] __riscv_sys_execve+0x38/0x4e
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

This is an arcane bug but we should still fix it.

Count down from MAX_ARG_PAGES so the loop ends when index reaches stop, stop == 0 included. The iterations performed are unchanged for every other value of stop.

Only CONFIG_MMU=n builds are affected, transfer_args_to_stack() is used by binfmt_flat and binfmt_elf_fdpic on nommu only.

The loop predates git history. commit 7e7ec6a93434 ("elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic") only moved it from binfmt_elf_fdpic.c into fs/exec.c and narrowed the copy to the used part of the first page. The condition and the decrement are unchanged from 2.6.12-rc2.

---
 fs/exec.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ int transfer_args_to_stack(struct linux_
 	stop = bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	sp = *sp_location;
 
-	for (index = MAX_ARG_PAGES - 1; index >= stop; index--) {
+	for (index = MAX_ARG_PAGES; index-- > stop; ) {
 		unsigned int offset = index == stop ? bprm->p & ~PAGE_MASK : 0;
 		char *src = kmap(bprm->page[index]) + offset;
 		sp -= PAGE_SIZE - offset;

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit bbf5f639918dc011aaf60aab8480218758ee68c5 upstream.

load_misc_binary() raises bprm->have_execfd as soon as it sees the 'O' (or 'C') flag. This happens well before it opens the interpreter. If that open fails the flag stays set on the bprm. binfmt_misc is at the head of the format list so an interpreter open failure that returns -ENOEXEC lets the search fall through to a later format. This means it runs the matched binary directly having never staged an interpreter. So bprm->executable is NULL while have_execfd falsely claims a descriptor is present.

Consequently, begin_new_exec() dereferences the missing executable:

  would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);

and NULL derefs. Had it not, the hand-off later in the same function would have failed anyway. FD_ADD(0, bprm->executable) rejects a NULL file with -ENOMEM. Both sites are past the point of no return so the exec cannot be unwound either way.

This can be reached by unprivileged users as binfmt_misc can be mounted in user namespaces. So a user can register an 'O' entry whose interpreter lives on a FUSE mount, have the FUSE server fail the open with -ENOEXEC and execute a native ELF file that matches the entry.

have_execfd only means anything alongside the executable it describes which is not set until the interpreter has been opened and staged. So lets raise it there, next to execfd_creds, which is already set at that point. An open failure now leaves it clear, so the fallback format derives credentials from the binary and emits no AT_EXECFD, as it would for any native exec. The argv rewrite load_misc_binary() performs before the open is still not undone. This means the binary sees the interpreter path in argv[0] and its own path in argv[1] but that predates this change and only became observable once the exec stopped faulting.

---
 fs/binfmt_misc.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -199,9 +199,6 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux
 			goto ret;
 	}
 
-	if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY)
-		bprm->have_execfd = 1;
-
 	/* make argv[1] be the path to the binary */
 	retval = copy_string_kernel(bprm->interp, bprm);
 	if (retval < 0)

@@ -231,6 +228,8 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux
 		goto ret;
 
 	bprm->interpreter = interp_file;
+	if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY)
+		bprm->have_execfd = 1;
 	if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS)
 		bprm->execfd_creds = 1;
 

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xu Rao <[email protected]>

commit b27e195d4db8dea263050bdbeb11881b2999c9c6 upstream.

mmc_ioctl_cdrom_volume() first reads the audio control mode page into a 32-byte stack buffer with cgc->buflen set to 24. If the device reports a block descriptor, the function increases cgc->buflen to include that descriptor and reads the page again.

For CDROMVOLCTRL, the function then builds a MODE SELECT parameter list by moving cgc->buffer forward by offset - 8 bytes. This drops the block descriptor from the outgoing payload and leaves a new 8-byte mode parameter header in front of the audio control page. However, cgc->buflen is left unchanged.

With a standard 8-byte block descriptor, cgc->buffer points at buffer + 8 but cgc->buflen remains 32. cdrom_mode_select() therefore asks the low level packet path to write 32 bytes from that adjusted pointer, reading 8 bytes past the end of the 32-byte stack buffer.

This is not hit by CDROMVOLREAD, and CDROMVOLCTRL only triggers it on drives that return a non-zero block descriptor length, which helps explain why it has gone unnoticed. The overread is also sent to the device as extra MODE SELECT payload, so it may not produce an obvious local failure.

Reduce cgc->buflen by the same amount as the buffer pointer adjustment so the MODE SELECT transfer covers only the intended parameter list.

---
 drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -3218,6 +3218,7 @@ static noinline int mmc_ioctl_cdrom_volu
 
 	/* set volume */
 	cgc->buffer = buffer + offset - 8;
+	cgc->buflen -= offset - 8;
 	memset(cgc->buffer, 0, 8);
 	return cdrom_mode_select(cdi, cgc);
 }

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ian Abbott <[email protected]>

commit 17221216ae8ce6a24e8a4e787382e3ebc81b88a8 upstream.

Syzbot reported a general protection fault in comedi_get_is_subdevice_running(), which was called from the interrupt handler parport_interrupt() in the "comedi_parport" driver, but it does not currently have a C reproducer for the problem. It's probably due to a premature interrupt for one of two reasons:

1. The driver sets up the interrupt handler before the comedi subdevices used by the interrupt handler have been allocated, but does not disable the interrupt in the parallel port's CTRL register first.
2. The driver uses a user-supplied I/O port base address which Syzbot would have supplied, but it might not be backed by real parallel port hardware.

Change the initialization order in the driver's comedi "attach" handler (parport_attach()) so that the hardware registers are initialized before the interrupt handler is requested. This should prevent premature interrupts occurring for real hardware.

Also add a test to the interrupt handler to ensure the comedi device is fully attached and return early if it isn't.

---
 drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/comedi_parport.c |   13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -211,6 +211,13 @@ static irqreturn_t parport_interrupt(int
 	struct comedi_subdevice *s = dev->read_subdev;
 	unsigned int ctrl;
 
+	/*
+	 * Check device is fully attached.  Device interrupts should have
+	 * been disabled, but do this in case of bad hardware.
+	 */
+	if (!dev->attached)
+		return IRQ_NONE;
+
 	ctrl = inb(dev->iobase + PARPORT_CTRL_REG);
 	if (!(ctrl & PARPORT_CTRL_IRQ_ENA))
 		return IRQ_NONE;

@@ -231,6 +238,9 @@ static int parport_attach(struct comedi_
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	outb(0, dev->iobase + PARPORT_DATA_REG);
+	outb(0, dev->iobase + PARPORT_CTRL_REG);
+
 	if (it->options[1]) {
 		ret = request_irq(it->options[1], parport_interrupt, 0,
 				  dev->board_name, dev);

@@ -286,9 +296,6 @@ static int parport_attach(struct comedi_
 		s->cancel	= parport_intr_cancel;
 	}
 
-	outb(0, dev->iobase + PARPORT_DATA_REG);
-	outb(0, dev->iobase + PARPORT_CTRL_REG);
-
 	return 0;
 }
 

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guangshuo Li <[email protected]>

commit 761b785a0cfbce43761227bc42a7f984f31f8921 upstream.

intel_th_output_open() looks up the output device with bus_find_device_by_devt(), which returns the device with a reference that must be dropped after use.

commit 95fc36a234da ("intel_th: fix device leak on output open()") attempted to drop the reference from intel_th_output_release(). However, a successful open replaces file->f_op with the output driver file operations before returning, so close runs the output driver release callback instead.

For MSC outputs, close runs intel_th_msc_release(), which only removes the per-file iterator and does not drop the device reference taken by intel_th_output_open(). Consequently, every successful MSC output open leaks one device reference.

Drop the device reference from intel_th_msc_release(), which is the release path actually used for MSC output files. Remove the now-unused intel_th_output_release() callback from intel_th_output_fops.

---
 drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/core.c |   10 ----------
 drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/msu.c  |    2 ++
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -843,18 +843,8 @@ out_put_device:
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int intel_th_output_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-	struct intel_th_device *thdev = file->private_data;
-
-	put_device(&thdev->dev);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static const struct file_operations intel_th_output_fops = {
 	.open	= intel_th_output_open,
-	.release = intel_th_output_release,
 	.llseek	= noop_llseek,
 };
 

@@ -1463,8 +1463,10 @@ static int intel_th_msc_release(struct i
 {
 	struct msc_iter *iter = file->private_data;
 	struct msc *msc = iter->msc;
+	struct intel_th_device *thdev = msc->thdev;
 
 	msc_iter_remove(iter, msc);
+	put_device(&thdev->dev);
 
 	return 0;
 }

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>

commit 144f29e85702234b23d2a62abf723e6a17eb5427 upstream.

If the mmio_pipe_open() fails to find a PCI device, the hiter->dev will be assigned to NULL. The mmiotrace read() function dereferences the hiter->dev if hiter exists.

Change the test of the read to not only check hiter being NULL, but also the hiter->dev before dereferencing it.

---
 kernel/trace/trace_mmiotrace.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_read(struct trace_it
 		goto print_out;
 	}
 
-	if (!hiter)
+	if (!hiter || !hiter->dev)
 		return 0;
 
 	mmio_print_pcidev(s, hiter->dev);

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: deepakraog <[email protected]>

commit c1d87e724ae55e781b7cc7ccafb34d9e668582b2 upstream.

The mmiotrace tracer was added May 12th 2008. At that time, resources created in pipe_open() could not be freed because there was not pipe_close function pointer of the tracer. The pipe_close function pointer was added in December 7th, 2009, but the mmiotrace tracer was not updated.

mmio_pipe_open() allocates a header_iter and takes a pci_dev reference when trace_pipe is opened. mmio_close() frees them, but it was only wired to the tracer's .close callback.

tracing_release_pipe() invokes .pipe_close, not .close, when the trace_pipe file is released. As a result, closing trace_pipe with the mmiotrace tracer active leaked the header_iter allocation and left a stale pci_dev reference.

Set .pipe_close to mmio_close, matching how function_graph wires both callbacks to the same handler.

Note, if the trace_pipe is read to completion, it will clean up the resources, but if one were to run:

  # head -n 1 /sys/kernel/tracing/trace_pipe
 VERSION 20070824

Over and over again, it would trigger a massive leak.

---
 kernel/trace/trace_mmiotrace.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ static void mmio_pipe_open(struct trace_
 	iter->private = hiter;
 }
 
-/* XXX: This is not called when the pipe is closed! */
 static void mmio_close(struct trace_iterator *iter)
 {
 	struct header_iter *hiter = iter->private;

@@ -281,6 +280,7 @@ static struct tracer mmio_tracer __read_
 	.start		= mmio_trace_start,
 	.pipe_open	= mmio_pipe_open,
 	.close		= mmio_close,
+	.pipe_close	= mmio_close,
 	.read		= mmio_read,
 	.print_line	= mmio_print_line,
 	.noboot		= true,

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>

commit 15f197856d68882af9416fc97516bb55079b7677 upstream.

In trace_probe_match_command_args(), a stack buffer buf[MAX_ARGSTR_LEN + 1] (256 bytes) is used to format "<name>=<comm>". However, since name can be up to 32 bytes (MAX_ARG_NAME_LEN) and comm up to 255 bytes (MAX_ARGSTR_LEN), the formatted string can exceed 256 bytes and get truncated by snprintf(), causing spurious argument matching failures.

Instead of formatting into a temporary buffer on stack, compare the argument name, the '=' delimiter, and the comm expression directly.

---
 kernel/trace/trace_probe.c |    9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -1150,16 +1150,17 @@ int trace_probe_compare_arg_type(struct
 bool trace_probe_match_command_args(struct trace_probe *tp,
 				    int argc, const char **argv)
 {
-	char buf[MAX_ARGSTR_LEN + 1];
 	int i;
 
 	if (tp->nr_args < argc)
 		return false;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
-		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s=%s",
-			 tp->args[i].name, tp->args[i].comm);
-		if (strcmp(buf, argv[i]))
+		int len = strlen(tp->args[i].name);
+
+		if (strncmp(argv[i], tp->args[i].name, len) ||
+		    argv[i][len] != '=' ||
+		    strcmp(argv[i] + len + 1, tp->args[i].comm))
 			return false;
 	}
 	return true;

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>

commit 8ce20bfba48902e1382187cd1a852f7cf3a1e739 upstream.

In __set_print_fmt(), LEN_OR_ZERO is defined as (len ? len - pos : 0). If len is non-zero but smaller than pos, len - pos evaluates to a negative integer. When passed as a size argument to snprintf(), this negative value is cast to a large unsigned size_t, bypassing buffer size limits.

Ensure len > pos before subtracting to avoid integer underflow.

---
 kernel/trace/trace_probe.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ int traceprobe_update_arg(struct probe_a
 }
 
 /* When len=0, we just calculate the needed length */
-#define LEN_OR_ZERO (len ? len - pos : 0)
+#define LEN_OR_ZERO (len > pos ? len - pos : 0)
 static int __set_print_fmt(struct trace_probe *tp, char *buf, int len,
 			   bool is_return)
 {

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>

commit a9d6fb284039a5d3858a1d9f9a0d7e46cfb7c2d4 upstream.

If trace_probe_log.argc is 0 in __trace_probe_log_err(), the loop constructing the command string will not execute and p will remain equal to command. Writing to *(p - 1) will cause an out-of-bounds access before command. This should not happen, but better to be treated.

Reject if trace_probe_log.argc is 0.

---
 kernel/trace/trace_probe.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void __trace_probe_log_err(int offset, i
 	char *command, *p;
 	int i, len = 0, pos = 0;
 
-	if (!trace_probe_log.argv)
+	if (!trace_probe_log.argv || !trace_probe_log.argc)
 		return;
 
 	/* Recalcurate the length and allocate buffer */

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

commit e057b94772328221405b067c3a85fe479b915dc8 upstream.

When seccomp support was originally added to arm64 in a1ae65b21941 ("arm64: add seccomp support"), seccomp was erroneously called _before_ the ptrace syscall-enter-stop and therefore the tracer could trivially manipulate the syscall register state after the seccomp check had passed. This was subsequently fixed in a5cd110cb836 ("arm64/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace") by moving the seccomp check after the tracer has run. Unfortunately, a decade later, that fix has been reported to be incomplete.

On arm64, both the first argument to a syscall and its eventual return value are allocated to register x0. In order to facilitate syscall restarting and querying of syscall arguments on the syscall exit path, the original value of x0 is stashed in 'struct pt_regs::orig_x0' early during the syscall entry path and is returned for the first argument by syscall_get_arguments(). Unlike 32-bit Arm, this stashed value is not directly exposed via ptrace() and so changes to register x0 made by the tracer on a syscall-enter-stop are not reflected in 'orig_x0'. This means that seccomp, syscall tracepoints and audit can observe a stale value for the register compared to the argument that will be observed by the actual syscall.

Re-sync 'orig_x0' from x0 on the syscall entry path following a potential ptrace stop (i.e. PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_ENTRY or SECCOMP_RET_TRACE). This behaviour is limited to native tasks (because compat tasks expose 'orig_r0' to ptrace) where the syscall is not being skipped (because x0 is updated to hold the return value of -ENOSYS in that case).

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c |   29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)

@@ -1797,6 +1797,21 @@ static void tracehook_report_syscall(str
 	}
 }
 
+static void update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Keep orig_x0 authoritative so that seccomp (via
+	 * syscall_get_arguments()), audit and the restart path all see the same
+	 * first argument the syscall is dispatched with, even if it has been
+	 * updated by a tracer. Skip this for NO_SYSCALL (set either by the user
+	 * or the tracer), as regs[0] holds the return value (see the comment in
+	 * el0_svc_common()) and can be unwound using syscall_rollback().
+	 * For compat tasks, orig_r0 is provided directly through GPR index 17.
+	 */
+	if (!is_compat_task() && regs->syscallno != NO_SYSCALL)
+		regs->orig_x0 = regs->regs[0];
+}
+
 int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	unsigned long flags = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);

@@ -1805,12 +1820,26 @@ int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *
 		tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
 		if (flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
 			return NO_SYSCALL;
+
+		/*
+		 * Ensure ptrace changes to x0 during a regular
+		 * syscall-enter-stop (PTRACE_SYSCALL) are visible to
+		 * subsequent seccomp checks, tracepoints and audit.
+		 */
+		update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(regs);
 	}
 
 	/* Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
 	if (secure_computing() == -1)
 		return NO_SYSCALL;
 
+	/*
+	 * Ensure tracer changes to x0 during seccomp ptrace exit
+	 * processing (SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) are visible to tracepoints and
+	 * audit.
+	 */
+	update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(regs);
+
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->syscallno);
 

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

commit 26b483d52417253d88a3a01262ac85914a7aec8e upstream.

This reverts commit e057b94772328221405b067c3a85fe479b915dc8.

Sashiko points out that updating 'orig_x0' after secure_computing() has returned is too late to handle the case where a seccomp filter is re-evaluated after initially returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. This means that a tracer can manipulate the first argument of the syscall behind seccomp's back.

For now, revert the initial fix and we'll have another crack at it soon. Since the incorrect fix was cc'd to stable, do the same here with an appropriate fixes tag.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c |   29 -----------------------------
 1 file changed, 29 deletions(-)

@@ -1797,21 +1797,6 @@ static void tracehook_report_syscall(str
 	}
 }
 
-static void update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	/*
-	 * Keep orig_x0 authoritative so that seccomp (via
-	 * syscall_get_arguments()), audit and the restart path all see the same
-	 * first argument the syscall is dispatched with, even if it has been
-	 * updated by a tracer. Skip this for NO_SYSCALL (set either by the user
-	 * or the tracer), as regs[0] holds the return value (see the comment in
-	 * el0_svc_common()) and can be unwound using syscall_rollback().
-	 * For compat tasks, orig_r0 is provided directly through GPR index 17.
-	 */
-	if (!is_compat_task() && regs->syscallno != NO_SYSCALL)
-		regs->orig_x0 = regs->regs[0];
-}
-
 int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	unsigned long flags = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);

@@ -1820,26 +1805,12 @@ int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *
 		tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
 		if (flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
 			return NO_SYSCALL;
-
-		/*
-		 * Ensure ptrace changes to x0 during a regular
-		 * syscall-enter-stop (PTRACE_SYSCALL) are visible to
-		 * subsequent seccomp checks, tracepoints and audit.
-		 */
-		update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(regs);
 	}
 
 	/* Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
 	if (secure_computing() == -1)
 		return NO_SYSCALL;
 
-	/*
-	 * Ensure tracer changes to x0 during seccomp ptrace exit
-	 * processing (SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) are visible to tracepoints and
-	 * audit.
-	 */
-	update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(regs);
-
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->syscallno);
 

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jun Yang <[email protected]>

commit 9b2854f86f0b56e9027d68e7a3fc909d1a9b566f upstream.

sctp_process_asconf() caches the transport the ASCONF chunk is processed against in asconf->transport (== chunk->transport, set once in sctp_rcv()). For an ASCONF located through its Address Parameter by __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(), that cached transport corresponds to the Address Parameter, which need not be the packet's source address.

sctp_process_asconf_param() rejects a DEL-IP for the packet source address (ADDIP D8, SCTP_ERROR_DEL_SRC_IP), but nothing protects asconf->transport. A single ASCONF can therefore carry, in order:

    [Address Parameter L] [DEL-IP L] [DEL-IP 0.0.0.0]

where L differs from the source. The DEL-IP for L passes the D8 check and calls sctp_assoc_rm_peer() on the transport that asconf->transport still points at, freeing it (RCU-deferred). The following wildcard DEL-IP then reuses the now-dangling asconf->transport in sctp_assoc_set_primary() and sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(): set_primary() dereferences the freed transport (->ipaddr, ->state) and plants the dangling pointer into asoc->peer.primary_path / active_path, and del_nonprimary_peers(), keeping only the pointer that is no longer on the list, removes every real transport, leaving the association with a transport_count of 0 and primary_path/active_path pointing at freed memory.

Reject a DEL-IP that targets the transport the ASCONF is being processed against, mirroring the existing source-address guard, so the wildcard branch can never reuse a freed transport.

---
 net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

@@ -3133,6 +3133,12 @@ static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(
 		if (!peer)
 			return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
 
+		/* Don't free asconf->transport; a later wildcard DEL-IP
+		 * parameter reuses it.
+		 */
+		if (peer == asconf->transport)
+			return SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED;
+
 		sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, peer);
 		break;
 	case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>

commit 4dbc71bcaf9a30abf3920a4e2cc4ed33bba78c02 upstream.

ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:

    snaptrace     = h + 1;
    snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);
    p             = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
    ...
    case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
        if (snaptrace_len) {
            ...
            if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
                                       snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
                                       false, &realm)) { ... }

ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays.

The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.

Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path.

---
 fs/ceph/caps.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -4125,6 +4125,7 @@ void ceph_handle_caps(struct ceph_mds_se
 
 	snaptrace = h + 1;
 	snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);
+	ceph_decode_need(&snaptrace, end, snaptrace_len, bad);
 	p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
 
 	if (msg_version >= 2) {

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Douya Le <[email protected]>

commit d3c32939fa0e3ee9b883b9a0fd1972c5c444e3d0 upstream.

handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received.

A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier message, causing an uninitialized memory read.

Use msg->front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that were actually read from the wire.

---
 net/ceph/mon_client.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ static void handle_get_version_reply(str
 	struct ceph_mon_generic_request *req;
 	u64 tid = le64_to_cpu(msg->hdr.tid);
 	void *p = msg->front.iov_base;
-	void *end = p + msg->front_alloc_len;
+	void *const end = p + msg->front.iov_len;
 	u64 handle;
 
 	dout("%s msg %p tid %llu\n", __func__, msg, tid);

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Raphael Zimmer <[email protected]>

commit 98917a499ec7064c14fc56d180a4fd636fc2784c upstream.

If a message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains a (maliciously) corrupted osdmap, out-of-bounds memory accesses may occur in decode_new_up_state_weight(). This happens because the bounds check for the new_state part is based on calculating its length depending on a len value read from the incoming message. This calculation may overflow leading to an incorrect bounds check. Subsequently, out-of-bounds reads may occur when decoding this part.

This patch switches the multiplication to use check_mul_overflow() to abort processing the osdmap if an overflow occurred. Therefore, osdmaps/messages containing large values for len that result in a multiplication overflow are treated as invalid.

[ idryomov: rename new_state_len -> new_state_item_size, formatting ]

---
 net/ceph/osdmap.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1822,6 +1822,8 @@ static int decode_new_up_state_weight(vo
 	void *new_up_client;
 	void *new_state;
 	void *new_weight_end;
+	const u32 new_state_item_size =
+	    sizeof(u32) + (struct_v >= 5 ? sizeof(u32) : sizeof(u8));
 	u32 len;
 	int i;
 

@@ -1837,7 +1839,8 @@ static int decode_new_up_state_weight(vo
 
 	new_state = *p;
 	ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, e_inval);
-	len *= sizeof(u32) + (struct_v >= 5 ? sizeof(u32) : sizeof(u8));
+	if (check_mul_overflow(len, new_state_item_size, &len))
+		goto e_inval;
 	ceph_decode_need(p, end, len, e_inval);
 	*p += len;
 

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhao Zhang <[email protected]>

commit bbeae12fda3384a90fbebc8a19ba9d33f85b5361 upstream.

Localized read selection can walk a parent bucket whose name exists in the CRUSH map while its type has no matching entry in type_names. get_immediate_parent() then dereferences a NULL type_cn and passes an invalid pointer into strcmp(), causing a null-ptr-deref.

Skip such malformed parent buckets unless both the bucket name and type name metadata are present. This keeps malformed hierarchy data from crashing locality lookup and safely falls back to "not local".

[ idryomov: add WARN_ON_ONCE ]

---
 net/ceph/osdmap.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -3021,8 +3021,11 @@ static int get_immediate_parent(struct c
 			if (b->items[j] != id)
 				continue;
 
-			*parent_type_id = b->type;
 			type_cn = lookup_crush_name(&c->type_names, b->type);
+			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!type_cn))
+				continue;
+
+			*parent_type_id = b->type;
 			parent_loc->cl_type_name = type_cn->cn_name;
 			parent_loc->cl_name = cn->cn_name;
 			return b->id;

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shuangpeng Bai <[email protected]>

commit 937d61f86d377a3aa578adae7a3dfcecdddf9d89 upstream.

ceph_x_create_authorizer() caches au->buf->vec.iov_base and au->buf->vec.iov_len in struct ceph_auth_handshake. These cached values are then used by the messenger connect code when sending the authorizer.

ceph_x_update_authorizer() can rebuild the authorizer when a newer service ticket is available. If the rebuilt authorizer no longer fits in the existing buffer, ceph_x_build_authorizer() drops its reference to au->buf and allocates a new one. If this is the final reference, ceph_buffer_put() frees the old ceph_buffer and its vec.iov_base, but auth->authorizer_buf still points at that freed memory.

A subsequent msgr1 reconnect can therefore queue the stale pointer and trigger a KASAN slab-use-after-free in _copy_from_iter() while tcp_sendmsg() copies the authorizer.

Refresh auth->authorizer_buf and auth->authorizer_buf_len after a successful authorizer rebuild so the messenger sends the current buffer.

---
 net/ceph/auth_x.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -671,9 +671,16 @@ static int ceph_x_update_authorizer(
 
 	au = (struct ceph_x_authorizer *)auth->authorizer;
 	if (au->secret_id < th->secret_id) {
+		int ret;
+
 		dout("ceph_x_update_authorizer service %u secret %llu < %llu\n",
 		     au->service, au->secret_id, th->secret_id);
-		return ceph_x_build_authorizer(ac, th, au);
+		ret = ceph_x_build_authorizer(ac, th, au);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		auth->authorizer_buf = au->buf->vec.iov_base;
+		auth->authorizer_buf_len = au->buf->vec.iov_len;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Douya Le <[email protected]>

commit 05f90284223381005d6bcddab3fda4a97f9c3401 upstream.

CRUSH bucket type 0 is reserved for devices. The mapper relies on that invariant and uses type 0 to identify leaf devices.

If crush_decode() accepts a bucket with type 0, a malformed CRUSH map can make the mapper treat a negative bucket ID as a device and pass it to is_out(), which then indexes the OSD weight array with a negative value.

Reject zero bucket types while decoding the CRUSH map so the invalid state never reaches the mapper.

---
 net/ceph/osdmap.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -504,6 +504,8 @@ static struct crush_map *crush_decode(vo
 		ceph_decode_need(p, end, 4*sizeof(u32), bad);
 		b->id = ceph_decode_32(p);
 		b->type = ceph_decode_16(p);
+		if (b->type == 0)
+			goto bad;
 		b->alg = ceph_decode_8(p);
 		if (b->alg != alg) {
 			b->alg = 0;

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Douya Le <[email protected]>

commit e4c804726c4afce3ba648b982d564f6af2cfa328 upstream.

ceph_destroy_client() tears down the monitor client before removing the per-client debugfs files. A concurrent read of the monmap debugfs file can enter monmap_show() after ceph_monc_stop() has freed monc->monmap, triggering a use-after-free.

Remove the debugfs files before stopping the OSD and monitor clients. debugfs_remove() drains active handlers and prevents new accesses, so the debugfs callbacks can no longer race the rest of client teardown.

---
 net/ceph/ceph_common.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -727,13 +727,13 @@ void ceph_destroy_client(struct ceph_cli
 
 	atomic_set(&client->msgr.stopping, 1);
 
+	ceph_debugfs_client_cleanup(client);
+
 	/* unmount */
 	ceph_osdc_stop(&client->osdc);
 	ceph_monc_stop(&client->monc);
 	ceph_messenger_fini(&client->msgr);
 
-	ceph_debugfs_client_cleanup(client);
-
 	ceph_destroy_options(client->options);
 
 	kfree(client);

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 3349ef6a366a61d631f6a263d12cea240957719d upstream.

The program header scan handles PT_INTERP from a switch nested in the scan loop, so its break leaves the switch and not the loop. A binary carrying more than one PT_INTERP runs the case again and overwrites both interpreter_name and interpreter. The previous name allocation leaks and so does the previous interpreter reference, along with the write denial open_exec() took on it. The denial is never released, so the file stays unwritable for as long as the system runs.

An unprivileged caller reaches this with a crafted binary and repeats it at will. binfmt_elf stops at the first PT_INTERP. Do the same here.

The flaw dates back to the driver's introduction in the pre-git history tree introduced in v2.6.11 by 91808d6ebe39 ("[PATCH] FRV: Add FDPIC ELF binary format driver").

---
 fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -231,6 +231,10 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct
 	for (i = 0; i < exec_params.hdr.e_phnum; i++, phdr++) {
 		switch (phdr->p_type) {
 		case PT_INTERP:
+			/* elf ABI allows only one interpreter */
+			if (interpreter_name)
+				continue;
+
 			retval = -ENOMEM;
 			if (phdr->p_filesz > PATH_MAX)
 				goto error;

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>

commit 780dfed688622ea01be3c9c2c55eec2207f05e04 upstream.

Hardware implementations report Scalable-Mode Page-walk Coherency Support via the SMPWCS field in the extended capability register. If the hardware does not support page-walk coherency, a clflush is required every time the page table entries (which are walked by the IOMMU hardware) are updated.

In the SVA case, page tables are managed by the CPU mm core, not by the IOMMU driver. Because the IOMMU driver has no way of knowing whether the CPU page table management code has ensured coherency via clflush, the driver must deny SVA if the hardware does not support coherent paging.

---
 drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static inline bool intel_svm_capable(str
 
 void intel_svm_check(struct intel_iommu *iommu)
 {
-	if (!pasid_supported(iommu))
+	if (!pasid_supported(iommu) || !ecap_smpwc(iommu->ecap))
 		return;
 
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) &&

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

commit 0f71f852a96af9685858ce59fda34ecbf85c283d upstream.

pep_get_sb() doesn't consider that pskb_may_pull() might have relocated the skb data, and continue to access the older pointer, causing UAF.

Reproduced under KASAN:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
  Read of size 1 at addr ff11000105510f50 by task repro/157
   pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
   pipe_handler_do_rcv+0x5f7/0xa10
   pep_do_rcv+0x203/0x410
   __sk_receive_skb+0x471/0x4a0
   phonet_rcv+0x5b3/0x6c0
   __netif_receive_skb+0xcc/0x1d0

Refetch the header with skb_header_pointer() after pskb_may_pull(), so the possibly stale pointer is no longer dereferenced. There are better ways to solve this, but, this is the less instrusive one.

---
 net/phonet/pep.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ static unsigned char *pep_get_sb(struct
 	ph = skb_header_pointer(skb, 0, 2, &h);
 	if (ph == NULL || ph->sb_len < 2 || !pskb_may_pull(skb, ph->sb_len))
 		return NULL;
+	/* pskb_may_pull() may have reallocated the head; refetch ph. */
+	ph = skb_header_pointer(skb, 0, 2, &h);
 	ph->sb_len -= 2;
 	*ptype = ph->sb_type;
 	*plen = ph->sb_len;

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit 3a61bd9637f3d929aa846e4eb3d98b48c26fcb0e upstream.

A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the sticky underlay netns vxlan->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in vxlan->net can rewrite a vxlan device whose underlay lives in vxlan->net.

vxlan_changelink() validates and applies the new configuration against vxlan->net (vxlan_config_validate(vxlan->net, ...)) and can reopen the underlay socket in that netns, so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series applies here.

Gate vxlan_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink" series.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

---
 drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -4255,6 +4255,9 @@ static int vxlan_changelink(struct net_d
 	struct vxlan_rdst *dst;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(dev, vxlan->net))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	dst = &vxlan->default_dst;
 	err = vxlan_nl2conf(tb, data, dev, &conf, true, extack);
 	if (err)

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sungmin Kang <[email protected]>

commit ee7f9bb9320add61f7b367d7e6cd55e3a3a4d65d upstream.

sl_realloc_bufs() replaces rbuff and updates buffsize while holding sl->lock. slip_receive_buf() reads those fields and writes through rbuff without holding the lock.

An MTU change can therefore race with receive processing. An MTU shrink can expose the new smaller rbuff with the old larger bound, causing an out-of-bounds write. A receive callback which already loaded the old rbuff can instead continue writing after that buffer has been freed.

Serialize receive processing with sl_realloc_bufs() by holding sl->lock while consuming each receive batch.

---
 drivers/net/slip/slip.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -692,6 +692,8 @@ static void slip_receive_buf(struct tty_
 	if (!sl || sl->magic != SLIP_MAGIC || !netif_running(sl->dev))
 		return;
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&sl->lock);
+
 	/* Read the characters out of the buffer */
 	while (count--) {
 		if (fp && *fp++) {

@@ -707,6 +709,8 @@ static void slip_receive_buf(struct tty_
 #endif
 			slip_unesc(sl, *cp++);
 	}
+
+	spin_unlock_bh(&sl->lock);
 }
 
 /************************************

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit 8efb8f8bbb353b8f2fdf4f37534c6d96c9f69e01 upstream.

A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the sticky underlay netns geneve->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in geneve->net can rewrite a geneve device whose underlay lives in geneve->net.

geneve_changelink() applies the new configuration against geneve->net:
geneve_link_config() and the geneve_quiesce()/geneve_unquiesce() pair reopen the underlay sockets in that netns (geneve_sock_add() uses geneve->net), so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series applies here.

Gate geneve_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink" series.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

---
 drivers/net/geneve.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -1751,6 +1751,9 @@ static int geneve_changelink(struct net_
 	struct geneve_config cfg;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(dev, geneve->net))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* If the geneve device is configured for metadata (or externally
 	 * controlled, for example, OVS), then nothing can be changed.
 	 */

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hidayath Khan <[email protected]>

commit 47a5116e56a6b6fe1e909f244e39cd0fc26ceee4 upstream.

afiucv_hs_callback_syn() allocates the child socket with GFP_ATOMIC. If the allocation fails, nsk is NULL.

The connection-refused path is entered when the listen state check fails, the accept backlog is full, or nsk is NULL. The code unconditionally calls iucv_sock_kill(nsk) in that path.

iucv_sock_kill() does not accept a NULL socket pointer and immediately dereferences sk via sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED). When nsk is NULL, calling iucv_sock_kill(nsk) results in a NULL pointer dereference.

Only call iucv_sock_kill() when a child socket was successfully allocated.

---
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1868,7 +1868,8 @@ static int afiucv_hs_callback_syn(struct
 		afiucv_swap_src_dest(skb);
 		trans_hdr->flags = AF_IUCV_FLAG_SYN | AF_IUCV_FLAG_FIN;
 		err = dev_queue_xmit(skb);
-		iucv_sock_kill(nsk);
+		if (nsk)
+			iucv_sock_kill(nsk);
 		bh_unlock_sock(sk);
 		goto out;
 	}

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]>

commit be7cc4656eb1f54029610e82d1f0fdd3f9b5ec0a upstream.

af_iucv queues not-yet-received message notifications on iucv->message_q, each holding a raw pointer to the connection's iucv_path. When the peer severs the connection, iucv_sever_path() frees that path with iucv_path_free() but leaves the notifications queued. A later recvmsg() drains message_q via iucv_process_message_q() and hands the stale path to message_receive() -- a use-after-free of the freed iucv_path.

Drop the queued notifications when the path is severed; once the path is gone they can no longer be received. This also frees the notifications leaked when a socket is closed with messages still queued.

---
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ static void iucv_sever_path(struct sock
 	unsigned char user_data[16];
 	struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
 	struct iucv_path *path = iucv->path;
+	struct sock_msg_q *p, *n;
 
 	/* Whoever resets the path pointer, must sever and free it. */
 	if (xchg(&iucv->path, NULL)) {

@@ -369,6 +370,19 @@ static void iucv_sever_path(struct sock
 		} else
 			pr_iucv->path_sever(path, NULL);
 		iucv_path_free(path);
+
+		/*
+		 * Message notifications queued on message_q still reference
+		 * the now freed path; drop them, otherwise a later recvmsg()
+		 * would pass the freed iucv_path to message_receive() via
+		 * iucv_process_message_q().
+		 */
+		spin_lock_bh(&iucv->message_q.lock);
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &iucv->message_q.list, list) {
+			list_del(&p->list);
+			kfree(p);
+		}
+		spin_unlock_bh(&iucv->message_q.lock);
 	}
 }
 

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Lee <[email protected]>

commit 5499e0602d2faafd42c580d25f615903c3fbe11b upstream.

x25_kill_by_neigh() walks the global X.25 socket list looking for sockets attached to a terminating neighbour. x25_list_lock protects list membership while the lookup is in progress, but it does not pin a socket's lifetime after the lock is dropped.

The function currently drops x25_list_lock before calling lock_sock(s). A concurrent close can run x25_release(), remove the same socket from x25_list, and drop the last socket reference in that window. The neighbour teardown path can then lock or inspect a freed struct sock/struct x25_sock.

Take sock_hold(s) while x25_list_lock still proves that the list entry is live, then drop the temporary reference after the socket has been locked, rechecked, and released. Recheck x25_sk(s)->neighbour after lock_sock(), because another path may have disconnected the socket before this path acquired the socket lock. Restart the list walk after each disconnect because the list lock was dropped and the previous iterator state may no longer be valid.

A QEMU/KASAN run against origin/master reproduced a slab-use-after-free in x25_kill_by_neigh().

---
 net/x25/af_x25.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1779,15 +1779,19 @@ void x25_kill_by_neigh(struct x25_neigh
 {
 	struct sock *s;
 
+again:
 	write_lock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
 
 	sk_for_each(s, &x25_list) {
 		if (x25_sk(s)->neighbour == nb) {
+			sock_hold(s);
 			write_unlock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
 			lock_sock(s);
-			x25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, 0, 0);
+			if (x25_sk(s)->neighbour == nb)
+				x25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, 0, 0);
 			release_sock(s);
-			write_lock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
+			sock_put(s);
+			goto again;
 		}
 	}
 	write_unlock_bh(&x25_list_lock);

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fan Wu <[email protected]>

commit 14fa65d10f5696b063a7d8d26e8291ea84a2c6ed upstream.

When build_skb() fails in hip04_rx_poll(), the driver jumps to the refill path without releasing the current RX buffer and its DMA mapping. Installing a replacement buffer then overwrites the slot references and leaks both resources.

Keep the current slot intact and return budget so NAPI retries the same buffer. Also free a newly allocated RX fragment when dma_map_single() fails.

This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hip04_eth.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -594,7 +594,11 @@ static int hip04_rx_poll(struct napi_str
 		skb = build_skb(buf, priv->rx_buf_size);
 		if (unlikely(!skb)) {
 			net_dbg_ratelimited("build_skb failed\n");
-			goto refill;
+			/* Retain the slot; return budget so NAPI retries this
+			 * buffer. Refill would overwrite rx_buf[]/rx_phys[]
+			 * and leak them.
+			 */
+			return budget;
 		}
 
 		dma_unmap_single(priv->dev, priv->rx_phys[priv->rx_head],

@@ -622,14 +626,15 @@ static int hip04_rx_poll(struct napi_str
 			rx++;
 		}
 
-refill:
 		buf = netdev_alloc_frag(priv->rx_buf_size);
 		if (!buf)
 			goto done;
 		phys = dma_map_single(priv->dev, buf,
 				      RX_BUF_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
-		if (dma_mapping_error(priv->dev, phys))
+		if (dma_mapping_error(priv->dev, phys)) {
+			skb_free_frag(buf);
 			goto done;
+		}
 		priv->rx_buf[priv->rx_head] = buf;
 		priv->rx_phys[priv->rx_head] = phys;
 		hip04_set_recv_desc(priv, phys);

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit 425224c2d700391729be7fe6929a88ef4e2d7a4e upstream.

Don't return the return value of down_read_killable() (0) when a ptrace access check fails, return -EACCES as intended.

---
 fs/proc/namespaces.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(stru
 	const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_ops = PROC_I(inode)->ns_ops;
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	struct path ns_path;
-	int error = -EACCES;
+	int error;
 
 	if (!dentry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(stru
 	if (error)
 		goto out_put_task;
 
+	error = -EACCES;
 	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
 		goto out;
 

@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ static int proc_ns_readlink(struct dentr
 	if (res)
 		goto out_put_task;
 
+	res = -EACCES;
 	if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
 		res = ns_get_name(name, sizeof(name), task, ns_ops);
 		if (res >= 0)

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Raphael Zimmer <[email protected]>

commit a6c4250b81bd30beae94e1b7a4b26fa1193ad2e4 upstream.

In a reply message to an RBD request, a positive result code indicates a data payload, which is not allowed for writes. While rbd_osd_req_callback() already resets a positive result code for writes to zero, rbd_object_map_callback() does not. This allows a corrupted reply to an object map update to trigger the rbd_assert(*result < 0) in __rbd_obj_handle_request(). This happens, because rbd_object_map_callback() calls rbd_obj_handle_request() -> __rbd_obj_handle_request() and passes this positive result code. From __rbd_obj_handle_request(), rbd_obj_advance_write() is called, which leaves the positive result code unchanged and returns true. Therefore, the if(done && *result) branch is executed in __rbd_obj_handle_request() and the assertion triggers.

This patch fixes the issue by adjusting the logic in the rbd_object_map_callback() path. A positive result code for an object map update is now reset to zero (similar to rbd_osd_req_callback()), and the message is subsequently handled the same way as if the result code was zero from the beginning. Additionally, a WARN_ON_ONCE() is added for this case.

---
 drivers/block/rbd.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2020,10 +2020,15 @@ static int rbd_object_map_update_finish(
 	bool has_current_state;
 	void *p;
 
-	if (osd_req->r_result)
+	if (osd_req->r_result < 0)
 		return osd_req->r_result;
 
 	/*
+	 * Writes aren't allowed to return a data payload.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(osd_req->r_result > 0);
+
+	/*
 	 * Nothing to do for a snapshot object map.
 	 */
 	if (osd_req->r_num_ops == 1)

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>

commit 92d3817649df2b0b6a008a686c8275c88d7ef594 upstream.

ila_csum_adjust_transport() caches ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb) before calling pskb_may_pull(). On a non-linear skb whose transport header sits in a page fragment, pskb_may_pull() can call __pskb_pull_tail() / pskb_expand_head() and free the old skb head, leaving ip6h dangling; the following get_csum_diff(ip6h, p) then reads freed memory. ila_update_ipv6_locator() uses ip6h (and the iaddr derived from it) again after the csum-adjust call and additionally writes the new locator through that pointer.

Impact: a remote IPv6 packet routed through a configured ILA csum-adjust-transport route or receive-side mapping triggers a slab-use-after-free in ila_update_ipv6_locator() (KASAN). The route or mapping requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to configure, but trigger packets are unauthenticated once it exists.

Reload ip6h after each pskb_may_pull() in ila_csum_adjust_transport() before the csum-diff read. In ila_update_ipv6_locator() only the ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT case pulls the skb, so reload ip6h and iaddr in that case alone before the destination-address write; the neutral-map modes never pull and keep their cached pointers.

---
 net/ipv6/ila/ila_common.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
 			struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *)
 					(skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
 
+			ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 			diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
 			inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&th->check, skb,
 							diff, true, true);

@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
 					(skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
 
 			if (uh->check || skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
+				ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 				diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
 				inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&uh->check, skb,
 								diff, true, true);

@@ -109,6 +111,7 @@ static void ila_csum_adjust_transport(st
 			struct icmp6hdr *ih = (struct icmp6hdr *)
 					(skb_network_header(skb) + nhoff);
 
+			ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
 			diff = get_csum_diff(ip6h, p);
 			inet_proto_csum_replace_by_diff(&ih->icmp6_cksum, skb,
 							diff, true, true);

@@ -126,6 +129,15 @@ void ila_update_ipv6_locator(struct sk_b
 	switch (p->csum_mode) {
 	case ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT:
 		ila_csum_adjust_transport(skb, p);
+		/*
+		 * ila_csum_adjust_transport() calls pskb_may_pull(), which can
+		 * reallocate the skb head and leave ip6h (and the iaddr derived
+		 * from it) dangling; reload both before the write below.  The
+		 * other csum modes do not pull, so their cached pointers stay
+		 * valid.
+		 */
+		ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+		iaddr = ila_a2i(&ip6h->daddr);
 		break;
 	case ILA_CSUM_NEUTRAL_MAP:
 		if (sir2ila) {

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <[email protected]>

commit fd3a3f28ed60c6af4b2a39933b151d6b27842c3b upstream.

llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the AEAD request as

	assoclen += datalen - authlen;

where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that only spans the real frame.

The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.

Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.

---
 net/mac802154/llsec.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -888,6 +888,11 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *sk
 	data = skb_mac_header(skb) + skb->mac_len;
 	datalen = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - data;
 
+	if (datalen < authlen) {
+		kfree_sensitive(req);
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+
 	sg_init_one(&sg, skb_mac_header(skb), assoclen + datalen);
 
 	if (!(hdr->sec.level & IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)) {

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <[email protected]>

commit e9c238f6fe42fb1b4dba3a578277de32cb487937 upstream.

pppoe_sendmsg() saves a pointer to the PPPoE header before calling dev_hard_header(). Device header callbacks are allowed to reallocate the skb head, invalidating pointers into it.

This can happen when a send is blocked in copy_from_user() while the first non-Ethernet port is added to an empty team device. The team's delegated GRE header callback then expands the skb head. PPPoE subsequently writes six bytes through the stale pointer into the freed head.

Reload the PPPoE header through the skb's network-header offset after device header creation. pskb_expand_head() updates that offset when it relocates the head.

---
 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -899,6 +899,7 @@ static int pppoe_sendmsg(struct socket *
 	dev_hard_header(skb, dev, ETH_P_PPP_SES,
 			po->pppoe_pa.remote, NULL, total_len);
 
+	ph = pppoe_hdr(skb);
 	memcpy(ph, &hdr, sizeof(struct pppoe_hdr));
 
 	ph->length = htons(total_len);

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daehyeon Ko <[email protected]>

commit ba0533fc163f905fe817cfabdf8ed4058da44800 upstream.

When tipc_sk_create() fails to insert the new socket (tipc_sk_insert() returns non-zero), its error path frees the sk with sk_free() but leaves sock->sk pointing at the freed object:

	if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) {
		sk_free(sk);
		pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n");
		return -EINVAL;
	}

This is harmless for plain socket(): the syscall layer clears sock->ops before releasing, so tipc_release() is never called. It is not harmless on the accept() path. tipc_accept() creates the pre-allocated child socket with tipc_sk_create(net, new_sock, 0, kern); on failure it leaves new_sock->sk dangling and new_sock->ops non-NULL, and do_accept() then fput()s the new file, so __sock_release() -> tipc_release() runs lock_sock(new_sock->sk) on the freed sk -- a use-after-free write of the sk_lock spinlock.

tipc_release() already guards this exact "failed accept() releases a pre-allocated child" case with "if (sk == NULL) return 0;", but the guard is bypassed because tipc_sk_create() left sock->sk non-NULL (dangling) rather than NULL.

Clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path so the existing tipc_release() NULL check fires and the use-after-free is avoided.

The tipc_sk_insert() failure is reached when the per-netns socket rhashtable hits its max_size (tsk_rht_params.max_size = 1048576, ~2M elements) -- i.e. once a netns holds ~2M TIPC sockets every insert returns -E2BIG.

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839)
  Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880047cdc38 by task init/1
   lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839)
   tipc_release (net/tipc/socket.c:638)
   __sock_release (net/socket.c:710)
   sock_close (net/socket.c:1501)
   __fput (fs/file_table.c:512)
  Allocated by task 1:
   sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2308)
   tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:487)
   tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744)
   do_accept (net/socket.c:2034)
  Freed by task 1:
   __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2391)
   tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:504)
   tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744)
   do_accept (net/socket.c:2034)

---
 net/tipc/socket.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -490,6 +490,7 @@ static int tipc_sk_create(struct net *ne
 	tipc_set_sk_state(sk, TIPC_OPEN);
 	if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) {
 		sk_free(sk);
+		sock->sk = NULL;
 		pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit d06c4173a7c38c7a39e98859f839ce714c7af2c9 upstream.

There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v10_0.c |   13 +++++--------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -3437,7 +3437,7 @@ static void gfx_v10_0_wait_reg_mem(struc
 			   WAIT_REG_MEM_ENGINE(eng_sel)));
 
 	if (mem_space)
-		BUG_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+		WARN_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr0);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr1);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, ref);

@@ -7811,7 +7811,7 @@ static void gfx_v10_0_ring_emit_ib_gfx(s
 	}
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, header);
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 		(2 << 0) |

@@ -7846,7 +7846,7 @@ static void gfx_v10_0_ring_emit_ib_compu
 	}
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_INDIRECT_BUFFER, 2));
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 				(2 << 0) |

@@ -7879,9 +7879,9 @@ static void gfx_v10_0_ring_emit_fence(st
 	 * aligned if only send 32bit data low (discard data high)
 	 */
 	if (write64bit)
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x7);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x7);
 	else
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x3);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x3);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, upper_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(seq));

@@ -7917,9 +7917,6 @@ static void gfx_v10_0_ring_emit_fence_ki
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = ring->adev;
 
-	/* we only allocate 32bit for each seq wb address */
-	BUG_ON(flags & AMDGPU_FENCE_FLAG_64BIT);
-
 	/* write fence seq to the "addr" */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_WRITE_DATA, 3));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, (WRITE_DATA_ENGINE_SEL(0) |

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 84a1a8a952ab4b8c23c5dd1f2eea4049cb4914f5 upstream.

There's no need to crash the kernel for this case.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v8_0.c |    3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)

@@ -6292,9 +6292,6 @@ static void gfx_v8_0_ring_emit_fence_com
 static void gfx_v8_0_ring_emit_fence_kiq(struct amdgpu_ring *ring, u64 addr,
 					 u64 seq, unsigned int flags)
 {
-	/* we only allocate 32bit for each seq wb address */
-	BUG_ON(flags & AMDGPU_FENCE_FLAG_64BIT);
-
 	/* write fence seq to the "addr" */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_WRITE_DATA, 3));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, (WRITE_DATA_ENGINE_SEL(0) |

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 6302be10b521f5106ce01eb5a724b9e7945a5061 upstream.

There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gfx_v9_0.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ static void gfx_v9_0_wait_reg_mem(struct
 				 WAIT_REG_MEM_ENGINE(eng_sel)));
 
 	if (mem_space)
-		BUG_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+		WARN_ON(addr0 & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr0);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, addr1);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, ref);

@@ -5295,7 +5295,7 @@ static void gfx_v9_0_ring_emit_ib_gfx(st
 	}
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, header);
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 		(2 << 0) |

@@ -5330,7 +5330,7 @@ static void gfx_v9_0_ring_emit_ib_comput
 	}
 
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, PACKET3(PACKET3_INDIRECT_BUFFER, 2));
-	BUG_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
+	WARN_ON(ib->gpu_addr & 0x3); /* Dword align */
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring,
 #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
 				(2 << 0) |

@@ -5364,9 +5364,9 @@ static void gfx_v9_0_ring_emit_fence(str
 	 * aligned if only send 32bit data low (discard data high)
 	 */
 	if (write64bit)
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x7);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x7);
 	else
-		BUG_ON(addr & 0x3);
+		WARN_ON(addr & 0x3);
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, upper_32_bits(addr));
 	amdgpu_ring_write(ring, lower_32_bits(seq));

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Boyuan Zhang <[email protected]>

commit 0c01c811be47e6b146552dd59bfedbea8f09b8f4 upstream.

When width or height is less than 16, width_in_mb or height_in_mb becomes 0, leading to fs_in_mb being 0. This causes a division by zero when calculating num_dpb_buffer in H264 and H264 Perf decode paths.

Add validation to reject frames with width < 16 or height < 16 before performing any calculations that depend on these values.

V2: Format change - move up all vaiable definitions.
V3: Use warn_once to avoid spam.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_uvd.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

@@ -567,6 +567,14 @@ static int amdgpu_uvd_cs_msg_decode(stru
 	unsigned image_size, tmp, min_dpb_size, num_dpb_buffer;
 	unsigned min_ctx_size = ~0;
 
+	/* Reject invalid dimensions to prevent division by zero */
+	if (width < 16 || height < 16) {
+		dev_WARN_ONCE(adev->dev, 1,
+			      "Invalid UVD decoding dimensions (%dx%d)!\n",
+			      width, height);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	image_size = width * height;
 	image_size += image_size / 2;
 	image_size = ALIGN(image_size, 1024);

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ce Sun <[email protected]>

commit 28c9b3c5dc35cc790d11e26ca3fc6e068be63998 upstream.

Call pm_genpd_remove() to unregister from global list prior to releasing acp_genpd memory, and clear the pointer after free.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acp.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -466,7 +466,9 @@ static int acp_hw_fini(void *handle)
 
 	mfd_remove_devices(adev->acp.parent);
 	kfree(adev->acp.acp_res);
+	pm_genpd_remove(&adev->acp.acp_genpd->gpd);
 	kfree(adev->acp.acp_genpd);
+	adev->acp.acp_genpd = NULL;
 	kfree(adev->acp.acp_cell);
 
 	return 0;

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>

commit 1579342d71133da7f00daa02c75cebec7372097b upstream.

bearer_disable() frees b->disc with tipc_disc_delete()'s plain kfree(), but tipc_disc_rcv() still dereferences b->disc in RX softirq under rcu_read_lock() (tipc_udp_recv -> tipc_rcv -> tipc_disc_rcv).

L2 bearers are safe thanks to the synchronize_net() in tipc_disable_l2_media(), but the UDP bearer defers that call to the cleanup_bearer() workqueue, so the discoverer is freed with no grace period:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_disc_rcv (net/tipc/discover.c:149)
 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802348b728 by task poc_tipc/184
 <IRQ>
  tipc_disc_rcv (net/tipc/discover.c:149)
  tipc_rcv (net/tipc/node.c:2126)
  tipc_udp_recv (net/tipc/udp_media.c:391)
  udp_rcv (net/ipv4/udp.c:2643)
  ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:241)
 </IRQ>
 Freed by task 181:
  kfree (mm/slub.c:6565)
  bearer_disable (net/tipc/bearer.c:418)
  tipc_nl_bearer_disable (net/tipc/bearer.c:1001)

The bearer is freed with kfree_rcu(); free the discoverer the same way. Add an rcu_head to struct tipc_discoverer and free it and its skb from an RCU callback.

Because the RCU callback (tipc_disc_free_rcu) lives in module text, a call_rcu() that is still pending when the tipc module is unloaded would invoke a freed function. Add an rcu_barrier() to tipc_exit() after the bearer subsystem has been torn down, so all pending discoverer callbacks have run before the module text goes away.

Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace: the TIPCv2 genl family is netnsok and its bearer commands have no GENL_ADMIN_PERM. Needs CONFIG_TIPC and CONFIG_TIPC_MEDIA_UDP.

---
 net/tipc/core.c     |  5 +++++
 net/tipc/discover.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 7724499f516e9e..4f01691aea3a40 100644
@@ -220,6 +220,11 @@ static void __exit tipc_exit(void)
 	unregister_pernet_device(&tipc_net_ops);
 	tipc_unregister_sysctl();
 
+	/* TODO: Wait for all timers that called call_rcu() to finish before
+	 * calling rcu_barrier().
+	 */
+	rcu_barrier();
+
 	pr_info("Deactivated\n");
 }
 

index 2730310249e3ca..28665de32245a5 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
  * @skb: request message to be (repeatedly) sent
  * @timer: timer governing period between requests
  * @timer_intv: current interval between requests (in ms)
+ * @rcu: RCU head for deferred freeing
  */
 struct tipc_discoverer {
 	u32 bearer_id;

@@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ struct tipc_discoverer {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	struct timer_list timer;
 	unsigned long timer_intv;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 };
 
 /**

@@ -381,6 +383,15 @@ int tipc_disc_create(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void tipc_disc_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rp)
+{
+	struct tipc_discoverer *d = container_of(rp, struct tipc_discoverer,
+						 rcu);
+
+	kfree_skb(d->skb);
+	kfree(d);
+}
+
 /**
  * tipc_disc_delete - destroy object sending periodic link setup requests
  * @d: ptr to link duest structure

@@ -388,8 +399,7 @@ int tipc_disc_create(struct net *net, struct tipc_bearer *b,
 void tipc_disc_delete(struct tipc_discoverer *d)
 {
 	del_timer_sync(&d->timer);
-	kfree_skb(d->skb);
-	kfree(d);
+	call_rcu(&d->rcu, tipc_disc_free_rcu);
 }
 
 /**

2.53.0

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Devin Wittmayer <[email protected]>

commit 39afc46c0243d10b7795e6e6cf4ae91f41732120 upstream.

PKT_TYPE_TXRX_NOTIFY is an mmio-only event, but mt7615_rx_check() and mt7615_queue_rx_skb() dispatch it to mt7615_mac_tx_free() on every bus. mt7615_mac_tx_free() cleans the DMA tx queues with mt76_queue_tx_cleanup(), which calls queue_ops->tx_cleanup(). Only the mmio queue ops implement that callback; on the mt7663 USB and SDIO buses it is NULL, so a TXRX_NOTIFY there calls a NULL pointer in the RX worker. Same defect as the mt7921 and mt7925 patches in this series.

Drop the event on non-mmio buses via mt76_is_mmio(), as in commit 5683e1488aa9 ("wifi: mt76: connac: do not check WED status for non-mmio devices").

[ No mt7615_rx_check() on this tree, so only the mt7615_queue_rx_skb()
hunk applies, and mt7615_mac_tx_free() takes the skb rather than (data, len), so the guard frees it here. ]

---
 drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/mac.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

index 4364f73b501da8..0c9201e073b271 100644
@@ -1492,6 +1492,10 @@ void mt7615_queue_rx_skb(struct mt76_dev *mdev, enum mt76_rxq_id q,
 		dev_kfree_skb(skb);
 		break;
 	case PKT_TYPE_TXRX_NOTIFY:
+		if (!mt76_is_mmio(mdev)) {
+			dev_kfree_skb(skb);
+			break;
+		}
 		mt7615_mac_tx_free(dev, skb);
 		break;
 	case PKT_TYPE_RX_EVENT:

2.53.0

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4032f8ed10fcb84d41c508dfb04be96589f78dfe ]

OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment. A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy().

Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a consumer handles it.

---
 net/openvswitch/actions.c  |   15 +++++----------
 net/openvswitch/datapath.c |   25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 net/openvswitch/datapath.h |    2 +-
 net/openvswitch/vport.c    |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

@@ -855,12 +855,8 @@ static void do_output(struct datapath *d
 		u16 mru = OVS_CB(skb)->mru;
 		u32 cutlen = OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen;
 
-		if (unlikely(cutlen > 0)) {
-			if (skb->len - cutlen > ovs_mac_header_len(key))
-				pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - cutlen);
-			else
-				pskb_trim(skb, ovs_mac_header_len(key));
-		}
+		if (unlikely(cutlen < skb->len))
+			pskb_trim(skb, max(cutlen, ovs_mac_header_len(key)));
 
 		if (likely(!mru ||
 		           (skb->len <= mru + vport->dev->hard_header_len))) {

@@ -1232,22 +1228,21 @@ static int do_execute_actions(struct dat
 			clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			if (clone)
 				do_output(dp, clone, port, key);
-			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0;
+			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 			break;
 		}
 
 		case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC: {
 			struct ovs_action_trunc *trunc = nla_data(a);
 
-			if (skb->len > trunc->max_len)
-				OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = skb->len - trunc->max_len;
+			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = trunc->max_len;
 			break;
 		}
 
 		case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE:
 			output_userspace(dp, skb, key, a, attr,
 						     len, OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen);
-			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0;
+			OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 			break;
 
 		case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_HASH:

@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ void ovs_dp_process_packet(struct sk_buf
 		upcall.cmd = OVS_PACKET_CMD_MISS;
 		upcall.portid = ovs_vport_find_upcall_portid(p, skb);
 		upcall.mru = OVS_CB(skb)->mru;
-		error = ovs_dp_upcall(dp, skb, key, &upcall, 0);
+		error = ovs_dp_upcall(dp, skb, key, &upcall, U32_MAX);
 		switch (error) {
 		case 0:
 		case -EAGAIN:

@@ -400,7 +400,8 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 	struct sk_buff *nskb = NULL;
 	struct sk_buff *user_skb = NULL; /* to be queued to userspace */
 	struct nlattr *nla;
-	size_t len;
+	size_t msg_size;
+	size_t skb_len;
 	unsigned int hlen;
 	int err, dp_ifindex;
 	u64 hash;

@@ -421,7 +422,8 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 		skb = nskb;
 	}
 
-	if (nla_attr_size(skb->len) > USHRT_MAX) {
+	skb_len = min(skb->len, cutlen);
+	if (nla_attr_size(skb_len) > USHRT_MAX) {
 		err = -EFBIG;
 		goto out;
 	}

@@ -436,13 +438,13 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 	 * padding logic. Only perform zerocopy if padding is not required.
 	 */
 	if (dp->user_features & OVS_DP_F_UNALIGNED)
-		hlen = skb_zerocopy_headlen(skb);
+		hlen = min(skb_zerocopy_headlen(skb), cutlen);
 	else
-		hlen = skb->len;
+		hlen = skb_len;
 
-	len = upcall_msg_size(upcall_info, hlen - cutlen,
-			      OVS_CB(skb)->acts_origlen);
-	user_skb = genlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	msg_size = upcall_msg_size(upcall_info, hlen,
+				   OVS_CB(skb)->acts_origlen);
+	user_skb = genlmsg_new(msg_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!user_skb) {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;

@@ -503,7 +505,7 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 	}
 
 	/* Add OVS_PACKET_ATTR_LEN when packet is truncated */
-	if (cutlen > 0 &&
+	if (skb_len < skb->len &&
 	    nla_put_u32(user_skb, OVS_PACKET_ATTR_LEN, skb->len)) {
 		err = -ENOBUFS;
 		goto out;

@@ -528,9 +530,9 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct
 		err = -ENOBUFS;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	nla->nla_len = nla_attr_size(skb->len - cutlen);
+	nla->nla_len = nla_attr_size(skb_len);
 
-	err = skb_zerocopy(user_skb, skb, skb->len - cutlen, hlen);
+	err = skb_zerocopy(user_skb, skb, skb_len, hlen);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 

@@ -587,6 +589,7 @@ static int ovs_packet_cmd_execute(struct
 		packet->ignore_df = 1;
 	}
 	OVS_CB(packet)->mru = mru;
+	OVS_CB(packet)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 
 	if (a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_HASH]) {
 		hash = nla_get_u64(a[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_HASH]);

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ struct datapath {
  * @mru: The maximum received fragement size; 0 if the packet is not
  * fragmented.
  * @acts_origlen: The netlink size of the flow actions applied to this skb.
- * @cutlen: The number of bytes from the packet end to be removed.
+ * @cutlen: The number of bytes in the packet to preserve on output.
  */
 struct ovs_skb_cb {
 	struct vport		*input_vport;

@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ int ovs_vport_receive(struct vport *vpor
 
 	OVS_CB(skb)->input_vport = vport;
 	OVS_CB(skb)->mru = 0;
-	OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0;
+	OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX;
 	if (unlikely(dev_net(skb->dev) != ovs_dp_get_net(vport->dp))) {
 		u32 mark;
 

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit c4fceb46add65481ef0dfb79cad24c3c269b4cad upstream.

saddr and daddr are set but not used.

---
 net/ipv6/raw.c |    3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)

@@ -335,7 +335,6 @@ static void rawv6_err(struct sock *sk, s
 void raw6_icmp_error(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr,
 		u8 type, u8 code, int inner_offset, __be32 info)
 {
-	const struct in6_addr *saddr, *daddr;
 	struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	struct sock *sk;

@@ -347,8 +346,6 @@ void raw6_icmp_error(struct sk_buff *skb
 	sk_for_each(sk, head) {
 		/* Note: ipv6_hdr(skb) != skb->data */
 		const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
-		saddr = &ip6h->saddr;
-		daddr = &ip6h->daddr;
 
 		if (!raw_v6_match(net, sk, nexthdr, &ip6h->saddr, &ip6h->daddr,
 				  inet6_iif(skb), inet6_sdif(skb)))

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit 97a4d46b1516250d640c1ae0c9e7129d160d6a1c upstream.

I accidentally broke IPv4 traceroute, by swapping iph->saddr and iph->daddr.

Probably because raw_icmp_error() and raw_v4_input() use different order for iph->saddr and iph->daddr.

---
 net/ipv4/raw.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ void raw_icmp_error(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	sk_for_each(sk, head) {
 		iph = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
 		if (!raw_v4_match(net, sk, iph->protocol,
-				  iph->saddr, iph->daddr, dif, sdif))
+				  iph->daddr, iph->saddr, dif, sdif))
 			continue;
 		raw_err(sk, skb, info);
 	}

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>

commit 6c4110d9f499e2170fbb36723b0a5f50a8116304 upstream.

When global vlan options are equal sequentially we compress them in a range to save space and reduce processing time. In order to have the proper range end id we need to update range_end if the options are equal otherwise we get ranges with the same end vlan id as the start.

---
 net/bridge/br_vlan.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1839,7 +1839,7 @@ static int br_vlan_dump_dev(const struct
 
 		if (dump_global) {
 			if (br_vlan_global_opts_can_enter_range(v, range_end))
-				continue;
+				goto update_end;
 			if (!br_vlan_global_opts_fill(skb, range_start->vid,
 						      range_end->vid,
 						      range_start)) {

@@ -1865,6 +1865,7 @@ static int br_vlan_dump_dev(const struct
 
 			range_start = v;
 		}
+update_end:
 		range_end = v;
 	}
 

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yehyeong Lee <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 295dd295e2137e10e9a5b1891d97e0f08de76f03 ]

mpls_getroute() builds the RTM_NEWROUTE reply to an RTM_GETROUTE request by filling a struct rtmsg allocated from an skb whose data area is not zeroed (alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, ...)). It sets every field of the header except rtm_tos:

	r = nlmsg_data(nlh);
	r->rtm_family	 = AF_MPLS;
	r->rtm_dst_len	= 20;
	r->rtm_src_len	= 0;
	r->rtm_table	= RT_TABLE_MAIN;
	r->rtm_type	= RTN_UNICAST;
	r->rtm_scope	= RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;
	r->rtm_protocol = rt->rt_protocol;
	r->rtm_flags	= 0;

struct rtmsg has no padding, so the one uninitialised byte rtm_tos (offset 3) is copied straight to user space on recvmsg(), leaking a byte of uninitialised heap memory. This is in contrast to mpls_dump_route(), which fills the very same header and does set rtm_tos = 0.

Initialize rtm_tos to 0, matching mpls_dump_route().

Reproduced with KMSAN by adding an MPLS route and issuing a non-RTM_F_FIB_MATCH RTM_GETROUTE for its label:

  BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x36c/0x33f0
   _copy_to_iter+0x36c/0x33f0
   __skb_datagram_iter+0x196/0x12c0
   skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5b/0x210
   netlink_recvmsg+0x37b/0xef0
   ...
  Uninit was created at:
   __alloc_skb+0x8ca/0x10e0
   mpls_getroute+0x1280/0x3a40
   rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1138/0x15a0
   ...
  Byte 19 of 64 is uninitialized

(byte 19 = nlmsghdr(16) + rtmsg offset 3 = rtm_tos)

---
 net/mpls/af_mpls.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

index 66f498667ed8..5c80fb93bb7a 100644
@@ -2492,6 +2492,7 @@ static int mpls_getroute(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *in_nlh,
 	r->rtm_family	 = AF_MPLS;
 	r->rtm_dst_len	= 20;
 	r->rtm_src_len	= 0;
+	r->rtm_tos	= 0;
 	r->rtm_table	= RT_TABLE_MAIN;
 	r->rtm_type	= RTN_UNICAST;
 	r->rtm_scope	= RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;

2.53.0

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Isaac Scott <[email protected]>

commit c2eda35e675b6ea4a0a21a4b1167b121571a9036 upstream.

Some cameras, such as the Sonix Technology Co. 292A, exhibit issues when running two parallel streams, causing USB packets to be dropped when an H.264 stream posts a keyframe while an MJPEG stream is running simultaneously. This occasionally causes the driver to erroneously output two consecutive JPEG images as a single frame.

To fix this, we inspect the buffer, and trigger a new frame when we find an SOI.

---
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h  |  4 ++++
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 1a8a89aa0c5c..7d462e346abd 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
 
 #include "uvcvideo.h"
 
+#define JPEG_MARKER_SOI                0xd8
+
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------
  * UVC Controls
  */

@@ -1075,6 +1077,7 @@ static int uvc_video_decode_start(struct uvc_streaming *stream,
 				  struct uvc_buffer *meta_buf,
 				  const u8 *data, int len)
 {
+	u8 header_len;
 	u8 fid;
 
 	/* Sanity checks:

@@ -1087,6 +1090,7 @@ static int uvc_video_decode_start(struct uvc_streaming *stream,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	header_len = data[0];
 	fid = data[1] & UVC_STREAM_FID;
 
 	/* Increase the sequence number regardless of any buffer states, so

@@ -1175,9 +1179,31 @@ static int uvc_video_decode_start(struct uvc_streaming *stream,
 		return -EAGAIN;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Some cameras, when running two parallel streams (one MJPEG alongside
+	 * another non-MJPEG stream), are known to lose the EOF packet for a frame.
+	 * We can detect the end of a frame by checking for a new SOI marker, as
+	 * the SOI always lies on the packet boundary between two frames for
+	 * these devices.
+	 */
+	if (stream->dev->quirks & UVC_QUIRK_MJPEG_NO_EOF &&
+	    (stream->cur_format->fcc == V4L2_PIX_FMT_MJPEG ||
+	    stream->cur_format->fcc == V4L2_PIX_FMT_JPEG)) {
+		const u8 *packet = data + header_len;
+
+		if (len >= header_len + 2 &&
+		    packet[0] == 0xff && packet[1] == JPEG_MARKER_SOI &&
+		    buf->bytesused != 0) {
+			buf->state = UVC_BUF_STATE_READY;
+			buf->error = 1;
+			stream->last_fid ^= UVC_STREAM_FID;
+			return -EAGAIN;
+		}
+	}
+
 	stream->last_fid = fid;
 
-	return data[0];
+	return header_len;
 }
 
 /*

index a83995276170..4a1ff08453d7 100644
@@ -204,6 +204,10 @@
 #define UVC_QUIRK_FORCE_Y8		0x00000800
 #define UVC_QUIRK_FORCE_BPP		0x00001000
 #define UVC_QUIRK_WAKE_AUTOSUSPEND	0x00002000
+#define UVC_QUIRK_NO_RESET_RESUME	0x00004000
+#define UVC_QUIRK_DISABLE_AUTOSUSPEND	0x00008000
+#define UVC_QUIRK_INVALID_DEVICE_SOF	0x00010000
+#define UVC_QUIRK_MJPEG_NO_EOF		0x00020000
 
 /* Format flags */
 #define UVC_FMT_FLAG_COMPRESSED		0x00000001

2.53.0

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]>

commit f078966ca1fb1b3865d8e6bbe2705cfd277fc637 upstream.

If the driver could not detect the EOF, the sequence number is increased twice:
1) When we enter uvc_video_decode_start() with the old buffer and FID has flipped => We return -EAGAIN and last_fid is not flipped
2) When we enter uvc_video_decode_start() with the new buffer.

Fix this issue by moving the new frame detection logic earlier in uvc_video_decode_start().

This also has some nice side affects:

- The error status from the new packet will no longer get propagated to the previous frame-buffer.
- uvc_video_clock_decode() will no longer update the previous frame buf->stf with info from the new packet.
- uvc_video_clock_decode() and uvc_video_stats_decode() will no longer get called twice for the same packet.

---
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_video.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

index 7d462e346abd..909e158a017a 100644
@@ -1093,7 +1093,55 @@ static int uvc_video_decode_start(struct uvc_streaming *stream,
 	header_len = data[0];
 	fid = data[1] & UVC_STREAM_FID;
 
-	/* Increase the sequence number regardless of any buffer states, so
+	/*
+	 * Mark the buffer as done if we're at the beginning of a new frame.
+	 * End of frame detection is better implemented by checking the EOF
+	 * bit (FID bit toggling is delayed by one frame compared to the EOF
+	 * bit), but some devices don't set the bit at end of frame (and the
+	 * last payload can be lost anyway). We thus must check if the FID has
+	 * been toggled.
+	 *
+	 * stream->last_fid is initialized to -1, and buf->bytesused to 0,
+	 * so the first isochronous frame will never trigger an end of frame
+	 * detection.
+	 *
+	 * Empty buffers (bytesused == 0) don't trigger end of frame detection
+	 * as it doesn't make sense to return an empty buffer. This also
+	 * avoids detecting end of frame conditions at FID toggling if the
+	 * previous payload had the EOF bit set.
+	 */
+	if (fid != stream->last_fid && buf && buf->bytesused != 0) {
+		uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_FRAME,
+			  "Frame complete (FID bit toggled)\n");
+		buf->state = UVC_BUF_STATE_READY;
+
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Some cameras, when running two parallel streams (one MJPEG alongside
+	 * another non-MJPEG stream), are known to lose the EOF packet for a frame.
+	 * We can detect the end of a frame by checking for a new SOI marker, as
+	 * the SOI always lies on the packet boundary between two frames for
+	 * these devices.
+	 */
+	if (stream->dev->quirks & UVC_QUIRK_MJPEG_NO_EOF &&
+	    (stream->cur_format->fcc == V4L2_PIX_FMT_MJPEG ||
+	     stream->cur_format->fcc == V4L2_PIX_FMT_JPEG) &&
+	    buf && buf->bytesused != 0) {
+		const u8 *packet = data + header_len;
+
+		if (len >= header_len + 2 &&
+		    packet[0] == 0xff && packet[1] == JPEG_MARKER_SOI) {
+			buf->state = UVC_BUF_STATE_READY;
+			buf->error = 1;
+			stream->last_fid ^= UVC_STREAM_FID;
+			return -EAGAIN;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Increase the sequence number regardless of any buffer states, so
 	 * that discontinuous sequence numbers always indicate lost frames.
 	 */
 	if (stream->last_fid != fid) {

@@ -1157,50 +1205,6 @@ static int uvc_video_decode_start(struct uvc_streaming *stream,
 			meta_buf->state = UVC_BUF_STATE_ACTIVE;
 	}
 
-	/* Mark the buffer as done if we're at the beginning of a new frame.
-	 * End of frame detection is better implemented by checking the EOF
-	 * bit (FID bit toggling is delayed by one frame compared to the EOF
-	 * bit), but some devices don't set the bit at end of frame (and the
-	 * last payload can be lost anyway). We thus must check if the FID has
-	 * been toggled.
-	 *
-	 * stream->last_fid is initialized to -1, so the first isochronous
-	 * frame will never trigger an end of frame detection.
-	 *
-	 * Empty buffers (bytesused == 0) don't trigger end of frame detection
-	 * as it doesn't make sense to return an empty buffer. This also
-	 * avoids detecting end of frame conditions at FID toggling if the
-	 * previous payload had the EOF bit set.
-	 */
-	if (fid != stream->last_fid && buf->bytesused != 0) {
-		uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_FRAME, "Frame complete (FID bit "
-				"toggled).\n");
-		buf->state = UVC_BUF_STATE_READY;
-		return -EAGAIN;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Some cameras, when running two parallel streams (one MJPEG alongside
-	 * another non-MJPEG stream), are known to lose the EOF packet for a frame.
-	 * We can detect the end of a frame by checking for a new SOI marker, as
-	 * the SOI always lies on the packet boundary between two frames for
-	 * these devices.
-	 */
-	if (stream->dev->quirks & UVC_QUIRK_MJPEG_NO_EOF &&
-	    (stream->cur_format->fcc == V4L2_PIX_FMT_MJPEG ||
-	    stream->cur_format->fcc == V4L2_PIX_FMT_JPEG)) {
-		const u8 *packet = data + header_len;
-
-		if (len >= header_len + 2 &&
-		    packet[0] == 0xff && packet[1] == JPEG_MARKER_SOI &&
-		    buf->bytesused != 0) {
-			buf->state = UVC_BUF_STATE_READY;
-			buf->error = 1;
-			stream->last_fid ^= UVC_STREAM_FID;
-			return -EAGAIN;
-		}
-	}
-
 	stream->last_fid = fid;
 
 	return header_len;

2.53.0

5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lee Jones <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a940aee176437046598dfc786b719bd96db3c74c ]

Since we will need to differentiate between the two report_enum types soon, let's unify the naming conventions now to save confusion and/or unnecessary/unrelated changes in upcoming commits.

{input,output}_report_enum is used in other places to let's conform.

---
 drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

index bd31315fdaf5e..91804ebabc69a 100644
@@ -1668,7 +1668,7 @@ static int logi_dj_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
 static int logi_dj_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
 			 const struct hid_device_id *id)
 {
-	struct hid_report_enum *rep_enum;
+	struct hid_report_enum *input_report_enum;
 	struct hid_report *rep;
 	struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev;
 	struct usb_interface *intf;

@@ -1711,10 +1711,10 @@ static int logi_dj_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
 		}
 	}
 
-	rep_enum = &hdev->report_enum[HID_INPUT_REPORT];
+	input_report_enum = &hdev->report_enum[HID_INPUT_REPORT];
 
 	/* no input reports, bail out */
-	if (list_empty(&rep_enum->report_list))
+	if (list_empty(&input_report_enum->report_list))
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	/*